South African Army Vision 2020
Volume 2
The South African Army relevant and ready for future security challenges in Africa

Edited by Len le Roux
# Contents

**Preface** ................................................................. v

**About the authors** ................................................... vii

**Glossary** ............................................................... xiv

**Chapter One**
**The nature of conflict in Africa towards 2020** ......................... 1
Brigadier General Frank K Rusagara

**Chapter Two**
**The African Standby Force** ......................................... 11
Future role in interventions, peace support operations and operations other than war
Major General Samuel A Odotei

**Chapter Three**
**A rapid reaction and deployment capability within**
**the African Standby Force** ........................................... 25
Captain (SA Navy) Johan Potgieter

**Chapter Four**
**SADC security cooperation and progress with the SADC Brigade** ........ 57
Ms Virginia Gamba

**Chapter Five**
**Civil-military relations** .............................................. 73
Challenges and the emerging African security architecture
Dr Martin R Rupiya

**Chapter Six**
**Sierra Leone** ........................................................... 83
Lessons learned by the Nigerian army
Brigadier General KTJ Minimah

**Chapter Seven**
**The South African National Defence Force: Midwives of peace in Africa?** .... 97
An evaluation of SANDF involvement in peace support operations
Dr Thomas Mandrup
## Contents

**Chapter Eight**  
*Lessons learned for complex operations* .......................... 127  
Transformation of the Royal Netherlands Army  
Brigadier General Theo WB Vleugels

**Chapter Nine**  
*Preparing leaders for the contemporary operating environment* ........ 141  
Colonel Bernd Horn

**Chapter Ten**  
*Enabling success* ..................................................... 171  
Cultural intelligence and the contemporary security environment  
Dr Emily J Spencer

**Chapter Eleven**  
*The privatisation and regulation of security in Africa* ............. 197  
Mr Sabelo Gumedze

**Chapter Twelve**  
*Beyond economics* ................................................... 209  
The impact of outsourcing on the military profession  
Prof. Lindy Heinecken

**Chapter Thirteen**  
*The revolution in military affairs* .................................. 225  
Technological solutions for budget-tight and manpower-scarce armed forces  
Prof. Lui Pao Chuen

**Chapter Fourteen**  
*Conclusion* ............................................................. 239
Preface

The second SA Army Seminar 21 was held from 26 to 28 February 2008 with the theme ‘An SA Army relevant and ready for future security challenges in Africa’. The SA Army was honoured by the attendance of senior military officers from the South African Development Community (SADC), members of the Portfolio Committee on Defence, representatives of the various services and divisions of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and captains of the local defence-related industry. Papers were delivered by academics, military speakers and government officials from Canada, Denmark, Ghana, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Rwanda, Singapore, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. This seminar again provided a valuable opportunity for the leaders of the SA Army to orientate themselves in relation to future challenges, mostly in Africa, and to debate strategic issues, especially with researchers and academics. Speakers presented independent views on important issues pertaining to the SA Army and this publication makes a further contribution in this regard. I wish to thank the speakers for their excellent presentations, as well as their honesty, openness and goodwill.

SA Army Seminar 21 furthermore provided the SA Army with an opportunity to update its long-term strategy, entitled SA Army Vision – Strategy. This strategy comprises a set of focused and optimised sub-strategies that will evolve over time to meet unpredictable threats and challenges. Not only will it enable the SA Army to meet future threats, but it also deals with creating an appropriate mindset and setting long-term objectives for transforming the SA Army in spheres such as doctrine, education, training and development.

The SA Army is making significant progress with Vision 2020. It is busy replacing the army office structure that is based on business principles with an army headquarters structure based on a general staff system that will be responsible for preparing, providing and sustaining combat-ready land forces for employment by the chief of the SANDF. Thereafter the three commands under the headquarters will be established, namely the land, training and support commands. This will be followed by the establishment of tactical headquarters for the motorised and mechanised divisions, the contingency brigade for rapid deployment and the engineer maintenance regiment for internal maintenance and post-conflict reconstruction tasks abroad.
Vision 2020 is, however, not only about restructuring. Several lower-level initiatives, especially in the doctrine environment, are also taking place to support Vision 2020. For example, the SA Army’s Infantry School is working on doctrine for complex operations in urban areas and the South African Armoured Corps is testing and experimenting with doctrine for more flexible and modular force compositions, to mention only two. The SA Army’s updated website (www.army.mil.za) can be viewed for further details on how a better SA Army is being built. The SA Army Journal is now available on this web page.

I would like to thank the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) for its participation and dedicated support in presenting SA Army Seminar 21. The financial support of the Royal Netherlands Embassy also contributed to the success of the seminar. The latter’s support for this seminar facilitated valuable learning opportunities between the Royal Netherlands Army and the SA Army, which is much appreciated.

The success of Vision 2020 depends not only on the SA Army, but also on other role-players within and beyond the local defence community. I wish to reiterate that a joint, interdepartmental and multinational (JIM) approach is essential to enable the SA Army and the SANDF to work towards a sound future outcome.

SZ SHOKE
Chief of the SA Army: Lieutenant General
About the authors

Brigadier General Frank K Rusagara

Brigadier General Frank K Rusagara (NDC(K), MA Int. Studies (IDS-UON)), is the Commandant of the Rwanda Military Academy, Nyakinama. Born in Rwanda, he lived, studied and worked in Uganda and Kenya, was involved in the struggle for the liberation of Rwanda and, after 1994, held several portfolios in policy formulation and implementation as a senior officer of the government of Rwanda in the Ministry of Defence. He was the General Staff Officer in charge of personnel and administration, Director of Finance, Secretary General (Permanent Secretary) of the Ministry of Defence, and president of the Rwanda Military Court. He is also currently the chairman of the Rwanda Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) and the Rwandan Chapter of the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS). He holds a Bachelor of Commerce (Hons) from Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda.

Major General Samuel A Odotei

Major General Samuel A Odotei (RCDS, PSC, PJSC) is the Chief of the Army Staff of the Ghana Army. He was commissioned into the Ghana Army as an infantry officer on 18 December 1971. During his 36 years of service he attended several professional courses. He has held various command and staff appointments, including those of company commander, tactical instructor at the Ghana Military Academy, member of the directing staff at the junior division of the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College and commanding officer of an infantry battalion between August 1992 and November 1995. He was the Director General Joint Operations at the Ghana Armed Forces Headquarters between March and September 2002 and Chief of Staff at the General Headquarters from September 2002 until his appointment as Chief of the Army Staff on 20 May 2005. Maj. Gen. Odotei has extensive peacekeeping experience and served as staff officer in various capacities with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) between 1980 and 1985. He commanded a battalion with UNIFIL on two different occasions between September 1992 and June 1993 and again from February to September 1995. He also commanded a battalion in Liberia with

Captain (SAN) Johan Potgieter

Captain (SAN) Johan Potgieter joined the South African Navy in Simon’s Town in 1983, where he served for eight years before leaving the Cape on transfer to Naval HQ in Pretoria, where he served as a ‘management consultant’ (organisation efficiency specialist). After a two-year stint in the Counter-Intelligence Division at Military Intelligence in the early nineties, he was again transferred to Naval HQ and later promoted to captain (SAN) and transferred to Defence Headquarters as systems manager for two mainframe DoD systems. In January 2001 he was deployed as Senior Military Liaison Officer to a UN peace mission in the DRC (MONUC), where he served with distinction before returning to South Africa towards the end of 2002 to participate in the DoD’s strategic-level management course (Executive National Security Programme.) During 2003, while he was the Senior Staff Officer Special Projects, he developed the DoD’s Peace Support Operations Doctrine for Joint Operations and became a member of the DoD’s team in SADC and AU work sessions on the development of the African Standby Force. Towards the end of 2004 he was sent to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to serve as interim military attaché to Ethiopia and was seconded to the AU as a consultant/expert in the establishment of the African Standby Force.

Ms Virginia Gamba

Ms Virginia Gamba is an associate researcher with SaferAfrica, an international NGO headquartered in South Africa. She works extensively in the field of safety, peace and security in Southern Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South America. Previous positions she has held include deputy director of the Institute for Security Studies (RSA) and head of the Arms Management Programme of the Institute for Security Studies (1996-2001), director of the Conflict Resolution and Disarmament Project of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (Geneva) (1994-96), programme officer for arms control, demobilisation and disarmament of the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation in Chicago (1991-1993), and lecturer on Latin American security issues at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London (1990-1991). Other relevant expertise
was gained as manager of the Low Intensity Conflict Collection at the National Security Archives (Washington, DC), lecturer at the University of Maryland and the American University, lecturer at the United States Defence University technical college and advisor to the Ministry of Defence (Argentina) on restructuring, downsizing and civil-military integration of the military under civilian rule (1984-88). She recently edited SaferAfrica’s *African Union Commission Compendium on African Documents on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, which was launched at the United Nations in New York in June 2006. In 1995 she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize together with the rest of the executive committee of the Pugwash Conferences in Oslo.

**Dr Martin R Rupiya**

Dr Martin R Rupiya is a senior researcher in the Defence Sector Programme of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), based in Pretoria, and is also associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at Rhodes University. He retired from the Zimbabwe Defence Forces as a lieutenant colonel in 1989. His current main responsibilities include organising and hosting parliamentary workshops on the oversight of the security sector in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa. This is coupled with arranging seminars and conferences on policy challenges related to the complexities of HIV/AIDS and its relationship with the armed forces in Africa. He has a PhD in Military History from the University of Zimbabwe (UZ), an MA from King’s College, London, a BA Hons in Economics and History (UZ) and a Diploma in War and Strategic Studies (UZ). He has published or edited five books and over 50 chapters in books and refereed articles on foreign and defence policy, food security and contemporary conflict analysis. His latest books are *The Enemy Within – HIV/AIDS & Southern African Militaries* (ISS, 2006) and *Evolutions and Revolutions – Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (ISS, 2005).

**Brigadier General KTJ Minimah**

Brigadier General KTJ Minimah enrolled for cadet training at the Nigerian Defence Academy on 3 January 1979 as a member of 25 Regular Course and was commissioned into the Infantry Corps on 18 December 1981. His military courses included jungle warfare and combat survival, basic airborne and advanced airborne courses and a senior staff course at the National War College.
He was the officer commanding 149 Infantry Battalion, part of the directing staff of the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, officer commanding Nigeria Battalion 2, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, and Commandant Nigerian Army Depot, and is currently the deputy commandant of the Infantry Corps Centre and School. Brig. Gen. Minimah holds a Bachelor of Arts in History and International Studies and a Master’s degree in Strategic Studies. He is a recipient of the Forces Service Star, Meritorious Service Star, Distinguished Service Star and the ‘passed staff college’ dagger.

Dr Thomas Mandrup

Dr Thomas Mandrup is currently a research fellow at the Royal Danish Defence College’s Institute of Strategy. He holds a PhD from the Institute for Political Science/Danish Institute for International Studies, for which his dissertation was titled ‘Africa: Salvation or Despair: A study of the post-apartheid South African government’s use of the military tool in its foreign policy conduct from 1994 to 2006’. Dr Mandrup has been a member of the SADSEM network since 2004. His most recent appointments include those of external lecturer at the Danish Defence Academy (2004-2006) and at the Centre for African Studies (2004-2006), analyst responsible for Africa at the Danish Defence Staff (2005-2007), and, from 2007, research fellow at the Institute of Strategy, Danish Defence College.

Brigadier General Theo WB Vleugels

Brigadier General Theo WB Vleugels is the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army Training Command in Utrecht. After completing his secondary education, Brig. Gen. Vleugels entered the Royal Military Academy, Breda, in 1976, where he was subsequently commissioned into the 43rd ‘Chassé’ Armoured Infantry Battalion in Assen. In 1981 he deployed to the Lebanon as part of the UNIFIL mission. Between 1981 and 1988 he held various positions, including that of company commander in the 12th ‘Garderegiment Jagers’ Armoured Infantry Battalion in Schaarsbergen. He was commanding officer of 42nd Armoured Infantry Battalion in Seedorf (BRD) until 1999, during which time he deployed with his battalion as part of SFOR IV to Bosnia-Herzegovina. From 1999 to 2001 he worked at the Department of Operational Policy within the Army Staff in The Hague and between 2001 and 2004 he returned to Schaarsbergen as both the second-in-command and Chief of Staff of 11 (NLD) Airmobile Brigade (AASLT).
From 2004 to 2005 Brig. Gen. Vleugels was responsible for operational readiness within the Staff of the Army Operational Command, Apeldoorn. In July 2005 he was appointed commander of the Manoeuvre Education and Training Centre in Amersfoort. Between August 2006 and January 2007 he commanded 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) as part of ISAF in Afghanistan.

**Colonel Bernd Horn**

**Colonel Bernd Horn** (OMM, CD, PhD) is currently the deputy commander of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. He is an experienced infantry officer with command experience at unit and sub-unit levels. He was the commanding officer of 1 RCR (2001-2003), the officer commanding 3 Commando, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (1993-1995), and the officer commanding ‘B’ Company, 1 RCR (1992-1993). He has conducted operational tours in Cyprus (1984-1985) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1993) as well as operational tasks in Rwanda (1994) and Afghanistan (2006). He was also the director of the Canadian Leadership Institute (2004-2007). Col. Horn holds an MA and PhD in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada and he is Adjunct Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada. He has authored, co-authored, edited and co-edited 22 books and numerous articles on military history and military affairs.

**Dr Emily J Spencer**

**Dr Emily J Spencer** attained her PhD in War Studies at the Royal College of Canada in 2006. She has been working at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute since July 2006, where she is a research associate, a project officer (cultural intelligence and insurgency), a member of the Cultural Intelligence Working Group, a member of the CDA press editorial board and a researcher in measuring leadership study. She is also a researcher for the Royal Canadian Regiment Project. She has published and presented widely. Her latest publication is a Canadian Forces Leadership Institute technical report, *Crucible of Success: Applying the Four CQ Domain Paradigm, The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan as a Case Study* (2007) and she has *Lipstick and High Heels: War, Gender and Popular Culture* in press. Her research presentations include *Cultural Intelligence: Laying the Foundation for Current Operations, Force Preparation, Africa Combat and Mission Readiness* (Pretoria, 18-20 June 2007) and the keynote address *Balancing*


Cultural Understandings: Using the Four Cultural Intelligence Domains as a Force Multiplier in a Chaotic and Complex Defence Environment (Defence ADM(PA) Annual Public Affairs Conference, Ottawa, 6-8 June 2007).

Mr Sabelo Gumedze

Mr Sabelo Gumedze joined the Defence Sector Programme at the ISS Pretoria office in July 2006 as a senior researcher. He is an attorney of the High Court of Swaziland. He interned at the Refugee and Migrant Rights Project of Lawyers for Human Rights in Pretoria and at the Legal Office in the Secretariat of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Banjul. He was a fellow at the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa in Banjul. Prior to this appointment he was a law lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand, where he also served as a book review editor for the South African Journal on Human Rights. He lectured at the University of Limpopo, South Africa, and briefly at the Institute of Distance Education, University of Swaziland. Sabelo holds an LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa from the University of Pretoria, as well as LLB and BA Law degrees from the University of Swaziland. He holds a Diploma in International Protection of Human Rights from Åbo Akademi University in Finland, where he is pursuing a PhD degree focusing on the African Union and human rights.

Professor Lindy Heinecken

Professor Lindy Heinecken was formerly a researcher and Deputy Director of the Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS) at the South African Military Academy. She now serves as Professor of Sociology at Stellenbosch University, where she lectures in political and industrial sociology. She has published widely on a range of subjects, including the management of diversity within armed forces, gender integration, civil-military relations and more specifically military unionism, HIV/AIDS and security. Her most recent publications include a book edited together with Richard Bartle entitled Military Unionism in the Post-Cold War Era: A Future Reality? as well as two chapters in the book edited by Guiseppe Caforio on cultural differences between the military and parent society in democratic countries. She holds an MSocSc from the University of Cape Town and a doctorate from the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London. She serves on numerous academic boards, including the Council of the Inter-University...
Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (USA), the South African Sociological Association and the International Sociological Association’s (ISA) Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution work group.

Professor Lui Pao Chuen

Professor Lui Pao Chuen was appointed to the newly created post of Chief Defence Scientist, Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) in 1986 and still holds this position. He graduated from the University of Singapore in 1965 with a degree in Science, majoring in Physics. In 1971, he was awarded a postgraduate fellowship by MINDEF. He elected to go to the US Naval Postgraduate School and graduated with a master’s degree in operations research and systems analysis in 1973. He holds various board and council positions and his many awards include Commander of the Royal Order of the Polar Star (Sweden) (1994), Honorary Fellow, Operations Research Society of Singapore (2000), Teaching Excellence Award, Faculty of Engineering, NUS (2002), US Naval Postgraduate School Distinguished Alumni Award (2002), induction into the Naval Postgraduate School Hall of Fame (2002), National Science and Technology Medal (2002), Distinguished Science Alumni Award, NUS (2005), and Outstanding Service Award, NUS (2007). This article was adapted from a lecture given at the Singapore Command and Staff College on 13 May 1998.
# Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3BW</td>
<td>Three block war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D</td>
<td>Diplomacy, development, defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4GW</td>
<td>Fourth generation warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPP</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>(United States) Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in the Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African peace and security architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>African security architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDAT</td>
<td>British Defence Advisory Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLEAS</td>
<td>The SA-led intervention in Lesotho called Combined Task Force Boleas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Command, control, communications and computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADSP</td>
<td>Common African Defence and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Combined arms team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduza movement, Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMIS</td>
<td>Centre for Military Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPS</td>
<td>Central European Pipeline System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional armed forces in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivPol</td>
<td>Civilian police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Civil-military relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter-insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Cultural intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (Sierra Leone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defence, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTF</td>
<td>Deployment Task Force, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECMM</td>
<td>EC monitor mission in the Balkans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

EUROMIL European Organisation of Military Associations
EW Electronic warfare
EWS Early warning system
FLN Forces for National Liberation (Burundi)
FLS Frontline states (in the SADC Region)
FR Force readiness
FTF Fast-track fielding
FTP Fast-track procurement
GDP Gross domestic product
GPS Ground positioning system
HF High frequency
HN Host nation
HQ Headquarters
HRF High Readiness Forces, NATO
IAF Israeli Air Force
ICU Islamic Courts Union (Somalia)
IED Improvised explosive device
IFOR Implementation Force, Bosnia
IGOs Intergovernmental organisations
INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces (treaty)
IO Information operations
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPOA International Peace Operations Association
ISAF International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan
ISDSC SADC Interstate Defence and Security Committee
ISTAR Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
JIM Joint, interdepartmental and multinational
JSCD  Joint Standing Committee on Defence (South Africa)
KFOR  Kosovo Force
LOC  Lines of communication
MAD  Mutually Assure Destruction (strategy)
MCOC  Mission Coordination Centre
MilObs  Military observers
MOU  Memorandum of understanding
MP  Military police
MSC  Military Staff Committee
NA  Nigerian Army
MSDS  Military Skills Development System (South Africa)
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO  Non-commissioned officers
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
NIBATT  Nigerian Battalion
NIGCON  Nigerian Contingent (Sierra Leone)
NOD  Non-offensive defence
NRF  NATO Response Forces
NSP  National security policy
NTM  Notice to move
NWC  National War College
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
OGD  Other government departments
ONUB  United Nations Operation in Burundi
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>UN operations in Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPDS</td>
<td>SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORBAT</td>
<td>Order of battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKW</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Wing (Sierra Leone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Professional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Pre-deployment training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGMs</td>
<td>Precision-guided munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMCs</td>
<td>Private military companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMSCs</td>
<td>Private military/security companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial reconstruction team, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>AU Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCs</td>
<td>Private security companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Peace and Security Department, AU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace support operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>Relative combat power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rapid deployment capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDT &amp; E</td>
<td>Research, development, test and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional economic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNLA</td>
<td>Royal Netherlands Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadmap</td>
<td>Framework Document and Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the ASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMC</td>
<td>Royal Military College of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPTC</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional standby capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSF</td>
<td>Regional standby force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCBRIG</td>
<td>SADC Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force (predecessor to the SANDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMs</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Package (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force, Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special operations force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard operating procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA/M</td>
<td>Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Ballistic missile submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCCs</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFU</td>
<td>Task Force Uruzgan, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>Table of equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>Tube-launched optically-tracked wire-to-command-link (guided missile set)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPDF</td>
<td>Tanzanian People’s Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTPs</td>
<td>Tactics, techniques and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Forces in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>UN Eritrea and Ethiopia mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOs</td>
<td>UN military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN peacekeeping force in Croatia and later Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>US Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPR</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The nature of conflict in Africa towards 2020

Brigadier General Frank K Rusagara

INTRODUCTION

The nature of future conflict in Africa and the attendant security responses are two sides of the same coin. It may well serve to begin by looking at the current global perceptions and how the African Union defines challenges of security as they manifest on the continent.

The global perception and practice of security has undergone a redefinition over the past quarter century, especially since the end of the Cold War. This change does not merely reflect the superpowers’ perceived security threats to their strategic interests, but also their realisation that security today must embrace insecurities driven by non-military challenges as well. Core to this view is the challenge of meeting the basic needs and aspirations of millions of impoverished people in Africa and elsewhere.

Security considerations are therefore being tied to the complex and multiple challenges of development, which include good governance and responsible political leadership. This point of view has led to a reformulation of security on the continent, along with such considerations as the interests of states, military power and ever-present geopolitical instability.

In this regard, the AU acknowledges that state security is often susceptible not only to the threats of armed attack from neighbouring countries, but also to more subtle hazards, many of which are the result of the often unresponsive conditions in the African state. In recognition of this reality, the first draft of the 2004 Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact of the AU offers the following definition of security in the African context:
‘[In Africa] security means the [protection of individuals] with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life; it also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for survival, … including the protection of fundamental freedoms, … access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential’ (AU 2004).

This acknowledgment in essence redefines security in Africa as being fundamentally a problem of leadership and sustainable development. The irony is, however, that poor leadership and chronic underdevelopment on the continent has generated the conflicts that have served to intensify the conditions of underdevelopment, and the economic and social injustices that lead to further conflicts.

When a situation explodes into violent conflict, most policy-makers look for a political explanation and a political solution. While politics may be a factor, other relevant factors, such as poverty and issues of inequality, are overlooked. It is increasingly being recognised that addressing issues of access to resources and participation in decision-making can provide more sustainable and realistic solutions to conflicts on the continent. While policy-makers may be learned in the ‘structural causes of conflict’, rarely does this inform their responses, nor do they give the same urgency to structural causes as they do to other conflict management and stabilisation measures. Yet issues of a structural nature, in particular extreme poverty, are a major cause and precursor of violence in Africa.

THE EXAMPLE OF KENYA

The myth of Kenya’s peace and stability that was shattered after the country’s 2007 general elections is in many ways a reflection of the situation in Africa, a condition that may well arise in a future South Africa. Before the violence that erupted after the controversial presidential tally, Kenya was perceived to be a beacon of stability, democracy and economic growth on the continent. As is now being appreciated, the contested presidential votes were only a trigger to much more significant underlying problems of poverty and inequality of access to national resources.

Like most states in Africa, Kenya is a multi-ethnic country where a lack of access to resources by the vast majority of its population is a major problem, a situation that is reflected in many African political systems where different ethnic
groupings could mobilise. Although usually lumped together under the umbrella term *ethnic* (e.g. Rwanda and Burundi), shared identities on the continent take many forms. For instance, people may identify themselves by religion (Sudan and Nigeria) or distinguish themselves from others by language (Cameroon). In-group and out-group distinctions may also be based on membership of a certain tribe or clan (Somalia) and may include distinctions of race or region of origin. Any of these distinctions may serve as potential axes of social differentiation and conflict (Fearon and Latin 2000).

Conflict on the continent is often defined by resources and how these are politicised. As already observed, ‘we’ and ‘they’ are often seen in ethnic terms. This means that voters tend to believe that they will be more likely to ‘eat’ if they can manage to elect a politician from their own ethnic community. It follows that the competition for jobs and other benefits, including the development of resources, becomes a struggle among different communities to put one of their own into a position of political power (Barkan 1979; Kanyinga 1994; Posner 2005). By the same token, politicians phrase their appeals in ethnic terms, wooing supporters by promising to channel resources to them.

In this manner ethnicity, through which resources are to be captured from the state, assumes a position of prominence in election campaigns. However unrealistic the aim may be, ethnicity provides a cue that helps voters distinguish promises that are credible from promises that are not (Ferree 2006). Conflict therefore becomes a possibility when a section of the electorate is convinced of its marginalisation from ‘eating’ the national cake, as the Kenyan conflict suggests.

Another challenge in Africa is ‘big-man politics’ or the ‘imperial presidency’, where the arms of government conform to the excesses and whims of the executive. This is also seen in Kenya, where government is fundamentally president-centred. ‘As in much of Africa’, Van de Walle writes, ‘power is highly centralised around the president. He is literally above the law, controls in many cases a large proportion of state finance with little accountability, and delegates remarkably little of his authority on important matters’ (Van de Walle 2003, 310; also Callaghy 1984; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Manning 2005). Such strong presidentialism obviously plays havoc with legislative politics and reduces their importance. This is an instance of mis-governance that may lead to conflict.

Though government may be accepted in such a situation, the political institutions through which it exercises its powers are often treated with remarkable indifference by large sections of the citizenry. Even where state structures and
institutions are present, it is widely acknowledged that in much of Africa the state is largely absent, both in physical terms and in the provision of basic services, security and development. This situation results in a deepening of insecurity and alienation of the population from the apparatus of the state. In worst-case scenarios, in areas where the state is entirely absent, the local population is left at the mercy of unscrupulous political and economic entrepreneurs, or warlords (e.g. the DRC).

**RECENT CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

The segmentation of societies that comes about as a result of an absence of a sense of citizenship and the weak capacity of states has impeded the many attempted reforms of political and socio-economic structures while exacerbating tensions in many countries in Africa. This has led to the eruption of conflicts across the continent over the decades. Between 1968 and 2006, more than 42 wars were fought in Africa, with the vast majority of them being intrastate in origin (Human Security Report 2005; Human Security Brief 2006).

The continuing conflicts in the Sudan and more recently in Chad are a reminder of the plight of many Africans who exist without protection from any state, notwithstanding the threats of climate change. Furthermore, the fragility of several war-to-peace transitions and the distinct possibility that a number of countries on the continent may degenerate into conflict demonstrate the volatile nature of security on the continent. Some of the more fragile war-to-peace countries include Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and the DRC. Some of the countries threatening to degenerate into conflict are Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea, Zimbabwe and Kenya.

Such situations of instability become fertile grounds for insurgency, which constitutes another real security threat. In Africa, impediments to rebel movements joining the fray are few because resources are readily available and state security apparatuses are generally weak. Insurgents are easily able to build and finance their private armies, especially since states are often incapable of exercising influence over an indifferent populace and there is an absence of effective institutions.

Weinstein (2007) observes that 'Building a rebel army should be difficult in principle, because young people must risk their lives for highly uncertain returns. Unlike where rulers depend on citizens for taxes and build strong states to protect them in return, the African state-building process has often
gone awry. Seldom do rebel leaders turn to civilians for the resources needed to field private armies. War is becoming cheaper, and the means to wage it flow from illicit trafficking in natural resources, contributions from foreign capitals, or networks of expats – not from the voluntary contribution of those who most need political change. The great irony is that in a part of the world where civil war is endemic, Africa faces a dispiriting shortage of true revolutionaries – members of movements committed to replacing decades of misrule with effective, transparent governance.¹

Only in places where armies have been mobilised with the most meagre resources have we witnessed the birth of insurgencies that protect and advocate for the poor. In countries rich in natural resources, where elites loot the treasury rather than providing services for ordinary people, civilians have been cursed with abusive insurgencies. War must be made more expensive in Africa. That means redoubling efforts to choke the sources of financial support that prop up rebel armies and stemming the trade in illicit resources.

**CLIMATE CHANGE AS A SOURCE OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT**

Climate change has recently been gaining attention as a potential source of widespread conflict in Africa. Drought, desertification, land degradation, failing water supplies, deforestation and the depletion of fishing stocks have sparked conflict in the past, but climate could exacerbate such conflict.

Security analysts and academics warn that climate change threatens water and food security, the allocation of resources and coastal populations. These are threats that could increase forced migration, raise tensions and trigger conflict (see illustration below) (Mathews 1989; Rodal 1994; Levy 1995).

Volatile weather patterns swinging between extremes have the capacity to reshape the productive landscape of entire regions and to exacerbate food, water and energy scarcities. Climate change could also bring about unregulated population movements, most of which will be internal, but the ripple effects of which could be felt across national borders. Extreme weather conditions may also lead to more serious natural disasters, stretching the resources and coping capacities of developing countries. Finally, extreme weather events and climate-related disasters will not only trigger short-term disease spikes, but will also have longer-term health implications as certain infectious diseases become more widespread (Dupont and Pearman 2006).
The African continent is likely to warm this century, with the drier subtropical regions warming more than the moist tropics. Rainfall patterns will shift as the hydrological cycle becomes more intense. Annual rainfall is likely to decrease throughout most of the region, with the exception of eastern Africa, where it is projected to increase. By 2050 sub-Saharan Africa is predicted to have up to 10 per cent less annual rainfall in its interior (Nyong 2005).

Less rain would have particularly serious consequences for sub-Saharan agriculture, 75 per cent of which is rain-fed. The areas suitable for agriculture, the length of growing seasons and crop yields are all expected to decrease, which could have a serious impact on food security. One study estimates that yields from rain-fed agriculture could fall by up to 50 per cent between 2000 and 2020 (Boko et al. 2007, 448).

A 2007 United Nations Environment Programme report (UNEP 2007) shows how the conflict in Darfur has in part been driven by climate change and environmental degradation. The Sahara has advanced by more than 1.6 km a year, while rainfall in the region has fallen by 30 per cent over the past 40 years. The Darfur conflict can be traced to the resulting tension between farmers and herders over disappearing pasture and declining waterholes. While the situation between north and south Sudan has improved after the 2005 peace accord, it remains fragile as far as the use of natural resources is concerned. The southern Nuba tribe, for example, has warned that it could ‘restart’ the war if Arab nomads displaced south by the drought continue to cut down ‘the tribes’ trees for fodder to feed their camels.

In its 2007 assessment, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated that ‘Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability, a situation aggravated by the interaction of ”multiple stresses”

Excessive Consumption

Resources and population in balance

Environmental change

Scarcity

Competition

Conflict

Institutional breakdown

Violent conflict

Feedback effect

Scarcity

Resources and population in balance

Environmental change

Excessive Consumption

Resources and population in balance

Environmental change

Scarcity

Competition

Conflict

Institutional breakdown

Violent conflict

Feedback effect
occurring at various levels, and low adaptive capacity’ (Boko et al. 2007, 435). The expected manifestations of climate change will have a range of consequences for social and economic well-being in many parts of Africa, namely:

- Current adaptations of food producers to cope with climatic variability may become inadequate.
- Agricultural production may fall, particularly in semi-arid regions.
- Existing water shortages will be aggravated and new nations may join the list of those experiencing shortages.
- Rates of ecosystem change will increase, especially in southern Africa.
- The risks of inundation in low-lying settled areas will increase.
- Risks to human health from vector-borne diseases are likely to increase (Parry et al. 2007, 435).

**CONCLUSION**

The conflict scenario outlined in this paper, based on problems of poverty and inequality, ethnicity and the threats posed by climate change, puts to the fore the issue of leadership in African countries and on the continent as a whole.

The example of Kenya suffices: from colonial times to independence and from one-party rule to subsequent multiparty rule, the welfare of the Kenyan people has been compromised, and the upshot is the current crisis. If the welfare of the people is compromised, leadership has failed and the nation is at risk of conflict and self-destruction.

No matter how popular a leader, no meaningful change can take place without good leadership. This is perhaps the most misunderstood concept of our times. It may come as a surprise, but many people – even in SA – believe that nations are run by leaders. To the contrary, leadership is given by those people who determine, direct, discipline and develop the destiny of a nation and its institutions. Security measures have no meaning unless the people are included and their welfare is taken into account.

Leadership is, therefore, about the welfare of the people, which should, in turn, manifest itself in sustainable security. There are traits that leaders should possess and I would like to conclude with these. These traits are seen in one of the most recognisable icons of our times, Nelson Mandela, who laid the foundation for the Rainbow Nation and enduringly remains a symbol of enlightened leadership and national unity in South Africa.
The six traits, as expounded by Suzy and Jack Welch (2008), include trust, vision, ability, resilience, effectiveness and being able to execute the leadership role. I will briefly touch on each:

- Trust: The sincerity of a leader should not be doubted. In Africa, people doubt the sincerity of their leaders. Déjà vu: they are like others before them.
- The ‘vision thing’ should be clearly conceived and have an inspirational mission, which is critical for real progress. Having a national vision does not mean announcing ‘Here’s where we’re going’, but rather ‘Here’s how our destination will make life better for our country as a whole and for you personally’.
- Innate ability to ‘hire great people’ is a characteristic great political leaders cannot be without. And it is not just a matter of hiring them, but utilising them properly. – challenging them for new ideas and deeper insights. They have to be able to select appointees who can engage and motivate reluctant teams. They also need the courage and discipline to dispatch appointees who do not deliver.
- Resilience: The capacity to bounce back after a defeat without feeling, well, defeated. ‘Every time you fail, you get back on the horse a changed person – in a word, wiser’.
- Effective leaders have the uncanny ability to see around corners. The skill to analyse/predict the surrounding environment is important for political leaders, given the world we live in. Many domestic issues develop into international crises over time. For politicians, seeing around corners means even something more: galvanising bipartisan support to the same end, to carry the whole nation along in time of crisis. That is hard by any order of magnitude.

Political leaders must be able to execute – get things done. It does not particularly matter if a leader makes actions happen himself or they occur through others. All that is important is that promises are kept and plans see their completion, be it passing a piece of legislation or managing a crisis like war. But very often, personality and style – the so-called likeability factor (charisma) – also come into play.

**LIST OF REFERENCES**


INTRODUCTION

Without a doubt, the bane of the African continent over the ages has been the proliferation of armed conflicts and instability, largely influenced by political misrule, rigged elections, human rights abuses, poverty and a host of other dehumanising conditions. The resultant civil wars, ethnic strife and skirmishes eventually lead to the collapse of governmental structures, with far-reaching ramifications for international peace and security.

These conflicts invariably create undue hardships for the citizenry of the affected areas and develop into massive refugee situations. The internally displaced persons become a menace to the population as a whole and the already poor economic circumstances are exacerbated. Undoubtedly, conflicts in Africa have in several dimensions contributed to the underdevelopment of the continent. When scarce national resources are diverted towards the resolution of conflicts instead of being used to build infrastructure for national development, the effect is the neglect of the wellbeing of the people, and this eventually leads to poverty and underdevelopment.

Considering their devastating effects, conflicts need to be dealt with decisively once they rear their ugly heads. However, the paucity of military resources available to national armies on the continent does not permit rapid and decisive interventions. The United Nations too has always been very slow to demonstrate promptitude in coming to the aid of African countries in conflict situations. The cases of Liberia in the early 1990s, Sierra Leone in the late 1990s and
Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, all in the West African Region, quickly come to mind. It required the impoverished states of West Africa, through the medium of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to intervene in these three states and bring some level of control to those situations. ECOWAS therefore became the first regional organisation to intervene in conflicts with some degree of success, despite numerous challenges. The lessons learned from these efforts have been documented for the benefit of the regional security of African economic communities.

One clear challenge identified is the lack of capacity in African countries to intervene effectively in African conflicts without logistical and other support from either the United Nations or donor partners. Realising its limitations in the face of numerous conflicts that bedevilled the continent, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was compelled to re-examine its first-generation peace and security architecture, which was, in essence, centred on the activities of the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. To change the status quo, a series of summits were organised, which culminated in the Cairo Declaration of 1993 and resulted in the establishment of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. This declaration marked the beginning of Africa’s second-generation peace and security mechanism. In a bold resolve by African leaders to take a stronger position in the resolution of conflicts on the continent through collective security arrangements, the OAU was transformed into the African Union (AU) in July 2002. The Durban Summit established the Peace and Security Council Protocol, a collective security and early warning arrangement that is meant to facilitate a timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union provides in Article 4 for the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) to facilitate the work of the Peace and Security Council in discharging its responsibilities to deploy Peace Support and Intervention Missions anywhere in Africa.

According to the planning schedule, the ASF should be fully operational by 2010. The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Brigade seem to be the two regional structures that have made considerable progress so far. The deadline for the formation of the ASF is so close, however, that pertinent questions should be engaging the attention of all stakeholders. I will attempt to address some of these here by providing a strategic overview of the AFS concept and outlining the possible role the South African Army could play.
BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The Constitutive Act of the AU of July 2002, agreed to at head-of-state and government level, was based in part on new principles to regulate peace and security and to ensure respect for human rights.

The 2002 Durban Summit achieved the following:

- The establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC)
- Definition of other African peace and security architecture (APSA) components, including the ASF, Panel of the Wise, Peace Fund and a Continental Early Warning System
- Recognition of the role of Africa’s regional organisations

The ASF initiative derives its legal mandate from Article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which calls for the establishment of ‘a common defence and security policy for the African Continent’. APSA revolves around the PSC and is expected to perform the following functions:

- Promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa
- Early warning and preventive diplomacy
- Peacemaking, including the use of good offices for mediation, conciliation and enquiry
- Peace support operations and intervention missions
- Peace building and post-conflict reconstruction
- Humanitarian action and disaster management
- Any other functions that may be decided by the AU Assembly

In order to perform these functions promptly and efficiently, the PSC is supported by the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the ASF and the Military Staff Committee.

The policy framework outlines six possible conflict and mission scenarios the AU and ASF are likely to face and may need to respond to in the foreseeable future, as follows:

- Scenario 1: AU/regional military advice to a political mission
- Scenario 2: AU/regional observer mission, co-deployed with a UN mission
Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission
Scenario 4: AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions
Scenario 5: AU regional peacekeeping force for complex multi-dimensional missions with low-level spoilers
Scenario 6: AU intervention, such as in genocide situations, where the international community does not act promptly

Naturally, the speed with which forces will be required to deploy has particular implications for standby-force structures and arrangements. It has been recommended that deployment should be done in 30 days in the case of scenarios 1 to 4. For scenario 5, complete deployment should be done in 90 days, with the military component able to deploy in 30 days. Finally, it will be important for the AU to be able to deploy a robust military force within 14 days in the case of demanding intervention operations, as envisaged in scenario 6.

It was decided that the ASF should become operational in two incremental phases. The first was aimed at developing a capacity to manage scenarios 1 to 3 towards the end of 2005. The second phase is aimed at developing a capability to deal with the remaining scenarios towards 2010. More specifically, phase 1 extended to 30 June 2005, by which time the AU was to be able to deploy and manage monitoring missions (either AU or joint UN-AU missions) and regions were to develop a standby brigade capacity. Such a capacity was also to include a small full-time planning element of 15 staff members. Realising that some regions would need more time to develop standby forces, the African chiefs of defence staff (ACDS) recommended that potential ‘lead nations’ should form ‘coalitions of the willing’ pending the establishment of such a capacity by all participating nations. In addition, by 30 June 2005, the AU was to establish a roster of 300 to 500 military observers and 240 police officers to be held in member states on 14 days’ notice to move.

The second ASF development phase extends to 30 June 2010, by which time the AU should have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations. Again, regions were tasked to continue to develop a capacity to undertake peacekeeping operations, while regions that had managed to establish their standby brigades were encouraged to enhance their rapid deployment capabilities. They are also required to incorporate a small headquarters planning unit within AU headquarters and in each of the five regions to plan and manage the size, mandate and structure of the standby peacekeeping force.
ROLE OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ON THE CONTINENT

At the meeting of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa in July 2004 the Framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) was formally adopted as the master plan for Africa’s search for peace, security and stability on the continent. Africa’s evolving conflict management systems and peacekeeping experimentation have been based on five basic principles, as follows:

- Acceptance and recognition that the UN remains the pre-eminent international authority for global peace and international peacekeeping
- Recognition of the need to enhance Africa’s capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations on the continent and beyond
- Recognition that peacekeeping operations in Africa should be undertaken with UN authorisation and that there should be close cooperation between the AU and the UN
- Acceptance that in exceptional circumstances when the UN Security Council is unable or unwilling to assume its primary responsibility Africa may have to undertake peacekeeping operations on its own
- A preference for various initiatives from the donor community to enhance African capacity in this area to be coordinated by the UN, or at least along UN peacekeeping principles, in close collaboration with African organisations

The CADSP goes on to enumerate the threats that pose a danger to the security interests of the continent, or are likely to undermine the maintenance and promotion of security and stability on the continent. These were alluded to in the introduction. Among others, some of the laudable objectives and goals outlined in the Common African Defence and Security document to facilitate conflict resolution are:

- Integrating and harmonising regional initiatives on defence and security issues
- Providing a framework for the establishment and operationalisation of the ASF

The ASF has been mandated to intervene in serious conflicts on the continent. Amongst others, Article 13 of the PSC Protocol outlines the functions and roles of the ASF as follows:
The African Standby Force

- Observation and monitoring missions
- Other types of peace support missions
- Intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4 of the Constitutive Act
- Preventive deployment to ensure that:
  - A dispute or a conflict does not escalate
  - Violent conflict does not spread to neighbouring areas or states
  - There is no resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement
- Peace building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation
- Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas and to support efforts to address major natural disasters
- Any other functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly

The detailed tasks of the ASF and its modus operandi for each authorised mission will have to be approved by the PSC upon the recommendation of the AU Commission.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The need to establish unity of command and staff capacities for a new mission was identified by the ACDS as a top priority and they recommended the establishment of a small planning element to support the planning for new missions and serve as part of an initial headquarters capability. In the pre-deployment stage, its responsibility is to develop concepts of operations and to organise limited joint exercises. During operations, the planning element is to serve as the nucleus of a regular brigade staff. The AU decision to establish a planning element in the AU Commission and within each of the regional standby arrangements provides for improved co-operation amongst the military units of different nations and promotes their rapid deployment.

Established procedures lay down that national early warning centres feed the regional early warning centres and the PSC secretariat with information as situations evolve. After consideration, the secretariat may take a decision to deploy the Panel of the Wise to undertake mediation in the affected state. At the same time, the ASF or the regional standby force is put on alert. The final decision to deploy is taken by the Commission, which may also authorise the Peace Fund to make
the necessary financial arrangements. When troops are deployed, operational command and control will vest in a force commander appointed through an established mechanism. Various contingents may retain administrative control of their respective components. The compatibility of communication equipment has always been a command and control problem and, as with the UN, the AU Commission should take responsibility for providing force-level and inter-contingent communication facilities. However, contingents should nevertheless deploy with their contingent-level communication equipment.

**INTEROPERABILITY**

The question of the interoperability of the ASF needs to receive attention. Standardised equipment and training will form the basis of interoperability and the AU has already developed and disseminated standing operating procedures (SOPs) and training doctrines to regional bodies. Their effective application will therefore ensure interoperability. Since they are based on the UN SOPs, no difficulties should be encountered when the UN eventually takes over.

The AU training doctrines and SOPs should be adopted by all participating armies, while the harmonisation of procedures and ensuring equipment compatibility are other requirements. The official language for missions at regional and continental levels needs to be determined to facilitate effective command and control.

**ENSURING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE**

It is an acknowledged fact that the poor economic performance of African countries limits their ability to plan and deploy troops to trouble spots with the speed and right balance of resources to influence a conflict situation positively. With all its good intentions, it took ECOWAS a great deal of time and effort to deploy ECOMOG in Liberia in an attempt to halt Mr Charles Taylor’s march to Monrovia in the early 1990s. The same situation prevailed during ECOWAS’ deployments to Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and again to Liberia in the recent past. Obviously this is not the most desirable way of achieving results in such circumstances.

Fortunately, many lessons have been learnt from the ECOWAS missions and these are readily available as a guide to stakeholders. There will thus be no need for any future AU force serving in similar circumstances to wallow in the dark,
commit the same mistakes and get its fingers burnt when trying to launch peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations.

With the benefit of hindsight, AU forces should be exposed to painstaking preparations prior to deployment. This must involve actions by the military establishment, the AU and any participating donor nations. For the ASF to be effective in its peace support roles, all or some of the actions outlined below will have to be taken on board.

**MILITARY COMMITMENTS**

- **Training.** Training is the bedrock of success of any military endeavour. As learnt by ECOWAS, training has to be carried out at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. There is no need to look too far. The UN Standard Training Modules (I, II and III) can be adopted for such training.

- **Rapid reaction capability.** The nature of conflicts on the African continent demands that, more often than not, intervention forces must have a rapid deployment capability to be able to deliver the required punch to influence any crisis situation positively.

- **In-theatre maintenance.** In-theatre maintenance appears to be the bane of past African peace-support operations. For the ASF to succeed, therefore, a very credible and reliable sustainment system has to be put in place.

- **Strategic lift capability.** To be able to make a meaningful impact on conflicts, the AU should develop the ASF’s capacity for strategic troop lifts. The timely deployment of troops and equipment will avert a lot of human suffering, especially when such deployment is able to stem atrocities.

- **Adequate logistics support.** Without adequate logistics, no peace support operation can take off with any degree of success. The AU should therefore ensure that requisite logistics requirements are provided for the success of the mission. In this regard, the AU should be prepared to source the required logistics for the operations. The proposed AU Logistics Support System for the ASF is a laudable concept on paper.

**AFRICAN UNION COMMITMENTS**

To complement military preparations aimed at achieving the success of the ASF in peacekeeping operations, the following issues should be considered by the AU:
Political will. More often than not it is the absence of political will on the part of African leaders to fully commit themselves to the decisions and resolutions crafted by them that prolongs conflicts unnecessarily and prevents early deployment aimed at bringing relief to the suffering masses in conflict situations. A lot of foot-dragging precedes major decisions and the subsequent implementation of such decisions. This attitude has caused havoc on the continent. Things will have to change for the better if the ASF is to make a significant impact in its peace support operations.

Proper assessment of members’ capabilities. To be able to establish a credible and dependable force capable of making the desired impact in the domain of peace-support operations, a diligent assessment of the capabilities of individual member states will need to be carried out in order to establish what each state can bring on board under the various scenarios.

SUPPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

In its present state of economic malaise, the AU is not in a position to plan, operate, manage and successfully conclude any peace support operations on its own. The recent AMIS experiment in Sudan is an example that cannot be dismissed easily. In preparing for peace support operations, every effort needs to be made to obtain the financial, material, training and even moral support of the international community. Without such external support, any mission initiated solely by the AU may run into difficulty.

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Operations other than war (OOTW) cover a wide range of military operations, including raids, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and assistance to national development. Most of these operations are covered in wider peacekeeping missions, but it is critical in contemporary times also to train and build capacity for the following operations:

- Combating terrorism
- Non-combatant evacuation operations
- Show of force
Support to counter-drug operations

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGIONAL BRIGADES – THE ECOWAS EXAMPLE

With about two years remaining for the attainment of the Phase II targets in 2010, the status of implementation of some of the standby brigades have not yet reached appreciable levels. One or two have managed to come close to meeting the AU timelines, while very little is known about the progress of others.

To a large extent the West African Region is on course in developing the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) as a component of the ASF. Capacity-building in terms of force generation and training at strategic, operational and tactical levels have all been developed considerably. Various units have been pledged by the ECOWAS member states. The ESF headquarter has actually inspected most of the units pledged. Doctrines, concepts of operations and their corresponding SOPs for the various scenarios have been evolved and have reached a very advanced stage of fine-tuning. Innovative protocols have been signed to increase regional inflows to the ECOWAS Peace Fund, while more efforts have been made to attract increased donor support in terms of logistics, equipment and funding. A strong political will and unity of purpose at regional level are the driving forces behind this endeavour.

The progress made by the ECOWAS Standby Force towards the realisation of the AU Standby Force concept is commendable. Indeed, the ECOWAS example is worthy of emulation by the other regions, so that the AU 2010 deadline for the ASF can be realised without any delays.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SUCCESS OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

As I said earlier, the poor economic conditions of African countries serve as a brake on their ability effectively to give much needed support to the cause of the ASF in the quest to provide peace and security on the African continent. The main concern of all stakeholders has been the need to get African countries to become self-sufficient in safeguarding the security of the continent in so far as conflicts are concerned. As a result of these weaknesses, the lead nation concept should be pursued to advance the cause of the ASF.

There are a few economically sound and better endowed countries in Africa that, when given the right impetus, can serve as lead nations. It is an
acknowledged fact that the Republic of South Africa, together with Nigeria and Egypt, is one of the economically best endowed nations. There is no gainsaying the fact that South Africa is endowed with certain assets and infrastructure that are not common in most other African countries. While the AU’s development partners may be able to provide some of the basic logistics and equipment requirements, it is the conviction of most African states that South Africa can complement those efforts with its enviable sea and air assets, and more especially with its military hardware industry, which might not have any parallel in Africa.

I am aware of the extensive intellectual work the South African Armed Forces have undertaken in the pursuit of the AU peace and security blueprint. The South African army stands to play a leadership role in the southern African defence ‘family’ when it begins to take up its rightful role in the ASF through its active participation in the SADC Brigade. There is no doubt that the South African defence industry can offer tremendous opportunities to South Africa’s army and to the rest of Africa in the development of the ASF.

The South African air force, on the other hand, can be employed to enhance the fortunes of the SABC Brigade when deployed on ASF operations anywhere in Africa, especially in the execution of airborne operations and the supply of food and other essentials to refugees.

Not to be left out is the support the South African navy can provide to the ASF when maritime operations are needed to advance the cause of the Force. The disposition of the South African navy is such that it is expected to have absolute control over the territorial waters of the Southern African Region. With its capacity enhanced by the South African maritime infrastructure, its ability to monitor and support maritime operations in the region and beyond is not in doubt. Thus, in the event that the ASF needs to deploy land forces along coastal areas within the Southern African Region or even beyond, the South African navy can be sure to provide the necessary support and protection.

THE WAY FORWARD

The ultimate aim of the ASF is to be able to respond quickly to evolving conflict situations or national disasters on the continent in order to preserve life and property and to pave the way for effective diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing peace and security to every African region. The underlying imperatives include the availability of readily deployable troops with the requisite training and the
availability of equipment, logistics, funding and motivation, backed by a well-defined mandate, a clearly spelt out status of forces agreement and adequate international support to act decisively.

With two years to go to the expected full operationalisation of the ASF concept, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to some of the lessons learnt as a result of ECOMOG operations in the West African Region. They capture the broad outline of activities crucial to the successful implementation of the ASF and thus serve as a litmus test of our readiness to meet the challenges. The lessons as applied to SADC are as follows:

- Pay more attention to conflict prevention and to improving the mechanics of peacemaking:
  - Focus on security sector reform and development issues to prevent conflict
  - Review capacity to assess and analyse the causes of conflict
  - Document past SADC experiences
  - Identify lessons and best practices in regional PSOs
  - Operationalise the early warning system more rapidly

- Strengthen the SADC Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC):
  - Clarify the role and function of the regional early warning system
  - Provide adequate staff and resources to sustain its functions
  - Provide adequate manning levels
  - Delegate sufficient authority to senior staff to ensure continuity
  - Operational centres to monitor situations in the region more closely
  - Management Cell to operate 24/7

- Develop and publish a SADC peace support operations vision, concept and doctrine:
  - Develop a clear and concise vision
  - Develop a detailed concept of peace support operations
  - Develop a comprehensive doctrine and manual on PSOs

- Develop a rapidly deployable, multifunctional standby capability:
  - The ASF should be well balanced
  - Troop contributing countries (TCCs) should deploy with sufficient contingent and equipment
  - The ASF should comprise police and civilian components
  - Ensure the rapid mobilisation of a civilian mission component

- Establish a firmer financial and logistic basis for future missions:
Encourage contributions to the Peace Fund
Ensure the availability of standby logistics assets
Ensure the availability of standby units to do equipment training
Finalise and formalise plans for logistics depots

Plan and structure the SADC Brigade for transformation to a UN mission:
- Adopt a joint mission planning approach
- Foster a high level of mutual co-operation
- Foster the confidence of members in each other
- Establish common doctrinal guidelines
- Ensure that contingents meet UN minimum levels of self-sustainment
- Embed UN personnel in the SADC Brigade HQ prior to transition

CONCLUSION

The formation of the ASF is indeed important as it will be the manifestation of a long-desired ideal in Africa to maintain a standby peacekeeping force on the continent. It is also important in the sense that further planning and capacity-building initiatives, as well as ongoing multilateral defence and security meetings at continental and regional levels will be directed towards achieving this common objective.

Effective collaboration with the UN and the donor community in the planning and development of concepts and procedures is crucial to achieving the goal of preventive diplomacy, as well as the funding, training, logistics and sustainment capabilities of the ASF in any intervention operation. The ASF passed through its first phase of implementation in 2005 and is due to be operational by 2010. Despite an advanced stage of implementation having been achieved, there are still nagging issues to be sorted out to bring the concept to fruition.

In our quest to succeed we should be able to look to Africa’s lead nations, which will be capable of pulling the less well-endowed states along. This is where South Africa and the other better-endowed states come in. Considering the enormous resources available to the South African Armed Forces, there is no doubt that the SADC Brigade stands to benefit tremendously.

The issue of the mechanism to be used for appointing the force commander and his staff must be finalised as we approach the deadline for the full operationalisation of the ASF. Command, control and communication within the theatre of operation should all be streamlined at the regional and continental levels to ensure interoperability and co-operation.
INTRODUCTION

One of the objectives of the African Union (AU) is to ‘promote peace, security and stability on the continent’. The Constitutive Act of the AU gives the Union ‘the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ and member states ‘the right … to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security’ (AU 2000, Articles 4h and 4j).

Article 13 of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council further mandates the African Standby Force (ASF) to intervene in various instances, from cases of human rights violations to preventative deployment and humanitarian assistance. The Framework Document and the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the ASF call for the development of a rapid deployment capability (RDC) capable of intervening within 14 days in the case of genocide, for urgent assistance to a peacekeeping force and as an early intervention presence in the case of imminent conflict (AU 2003 para 5.2c). The AU is obliged to act in accordance with recommendations of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, as follows: ‘In an emergency situation, the OAU [Organisation of African Unity] should undertake preliminary preventive action while preparing for more comprehensive action which may include the UN [United Nations] involvement. The emphasis here is for speed of action and deployment’ (AU 2003, para 1.4b).
Early interventions during violent conflict, cases of genocide and gross violations of human rights thus require swift action from the AU’s peace and security mechanisms to stop atrocities, stabilise the situation and manage circumstances for a return to normality. The founding fathers of the AU envisaged the African peace and security architecture and undertook to develop a capacity to address these situations. The ASF RDC, as part of the ASF, is one of these components.

However, experience from Darfur, Burundi, Somalia and other recent Africa-led peacekeeping missions also points to the utility of a rapidly deployable force in a wider range of roles.

THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND THE ROLES OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY

The security environment is constantly changing. Amongst other factors, the expansion of democracy and the resulting expectations by constituents give rise to tensions. Governments’ inability or inexperience in managing such developments further aggravates the situation. Regional organisations and the AU Commission are constantly implementing initiatives to defuse tension and to manage conflicts.

To prepare for the future requirements of rapid deployment it is important to be aware of the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict in Africa. The following are considered to be the most important contributing factors (Boshoff 2007):

- **Interstate conflict.** Whereas interstate conflict has reduced considerably in the rest of the world, it is still prevalent in Africa, e.g. disputes over border demarcation (Ethiopia/Eritrea, Ethiopia/Somalia/Somaliland and Nigeria/Cameroon), interstate disputes over scarce resources (Nigeria/Cameroon’s Bakassi peninsula, DRC/Uganda’s oil discoveries in Lake Albert, etc.).

- **Intrastate conflict.** The vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts in Africa are within states and the flow of refugees, the trafficking in small arms and the disruption to trade have profound spill-over effects on neighbouring states. Some neighbouring states may also sponsor warring parties in another country for their own purposes. Attempts to achieve peaceful resolution to such intrastate conflicts are often frustrated, which could give rise to the need for forceful external intervention. The provision of basic human security is the responsibility of governments, but if it is not provided, populations could react violently and in a non-democratic manner.
- **Competition for resources.** Competition for access to scarce and strategic resources such as water, land, oil and gas have contributed considerably to instability in Africa (the Niger Delta and Uganda for oil, the scramble for a neighbour’s resources in the DRC). Some of Africa’s conflicts are the direct result of foreign and domestic competition over access to the continent’s resources.

- **Climate change threat.** Projected climatic changes for Africa suggest a future of increasingly scarce water, collapsing agricultural yields, encroaching desert and damaged coastal infrastructures. Such impacts, should they occur, would undermine the ‘carrying capacity’ of large parts of Africa, causing destabilising population movements and raising tensions over dwindling strategic resources. Climate change could be a factor that tips fragile states into socio-economic and political collapse.

- **Role of non-state actors in insecurity.** Non-state actors are responsible for many of the above instabilities. Transnational criminal organisations, mercenaries, rebel movements, warlords and militia thrive in an unstable environment and will continue to destabilise it in order to achieve their individual objectives. Non-state actors are often well-trained, experienced and well-equipped and only a properly mandated, robust and well-prepared RDC should be tasked to neutralise such a threat.

- **Rise of international terrorism.** Terrorism has become less territorially defined and more global in reach. In addition, it has assumed a level of anonymity that is increasingly driven by non-state actors. No country can be considered to be immune from acts of international terrorism and all are affected by the way in which the world responds to this threat. It is therefore important that African states and regional and continental organisations plan for the eventuality of such disasters. The collateral capabilities of the RDC could be utilised in such an eventuality.

- **Other destabilising factors.** There are of course also other factors that contribute to instability in the rest of the world and in Africa, such as globalisation. North-south economic disparities have also had an impact, with the south becoming progressively poorer. This trend has grave implications for the development and hence the security of countries in Africa.

- **Mercenary activities.** The nature of the activities of mercenaries and/or private military companies and their participation in armed conflict has often been controversial. Such controversy arises especially when mercenaries provide military services in violation of domestic and international norms.
The sophistication of such possible opponents needs to be considered in the design/development of a capable RDC.

It is hoped that the AU’s conflict management initiatives will defuse many of the above issues in good time, but early intervention by a neutral but credible force may be required to give political dialogue sufficient time to succeed. The RDC could thus be used to stabilise the situation and to create conditions for other conflict resolution initiatives to run their course.

THE LIKELY AFRICAN SCENARIO

The threats outlined in the examples above have all occurred in the African context and are likely to reoccur, despite continental and international efforts to prevent them. Contemporary conflict and insecurity in Africa emanate from, inter alia, disenfranchised constituents, weak and dysfunctional states, poor political and economic governance, the politicisation of ethnicity, armed competition over scarce and strategic resources, the involvement of the military in the political and economic governance of states, and unconstitutional changes of governments. These factors all contribute to inter- and intrastate conflict, poverty and underdevelopment, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the use of child soldiers (Boshoff 2007).

Henri Boshoff (2007) argues that this instability allows for the unlawful activities of mercenaries and non-state actors in armed conflicts, the use of Africa as a base for international terrorist groups as well as a target for their activities, and increased piracy along Africa’s coastline. The conflict-creating factors mentioned are further exacerbated by religious intolerance, HIV/AIDS, malaria, landmines, famine, small arms, child soldiers, cross-border crime, poaching and fundamentalism.

THE CURRENT NATURE OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA

A recent survey of wars and conflicts in Africa over the last decade revealed that any intense fighting is limited to an average of three weeks, that forces engaged in such intense fighting number only a few thousand, and that the forces are secretive, highly mobile and assisted by limited airpower, in particular for transport. Rebel contingents engaged in the fighting sometimes enjoy the support of governments/states and incorporate integrated conventional and militia units. The purpose of the fighting is to create dominant conditions for a more long-term rebel force.
PURPOSE AND ROLES OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT

Purpose

The aim of a robust and rapid AU deployment capability is for a force to be inserted into a crisis area to stabilise the situation and to neutralise the source of the crisis. The RDC must be able to react swiftly to any emergency situation, but is not designed to provide the initial forces for a peacekeeping mission.

Roles

The envisaged roles for the RDC are as follows:

- The conduct of reconnaissance missions in possible hostile environments where Scenarios 4 to 6 are considered [refer to the article by Major General Odotei]
- Peace enforcement/intervention missions (AU 2003, Scenario 6, para. 2.3 and 2.4)
- Crisis response/emergency assistance where another mission might be in crisis
- Crisis response/emergency assistance in cases of natural disasters where the collateral capabilities of the RDC can be utilised in emergency rescue activities

Requirements

The composition of the initial capabilities will differ in accordance with the type of intervention required. The RDC must be able to address these challenges successfully and be self-sufficient until the other required forces/capabilities can be in the mission area (30 days) (AU 2003, para. 2.3 and 2.4).

The criteria for an ASF RDC to deploy rapidly within the concept of operations are discussed in Annexure A and point towards the following key requirements:

- **Command and control capacity.** No force can be properly utilised or be effective if the command structures are not competent and adequate. The Policy Framework dictates the requirement for strategic and mission-level headquarters (HQs) [refer to the article by Major General Odotei]. A standby HQ transportable by air will enhance the force’s readiness to function (AU 2003, para. 2.3 and 2.4).
Communication and security. The transportable HQ should be complemented by modular operations and communications centres, with integral HF, VHF and UHF communications on 10 to 14 days’ notice to move (NTM). The force HQ must have satellite communications, protection and the ability to sustain itself in a hostile environment, suggesting the need for a signal element and an HQ company element.

Operational capability. The force will also need strategic lift to get it into the theatre of operations and a military capability, including vehicles, helicopter support, communications, logistics support, and medical and defence stores appropriate to the hostile environment that is envisaged. (An analysis for each scenario possible will give an indication of total requirements and should include equipment to be leased, and capabilities and equipment that require the UN and/or the international community to have it ‘in-theatre’ on seven days’ notice.)

Training. The force will require troops, police and civilians, trained to a high standard, on 14 days’ NTM. This implies strong coordination with training establishments and training providers, a task that would be the main focus of the officer responsible for ASF training in the AU Strategic HQ.

Notice to move. The timelines mandated for the RDC are extremely demanding, but should be possible to achieve with a properly functioning early warning system (EWS) and timeous mission reconnaissance.

DEPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY

Depending on the political circumstances surrounding a crisis, constraints will inevitably be placed on the deployment of troops. This suggests the need for either a menu of forces available on standby, or two separate standby forces. Two separate, rapidly deployable forces should give sufficient flexibility to allow a single force to be created, provided the troops are trained to a common doctrine and standard and sufficient interoperability exists. The following requirements are fundamental in this regard:

- An early warning system
- Timely reconnaissance
- Determination of the requirements and configuration of the force
- Readiness to deploy an advance force to create a ‘beachhead’ or holding area, where required
- Readiness to deploy the main force
Readiness to deploy subsequent support elements

The ability to equip properly and to deploy the RDC efficiently through timely strategic lift is fundamental to the concept of rapid deployment. Similarly, the ability to sustain the RDC operationally in the area of deployment is elemental to the outcome of the mission. Logistic support for the RDC is therefore a key factor and is one of the premises on which AU peacekeeping is built. Appropriate logistics staffing at all levels, as well as predictable funding, are crucial elements.

Maritime capabilities have many attributes that can contribute to the success of peace missions. Advance planning can ensure that a maritime force handles the strategic lift requirements and that suitable ships are ready to provide an adequate ‘base/platform’ for the deployment of forces and to handle operational and logistics support. The increase in piracy around the African coast poses a serious threat to the already fragile security conditions in Africa and strategies need to be developed for a rapid response to neutralise this threat.

Superior technology, like UAV, satellite coverage, thermal imaging, etc., will enhance the RDC’s intervention and stabilisation roles. Technology can, however, not replace the quality of the leadership and training and the force’s experience.

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and MSC (Military Staff Committee) (AU 2003) envisages an African capability that will be able to intervene rapidly in those areas where the UN is reluctant to engage because there is ‘no peace to keep’ or where the preferred early deployment in accordance with Article VII of the UN Charter is not achievable in the timeframe in which most atrocities are perpetrated, namely during the first month.

The AU envisages capacities to address these issues through the African peace and security architecture (APSA), of which the Peace and Security Department is the ‘executive arm’ and the ASF is the primary mechanism for achievement of the stability, peace and security initiatives. The ASF’s RDC must therefore be able to react rapidly in cases of grave violations of human rights or genocide, or to intervene in cases where there is ‘no peace to keep’ and where the UN will thus not intervene. The AU considers this initial phase as important as subsequent phases that create conditions where belligerents can start the process of reconciliation.
The Policy Framework (AU 2003, article 3.1) states that ‘the ASF will be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice’. The ASF’s rapid deployment force (RDC) is thus to be developed. The Policy Framework also recommends that the AU Commission has arrangements ‘outside’ the ASF concept, through bilateral arrangements with lead nations, to create this rapid deployment force.2

The ASF will consist of five regional standby capabilities (RSCs). Each is to consist of military, police and civilian components. From this number, the regional economic communities (RECs) or regions must create the RDC. It is the responsibility of the RECs/regions to prepare these capabilities as mechanisms for utilisation by the AU Commission to achieve the PSC’s peace, security and stability initiatives. The ASF should thus be able to act on an AU or UN mandate to bridge the gap between the eruption of violence/conflict and the deployment of the UN forces.

However, the AU Commission (ASF HQ) also requires the capacity to rapidly deploy the RDC for quick, efficient and effective intervention. The ASF HQ must therefore have a nucleus of senior support staff preselected for rapid deployment to help in the establishment of a new mission headquarters and the planning of new missions. The support staff can come from the current mission division within the ASF HQ, or be complemented by the required staff of the RDC on standby. This implies that the strategic level HQ must manage a roster of senior support staff that is available to complement the operational level planning element (PLANELM) at the AU ASF HQ.

A workshop on the development of the RDC was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2007 and was attended by military, police and civilian experts from all the RECs/regions. The workshop considered the initial concept paper and endorsed the following conceptual framework:

- The RDC should be an integral part of the regional standby forces (RSF). RECs will provide an RDC from within their designated RSFs at 14 days’ NTM.
- Where possible, an RDC should be based within one region.
- There should always be two RDCs on standby. Political realities, which may make it undesirable to deploy a particular RDC within a region, makes it necessary to have a second RDC on standby at all times. The continental roster system required to implement this should be co-ordinated by the AU, while the regional rosters could be managed by the RECs themselves, possibly using the lead-nation concept.
The RDC will consist of an integrated (civilian, police and military) baseline capability, configured in accordance with mission requirements. Inherent in the concept is the need to reduce the NTM of follow-up elements from the standby brigade and police components and to activate the civilian call-up process commensurate with operational requirements.

The conceptual basis for the RDC is that it is either:

- A separate (stand-alone) entity and therefore not part of the RSC, but available in accordance with agreements with various lead nations (see also AU 2003, para. 3.11a(3)), or
- Part of the RSC, i.e. not a stand-alone entity but an integral part of the RSC.

Four categories with eight options were considered (see Annexure C for an evaluation of the options), as follows:

- **Option 1**: The Protocol on the Establishment of the ASF and MSC advocates lobbying with lead nations that have a ‘standing deployable HQ capacity of greater than brigade level, and with forces that are capable of seizing points of entry, ideally using airborne or airmobile assets’ (AU 2003, para. 3.11a(3)). This could be an interim solution and the AU’s Peace and Security Department (PSD) should identify lead nations as soon as possible and negotiate possible arrangements with them. If the lead nation is not able to provide the full RDC as envisaged in Annexure B, it will be possible for this RDC to constitute the ‘first wave’ of entry, with the RDC of a particular RSC then constituting the ‘second wave’. It would imply similar arrangements with a number of lead nations in order to address non-availability or non-interest by a particular lead nation.
- **Option 2:** This covers a situation where the RDC is a separate component within the RSC, but still part of the RSC. The rationale here is that the profile requires the troops to be differently selected and trained. The RDC would also be under the command and control (C2) of the AU ASF HQ while on standby and during deployment. The RDC would, however, withdraw from the missions once the situation is stabilised and handed over to the ‘peacekeepers’. The RDC would then be available for another assignment or as a reserve to handle a crisis.

- **Option 3:** This covers the case where the RDC is part of the RSC. It would deploy on 14 days’ notice, but would only come under AU ASF HQ C2 once it was deployed. The RDC would remain in the mission area and would be incorporated into the RSC that followed it.

- **Option 4:** This is the alternative concept option where the RDC is a permanent AU capability and independent /separate from the RSC organisation. It would be constituted with personnel from member states and all the components
of this RDC would be collocated at a permanent base. (See Annexure C, Category B for an evaluation of this option.)

**CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

The RDC’s concept of operations should be formulated for the achievement of mission objectives. It could therefore be a robust force with a variety of sophisticated assault weapons, which would impact on mobility, or be a lightly equipped force with high mobility, provided the situation permitted this. An analysis of African conflicts in the last decade that required intervention indicates that belligerent forces had a low level of sophistication. Configuration objectives should therefore be specific – a design that covers all eventualities is too ‘multi-functional’ and might be unaffordable.

**DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT**

The deployment concept must enable the RDC to be in-theatre within the 14 days after having been mandated by the PSC and as prescribed in the Policy Framework. (This period could of course be shorter if the political decision-making process were to be streamlined.)

The RDC is to deploy in three phases, as follows:

- Phase 1 – Pre-mission reconnaissance – should be conducted by the RDC and will most probably be required prior to the endorsement of the mandate by the PSC.
- Phase 2 – Force HQ becomes operational – involves the establishment of a secure area from where the operation can be conducted. This might be in an
adjacent country, if it makes operational sense, or can be within the area of operations if a secure ‘beachhead’ can be established.

Phase 3 – Deployment of rest of the force and conduct of operation.

The RDC workshop recommended what is now reflected as Category D as the preferred category, with Option D2 as the option. The reason for this is that there will not be sufficient time for the RDC to deploy again within its standby period. Also, the RECs/regions are seen as the appropriate institutional structure to generate and prepare the required capabilities for the operationalisation of the ASF in accordance with the ASF (ASC) concepts.

The AU Commission nevertheless decided that other options should be reflected and compared against each other to allow the Commission to make a qualitative decision. Various options were developed to facilitate this approach (see Annexure C for a comparison of options). These options were fundamentally different in the following aspects:

- Category A is where the AU has special arrangements with lead nations to provide an RDC on ‘standby’, as discussed above. Although this option was endorsed in the Policy Framework, it lies ‘outside’ the RSC concept as it implies bilateral arrangements with member states. It also implies a pledge by a lead nation without it avoiding its responsibility for contributing capability to the REC/region’s RSC. (Note: The Category A option implies that a number of RDCs will be available in accordance with arrangements with various identified lead nations.)
- Category B1, B2 and B3 options are based on a standing RDC constituted from national resources (member states) that falls permanently under the AU C2.
- Options C1 and C2 are based on a part standing and a part standby RDC, where the first wave resorts permanently under the AU C2 (a permanent force that consists of elements drawn from RECs, but organised by the AU), and the second wave is provided on a roster system in accordance with agreements with a particular REC/region.
- Options D1 and D2 are based on permanent standby RDCs. Option D3 is based on the concept that the RDC deploys, but remains in the mission area.

It should be noted that any standing arrangement would need to take into account infrastructure requirements and the administrative arrangements necessary to supervise and administer a standing component. The cost of building separate
barracks, including their maintenance and running costs, together with the cost of paying for the secondment of national forces to the AU and the development of international command structures, will require political endorsement as well as significant financial investment.

**COMPARISON OF OPTIONS**

Assuming that the key enablers discussed above are in place, all the options will be able to meet the AU deployment timeline criteria. The matrix in Annexure C compares each of the options against prerequisite risks, costs, advantages and disadvantages. The following key conclusions were made:

- The framework agreed upon by the experts immediately puts Options B1 to B3, C1 and C2, and D1 outside the scope of possibility.
- Although a standing RDC was considered to be the most effective, it will not be the most efficient, as the cost will be in excess of US$300 million per year.
- The lead nation concept (Category A option) has many advantages, specifically in the short term (up to 2010), and should be further explored. It might, however, undermine the important role that RECs/regions play in the collective objectives for continental stability, peace and security. However, the workshop considered it to fall outside the RSC concept and it was thus not developed further. (Also see Annexure C for the evaluation of the options.)
- Option D2 was the option supported by all the RECs/regions and delegates.

**OPTION D2 AS CONCEPTUAL STARTING POINT**

Considering the support for option D2, the workshop concentrated on this option and recommended the establishment of RDCs as an integral part of the regions’ standby capabilities. The obvious advantages of option D2 over the other options are as follows:

- The option is financially sound. The burden is shared among the members of the RECs/regions, with every region having to expect additional costs of roughly US$10 million per year per force.
- The RECs/regions’ role in achieving African stability, peace and security objectives is essential. This option builds on the proven concept of using RECs/regions as pillars of, and implementation agencies for, continental policy. The
fact that the RECs/regions are given a major stake in the development process reduces the chances of failure.
- It avoids further centralisation of responsibility and thus reduces the burden on an already overstretched African Union.

**IMPLICATIONS OF OPTION D2**

While option D2 is the preferred option, the following implications should be addressed:

- The inclusion of an RDC in the existing RSC reduces the RDC capacity to act as an independent force. Is this desirable?
- The integration process, once all forces are on mission, needs to be further developed and considered. Would the RDC remain a separate force in-theatre, or merge (back) into the RSC? What are the command and control implications?
- Is it desirable to take a group of highly trained ‘interveners’ and change their profile after 30 days to become ‘peacekeepers’? By the nature of their task, intervention capability (RDC) personnel will be specifically selected and trained for the role of intervention. They will most probably function in a very hostile and confrontational situation during the stabilisation phase of the mission and the desirability of changing their profile must be considered. It might be more effective to maintain their profile and keep them in reserve for further intervention, or to return them to their base.
- How would the training cycle of the RSFs have to change to accommodate the fact that a substantial part of their forces will now have to be trained for rapid reaction tasks rather than the peace support duties originally foreseen?
- Would the composition of the RSC personnel have to change?
- How would the different roster systems interact?

**CONCLUSION ON OPTIONS**

In considering all the various options, the following can be concluded:

- A standing (permanent) RDC is not a viable option and should not be considered.
- The role of the RECs/regions and their responsibilities must remain paramount in the development of the RSC and the RDC.
Two RDCs of ‘battle group’ capability, on seven days’ standby notice, should always be available for six months at a time, while two other RDCs should be in preparation mode. An example is given in the adjacent diagram.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Standby</th>
<th>Out of cycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jan–Jun</td>
<td>SASF</td>
<td>EASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CASF</td>
<td>ESF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul–Dec</td>
<td>NASF</td>
<td>SASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>CASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jan–Jun</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>NASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SASF</td>
<td>EASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul–Dec</td>
<td>CASF</td>
<td>ESF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NASF</td>
<td>SASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Jan–Jun</td>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>CASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>NASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul–Dec</td>
<td>SASF</td>
<td>EASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CASF</td>
<td>ESF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lead-nation concept to provide RDCs was not developed as it falls ‘outside’ the RSC concept, but should be given serious consideration as an interim solution.

None of the options considered will be workable or acceptable if a competent and functioning ASC command structure is not in place.

LOGISTICS

The ability to equip properly and to deploy the RDC efficiently through timely strategic lift is fundamental to the concept of rapid deployment. Similarly, the ability to sustain the RDC operationally in the area of deployment is essential to the outcome of the mission. Logistic support for the RDC is therefore a key factor and is one of the premises on which AU peacekeeping is built. Appropriate logistic staffing at all levels and predictable funding are crucial elements.
CONCLUSIONS

This paper cannot do more than to suggest how RDCs could work and be made available. What is not negotiable is the competence of the command cadre and the forces, which implies thorough training, quality intelligence and the capability to deploy rapidly. The development of an RDC and applicable concepts of operations requires more detailed, broad-based discussions in close collaboration with the RECs/regions and member states, and in such a way as to meet the capability as defined. All this will require political acceptance. The establishment of rapid deployment capabilities as part of the ASF is quite possible and should be achieved at the earliest opportunity.

NOTES

1 It was earlier proposed that the name of the ASF should be changed to ‘African Standby Capability’ (ASC), as the word ‘force’ refers specifically to military and police forces and does not accommodate the other component of the ASC, namely civilians.

2 AU 2003, para. 3.11a(3): ‘... the meeting recommends that encouragement be given to potential lead nations to form coalitions of the willing as a stop-gap arrangement, pending the establishment of regional standby forces. In addition, however, it is recommended that at the AU level potential lead nations be identified for Scenario 6 (intervention) type operations.’

LIST OF REFERENCES


ANNEXURE A: CRITERIA FOR AN AFRICAN UNION RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY

The following are the criteria to which a rapid deployment capability should conform:
- **Robustness.** Robustness is an essential requirement in the design of the RDC to ensure that it can face any adversaries and be in a position to stop atrocities, stabilise the situation and provide self-defence. The RDC must therefore be designed to be successful. The design must be applicable to the scenarios envisaged and appropriate (robust) enough for the RDC to fulfil its immediate tasks until reinforced. Sophistication, such as access to satellite communication and monitoring/imagery, will give it an advantage in any situation.

- **Adaptability/flexibility.** The RDC must be capable of adapting to different scenarios and this requires sufficient flexibility. The force must be trained to handle different scenarios in various circumstances and in contrasting terrains. It must be flexible in its composition to allow it to be deployed despite the political constraints that circumstances will inevitably impose. An additional component to be considered is its reserve capacity.

- **Preparedness.** Deployment within 14 days to a hostile environment implies that the RDC’s training must be sufficiently extensive in order to limit any pre-mission training. Various scenarios should have been trained for to ensure readiness.

- **Mobility.** Mobility implies a structure, composition and capability that allows the RDC to be deployed anywhere on the continent within 14 days. This suggests an airborne force with its essential components pre-packed in containers or available in modular format ready for deployment by air. The requirement for mobility further suggests the need for a strategic airlift capability, an aspect that might have to be negotiated in advance with reputable providers.

- **Simple command and control structure.** Unity of command implies a single line of responsibility with a robust mandate and rules of engagement (RoE), and delegation of in-theatre decision-making. Streamlined processes for the speedy approval of the mandate/RoE/CONOPS will be essential to get the forces in the area of operations (AoO) legally at the earliest opportunity. (Only the PSC at summit level can authorise interventions, which implies some delays in the decision-making process.)

- **Intelligence.** Adequate information/intelligence is required to prepare sufficiently for any likely intervention situation. This implies an ASF HQ that can competently monitor all possible areas of potential conflict in close collaboration with the continental early warning system (CEWS). A close working relationship between the ASF and RDC HQs will keep the latter informed about possible scenarios, enabling it to exercise these during the RDC.
training/preparation cycle. It might be preferable that RECCE teams consist of members from the RDC on standby.

- **Logistically self-sustainable.** The RDC must have sufficient logistical capability to be self-sustaining for 30 days, or until such time as it is reinforced or complemented by additional forces and capabilities.

## ANNEXURE B: ORGANISATION AND MATIERIEL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ASF RDC

### Table 1 RDC Phase I deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Light vehicles</th>
<th>Armoured vehicles</th>
<th>Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ + support</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light infantry battalion</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanised infantry company</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air support</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics + military police + medical</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police + civilian + miscellaneous</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 047</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2 RDC Phase II deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Light vehicles</th>
<th>Armoured vehicles</th>
<th>Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ + support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light infantry battalion</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanised battalion</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air support</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police + civilian</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 443</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 490</strong></td>
<td><strong>232</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEXURE C: TABLE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF RDC OPTIONS

Note

- The fundamental differences between the categories of options are as follows:
  - Option A is based on standby RDCs in accordance with bilateral agreements between the AU and member states.
  - Options B1 to B3 are based on a standing RDC.
  - Options C1 and C2 are based on a part standing and part standby RDC.
  - Options D1 and D2 are based on a standby RDC only.
- The options are grouped by letter because they are essentially the same. However, the difference between 1 and 2 is whether the RDC is drawn from the continent as a whole or from a specific region.
- Option A2 differs in the sense that the RDC will be a permanent capability accountable only to the AU – thus a separate military force composed of African citizens, selected on specific criteria and trained to the required standards.
- The part standing/part standby option is predicated on the RDC deploying in two phases, Phase I being 1 000+ and Phase II being a further 1 500+, depending on the mission.
- None of these options will be successful if the required ASF HQ structures are not suitably staffed.
- All options are able to meet the AU rapid deployment criteria.

Option descriptions

- Category A: All units are prepared in accordance with agreements with the AU, but under member states’ C2 until deployment
- Category B: All units co-located while on standby
- Category C: Only Phase I units co-located during period on standby
- Category D: RDC only co-located at mounting base before deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Only Phase I units co-located during period on standby)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standby force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organised by the AU in close collaboration with identified and willing lead nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Features

- Mobilised in suitable base as provided by lead nations
- Phase I units co-located during period on standby with bouquet of requirements as for Phase I
- The rest of the force available within the lead nation where on standby as per requirement
- RECs/regions will have no jurisdiction over forces
- The RDC can be deployed on any mission once sanctioned by the PSC (MOUs can/should however clearly define conditions where PSC has sole authority for assignments)
- Military force with the other components of the RDC, civilian and police, on standby in accordance with roster as agreed by lead nation – see Annexure A
- The C2 is vested in the AU Commission once on standby in the mounting base

**Note:** Lead nations can on bilateral agreements with other member states complement their own RDC

## Prerequisites

- Lead nation availability and willingness to support the concept
- Political acceptance
- Other member states (MS) and REC acceptance
- Sufficient lead nations to support the concept and to have flexibility in tasking
- Lead nations must supply sufficient forces for strict/robust ASF selection during preparation/mobilisation phase
- AU support in training to ensure required standards*
- Sufficiently equipped for any task. AU might have to assist with strategic lift requirements
- Reimbursement policies negotiated and availability of AU funds
- Standardised doctrine/SOP
- Detailed MOUs
- RDC to be equipped with bouquet of options for possible different scenarios
- Self-sufficiently equipped with all requirements (accommodation, training, maintenance, depot, administration and C2 capabilities) to remain in the mission area for at least 30 days
- A credible and competent strategic and operational level command structure at AU HQ

## Other considerations

- MS will not support the concept if they do not trust the command and control competencies
- Efficient organisational capacity must be in place before acceptance/ adoption – strategic and operational levels

## Costs

- Facility establishment costs = lead nation costs
- Facility maintenance costs = lead nation costs

- Deployment costs (travel) = ±$M0,9 per rotation
- Salaries @ 30% UN rates = ±$M1,8 per 1 week in mounting base
- Daily allowances = ±$M0,083
- Troop maintenance = ±$M1,4
- Training costs = Not calculated
- Insurances = $M0,025
- Total = ±$M4,208

**Note:** Per ±2 000 force for 1 week in mounting base
**Advantages**

- A ‘permanent’ force ready for deployment as per requirement
- Command and control of the RDC will be uncomplicated
- The mobilisation of the RDC will be simplified with short lines of communication
- Capability will discourage militant factions getting ‘out of control’
- Serve as a deterrent
- Provide AU and UN with a recognised capability for early response as per RDC tasks
- REC/region remains central to the establishment and mobilisation of the RDC
- Lead nations remain central to Africa’s collective security system

**Disadvantages**

- RECs/regions are left out of the collective security responsibilities
- AU and REC/region ‘competing’ for the same resources. Lead nation’s RDC will most probably form important part of REC/region’s RSC

**Risks**

- A ‘non-starter’ if political support is not achieved and lead nations are not forthcoming.
- Lead nations must concur for the unconditional deployment of the RDC for the type and area of operation once PSC mandate has been issued

**Recommendations**

- Recommended as preferred option

* Forces must be trained to different scenarios and terrains. This implies additional costs for exercises and transport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(All units co-located while on standby • In a dedicated base or in accordance an agreement with a specific country)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Option B1</th>
<th>Option B2</th>
<th>Option B3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A standing force</strong></td>
<td>A standing force</td>
<td>A standing force</td>
<td>A standing force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawn from member states</td>
<td>Drawn from member states</td>
<td>Drawn from all member states</td>
<td>Drawn from MS within REC/region. The REC/region to coordinate the integration of the various components from different MS (same as for Option I but no lead nation and REC mobilise the contingent as per requirement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lead nation concept – main component from lead nation with other components from other MS on the continent)</td>
<td>(trained individuals from MS)</td>
<td>(trained individuals from MS)</td>
<td>(trained individuals from MS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Option B1**

A standing force

Drawn from member states

(lead nation concept – main component from lead nation with other components from other MS on the continent)
### Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option B1</th>
<th>Option B2</th>
<th>Option B3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The whole contingent (civilian, police and military) is co-located in one base with full bouquet of requirements.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Air support (helicopter – utility and offensive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Full spectrum of ‘assault force’ – light and mechanised infantry, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HQ Coy and all support structures – training facilities, accommodation, workshops, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- REC/regions will have no jurisdiction over forces once sanctioned by the PSC (MOUs can/should however clearly define conditions where PSC has sole authority for assignments)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- This permanent RDC can be utilised for any mission sanctioned by the PSC. MOUs can/should however clearly define conditions where PSC has sole authority for assignments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military force with the other components of the RDC, civilian and police, on standby in accordance with roster as agreed by MS. See Annexure A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Prerequisites

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political acceptance</td>
<td>Other members states (MS) and REC acceptance</td>
<td>Efficient <strong>ASF strategic and operational</strong> organisational capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufficiently defined scenarios for PSC tasking</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sufficiently defined scenarios for PSC tasking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Option B1
- Specifically identified MS unit capabilities (±4 000 for 2 x RDC)
- MS must supply sufficient forces for strict/robust selection during mobilisation phase
- Extensive training by AU-appointed institution*
- Standardised equipment
  - What?
  - From where?
  - Paid for by?
- Standardised doctrine/SOP
- Detailed MOUs
- Permanent base for mobilisation and standby – self-sufficient, equipped with all requirements (accommodation, training, maintenance, depot, administration and C2 capabilities (can be outsourced to MS or REC for AU cost in preferred country – maybe with AU log depot?))
- Base to be equipped with bouquet of options for possible different scenarios

### Option B2
- Specifically identified MS individual/volunteer capabilities (±4 000 for 2 x RDC)
- Sufficient forces for strict/robust selection
- Careful selection of command cadre to ensure development of the RDC into a competent force
- Trained by AU-appointed institution
- Standardised equipment
  - What?
  - From where?
  - Paid for by?
- Standardised doctrine/SOP
- Detailed MOUs
- Permanent base for mobilisation and standby – self-sufficient, equipped with all requirements (accommodation, training, maintenance, depot, administration and C2 capabilities (can be outsourced for AU cost in selected MS))
- Base to be equipped with bouquet of options** for possible different scenarios – simple to complex

### Option B3
- Specifically identified units from MS with capabilities (±4 000 for 2 x RDC)
- Sufficient forces for strict/robust selection
- Trained by AU-appointed institution
- Standardised equipment
  - What?
  - From where?
  - Paid for by?
- Standardised doctrine/SOP
- Detailed MOUs
- Permanent base for mobilisation and standby – self-sufficient, equipped with all requirements (accommodation, training, maintenance, depot, administration and C2 capabilities (can be outsourced for AU cost in selected MS))
- Base to be equipped with bouquet of options** for possible different scenarios – simple to complex

### Other considerations
- **MS will not** support the concept if they do not trust the command and control competencies at ASF strategic and operational levels
- Efficient organisational capacity must be in place before acceptance/ adoption – strategic and operational levels

---

* AU: African Union

** MS: Military Services

---

* AU: African Union

** MS: Military Services
## A rapid reaction and deployment capability within the African Standby Force

### Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option B1</th>
<th>Option B2</th>
<th>Option B3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facility establishment costs = ±$M10</td>
<td>Facility establishment costs = ±$M10</td>
<td>Facility establishment costs = ±$M10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility maintenance costs = ±$M1 per year</td>
<td>Facility maintenance costs = ±$M1 per year</td>
<td>Facility maintenance costs = ±$M1 per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment costs (travel) = ±$M1,9 per rotation</td>
<td>Deployment costs (travel) = ±$M1,9 per rotation</td>
<td>Deployment costs (travel) = ±$M1,9 per rotation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries @ 30% UN rates = ±$M57</td>
<td>Salaries @ 30% UN rates = ±$M57</td>
<td>Salaries @ 30% UN rates = ±$M57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily allowances = ±$M0,6</td>
<td>Daily allowances = ±$M0,6</td>
<td>Daily allowances = ±$M0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop maintenance = ±$M43,5</td>
<td>Troop maintenance = ±$M43,5</td>
<td>Troop maintenance = ±$M43,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training costs = Not calculated</td>
<td>Training costs = Not calculated</td>
<td>Training costs = Not calculated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurances = $M0,75</td>
<td>Insurances = $M0,75</td>
<td>Insurances = $M0,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total = ±$M162</td>
<td>Total = ±$M162</td>
<td>Total = ±$M162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Per ±2500 force for 6 months

### Advantages

- A permanent force ready for deployment as per requirement
- Capability will discourage militant factions getting ‘out of control’
- Serve as a deterrent
- Provide AU and UN with a recognised capability for early response

### Disadvantages

- High costs
- Exclusion of regional and other MS
- Ignore AU concept of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness
- Further development and support only for those with existing capacities
- Will be perceived as a separate force from the ASF
- Will require an oversized capacity to fulfil

---

**Option B1**

**Option B2**

**Option B3**
### Risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option B1</th>
<th>Option B2</th>
<th>Option B3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>■ Can cause disruption of the unity of the AU</td>
<td>■ Can cause disruption of the unity of the AU</td>
<td>■ Failure to implement RDC successfully will result in failure of ASF – the ASF without RDC is a non-entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Failure to implement RDC successfully will result in failure of ASF – the ASF without RDC is a non-entity</td>
<td>■ Can be seen as the AU’s own militia and can result in reluctance of participation in the concept of collective security</td>
<td>■ Risk of alienating smaller MS or RECs/regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Risk of alienating smaller MS or RECs/regions</td>
<td>■ Risk of alienating smaller MS and/or RECs/regions</td>
<td>■ Insufficient structures/ capacity at strategic and operational levels will put strain on C2 – ‘bad’ missions will ensure rejection from stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Insufficient structures/ capacity at strategic and operational levels will put strain on C2 – ‘bad’ missions will ensure rejection from stakeholders</td>
<td>■ Insufficient structures/ capacity at strategic and operational levels will put strain on C2 – ‘bad’ missions will ensure rejection from stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Option B1</th>
<th>Option B2</th>
<th>Option B3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not recommended</td>
<td>Not recommended</td>
<td>Not recommended</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Forces must be trained to different scenarios and terrains. This implies additional costs for exercises and transport

** Can be heavily dependent on air deployable capabilities and support (utility and attack helicopters)

### CATEGORY C

(Only Phase I units co-located during period on standby)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Option C1</th>
<th>Option C2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>■ Standing/standby force</td>
<td>■ Standing/standby force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Organised by the AU</td>
<td>■ Organised by RECs/regions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Option C1</th>
<th>Option C2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>■ Mobilised in suitable base as provided by REC/ region</td>
<td>■ Mobilised in suitable base as provided by REC/ region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Phase I units co-located during period on standby with bouquet of requirements as for Phase I.</td>
<td>■ Phase I units co-located during period on standby with bouquet of requirements as for Phase I.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ The rest of the force are in their MS but on standby</td>
<td>■ The rest of the force are in their MS but on standby</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ RECs/regions will have no jurisdiction over forces during standby and the RDC can be deployed on any mission once sanctioned by the PSC (MOUs can/should however clearly define conditions where PSC has sole authority for assignments)</td>
<td>■ RECs/regions will have no jurisdiction over forces during standby and the RDC can be deployed on any mission once sanctioned by the PSC (MOUs can/should however clearly define conditions where PSC has sole authority for assignments)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A RAPID REACTION AND DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY WITHIN THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option C1</th>
<th>Option C2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>■ Military force with the other components of the RDC, civilian and police, on standby in accordance with roster as agreed by MS. See Annexure A</td>
<td>■ Political acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Members states and REC acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Sufficiency defined scenarios for PSC tasking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Specifically identified MS individual/volunteer capabilities (±4 000 for 2 x RDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ MS must supply sufficient forces for strict/robust selection during mobilisation phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Extensive training by AU appointed institution*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Standardised equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– What?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– From where?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Paid for by?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Standardised doctrine/SOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Detailed MOUs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Permanent base for mobilisation and standby (outsourced?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Base to be equipped with bouquet of options for possible different scenarios</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Prerequisites**

- Political acceptance
- Other members states (MS) and REC acceptance
- Sufficiently defined scenarios for PSC tasking
- Specifically identified MS unit capabilities (±4 000 for 2 x RDC)
- MS must supply sufficient forces for strict/robust selection during mobilisation phase
- Extensive training by AU appointed institution*
- Standardised equipment
  - What?
  - From where?
  - Paid for by?
- Standardised doctrine/SOP
- Detailed MOUs
- Permanent base for mobilisation and standby (outsourced?)
- Base to be equipped with bouquet of options for possible different scenarios

**Costs**

- Facility establishment costs = ±$M5
- Facility maintenance costs = ±$M1 per year
- Deployment costs (travel) = ±$M0,9 per rotation
- Salaries @ 30% UN rates = ±$M22
- Daily allowances = ±$M0,1
- Troop maintenance = ±$M17,2
- Training costs = Not calculated
- Insurances = $M0,3
- Total = ±$M46,5

**Note:** Per ±1000 force for 6 months

- Facility establishment costs = ±$M5
- Facility maintenance costs = ±$M1 per year
- Deployment costs (travel) = ±$M0,9 per rotation
- Salaries @ 30% UN rates = ±$M22
- Daily allowances = ±$M0,1
- Troop maintenance = ±$M17,2
- Training costs = Not calculated
- Insurances = $M0,3
- Total = ±$M46,5

**Note:** Per ±1000 force for 6 months

**Advantages**

- A ‘permanent’ force ready for deployment as per requirement
- Capability will discourage militant factions getting ‘out of control’

- A permanent force ready for deployment as per requirement
- Capability will discourage militant factions getting ‘out of control’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option C1</th>
<th>Option C2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Serve as an deterrent  
- Provide AU and UN with a recognised capability for early response as per RDC tasks | - Serve as an deterrent  
- Provide AU and UN with a recognised capability for early response as per RDC tasks  
- REC/region remains central to the establishment and mobilisation of the RDC  
- REC/regions remain part of Africa's collective security system |

**Disadvantages**

- REC/regions are left out of the collective security responsibilities  
- Co-location during standby implies the availability of extensive unique requirements as per possible tasking/operation  
- High costs from creation of another 'base' during standby  
- Co-location during standby implies the availability of extensive unique requirements as per possible tasking/operation  
- High costs from creation of another 'base' during standby

**Risks**

- A 'non-starter' if political support is not achieved for the unconditional deployment of the RDC for the type and area of operation – the C2 must be vested in the AU Commission  
- A 'non-starter' if political support is not achieved for the unconditional deployment of the RDC for the type and area of operation – the C2 must be vested in the AU Commission  
- Poor communication between REC/region can result in disputes – the C2 must be vested in the AU Commission

**Recommendations**

- Not recommended  
- An option for consideration on condition that the REC/regions and MS support the unconditional utilisation of the RDC when it goes on standby – as per PSC mandate

* Forces must be trained to different scenarios and terrains. This implies additional costs for exercises and transport

** Can be heavily dependent on air deployable capabilities and support (utility and attack helicopters)
## A rapid reaction and deployment capability within the African Standby Force

### Option D1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The AU (ASF HQ) will negotiate with different RECs/regions for the availability of sufficient RDC forces (2 x capabilities of ±2 000 each) – can consist of different elements from all RECs/regions as provided by their member states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RDC will train together to ensure smooth operations during deployment, but will remain in their respective bases ‘on standby’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only the force that will be employed in Phase I will co-locate in mounting base prior to deployment (after PSC mandate and within the NTM period) during the period on standby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other units required for phase I integrate/co-located at a mounting base before deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs/regions will have no jurisdiction over forces once sanctioned by the PSC for whatever mission (MOUs can/should however clearly define conditions where PSC has sole authority for assignments).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The remainder of the force is on standby. See Annexure A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Prerequisites

| Political acceptance |
| Other members states (MS) and REC acceptance |
| Efficient ASF strategic and operational organisational capabilities |
| Sufficiently defined scenarios for PSC tasking |
| Specifically identified MS unit capabilities (±4 000 for 2 x RDC) |
| MS must supply sufficient forces for strict/robust selection during mobilisation phase |
| Extensive training by AU appointed institution* |
| Standardised doctrine/SOP |
| Detailed MOUs |
| Arrangements (MOUs) with RECs/regions to provide training bases for RDC in respective REC/region – partly for AU cost as per MOU |
| Base to be equipped with bouquet of options for possible different scenarios |

### Option D2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The RDC will train together to ensure smooth operations during deployment, but will remain in their respective bases ‘on standby’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only the force that will be employed during Phase I will be co-located at a mounting base before deployment (after PSC mandate and within the NTM period) during the period on standby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs/regions have the responsibility to develop the RDC in accordance with ASF standards, but will have no jurisdiction over forces once sanctioned by the PSC for whatever mission (MOUs can/should however clearly define conditions where PSC has sole authority for assignments).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC/region to manage the Phase II standby RDC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Prerequisites

<p>| Political acceptance |
| Other members states (MS) and REC acceptance |
| Efficient ASF strategic and operational organisational capabilities |
| Sufficiently defined scenarios for PSC tasking |
| Specifically identified MS unit capabilities (±4 000 for 2 x RDC) |
| MS must supply sufficient forces for strict/robust selection during mobilisation phase |
| Extensive training by AU appointed institution* |
| Standardised doctrine/SOP |
| Detailed MOUs |
| Permanent base for mobilisation and standby – self sufficient, equipped with all requirements (accommodation, training, maintenance, depot, administration and C2 capabilities (can be outsourced to MS or REC for AU cost in preferred country – maybe with AU log depot?) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option D1</th>
<th>Option D2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Base to be equipped with bouquet of options for possible different scenarios</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other considerations

- **MS will not support the concept if they do not trust the command and control competencies**
- **Efficient organisational capacity must be in place before acceptance/adoPTION — strategic and operational levels**

Costs

| Facility establishment costs = ±$M? Rental cost only |
| Facility maintenance costs = ±$M? |
| Deployment costs (travel) = ±$M0,9 per rotation |
| Salaries @ 30% UN rates = ±$M1,8 per 1 week in mounting base |
| Daily allowances = ±$M0,083 |
| Troop maintenance = ±$M1,4 |
| Training costs = Not calculated |
| Insurances = $M0,025 |
| Total = ±$M4,208 |

**Note:** Per ±2 000 force for 1 week in mounting base

Advantages

- Keeping the focus at regional level enhances regional coherence and builds on the regional capability
- The rapidly deployable force could form the basis of a build-up to brigade strength, again operating within the regional envelope
- It simplifies the training requirement
- A permanent force ready for deployment as per requirement
- Capability will discourage militant factions getting out of control
- Serve as an deterrent
- Provide AU and UN with a recognised capability for early response
- Least expensive option
A RAPID REACTION AND DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY WITHIN THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option D1</th>
<th>Option D2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disadvantages</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disadvantages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Will be difficult to coordinate</td>
<td>■ Not a standing (permanent) force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Integrated training and mobilisation will pose challenges for creativity</td>
<td>■ Poor communication between RECs/regions will jeopardise success of RDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Exclusion of regional and other MS other than utilisation of their forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risks</strong></td>
<td><strong>Risks</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Will be very difficult to coordinate and ineffective communication might result in the inability of the AU to utilise the RDC as envisaged – failure to implement RDC successfully will result in failure of ASF</td>
<td>■ Insufficient structures/capacity at strategic and operational levels will put strain on C2 – ‘bad’ missions will ensure rejection from stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ Insufficient structures/capacity at strategic and operational levels will put strain on C2 – ‘bad’ missions will ensure rejection from stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommendations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not recommended</td>
<td>Recommended</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Forces must be trained to different scenarios and terrains. This implies additional costs for exercises and transport

**Evaluation of the options**

■ **Options B1, C1, D1 against B2, C2, D2.** The main argument between drawing troops from the regions or from the continent as a whole rests on which is the most effective process for generating forces and on which provides the most efficient command and control. To date the AU, through necessity, has raised forces on a bilateral basis and has struggled to put together ad hoc coalitions. Command and control has been equally ad hoc. While understandable at present, for the future a much more effective way of raising trained forces is likely to be the use of the regional mechanisms. The ASF concept is based on the REC/region being able to deliver a capability to the AU.

■ **Options B2, C2 against D2.** The argument between the creation of a standing element or a standby element is mainly one of cost, although the political ramifications should not be overlooked. A standing RDC gives the AU autonomy at the expense of national sovereignty. The cost of a standing capability proved the downfall of the UN Strategic Reserve. Clearly, the compromise Option C2, which has a smaller standing element, is less costly but reduces
the autonomy of the AU. It remains a significantly expensive option, unless member states continue to pay for the forces donated to the AU and, equally, the member states cover the cost of providing equipment, accommodation, running and maintenance costs, training, etc. There are ways of reducing the cost to the AU but nevertheless the cost remains to be borne by either the AU or the member states.

■ **Option D1 against D2.** These were the main options discussed at the expert’s workshop in July 2007.
SADC security cooperation and progress with the SADC Brigade

Ms Virginia Gamba

INTRODUCTION

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has an ambitious agenda for the region. The lynchpin for the economic, political and social goals articulated in the various SADC protocols and treaties is the ability to ensure a peaceful and stable region. Thus security remains high on the regional body’s agenda, as demonstrated by the proliferation of declarations, treaties and protocols aimed at preventing and containing conflict. SADC is mindful of its stature within Africa, particularly the role it is expected to play in strengthening the African Union’s (AU) broader goals for the continent. The pursuit of the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG) is an essential part of these goals as member states become increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations across the continent. Developing regional capacities directly translates to building the continental capacity and brings the ideal of the African Standby Force (ASF) one step closer.

Discussion on SADCBRIG should be considered within the broader context of the ASF. Couched within the Common Defence Policy, the Constitutive Act of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the PSC Protocol on the ASF, provisions have been made for a multidisciplinary standby force incorporating civilian and police components located in their country of origin. The ASF is to be a rapid deployment force for use across the continent and is envisaged to be established by 2010. It is to be made up of five regional brigades. Development of the capacity of these brigades was always envisioned to form part of the continental
action, on the understanding that the primary goal of regional brigades would be to serve their own regions in a number of ways.

The importance of developing strong regional brigades such as SADCBRIG is underscored by the fact that the interventions of the African Union have generally been ad hoc and limited in terms of size, mandate and duration. The reasons for this have largely been the absence of a sizeable standby force and minimal resources. By utilising the capacity of regional economic communities (RECs), which generally have better organisational mechanisms and a willingness to engage in peacekeeping operations, the conflict prevention and management capabilities of the AU will be enhanced.

A corollary benefit is that SADC (and the AU) will have reliable knowledge of the general state of the armed forces in every region. This is a significant yet curious break from a past of military secrecy, especially with the expectation that the AU will be able to effectively monitor and verify operational readiness. As such it will be easy to develop realistic operational plans when executing decisions of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The depth of each country’s commitment to AU programmes can be measured by the level of readiness of the pledged military regional ASF units. Furthermore Africa’s hitherto unrecognised operational planning expertise will be elevated to its rightful place as ASF operational planning will start at the regional level, empowering African armies to determine the manner and approach of the continent’s efficacy in peacekeeping. Africa will no longer simply be the source of troops but will be at the centre of determining the degree of success operationally, nurturing a culture of common approach to military professionalism in the long term’ (Mtimkulu 2005).

THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE MANDATE

The AU, within its peace and security architecture, has created the framework for the establishment of the ASF, and by extension the regional brigades that will serve it. The base document for these agreements, acts and protocols is the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000), which identifies the ongoing conflicts across the continent as a significant factor in the lack of socio-economic development.

The PSC Protocol establishes the council as a ‘standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’ (African Union 2002, Article 2), which would be responsible for the co-ordination of an efficient, collective response to crises across the continent.¹ The subsequent
The framework further outlines the nature of the missions to be undertaken and the required deployment time (from the moment a mandate resolution is passed), as follows:

- AU/regional military advice to a political mission – 30 days
- AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a United Nations (UN) mission – 30 days
- Standalone AU/regional observer mission – 30 days
- AU/regional peacekeeping force, preventive deployment missions and peace building operations – 30 days
- AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers – 90 days, although the military component will deploy in 30 days
- AU intervention for urgent situations such as genocide – 14 days

The framework outlines two phases for the ASF development. The first phase, which ran until 30 June 2005, was to create the management structures for the first two types of missions and the brigades capable of deploying for scenarios 1 to 4 above (the latter by regional communities). The second phase, running from July 2005 to June 2010, is to build the capacity of the AU to manage complex peacekeeping operations. In addition, the regional communities are to create mission headquarters for managing both regional and continental missions. By the conclusion of phase two, command and control structures, as well as logistical and training arrangements, are to be in place.

Other important documents include the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (African Union 2004), which outlines common security threats, goals and principles, and the Roadmap (African Union 2005), which restates the commitments in the framework and provides new timelines for the two phases.

FORMING OF THE SADC BRIGADE

SADCBRIG was officially launched at the SADC Summit in Lusaka on 17 August 2007 (AU Monitor 2007). The underlying motivation behind the formation of SADCBRIG is the need to build the capacity of African armed forces to intervene
and resolve conflicts throughout the continent without undue interference from external parties that may not understand the complexities of the conflict and can at times make a bad situation worse. This is in line with the self-sufficiency credo underlined in all the major agreements and declarations produced across the continent, both within the AU and within the regional economic communities, including SADC. SADCBRIG will not only serve the needs of the ASF, as we shall see below.

By creating a regional brigade that draws troops and resources from all member states, the burden of conflict resolution does not fall solely to one state. It also gives credibility to interventions and increases the likelihood of success as troop rotation can occur more regularly with the larger standby force in place.

The 2004 SADC Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) meeting in Lesotho mandated the Ministerial Defence Subcommittee to establish a technical team to facilitate the creation of SADCBRIG. Subsequent to a military planner’s team meeting in 2005, an interim planning element (PLANELEM) was established at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone.

The resulting understanding was that SADCBRIG would take into account the existing and potential capabilities of member states (particularly their current standby arrangements) and design the regional peace support operation (PSO) structure accordingly. To attain the goals of interoperability of military equipment, personnel and procedures, the activities of the regional peacekeeping training centre (RP TC) based in Harare would need to be developed and consolidated (within the financing limits of member states and foreign partners). Regional forces would need to be trained, the peacekeeping abilities of national police services would have to be assessed and supplemented, and joint training of civil police would also be required. It is also imperative that joint multinational training exercises be conducted to ensure operational readiness. Financial constraints would have a marked impact on the design of the PSO structure, which would need to take into account available resources to ensure that the range of activities is not too ambitious. Lastly, a regional database of trained personnel would need to be compiled (Ajulu and Lamin).

It is important to note here that since 1995 there has been interest in traditional peacekeeping countries, i.e. the Scandinavian countries, the USA under the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), etc., to support the peacekeeping capacities of African states so that they will be in a position to conduct Chapter VIII operations in Africa. Concurrent with multiyear initiatives to speed up South Africa’s capacity to engage in peace support operations, SADC member
states have undertaken numerous exercises, commencing with Blue Crane, to pilot the potential of regional peacekeeping operations. Most of these exercises were based on the multinational UN operations model then in use. The exercises the additional purpose of testing regional command and control measures in an environment where both military and civilian roles were envisaged (De Coning 1999).

Thanks to these exercises it became clear that joint training would need to be intensified to integrate particular elements of military, police and civilian training in preparation for peacekeeping operations. It is interesting to note that the same problems were more recently identified after the creation of the AU and the commencement of preparatory work for a functional ASF in Africa.

In southern Africa, largely because the region has been involved in making peace support training at regional level thinkable and doable for the past eight years, important strides have been made in addressing practical issues that could impact on multinational peacekeeping operations and have subsequently influenced the manner in which the ASF was being conceived. Among these regional lessons were the following:

- Refining the training priorities of SADC
- Allowing for the fine-tuning of the manner in which future multinational field-training exercises would be conducted
- Examining the manner in which the various military contingents operated together under joint command
- Assessing the interoperability of the contingents and practising common standards of operations (SOPs)
- Developing and testing the new Mission Co-ordination Centre (MCOC) and receiving feedback from the police, military and civilian actors on its functioning

**THE MANDATE OF THE SADC BRIGADE**

After the years of training and the generation of new frameworks for directing African peace support operations, the regional brigades have become the most important actors in securing appropriate training and readiness for deploying complements in the service of the AU under its ASF flag. In this sense, SADCBRIG will be dealing primarily with intra-state conflicts, but those that may have trans-border implications. The primary triggers for such conflicts will likely be
ethnic rivalries, economic inequalities, lack of political order, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the effects of organised crime. Of particular importance will be the capacity of the brigade to deal with significant movements of people, from cross-border refugees to internally displaced persons and migrants. In addition, there will be the added complexity of interference by warlords, non-state actors, militias, armed civilians and other third parties.

The mandate of SADCBRIG is fairly wide and covers the following areas:

- Observation and monitoring missions
- Peace support operations
- Interventions at the request of a member state to restore peace and security
- Preventative deployment to stop the escalation of a conflict, or to prevent a conflict from spilling over into neighbouring states
- Peace building in a post-conflict situation, including disarmament and demobilisation
- Humanitarian missions in aid of civilians (conflict or natural-disaster related)
- Any other functions as may be authorised by the SADC Summit (AU Monitor 2007).

SADC has also passed a number of protocols related to the peace and security concerns of the region, which directly and indirectly provide a mandate for SADCBRIG. These include the Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992), Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-Operation (2001), Protocol on Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2001), Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (2002), and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (2003).

**STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE SADC BRIGADE**

SADCBRIG comprises three distinct components, namely military, police and civilian. The regional military, police and civilian staff on secondment from contributing SADC member states are on rotation in Gaborone, while the troops and personnel for SADCBRIG remain in their home countries in an ‘on-call’ status to ensure rapid response times (Ajulu and Lamin). The civilian component will provide human resources, financial and administrative management and act as the humanitarian liaison, providing legal advice and
overseeing the protection of human rights, particularly those of women and children (*AU Monitor* 2007).

PLANELM is the only permanent SADC structure related to the brigade. It is an autonomous organisation which is not intended to be incorporated into the SADC BRIG structure during actual missions. It operates on a daily basis as a tool of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS) and receives its guidance from the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff and the Committee of SADC Police Chiefs’ (*AU Monitor* 2007).

Authority is drawn from OPDS and the Strategic Indicative Plan (SIPO) that operationalises the organ. SIPO focuses on two areas, namely politics and diplomacy, and defence and security issues, and its mandate is clearly reflected in the goals of SADC BRIG. Objectives in the political sector include safeguarding against inter- and intrastate conflicts, resolving conflicts through peaceful means and promoting political cooperation in the region. The political sector also addresses the social reintegration of ex-soldiers, coordinates participation by member states in international and regional peacekeeping operations and manages humanitarian aid in the case of natural disasters.

Upon deployment, strategic direction will be provided by the special representative, who will be appointed for each mission by the mandating authority. SADC BRIG will be under the command of this special representative (*SADC 2007*).

For each mission undertaken by SADC BRIG, the SADC Summit will also appoint a force commander, a commissioner of police and a head of the civilian component, all of whom will be drawn from the personnel put forward by participating member states. These appointees will fall under the command of the special representative. Military contingent commanders will report direct to the force commander. The headquarters and command centres will be covered by the terms of reference drawn up by the mandating authority.

While military personnel and equipment remain under the command of the contributing country, they will be under the operational control of the force commander. The same applies to the police component, whose operational control falls to the commissioner of police (*SADC 2007*).

Either the UN or the AU may issue the mandate under which SADC BRIG could be deployed. The chairman of the SADC organ would issue a recommendation to the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, who would in turn issue the mandate to SADC BRIG. Thereafter, the Ministerial Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Security and State Security would
manage all SADCBRIG-related matters. Other structures playing a role include the ISDSC, the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence and the SADCBRIG PLANELM, which will monitor force preparation in participating member states while mission preparations are underway (Ajulu and Lamin).

The SADC states contributing to SADCBRIG have signed a memorandum of understanding to create a legal basis for the establishment and maintenance of the brigade. There have also been reports that long-term deployment targets have been set by African defence chiefs to ensure deployment in traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of a resolution having been adopted, and within 90 days of that date for complex peacekeeping operations. It is stated that these standby force deployment targets are to coincide with the timelines set by the UN (IRIN News 2005).

As stated earlier, SADCBRIG together with the brigades of the other RECs will form part of the ASF. The operational centre of SADCBRIG will be in Gaborone, Botswana (which also serves as the headquarters of SADC). The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security holds the authority to deploy the brigade, a decision that will usually only take place after consultations with the AU and/or the UN. The troika will also consult with the country in which the peacekeeping intervention is to take place.

As stipulated in the policy framework, the standby brigades are to be composed of the following units:

- A brigade (mission-level) headquarter and support unit of up to 65 personnel and 16 vehicles
- A headquarters company and support unit of up to 120 personnel
- Four light infantry battalions, each composed of up to 750 personnel and 70 vehicles
- An engineering unit of up to 505 personnel
- A light signals unit of up to 135 personnel
- A reconnaissance company (wheeled) of up to 150 personnel
- A helicopter unit of up to 80 personnel, 10 vehicles and four helicopters
- A military police unit of up to 48 personnel and 17 vehicles
- A light multi-role logistical unit of up to 190 personnel and 40 vehicles
- A level II medical unit of up to 35 personnel and 10 vehicles
- A military observer group of up to 120 officers
- A civilian support group consisting of logistical, administrative and budget components (AU Monitor 2007).
The AU would maintain centrally further military, police and civilian standby personnel, including the following:

- 300 to 500 military observers (MilObs)
- 240 civilian police (CivPol)
- A roster of civilian experts for human rights, humanitarian, governance, demobilisation, disarmament, repatriation and reconstruction components

**INTEROPERABILITY IN THE SADC BRIGADE**

The focus of the brigade is to ensure that effective training is completed and to prepare for rapid mobilisation through exercises such as rehearsed generic contingencies. Training will focus on compatibility and interoperability of equipment and systems. Discrepancies between the general military training of participating states have been taken into account. The strategy is to standardise training objectives rather than the training curriculum. Compatible common standards are also being developed in conjunction with the UN to assist with the achievement of this goal and are being aided by the ISDSC. In addition, the RPTC in Harare, in partnership with national peace support training institutions, is playing a pivotal role in training military commanders, police officers and civilian officials, as well as ‘acting as a “clearing house” for all peace support operations training activities in SADC’ (African Union 2005).

To identify emerging conflicts and to deal effectively with existing conflicts the strategic management structure of SADCBRIG needs to be addressed. This would entail the improvement of the peace support operations doctrine and policy formulation. Rapid deployments for limited durations, whether in the SADC Region or beyond and whether for a UN, AU or SADC-mandated mission must also be guaranteed. However, before this could be feasible, the composition of the brigade must incorporate the capacity for self-defence and self-extrication should the situation on the ground warrant it (African Union 2005).

The operationalisation roadmap for SADCBRIG was created to be in synergy with those of the AU and other RECs and runs to 2010. The primary logistics depot for SADCBRIG is to be in Botswana. The depot is charged with keeping stock of all operational equipment that may be required. The details for the establishment and operation of the depot are currently being finalised (African Union 2005).
**SUSTAINABILITY**

The operating costs of both the support structures for the regional brigades and the missions are likely to be considerable. Clause 26 of the Roadmap calls on both the AU and the RECs to:

- Assess the detailed cost of the structures of the ASF, including pre-deployment activities, such as training and the activities of the PLANELMs and regional brigade groups.
- Assess the costs of the various types of ASF missions, based on the relevant force levels, for an average mission timeframe of between one and two years, including the mandating process, which is a long enough period for the follow-on deployment of a UN mission or operation, and for more limited operations in support of peace processes of between six months and one year only.
- Encourage AU member states to contribute to the AU Peace Fund.
- Sustain negotiations with external partners for assistance (African Union 2005).

The Roadmap also points to the need for external multinational regional arrangements for the stocking, maintenance and strategic airlift of equipment for pre-deployment training and missions.

**LESSONS LEARNT FROM REGIONAL BRIGADES: ECOWAS**

The functioning of regional brigades is subject to a number of concerns. Lessons learnt from the operations of ECOMOG in West Africa have pointed to the following requirements if regional brigades are to operate successfully:

- The development of a common approach towards peacekeeping operations at both the regional and international level. Due consideration needs to be taken of African traditions and customs.
  - Political decisions are required to 'provide conceptual clarity as to the boundaries of peacekeeping, so that countries may participate more fully and confidently in future peace operations'.
  - Guidance is needed from a dedicated 'pool of qualified regional instructors' so that the required skills and knowledge are imparted to sub-regional efforts.
The UN needs to clarify the ‘rules of the game’ for countries contributing troops.

A possible dilemma arises in cases of ‘aggravated peacekeeping’, whereby ‘self-defence needs may lead to a loss of neutrality and impartiality, making it difficult for the peacekeeper to respond appropriately to events’.

Command and control issues arise because of the plethora of languages spoken within the sub-region (and across the continent), which distorts the ‘translation and interpretation of military terms’. Combined with a lack of standardised terminology and command language, the command hierarchy is further disrupted.

There is a need for common SOPs and it is particularly important that an African approach is developed when states such as France, Belgium and the United Kingdom, which have their own modus operandi, are to be involved.

Troop contributors must receive a clear mandate and this must be accompanied by clarification of the legal aspects involved.

Wider consultations are required before a mandate for a peace support operation is issued, particularly as far as clarification of the ‘causes and history of the conflict’ and the ‘formulation of more appropriate and realistic resolutions’ are concerned.

Information-sharing systems require a drastic overhaul, particularly in terms of the sharing and revision of best practices. Ideally this would entail a network between regional and international peacekeeping training centres, possibly coordinated by the AU.

Pre-deployment training, apart from addressing issues of SOPs, should also incorporate cultural awareness training since this aspect has a direct impact on the acceptance of the peacekeeping force in the host country.

As with the UN, the AU charter upholds the principle of non-interference. Therefore any involvement, such as for reasons of a ‘compelling humanitarian imperative’, should occur only with a clear mandate that is given under the auspices of AU (or a regional body’s) leadership, rather than by a single state.

The rules of engagement must be clarified prior to deployment to ensure the safety of personnel and the success of the mission. Troops also need to be armed for all anticipated contingencies.

Logistics and equipment prepositioning bases are crucial for both advanced training and uninterrupted supply chains during missions. Currently the lack of logistical support to troop-contributing countries is creating difficulties. The standardisation of logistics and equipment is essential for inter-
operability to be possible. It has been suggested that the UN could provide training in this regard (Malan, Nhara and Bergevin 1997).

In terms of training, regional centres of excellence that provide the necessary skills in complex peacekeeping operations are important. One example is the Zimbabwe Staff College, which has been designated by the UN for the training of commanders and staff officers for peacekeeping operations. Such centres of excellence would offer instruction in logistics, field engineering, military policing and medical support, amongst others (Malan, Nhara and Bergevin 1997).

ECOMOG has experienced difficulties as a result of the varying tactical guidelines of the francophone and anglophone states contributing troops to missions. Similar complications could arise for SADCBRIG between lusophone and anglophone states, once again highlighting the need for regional SOPs.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM PREVIOUS MISSIONS IN SADC

The founding of SADC at the Southern African Development Coordination Conference in 1992 signified a new way in which regional co-operation and conflict resolution was going to be addressed. The ten member states, namely Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, signed the treaty that changed the existing SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) from an organisation coordinating regional development projects into a development community. The aim of this community was the promotion of social and economic development through intensified regional cooperation. South Africa became a member of SADC in 1994. Since its joining, two significant missions have been fielded by SADC, both in 1998, one to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the other in Lesotho.

The mission deployed to the DRC is hailed as one of the successes of southern African conflict resolution engagements. It is important to note though that initially only five of SADC’s then 14 member states sent troops to the DRC. South Africa and Botswana were also engaged in what was to become a highly controversial mission to Lesotho. SADC member states were unable to agree on a common stand over the management of the Lesotho and DRC conflicts and this fed into the controversy of the ‘purported’ SADC mission to Lesotho. The timing of the deployment in Lesotho faced criticisms, as Angola and Zimbabwe had decided to oppose military intervention in the civil war raging in the DRC.
SOUTH AFRICA’S CONTRIBUTION

South Africa has been active in peacekeeping undertakings across the continent and thus has a valuable contribution to make to the effective functioning of SADCBRIG. South Africa’s engagement in Africa has to be examined in the light of factors seen as informing its foreign policy, namely self-identification as an African state and the evolving nature of conflicts within the continent.

Although South Africa acknowledges its global obligations and responsibilities, Africa is placed as a priority as far as its international engagements are concerned. The preservation of regional peace and stability coupled with the promotion of trade and development are obvious South African interests and are shared with those of other African states. South Africa’s identification as an African state is enhanced by its drive to deter the spill-over effects of conflicts within the regions of the continent.

Another factor informing South Africa’s foreign policy is somewhat more unpredictable and can readily result in failure. This is the evolving nature of conflict on the African continent and elsewhere, and the related security challenges. These threats present themselves in a veritable spectrum, ranging from the scourge of failing or failed states, crime, violence both ethnically motivated and fuelled by claims of legitimacy, and inter- and intrastate warfare involving state and non-state actors. In addition, South Africa has to take into cognisance the changing international security complex, namely the reticence by some major powers within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to involve themselves in peacekeeping missions on the African continent, driven by lack of political will. In addition, there is the harsh realisation that any efforts aimed at conflict resolution hold little prospect of success without the consent of the belligerent parties.

South Africa’s own recent experiences play a vital role in the way that it seeks to address efforts aimed at peacekeeping. The country’s own transition towards democracy contributes to its foreign policy approach to conflict resolution. Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa has assumed the principal role in four conflict resolution attempts of significance, namely in Burundi, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan. The outcome, although not without some notable successes, was mixed.

In both Burundi and the DRC South Africa’s engagement brought about a restoration of political contestation and successful elections that have produced functioning, if somewhat fragile, governments. It is important to note that South Africa was initially limited in the manner in which it could engage on the continent by
its apartheid-era reputation. This necessitated a much more diplomatic approach to conflict resolution, as seen in the early engagements in Burundi, under former President Nelson Mandela, and subsequently in the DRC, although in the latter case South Africa was able to deploy troops as part of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC). In the DRC South Africa stressed the importance of inclusiveness and reaching a political agreement rather than achieving an outcome through military means. In many regards the outcome here was seen as a landmark in South Africa’s efforts in conflict mediation and resolution.

Burundi currently occupies a sizeable share of South Africa’s peacekeeping attentions. Although efforts met with relative initial success, the current situation has had a tendency to stall further South African efforts. This creates a potential danger to the role South Africa plays in the country as it could see that role shift from peacekeeper to enforcer without adequate warning.

Efforts in Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan have highlighted the limitations of South Africa’s efforts and capabilities. Côte d’Ivoire brings to the fore the prerequisite necessary to the South African model of transition through negotiation, namely recognition by all parties involved that contestation by force is the least desirable option. The advantages of being in power, which revolve mainly around control of the state’s economic benefits stemming from the exploitation and exploration of natural resources, factor into the readiness of parties to sit in negotiations and they just do not share a common interest in reaching peace. In addition, South Africa’s attempts at mediation in Côte d’Ivoire did not take into consideration the regional dynamics and international rivalries, which underscores the key roles played by other francophone states in the region and by France as the former colonial master. In Sudan, African peacekeeping capacity remains highly dependent on foreign support. Even though this is not a crippling condition, African states need to take into account that the financial sustainability of an intervention has an impact on peacekeeping efforts.

To date South Africa has contributed the following personnel towards peacekeeping efforts on the continent:

- Burundi – 900 troops
- DCR – 1 350 South African National Defence Force (SANDF) members, including military observers, staff officers and contingent members
- Côte d’Ivoire – 38 members as a military advisory and monitoring team
- Sudan – 318 members as part of AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan)
- Ethiopia and Eritrea – 7 military observers and staff officers
CONCLUSION

It is clear that countries in the southern African region must now prioritise their efforts at developing all the components that will make SADCBRIG an efficient policy tool for and in the region. This means that the military, police and civilian components must receive equal prioritisation. The challenge for SADC member states will be to generate the training and the coordination required to comply efficiently with deployment timings, to ensure that the region’s actions are compatible with the needs and requirements of the ASF, and to pursue interaction and dialogue with the UN in an active manner so that the evolving nature of the current generation of international peace support operations does not create gaps between what southern Africa is doing, the AU requires and the UN expects. This is the greatest challenge of all.

A subsidiary challenge is to retain ownership of the ultimate goal of SADCBRIG in pursuit of the common regional good in southern Africa. After all, only a portion of the mandate of SADCBRIG ties in with AU or UN commitments. It is the manner in which SADCBRIG, once it is fully operationalised, serves southern Africa itself that will ultimately provide the regional benefit. We must not forget this as the necessity for speed force us to compromise on the ultimate objective and function.

NOTES

1 The AU conflict management structures (developed in 1993 and replaced in 2002) have five main organs, of which the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) are the most relevant in terms of this discussion. The ASF mandate was formulated in Addis Ababa in 2004.

2 The 2005 Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force updates a number of the guidelines outlined in the ASF Policy Framework.

LIST OF REFERENCES


De Coning, C. Exercise Blue Crane: a unifying moment for SADC. Conflict Trends, April 1999.


SADC. Memorandum of Understanding amongst the Southern African Development Community Member States on the Establishment of a Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade. 2007.

SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (Blantyre, August 2001), SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (Blantyre, August 2001), and SADC Mutual Defence Pact (Dar-es-Salaam, August 2003).
Chapter Five

Civil-military relations

Challenges and the emerging African security architecture

Dr Martin R Rupiya

Introduction

After decades of trying to develop a model of balanced civil-military relations (CMR), in a process that goes back to the emergence of the nation-state system towards the end of the 15th century, there is now general agreement on what constitutes balanced civil-military relations in a liberal, constitutional democracy. To this end, dimensions of the monopoly of force are evenly distributed between the state, elected members of parliament and the institutions responsible for implementation, within strictly set criteria.

To reach this critical stage, military power and its means were, in the first instance, wrested from warlords amidst the rise of the merchant classes, who later convinced the monarchical states to allow electoral representation based on taxation. Still later on, the seeming collusion between warlords, monarchs and the moneyed classes was again distanced from exclusive monopoly of force through violent protests by ordinary peoples in France, Russia and Britain. This short and violent period propelled experiments in political organisation and control of the armed forces into a tripartite union of shared responsibility between the state, the armed forces and society. Europe provided the future political model of democratic states and the norms for integral civil-military relations.

In Africa, the post-colonial states struggled to replicate this European model as part of emerging statecraft. However, the early period of independence was characterised by a series of coups and counter-coups in every state between the 1960s and the late 1980s (DFID 2001, 7). In an attempt to break this cycle and
create space for electoral political processes, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), in 1987 passed a resolution banning coups d’état and unconstitutional changes of government. This was designed to outlaw accession to office through the barrel of the gun (Maluwa 2003, 157-159). By implication, the resolution was calling for the implementation of a balanced CMR model in emerging constitutional democracies. These settled notions of civil-military relations informed the state-building efforts of post-colonial Africa until the 1990s. However, thereafter things changed in a variety of ways. The impact of African conflict on fragile and emerging national institutions further weakened ethnic and regional representation, leaving in charge dominant tribal groups to the exclusion of others. This has not augured well for balanced civil-military relations in the new states. The result has been to create pockets of ethnic and regional resistance that are forced to seek change through armed resistance and civil disobedience.

Some good examples of the establishment of democratic civil-military relations can be found in the successful conclusion of the liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa between 1975 and 1994. In each of these conflicts the establishment of security and defence institutions was the result of negotiations and ceasefire agreements. Yet, even in these cases, the careful balancing of ethnic representation was not always achieved, leading to a breakdown of democratic CMR in some of these countries.

These events have presented Africa with formidable and complex civil-military challenges, which will be identified in this paper. At the same time related dimensions and policy options will be examined for purposes of clarity. The paper will also offer some suggestions for the way forward in what are uncharted waters.

KEY QUESTIONS CONCERNING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

At stake in terms of civil-military relations are the following key questions:

- Who or what serves as the political control mechanism for the African security architecture and is there accountability to elected constituencies?
- What influence will African political constituencies have over the composition of the continental instruments of force?
- Where will the funding come from and what strings will be attached?
To what extent has there been a convergence of value systems to achieve (liberal) democratic norms within African states?

Have the regional security structures established a track record of political oversight by the electorate?

The post-conflict pressures related to CMR stemmed from inherent conflict situations that had been forced into the background as a consequence of the dominant influence exercised by Eastern and Western powers. This was especially the case in the former Zaire, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and even Mengistu’s Ethiopia. The alternative CMR in these states was a tiny, ethnic-based patronage system that survived because of its ability to draw in foreign forces in time of serious internal security challenges. In states where the ‘strong-man’ syndrome was a phenomenon, a one-party-state system was usually in place that was later challenged by the post-Cold War need to introduce political deregulation and multiparty democracy, and required the fundamental restructuring of existing security organs.

An important example in this regard is Tanzania and the People’s Defence Forces (TPDF), which had emerged in 1964 following an abortive coup early that year. The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduza (CCM) subsequently disbanded the army and the police and re-established these with new recruits drawn from the party. It instituted a dual command structure that was dominated by the ruling party. However, in 1991, the Justice Nyalali Commission, charged with investigating how the country could transform from a one-party state to a multiparty democracy, recommended the separation of the security organs from the state and party, and an end to the dual-control system.

This development came as a major challenge to CMR in Tanzania, and reflected similar situations in several other African countries. Hence, the changes at national level still have to filter through to and influence regional notions at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) level, where many countries still share the historic experience of armed struggle and being front-line states (FLS). More broadly, the changes, when they occurred, found the different parts of the state, society and security organs unprepared for adjustment, adaptation and accommodation, leading to some interesting developments.

When the lid was lifted on Eastern and Western influence, there was an almost immediate challenge to the politico-military system, which did not have the capacity to respond. In many cases this led to the collapse of the state and the revival of CMR based on tribal or warlord power. This development further undermined national security and stability, and even regional peace, as occurred in
Liberia, Sierra Leone and, more recently, the Horn of Africa. In effect, this meant that continental Africa had to give serious thought to peace intervention strategies. The resulting 1993 Cairo Declaration established the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism to guide the process and resulted in the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). Because this structure is still a work-in-progress, the provision of a viable framework remains a major challenge.

THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

CMR involves complex links between the authority, influence and ideology of the military and pacifist, non-military groups with their world view on armed organs that implement security policy. CMR also defines the type of organisation(s) involved and their composition, equipment, weaponry and nature of deployment. It further regulates the level and priority of funding stemming from shared-threat perceptions, while the survival of state, society and the institutions themselves must be ensured.

In combination, all these dimensions influence and shape CMR as, firstly, it provides the rationale for the function and role imperatives vs. the level of threat and, secondly, it provides societal security imperatives as derived from ideology and institutional dominance. At the second level of conceptual interrogation, CMR within a state is a reflection of the type of military officer corps that is in place, a body that is closest to the state. Finally, the notion of (elected) civilians exercising authority over the armed forces is fundamental to democratic states in a process otherwise known as balanced CMR. However, CMR is itself a dimension of national security policy (NSP), which is the framework that ensures safety, and socio-economic and political stability through institutions that have the capacity and capability to respond to either internal or external threats.

According to Huntington (1957), NSP has three components, namely military security dealing with external armed threats, security policy that addresses internal subversion and, finally, what he refers to as ‘situational security policy’, which responds to any rapid erosion or long-term deteriorating changes in socio-economic and democratic political conditions. CMR is understood to be the principal component of military security policy. In its execution, the officer corps acts as the element of the military structure that is directly responsible to both society and the state, making this component of the military institution most important. Related aspects include the nature of the officer corps, the funding of the institution and its democratic values (Huntington 1957). The make-up and
composition of the officer corps and its relationship with the state is nuanced even within each state. For instance, Driver (2004) has identified an interesting feature within the United States political system, namely the two traditions of ‘republican’ and ‘democratic’ theory. As is evident from the Republican and Democratic campaigns for the presidential elections in November 2008, each party has a different emphasis and approach to international relations. This has a direct impact and influence on the nature of CMR that obtains during the reign of each of the parties, culminating in what has been referred to as ‘democratic’ or ‘republican’ type of CMR.

On the African continent, perhaps three elements can be cited as having provided the practical and intellectual underpinnings to how CMR has evolved and is understood. The first dimension must be the theories imported during colonial times and inherited by post-colonial states, as well as, of course, the new ideas that originated in multiparty and liberal democratic discourses. The second dimension to be borne in mind is how African societies were and sometimes continue to be organised around strong ethnic, regional and customary monarchies that provide social structure and purpose for many communities, including their military organisation. Finally, there is what can be cited as the liberation theory that played a role in the way former social and nationalistic organisation became political parties that in turn established armed factions with clear lines of CMR. These aspects have since become part of national state systems, thereby feeding into the complex typology of CMR as framed on the continent.

The strategic challenge is therefore to understand, isolate and integrate the positive elements of each of the periods in the creation of a modern CMR framework that responds to both national and continent-wide PSC agendas. Development has also been influenced by different regional experiences in Africa. Based on aspects such as religion, Western interests, historical experiences, and political and economic development, a different CMR has emerged in each region. The challenge is to harmonise these regional variances in order to come up with a continent-wide CMR template.

THE EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

As indicated, CMR on the African continent is a mixture of local customary practices, including traditional and linguistic influences, the adaptation of colonial inheritances, historical nuances brought about by ‘fighting’ for democratic rights that leave certain institutions imbued with the ethos of armed struggle
or civil disobedience as a weapon to exact political concessions, and, after the 1990s, subtle differences in embracing multiparty liberal democratic practices. In other words, in each country, the nature and type of CMR is best explained by looking at the country’s political history and its socialisation under colonial and post-colonial hierarchies. It is also important to acknowledge the fact that within these subjective and objective parameters, there is deference to formal and informal dimensions of power, influence and authority, in each country and region, all of which have an effect on notional AU PSC and ASF ideas. Taken as a whole, the continent and its many states and regions therefore exhibit a cocktail of CMR beliefs and practices that have to find common accommodation with the evolving African security architecture (ASA). In other words, while patterns are discernable at national and perhaps at regional level, the same cannot be said for continental level.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS CHALLENGES IN RELATION TO THE EMERGING AFRICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

There are at least five major CMR-related challenges in relation to the emerging ASA that, in combination, have placed the continent in a unique position for framing new CMR concepts. Stated differently, these dimensions represent the strategic challenges of CMR in relation to the evolving ASA.

The first challenge is the complexity of identifying what represents common African CMR versus its emerging ASA. Conceptually, the continent is to present a united ASA, which presupposes that there has been agreement, or at best a common CMR approach at national, regional and African levels. However, in practice, nothing could be further from the truth. For instance, the setting in which balanced CMR is supposed to operate, at least at the conceptual level, is that of a functioning, liberal, democratic state. This ignores the reality of Africa in which, for example, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia was by force of arms and for a brief period able to impose a modicum of grassroots peace and stability until it was violently removed by combined African and international forces operating under the auspices of the war on terror. Without consensus at the primary policy level about the common purpose and objective of employing military means on the continent, it is impossible to link this with the new ASA components. The significant analogy for the rest of the continent is the fact that many of Africa’s political structures have CMRs that are informed and guided by episodes of armed struggle, a fact that has still not been fully acknowledged.
alongside the more universal CMR concepts present in fledgling liberal democracies. Hence, in many instances, given the employment of force on the continent, isolating the integral CMR is still very much work in progress.

Secondly, the different CMR trends at national level have not been sufficiently integrated at the regional level. Our case study of Sudan and Somalia is useful in explaining this dilemma. Taking into consideration the main actors and forces in Sudan, it has become clear that both the government forces from Khartoum and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) represent major African and Arabic interests, as well as Muslim and Christian beliefs. The nature of the officer corps and troops recruited into the ranks, their levels of education and training, their social values and ethos, and the nature of resources to support and sustain the forces all contribute towards shaping the nature of CMR in each of the armies. To then expect these differences to be set aside for the purpose of creating a regional security structure is a challenge that still has to be overcome in the volatile Horn of Africa. We believe that the same applies in relation to the ICU and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces in Somalia, and the Ethiopian, Eritrean, Ugandan and even Burundian forces that have been deployed in that country.

Thirdly, Somalia and Sudan demonstrate the major weaknesses associated with the ASA. On the one hand, because the ASA is weak, the conflict in Sudan provided the opportunity for an ‘African solution to African problems’, resulting in the first fully fledged AU peacekeeping mission to be deployed in a theatre where genocide had occurred. There was agreement that a robust international force should intervene. With a mere 8 000 troops deployed from Ethiopia under the PSC umbrella, the continental body lacked the resources, manpower and experience in command and control to manage such an undertaking. What followed in operational terms was a near disaster. The same can be said of the CMR dimension. The Sudanese AU Mission also indicated a lack of preparedness in the conceptual policy and structures of the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CASDP) and the ASF. Given the intransigence of the Sudanese government, there was, for instance, difficulty in securing viable mandates and the forces that were eventually deployed were not from the region, but depended upon volunteers from far and wide. This meant there was little relation to the emerging ASA, posing a major challenge to the relevance of this body in the future.

The challenge of funding the ASA is indicated by the fact that only six per cent of existing AU member states’ contributions is directed to the Peace Fund for funding peacekeeping operations. Given the annual Fund income of about
US$60 million and the hugely expensive peacekeeping operations amounting to over $1 billion a year just for the DRC MONUC peacekeeping operations, the AU funding is insufficient to make a difference. Taking into consideration that the MONUC operation has a strength of about 17 500 and the AU operation in Sudan has been authorised at 26 000 personnel, the latter is likely to result in even greater expenditure. In CMR terms, where the resources come from and how they are directed towards security policy are critical in fostering balanced relations. Yet Africa has almost no say as to where the money comes from or how it is to be spent, even within its own ASA. This is a major strategic challenge that is unlikely to be resolved in the short to medium or even the long term. If this situation continues and the continent is unable to make significant material contributions, there is little justification for attempting to create a uniquely African framework.

Finally, the flaws and weaknesses of the ASA, as revealed in Sudan and Somalia, have by default strengthened the hand of external players in finding entry points in African conflicts. Involvement by NATO, AFRICOM and a EUFOR (European Union Force) deployed in Darfur with a French contingent across the border in Chad, amongst others, imposes foreign policy on the continent. These organisations do not necessarily link themselves with the weak and fragile ASA. The result is a more complex continental CMR terrain over which Africa has no control. Issues include such questions as how the foreign militaries interact with local communities or armed forces, which laws or customs are supreme when transgressions occur, who provides the mandate(s) (the AU, the UN or member states deploying forces), who funds the operations and for what purposes and, finally, is there any residual effect on building the capacity of the ASA now and in the future from these operations and interventions.

The final thought to take away from the assessment of these five elements and how they sit with the new ASA is that this period represents an era of fluid CMR that Africa has little or no capacity to influence. This is borne out by the intensity of the current conflicts on the African continent, in an era in which the continent has a plethora of weak and collapsed states.

CONCLUSIONS

Strategic issues related to framing CMR as part of the evolving ASA are varied and complex. They begin with the conceptual challenge of isolating the issues and locating them at the continental, regional and national levels, and continue with
questions about the definition of a shared threat and the circumstances under which and manner in which there should be a military response. Who triggers and therefore exercises the strategic command while providing legitimacy for the operational and tactical execution, which could be undertaken by an African force on its own or be conducted as a joint operation with external partners? We are yet to see the results of the ASA in the hybrid Sudanese peace mission. Who or what will constitute the composition of the force, equipment and training? Finally, the important question of who funds the ASA has been asked and found to be wanting.

All these important questions reflect the major flaws and weaknesses associated with the integrity of CMR in Africa beyond the individual state. The reality is that even though key components of the CMR dynamic have not yet been settled at state level, those involved are now being challenged to find common ground at a higher regional and continental level. It is my submission that Africa and its CMR are still not sufficiently grounded to offer a coherent framework that can act as a point of reference. States, regions and the continent will have to start thinking seriously about what should be put in place in the interim and what should be the desired goal in the medium to long term.

**LIST OF REFERENCES**


Chapter Six
Sierra Leone
Lessons learned by the Nigerian army

Brigadier General KTJ Minimah

INTRODUCTION

The UN was formed after the demise of the League of Nations for the primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Articles 39 to 42 of the UN Charter empowered the Security Council to assess threats to international peace and security, to commence a process of intervention with preventive diplomacy, and to use force where diplomacy fails to maintain or restore international peace and security, using air, sea or land forces of member states as may be necessary.

The formal birth of UN peacekeeping operations was marked by the Security Council’s dispatch of unarmed military observers to Palestine in June 1948 to supervise the negotiated truce in the first Arab–Israeli war. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), or the Peace Support Operation (PSO) as it is known today, was initially restricted to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The PSO has, however, assumed a wider dimension to embrace other peace-related operations that were hitherto consigned to civilian agencies.

Nigeria’s participation in PSOs began in 1960 when her troops joined the UN operations in Congo (ONUC). Apart from the UN platform, other regional and sub-regional organisations have also attempted to ensure peace in their respective regions through the PSO instrument. Articles 52 to 54 of the UN Charter encourage regional groups to engage in peacekeeping operations in their own capacities. Hence the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) attempted its first
peacekeeping mission in Chad in 1981/82 and another in Rwanda in 1992/93. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) initiated its PSO effort in Liberia in 1990. Over the last two decades, PSOs have become increasingly complex and multidimensional, involving the employment of both military and non-military actors. The Nigerian Army (NA) has participated in 30 UN PSOs, three under ECOWAS, three under the OAU/AU and four bilateral missions.

The increasing role of regional and sub-regional platforms in the maintenance of international peace and security saw Nigeria playing a pivotal, if not domineering, role in West Africa. This is substantiated in the operations of the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which Nigeria spearheaded and sponsored almost single-handedly. The ECOMOG structure was to stabilise the West African sub-region for about two decades. Nigeria’s participation in PSOs has therefore been consistent with the maintenance of international peace and security, even at her gross expense, such as in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

CONCEPT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A UK military publication defines a PSO as ‘an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace … such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building which are principally to protect civilian agencies’ (Ministry of Defence 2002, 2). However, the British Army Field Manual defines PSO as ‘… the generic term used to describe those military operations in which a UN sponsored multinational force may be used’ (British Army 1994, 16). This definition does not acknowledge the role of the police, paramilitary and civilian elements in a PSO, unlike the other publication, which does recognise their involvement. The former definition is therefore more appropriate to this paper.

It is my assumption that readers will be well versed and knowledgeable in the conceptual discourse of the components of PSOs, i.e. peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace making, peace building, preventive peacekeeping, observer mission, humanitarian operations, etc, as well as the prerequisites for the success of PSOs as asserted by the guiding principles enunciated by the UN. These include consent, mandate, authority/legitimacy, impartiality, mutual respect, finance and logistics (Atoyebi 2004, 70). The components and guiding principles of PSO were prominent in the Sierra Leonian crisis.
BROAD OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION

The civil war in Sierra Leone lasted more than nine years and had its origins in the interplay of various factors. These were of a political, economic, social and external nature. At a political level, poor governance, containment of peoples’ freedom, election violence, thuggery, opportunism, greed for power and political killings precipitated the crisis. The socio-economic factors were economic decline, mass poverty, unemployment, indiscipline at all levels of society, poor working conditions and ineffective government policies (Bamalli 2006). The external influences were economic opportunism related to Sierra Leone’s diamond wealth and the ideological calculations of countries such as Libya, Burkina Faso and Liberia in their support of the rebels in Sierra Leone (Sessay et al. 2007). These factors precipitated disaffection that was exploited by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other rebel groups in order to foment the crisis.

On 25 May 1997, President Tejan Kabbah’s government was overthrown in a coup d’état 14 months after assuming power and was replaced by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). In response to a request by President Kabbah, ECOWAS heads of government in concert with OAU leaders advanced a three-stage policy approach to restore Kabba to office. The first stage was to open dialogue and negotiation. The second was to impose sanctions and embargoes on the regime, while the last was to resort to the use of force to remove the regime from power (Oni 2002).

ECOWAS leaders established a five-member contact group to facilitate their policy approach. The members were the foreign ministers of Ghana, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Nigeria as the head. The group’s contact and unsuccessful progress with the junta led to a Security Council-backed embargo on Sierra Leone that eventually resulted in a peace meeting in Conakry on 23 October 1997 at which the junta agreed to hand over power. However, this agreement was not honoured. Reacting to the junta’s defiance, ECOWAS leaders activated their third option, namely intervention by ECOMOG in Sierra Leone on 2 June 1997 (Oni 2002). Prior to the intervention from Liberia, an NA training team had been stationed in Freetown in terms of a bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

ECOMOG forces comprising troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali routed the AFRC junta from Freetown on 11 February 1998 and captured over 60 per cent of the country, including all the provincial capitals. President Kabbah was restored to power in March of that year. In a renewed offensive,
AFRC and RUF rebels recaptured some provinces from an already over-stretched and seemingly tired ECOMOG. In succession, the diamond-rich districts of Kono, Daru, Makeni, Kabala and Kambia fell to rebel control. In January 1999 rebels captured the eastern part of Freetown up to State House. ECOMOG forces regained the initiative in a counteroffensive and finally forced the rebels out of Freetown late that month and also recaptured a large part of the lost territories.

The Sierra Leone government and the AFRC/RUF rebels signed a ceasefire agreement in Lomé, Togo, on 18 May 1999, which came into effect on 24 May, before the Lomé Accord was signed on 7 July. The signing of the Lomé Accord changed the role of ECOMOG. The accord requested ECOWAS to revise the mandate of ECOMOG to cover functions such as peacekeeping, security of the state, protection of the UN observer mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), protection of disarmament and demobilisation centres, and the reintegration of combatants (Oni 2002, 208-209).

Before the Lomé Accord, ECOMOG was financed by ECOWAS, but principally Nigeria. However, by 1999 some Western countries had started lending support to ECOMOG, necessitating an assumption of control by the UN. The Security Council assessed the situation and on 22 October 1999, under Resolution 1270, authorised the establishment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The resolution authorised the deployment of a maximum of 6 000 military personnel, which included 260 military observers. The number was continually increased up to 17 500 personnel to meet emerging situations. The troop-contributing countries (TCCs) included Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Zambia and others that provided staff officers at the UN Force Headquarters (Bamalli 2006). The criteria of multinational, multilateral and interagency operations were thus met in Sierra Leone.

THE NIGERIAN CONTINGENT’S EXPERIENCE

The experience of the Nigerian contingent (NIGCON) in Sierra Leone is twofold: first as part of the ECOWAS PSO and second in the UN PSO. Though the experiences share the same characteristics and are similar, the former witnessed the darkest era in Nigeria’s foreign military operations. They range from the conventional to the absurd and cover aspects of training, planning and preparation, logistics, equipment, morale, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), peace building, and humanitarian and quick-impact projects.
Training

The NA is a conventional army trained principally for conventional warfare. The contingent found itself engulfed in a theatre of unconventional warfare and had to learn and train to contain asymmetric tactics in the theatre. Furthermore, the scale of arms and ammunition usage in the Sierra Leonean theatre was abnormal. While the Nigerian contingent used the RPG7 as an antitank weapon, the rebels employed this weapon in an antipersonnel role and even used anti-aircraft guns as machine guns.

Planning and preparation

From the onset the NIGCON of the ECOWAS PSO suffered from flawed planning and preparation. The planning stage failed to envisage the difficulties of sustaining contingents thousands of kilometres from home and failed to appreciate the contending issues on the ground, with casualties in manpower and equipment not being adequately forecast. This resulted in the contingent at one stage becoming trapped in Sierra Leone, as troops could not be rotated. Nigeria had to bear the burden of troop replacement, as other TCCs became reluctant to participate. Gradually the Nigerian contingent became tired and worn out and its fighting efficiency and invincibility was diminished and demystified.

Logistics

The contingent experienced acute logistical problems in the areas of land and air transportation, medical supplies, communication facilities etc. Food, medicine and other supplies arrived long after the peace force had reached the theatre of conflict instead of the other way round (Nwolise 2004, 222). For instance, Nigerian Battalions (NIBATTs) 1 and 2 arrived at Lungi Airport on 1 December 1999 with an appearance that indicated a lack of preparedness (Oyebanjo 2007). They had no sleeping kits. Basic equipment like tents, a field kitchen, beds and mattresses were not forthcoming. There was no arrangement for their feeding (Esekaigbe 2007, 38). The contingent table of equipment (TOE) fell short of the UN expectation for TCCs. NIGCON lacked the required number of armoured personnel carriers (APCs), vehicles and communication equipment to operate in the mission area (Esekaigbe 2007, 38).
Equipment

NIGCON experienced severe inadequacy in relation to the contingent equipment. Communication, medical and hardware military equipment and spares became dysfunctional without due battle-line replacement. Command and control cohesion reduced as a consequence, affecting the state of equipment readiness and combat efficiency. In one instance, the replacement of faulty major components of APCs, guns and signal equipment had to be delayed owing to unavailability in the logistics supply chain.

Morale

Troop morale was affected when periodic rotations were no longer maintained owing to the change of mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The soldiers became exposed to the whims and caprices of their natures, as their self-control broke down because of over-stretched endurance. Some soldiers developed bad habits and this contributed to indiscipline in the mission area.

DDR programme

NIGCON participated actively in the DDR programme. The programme started after the Lomé Accord, but failed with the reopening of hostilities. NIGCON troops manned reception sites in the Kambia area, Mange, Rosar, Rogberi Junction, Malai, Koso Town, Lungi Loi, Pepel Island and Wilberforce Barracks, and demobilisation centres at Port Loko North and South, and Lungi.

Peace building

NIGCON troops participated in the supervision and monitoring of elections, the reorientation training of disarmed soldiers, and the teaching of children in schools. The performance of NIGCON in these tasks, though salutary, did not conform to best practice, as NIGCON was not adequately trained and equipped for this multidimensional aspect of PSO. The NA’s vast experience in previous UN and regional operations was centred mainly on traditional peacekeeping roles, hence it was perceived as strange that peace building should be a soldier’s responsibility (Esekaigbe 2007, 14).
Humanitarian and quick-impact projects

NIGCON embarked on humanitarian projects aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people of Sierra Leone and ameliorating their suffering (Esekaigbe 2007, 40). Amongst others, the projects included mobile clinic services in the Kambia and Port Loko districts and the renovation and equipping of Port Loko Teachers’ College and Home Economics Centre (Bamalli 2006). However, as NIGCON troops lacked basic training in humanitarian duties, some civilian humanitarian organisations perceived them as crude and hostile (Esekaigbe 2007, 42).

THE COMPLEXITY OF AND CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED DURING MISSIONS

There were common themes in the challenges experienced by the NA owing to recurring problems with planning, preparation and logistics as discussed above. Others difficulties encountered included ambiguous and partisan mandates, a lack of detailed information and intelligence, a lack of skilled personnel, difficulties of command and control, and a lack of national policy on PSOs (Bello 2007).

Ambiguous mandates

The issue of unclear mandates has been a perennial one of the PSOs in which the NA has participated. For example, in the Congo the mission did know how to handle the emergency created by mercenaries from Katanga (Esekaigbe 2007, 46). In Chad, OAU troops stood by while a party to the conflict chased out the government in power. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the mandate was for peacekeeping, whereas the reality was peace enforcement culminating in limited war. This exposed the battle-readiness of NIGCON, as contingents from other nations stuck to the peacekeeping mandate and refused to carry out peace enforcement orders.

Lack of detailed information and intelligence

The absence of a detailed briefing was a major challenge in Nigeria’s preparation for the PSO. Commanders and troops were not adequately briefed on the causes of the conflict, the belligerents and key players in the conflict, the area’s topography or Nigeria’s interest (Esekaigbe 2007, 46). For instance, the first ECOMOG troops to arrive in Sierra Leone in 1997 discovered that the available maps were
outdated (Adeshina 2007). In another instance, troops airlifted from Lungi to Hastings near Freetown were still finding their position when rebels struck, causing casualties within the NIBATT.

**Lack of skilled personnel**

The NA’s participation in PSOs has mostly been in the role of traditional peace-keeping. Thus the ECOMOG operation became a major challenge for the NA with over a brigade in the mission area. Most of the troops lacked the necessary experience for the new multidimensional PSO. This deficiency led to most of the casualties suffered by the NA. Nigeria is believed to have lost over 500 personnel in the Sierra Leone mission area (Oyebanjo 2007). Indiscipline also crept into the ranks. It was alleged that some NA personnel were involved in diamond mining, sexual abuses and the illegal escort of VIPs (Ero 2007).

**Difficulties in command and control**

Most NIBATT personnel who participated in ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone were officers and soldiers drawn from different units. This brought with it a lack of cohesion that affected discipline, esprit-de-corps and performance. Another dimension was the refusal by contingents of other nations to take orders from ECOMOG High Command. This was exacerbated by the lack of coordination and consultation amongst TCCs (Bello 2007).

**Lack of national policy on PSOs**

The non-existence of a clear and definite policy on preparation, entry and exit strategies, and identification of national interest, amongst other things, affected the NA’s participation in the PSO in Sierra Leone. A clear policy would have outlined Nigeria’s national interest in the PSO and the level at which participation was to take place.

**IMPORTANT LESSONS LEARNED**

Arising from Nigeria’s participation in PSOs over the years, some lessons have been learned by the NA. These include the need for a contingency plan and an exit strategy/end state in the PSO, adequate preparation and good planning as constituents of
successful PSOs, the importance of good intelligence, adequate logistical backup and finance, and the development and utilisation of best practices (Esekaigbe 2007).

Contingency plan and exit strategy

The NA became aware of the need to have a deadline by which, if there is no progress in resolving a conflict, peacekeepers will be recalled home. In Liberia and Sierra Leone there was no such deadline and hence Nigeria could not withdraw, though the conflict stretched to almost nine years. Today, the NA’s participation in all PSOs has been limited to a period of not more than six months. Such deadlines can of course always be extended, but their existence will enable a contingent to withdraw honourable (Bello 2007).

Good planning and adequate preparation

Throughout the ECOMOG era up to the early UNAMSIL, good planning and adequate preparation were NIGCONs’ weak point. However, since NIBATT 7 joined UNAMSIL, units have been properly selected, prepared, trained and equipped before deployment. Since the establishment of the Peace-Keeping Wing (PKW) in Jaji, Kaduna, all NIGCONs receive pre-deployment training (PDT) and are equipped in line with the MOU relating to the PSO platform, so as not to repeat the shameful experience of NIBATTs 1 and 2 in UNAMSIL.

Importance of good intelligence

The NA learned the overriding importance of detailed information and good intelligence. Many casualties occurred because of inadequate or even a complete lack of knowledge of the causes of the conflict, the belligerents, the history of Sierra Leone and the topography of the mission area. Adequate briefing, in particular as regards mission specifics, is now provided for units at formation-headquarter level and in the PKW that are going to enter any mission area to avoid the Hastings experience.

Adequate logistics

The problem of logistical backup bedevilled NIGCONs in PSOs for a very long time, from air and sea-lifts to specialist and medical equipment, and from ECOMOG to UNAMSIL operations. Today there is a deliberate effort to conform to the TOE
and MOU of the PSO platform in order not to re-enact the embarrassing scenes of December 1999. Furthermore, contingent finance, i.e. allowances and running costs, which created wide-scale indiscipline within the ranks and mutual suspicion at leadership level during the ECOMOG operations, has also been addressed as a result of the lessons learned.

**DEVELOPMENT AND UTILISATION OF BEST PRACTICE**

The consistent inadequacies of past missions has led to the development and utilisation of best practice through the establishment of a Directorate of Peacekeeping at the Army Headquarters, the establishment of a PKW and the training of units earmarked for PSOs. Unlike the case with ECOMOG, when units were scrambled and inducted for missions, units are now selected and trained at the PKW and other PSO institutions with the assistance of the British Defence Advisory Team (BDAT) and the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) programme provided by the UK government and the USA respectively. This training is aimed at building the NA’s capacity in PSO. The assistance received under this initiative to date consists of numerous workshops and company and battalion-level pre-deployment collective training packages (Nwolise 2004).

**PREPARING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

Nigeria had participated in PSOs for over 47 years before proposing strategies to enhance her capacity in this regard. Many of the difficulties experienced by NIGCONs were self-inflicted and no deliberate efforts were made to learn from their experiences until recently. In preparing the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) for future African PSOs, efforts should be made to learn from the Nigerian case study, as both countries play leadership roles in peace and security at the regional and sub-regional levels.

Since the nature and causes of internal and external conflicts in Africa are similar, it may be assumed that similar PSO instruments, ingredients and processes will achieve peace and stability, provided that lessons are learned from previous PSOs. Consequently, the sad and negative experiences of NIGCONs, particularly in ECOMOG operations up to the early stages of UNAMSIL, must be avoided as a first step. The SANDF could achieve greater success by adhering to a series of integrated strategies drawn from the Nigerian experience. These include the following:
Formulating a policy on SANDF participation in African PSOs that determines the level of participation and SA’s interest in the theatre in the event of a change in the PSO mandate

- Developing a contingency plan with an exit strategy/end state in the PSO
- Ensuring good planning and adequate preparation, including obtaining detailed information on the theatre and intelligence specific to the mission
- Evolving a bold logistical backup that covers financial aspects
- Developing a doctrine, an SOP, a TOE and techniques/tactics to be employed
- Acquiring the structure for PSO training, including humanitarian roles, at company, battalion and services levels

SA as a regional and sub-regional power may be prepared to play a super-power role in any African PSO in which she participates. In this case, she may be required to provide force-level equipment and services that other TCCs may not be in a position to provide, especially as regards the provision of air transportation and armed helicopters, medical care, engineering/recovery units and APCs. The SANDF may be required to staff the force headquarters or produce the force commander. Consequently, SA may need to play ‘Nigeria’ in any SADC ‘ECOMOG’. The approach will depend on the operational concept of the contingent, the mandate of the mission, the platform and the SOFA.

One way of promoting interoperability with other armies, NGOs and international organisations is through international, regional and sub-regional cooperation at summit and lower levels using structures employed in West Africa, such as the ECOWAS Chiefs of Defence Staff forum, where the peace and security of the sub-region is discussed and evaluated. The ECOWAS Defence Security Commission and the ECOWAS standby force mechanisms are other examples of interoperability. Apart from the ECOMOG structure, NGOs and other international organisations also periodically have sub-regional seminars and workshops where issues affecting the sub-region are evaluated.

Relevant threats to the SANDF towards 2020 include a theatre where some elements of the PSO, such as the consent of parties to the conflict and SOFA, are not fully settled before the induction of troops. The interests of TCCs and their response in the event of a mandate change may also expose the lead country. A lack of good planning, adequate preparation and robust logistical backup may be threats the SANDF has to face. The SANDF’s successful participation in, or its effectiveness in leading, a future African PSO that earns global acclaim depends
CONCLUSION

Nigeria’s participation in PSOs started in 1960 when the NA joined the UN peacekeeping operations in Congo. She has since participated in several UN regional and sub-regional PSOs, as well as bilateral agreements. The Sierra Leone crisis was precipitated by the interplay of various political, economic, social and external factors. ECOWAS intervened in the country, invoking a sub-regional security protocol that restored deposed President Kabbah to power. The subsequent reopening of hostilities led to a ceasefire agreement in Lomé and to the Lomé Peace Accord, which paved the way for UNAMSIL.

NIGCON’s experiences and the complexity of challenges it faced during missions were a catalogue of woes ranging from the conventional to the absurd. The NA has learned some lessons after participating in PSOs for more than 40 years, especially in Sierra Leone. These include the need for a contingency plan and an exit strategy, the importance of good planning, adequate preparation and good intelligence, adequate logistics, etc.

In preparing the SANDF for Vision 2020, concerted efforts must be made to avoid the difficulties experienced by NIGCONs during their missions. Consequently, some strategies have been proffered, including the formulation of a policy for SANDF participation in African PSOs. The SANDF must be prepared for lead roles, as SA may be required to play ‘Nigeria’ in any SADC ‘ECOMOG’.

Interoperability could be promoted through international, regional and sub-regional cooperation using available peace and security mechanisms. The threat to the SANDF towards 2020 could be theatre–related, where the elements of PSO are not properly established, and poor holistic preparation by the SANDF for the mission. Opportunities will, however, arise from effective participation and earning global acclaim for successful peace support operations.

LIST OF REFERENCES


Bello, SY. Nigerian military capacity for regional and global peace support operations. Lecture to National War College, Abuja, 8 March 2007.


Chapter Seven

The South African National Defence Force: Midwives of peace in Africa?

An evaluation of SANDF involvement in peace support operations

Dr Thomas Mandrup

INTRODUCTION

‘…any form of participation in peace operations is an extension of South African foreign policy …’ (DFA 1999, 30)

The many years of military counter-insurgency operations by South Africa in southern Africa have meant that the country was perceived, both regionally and internationally, as possessing a significant military capability in relative terms. In the immediate aftermath of the transition in 1994, therefore, it was supposed that South Africa would be able to play a central part in the resolution of future conflicts in southern Africa.

However, the first post-apartheid decade showed South Africa to be very reluctant to undertake this particular international military role for both practical and political reasons. Politically, it proved difficult to deploy the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in international missions in Africa just a few years after its predecessor, the South African Defence Force (SADF), had itself been a main source of conflict. In practical terms too, the SANDF had undergone a far-reaching transformation and reduction process following the transition to democracy in 1994, which at least temporarily reduced its capacity as a defence force. The defence budget had been reduced from 4.4 per cent in 1989 to a projected 1.2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) by
2009, one of the lowest percentages in southern Africa (Portfolio Committee on Defence 2007).

Nonetheless, as this article will argue, the African National Congress (ANC) government has slowly come to acknowledge that the military tool is a useful, if not prioritised, tool in its efforts to fulfil the country’s post-1994 foreign policy ambitions of reform, stability and development in Africa. The reasoning seems to be that South Africa cannot achieve its diplomatic goals in Africa of creating peace, stability and development without being willing to use its coercive tool, e.g. there can be no effective South African engagement with the African Renaissance without the support of the SANDF, comprehensiveness being the key. Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota argued that South African military participation in African peace missions could be used to create a framework for the stabilisation of the continent as a whole (JSCD 2001). However, if it failed, it would also be seen as a failure for South Africa and a setback for the provision of African solutions to African problems. In relation to this, President Mbeki made the following statement in Parliament in June 2004:

Honourable members of the National Assembly, let me emphasise the fact that we have sent troops to countries like Burundi and the DRC because we know that we will never develop and be happy forever all by ourselves while wars and poverty are prevalent in our neighbouring states .... It helps South Africa to work for peace so that we increase the number of countries we can trade with while developing the economy of our country and of Africa as a whole. We are prepared to work for peace in Africa so that no Africans live in poverty and fear. (Mbeki 2004)

Mbeki hereby stated and acknowledged that the SANDF plays a critical role in South African foreign policy, because by helping to secure Africa, South Africa was securing itself. That said, the international role played by the armed forces in the current government is somewhat different from the one they played during the white minority rule of the apartheid era. The perception of threat differs significantly from the era of president Pieter W Botha in particular, when South Africa was seen as the target of a total communist onslaught. At that time, the SADF had to deter this threat and to redirect the confrontation away from South African soil. Today Foreign Minister Nkosazana Zuma has claimed that the SANDF is an integral part of South Africa’s new foreign policy ambition of creating an African renaissance (Zuma 1999).
In his June 2004 defence budget speech, Defence Minister Lekota argued that the SANDF will increasingly support the government’s diplomatic drive in Africa (Lekota 2004), a role that President Mbeki has called ‘being the “midwives” of peace’ (Mbeki 2005). It is unclear, however, to what extent the SANDF has the capacity to carry out this role of supporting and propping up South Africa’s regional diplomatic efforts. Using examples and experiences from some of the recent operations of the SANDF, this paper will attempt to address this question.

THE ROLE, EMPLOYMENT AND CAPACITY OF THE SANDF IN AFRICAN PSOS

Since 1994 South Africa has been faced mainly with non-conventional security challenges, such as crime, migration and social and economic inequality. One of the main tasks performed by the SANDF since 1994 has therefore been to support the police in their attempt to provide safety and security to the people. In the strategic business plan of the Department of Defence (DoD), the SANDF’s primary mission is described as ensuring an ‘effective defence for a democratic South Africa’ (DoD 2004a; DoD 2007). At the same time, the SANDF is increasingly being regarded as an effective and useful foreign-policy tool, one that can support the government’s diplomatic drive in Africa. In the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) it was argued that it was as if the DFA had rediscovered the military tool, a tool they had forgotten they had (Castleman and Short 2003). However, negotiations and political settlement have been and still are the dominant strategy in South African foreign policy and the military tool is only used to secure the political solutions once these have been achieved (Castleman and Short 2003). In the SA cabinet there is still a fundamental lack of belief in military solutions to international problems, which explains why the SA government has a difficulty with the current US administration’s unilateral approach to international relations and its tendency to rely on military solutions.

The new priorities and focus for the SANDF, which followed the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DoD 1996) and especially the 1998 Defence Review, have been subjected to criticism, especially from scholars like Peter Vale who argues that the new force, and thus the SA government, has continued to keep the focus in defence on national security and that this represents a continuation of the security perceptions of the pre-1994 period. Vale argues that even though South Africa is no longer confronted by any conventional military threat, the focus on national security and sovereignty, e.g. on protecting borders etc., is still based on
such a security perception. The opportunity to build a new type of joint regional common security system has been missed, he claims. According to Vale, the ANC government was never interested in changing the system, merely in establishing control over it. The process of transformation therefore took the form of a trade-off between the new and old elites. The White Paper process is a typical example of an attempt to create a framework for SA military contributions to international PSOs by looking backwards and not forwards to the future.

However, despite the fact that Vale is right to criticise the defence review process, which ended with a narrow definition of security, he misses an important point. A modern defence force needs to able to undertake a wide range of tasks, including offensive operations. Even defensive strategies, such as the so-called ‘non-offensive defence’ (NOD), have significant offensive capabilities incorporated within them. That being said, it is true that in hindsight it seems as if the over R50 billion 1999 Strategic Defence Package (SDP) was shaped by this narrow security thinking, leaving the SANDF with expensive and technologically advanced equipment that is expensive and difficult to maintain and keep operational, while not being useful for the day-to-day tasks of the force. The most striking example is the acquisition of the three new German-made submarines.

THE TASKS, THE FORCE STRUCTURE AND ITS SUSTAINABILITY

The proposal for a permanent force of 70 000 as put forward in the Defence Review has been declared unsustainable, while the White Paper on Peace Missions has become outdated. In 2008 the permanent force numbered 84 000, exceeding the unsustainable 70 000 by 14 000. The DoD has furthermore told policymakers that the current level of operations by approximately 4 700 soldiers deployed domestically and on international missions cannot be sustained without additional funding or political prioritisation of the tasks of the SANDF. However, the attitude in other government departments seems to be that the DoD receives more than enough resources as it is. In his June 2004 defence budget speech and again in his 2005 speech (Lekota 2005), Lekota gave particular attention to the SANDF’s participation in international operations. This has to be understood as part of the prioritisation of the tasks of the SANDF, which includes a greater focus on its support role for the country’s diplomatic drive in Africa. Nevertheless, in reality and according to, for instance, the SANDF military strategy paper for 2004-2007, the missions envisaged for the next ten
years can be divided into three pillars in terms of tasks that the force needs to be capable of undertaking at any time.

The three mission areas show the tasks already given to the SANDF, as well as tasks it expects to be added in future. At the political level, a prioritisation of the SANDF tasks and missions has been initiated as this will enable funds to be made available for what are considered to be the core tasks of the armed forces. Currently, for example, the defence budget includes, as shown in pillar three, internal deployments in support of the South African Police Service (SAPS), which constitutes a major financial drain on the total budget.

However, the Cabinet has decided that routine support to SAPS is to be phased out by 31 March 2009, thereby enabling the SANDF to focus increasingly on the tasks contained in the first two pillars. However, in the draft Defence Update it is stated that ‘support to the People of South Africa’ is a permanent task, which

---

**Figure 1 The major missions for the SANDF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence against aggression</th>
<th>Promoting security</th>
<th>Supporting the people of South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Show of force</td>
<td>Support military foreign relations</td>
<td>Maritime support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emptive operations (within the limits of international law regulating the use of force?)</td>
<td>Defence against and information onslaught</td>
<td>Border-line control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repelling of conventional onslaught</td>
<td>International, regional or sub-regional peace support operations:</td>
<td>Cooperation with the South African Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repelling of unconventional onslaught</td>
<td>■ Observers</td>
<td>Search-and-rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repelling of unconventional onslaught</td>
<td>■ Peace-keeping</td>
<td>Disaster-relief and humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence against an information onslaught</td>
<td>■ Peace-making</td>
<td>Presidential assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence against a biological and/or chemical onslaught</td>
<td>■ Peace-building</td>
<td>Presidential health support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special operations</td>
<td>■ Peace-enforcement</td>
<td>Maintenance of health status of members of the SANDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of foreign assets</td>
<td>■ Humanitarian intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
again shows that the SANDF must be in a position to undertake a broad range of
tasks (DoD 2005b, Chapter 4, Article 9, 16). The ability to prioritise between the
three mission areas is limited. The mission areas fall in line with the suggestion
in the draft Defence Update that the distinction between primary and secondary
functions be removed. Consequently all tasks are seen to be equally important
(DoD 2005b, Chapter 4, Articles 15 and16, 17).

At the political level, it has previously been stressed that the most important
task of the SANDF is to provide support for the people and to protect the state
against external attacks. However, as mentioned already, South Africa faces
no conventional military threat in the short to medium term. Moreover, tasks
that were formerly considered of secondary importance have in reality become
primary, for instance participation in PSOs and disaster relief (DoD 2004b, 5).

The major challenges envisaged during the consultative processes in the 1990s
have been exceeded by the scope of the government’s ambitions and the capabili-
ties required of the SANDF. As Williams (2000, 119) points out, it is very rare for
modern armed forces actually to perform their primary functions; rather, the
secondary tasks become their day-to-day role. The DoD must therefore tackle
the dual task of retaining the capability to handle the primary functions – as
stipulated in the Constitution and as outlined in pillar one in the illustration –
while at the same time being able to cope with the increased level of secondary
tasks the politicians expect the SANDF to undertake (DoD 2004b, 5). Dr Gerhard
Koornhof, ANC member of the Portfolio Committee on Defence, stated in this
regard that 'the SANDF will play an increasingly determining role with regard to
the stabilisation of the region south of the Sahara’ (Koornhof 2004, 13). He thus
underlined the political ambitions directed towards the SANDF in playing an
increasingly important role in securing future peace and stability in sub-Saharan
Africa in support of the government’s diplomatic drive.

Similarly, at the defence hearing in November 2004 and in the draft proposals
put before the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), it was repeatedly
pointed out that the narrow focus on primary functions that had driven the first
defence review was too limited and that South Africa’s national security interests
now had to be seen as including peace and stability in Africa generally. The SA
defence attaché in Kinshasa confirmed this position when he tried to explain the
reasons behind South Africa’s involvement as a mediator in the DRC conflict
(Khaniye 2004). In November 2004, South Africa had more than 3 000 soldiers
deployed as part of international PSOs, primarily in the DRC and Burundi. In
addition, in 2006, the SANDF had 11 rifle companies, or a total of 1 765 troops,
deployed domestically on a daily basis in support of SAPS in an effort to tackle the crime pandemic.¹²

This means that the SANDF has a total of more than 4 700 soldiers, or five to seven battalion-sized formations, occupied continuously in what has been described as secondary roles, namely support to SAPS, humanitarian relief operations and support to South Africa’s foreign policy. Not only does this make training and mission preparation more difficult, but it has put heavy pressure on the defence budget (Le Roux 2003b). In the Defence Review it was recognised that ‘additional capabilities may be required’ (DoD 1998, 30) if the SANDF were to undertake secondary functions like PSOs. The Strategic Plan for 2004–2007 concludes: ‘Budget constraints are adversely affecting the ability of the SANDF to maintain and sustain certain capabilities’ (DoD 2004a, DoD 2007). But the political statements coming from the ruling party still cling to the constitutional requirement of providing deterrence against external aggression, as well as providing support to the people. This places severe limitations on the capacity of the SANDF if it is at the same time increasingly expected to prepare for PSOs elsewhere on the continent (Koornhof 2004, 10).

The November 2004 mid-term financial statement showed that the SANDF only had adequate resources to keep its full force in the DRC and a small contingent in Burundi. The statement concluded that government policy seemed to be that the forces in Burundi should be withdrawn when no more resources were allocated to the DoD (DoD 2004c). This, of course, is part of the game of political bargaining between the DoD and other government departments for additional funding. It also stresses a point made by Alden and Le Pere (Alden and Le Pere 2003, 73) that the public debate in South Africa concerning participation in PSOs did not focus so much on the risk of landing in militarily difficult circumstances as on the financial implications. This point was also partly illustrated in the Defence Portfolio Committee during the debate following the presentation of the DoD’s strategy for the 2007/08 financial year. The chair of the meeting, Tandi Tobias, concluded that the DoD would not get additional funding and ‘… that it would be very difficult for the Minister of Finance to prioritise defence, when it had already been agreed that South Africa’s biggest enemies were poverty, underdevelopment and unemployment’ (Portfolio Committee on Defence 2007). Interestingly enough, there was no debate on the consequences of this fact for the operations, and the risks to the individual soldiers.

In addition to this, the DoD has been affected by problems of a financial nature because reimbursement for participation in UN missions is not paid to
the DoD, but directly to the Ministry of Finance. Although the White Paper on Participation in Peace Missions stipulates that the decision to participate in international peace missions is a shared responsibility of several government departments, as well as of Parliament and the President’s Office, the DFA has the overriding responsibility, both as regards coordinating effort and securing the necessary bridging funding (DFA 1999, 28). This has often not been the case and participation in international missions has had to be covered partly from the DoD’s ordinary budget. One of the difficulties is a lack of departmental coordination and the fact that for periods of time the Presidency has had a tendency to act on its own without proper coordination with government departments. The bottom line is that the guidelines laid down in the 1999 White Paper on Peace Missions are often not followed, thus creating a number of problems for the DoD and the SANDF in terms of funding and the availability of soldiers and equipment.

PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES: THE SANDF’S INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The SANDF (and before that the SADF) had a reputation in military circles of having, in relative terms, high military standards equivalent to those of most First-World countries. However, the record of SANDF PSO participation since 1994 is, I would claim, changing this perception. I shall return to this later. However, for the SANDF the increased deployment to international PSOs has constituted both an opportunity and a challenge, the former because it created a raison d’être for the force, exemplified by General Siphiwe Nyanda’s (former Chief of the SANDF) statement that there will be no renaissance without military muscle and consequently that the continued state funding of defence is fully justified. Since 1994 the SANDF and the DoD have had to fight for their existence and they have been hampered in their efforts by politicians who for a long time did not have a clear idea of why they wanted a defence force. The situation is summarised in the following statement:

In a democracy, the government can only employ the military if they have the backing of both the public and the media. This reality is also tempered by a growing public apathy towards the military. The SANDF does not feature prominently on the South African political agenda anymore, besides the occasional reference to the necessity of employing the SANDF
in the fight against crime and the importance of the SANDF being representative of the broader South African public ... the SANDF has been relegated to almost peripheral status. (Kent and Malan 2003, 13f).

The public debate on the role of defence in the foreign policy has been remarkable by its absence, while the government has been unwilling to prioritise the SANDF’s international deployment, apart from festive speeches and supportive statements. Real commitment has been lacking because other sectors of society are perceived as constituting bigger security challenges than African conflicts. Recent international deployment experiences show that the international role given to the SANDF is not accompanied by the required resource commitment. The SANDF is having to struggle for additional resources from the National Revenue Fund in competition with other government departments (Mandrup 2007a, 250; Mandrup 2007b; Mandrup 2008). The policy seems to be that the SANDF must make do with the resources it receives. The result is malfunctioning equipment, lack of training, etc., all of which increases the risk to the individual soldier in operation.13

The fact that the political level did not follow the White Paper guidelines was, however, also a positive problem for the SANDF. For the first time it provided the DoD with a legitimate reason to apply for additional funding on the basis of the government requiring its services. The DoD has therefore been reluctant to object to new deployments as they constituted a real opportunity for the SANDF as well. From being a problem and a perceived negative strain on national finances, the SANDF turned out to be an indispensable tool to government, in terms of support for both the people and SAPS at home, and the DFA in international peace missions. On the other hand, the deployment to international PSOs was a challenge for the SANDF since it was a new task for the force, one for which it had not been prepared. In addition, it occurred in the middle of an internal transformation process. Like many other military forces in the contemporary world, the SANDF was experienced in and capable of fighting the battle, but inexperienced in winning the peace.14

The extent to which the SANDF has been reduced to ‘almost peripheral status’ is, of course, debatable. It is true that compared with the period before 1994 it has a peripheral status, but in reality this is a positive sign. It shows that the armed forces have been ‘relegated’ to exercising their role within the military sphere of society under strict civilian and democratic control. In the draft Defence Update document, the DoD itself stresses that
The South African National Defence Force

South Africa’s domestic security environment has improved significantly since the inception of democratic governance. The security sector, in particular, has been transformed to display values of democratic governance that reflect the principles of transparency, accountability and representivity. (DoD 2005b, Article 16, 5)

The most important elements in the reform of civilian-military relations were the constitutional position of the president as commander-in-chief, the constitutionally determined functions of the SANDF, parliamentary committee oversight and a transparent defence policy process. According to Len le Roux, senior researcher at the ISS in Pretoria (Le Roux 2003a, 8), this has meant that the armed forces could focus their attention on their primary function, namely provision, preparation and employment. The armed forces ceased to be a political player, and a clear separation between the civilian and military sphere was established. What was of particular importance was the establishment of civilian control and oversight of the armed forces. This brought with it that SANDF personnel started focusing on being professional soldiers.¹⁵

**CO-OPERATION WITH THE REGION**

The security and development of South Africa is inextricably linked to southern Africa and the continent. Africa therefore remains the focus in the conduct of our defence policy and relations. South Africa is accordingly committed to and deeply involved in strengthening continental and regional structures, in particular the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and in the implementation of socio-economic development programmes like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). (DoD 2005b, Chapter 2, Article 1, 5-6)

DoD strategic plans stress that military co-operation with the region is being prioritised. In the draft Defence Update the emphasis is being placed on collective security¹⁶, i.e. a focus on human security and rejection of the separation of the security of the state from that of the people, which should nonetheless be seen as mutually dependent (DoD 2005b, 6). However, South Africa is geographically situated in what Holsti (1996, 141ff) defines as a ‘zone of conflict’, thus placing it in a delicate dilemma, namely how to function as a democratic state in a ‘rough neighbourhood’¹⁷ but also how to co-operate militarily with
states that do not necessarily comply with the same democratic principles, and for whom the main focus is on creating security for the ruling regime and not the people. By nature, these states are often not interested in collective security arrangements, but in collective defence arrangements. The problems with security cooperation and integration in SADC could be seen as partly resulting from this distinction.

On the more practical side, and through its security cooperation in SADC and the AU, the South African government has tried to create a strategy for how to deal with future cooperation by the SANDF with some of the ill-disciplined and low-capacity forces of a majority of its African partners, as well as with other African military forces when on deployment in joint missions. This includes, for instance, standards of accommodation and facilities in the camps while deployed.

Military cooperation in SADC is, after some years of internal struggle, beginning to take shape and today seems more than just a long-term ambition. South Africa has been very active in the formation of the so-called SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG) as part of the overall African Standby Force (ASF), which according to the plan should by 2010 be able to provide the AU with a rapid reaction capability consisting of five regionally-based brigades. The SADCBRIG was declared operational at a ceremony in Lusaka in 2007. However, it is currently only a ‘paper-tiger’ since the contributing countries still have to produce the designated units and permit a SADC inspection. In addition to this, SADCBRIG has difficulties in securing the needed funding. However, SADCBRIG has a high South African priority and in the DoD’s draft Defence Update it is stated: ‘As the largest UN troop-contributing country in the region, South Africa will be expected to make a meaningful contribution to the establishment and maintenance of the SADC regional brigade’. (DoD 2005b, Chapter 2, Article 22, 9)

This very vague formulation does not specify what the South African contribution is going to consist of, apart from it being ‘meaningful’, which in this context could be seen as substantial. However, SADCBRIG poses some direct challenges to the SANDF because as the regional power South Africa plays a pivotal role in setting up and sustaining SADCBRIG, i.e. by providing the specialised functions that its partners are unable to provide. This is essential if SADCBRIG is to be operational. Another issue with serious ramifications for South Africa, and especially the future force design, is that the ASF brigades are supposed to be able to undertake robust enforcement-type operations. This means that the SANDF needs to have significant offensive capabilities in its inventory.
For the SANDF this poses some concrete challenges because its existing strategies and doctrines have turned out to be insufficient, i.e. the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the subsequent 1998 Defence Review do not match the tasks the SANDF is being required to undertake. Internally the process of reform and transformation will have to continue, shaping the force to the task that lies ahead by making the best use of the limited resources available to serve the interests of the Republic. It will always be debated in a society like South Africa, with its large developmental needs because a third of its population live in poverty, whether these resources might be better used elsewhere. This is especially the case with a technologically advanced force, which, as Gilpin (1981, 66) points out, tends to become increasingly expensive. This means that it seems rather unlikely that the DoD share of the GDP will be increased in the near future, which the statement by the Chair of the Portfolio Committee quoted in the section above on ‘The tasks, the force structure and its sustainability’ also stresses. The DoD must settle for the resources at its disposal, which is why major acquisitions for the army, which were supposed to be the focus in the second phase of the strategic defence package (SDP), might be difficult to get through government.

EVALUATION OF THE SANDF’S PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN AFRICAN PSOS

Of South Africa’s current contribution of some 3 000 soldiers to international PSOs, 1 700 are attached to UN missions. Since the initiation of Operation Boleas in Lesotho in 1998, the SANDF has become an important tool in the implementation of South Africa’s foreign policy. This section will look at some of the issues brought to light by South Africa’s recent PSO experiences, particularly its involvement in Operation Boleas, AMIB/ONUB (African Mission in Burundi and UN Operation in Burundi), and MONUC (the UN Mission in the DRC). These three operations provide some important insights into South Africa’s use of its military tool in the conduct of foreign policy since 1994, and especially the capacity of the SANDF to undertake this role. Since this is an area that is undergoing rapid change, the cases discussed can only give an indication of how the situation has developed from 1994 up to the time of writing in early 2008, and point to some of the possible pitfalls that lie ahead. The operations chosen have provided the political level with some important lessons concerning what can and cannot be expected of the SANDF as a foreign policy tool. This has been important in the debate on the role of the defence force in post-apartheid South Africa.
The operations show that South Africa has generally followed a negotiating strategy in which it has functioned as a mediator, followed by a military commitment during the implementation phase. In the case of Burundi and the DRC, the SANDF was used as a foreign policy tool, implementing brokered peace agreements under extremely volatile conditions. The cases also show that, despite its stated peaceful strategy, the government is willing to use coercive means if need be. In the case of Lesotho the SANDF was used as a pre-emptive tool and in the case of the DRC as part of a robust PSO operation. The DRC case is especially interesting, as for a long time South Africa disagreed with MONUC about the interpretation of the mandate concerning the use of force (Mandrup 2007a; Mandrup 2007b), wanting MONUC to use forcible disarmament long before the MONUC leadership was prepared to do so.

The three cases indicate that, despite South Africa’s stated strategy of a benign peaceful approach, it is in some instances willing to use the SANDF in a coercive manner to obtain the required political results, which is of course in accordance with the possible mission areas described in the DoD’s strategic business plan. This, combined with the general development in international PSOs towards more robust mandates, indicates that in the future the SANDF will increasingly be engaged in complex PSOs with a Chapter VII mandate. In addition, the future deployment of SADCBRIG might have a robust or even offensive nature. However, the SA government will continue to follow its multilateral track and the SANDF will also in the future be used in UN and AU-mandated missions. The mandating of missions is critical, as South Africa learnt in 1998 when a mandate was not in place before the initiation of Operation Boleas, which created considerable problems for the government. (Mandrup 2007b).

In the case of South Africa’s involvement in Burundi, Minister Lekota argued that this operation was to be seen as a model for peace in Africa (JSCD 2001). The involvement in the DRC and Burundi was a matter of creating peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region to safeguard and protect current and especially future South African markets for export of industrial products, as well as access to and control of natural resources (Manuel 2002). This was to be done by creating the necessary foundations for peace and development. However, the operation also involved issues of moral responsibility in relation to fellow Africans and was thus part of the Pan-African idea. This thought became apparent during the debate in the Portfolio Committee on Defence when an ANC committee member argued that South Africa had a moral obligation to assist fellow Africans in need. Both the economic and moral issues are closely
tied to the country’s role as a regional power, e.g. the desire for control and the responsibility to provide security for the members of regional structures. The country’s involvement in the peace process in Burundi was an important step in creating this model for peace in Africa.

Past experience shows that the government has been willing to compromise on criteria such as sufficient means, a distinct entry/exit strategy and a clear mandate because of the greater importance given by it to strategic concerns and South Africa’s predominantly benign regional great-power role. Beyond its role as a mediator, South Africa needs to take an active part in the creation of peace and stability on the continent in order to sustain this role. As mentioned above, the credibility of a mediator is closely tied to their ability to deliver results. The SANDF has become an integral part of this strategy by supporting the government’s diplomatic strategy, which includes the use of force if required.

The Burundi operation showed that despite its shortcomings the SANDF was able to perform its role as lead nation in the mission. The government has put a lot of effort into building and reforming both continental and regional structures. Within this context, it has been able to create and sustain its role as a credible mediator and benign regional power. The shortcomings of the SANDF in the DRC and Burundi operations do not constitute a major issue in this regard, since the quality and capacity of the SANDF still remained relatively higher than that of most of its African partners. There is no doubt, however, that the shortcomings that did occur will have a negative influence on the capacity of future regional ASF brigades and their potential for success when deployed. The significant structural problems faced by the SANDF in general were also experienced in both the DRC and Burundi operations. The SANDF has started a process to address this by, for instance, rewriting the White Papers and creating the South African Army’s (SAA) Vision 2020 paper, but there is still a long way to go. The first phase of the SDP will provide the SANDF with some critical capabilities that will enhance its capacity for leading regional PSOs as well, but will not solve the main capacity problems within the army (Mandrup 2007a). In its 2007/08 strategic business plan (DoD 2005a), the DoD itself points to the risks of the SANDF facing the blanket obsolescence of several major weapon systems, which could inter alia result in a lowering of morale and motivation among its personnel (DoD 2007). Seen from a Western point of view, if the government fails to provide the SANDF with the necessary resources to undertake its missions in a satisfactory manner it could have severe ramifications for South Africa’s strategic role. Nevertheless, the capacity of the SANDF must also be analysed with respect
to the framework within which it works and the partners with whom it has to operate, and not necessarily by NATO standards.

For the SANDF, deployment in Burundi did provide some important lessons. It was the first time it led an international peace mission. It showed the difficulty of having to rely on international partners, given the fact that troop replacements from partner countries failed to materialise after the first year. It also showed how difficult it can be to cooperate with forces from partner states. For instance, South Africa was forced to provide the initial financing for Mozambican forces before that country would even consider deploying its forces in Burundi. The AMIB/ONUB experience was valuable in the sense that it helped in the establishment of SADCBRIG and pointed to areas needing special attention. It also provided important lessons about the capacity of a small state, in military terms, such as Mozambique. This could, for instance, prove beneficial in the area of communications equipment, where many African nations have a limited capacity, but to which South Africa is able to contribute.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF PROXIMITY**

Experience from the three deployments has demonstrated that there is a certain discrepancy between the conduct of regional policy and the officially stated policy. The prioritisation and quality claimed for South African forces have lacked follow-up on the ground when deployment has occurred. The operations discussed have shown that it is necessary to divide South Africa’s regional policy, and thus its political and economic commitments, into different sections based on the geographic proximity of the deployment area to South Africa, even though the draft Defence Update stipulates that PSOs will be considered as important as national defence (DoD 2005b).

Operation Boleas, despite having to be considered an extraordinary operation, showed that South Africa was willing to use force pre-emptively to achieve its foreign policy goals. This was not the case in Burundi, and especially not in the DRC. The main difference was that Lesotho as a small, landlocked state with a large expatriate community living in South Africa, which makes it totally dependent on its big neighbour, has always been regarded as being within South Africa’s sphere of national interests (Alden and Soko 2006). Another important element was that the South African-led intervention was a signal to the parties that the historical tradition in Lesotho of military interference was no longer acceptable in a southern African context. It can be argued that for South Africa to
be able to initiate its reform proposals in Africa in general it needs to safeguard its own sphere of interest. A military government in Lesotho would therefore be totally unacceptable to the SA government and its ambitions in Africa.

It can also be argued that South Africa was able to play the role it did in Burundi and the DRC only because of its earlier intervention in Lesotho. It had proved itself a credible mediator following its military intervention by assisting with the drafting of a new constitution for Lesotho. This same ability has in recent years been seen in the DRC within MONUC’s eastern command. Had the coup plotters in Lesotho been successful, it would have undermined South Africa’s status as a regional power and mediator. The SANDF therefore became the tool that saved a seemingly failed attempt at political mediation.

The two cases in the Great Lakes Region both showed the limitations and possibilities of the military as a foreign policy tool. The SA government was unwilling to use the SANDF in the 1998 Zimbabwean-led attempt to save the autocratic leadership of Laurent Kabila, primarily because of its preference for political settlements. But it can also be argued that the so-called SADC force served South Africa’s interests because, in the end, it forced the parties in the DRC to find and accept a negotiated solution. The DRC itself was outside South Africa’s traditional direct sphere of interest, which is another reason why South Africa did not take part in the military expedition by three SADC members. South Africa was also of the opinion that the parties to the conflict at the time were not ready for a political solution, having to exhaust each other first. The SANDF’s role in the DRC, as in Burundi, was to secure the implementation of a negotiated peace deal, which underlines the SA government’s preference for the political tool.

Proximity, political reality and objectives, as well as capacity, are the keys to understanding South Africa’s behaviour and the use of the SANDF. Central to the ANC political view is a peaceful resolution of disputes, with force being used only when the diplomatic options have been exhausted or South Africa’s interests are directly at stake. The Lesotho case is an example of this, since South Africa’s interests were clearly at stake. In the Great Lakes South African forces never used coercion in attempting to force the remaining rebel force, the Forces for National Liberation in Burundi (FNL), to accept a peace deal, even though it could be argued that the diplomatic channels had apparently been exhausted on several occasions. This, of course, also had something to do with the mandate, which did not allow for forceful disarmament.

However, in the DRC, South Africa has been one of the states calling for MONUC to disarm the so-called negative forces in the eastern DRC by force. The
SANDF has played a central role in offensive operations against and disarmament of the militias and the foreign rebels operating from the eastern DRC. The South African government has in this instance allowed its forces to be used in offensive military operations as a part of a UN force to secure the success of a political process partly brokered by itself. This active involvement against the ‘negative’ forces has had a positive effect on its standing among the political leaders of the Great Lakes region, who in 2006 asked the South African government to help find a solution to the problems in northern Uganda. This has resulted in South Africa now being involved in peace negotiations in all the states in the Great Lakes Region.

It is a combination of effort that has put South Africa in this role. The SANDF helped to implement the politically negotiated settlements, thereby making the political achievements possible. In the Burundi case the SANDF played, and still plays, an important role in keeping the signatories to the Arusha peace agreement on board by providing security, while allowing the non-signatory rebel movements to join the agreement at a later stage. By early 2008 the SANDF was an integral part of South African foreign policy, something that was not the case in the period from 1994 to 2001. However, even though it is almost impossible to think of South African foreign policy without including the SANDF, structural and capacity problems and lack of government priority remain to be solved in order to make the force a more effective tool, and not a partly negative effort, as has to some extent been the case in the DRC.28

THE PSO EXPERIENCE AND THE SANDF’S LEAD-NATION CAPABILITY

The AU expects the regional powers to play a central role in the formation of the ASF and the DoD argues that South Africa will have to play a meaningful role in SADCBRIG, i.e. that SADCBRIG will have difficulties in becoming operational without significant South African contributions. However, the question that remains to be answered is whether the SANDF has the capacity to take on this role, or even the role as lead nation in future PSOs in the African theatre.

On paper the SANDF has the capability and the inventory to function as a lead nation in international PSOs. It has the HQ capacity, communications equipment for a whole mission and specialised functions such as level three medical facilities, airport handling crews, river patrol capacity, engineering units, etc. In addition to this, it will soon have a long-distance transport and close air support
capacity. This means that in theory South Africa would be able to take on the responsibility of a lead nation for a brigade-level deployment. It can even be argued that it has already partly done this in Operation Boleas and in AMIB/ONUB.

However, the reality on the ground indicates that serious structural and capability issues affect the capacity of the SANDF to undertake a lead-nation role. The record shows that in actual operations South Africa has had difficulties in meeting several of the requirements of lead nations, mostly because of a lack of economic and human resources, but also because of domestic political constraints and poor management within the SANDF itself. According to Mandrup (2007a), the SANDF has a significant capacity problem within its armed forces. Some of these are structural – general-to-private ratio, tooth-to-tail ratio, the relationship between force design and available resources – while others are due to bottlenecks caused by difficulties with rotation, serious health problems among personnel and vacancies in critical-function personnel groups. Other problems stem from domestic policy constraints, a shortage of forced retrenchment possibilities for surplus personnel and an imbalance between the need to fast-track officers and the need for experience in creating skilled staff officers.

With the introduction of the Military Skills Development System (MSDS) the force started a much-needed rejuvenation process within the SANDF. This programme will help to sustain present levels of deployment without the same individual having to be deployed twice within 18 months, as was the case, for instance, in the DRC and Burundi during deployments from 2002 to 2006. The positive effect of MSDS on the deployment capacity of the regular army units will not, however, resolve the situation when it comes to specialised functions in view of the serious health situation in the SANDF. The financial repercussions of the latter are also significant (Mandrup 2007a, 159-207).

Another area that is causing concern when it comes to the lead-nation role of the SANDF is the financial problems being faced by the force. For various reasons, the SANDF does not have the required resources to maintain its equipment on a daily basis, thus creating a maintenance backlog (Mandrup 2007a). As a result, a lot of resources are required to prepare and make equipment operational prior to deployment. This is because of the present force structure, which, as mentioned previously, is according to the DoD not financially sustainable within the current defence budgetary frame (DoD 2004b). Another complication is the force structure itself. The SANDF has a problematic tooth-to-tail ratio, which means that too few troops are being left at the sharp end, available for deployment. Currently the SANDF has a general-to-private ratio of approximately 1 to 300, compared
with an average in the Western world of 1 to 1 500 to 2 000 (ISS 2004, 10). One reason for this is that the DoD has, in terms of salary-brackets and areas of responsibility, attempted to duplicate the system that prevails in the rest of the public sector. This is expensive and has a negative impact on the capacity of the force (Le Roux 2004).

An additional aspect to be considered is that the logistical problems facing the SANDF are seriously affecting its level of operational readiness. This situation has been partly caused by the open-tender system favoured by the government, which prolongs the acquisition process. In addition, the DoD has insufficient resources to maintain the necessary stock of spare parts. This problem is solved by the military units by cannibalising some equipment to keep the rest operational, which is an expensive and time-consuming way to run an armed force. Although this is not a uniquely South African problem, it does raise a number of risks and needs to be firmly controlled by the logistical chiefs. If all levels of a defence force, which seems to be partly the case in the SANDF, start cannibalising equipment at their own initiative, it reduces the totality of operational equipment available. In reality a piece of equipment that is cannibalised will never be operational again. An issue that worsens the level of operational readiness and increases the incentive to cannibalise is the shortage of critical-function personnel, in particular pilots.32 The SANDF’s incapability to keep its equipment in working order has a very negative effect on the lead-nation capacity of the force.

During the MONUC operation, several UN inspection teams declared the SANDF contingent to be at insufficient force readiness (Mandrup 2007a, 255-284).33 The contingent’s standard of training, discipline and equipment turned out to be not much better than that of the troops of the other African contributors (Iffl and 2004). This correlates poorly with the SA government’s stated political ambitions of wanting to make a significant and meaningful contribution, and thus make a difference, i.e. by being an example for others to follow. The forces in the DRC were deployed with equipment that UN inspections declared ‘non-operational’, while vital strategic components were not made available (Iffl and 2004; Meier 2004). For instance, of the total of 18 armed personnel carriers (APC)34 deployed in the DRC in August 2004, 13 were declared non-operational owing to maintenance problems.35

This pattern was confirmed at a re-inspection conducted in November 2004 (Meier 2004), which indicates that the political commitment is not being followed by actual commitment on the ground. South Africa cannot take on its responsibility as a lead nation with relatively weak African partners without the
capacity to keep its own equipment in good working order. A peace mission will not be able to function if, for instance, it has no engineering capacity. For others to call on or accept South Africa as a lead nation, the SANDF must be able to ensure that its specialised functions are both available and operational. The lack of critical-function personnel will have a seriously negative effect on the capacity of the future SADCBRIG if it is not remedied, since certain capabilities will be (partly) unavailable. On a more practical note, the low levels of operational readiness also mean that South Africa does, in principle, not receive any reimbursement for the malfunctioning equipment, putting even more strain on the already stretched resources of the SANDF.

Finally, the SANDF has a force-cultural problem in the sense that its forces on deployment have so far exhibited an extremely poor disciplinary record. There has been increased focus on this particular area because of sexual-abuse investigations, especially in MONUC. This is a command and control issue, one that the SANDF leadership must take much more seriously. Ultimately, the behaviour of forces on deployment is the responsibility of the chief of defence, since it is his directives that should be implemented on the ground. The behaviour of South African troops, especially off-duty troops in both Burundi and the DRC, has been an embarrassment to South Africa and has given the force a bad reputation. South Africa needs a professional and capable force that functions properly when it represents South Africa.

On a slightly more positive note, the SANDF has made an important difference during its deployments. The force has been highly praised, for instance, during high-risk combat operations in Kivu province and Ituri in the DRC. This illustrates that the force does indeed have a high fighting capacity, which of course is something that needs to be maintained. The complex asymmetry that characterises many present-day conflicts and the robust nature of the ASF brigades underlines the fact that there is still a need for this offensive capability. However, the disciplinary problems need to be tackled, while most of the other problems relate back to the DoD, the force planners and the politicians, who make the job difficult for the forces in operations.

The cases discussed previously show that the SANDF has the capacity to function as a lead nation, but in the present situation political, institutional and economic factors are making it difficult for it to fulfil this task properly. The delayed consultative defence policy review processes need to be completed to enable funds to be released for operational expenses. The political level needs to realise that, if it wants the SANDF to play the lead-nation role, it must release more funds to it.
The SANDF will have to cooperate with often weak SADC or African partners and the demands on the South African contribution are likely to increase. This will be expensive and the political level will have to decide whether it is willing to provide the necessary resources.

CONCLUSION

The SA Army is finding it increasingly difficult to provide affordable and sustainable readiness levels for the increasing CJ Ops operational output requirement (internally and externally) and simultaneous joint and combined training requirements due to the current health status and ageing HR profile of serving members, which is compounded by a lack of aligned additional funding. (DoD 2004b, 36)

This statement to a large extent captures the challenges facing the DoD and the SANDF. A lack of funding and a whole range of structural problems and bottlenecks is reducing the capacity of the SANDF to support the government’s foreign policy. The prospect of South Africa’s military capabilities and its ability to function as a lead nation in PSOs and in the ASF may seem bleak. There seem to be two aspects to this. One is the force-to-force ratio in future deployments, i.e. what number and quality of soldiers, and how much equipment does South Africa need to fulfil its future African deployment roles? Conflicts in Africa are usually low-tech and low-intensity in nature. The technological level of the SANDF will exceed the forces it will encounter while deployed. It will therefore have technological advantages compared with most of the African armies or militias it will be facing. Moreover, the SANDF is a relatively potent and disciplined fighting force, though there is a general perception within the force of reduced capacity and quality. As well as the force has conducted itself during operations, many disciplinary problems have emerged in camp.

A second aspect is the force-space ratio in relation to the tasks given to the SANDF. It is clear that this is a potential problem for the SANDF because of its current limited deployment capacity. If the maximum sustainable force level that can be deployed by the SANDF stands at 3 000, this might well turn out to be insufficient to deal with the tasks that South Africa will be expected to address. However, the capacity to function as a lead nation is not necessarily tied to a capacity to deploy large force numbers (Rahbek, per com) More important for South Africa will be the ability to provide critical functions and thus to tie the
operation together. South Africa is slowly expanding its capacity in this regard and will be able to undertake such a commitment. Nigeria, by comparison, has an army of 150 000 soldiers and a much larger deployment potential, but it lacks much of the critical-function capacity required. Because of South Africa’s economic priorities and the SANDF’s structural problems, it seems unlikely that its capacity will exceed the current 3 000 during peacetime. In the event of a ‘push’, the capacity will evidently be much bigger.

It is important to acknowledge that until now the SANDF has been able to carry out the tasks allocated to it. It can be argued that this relatively limited armed force has shown an impressive ability to consistently deploy more than 4 700 soldiers internationally and domestically since the summer of 2003. However, compared with other states this figure is not that high. As an example, Denmark plans to deploy and sustain 2 000 soldiers out of a force of approximately 26 000, while the British army has at times deployed a quarter of its force. Compared with this, the SANDF fails to impress.

Deployment in international PSOs has given the SANDF valuable mission experience, which will be extremely useful in setting up SADCBRIG. The most likely result of this process will be that the SANDF will be given responsibility for the more specialised and critical functions within the ASF, for instance the medical corps, logistical support and the engineering role, as is already envisioned in the plan for the operationalisation of the ASF (Motumi 2003; Hauter 2003). The first phase of the SDP will also have made its impact felt and thanks to the initiation of a second phase of the acquisition programme in 2010, provided the Defence Update passes through Cabinet and Parliament, the army will be able to benefit from an increased focus on its equipment needs. However, the problems it has in attracting and retaining critical personnel will reduce its capacity to deliver such capabilities to SADCBRIG and PSOs in general.

The human resources problems that South Africa’s armed forces are currently experiencing will have a severe negative impact on their capacity to deploy in PSOs in the short to medium term. However, the SANDF is aware of these challenges and has launched a number of initiatives to deal with them. The MSDS programme has helped rejuvenate and right-size the force’s composition and has had a positive impact on the army’s ability to deploy, and the benefits will be even greater in the future. However, the MSDS will not solve the problem of the lack of critical-function personnel. By 2010, when the ASF is supposed to become fully operational and the planned withdrawal from domestic deployment will have released 1 700 soldiers for international deployment, some of the pressure will have
been taken off the rest of the force. The Phoenix Project, which was established to revitalise the SANDF’s Reserve Force, is also important as it will re-create a reserve capacity that could be useful in future PSOs.

The unknown factor is the impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis, which has rightly been termed a strategic issue by the SANDF. At least 23 per cent or more than 16 000 personnel are believed to be HIV-positive. If the SA armed forces fail to remedy the causes and negative effects of the pandemic, it risks crippling the capacity of the SANDF and thus also South Africa’s ambitions to contribute constructively to the creation of a more peaceful and successful continent. According to the objectives laid down in the HR 2010 strategy, a large number of older personnel on long-term contracts will be offered retrenchment packages, enabling the force to rejuvenate and right-size its composition. Combined with force depletion because of health-related problems, this means that up to half of all SANDF personnel may have to be replaced in the short term in order for the SANDF to carry out the tasks allocated to it under the Constitution and as outlined in the White Papers. The distribution by the SANDF of antiretroviral drugs to its infected members might be an important step in enabling them to continue to serve. However, this category of staff could still not be deployed to international PSOs because of the stage their illnesses have reached and the risk that they might need to be repatriated. This human resources challenge might very easily lead to a loss of technical skills that could only be replaced with difficulty. The SANDF has already lost a number of highly skilled and experienced personnel to the private sector. This has left a perception of reduced capacity among the remaining force members that has had a severely negative effect on their esprit de corps.

One element that has turned out to be an true problem and will continue to be so in the years to come is the lack of resources. The SANDF has had considerable difficulties in making ends meet in the daily running of the force. Owing to this lack of resources it has a maintenance backlog that makes it very expensive to prepare equipment for deployment. When the force is deployed, the lack of resources and, for the SANDF, operational capacity problems resulting from government policies mean that it is difficult to keep equipment operational. Lack of resources also means that the force is losing certain capabilities as the money is not available to purchase the necessary replacements. Over time this will probably be remedied, though probably not in the short term. With hindsight, it is clear that the defence planners and the politicians incorrectly decided to spend a large part of available resources on renewing the navy’s submarine capacity, resources that could have been spent more usefully on the army or the air force.
Another problem is that the SANDF is not very competent in utilising the resources at its disposal, reflecting Le Roux’s central point that it is difficult to argue effectively for additional resources if the available resources are not being used effectively. However, this is not entirely the fault of the SANDF, since political and social considerations have made it difficult to right-size the force, which needs to reduce the proportion of its personnel in the support and staff functions and move more capacity to the sharp end. The MSDS programme and the Reserve Force will be pivotal in this process, which will not be made easier by the fact that the current force structure target of 70 000 has been declared unsustainable by the DoD within the current budgetary framework. The task for the SANDF and the Defence Update drafters is to increase the number of soldiers available for international missions by solving structural problems, while creating a sustainable force structure, revitalising the Reserve Force structure and thus improving the SANDF’s overall capacity. This must happen within the existing budgetary framework because it is difficult to convince government that more money is needed for defence, the argument being that ‘defence gets more than its share as it is’ (Ngombane 2004).

This points back to a problem raised in the introduction, namely that the SANDF has become a useful, but not politically prioritised, foreign policy tool. President Mbeki may have called the SANDF ‘the midwives of peace’, and Foreign Minister Nkosazana Zuma may have claimed that the SANDF is an integrated and important part of foreign policy, but the politicians have so far been unwilling either to prioritise the tasks that the SANDF is expected to undertake or to provide the political and financial framework needed to enable the force to operate efficiently. The SANDF is a useful tool, but it must make do with the resources it has.

NOTES

1. This report is part two of a report on the role of the military tool in South African foreign policy. This first part is entitled Defence and foreign policy: the case of South Africa.


3. The name of the South African armed forces was changed in 1994 from SADF to SANDF to mark the transition.

4. For an overview of the development in defence spending see the annexure.
5. The term ‘diplomacy’ should here be understood as argued by Bull (2002, 156): The conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.

6. President Thabo Mbeki in 1997 put forward the idea of an African Renaissance based on five fundamental elements: 1. Cultural exchange; 2. Emancipation of African women; 3. Mobilisation of young people; 4. The broadening and deepening of democracy; and 5. The promotion of sustainable development on the African continent (Vale and Maseko 1998, 274). Vale and Maseko rightly argue that at least two contesting interpretations and critiques of the Renaissance ambition exist, the modernist and post-structuralist. It is outside the scope of this paper to go any further into these divisions and the fundamentally different perceptions and critiques of the government’s foreign policy.

7. For further reading on non-offensive defence see, for instance, Moeller (2003).

8. The SDP has been highly controversial in relation to the chosen equipment, the cost of the deal in a country with such large developmental problems and the corruption allegation around the deal. For further reading see, for instance, Feinstein (2007, 154-207).

9. This view arose during an interview with the SA Ambassador to the DRC in November 2004. The same view was confirmed at an interview at the DoD in December 2003. In his 2005 budget speech, Defence Minister Lekota more or less apologised to Parliament for the strain that the DoD puts on the entire budget. See also the statement by ANC MP Thandi Tobias further on in this section.

10. This refers to Operation Intexo, which is an SANDF effort to control the borders, and Operation Stipper, which deals with rural security. Under Operation Intexo the SANDF was given the task of protecting the maritime borders within the Exclusive Economic Zones of South Africa and its neighbouring countries, primarily Namibia and Mozambique.

11. The DoD in 2004 started a much-needed process to update the White Paper and the Defence Review. However, the 2005 draft update White Paper is so far the only publicly available document from this process and the Defence Review seems to have been delayed in government.

12. In this deployment, the ongoing Operation Intexo, the SANDF operates with three months’ rotation. In addition, the SANDF’s Operation Stipper has responsibility for rural security in support of SAPS. Operating in all nine provinces, this involves 23 platoons from the Army Territorial Reserve (DoD 2006, 101). The reserve units are in the process of being dismantled, a process that should be finalised by 31 March 2009.

13. Because of malfunction equipment SA soldiers in the DRC are forced to walk, which has a serious negative effect not only on mobility, but also on the security of the soldiers, as they are more exposed.

14. This is despite the fact that similar operations had been conducted domestically for a long period, for instance in KwaZulu-Natal, and the SADF had great experience with ‘WHAM’ missions during the liberation, although the success of these operations was questionable.

15. For further details on the concept of professionalism see, for instance, Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1971).
16. Under the principles of collective/common security it is argued that the state’s security dilemma is not best solved at individual state level, but by instituting communal commitments whereby each state undertakes to join in common action against those that threaten territorial integrity or political independence. For a collective security mechanism to be successful, common values and norms are required, for instance a commitment to democratic principles and a high level of trust. The basic objective of collective security systems is to make collective defence redundant.


18. This is not to say that all the states in southern Africa are undemocratic, but simply to underline the fact that the diplomatic rules the South African government has to engage with are significantly dissimilar internationally and regionally.

19. This has, for instance, been a major issue for the Danish Defence Force in its cooperation with other forces, primarily from former Eastern Bloc countries, because Danish soldiers had better facilities and received higher pay. These are issues that need to be taken care of before deployment.

20. See DoD Annual Report 2004/05 (DoD 2005c) for further details of the South African involvement in the process of ASF formation.

21. South Africa has, for instance, designated sanitation units, engineers, the parachute battalion, small boats for water patrols, communication equipment, divers, blue-water capability and helicopters.

22. It has been argued (Trainer 2004) that if the DoD’s share of the GDP was increased to two per cent from the current 1,5 per cent it would solve the DoD’s financial constraints.

23. The empirical data used in this paper is based on three case studies presented in a PhD dissertation by Thomas Mandrup (2007a).

24. South Africa was by March 2008 ranked 15th on the list of contributors to UN missions.


26. The operation was plagued by, for example, problems in keeping equipment operational, disciplinary problems amongst personnel and the securing of the necessary economic resources. See Mandrup 2008.

27. Thanks to Laurie Nathan for pointing this out.

28. This point is elaborated on later. See also Portfolio Committee on Defence 2006 or Mandrup 2007.

29. This is a controversial issue, especially in a country that has an employment rate of up to 36 per cent. From an institutional point of view it is problematic, however, to have a large number of personnel that have, for instance, lost their operational capability.

30. This is another delicate issue because of the potential conflict between different ambitions, i.e. the creation of a force that is representative of the SA population and the need for a force that has skilled and experienced officers. In Denmark it is argued that it generally takes between 15 and 20 years to educate a good staff officer.
31. The MSDS was started in 2003 to ensure the enhancement of the SANDF’s mission readiness through the systematic rejuvenation of its human resource composition by yearly intakes of the country’s youth. The MSDS also ensures a continuous supply of personnel to the SANDF Reserves.

32. In its March 2006 report from the DRC, the Portfolio Committee on Defence (Portfolio Committee on Defence 2006) identified the DoD’s procurement practise as creating serious problems for the deployed forces.

33. DoD staff have argued that part of the SANDF’s problems detected by UN inspection visits resulted from some equipment being declared non-operational on account of smaller malfunctions, such as a broken windshield. See, for instance, *South African Army Journal* 2007. However, during the DRC inspection in November 2004 in which the author participated, no equipment was declared non-operational on this account.

34. The Caspir armoured personnel carrier is the primary vehicle used by the SANDF. This APC has been used by the force since 1980 and was battle-proofed in Angola during the liberation/border wars in the 1980s. The quality of this APC was confirmed recently when Russia bought 100 Caspirs because of its unique protection ability against mines.

35. Inspections are a standard UN routine. The forces deployed are inspected at least once every six months to check their force-readiness (FR). The UN also inspects the state of equipment in a separate inspection. During the two most recent FR inspections, the SA forces were found to be in an unsatisfactory state. Apart from non-operational APCs, the camp was insufficiently protected, the soldiers had no bullet-proof vests and no batteries for their binoculars, and did not know their operational orders and procedures, etc. The soldiers’ personal equipment was also found not to be in order and several soldiers did not have local area maps, medical kits, mortar grid maps, etc. (Iffland 2004; Meier 2004).

36. Force-to-force ratios measure how big an international force must be to balance the indigenous force and enable it to fulfil its mandate.

37. In AMIS, South Africa is the only contingent that brings its own equipment. The other force contributors have been provided with their main equipment by Western donors, either directly or indirectly from a private military company.

**LIST OF REFERENCES**


Castleman, H and Short, E. Interview at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, September 2003.


DoD. Mid-term financial statement presented to Parliament by the Minister of Defence, November 2004c.


Hauter, Rear Admiral R. SANDF Chief Director Strategy and Planning. Interview at the Department of Defence, 26 November 2003.


Ifland, Lt Col. MA to the Force Commander of MONUC. Interview at MONUC HQ, 9 November 2004.

ISS. Submission to the Portfolio Committee on Defence, SA National Assembly, on the *South African Defence Review*, 4 October 2004.


JSCD. Minutes of a meeting of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs, 14 November 2001.


Khaniye, Col J. SA military attaché. Interview in Kinshasa, 1 November 2004.


Mbeki, President Thabo. State of the Nation Address, National Assembly, 23 June 2004.

Mbeki, President Thabo. State of the Nation Address, National Assembly, 2005.

Meier, WO IA. Member of the UN inspection team. Interview at Camp Iveco, 11 November 2004.


Ngombane, Sisa. SA Ambassador to the DRC. Interview in Kinshasha, 3 November 2004.

Portfolio Committee on Defence. Department of Defence Budget and Strategic Plan 2007/08: Presentation to Defence Portfolio Committee, 22 March 2007.

Portfolio Committee on Defence. Report of the Portfolio Committee on Defence on an oversight visit to the DRC, dated 14 March 2006.

Rahbek, Mads. Major in the Danish Armed Forces. Personal comments.

Ratala, Ed. Rear Admiral in the Chief Joint Operations Division, SANDF. Interview at Thaba Tshwane, 21 February 2008.


ANNEXURE A

Figure 1 The development in South African defence spending

![Graph showing the development in South African defence spending as a % of GDP and Government Expenditure from 1990 to 2009.](image-url)
INTRODUCTION

In November 1989 the Berlin Wall came down and much changed for the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA), as it did for all (Western) European armies. This statement is more or less a cliché, but it is only so because it contains a large degree of truth. In this paper I will describe the transformation process of the RNLA from the end of the Cold War until the present time. I will start with a characterisation of the RNLA around 1990. Thereafter I will discuss the period until about 1995, during which time the first large transformation and downsizing of the RNLA took place and conscription was deactivated. Also in this period parts of the RNLA were deployed in the former Yugoslavia within the framework of UNPROFOR. The third part of this paper deals with the period from 1996 until 2002, during which time the RNLA experienced its first deployments as an all-volunteer army, again mainly in the former Yugoslavia, but now under NATO control, in Bosnia as part of IFOR and SFOR, but also in Kosovo as part of KFOR.

In 2002 the newly elected Dutch government decided that the armed forces needed another reorganisation and downsizing to suit the budget. This reorganisation, which took place from 2003 to 2007, will be covered in the fourth part of this paper. The deployment of elements of the RNLA in Iraq during this period will also be described briefly. Finally, I will discuss the employment of RNLA units in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and some of the lessons we have learned from operations in the province of Uruzgan.
THE ARMY IN 1990

During the Cold War the Netherlands armed forces and therefore also the RNLA had one primary task, namely the defence of the national territory and the territory of our NATO allies. Our constitution refers as follows to the duties of the armed forces: ‘For the protection of the interests of the State, there are armed forces’.

The organisation of the RNLA during this period was based on conscription. Professional soldiers, mainly officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), constituted a framework for the processing of a large contingent of conscripts, who during the 1970s and 1980s served for a period of 14 months (privates and corporals) or 16 months (officers and NCOs). During this period they were trained from scratch for their main task – defence. Conscripts within combat and combat support units were enlisted as a unit and stayed together in the same unit during their entire active period, after which their unit as a whole was transferred to the reserve component. This system was called the unit addition system. Active units comprised less than a third of the RNLA. The majority of the units had a reserve status and would only be called up in case of emergency. However, if reserve units were called up, mobilisation of the main combat units had to be completed within 48 hours. In order to achieve this the mobilisation system was tested frequently, e.g. in the annual exercise Thunderclap.

The need for rapid mobilisation existed because the RNLA played a major role in NATO’s defence along the Iron Curtain in case of a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact. The RNLA had been assigned a corps defence zone on the northern European plain, south of Hamburg, shoulder-to-shoulder with forces of other NATO members. In peacetime a reinforced armoured brigade was stationed near this defence zone in West Germany. Its mission in the case of war was to gain time so that the major part of the corps could prepare the defences. The rest of the corps brigades could be mobilised and transported within 48 hours. For the transport of its tracked vehicles the RNLA possessed hundreds of railway flat-cars, which stood at the ready in the vicinity of the main barracks and depots.

Our most likely opponent had large armoured formations at her disposal. According to open sources, the Soviet Army on its own in 1981 possessed over 50 000 tanks and more than 60 000 other armoured vehicles. These numbers were supplemented by those of the forces of the other Warsaw Pact countries. As a consequence, the RNLA was also largely mechanised. Most of its combat units were armoured (infantry) and had at their disposal a large number of antitank
weapons, such as the tube-launched optically-tracked wire-to-command-link (TOW) guided missile set.

Our logistical assets and organisation were also focused on the main task of the RNLA. To support the RNLA forces in West Germany in wartime a logistical chain was created from the national territory to the combat zone, which was situated some 350 km to the north-east. Along this chain large quantities of ammunition, fuel, food and spare parts would be transported to the east, and sick and wounded to the west. Most goods were to have been transported by road in military or militarised trucks. During the 1980s, however, large depots (forward storage sites) were built in Germany to ease this giant logistical effort.

Beside its main task, the RNLA also participated in international missions during the Cold War, although most of these were executed on a relatively small scale. A battalion-sized battle group operated as part of an American division during the Korean War. From 1956 the Netherlands participated in the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East. From 1979 to 1985 an armoured infantry battalion and later a company formed part of UNIFIL in Lebanon, and from 1982 to 1995 the RNLA contributed a signals unit and military police (MP) to the multinational force and observers in the Sinai. The RNLA also undertook two humanitarian missions on African soil. In 1969 and 1970 a company-sized unit assisted the Tunisian government to restore the water distribution system and in 1974 a transport company was sent to Sudan to help the UN humanitarian organisation in that country. Other smaller missions also took place in this period.

During the Cold War the RNLA consisted of NATO-assigned forces and so-called territorial forces. NATO-assigned forces comprised one corps (1 NL Corps), which was composed of three divisional headquarters. Nine brigades (three armoured and six mechanised or armoured infantry) as well as four armoured reconnaissance battalions were put under the command of these divisional HQs. Each brigade consisted of one or two tank battalions, one or two armoured infantry battalions, a mechanised artillery battalion and an engineer company, as well as a logistical unit. Furthermore, 1 NL Corps had at its disposal one independent infantry brigade (two armoured and two motorised infantry battalions), an artillery brigade, composed of three field artillery groups and one anti-aircraft artillery group, one logistical brigade, two engineering groups, a signals group, an MP battalion and a Special Forces company, while an (air force) group of light transport helicopters was attached. The RNLA possessed 913 tanks (Leopard 1 and 2) and over 400 artillery pieces (M109, M110, M114, MLRS, Lance).
The territorial forces consisted of two infantry brigades with an organic artillery battalion, an engineering group, a Special Forces battalion and numerous independent security battalions and companies. Large logistical elements also formed part of the territorial forces. An important task of National Logistical Command was the maintenance of lines of communications to the 1 NL Corps. The total peace-time strength of the RNLA in 1990 was approximately 60,000 personnel, some 40,000 of whom were conscripts. After mobilisation, this strength rose to approximately 210,000 personnel.


After the end of the Cold War the Netherlands government decided to cash in on the ‘peace dividend’ and to reduce its armed forces. The reduction and restructuring took place in two steps. Each step was announced through the publication of a Defence White Paper. The first White Paper was published in the spring of 1991 and carried the title *Restructuring and reduction*. The most important implication for the RNLA was the reduction of the wartime strength of 1 NL Corps to two divisions and the disbanding of a large part of the reserve component. Some active units were also disbanded and one of the brigades was transformed from a mechanised to an air mobile formation.

Just 22 months later, in January 1993, a second White Paper announced further reorganisation and reductions. This ‘Priority Paper’ entitled *A different world, a different defence* had an even larger impact on the RNLA, the most important element of which was the ‘deactivation’ of conscription. However, conscription is, at least in theory, still possible. An article in the Constitution states that the armed forces of the Kingdom consist of volunteers and conscripts. In 1996 the last conscripts left the RNLA and since then only professional soldiers have served in our army. This has had a large impact on, in particular, officers and NCOs. Conscripted privates and corporals were no longer temporary, involuntary subordinates who considered their stay in the forces an interruption of their careers. The volunteers were professionals who were – and still are – proud to be soldiers and eager to perform well. However, these professionals could only sign up for a limited period. The contracts of privates and corporals who reached the age of 30 were discontinued and they had to find civilian jobs. An organisation to help former soldiers establish a civil career was created.

Another change during this period was the fact that, next to the defence of national and allied territory, participation in international missions became the
second main task of the armed forces. This was even laid down in the Constitution. Article 90 now declares: 'The Government shall promote the development of the international rule of law'. The Priority Paper suggests that it should be possible for the armed forces to participate in four peace missions simultaneously with a battalion-sized unit.

The reduction of the RNLA announced in the Priority Paper took the form of reducing the army to one division of four mechanised brigades, two of which were reserve. One mechanised brigade was still stationed in Germany. The air mobile brigade was to be a full-strength standing formation. The reserve component of the RNLA was initially to be manned by former conscripts, but after some time former volunteers, who had ended their contracts, were to fill the ranks of the reserves. Because the RNLA now only possessed one division, a National Corps HQ was no longer required. However, RNLA leaders considered it essential that experience in working at corps level be maintained. For this reason cooperation was sought with Germany and the HQs of 1 NL and the German 1 GE Corps merged into a bi-national HQ: 1 (GE/NL) Corps with a German and the Netherlands division under its command.

During this period a conflict erupted in Yugoslavia when first Slovenia and then Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia declared their independence from Yugoslavia. The European Community (EC) and the UN created missions to preserve the peace in the Balkans. The EC installed a monitor mission, ECMM, and the UN created a peacekeeping force in Croatia, UNPROFOR, while it also deployed military observers (UNMOs). UNPROFOR's mission was later extended to Bosnia. The RNLA participated in both missions. From 1991 individual officers were sent to ECMM as monitors, while others were deployed as UNMOs. The participation in UNPROFOR was much more intense. The first units to be sent to the former Yugoslavia were combat support and combat service support troops. The reason for this was that at that time (1992) the RNLA did not consist solely of professional units. Conscripts formed a large part of every unit and by law conscripts could only be sent on a peace mission on a voluntary basis. A conscript could refuse to be sent on a mission until the very moment he boarded the aircraft to the mission area. It was therefore considered too great a risk to commit combat units. The units that were sent were a signals battalion in the spring of 1992 and a combined Netherlands and Belgian Transport Battalion later that year. The first was deployed until 1994 and the latter until 1996.

In the meantime public opinion in the Netherlands stressed the importance of extending the RNLA's contribution to UN forces in the former Yugoslavia.
In January 1993 the decision was taken to deactivate conscription. The first all-volunteer units were to be the infantry battalions of the air mobile brigade. The first battalion was to be operational at the beginning of 1994. The Dutch Defence Minister, Relus ter Beek, therefore offered the UN an infantry battalion for operations in Bosnia, for a period of 18 months. This offer was accepted and UNPROFOR command decided to commit the battalion to the UN-protected Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. Because it appeared impossible to reach Zepa, the majority of the battalion was committed to Srebrenica in the spring of 1994, while one infantry company was sent to Tuzla airbase. Although I will not elaborate on the operations around Srebrenica, I want to make some observations.

- The battalion, minus an infantry company, operated in the enclave of Srebrenica. This Muslim enclave was completely surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces.
- The lines of communication (LOC) of the battalion to the national support element in Lukavac were neither secure nor guaranteed. The Bosnian Serb forces had to give permission for the territory they occupied to be entered.
- Although the battalion possessed armoured vehicles, it was only lightly armed. For instance, their YPR vehicles only had heavy machine guns, no cannon. The battalion did not have escalation dominance of its own.
- For escalation dominance the battalion relied on NATO air forces. To allow air support the so-called dual key was used. Not only the military leadership of UNPROFOR, but also the civilian High Representative of the UN Secretary General had to grant permission.
- There was no exit strategy. Although the commitment was to last only 18 months, replacement was not guaranteed by the UN until the summer of 1995. Realistic plans to relieve the battalion by force, should the Bosnian Serbs attack the enclave, did not exist.
- The rules of engagement (ROE) were very restrictive. UNPROFOR was a neutral force and was only permitted to use force to protect its own troops.

The consequence of all this is well known.

**AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY (1996–2002)**

In the 1996–2002 period, the RNLA transformed into an all-volunteer army. During this time lessons learned from the UNPROFOR experiences were also
implemented, more reorganisation took place and RNLA units were deployed in several crisis areas.

The first issue I wish to mention is the development of a new doctrine. During the Cold War the doctrine of the RNLA had emphasised defence against a more numerous mechanised opponent. From 1996 new army doctrine publications began to appear as part of the ‘ADP Series’. Separate publications covered peace operations (‘blue’ operations) and operations against an irregular force, as well as conventional combat operations (‘green’ operations).

The Dutch parliament also drew its conclusions following the completion of the UNPROFOR mission. It demanded that parliament be consulted before any participation in peace support missions was decided upon. An article was added to the Constitution to this effect. For purposes of oversight, the government had already in 1995 established an examination cadre. The cadre encompasses around 20 political and military criteria that have to be examined and have to be used and met to conclude whether or not participation in a mission is desirable and feasible.

It was also decided to strengthen the role of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Until 1995 he was the primary military advisor of the Minster of Defence. However, he did not command the commanders of the army, navy and air force, who fell directly under the minister. In the middle of the 1990s the CDS acquired two new roles: those of corporate planner and corporate operator. For purposes of this paper the second role is important as from that time units deployed in operations abroad were under the direct control of the CDS.

The deployment of forces to UNPROFOR resulted in many valuable lessons for future operations. The RNLA recognised the need to structure the lessons learned and within the Army Staff a ‘Lessons Learned Branch’ was created. Moreover, at the level of the Defence Staff a joint Evaluation Department was established. For each mission in which Dutch Forces participated an annual evaluation was conducted and the evaluation paper was forwarded to parliament.

Another development took place in the RNLA’s structure. The need for close cooperation between ground and air components during air manoeuvre operations was recognised. For this reason the air mobile brigade and the (air force’s) helicopter group started an intensive training programme in order to be certified for integrated air manoeuvre operations. Certification was achieved in 2003 and 11 Air Manoeuvre Brigade received ‘full operational capability’ status.

A third mechanised brigade was also activated, while the fourth (reserve) brigade was disbanded. The active mechanised component now consisted of
three brigades comprising one active tank and armoured infantry battalion each, and one reserve tank and armoured infantry battalion as combat units.

During this period the RNLA participated in two missions with battalion-sized units. An RNLA armoured infantry battalion task force formed part of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successor, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), in Bosnia from 1996 until 2004. RNLA artillery and engineers battalions formed part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) during a 12-month period in 1999–2000. I will mention some details of these deployments.

- Both forces, IFOR/SFOR and KFOR, were based on a UN-resolution, but operated under NATO command. This meant that during operations NATO standards were used.
- The deployed units included heavy armament and therefore possessed escalation dominance. For the artillery battalion this is obvious. The armoured infantry battalion had YPR infantry fighting vehicles with 25 mm cannon and two tank platoons (Leopard 2) were included in its battle orders.
- The ROE were less restrictive than during the UNPROFOR period. The forces had the mandate to enforce the restrictions of the peace agreements.
- A realistic exit strategy existed, both at NATO and at the national level. The battalion in Kosovo could be withdrawn after a year with relative ease.

During this period RNLA units also participated on a smaller scale in other missions. Examples are the UN mission at Cyprus (UNFICYP) with a company-sized unit and Task Force Fox in Macedonia with an infantry company and HQ elements. Logistical and engineer elements supported the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps battalion that was deployed to Eritrea and Ethiopia during the UNMEE-mission.

**CREATING AN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY (2003–2007)**

The coalition government that came to power in 2002 concluded that the size of the armed forces was too large for the defence budget and the next reorganisation was announced. The single-service commands were disbanded and the CDS became commander of the forces. The former services army, navy and air forces were transformed to operational commands under his command. Another major decision was to abolish the reserve component almost entirely. The RNLA became a fully professional standing army of approximately 25,500 personnel,
with a small reserve component. The latter consists mainly of five battalions of the National Reserve. These are part-time soldiers with security duties in their own regions. Some specialist reserve officers are also included in HQs and in units on deployment. Many of these have acquired civil specialities that are scarce among professional soldiers.

During this reorganisation the divisional HQ was merged with the Army Staff. This meant that the RNLA no longer had a divisional HQ in its organisation. It was also decided to withdraw all national units from Germany. From 2007 all RNLA units were stationed within the borders of the Kingdom, with the exception of the RNLA elements of the HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps. The mechanised brigade stationed in Germany was disbanded. Some of its units were added to the two remaining mechanised brigades.

HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps HQ was restructured during the same period. It is now a multinational unit, but with Germany and the Netherlands still acting as lead nations. It no longer commands any troops (except for its own staff support and HQ battalions) when the HQ is not deployed. The HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps is now one of the deployable HQs within NATO and acquired ‘High Readiness Forces’ (HRF) status in 2002. In 2003 the HQ was deployed to Afghanistan for six months as HQ ISAF. During the first half of 2008 the HRF HQ commanded the land elements of NATO’s response forces (NRF), as it did in 2005.

The operational units of the RNLA currently consist of one air manoeuvre brigade (the helicopter component of which is provided for by the air force), two mechanised brigades, one combat support brigade, one combat service support brigade and a Special Forces battalion. The units have no significant reserve components. Each mechanised brigade has a two-squadron-strong tank battalion and a two-battery-strong mechanised artillery battalion. The total number of operational tanks (Leopard 2A6) stands at 60. Operational pieces of artillery (Panzerhaubitse 2000NL) number 24.

Despite the reduction in the strength of the force, the capacity of certain scarce assets essential for missions are currently being increased. The armoured reconnaissance battalion was disbanded, but an ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) battalion has been created. This unit not only consists of two reconnaissance squadrons, but also commands intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicle and ground-based radar capacity. The engineering capacity of each mechanised brigade has been expanded from a single company to a full battalion, and a fourth Special Forces company has been established.
During this period elements of the RNLA were still deployed in Bosnia, although the mission was being scaled down and had been taken over by the EU. New deployments included a company-sized unit in Kabul within the framework of ISAF from 2002 until the end of 2003. In 2004 an infantry battalion task force relieved the marines in southern Iraq as part of the Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR). After three four-month rotations the RNLA unit was withdrawn. Once again, valuable lessons were learned. One of the most important is that during such missions the HQ is overloaded with tasks and that the small HQ of a battalion is not the unit most suited for these tasks.

Another result of operational experience in areas such in Iraq was a revision of the RNLA doctrine. The new doctrine is currently under development and will be based on both the national defence doctrine, which was published in 2005, and the current NATO doctrine. The new army doctrine publication was expected to be published in the first half of 2008. The most important difference from the former doctrine is that the new doctrine is based on the principle that operations are operations. A sharp distinction will no longer be made between peacekeeping operations and so-called combat operations, at least from a military perspective. A commander prepares for a mission and must be able to cope with all possible situations in his area of operations.

DEPLOYMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

The first Dutch soldiers were deployed to the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan on 14 March 2006. They were part of the ‘Deployment Task Force’ (DTF), which was tasked to prepare for the deployment of Netherlands forces that were to be part of ISAF, stage III. Netherlands participation in ISAF is called Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), which started its operations on 1 August 2006.

The TFU is composed of three main units: the RNLA battle group and provincial reconstruction team (PRT), and the Australian reconstruction task force. Logistical, Special Forces, information operations, ISTAR, engineering elements and a platoon of howitzers are also part of TFU, which is based at two locations: the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt and in the west the town of Deh Rawod. TFU operations can be supported from the air. An air task force, consisting of F-16 fighter bombers, Apache attack helicopters and transport helicopters is based at Kandahar Airfield. Total Netherlands strength in Afghanistan is approximately 1 600 personnel. TFU is subordinated to Regional Command South, which is commanded on a rotational basis by a British, Canadian or Dutch general officer.
TFU has been deployed now for more than 18 months and the Dutch government has agreed to extend the country’s contribution to ISAF to the summer of 2010. However, we cannot wait until 2010 to learn from our experiences. If lessons are identified, measures have to be implemented as soon as possible to enhance the performance of Dutch troops and stand up against the continuously changing challenges in Afghanistan. In the final part of this paper I will touch on some of the lessons we have learnt from our deployment with ISAF.

During the Cold War era the brigade was the lowest level of Dutch combined arms. During deployment in the Balkans in the last decade of the 20th century we found that it was necessary to deploy battalion task forces composed of different elements of combat arms and with their own indigenous combat support and combat service support elements. During operations in Uruzgan it appeared to be necessary to combine arms at even lower levels. Today the lowest level of combined arms is the platoon. Lieutenants no longer command a platoon of four or five combat vehicles, but the units include engineers, Special Forces, ISTAR, logistics, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), forward air controllers, etc. Such a unit, which exceeds normal platoon strength considerably, is called a combined arms team (CAT). At this point a temporary doctrine has been developed by the Manoeuvre Training Centre. However, it must be clear that commanding a CAT places heavy demands on the capabilities of our junior leaders.

Military power is one of the instruments of power a state, alliance or coalition can use to achieve its goals. Certainly, in a complex environment such as Afghanistan, the use of military power on its own is insufficient for success and achievement of the desired end state. A comprehensive approach in which all instruments of power, namely diplomatic, information, military and economic, are used is the only way to succeed in the execution of complex operations. The application of these instruments is often described with the acronym 3D: diplomacy, development, defence.

Military operations in southern Afghanistan are being executed within the framework of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Characteristically the opponent during such a campaign uses irregular tactics. Among other things, this means that insurgents operate amongst the people, are hardly recognisable as legal fighters and may disappear in the population directly after they have executed an action. For a force involved in a COIN campaign the importance of adequate and timely information and intelligence becomes even more important than during regular operations. Moreover, it speaks for itself that collateral damage must be avoided as far as possible. For this reason, the use of non-kinetic
means, such as psychological operations and CIMIC, is in some cases as essential as the use of kinetic firepower. The fact that the opponent sometimes does not respect the rules of international conflict complicates operations. However, this should never be an excuse for the peacekeeping mission to use illegitimate means. The legitimacy of all our actions is essential.

Operating in a mission such as in Uruzgan puts great strains on soldiers. When a soldier knows that his family and close relatives at home are well-informed about his circumstances and that he is supported by the Defence Department, his (or her) morale and professional performance will increase. The Netherlands’ forces have therefore set up a so-called home front organisation. We consider home front support an integral part of operational personnel support for soldiers on a mission.

As is the case with many Western armies, the greater part of the RNLA’s equipment has been designed for operations in Western Europe. It will not be a surprise to hear that climatic and topographical conditions in Uruzgan differ significantly from those in Western Europe. This means that wear and tear on equipment is much greater than envisaged and that operations demand a lot of our soldiers. Moreover, the operations themselves are different from those expected in a classical conflict in central Europe. An example of this is the use of improvised explosive devices. This means that special equipments, suited to Uruzgani conditions, are needed. Over the past two years the RNLA has acquired several types of new equipment for use in Afghanistan, such as jammers, Bushmaster mine-protected vehicles and protected accommodation. The greater part of this equipment has been acquired through the fast-track procurement (FTP) and fast-track fielding (FTF) processes.

The operations executed by RNLA units during the last 15 years have had their impact on training. It will be clear that to operate in an environment like Uruzgan different skills are needed to those used against a mechanised opponent in a regular conflict. However, basic fighting tactics and skills still constitute the framework upon which our training is built and every soldier and unit have to be trained thoroughly in all aspects. To these are added other skills, such as cultural understanding and language skills, but also skills for fighting an irregular opponent, all of which are dependent on the characteristics of a specific mission. Using modern computer-based training equipment, such as r-learning applications and simulators, can multiply the effects of training. The electronic learning methods are advantageous in preparing for missions such as in Uruzgan, as many of the skills have to be acquired within a limited period of time.
CONCLUSION

With these experiences and lessons from Afghanistan I conclude this paper. The RNLA has come a long way from a conscript army preparing for a conflict in Western Europe to the professional army that is still deployed in Afghanistan, although this mission will not continue forever. And although it is difficult to make predictions, this means that the possibility of RNLA elements participating in missions elsewhere is high. It could well be a mission on the African continent, whether such a mission is of a humanitarian nature, like those in the 1960s, or based on a mandate of the UN or another international organisation, e.g. the African Union (AU). Whatever the mission, our soldiers will be ready for it.

NOTE

1 Apart from road transport, the Central European Pipeline System (CEPS) was an important means for fuel supply. However, the larger part of its capacity was used to support air force bases.
INTRODUCTION

Recently in South Africa, I presented a workshop on cultural intelligence based largely on the Canadian experience in Afghanistan and other operations over the last decade. At the end of the session a South African general approached me and thanked me for the ‘very interesting professional development session’. However, he then clarified that what I was discussing was war, and that South African forces would never take on anything other than simple peacekeeping. I truly hope that the general’s prophecy is correct. But I doubt it.

The desire to do ‘simple’ peacekeeping operations, akin to the Cold War-model Chapter VI operations, as represented, for example, by the decades-long deployment of the UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), is understandable. Relatively speaking, they were simple operations. The peacekeepers’ role was to monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement once the fighting had stopped. Their employment was always within a prescribed boundary – in the buffer zone between the two former warring parties. Their operating environment was very clear. Each side had its fortified line. Each side was clearly delineated by its front line and all participants were in clearly identifiable national uniforms. Moreover, the entire operational area was quarantined. There were rarely civilians or press to deal with. When there was, it was under carefully controlled conditions and the outside interlopers were always escorted. In essence, the military was allowed to operate in almost complete isolation.

The end of the Cold War, generally marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, resulted in a dramatic shift in the international security environment.
Many of the proxy states that were supported or subsidised by one or the other of the superpowers were abandoned and thus drifted towards total collapse. The resultant chaos transformed peacekeeping operations. Where conflict in the Cold War was based on an inter-state paradigm, it now took on an intra-state posture. Failed states spiralled into anarchy, creating a vacuum of power that was often filled by warlords, paramilitary gangs and criminal organisations. The civil wars and unrest that ensued were incredibly savage and frequently threatened to spill beyond borders. In 1995, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General of the UN, wrote: ‘The end of the cold war removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere ... [There] has been a rash of wars within newly independent States, often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty’ (Boutros-Ghali 1995).

The safe, templated and well-known Cold War paradigm disappeared almost overnight. The new security environment, marked by complexity, ambiguity and ever-present media and nefarious enemies and threats embedded in the context of failed and failing states, changed the face of peacekeeping. Operations were no longer static, no longer conducted in isolation or with the agreement of all parties, and they were exponentially more dangerous. A whole new lexicon was developed that spoke of peace support operations that encompassed peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacemaking missions. The dynamic, fluid and combative nature of the new security landscape spawned a whole new concept entitled the ‘three block war’, which argued that military forces were required to conduct humanitarian, peacekeeping and war-fighting operations, potentially all on the same day, all within three city blocks. Simply put, military forces deployed on peace support operations were required to have a wide range of skills, including combat capability.

But the evolution of peace support operations was not yet complete. The terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 (9/11) led to the most dramatic – if not radical – shift in Western security policy since the end of the Cold War. It provided the rationale for two major conflicts – Afghanistan and Iraq – as well as a global anti-terror campaign that has arguably fuelled an extraordinarily high level of anti-Western sentiment in much of the Muslim world. Like it or not, traditional UN peace support operations to bolster failing states or provide humanitarian assistance cannot separate themselves from the larger global context of the conflict that is currently raging. Globalisation has allowed exponential advances in communications, as well as the transfer of information and technology. These changes have fuelled the next generation of conflict.
In essence, although many threats are geographically confined, international terrorist networks (e.g. al-Qaeda) pose a global threat. Quite simply, their goals, operational methodologies and adaptability have shifted the nature of trans-national insurgencies. They employ asymmetric strategies in attacks following a doctrine of propaganda by deeds. They use the tactics of terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the pursuit of their objectives and have refined other disruptive techniques, including suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices and mass casualty events. In addition, as already mentioned, they exploit globalisation, e.g. telecommunications, financing, Internet interconnectivity for information operations and sharing the lessons learned, techniques, tactics and procedures. Furthermore, the proliferation of technology continues to enhance their capacity and reach. In summary, these organisations are networked, multi-layered and complex entities capable of detailed operational planning, synchronisation and execution, and are continually expanding their reach.

The ‘so what?’ is dramatic. Quite simply, no region or nation is immune. The set of actors on the international scene is now much more diverse, interconnected and ruthless. ‘It is a merciless enemy,’ explained US Marine Corps Lieutenant General James N Mattis, ‘and it is up to you [military] to stop them as far from our shores as you can’ (Mattis 2001, 10). The enemy we face, described Major General Robert Scales, ‘is dedicated to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that are unacceptable to western nations; they are organised and networked; passionate and fanatical; committed; relentless and savage’. Additionally, respected author, scholar and analyst Robert Kaplan warned: ‘[we will face] warriors – erratic primitives of shifting alliance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order’ (Kaplan 2002, 118).

As such, some theorists have noted that we are currently engaged in fourth generation warfare (4GW), where the enemy uses largely asymmetrical tactics to achieve their aim, where human (non-kinetic) – not technological – solutions are paramount and where integrated operations (i.e. cooperation and coordination between all players – joint (all four military services), law enforcement agencies, other government departments, coalition partners, allies, national and international agencies) in a long war scenario provide the best hope for success.

In the current security environment, militaries need soldiers, leaders and commanders with judgement, wisdom and reasoning abilities, not just technical skills. Increasingly we find that we are unwilling or unable to bring our technological superiority to bear. ‘You’re going to have people coming at you who don’t play by the rules,’ observed Harvard University political scientist Michael
Ignatieff, ’and you’re going to have people coming at you who have an infinitely greater willingness to risk anything, i.e. their lives, than you may and that’s one of the challenges you have to face.’ (Ignatieff 2001).

Simply put, the current security operating environment is chaotic, volatile, uncertain and ever changing. The ambiguous nature and asymmetrical conditions inherent in most conflicts today require militaries to rapidly deploy forces that can apply special skills sets in a variety of environments and circumstances to achieve difficult missions in peace, conflict or war. Although excellent equipment may provide a technological edge, deployed forces must ensure they are composed of leaders and soldiers who are adaptive and agile. In the end, the naive belief that one can undertake missions that consist only of ’simple peacekeeping’ is an assumption that could prove to be costly.

As such, this paper will examine theoretical constructs to frame operations in the current security environment. Furthermore, as a case study, leadership lessons for preparing leaders for the contemporary operating environment will be discussed using Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, which began as a result of the Canadian government’s desire to assist UN efforts to rebuild a failed state.3

THE CONCEPT OF THE THREE BLOCK WAR

The attraction of ’simple peacekeeping’ missions is understandable. They allow forces to minimise the training and equipment requirement for their personnel and are far less dangerous. However, the world has changed and one can argue that the ’simple peacekeeping mission’ of yesteryear has vanished. In the early 1990s, US Marine Corps (USMC) Commandant General Charles C Krulak coined a concept called the ‘three block war’ (3BW). He described this as military operations other than war combined with mid-intensity conflict. Although he developed his concept based on the belief that most of our future conflicts would take place in cities because of urbanisation, the core of the issue was based on the evolution of peace support operations. He explained that in 3BW the entire spectrum of tactical challenges ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping to traditional war-fighting could be encountered in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks (Krulak 1999).

The importance of the concept was based on the premise, or reality one could argue, that military personnel must be capable of operating in an ambiguous, chaotic, volatile and rapidly changing battle space. Moreover, they must be able to think in non-traditional, non-Western ways and in terms of the enemy’s
perspective. Importantly, leaders and their followers must also be able to move through the entire spectrum of conflict seamlessly – in essence they must be able to fight the ‘three block war’. Simply put, military personnel must be able to transition from humanitarian operations, peace support or stability tasks to high-intensity mid-level combat, potentially all in the same day all in the same area of operations (Krulak 1997, 1999).

FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE

The concept of 3BW dominated during the 1990s as a result of the context of the times. Failed and failing states, such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, fixated UN and Western efforts. Nonetheless, as early as October 1989 former Lieutenant Colonel William S Lind had introduced the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). He attempted to forecast the future trend in warfare. Although overshadowed by other theorists at the time, his idea gained prominence after 9/11 (Lind 1989).

According to Lind, first generation warfare was characterised by linearity and order: an environment where states held a monopoly on the use of war to obtain political ends. The next generation of war, 2GW, was ushered in by World War I. It was a function of fire and movement captured in the mantra ‘artillery conquers, infantry occupies’. 3GW was also introduced during World War I by German storm troopers, but was refined and became dominant during World War II, where it was showcased by German blitzkrieg tactics. In simplest terms 3GW was manoeuvre warfare.

4GW refers to a non-linear, asymmetrical approach to war in which agility, decentralisation and initiative are instrumental to success. Antagonists utilising 4GW will, however, employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will. In essence, 4GW ‘seeks to convince the enemy’s political decision makers/political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for perceived benefit’. The struggle ‘is rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, will defeat greater economic and military power’ (Hammes 2006). It is fought across the entire spectrum of society and human activity – political, military, economic and social. In short, 4GW is intended to influence and affect the non-military population of a nation. It is, as General Sir Rupert Smith asserts, ‘war amongst the people’ (Smith 2005, xiii). Its use is meant to collapse an enemy internally versus destroying them physically.
Furthermore, 4GW departs radically from the traditional model in which the conduct of war was the monopoly of states. It evolved out of the radically different conditions of the post-Cold War era. It is not a type of war for conquest or territory. The enemy is not a nation-state and its people. Rather, in 4GW, non-state actors such as Hamas, al-Qaeda and the Taliban become serious opponents, capable of operations outside of their traditional areas of operation. Moreover, in 4GW the definition of combatants diverges significantly from the traditional laws of armed conflict. 4GW is non-linear, widely dispersed and largely undefined. It has few, if any, definable battlefields and the difference between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ is often indistinguishable (Lind 1989).

The concept of 4GW is not without criticism. Some analysts have stated that 4GW is so vague and all-encompassing that it can include everything and as a result is of little value.4 However, it does provide a construct by which to examine asymmetrical tactics and evolution of warfare. Moreover, placed in the context of ongoing conflicts, it also provides a framework to understand enemy intent and TTPs, as well as to prepare your own forces.

**ASYMMETRY**

As already eluded to, the asymmetrical nature of future conflict will have a dramatic effect on how we fight. ‘Asymmetry,’ according to American strategist Steven Metz, ‘is acting, organising and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximise one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action.’ He adds that ‘[i]t can entail different methods, technologies, values, organisations, time perspectives, or some combination of these … [and it] can have both psychological and physical dimensions’ (Metz and Johnson II 2001, 5-6). Doctrinally, an asymmetric threat is a concept ‘used to describe attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses, using methods that differ significantly from the opponent’s usual mode of operations’ (Fulton 2001).

At its core, asymmetry is not designed to win battlefield victory. Rather, its aim is to disrupt, distract and disconnect, in short, to wear down a normally superior opponent. ‘Difficult to respond to in a discriminate and proportionate manner,’ explained strategist Colin Gray (2002, 6), ‘it is of the nature of asymmetric threats that they are apt to pose a level-of-response dilemma to the victim. The military response readily available tends to be unduly heavy-handed, if not
plainly irrelevant, while the policy hunt for the carefully measured and precisely targeted reply all too easily can be ensnared in a lengthy political process which inhibits any real action’.

Gray also points out that the asymmetrical threat makes coercive threats less credible and even poses difficulties in going to war, as was recently demonstrated in the war against terrorism and the lack of international support for the American war against Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the asymmetrical threat makes the achievement of operational and tactical goals difficult. As Gray pondered, what defines success? Displacing Osama Bin Laden? Ousting Saddam Hussein? Furthermore, it is not enough for responses ’to asymmetric threats to be effective; in addition, they must be politically and morally tolerable’ (Gray 2002, 9).

Herein lies the difficulty for the practitioner. Commanders will be required to operate in, and be comfortable with, ambiguous and uncertain surroundings. Their options for the type of, if not the use of, force will often be restricted. In addition, of necessity, they will require the capability of adapting physically and theoretically to changes not only in their immediate operational area, but also in the larger international security environment. It will also demand that individuals, units and formations be agile, flexible and capable of responding to the unforeseen and expected.

Complexity will also derive from the nature of the enemy that is spawned by asymmetrical warfare and the evolving Western way of war. As military superiority increases, so too does the resiliency of the opponents. The enemy will work increasingly in complex networks composed of small organisations made up of a small number of dispersed individuals who communicate, coordinate and conduct campaigns in an inter-netted manner. These associations will be diverse, robust and redundant, thus making it difficult to bring superior effects to bear. There will be multiple nodes, most likely with no centralised command to attack. The question therefore arises: how do you defeat it?5

LEADERSHIP LESSONS LEARNED

Having set the theoretical parameters of operating in the contemporary environment, it is now timely to look at the actual execution of operations and the difficulties they entail for commanders and leaders. The lessons are many and those discussed in this paper only scratch the surface. Many are inter-related and support each other mutually, as will become evident. Nonetheless, Canadian
operations in Afghanistan have highlighted a number of salient issues that have forced change in how military personnel are educated and trained. In most cases changes have been successfully undertaken (whether out of necessity or circumstance or by design is a separate debate).

Preparing for complexity

To state that the modern battle space is complex is a huge understatement. The nature of 4GW and the enemy’s asymmetrical approach it entails, coupled with operations in foreign, harsh, inhospitable and alien environments, as well as in cooperation with a multitude of players (e.g. coalition, allies, host nation, other government departments, national and international agencies and NGOs), provide challenges of Herculean proportions. Major General Scales observed: ’Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground’. He explains:

Understanding and empathy will be more important weapons of war. Soldier-conduct will be as important as skill at arms. Cultural awareness and the ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops more effectively than body armour. Leaders will seek wisdom and quick but reflective thought rather than operational and planning skills as essential intellectual tools for guaranteeing future victories (Scales 2006).

His sentiments are well supported. ’The absolute truth of the complexity of the modern battle space,’ revealed Lieutenant Colonel Shane Shreiber, the operations officer for the NATO multi-national brigade in Afghanistan, ’requires mental agility and adaptability. The greatest weapon is the intellectual ability of the Canadian soldier to adapt – not new technology, surveillance, or weapons’ (Shreiber 2007).

The emphasis in the contemporary environment has shifted from a traditional focus on internal processes to one that must be capable of dealing with 4GW, which is inherently chaotic and fluid. Therefore, emphasis must be placed on the enemy and the situational requirements. Individual leader and soldier initiative is more important than slavish adherence to standard operating procedures (SOPs) and obedience. Understanding and adherence to the commander’s intent becomes far more important than specific detailed orders. In essence, the contemporary environment has shifted as follows:
From | To
--- | ---
Predictability/symmetrical threats | Surprise, uncertainty and asymmetrical threats
Single focused threats | Multiple complex challenges at home and abroad
Interstate threats | Decentralised terrorist and criminal networks and non-state enemies
Response after a crisis | Preventive action to prevent, disrupt and dislocate threats
One-size-fits-all deterrence | Tailored deterrence of rogue states, terrorists, peer competitors

The very indiscriminate and asymmetrical nature of 4GW necessitates agility in thinking and the rapid and flexible conduct of operations, as well as decentralisation and reliance on initiative at the lowest tactical level. As it is a small-unit war most of the time, subordinate commanders must be allowed the freedom to conduct operations based on the circumstances at hand. A culture of adaptability and agility of thought is key. But the operational commander must ensure that the employment of tactical forces achieves specific ends or objectives in accordance with the operational campaign plan.

This factor is complicated by the operational context. First, the commander rarely has enough enablers (e.g. aviation, fast air, surveillance suites, artillery and psychological operations) and those that do exist in theatre are national assets and controlled by the respective donor nation, which means that priority of use and national caveats are not the commander’s call. Furthermore, the environment is extremely complex and the commander simply does not own the battle space. For example, a commander may have to deal with up to 30 significant incidents a day, including a mass casualty, a catastrophic friendly fire incident minutes before H-Hr for a brigade offensive, and five different special operations forces (SOF) groups all from different countries, all operating in their active area of operations (AO), all of whom report to different chains of command. These issues are exacerbated by national caveats on force utilisation, insufficient enablers – none of which you own – hidden international agendas, host nation limitations and domestic national imperatives, just to name a few. Added to this is an extremely complex operational environment where it is hard to determine friend from foe and the terrain is some of the most difficult possible in which to conduct military operations.

The restrictions and limitations placed on the operational commander as a result of the coalition context is another huge challenge. As briefly mentioned earlier, leaders must cope with diverse, nation-centric and/or at times
competing national interests, which must all be dealt with through complex chains of command. From the political/development side this also means players must seek policy directives and/or authority prior to engaging. National caveats on force employment provide further restrictions. Amazingly, it seems not all force-providing countries are prepared to let their forces fight. This is further complicated by cultural and organisational differences and the egos of individuals, especially commanders. The building of personal relations becomes key.

Finally, perhaps one of the most difficult challenges is balancing ground truth with domestic expectations. National agendas and expectations for progress and good news stories, for example reconstruction and a better Afghanistan to justify the cost in Canadian blood and treasure, often run counter to the reality on the ground. Leaders face pressures ‘to get on with it’ while still wrestling with a very dangerous environment on the ground that does not always permit the necessary freedom of movement or the collaboration required to pursue development and reconstruction programmes. In addition, coalition resource limitations and foreign national caveats on participating forces can place an inordinate burden on select nations that are in a lead position to provide security in an assigned area of responsibility.

The actual ground also adds to the complexity of the modern battle space, particularly with operations in urban centres. Small, distributed targets, comprising primarily people, are densely located in a high-clutter, masked environment. Cities with their abundance of varied infrastructure limit and restrict current military capabilities such as stealth, mobility, C4 (command, control, communications and computers), ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) and GPS (ground positioning system) navigation and target designation. Moreover, fighting in built-up areas is not a traditional core competency of most armies. This is further exacerbated by the inability of soldiers and commanders to think in a three-dimensional manner because of failure to train and practise.

These challenges and limitations provide a levelling effect. In addition, cities provide physical cover for the enemy. Since an urban centre by its very nature tends to neutralise technology, especially long-range weapons, it relegates action to close combat – normally a very slow, resource- and casualty-intensive process. The clutter and dense nature of cities allows for the maximisation of camouflage, concealment, deception and surprise strikes. The most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that an opponent will hide combatants, equipment and weapons in churches, community centres, hospitals and schools, as well as shedding uniforms, deploying combatants in civilian dress and mixing them in
with the population. One unofficial after-action report revealed the enemy to be ‘Smart, flexible. Utilising all means at their disposal. They have moved ammo in civilian trucks, held weapons to their own people’s heads and pretended to be doctors with asthmatic children. Pretend to surrender then open fire’. Not surprisingly, two Chinese strategists have warned: ‘There is no means which cannot be used in war [in the future] and there is no territory or method which cannot be used in combination’ (Qiao and Wang 1999, 199).

The movement to asymmetrical and unrestricted warfare on the part of some antagonists severely increases the complexity for commanders and their soldiers. Regardless of the nature of the circumstances that caused the conflict, or the moral bankruptcy of the organisations fighting it, militaries of participating democracies will be expected to uphold the principles and values that are fundamental to their societies. Pressures arising from the political context and other constraints, such as societal intolerance to friendly casualties, timelines, collateral damage and a demand for increasing precision engagements, will make military operations exponentially more complex in the future (Record 2002). When military force is authorised, the resultant action will have to be at as low a risk threshold as possible, ensuring the minimum of casualties and collateral damage, yet accomplished in the quickest possible timeframe.

This results in an inherent paradox. Commanders are often left with the quandary of using enough force to win, but thereby risking criticism of excessive death and destruction, or using too little force and risk losing, or, at a minimum, becoming the target of criticism once again for a stalled, ineffectual strategy, campaign and/or performance, such as occurred in the initial stages of the Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns in 1999, 2001 and 2003 respectively.

This realisation provides opponents with another valuable reason to use urban settings – political cover. The risk of heavy casualties, specifically civilians, the danger of collateral damage and the likelihood of a subsequent humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of a prolonged struggle in an urban area, compounded by the scrutiny of the media, provide not only a levelling of the battlefield, but in some ways an advantage to the enemy. The resultant political constraints, i.e. restrictive ROEs, compounded by the necessity to invest heavily in humanitarian and public affairs efforts to counterbalance the negative press, can potentially distract from the primary mission and sap momentum. They will also have the effect of prolonging the conflict, which to an impatient public is untenable.

In the end, the complexity in the contemporary and future battle space will require mental agility and adaptability. A military’s greatest weapon will be the
intellectual ability of the average leader and soldier to adapt and do the right thing. Only internalised values, commitments and intellectual skills will fit the bill (Cook 2006). It will not be a function of new technology, surveillance equipment or weapons. ‘We must never forget that war is fought in the human dimension,’ reminded General Peter Schoomaker, former Chief of the US Army. He explained:

Defeating our enemies requires a shared understanding of the threat and a strategic consensus. It requires a concerted effort, utilizing all elements of power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Finally, it requires a national commitment to recruit, train, equip, and support those in uniform and their families, something that is a matter of priorities, not affordability (Schoomaker 2007).

Dealing with the host nation

Yet another important leadership lesson is the importance of working with host nation forces and decision-makers. TE Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, the infamous practitioner of unconventional warfare in the Middle East during the WW I, wrote: ‘It is better to let them do it themselves imperfectly than to do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their way and our time is short’. Amazingly, his sage advice is often ignored.

Military commanders invariably approach a problem with conviction, confidence and preconceived ideas of how they will solve it. Rarely do they have knowledge or confidence in the experience or advice of others. As a result there are often mistakes or delays in achieving effects. ‘Individuals were sent home,’ Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, a former Deputy Commander of ISAF, remarked. ‘Immaturity and the inability to actually think outside the box made them ineffective. What they tried to do was bring their usually very limited experience from somewhere else and apply it the same way that it had been done somewhere else and that didn’t work,’ he explained. ‘Each mission had its own unique drivers, cultural conditions, local nuances, relationships with their allies or other combatants,’ he said and emphasised that the Afghan problem needed an Afghan solution (Leslie 2006).

In the end, commanders must engage host nation forces and decision-makers. As difficult as it may be to work with less skilled, trained and equipped forces and personnel, it must be understood that there is no option. In order for the
host nation eventually to take over responsibility for its own affairs, the governance and security apparatuses must be built. This can only be achieved through dedicated efforts and by creating host nation capacity at all levels. Moreover, long-lasting success can only be achieved if the solution is integral to the culture, society and norms of the host nation. Transplanted ideas and structures, as well-intentioned as they may be, are more often than not ineffective.

Preparing self and others for the scope of conflict

An important leadership lesson that is not always grasped is the scope of the conflict. For example, the default setting or, more accurately, the attitude that ‘this is just a simple peacekeeping or peace support mission’ ignores the nature of contemporary operations. As argued earlier, there is no such thing as a ‘simple peacekeeping mission’. UN operations in the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda and Afghanistan, to name a few, have shown the tragic results of being unprepared.

As such, leaders must ensure that they create, nurture and maintain the proper combat mentality within their command by cultivating an understanding of the magnitude of the mission and the soldier’s responsibility in making the operation a success. They must reinforce the concept of 3BW and 4GW. Everyone must comprehend that the blue beret or the moral righteousness of his engagement in a trouble zone does not guarantee an absence of violence.

Repeatedly, commanders on the ground lament that not everyone in theatre, or at home, has fully grasped the scope of the conflict they are engaged in. The slow uptake of individuals in operational areas often translates into unnecessary casualties. This is the reason why an intelligence senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) who provides an in-country threat brief to newly arrived personnel in Afghanistan ends his 40-minute lecture with the words: ‘Now it’s important to remember, they [the Taliban] ARE trying to kill you’.

Ensuring that leaders and subordinates are properly prepared for the theatre of operations and the full spectrum of conflict is critical. In practical terms it will physically save lives since individuals will adopt the correct force protection posture. But, equally important, it will steel leaders and their subordinates for the hard decisions that need to be made in crisis situations, as well as prepare them to deal with the reality of violent, traumatic and stressful events. ‘Mental toughness must be developed just like physical fitness,’ counselled a unit regimental sergeant major, ‘because you are going to face some hard times and hard decisions’ (Northrup 2007).
Dealing with death

Casualty-averse publics are a reality. The less a society feels they have at stake in an out-of-area mission, the more reluctant they are to pay in blood or national treasure to help out a failed or failing state. This dynamic is well understood by belligerents and combatants and they use this knowledge as a major tool for destabilising UN missions or coalitions of the willing. Asymmetrical tactics assist in their ability to wreak havoc on participating nations. Opponents understand that casualties have a huge domestic impact. Deaths in far-away places for reasons not always well understood by domestic populations inevitably erode support for operations.

With a determined foe casualties will inevitably occur as they attempt to influence events and undermine governments and their support base. The effect in-theatre is dramatic. ‘The biggest shock,’ revealed Lavoie, ‘is that you will lose guys and you are losing guys’. He elaborated:

'It’s a bit of a shock and as a leader you must put it into perspective. But it’s a huge morale issue. Soldiers see their friends, buddies and colleagues on the ground dead. They don’t see the 200 enemy dead. The guys are definitely hurting. I’m just not sure how you could ever replicate that in training. I mean, we certainly covered the issue in our preparatory training back in Wainwright and other places. You can get your TTPs down for doing the casualties, but you never get that true battlefield inoculation of actually seeing 37 soldiers laying on the ground all wounded, all in pain, all in agony, all needing treatment, as well as the dead along with that. And that’s just something that never gets any easier. I think your TTPs – the procedural stuff – can be ironed out and more efficient SOPs developed, but the psychological side of it never, never gets any easier, that’s for sure. (Lavoie 2006)

‘You can mitigate it [taking casualties], but will never be able to bring it to zero,’ asserted Brigadier General David Fraser. ‘You need commanders who have resolve of steel to get things done’ (Fraser 2007). In the end, leaders themselves must come to grips with, and assist their subordinates to cope with, mass casualties and combat death. This is the single biggest shock and most difficult psychological challenge all participants are facing in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that everyone acknowledged that there would be casualties and deaths in-theatre, and
they all witnessed ramp ceremonies on television before deploying, almost all were unprepared for it when it occurred. Leaders at all levels struggled to make sense of the deaths themselves, and then had to try to comfort and make sense of it for their subordinates. ‘People are choking on a richness of experience,’ commented Padre Robert Lauder, ‘they are trying to metabolise it; trying to understand the new environment, but there is too much to chew, too much to swallow, but they can’t spit it out (Lauder 2006).

**Information operations**

Major General Scales, a well-known strategic analyst and author, observed: ‘The greatest challenge in the modern battlefield is human. Its not about technology, rather the object is to influence opinion – to win over populations’. He added, ‘its not about kinetic energy or kinetic solutions. Killing is not important. Cognitive dominance is the key’ (Scales 2006). US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice reinforced this idea when she stated that the US is now engaged in a ‘great global struggle to determine what ideas will organise the 21st century’ (Tutton 2006). However, prosecuting a long war or operational deployment is difficult unless the public can see a major attack or clear threat to them or their society. As such, militaries desperately need a clear moral right to be doing what they are doing, and if they step off the moral high ground they will lose support – both domestically and internationally.

Within this context, one leadership lesson that is frustratingly slow in gaining traction is the importance of information operations (IO), which ‘are continuous military operations within the Military Information Environment that enable, enhance and protect the commander’s decision-action cycle and mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations’ (Canadian Army, 2001). Clearly, all operations in the contemporary environment, at all levels, are dependent on IO, which includes computer network attacks, counter-propaganda, deception, electronic warfare (EW), destruction of enemy IO targets, security of friendly information and infrastructure, and related activities such as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and public affairs. One immediate requirement is the need to get information disseminated quickly to military personnel, the civilian population in the area of operations, the wider domestic population and the international audience.

IO carries a degree of risk and adds to the complexity of the task. However, a RAND study concluded: ‘The marginal return from leveraging an information
factor – such as the media – may be greater than the marginal return of applying more firepower’ (Edwards 2000, xiv). In the end, time becomes the critical factor – often the centre of gravity. It has a dramatic implication for those conducting operations. It requires a greater concentration on IO and a comprehension of the peoples/cultures of the area of operations. It will also necessitate great effort to counter propaganda and inform the media, the affected population, the domestic audience and the international community of the ‘proper and righteous’ manner in which operations are being conducted.

A fundamental lesson is that commanders must believe and communicate that IO is an integral part of the unit’s mission. Their actions must mirror their words. As such, personal involvement and staff focus are critical. For instance, key personnel must be selected and dedicated to carry out IO planning and coordination. Commanders must support IO in their selection of priority intelligence requirements and they must set the tone for the vital intelligence support of IO.

For effective IO it is vital to keep objectives simple. In addition, one should never take a templated, cookie-cutter approach. It is important to stay adaptive and dynamic. What worked one week will not necessarily work the next. Moreover, what worked in one area/region/country may not work in another. ‘Although lethal operations against insurgent fighters instil confidence in the population,’ stated one senior officer, ‘their effect can be short-lived and also open to interpretation and manipulation by the insurgent information operations campaign.’ He continued: ‘The consistent promulgation of key messages in conjunction with all other types of operations has a broader and more lasting effect on the population. IO is the best tool that can be used to have an impact on the greatest number of people’ (Adair 2007).8

**Dealing with the media**

Opponents will use the mass media as a tool to defeat national resolve. As such, leaders and their subordinates will invariably operate in a politically sensitive environment where the actions of a soldier at a roadblock or in a tactical setting can have strategic ramifications. Operating in a setting that is under the constant glare of the news cameras will exacerbate the complexity faced by leaders and their subordinates. ‘The Power of CNN’ is no longer an idle network boast (International Press Institute 2003).9 The CNN effect of instantaneous worldwide imaging will magnify tenfold the concept of the ’strategic corporal’, where a tactical decision/error can become a strategic issue as it is beamed across the globe in real time.
In fact, it adds to the volatility of the political security environment. The media’s global connectivity and instant reporting can create threats or new threats based on viewers’ reactions (and generated perceived beliefs) to news reports. A glaring example was the American soldier who upon clearing a stronghold in Iraq during the invasion raised the American flag. Although lowered almost immediately, the fleeting image of that action unleashed a barrage of controversy and debate over the act in regard to the implications of an American occupying power rather than a liberating force. ‘A wrong decision in the glare of the media,’ warns Colonel Paul Mailet, a former Canadian Department of National Defence Director of Defence Ethics, ‘can have far-reaching consequences that can affect peacekeeping mandates and strategic and national policies and aims’ (Mailet 2000).

The CNN effect also feeds what has become an unrealistic impatience by both the public and the media. Military operations, arguably the most multifarious of human endeavours, even when conducted in some of the most distant and hostile environments known, are expected by a restless media and their audience to be completed within days, at best weeks. In a medium where only 90 to 100 seconds are allocated per issue on an average news story and where the concept ‘if it bleeds it leads’ exists, there is a need for news to be dramatic, if not sensational. This causes great problems for the military. News reports will be fleeting and without context. ‘Television as a medium has no past and no future,’ explained NATO spokesman Jamie Shea. ‘It is always the eternal present. What BBC’s Nik Gowing has called the “tyranny of real time”, with no causality, no connection to what came before or what goes next. So everything is immediately important and a few moments later completely unimportant, contrary to our experience of real life (Shea 2000, 409).

A single act can become the defining image of a battle, campaign or operation. Failure or errors of any scale carry the potential of being catastrophic. Recent examples have shown that shocking images of combat can sway public opinion in an open democratic society and create intense political pressure to cease hostilities (Edwards 2000, 67). And there will be no respite. In Bosnia there were 3 000 journalists on the ground throughout the NATO air campaign of 1995. ‘They were faster than NATO soldiers or NATO satellites,’ conceded Shea. ‘Certainly faster than our intelligence community’ (Shea 2000, 410). The infamous televised tractor bombing incident caused NATO to lose 20 percentage points of public support in Germany alone (Shea 2000, 411). In 2003, during the war on Iraq, there were about 810 embedded reporters with the Coalition alone, in excess of 3 000 war corresponds in total and a multitude of others covering
the conflict from strategic locations across the globe (IPI 2003). This has led to a universally-accepted populist notion that ‘it isn’t real unless it’s on television’. To conduct operations in such an environment magnifies the complexity of an already complicated profession.

The reality of the ‘strategic corporal’ necessitates the education and training of everyone who deploys into the theatres of operation. Individuals must be inculcated with the notion that everyone needs to be conscious and accountable for their actions at all times since their actions become tools, if not weapons, in the ongoing information campaign waged by the enemy.

**Cultural intelligence**

‘During the first year of my counterinsurgency duties,’ explained one senior officer, ‘I believe I created more insurgents than I eliminated. This was not only because of inexperience, but also because I lacked fundamental knowledge of the terrain, the people and the culture. I also did not know how to sift through local intelligence effectively. A combination of my own naiveté and enthusiasm, not to mention pressure from senior commanders to deliver results, resulted in actions that alienated the locals and inadvertently helped the insurgents’ (Killcullen 2006, 279). Similarly, Brigadier General Fraser conceded: ‘I underestimated one factor – culture. I was looking at the wrong map. I needed to look at the tribal map, not the geographic map. That map was over 2 000 years old’ (Fraser 2007).

Cultural Intelligence (CQ) is the ability to recognise the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people and to apply this knowledge toward a specific goal. Dr Emily Spencer has identified that CQ goes beyond the normal parameters of understanding the enemy. It pertains concurrently to the national (i.e. domestic population/society), international (i.e. allies, coalition partners, NGOs, UN and other international agencies) and host nation (i.e. governmental, military and police agencies within the country of operations) as well as the enemy domains. Spencer explains: ‘Showing high CQ can be an effective force multiplier. However, demonstrating low CQ in any of these four domains can negatively impact a mission’ (Spencer 2007, 13).

In the end, the message that is intended is less important than the message that was actually received by a target audience. Simply put, it is critical to see reality through the eyes of the other culture, not through the lens of your own experience and bias. The importance of this is most often ignored, or just given token attention. A few language classes that provide some common phrases, a
brief history overview and some cultural anecdotes are normally the depth of the CQ provided. However, mission success rests on in-depth CQ in all four domains so that the necessary assistance, cooperation and support are achieved.

**Winning hearts and minds**

Current conflict that is enmeshed in 4GW inevitably centres on the violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. Opponents inevitably attempt to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will. As such, one veteran explained, ‘every soldier must be made to understand to take responsibility for everything he does – from facial expressions to direct action’. He stressed: ‘Everything you do has ramifications’ (Penniston 2007).

An American general agreed. He proclaimed: ‘Every time you offend an Iraqi you are working for the insurgents’ (Cook 2006). A former commandant of the US Marine Corps cautioned: ‘Do not create more enemies than you take out by some immoral act’ (Mattis 2001, 11). This advice is relevant regardless of theatre of operations, or scale of belligerence within the spectrum of conflict of an operation.

Winning the respect and support of the host nation population is key to success in any mission. It can provide intelligence on enemy activity, location and movements, advance IO initiatives and government programmes and assist military forces operating within an AO. If it is not actively supportive, the population can at best remain neutral, withholding vital information required for force protection. At worst, the population can assist the opponents with information, food, lodgings, caching of weapons and potential recruits. Importantly, winning the hearts and minds of the population is more than just providing soccer balls and food parcels. It is the amalgam of security, governance and development. It is about providing the population with a stake in the system and trust in the legitimacy of the government. It is not just about doing nice things, but about how you do them. Respect for individuals and culture is critical.

However, the reality of 4GW makes winning hearts and minds difficult. For example, in the Afghanistan case study, it is often difficult to breach the cultural barrier, particularly one that is so xenophobic. Moreover, it is not unusual for soldiers who are attacked to feel angry and betrayed. They believe deeply that they are serving in Afghanistan to create a better society for its people, yet they are continually attacked by seemingly invisible antagonists who appear to operate effortlessly in the very Afghan society that the soldiers are trying to improve and protect. Although most understand that the average Afghani is just trying
to survive, the resentment still builds with each attack, with every casualty and especially with every death.

The nature of the conflict fuels a spiral of antagonism. In essence it is a vicious circle. The enemy has learned to use our kindness against us. As coalition forces continue to be targeted by IEDs and suicide bombers, they have no choice but to take the necessary action to protect themselves. This, however, comes with a cost. As convoys drive aggressively down the centre of the road, they force local Afghan traffic to scurry for the shoulder. As they physically bump traffic out of the way, or threaten vehicles that follow too close by pointing weapons, or create collateral damage because of attacks against them and/or defensive or offensive operations, they risk alienating Afghan nationals. With every action taken against the population at large, regardless of justification or cause, a cost is incurred. Coalition actions could potentially push Afghans to support the Taliban, or at least cause them to turn a blind eye to Taliban activities. Yet to do nothing and continue to be hit without taking some action feeds soldier disillusionment and has the potential of losing Canadian public support for the conflict, since it appears that the country’s troops are put at risk without taking the necessary steps to defend themselves. Moreover, if a safe and secure environment is not created for the local population, there is almost no hope of creating support for the new Afghan national government.

As such, a careful balance must be reached between force protection and winning the hearts and minds of the population. In 4GW, kinetic combat power is not always the most effective tool or weapon. Leaders must ensure that their personnel understand that money, medicine, fuel, food, access to education, employment opportunities, public works projects, respect and particularly information are all important enablers to achieving the mission. These non-kinetic, non-military tools are force multipliers that can dramatically change the threat picture and effectiveness of the insurgents. Security and reconstruction are not mutually exclusive concepts – they are intertwined and one feeds the other.

Regardless of mission or theatre of operation, winning the hearts and minds of the population is key. Cultural awareness, a carefully targeted IO campaign, solid leadership that ensures tolerance, patience and a sound understanding of who actually is the enemy must be priorities.

The integrated approach – the whole of government

’It’s quite easy to kill people and break things,’ observed one veteran, ‘compared to putting them back together’ (Shreiber 2007). This is, in a nutshell, the dilemma.
As already mentioned, successful operations in the contemporary environment necessitate joint, multinational and multi-agency cooperation, i.e. an integrated approach. However, this is normally a greater challenge than it appears. Within the military sphere, inter-service rivalries, differing sub-cultures and limits on interoperability create stresses and inefficiencies. Once allies or coalition partners are included, differing training standards, language barriers and larger issues of interoperability and national caveats muddy the water even more.

These challenges are further exacerbated when government and civilian agencies with different agendas, alien organisational cultures and various philosophies are included. Most often the greatest problem is one of ignorance. None of the players fully understand who the other participants are, what they do, their mandates or how they actually operate. Other government departments (OGDs) and civilian agencies are normally not accustomed to military directness or command structures. In addition, ironically, they are most often nowhere near as flexible and are more bureaucratic and risk averse than the military. Where the military looks for quick solutions and immediate results, the developmental agencies focus on long-term sustainable development. Not surprisingly, timelines, approval mechanisms, communications and organisational methodologies all vary and require both patience and tolerance.

Clearly, ensuring an effective integrated approach is a key challenge that must be mastered. How does a leader ensure that a diverse, multinational force is welded into a coherent organisation in which all personnel have a clear conception of the operational end-state desired? This understanding must then be extended to civilian counterparts, who must be integrated into the team and into the decision-making process in an acceptable manner and on an equal basis. What is often lost is the fact that invisible cultural barriers (i.e. divergent attitudes, beliefs and values, as well as methodologies and organisational practices) restrict true cooperation. Often we do not know enough and assume our perception of the state of affairs to be accurate and mutual, when the underlying situation may in fact be entirely different. Operational commanders thus face an enormous challenge in creating a conducive environment in which planning, decision-making and the conduct of activities occur in an integrated manner that permits reforms and the advancement of political and economic initiatives to happen in a safe and secure environment.

The integrated approach unquestionably creates challenges for leaders. Essential is the realisation by all military and civilian personnel that success depends on an effective and integrated military-civilian approach to most
operations in the contemporary environment. Very few challenges are an exclusive military function. The majority are, in fact, the result of political, economic and social dysfunction that is exacerbated by, and prolonged as a result of, insecurity. Military presence and/or force is thus but one tool for remedying the problem, and this is normally ineffective without political and economic measures to fix the larger underlying problems.

The balance between specialisation and generalisation

The implications for the soldier in the contemporary and future security environment are simple. To be a highly trained combat soldier is not enough. To operate in this multifaceted environment soldiers will have to be highly educated. The traditional emphasis on training, with its focus on ‘a predictable response to a predictable situation’, will have to be better balanced with education, defined by Prof. Ron Haycock as the ‘reasoned response to an unpredictable situation – critical thinking in the face of the unknown’ (Haycock 1999). In this vein, ‘time dedicated to understanding the higher orders of conflict inculcates mental agility and the ability to be creative as well as technically competent,’ explains Major General Scales. ‘A well-read and educated leader,’ he adds, ‘will be better prepared to deal with the uncertainty and chaos of combat [or increasingly complex operations]’ (Scales 2006, 13). Quite simply, decentralised decision-making power and enlightened low-level leaders capable of making reasoned, timely decisions under pressure will determine success or failure.

Unfortunately, the reality is that the minimalist approach to training individuals and units to perform ‘simple peacekeeping’ operations is risk-laden. Given globalisation and its implications for the proliferation of technology, weaponry and information, opponents seeking to undermine UN missions and coalitions will utilise 4GW and all that it entails to achieve their aim. As such, commanders and their forces must be capable of transitioning through the spectrum of conflict on a regular, if not daily, basis to accomplish their mission. Therefore, as a minimum, leaders and troops must be trained, in simple terms, to execute 3BW. Units must be capable of undertaking a wide range of operations in which troops perform a range of activities from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping and fighting. Leaders must be intellectually agile and adaptive to the use innovative tactics and approaches in order to accomplish the higher intent of a mission, rather than being limited in the scope of their actions by the use of restrictive mission verbs that have their origins in
an outdated lexicon and often fail to capture the reality of the contemporary and ever evolving security environment.

**ACHIEVING AN ADAPTIVE AND FLEXIBLE MINDSET**

We are all prisoners of our own experience and as such bring along our personal baggage in all we do. Furthermore, most view change as a threat. It moves us from our comfort zone, which includes a sound understanding of current TTPs, technical competence, personal experience and proficiency, and a system that rewards those characteristics. For this reason there is usually resistance to change and an undue reliance on doing things 'the way we always have'. Although innovation is applauded, conformance is normally rewarded. So, creating and nurturing adaptive and flexible mindsets among all levels of leadership in a military institution requires a conducive environment that actively encourages and rewards such behaviour. It is a top-down-driven function that must be supported in deed, not just in words.

On a practical level it requires an emphasis on a robust professional development (PD) programme that covers training, experience, education and self-development and emphasises innovation, creative thought, discussion and intellectual rigor and debate. Nonetheless, training that provides ‘a predictable response to a predictable situation’ remains a fundamental pillar for preparing leaders and soldiers to be adaptive and flexible. Training provides the necessary skills, technical competence and confidence in oneself, the group and the equipment employed in operations. It also furnishes an understanding of capability, capacity and function that acts as a point of departure and is also a fall-back position, acting as a safety net in crisis.

Training must be as realistic as possible and encompass battle and casualty simulation, realistic scenarios, unscripted enemy action and an unrelenting tempo. Leaders and soldiers must be tested in an environment where they can make mistakes from which they can learn. They must be pushed to the limit so that they are not in such a position for the first time in actual operations. Veterans from Afghanistan repeatedly stated: ‘Training can never be complex enough’ 13. Such a process builds an inherent flexibility and adaptiveness.

The payback of good training is enormous. During a final validation exercise for a force-protection platoon deploying to Afghanistan, the group underwent a scenario where a convoy they were protecting underwent 29 events in less than a 24-hour period. Upon termination of the exercise, all platoon members complained that this was totally unrealistic. On their second convoy in-theatre,
a supposedly eight-hour convoy turned into a 36-hour ordeal that included no fewer than 19 separate incidents, including multiple suicide bombers, mortar and rocket attacks, ambushes, casualty evacuation, a vehicle accident and mechanical breakdowns. To a person, they conceded that the only way they had got through the convoy experience was as a result of their already having experienced such a situation before, on exercise, before deployment. In essence, the rehearsal in Canada provided them with not only the practical experience, but also the mental strength and stamina, as well as context and ideas of how to react and adapt to the changing dynamics of a real situation.

Within this context, adventure training is an important activity for leaders and soldiers to undertake. Whether mountain climbing, trekking, canoeing or other challenging activities, the opportunities for individuals to undertake risky ventures in unfamiliar environments allows them to develop leadership traits and deal with unforeseen events that inevitably occur. It forces leaders to improvise, adapt and learn to deal with adversity in real-world settings as against canned exercise scenarios.

A corollary to training is experience. Experience builds confidence and individual and group competence. Quite simply, experience is empirical and tangible; decisions are made, actions are taken and the results are seen, if not felt. In fact, the military culture reveres and rightfully recognises the experience of individuals. Such experience should be shared so that those not fortunate enough to have undergone operations or complex exercises can learn through others, gaining in essence vicarious experience. Seminars, conferences, PD symposiums, publications such as the Canadian In harm’s way series, which consists of a number of volumes written by individuals representing different rank levels and services. They profile operations and the leadership challenges experienced and how these were overcome. All provide valuable vicarious experiences to learn from.

This repertoire of experience learned or accrued through other sources provides individuals with a data bank of knowledge that can be accessed in a crisis or when facing a problem. It enables individuals to draw from past experience, whether this is their own or that of someone else, to respond to a problem. In short, experience provides confidence and practical ideas for individuals to develop an adaptive and flexible approach to the challenges they encounter. As such, a conscious programme of deploying leaders at all levels on exercises, operations and PD courses is very important.

Education that promotes ‘the reasoned response to an unpredictable situation - critical thinking in the face of the unknown’ is another vital, if not the most
important, pillar in developing adaptive and flexible mindsets. Quite simply, one must be educated in order to deal effectively with uncertainty, which is omnipresent in the current and future security environment. ‘Education,’ explains Major David Last, a professor in the Department of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), ‘is the shaping of the mind’ (Last 2006, 26). Education assists in our reasoning ability, which in turn is critical in responding to unanticipated circumstances.

Clearly, education rooted in critical thinking, problem-solving and analytical research prepares individuals better to think and cope with problems and situations that are unexpected. It assists individuals not only to embrace change, but to adapt and anticipate. More importantly, it instils in people the attitude and ability to learn constantly from one’s environment and to prepare and react accordingly. The famous British military historian Sir Michael Howard wrote:

... academic studies can provide the knowledge, insight, and the analytic skills which provide the necessary basis, first for reasoned discussion, and then for action. They provide a forum, and breed the qualities, which enable the student, the teacher, the politician, the civil servant, the moral philosopher, and not least the soldier to reach a common understanding of the problems which confront them, even if inevitably there is disagreement about the solutions. This dialogue is what civilization is all about. Without it societies dissolve. (Howard 1984, 83)\(^{14}\)

Similarly, Dr John Cowan, the principal of RMC, reinforced the necessity of education in relation to the military. ‘Today, when a young officer may be called upon to be a skilled leader, a technical expert, a diplomat, a warrior, and even an interpreter and an aid expert all at once,’ he said, ‘there is no question that good training is not enough. Skills are not enough.’ He added: ‘The job calls for judgement, that odd distillate of education, the thing which is left when the memorized facts have either fled or been smoothed into a point of view, the thing that cannot be taught directly, but which must be learned. Without the mature judgement which flows from education, we fall back on reflexes, which are damned fine things for handling known challenges, but which are manifestly unreliable when faced with new ones’ (Cowan 1999)\(^{15}\).

Finally, the development of adaptable and flexible mindsets also rests on self-development. Individuals, particularly leaders, must take it upon themselves to continue their professional development by reading and studying the profession
of arms and the evolution of conflict. They should devour material that encompasses changes to the security environment and their profession, particularly material that provides insight into the geography (human, political and terrain) of regions to which they will deploy on operations. Reading will expand their horizons and assist with their understanding of the culture, history and practical dynamics of the environment in which they will be operating. Thus, they will be better positioned to anticipate and adapt to challenges they will face.

CONCLUSION

The theoretical solution to any problem is always easy. It is without economic, political or cultural restraint. It normally represents the logical, comprehensive and ideal resolution to the quandary. It is also, normally, useless, as it is unworkable within the constraints of real life. It is within this context that every government and military must balance risk with achievable solutions. In the end, whatever is decided should be based on a clear understanding of the reality of the contemporary operating environment and the risk that is acceptable. It should not be based on wishful thinking.

As such, the trends in the contemporary security environment are fairly clear. Simple peacekeeping is unlikely to be a realistic task. Militaries deploying on missions in foreign lands should be prepared to conduct operations along the entire spectrum of conflict. Moreover, they should be capable of dealing with 4GW. Although this does entail a larger training bill, and to some degree a level of specialisation as against a lower level of general capability, the risk of not doing so is potential mission failure and casualties. As a minimum, a robust PD program must be undertaken to prepare leaders to operate in the volatile, ambiguous and complex environment in which they will find themselves.

NOTES

1. For example, explosively-formed projectiles similar to antitank-shaped charges were first used by Hezbollah in Lebanon. They then migrated to Iraq in 2004 and were later confirmed to be in Afghanistan in April 2007.

2. Scales 2006. This new era of conflict has also spawned a new threat even within Western nations, namely the radicalisation of elements within the society of developed nations – homegrown terrorists. Recent examples include the UK ‘shoe bomber’ who attempted to destroy an aircraft with a bomb hidden in the sole of a running shoe, the terrorists who conducted the London
subway bombing and the 'Toronto 17', a group of Canadian homegrown terrorists who established a training camp in Ontario, Canada.


4. For criticism of 4GW see Curtis (2005).

5. Mohammed Aideed in Somalia is one example. He used runners, burning tyres and other primitive means of communication and was able to elude capture and destruction of his power base.

6. '3-7 CAV lessons learned', posted on Companycommand.com, 1 April 2003.

7. Scales elaborated: 'His hope is to leverage our impatience to cause us to overreact with inappropriate use of physical violence. Perception-control will be achieved and opinions shaped by the side that best exploits the global media.'

8. Terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda exploit communications. They make extensive use of the media, television and the Internet for the battle for hearts and minds. The computer keyboard is a weapon no less powerful than RPG assault rifles.

9. It is estimated that a minimum of 100 million people had access to satellite networks carrying reports on the war in Iraq during the US-led invasion (International Press Institute 2003 and CNN televised report, 9 April 2003).

10. The message is simply, 'Know your audience'. Terrorists stopped showing videos of beheadings because they found that they had violated the accepted standards, although informal, of those they relied on for support and legitimacy. This fear of losing popular support prompted their modified behaviour (Shifman 2007, 226).

11. This reality is similar to that experienced by UN forces working in Somalia in 1992–1993.

12. These different approaches can be explained as follows: the effects of security (military operations) are measured in weeks; the effects of development (programmes to provide food and build roads) are measured in years; the effects of capacity-building (the training of clinicians and armies, the building of schools) are measured in generations.

13. Schreiber (2007) repeated the sentiments of many when he said: 'Casualties are a fact of life for us. Bring them into training. Practise it – test the limits of the soldiers'.

14. Major General the Honourable WA Griesbach (1931) stated: 'Since wars cannot be arranged to order merely to train officers, it follows that, after a long period of peace, the officers of an army must get their military education from reading and study'.


LIST OF REFERENCES


Cowan, Dr John Scott. RMC Convocation Address, Kingston, Ontario, 4 October 1999.


Maillet, Colonel JPM. Defence ethics, program ethics and operational project. Memorandum, 20 June 2000.


Schoomaker, General Peter J. 35th Chief of Staff of the Army. Farewell message, 9 April 2007.


Shreiber, Lieutenant Colonel Shane. ACOS, Multi-national Brigade HQ. 1 CMBG briefing, 22 January 2007.


Chapter Ten

Enabling success
Cultural intelligence and the contemporary security environment

Dr Emily J Spencer

‘It’s all cultural in the end.
–Hope (2006)’

INTRODUCTION

An American veteran of several foreign interventions once observed of the US military, ‘What we need is cultural intelligence.’ He continued, ‘What I [as a soldier] need to understand is how these societies function. What makes them tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that is so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think compared to my values and the way I think?’ (Anonymous 2005, 304). More recently, Brigadier General David Fraser, the former commander of the International Security Assistance Force Multi-National Brigade Sector South in Kandahar, Afghanistan, admitted, ‘I underestimated one factor – culture.’ He then elaborated, ‘I was looking at the wrong map – I needed to look at the tribal map, not the geographic map. The tribal map is over 2 000 years old. Wherever we go in the world we must take into account culture. Culture will affect what we do. This is the most important map [i.e. tribal] there is.’ Fraser lamented, ‘I did not take that in up front. Not all enemy reported was actually Taliban – identification of enemy forces was often culturally driven’ (Fraser 2007).

Indeed, the desire for cultural understanding of our enemies is as old as war itself. Exhibiting high cultural intelligence (CQ)², however, requires more than just amassing cultural understandings of our enemies. CQ is the ability to
recognise the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people and, most importantly, to apply this knowledge toward a specific goal. In particular, CQ must be applied in the context of the national, international, host nation and enemy arenas and the focus must be on its ability to be a force multiplier.3

The non-linear and asymmetrical approach of the contemporary defence environment demands that soldiers act as warriors and technicians as well as scholars and diplomats. Kinetic solutions are no longer the panacea of warfare. Rather, individuals need to see ‘reality’ through the eyes of another culture, specifically the one with which they are interacting, in order to adapt their attitudes and behaviours so as to better influence the target audience to achieve specific aims. Cultural knowledge contributes to this end, while an understanding of CQ and, in particular, the four CQ domain paradigm provides the template for how to use this cultural knowledge to attain desired objectives.

In seeking to understand CQ, it is important to realise that it is more than just amassing cultural knowledge. Notably, someone can have cultural awareness but still not exhibit high CQ. For instance, one may know all the cultural information about a target society or culture but still fail to adapt their own behaviour to ensure the attainment of intended objectives. That having been said, it is not possible to have high CQ without cultural knowledge.

Similar to a picture on a puzzle box, the four CQ domain paradigm provides the framework to indicate where individual cultural knowledge pieces fit in the global context. Specific culture, country or area cultural awareness provides details for each piece of the puzzle. Without both the overarching conceptualisation provided by the four CQ domain paradigm and the individual pieces established through country and even area-specific cultural awareness, the puzzle cannot be put together.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE FOR THE USE OF CQ IN WARFARE: RENAMING FIDO

CQ has recently become a key ‘buzzword’ in the Western defence community. As the process of recognising the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people and applying that knowledge towards a specific goal, CQ has in some respects been a part of warfare, both conventional and unconventional, for centuries. Looking at military history through the lens of CQ provides historical perspectives on the use of CQ in the national, international, host nation and enemy arenas and underscores the value of demonstrating high CQ in warfare.
History is replete with examples of how CQ has (and has not) been applied in warfare. Interestingly, in almost every battle recounted in the Peloponnesian War, the three-decade-long fight between the Spartans and the Athenians at the end of the fifth century BC, Thucydides describes how each side took advantage – or tried to – of the other’s cultural ‘weaknesses’ while at the same time playing on what they believed to be their own cultural ‘strengths’. Moreover, each battle was generally viewed in terms of broader strategic objectives. The battle for Lesbos is just one example, in that a holiday feast was chosen for the date of attack, yet ultimately rejected because of the feared retaliation that an attack on this occasion might foster amongst the island’s allies. Indeed, the Spartans were reluctant to incur the wrath of neutrals by not appearing to respect their cultural practices. While the details of this particular battle are not germane to this discussion, it is interesting to note that cultural practices and historical alliances contributed considerably to the forming of the Spartans’ strategy (Kagan 2003, 100-102).

The myth of the Trojan horse provides another case study of how cultural knowledge is perceived to have been used in warfare. In this story, which may or may not be historically accurate, after a ten-year siege of Troy the Greeks built a hollow horse, loaded it with men and left it at the gates to the city as a supposed peace offering. Relying on both the discipline of the Greeks to stay in the horse until the appropriate moment and the Trojans to accept the gift and rejoice with drink, as was their cultural practice, the Greeks were able to pillage Troy. The Greeks had also relied on the customary practice of the time of the defeated general to surrender his horse to the victorious general as a sign of respect. They therefore had good faith that the Trojans would accept the ‘gift’. The Greek’s transfer of cultural knowledge – the discipline of their men, the projected celebration of the Trojans and the cultural symbolism of the horse – into behaviour that would further their efforts to defeat the Trojans demonstrated high CQ.4

CQ has also been widely used in modern conflicts such as the Second World War. Even in conventional warfare, information about the motivation and behaviours of others and yourself was deemed vital to the war effort. The establishment of special operations forces (SOF) is but one example. SOF are defined as ‘specially organised, trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces that conduct special operations to achieve military, political, economic or informational objectives by generally unconventional means in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas’ (Horn 2007a, 159). Their use by many Western militaries during the Second World War is an example of how cultural knowledge, in addition to other factors, was used to further political objectives. Indeed, the
US government employed anthropologists, as specialists in human behaviour, to help them understand and respond to the war. Scholar David Price notes that despite initial ethical concerns, ‘Once America entered a state of total-war, half of America’s anthropologists joined the war effort working for over a dozen agencies’ (Price 2008). The US government in the early 1940s obviously recognised the need for a clear understanding of self and other that could be obtained by employing experts in the study of human beings and their relationships with each other and their environments.

During the Cold War, the epic struggle of ‘West’ versus ‘East’ from circa 1945 to 1989, culture was recognised as a central component in the belligerence. From a purely military point of view in which two symmetrical forces faced each other on a conventional battlefield, this may not be entirely true. However, in a larger context it was a battle of ideologies fought in the political and social realms. Both West and East appreciated the need for cultural understandings of each other, as well as themselves, their international partners and the host nation peoples in ‘hot zones’. Furthermore, they understood that the relationships between these four domains were dynamic and each side used propaganda to enhance support for their particular ideology.

Arguably, however, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which represented the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and the subsequent end of the Cold War, Western nations no longer had a visible ‘enemy’. In retrospect, the Cold War model, in existence for almost 50 years, was a very comfortable environment for everyone. The world was clearly delineated – the enemy was easily identified and understood and the anticipated battlefield was fully comprehensible, to the point where exercises, particularly in Europe, were practically dress rehearsals for the potential conflict.

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall the rigidly controlled bi-polar world tumbled into a free fall. An economic and political power vacuum was created as the superpowers disengaged from many areas around the world. Very quickly failed and failing states mushroomed around the globe. Exacerbating the situations were other significant problems such as ethnic violence, narco-trafficking, transnational crime and conflicts over resources.

In the 1990s, things got worse. With only a single global superpower, the United States, the West, following the lead of the US, began a series of selective interventions. In this context, the landscape for militaries also changed dramatically. The belligerents were no longer clearly identified or well understood. Indeed, operations in the 1990s involved a monumental leap in complexity. Antagonists
ranged from military to para-military forces to warlords to criminal organisations and gangs to armed mobs. In addition, military forces now had to deal with other governmental departments and organisations, as well as non-governmental agencies and an ever-present press. By 1993, United States Marine Corps commandant General Charles Krulak articulated the new security environment within the context of the ‘three block war’. He described an operational concept, or contingency, in which soldiers conducted operations spanning humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping and/or mid-intensity combat all in the same day and all within three city blocks (Krulak 1999).

Militaries scrambled to meet the requirements of the new environment, one that required both war-fighting and diplomatic skills. More emphasis was placed on lower levels of leadership. The old mass army concept that relied only on senior leadership to make decisions and deal with the public or press was no longer relevant or effective. The concept of the ‘strategic corporal’, where the tactical decisions made by junior members on the ground in the glare of media cameras can become strategic issues as they are beamed across the globe by the media in real time and influence or incite negative and often violent reactions, required a more decentralised leadership approach.

Just as militaries began to cope with the new environment, the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 (9/11) shattered any level of comfort that may have developed. It unleashed a global war on terror that engulfed the Americans and their international allies in deadly struggles in Afghanistan, Iraq and other parts of the world. The unchallenged military prowess of the United States dictated that hostile elements had to adopt asymmetrical approaches.5

As such, counter-insurgency operations, characterised by the use of asymmetrical warfare, have regained importance in the defence community since 9/11 and the subsequent deployment of multinational forces to Afghanistan and Iraq.6 This new era of counter-insurgency warfare is noticeably different from the post-World War II period of national liberation that extended roughly between 1944 and 1980, yet nonetheless bears some similarities. Specifically, people remain the key focus in counter-insurgencies, where winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of home and host populations is germane to success. But the stage is no longer restricted to local citizenry, as new technologies and the media have created a global audience (Kilcullen 2006-07) and thereby further highlighted the importance of exhibiting high CQ in all four of the proposed CQ domains. Indeed, in his retirement speech, US Army General PJ Schoomaker (2007) reminded his audience, ‘We must never forget that war is fought in the human dimension.’ Canadian
Lieutenant Colonel Ian Hope (2007, 211) also remarks that ‘[i]n combat, the power of personality, intellect and intuition, determination, and trust, outweigh the power of technology, and everything else.’

As these examples show, CQ, or the ability to recognise the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people, oftentimes at the national level, and to apply this knowledge towards a specific goal, has been an aspect of most military campaigns, from small wars to conventional engagements, throughout much of history. Noticeably, however, the attention paid to the cultural components of warfare have ebbed and flowed, largely reflecting the perceived need of demonstrating high CQ for military success.

DEFINING CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE

CQ is a new label that has been attached to an old concept and over the years has led to the creation of several definitions. Despite the plethora of descriptions of CQ, the term lacks a clear, concise definition. It is thus important for us to establish a practical definition and conceptualisation of CQ as it applies to the defence community.

Despite some fundamental differences between the two areas of research, both the civilian and military schools of thought are inextricably linked and each requires further explanation. One of the leading authors on CQ in the civilian domain is scholar P Christopher Earley. Earley, working with Elaine Mosakowski, in a 2004 Harvard Business Review article describes CQ as an outsider’s ‘… ability to interpret someone’s unfamiliar and ambiguous gestures in just the way that person’s compatriots and colleagues would, even to mirror them.’ They continue, ‘A person with high cultural intelligence can somehow tease out of a person’s or group’s behaviour those features that would be true of all people and all groups, those peculiar to this person or this group, and those that are neither universal nor idiosyncratic. The vast realm that lies between those two poles is culture’ (Earley and Mosakowski 2004).

In a more complex analysis of CQ, Earley and Soon Ang define CQ as ‘a person’s capability to adapt effectively to new cultural contexts.’ While slightly vague, they further explain that CQ has both process and content features that comprise cognitive, motivational and behavioural elements (Earley and Ang 2003, 59, 67). Earley and Randall S Peterson elaborate on this concept and build upon Earley and Ang’s original concept that ‘CQ captures [the] capability for adaptation across cultures and … reflects a person’s capability to gather, interpret, and act upon these radically different cues to function effectively across cultural
settings or in a multicultural situation’ (ibid.). Earley and Peterson add, ‘CQ reflects a person’s capability of developing entirely novel behaviour (e.g. speech, sounds, gestures, etc.) if required.’ They surmise, ‘At its core, CQ consists of three fundamental elements: metacognition and cognition (thinking, learning and strategising); motivation (efficacy and confidence, persistence, value congruence and affect for the new culture); and behaviour (social mimicry, and behavioural repertoire)’ (Earley and Peterson 2004, 105).

Other researchers have also explored the idea of CQ being composed of cognitive, motivational and behavioural domains or similar variations of this triplex system. For instance, James Johnson and a group of researchers (Johnson, Lenartowicz, and Apud 2004) define CQ in terms of attitude, skills and knowledge and another scholar in the field, David C Thomas (2006), emphasises knowledge, skills and mindfulness.

Most of this literature, however, prioritises CQ as pertaining to other cultures and notably not one’s own. Earley and Ang (2003, 12) are clear when they state, ‘CQ reflects a person’s adaptation to new cultural settings and capability to deal effectively with other people with whom the person does not share a common cultural background.’ Indeed, they even go so far as to suggest that individuals who are part of their own cultural in-group will find it particularly difficult to adjust to a new cultural setting, as it may be one of the first times that they experience alienation from the in-group and lessons learned in one culture may not be useful in another (ibid., 94).

This argument, however, ignores the support of, and reactions from, the home population. Although this concept is something that may work for businesses, it is not acceptable for militaries that serve democratic nations. The ability of an individual to understand the behavioural patterns, beliefs, values and attitudes of their own society must remain an important aspect of the definition of CQ as it applies to the Canadian Forces (CF). Certainly, most of the military literature that discusses CQ recognises this fact.

Seen collectively, the military literature underscores the need for CQ at the national, international, host nation and enemy levels. These arenas comprise a dynamic four domain CQ paradigm. The expression of high CQ might differ in each of the four domains, but demonstrating enhanced CQ in each domain as well as recognising the connections between them is essential in today’s complex and dynamic defence environment.

It is important to appreciate the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and ever increasing requests from military personnel for more cultural
knowledge because this frames how definitions of CQ have been adapted to match the needs and understanding of Western militaries. These concerns apply across the broad spectrum of operations that exist in the contemporary defence environment.

A common theme in accounts by soldiers serving in conflict zones is the need for a deeper understanding of host nation peoples. ‘The pitfalls presented by a different culture and an ill-defined, poorly functioning (or non-existent) local judicial, administrative, and political system are enormous,’ writes Major PM Zeman (2005, 20) of the US Marine Corps. American Army Major General (Ret) Robert H Scales Jr (2004, 32) echoes these sentiments in describing the vital ‘cultural’ phase of the war where ‘intimate knowledge of the enemy’s motivation, intent, will, tactical method, and cultural environment has proved to be far more important for success than the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned aircraft, and expansive bandwidth.’ American Naval Reservist Lorenzo Puertas (2004, 43) aptly notes, ‘Every war is a war of persuasion. … we must destroy the enemy’s will to fight.’ He continues, ‘Persuasion always is culturally sensitive. You cannot persuade someone if you do not understand his language, motivations, fears, and desires.’

Moreover, in this global age of media, decisions by soldiers in remote areas can have far-reaching consequences for home and host populations, which highlights the importance to mission success of demonstrating high CQ. Puertas illustrates this point by describing the potential consequences of one corporal and his decisions after being fired on in an alley in Iraq. ‘Without cultural training, his reaction will be a product of his personal experiences and beliefs,’ Puertas asserts. He adds, ‘He might have cultural misunderstandings that lead to serious errors in judgement. He might fail in his mission – and he might find himself despised by one poor neighbourhood, or by a billion horrified TV viewers.’ Puertas cautions, ‘Cultural knowledge of the battlespace should not be left to on-the-job training’ (ibid., 43) Indeed, it has been noted that ‘[i]n the constant cross-cultural exchange a simple mistake could become an obscenity without the “guilty” party even being aware of the error’ (Noble 2007, 47).

Certainly, the concept of the ‘strategic corporal’ is not new. Canadian Colonel Bernd Horn further observes, ‘The perception of the media, as well as that of defence analysts, right or wrong, for better or for worse, is critical.’ He explains, ‘They [the media] set the terms of the public debate. What they report becomes the basis of societal perception; it influences and forms the public’s attitudes and beliefs. Repeated often enough or pervasively enough, perception becomes
reality.’ Thus, Horn concludes that militaries ‘must always be attentive and responsive to the perceptions of others’ (Horn 2005, 1).

Not surprisingly, to help mitigate problems that arise from cultural misunderstandings and to maximise support for the war effort at home and abroad, Western militaries are starting to define CQ and underscore important aspects about culture that contribute to mission success. For example, the US Center for Advanced Defence Studies (CADS 2006, 1) defines cultural intelligence as ‘the ability to engage in a set of behaviours that use language, interpersonal skills and qualities appropriately tuned to the culture-based values and attitudes of the people with whom one interacts.’ Culture is explained as comprising ‘equivocal layers based on language, society, customs, economy, religion, history and many other factors’ (ibid.). American army scholar and researcher Leonard Wong and his team describe cultural savvy, or in our terms CQ, for their report to the US Army War College as enabling ‘an officer [to] see perspectives outside his or her own boundaries.’ They explain: ‘It does not imply, however, that the officer abandons the Army or US culture in pursuit of a relativistic worldview. Instead, the future strategic leader is grounded in National and Army values, but is also able to anticipate and understand the values, assumptions, and norms of other groups, organisations, and nations’ (Wong et al. 2003, 7).

A more thorough definition is provided by Commander (US Navy) John P Coles. He defines CQ as ‘analysed social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and behaviours.’ He asserts: ‘It helps provide understanding as to why a people act as they do and what they think. Cultural intelligence provides a baseline for education and designing successful strategies to interact with foreign peoples whether they are allies, neutrals, people of an occupied territory, or enemy.’ Coles emphasises: ‘Cultural intelligence is more than demographics. It provides understanding of not only how other groups act but why’ (Coles 2006, 7). Notably, he identifies three of the four domains that are also important for CQ within the CF (international, host nation and enemy – but he leaves out the national domain). Of importance, he underscores the main point of CQ – the ability to understand, predict and respond to behaviour at a group level.

This paper builds on both the civilian literature about CQ and the military concerns and definitions of CQ in order to establish a clear understanding of what CQ is. As such, an analysis of the literature leads to the conclusion that CQ is the ability to recognise the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours
of a group of people and, most importantly, to apply this knowledge towards a particular goal. More specifically, CQ refers to the cognitive, motivational and behavioural capacities to understand and respond effectively to the beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of individuals and institutions of their own and other groups, societies and cultures under complex and changing circumstances in order to effect a desired change. CQ thus has four principle components (see Figure 1): first, one must clearly understand the national objective and/or goal of applying enhanced CQ; second, individuals require region-specific knowledge and awareness; third, they need the ability, or skills set, and motivation to apply enhanced CQ; and, finally, they need to exhibit the appropriate behaviour in order to achieve the desired objective.

**Figure 1 CQ components**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CQ Components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National objective and/or goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Region-specific knowledge/awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ability (or skills set) and motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Appropriate behaviour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In particular, CQ must be applied in the context of the national, international, host nation and enemy arenas. Moreover, CQ demands that individuals continuously adapt to complex and changing circumstances. The focus for militaries must be on providing individuals with the skills sets and knowledge they need to exploit the benefits of high CQ in order to achieve mission success. In this context, CQ can be viewed as the ‘big picture’ that provides direction for where/how specific cultural awareness pieces fit in the broader global scheme. Moreover, CQ should be a process that is continuously developed within military personnel and prepares them for pre-deployment cultural-specific training. The question is how do we fulfil this mandate?

**UNDERSTANDING THE FOUR CQ DOMAIN PARADIGM**

CQ empowers individuals to see ‘reality’ through the eyes of another culture, specifically the one with which they are interacting. This ability in turn provides
individuals with the skills to be able to adapt their attitudes and behaviours in order to better influence the target audience to achieve specific aims. For example, for the CF, CQ requires an appreciation of the role of the CF within the broader spectrum of Canadian society, the role the CF plays in multinational alliances, the complexities that may arise when operating in an overseas environment, particularly with host nation institutions and populations, and an in-depth understanding of the ‘enemy.’ Interactions between these four domains must also be recognised and understood. Indeed, CQ demands that all four domains (see Figure 2) are continuously balanced. This is no easy task and it is further complicated by the fact that each domain and the relationships between them are complex and dynamic.

Figure 2 The four CQ domains: national, international, host nation and enemy

National domain: Winning and keeping the ‘hearts and minds’ of Canadians

For CF members, understanding the beliefs, values and customs that comprise Canadian culture is important because the CF both represents and serves this
culture. Applying this knowledge to maximise support for a mission on the part of the Canadian public and within the CF is imperative for mission success. A military that serves a democratic nation cannot be fully successful if the home population does not support the mission. The ever-present media in the 21st century with its ability to project events ‘as they happen’ into living rooms around the globe exacerbates this.

Part of the application of CQ by CF leaders therefore requires them to understand the behavioural patterns, beliefs and institutions of Canadian society and to act according to these culturally acceptable norms and customs in order to retain public support for the mission. One specific example of the Canadian public’s desire to have their beliefs, values and attitudes reflected in the behaviours of their soldiers is the media attention paid in the spring of 2007 to the alleged beatings of Afghan detainees who had been captured by Canadians and released to Afghan authorities. Licia Corbella, a reporter with the *Toronto Sun*, remarked on the irony, saying the fact that ‘the Afghan authorities beat prisoners is hardly surprising when one understands the culture a bit better.’ She asked: ‘Isn’t that what being a good multiculturalist means? Understanding cultural differences?’ and concluded: ‘Perhaps, thanks in part to Canada, prisons will be one of the first places in Afghanistan where beatings are not the norm. How’s that for irony?’ (Corbella 2007). Indeed, the reaction to the detainee situation suggests that many Canadians do not want to support a mission that does not continuously uphold Canadian beliefs, values and attitudes, even in areas that clearly have different and opposing beliefs and values.8

Public polls show that support of the war effort also diminishes as the number of Canadian casualties increases.9 One way to try to sway public support for the war effort is to underscore the benefits of having CF members deployed to Afghanistan. Certainly, the mission needs to be judged as valuable by CF personnel and the civilians they serve. While some people judge value in terms of geopolitical/strategic advantage, Canadians by and large view it in terms of quality of life issues that are based on cultural beliefs and values and are generally less easily measured. People want to feel like they are making a difference. This sentiment was expressed clearly by a Canadian information officer stationed in Kandahar. He lamented: ‘I will say it until I’m blue in the face, and I ask you to spread the word: we (as in the International Community) are actually getting it right over here, although it will take time. Canada plays a significant role in the South [Kandahar Province] but we are not alone. The UN/NATO partnership, when executed correctly with Afghan input, works.’ He concluded: ‘What most
impresses me over here is the late writer Margaret Mead’s old adage about never doubting a small group of dedicated people can change the world; indeed history has shown it is the only thing that ever has. If you are imaginative, articulate, and inspiring in how you deliver your thoughts, the masses will follow for the greater good. Utopian perhaps, but as a student of history, I have to believe it’s true.”

The value of a mission is arguably most apparent to the CF personnel in-theatre. Combat commanders therefore have the responsibility to inform their superiors of the challenges and successes of a mission. Hosting senior officers and high-ranking civil servants in-theatre, as well as ensuring transparent and open communications at all times, can help the combat commander bridge gaps that exist between what is happening in-theatre and what is believed to be occurring. This is an important process because both peace operations and wars are generally measured in terms of political successes rather than simply military victories, with political and military aspects ideally falling into alignment. In addition, this process assists senior military leaders and politicians in working together and to better explain and frame messages that assure public support (Hope 2006).

**International domain: Playing with others – military coalitions, inter-governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations and host nation partners**

Exhibiting CQ is becoming more important in today’s operating environment as greater emphasis is being placed on coalition operations for a multitude of reasons. The complex security environment has necessitated the creation of international coalitions to share the responsibility of ensuring global stability. Nations contribute members to military coalitions and intergovernmental organisations. In addition, individuals from a variety of national backgrounds join non-governmental organisations. All operate in the same theatre and each culture can cause any number of problems. To facilitate cooperation and effectiveness, particularly mission success, participants at all levels require enhanced CQ. Organisationally, each group might have its own unique task in the region; however, the overarching theme is generally to bring peace and stability to an area. These groups are thus usually working to achieve the same goal, but they operate under a variety of national chains of command and caveats.

Unity of command, as defined by the overall command of an area by one individual or organisation, is rarely possible in complex scenarios involving multiple
players. Part of the problem is that some organisations are military, while others are civilian or a combination of both. Military organisations, for example, strive for uniformity, a clear plan, decisive decisions, speed and acceptance of risk. Aid agencies and diplomats on the other hand prefer a slower, long-term, more risk-averse, more dialogue-intensive and consensus-based approach. It is important to factor in these differences if one wishes to make progress. Organisational chains of command may furthermore seem to supersede even national command in-theatre. For example, both the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade have personnel serving in Afghanistan; both departments are serving the Canadian government, yet each has its own separate chain of command, thus preventing unity of command even between these two Canadian departments.

Unity of effort, however – meaning the cooperative alignment of agencies towards the same goal with minimal duplication of effort – can and should be achieved. Assuring that redundant behaviour is kept to a minimum, that pertinent information is shared between organisations and that everyone is working towards the same long-term goal contributes to unity of effort. Understanding and acting on the cultural beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of other organisations and appreciating how your own may be viewed by others (i.e. enlightened CQ) facilitates the achievement of unity of effort.

Exhibiting enhanced CQ is particularly important in view of the current defence environment, in which, increasingly, the CF is called on to operate within intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), such as the UN, NATO and other coalition operations, and to work in cooperation with other Canadian governmental departments and domestic and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Furthermore, CF members deployed overseas often have to help train and work with host nation (HN) partners.

Working with IGOs and within coalitions, which in the case of the CF means other national military forces, can be challenging for a variety of reasons. Differing practices, work ethics and behavioural norms are challenging and at times frustrating. Different rules of engagement (RoE) among coalition partners can be particularly frustrating.

In addition, cultural nuances in speech and behaviour can be easily misinterpreted, even within groups that share a common language. For example, in August 2006, a young Canadian captain described his participation in the battle of Panjwaii in an e-mail to friends and family (which ended up being more widely circulated). Many of the issues that CF members face while serving in
Afghanistan, such as being part of a coalition and facing enemy fire, are apparent in this first-hand account of the battle. In one section, the young captain described a dialogue that occurred between himself and a member of the American Army National Guard embedded training teams (ETT) who was working with the Afghan National Army (ANA). The conversation occurred during a period of intense fighting. The Canadian captain was busy ensuring that his team was at a safe distance from the enemy in preparation for a friendly artillery strike when the American captain appeared to state, ‘There are no ANA forward of us.’ The Canadian replied ‘Roger.’ It was only after the American called in the fire mission that the Canadian realised that the American captain had not announced that there were no ANA members in front of them; rather, he had been posing a question. With the torrent of gunfire, the intonation in the American’s voice had been drowned out. In the aftermath, the Canadian reminded the American, ‘I have no idea where your ANA are; you’re supposed to look after them!’

Working with other Canadian governmental organisations and agencies poses a completely different set of issues, yet demonstrating CQ can mitigate potential problems in this relationship as well. Canadian beliefs and values, as well as political directive at the national level, are common among Canadian governmental organisations. Specific directives and mandates, however, may not be so transparently parallel. This situation can be aggravated by the existence of different organisational cultures and even languages. It is important in these instances to really emphasise the idea of unity of effort and to acknowledge similarities and differences in order to function as a cohesive national unit. The bigger picture of achieving national objectives over particular departmental objectives must be underscored. Understanding and working within the different cultural nuances that exist in each department greatly contributes to unity of effort across Canadian governmental organisations and agencies. In fact, Colonel Bernd Horn (2007b,197-198) remarked of working with other Canadian governmental departments, ‘the greatest problem is one of ignorance. None of the players fully understand who the other participants are. Other government departments and civilian agencies are normally not accustomed to military directness or command structure.’

Acquiring unity of effort while working with NGOs is arguably more difficult than when working in IGO or other governmental departments. Nonetheless, enhanced CQ in these instances can also help to facilitate the process. The 2006 American counter-insurgency manual also notes that many NGOs ‘maintain strict independence from governments and belligerents and do not want to be
Enabling success

seen directly associating with military forces.’ The final assessment provided in the manual is that ‘[e]stablishing basic awareness of these groups and their activities may be the most commanders can achieve (ibid.).’ Given the general overlap in strategic objective that often exists between the Canadian government and NGOs, that of facilitating a stable and humanitarian HN state, unity of effort in these cases should also be achievable. However, as Colonel Francois Vertefeuille reflects, this is no easy task:

Serving as liaison between a military coalition HQ and a group of individuals from diplomatic and international aid organisations was one of the most difficult tasks of my entire career. Persuading this group of individuals, some of whom were overtly hostile to the military, to discuss matters related to operations of the PRTs [provincial reconstruction teams] (which are military units with a humanitarian objective) was extremely laborious. (Vertefeuille 2007, 188)

Host nation domain: In the land of Oz – applying CQ in an unfamiliar environment

When operating in a foreign environment, it is helpful to understand the culture of the HN population. Therefore, another domain in which high CQ is particularly valuable is that of the host nation.

For instance, CF personnel serving in Afghanistan are operating in a foreign, and somewhat incomprehensible, culture. As an example, Colonel Horn describes the situation faced by a convoy in which he was travelling in the spring of 2006. He writes of the voyage: ‘The countryside was barren, desolate and harsh, yet held a strange beauty.’ He continues, ‘Similarly, the sentiments of the local population reflected a startling array of contrasts in stance and bearing. The old men gave the convoy scant attention or ignored it outright as if it did not even exist. They seemed to embody a stoicism, which radiated a resiliency and patience that carried a nuance that this too would pass.’ The Afghan children, Horn describes, demonstrated a ‘carefree exuberance’ as they ran by the road and waved to the passing convoy. In contrast, however, ‘the young and middle-aged men would glare – their hostility and resentment barely concealable.’ Yet, it remained, according to Horn, ‘virtually impossible to differentiate friend from foe. … the threat environment was extreme, yet non-existent.’ Without warning, the convoy was hit by a suicide bomber driving a Toyota sedan. There were no fatalities. In
his discussion of the events, Horn aptly reflects that ‘It has long been recognised that culture is to insurgency what terrain is to conventional mechanised warfare. However, as already indicated in the current environment it is sometimes difficult to breach the cultural barrier.’ He furthermore notes, ‘It is not unusual for soldiers who are attacked to feel angry and betrayed. They deeply believe that they are serving in Afghanistan to create a better society for its people, yet they are continually attacked by seemingly invisible antagonists who appear to operate effortlessly in the very Afghan society that the soldiers are trying to improve and protect.’ (Horn 2006)

As Figure 2 illustrates, and as Horn observed, there are several different elements at play in the HN domain. HN populations can generally be divided into political, security, civilian and belligerent elements. One of the goals of counter-insurgency operations is to remove the belligerents from the HN. Notably, as illustrated in the figure, belligerents can permeate the entire HN society, including the political and security infrastructure. Politicians, security enforcement personnel and locals can all be tempted to join the insurgency through intrinsic (sympathising with the ideals/goals of the insurgents) or extrinsic means (such as aligning with insurgents to protect yourself, family, clan, etc.). Understanding nuances in speech and gestures (helped by interpreters when necessary) can provide clues as to the presence of belligerents, which facilitates mobility on the ground. Good interpreters in Afghanistan are able to relay more than verbatim translations to the CF. They are also able to explain nuances that are missed by those with only a basic understanding of the language and are able to translate these into more meaningful messages. In fact, the message, through the means in which it is expressed (pauses, ambiguities, etc.), might have less to do with what is being said and more to do with how it is being said.

Being savvy with regard to cultural cues can also help determine if an area is under the influence of the enemy and whether or not locals are ‘willingly’ supporting insurgents. This can help determine how to influence locals to one’s way of thinking. For example, in an area where insurgents are coercing locals to cooperate by threat of punishment, securing the area of operation and assuring the locals of one’s long-term commitment to them can help them side with you. But accomplishing this involves trust, which has to be earned through concrete action. Without a sound understanding of what is important and what behaviours will be seen as credible, their cooperation would be difficult to attain.

On the other hand, while national culture (often coupled with political directive) can sometimes supersede military culture, belief in a universal military
ethos can help guide the training of HN militaries. Playing to this perceived commonality, or indeed establishing a shared cultural space based on membership in the profession of arms, aids in establishing unity of effort when training and working with HN forces. For example, most CF veterans of Afghanistan underscore the military potential of the ANA – an organisation respected by the Afghan people – recognising that the ANA is the future of Afghanistan: a well-trained and equipped ANA will allow foreign troops to withdraw and leave the stability of Afghanistan in capable hands. Interestingly, when working with and training ANA members, CF members emphasise the shared cultural values of the profession of arms over unique national beliefs and values. A Canadian veteran noted of the ANA during interviews I conducted at CFB Edmonton in January 2007: ‘They’re soldiers, they just want to soldier with you. It doesn’t matter where soldiers are from, they’re going to get together, they’re going to try to communicate, they’re going to break bread together. [Canadian] troops would be making friends with the Afghan troops … when people live together like that, they’re bound to become friends.’

Simply put, building trust and credibility take time and is a difficult task. It requires appreciating how others see you. Viewing yourself through the eyes of HN members while being cognisant of the environment (human and physical) will help one make good decisions when trying to influence HN peoples. Moreover, building trust and credibility for a mission will increase support of the national government and can lead to stability and economic adjustment in the HN.

**Enemy domain: Knowing the enemy**

Unlike during the Cold War, when the enemy was predictable and easily identifiable, to the point where his behaviour, decisions and as tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) could be templated in time and space, today’s enemy is an amalgam of opponents that span the realm of criminals, warlords, HN belligerents, radical religious extremists, ideologues, jihadists, mercenaries and foreign-state-sponsored combatants. As opposed to the symmetrical enemy of the Cold War, the new opposition relies on asymmetrical means. They follow no standard organisational framework, abide by no international rules and follow no standard doctrine. Rather they are decentralised, agile and non-linear. They are networked and rely on the advanced technology and globalisation of communications, specifically the Internet and cellphone technology, to facilitate financing, planning and the sharing of successful TTPs. Moreover, their non-linear and asymmetrical
approach, in stark contrast to the symmetrical mind-set of the Cold War opponents, makes no distinction between civilian and military. As such, operations are conducted both among and against civilians and society at large.

Exacerbating the challenge of identifying ‘friend from foe’ is the reality that in many cases, such as in Afghanistan, the belligerents permeate the entire society. Sympathisers, as well as active combatants, can actually exist within the security and political apparatus of an HN country. Thus, attempting to operate within such an environment in a collaborative manner is difficult. Moreover, conducting operations in an environment in which the enemy actively seeks to blend into the population and use this to their advantage places additional strain on coalition forces. Captain Matthew Dawe, recently killed by an improvised explosive device (IED), expressed feelings of anger and frustration about the mission at times. He felt betrayed by some of the very people he was trying to help, describing some local Afghans as ‘farmers by day and Taliban or killers by night.’ Dawe further lamented: ‘That is what is particularly frustrating about this mission – it’s a guerrilla war.’ He finished, ‘You don’t really know who your enemy is’ (Fitzpatrick, 2007). Another veteran explains Afghans ‘could pretend to be eager and co-operative ditch shovellers [sic] to your face and turn into mine-planting Taliban insurgents behind your back’ (Martin 2007).

Certainly the Taliban will use every weakness of the coalition to their advantage, particularly to enhance their information operations (IO) campaign. Every friendly fire incident, every civilian death or amount of collateral damage plays to the opposing side – namely, more evidence of the callous oppressive foreign invaders. In the case of Afghanistan this plays to the ancient tribal custom that has often been described as ‘my brother and I against my cousin. My cousin, my brother and I against the world.’ It also underscores the point that foreign troops will eventually go home; guerrillas are already home.

In essence, enhanced CQ offers one of the few possible solutions to this complex operating environment. Success in counter-insurgencies, specifically in locations such as Afghanistan, depends on winning the hearts and minds of the populace. In fact, the HN population is the centre of gravity for success in-theatre (although an equally compelling case can be made for domestic support with regard to maintaining a national contingent in Afghanistan to prosecute the mission). As such, kinetic operations are not the answer. Although they are capable of killing opponents, the enemy has proved itself capable of quickly regenerating numbers to continue the fight. Therefore, it is the credibility and local support of the opposing forces that must be destroyed. This can be achieved only
when the HN population shift their full support towards the national government and its coalition partners. However, this will only be achieved when they feel the national government and coalition are in a position to provide security and basic governmental services.

Winning hearts and minds is not the only important function of exhibiting high CQ when dealing with enemy forces, though. The enemy forces, as noted earlier, are not homogeneous. They all have disparate beliefs, motives, incentives and rationales for fighting or opposing government authority and coalition forces. CQ therefore becomes essential for understanding the enemy, whether as part of the IO campaign to discredit a particular opponent with a specific target audience, or of the targeting campaign to understand how decisions are made and by whom, or by attacking alliances or support along tribal lines, taking advantage of historic tensions and animosities. A Canadian lieutenant I interviewed at CFB Edmonton in January 2007 commented of the ongoing fight with the Taliban that not only are they a worthy opponent because they are fighting on their ‘home turf’, but even more difficult to combat is the fact that ‘they have the belief that they’re doing the right thing. You’re combating that ideology, so you can’t underestimate them.’

Clearly, enlightened CQ is essential if a military forces wishes to defeat opposing forces successfully, particularly in a complex security environment like that found today, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq. Only by understanding the attitudes, beliefs, behaviours, motives and values (to name but a few factors) of the enemy can a military be successful. With this knowledge, friendly forces can begin to target their IO campaign and kinetic and other operations to erode the support of the enemy and gain that of the host nation population.

**BALANCING THE BALLS: INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FOUR CQ DOMAINS**

Balancing the four CQ domains so that CQ can be an effective force multiplier is important. This does not mean that people should be cultural chameleons as they jump between each domain; rather, individuals need to balance the knowledge that they acquire of each domain and apply it in a manner that allows them to further their goals and to achieve the necessary and desired national objectives. For the CF, these goals should ultimately align with those of the Canadian government and population and should be reflective of Canadian cultural values. Balancing the four CQ domains is of critical
importance because behaving appropriately in each cultural domain is essential for mission success.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP**

The ability of military leaders to recognise what CQ is and to apply this knowledge as a force multiplier has many implications for mission success. CQ facilitates winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of home and HN populations, as well as the cooperation of military allies, other IGOs and NGOs. Moreover, it can also help retain the support of military members.

CQ can be applied at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. It is important when planning at any of these levels to be aware of the four CQ domains – national, international, host nation and enemy – and to appreciate how they interact and contribute to mission success. Different levels of leadership may need to prioritise the attention paid to specific domains; however, a balance between all four is always necessary.

The CQ domain paradigm allows leaders consciously to address cultural gaps in knowledge with specific information concerning the various cultures they may face on operations. This can be done through a combination of strategies and methodologies such as programmed cultural awareness training, designated reading lists tapping scholarly studies, travel books, sociological and anthropological studies and literary works, discussions among peers and veterans with specific country experience, and role-playing. Notably, when learning culturally specific information, it is important to try to see the world through the eyes of the group that one is examining. This skill will help one make appropriate decisions and will contribute to one’s ability to shift others to your way of thinking.

**CONCLUSION**

Today’s complex security environment demands that soldiers are warriors and technicians as well as scholars and diplomats. Kinetic solutions are no longer the panacea of warfare. CQ, on the other hand, offers one of the few possible solutions to this new and complex operating environment.

This paper provides a conceptual and practical framework for militaries to apply CQ as a force multiplier. In summary, CQ is the ability to recognise the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people and, most important, to apply this knowledge towards a specific goal. More specifically, CQ
Enabling success refers to the cognitive, motivational and behavioural capacities to understand and respond effectively to the beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of individuals and institutions of one’s own and other groups, societies and cultures under complex and changing circumstances in order to effect a desired change. In particular, CQ must be applied in the context of the national, international, host nation and enemy arenas and the focus must be on its ability to be a force multiplier.

Balancing the four CQ domains (i.e. national, international, host nation and enemy) so that CQ can be an effective force multiplier is of paramount importance. This does not mean that people should alter their own beliefs and values as they jump between each domain; rather, individuals need to balance the knowledge that they require of each domain and apply it in a manner that allows them to further their goals and to achieve the necessary and desired national objectives. Indeed, enhanced CQ requires individuals to know their audience so that they may exhibit appropriate behaviours in order to achieve the desired objectives.

NOTES

1. Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope is commanding officer of the Canadian Battle Group (Task Force Orion).

2. There are several different terminologies used to express the advantageous use of cultural knowledge. These terms include, but are not limited to, cultural savvy, cultural astuteness, cultural literacy, cultural appreciation, cultural expertise, human terrain, cultural awareness, cultural competency and cross-cultural competence. There are also many different proposed acronyms for cultural intelligence, e.g. CI, CULTINT and CQ. CQ draws parallels to the more commonly used term ‘intelligence quotient’ or IQ. IQ is based on the early 20th century findings of German psychologist William Stern that the mental age to chronological age remains relatively constant throughout one’s life. This suggests that an individual’s IQ does not change throughout their lifetime. See http://www.geocities.com/rnseitz/Definition_of_IQ.html (accessed on 14 July 2007). The way that CQ is used in this article, however, does argue directly that individuals can increase their CQ with knowledge and the motivation to apply that knowledge towards a specific goal. Indeed, Earley and Ang (2003. 4), the originators of the term, are also clear on this point. They write, ‘We use the shorthand label of CQ as a convenience to remind the reader that this is a facet of intelligence. However, we do not use CQ in a strict fashion as is implied by “IQ”; that is, we do not mean to denote a mathematical relationship generated from normative data of capability. In this sense, our usage parallels that from the literature on emotional intelligence and their usage of “EQ.” Cultural intelligence and the acronym CQ were chosen for this paper for the same reason that Early and Ang chose to use the term: CQ stresses the intelligence
component of cultural intelligence. Notably, however, CQ does not limit the concept to a strictly mathematical calculation of a static competency. Moreover, whatever the label one applies to the concept, in the end the issue is to determine what enables people to function effectively in cultural settings.

3 This definition as well as the concept of the four CQ domain paradigm was developed by the author after consulting multiple sources that explore CQ. A force multiplier is a capability that when added to or employed by a combat force significantly enhances their combat potential and thereby increases the probability of mission success.

4. The term ‘Trojan horse’ now refers to computer software that appears innocuous but actually contains a virus.

5. Asymmetrical warfare, in contrast to traditional warfare, refers to operations that do not rely on troop numbers or weapons to destroy and/or control an enemy and gain control of an area of operation. Rather, ‘asymmetric warfare most commonly refers to warfare between opponents not evenly matched where the smaller or weaker force must exploit geography, timing, surprise, or specific vulnerabilities of the larger and stronger enemy force to achieve victory.’ Available at http://www.answers.com/main/ntq-dsid-2222-dekey-Asymmetric-warfare, accessed on 17 July 2007.

6. Counter-insurgency is defined as follows )US Army Combined Arms Center 2006, Foreword): ‘Those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.’

7. This definition as well as the concept of the four CQ domain paradigm was developed by the author after consulting multiple sources that explore CQ.

8. A recent Canadian Department of National Defence report states that ‘standing [with the Canadian public] of the Canadian Forces has clearly risen since the Somalia scandal thanks to a general alignment between military values and Canadian values’ (cited in an article by Allan Woods in the Toronto Star, 19 May 2007).


0. Captain Allan Best in an e-mail to the author received 17 March 2007. Reprinted with permission. Almost all CF members interviewed stated without hesitation that they would willingly return for another tour in Afghanistan. The following quote from a newspaper appears to be well representative of CF veterans of the war in Afghanistan: Master-Corporal Jon Tymec, a 25-year-old reservist with the Windsor regiment already filled out his application to return to Afghanistan in 2008. He explains: ‘Canada is doing a great job here [Afghanistan] and I want to be a part of it.’ (O’Neil 2007)

2. The NATO definition for information operations is ‘… a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC-approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives’ (cited in Peters 2007, 20-21).

LIST OF REFERENCES


Schoomaker, General Peter J. 35th Chief of Staff of the Army. Farewell message, 9 April 2007.

Staff reporter. Opposition leaders unite as war toll mounts. The Edmonton Sun, 5 July 2007, 38.


Vertefeuille, Colonel F. Civil-military operations. 2007.

Weston, Greg. Battle for public opinion desire to have troops withdraw from combat in Afghanistan growing, polls show. The Winnipeg Sun, 24 June 2007, 13

The privatisation and regulation of security in Africa

Mr Sabelo Gumede

INTRODUCTION

The debate around the privatisation of security has become a topical issue and raises a plethora of legal and ethical questions resulting from the lack of accountability of private security actors. Not so long ago, Blackwater USA, a private security contractor protecting US interests in Iraq, was ordered to leave because of its involvement in the killing of 11 and wounding of 12 Iraqis in al-Nusur Square in western Baghdad on 16 September 2007. It is alleged that Blackwater security guards in Iraq had engaged in nearly 200 incidents of gunfire in Iraq since 2005 and in most cases Blackwater operatives fired their weapons from moving armoured vehicles without stopping to count the dead or assist the injured (Stout and Broder 2007) The Blackwater incident not only raised the question of accountability of private security actors in Iraq, but also the question of their desirability, especially in volatile states. The accountability question is further complicated by the fact that the owner of Blackwater, Eric Prince, is a radical right-wing Christian mega-millionaire who has served as a major bankroller not only for President Bush but also for the broader Christian-right agenda (Scahill 2007, xix).

According to some sources, the US State Department’s Blackwater contracts vastly exceed those of the Pentagon. Since 2004, the US State Department has paid Blackwater $833 673 316, compared with Defense Department contracts of $101 219 261. Perhaps there are many lessons for Africa to learn from the involvement of private security actors in Iraq, especially when it comes to their regulation or lack of regulation. It was recently observed that Blackwater’s forces are
capable of overthrowing governments and this puts African states at a disadvan-
tage because of their weakness when it comes to their own security. If Blackwater
were contracted by the US government to operate in Africa, especially in states
that are in conflict or post-conflict, undergoing transition and/or implementing
security sector reform (SSR), the African people would be put at risk, as is the case
with the Iraqi people. At present Africa does not have a continent-wide policy
on the operation of private security actors, especially those that are foreign. This
speaks to the need for African states, through the African Union (AU), to devise
strategies on how best to control and regulate private security actors in Africa at
continental level. This should be informed by a thorough understanding of the
extent of the private security industry in Africa.

This paper reflects on the privatisation of security, which Africa has to consider
in shaping its continent-wide security architecture. The paper is largely informed by
the emergence of the generally unregulated foreign private security actors in places
like Iraq and of course on the African continent, especially in conflict-ridden states
such as Sudan. While accepting that the private security industry does sometimes
have an important role to play in restoring peace in Africa because of the variety
of functions it performs, it is equally true that the absence of effective regulatory
frameworks at the regional and domestic levels exposes the industry to becoming a
law unto itself and thus undermining security efforts.

Firstly, the paper will seek to give a brief explanation of the meaning of priva-
tisation of security and the confusion represented by private security companies
(PSCs), private military companies (PMCs) and to some extent mercenaries.
Secondly it will highlight peacekeeping operations in Africa and the involvement
of private security actors, especially in African states in conflict and post-conflict
situations. Thirdly, some thoughts on how to address the privatisation of security
within the African security sector reform (SSR) strategy will be given, before
some concluding observations are made.

UNDERSTANDING THE PRIVATISATION OF SECURITY

For our purposes, privatisation of security is reflected by the use of PSCs and
PMCs. In a nutshell, PSCs can be defined as ‘companies that specialise in provid-
ing security and protection of personnel and property, including humanitarian
and industrial assets’ (Schreier and Caparini 2005, 2) and PMCs are ‘corporate
entities that provide military expertise and other professional services essential to
combat and warfare’ (Spear 2006, 7). Sometimes PMCs prefer to call themselves
private security companies (PSCs). Since the emergence of private security actors in the form of PMCs and PSCs, a lot of confusion has been created by commentators grouping PMCs and PSCs with mercenaries. As noted by Isenberg (1997), the term ‘mercenary’ is a ‘loaded, subjective one, carrying lots of emotional baggage and connotations’ (Isenberg 2007). It is a pejorative term and no government or non-state actor wants to be associated with it. For this reason mercenarism is prohibited outright. So far, there are no universally acceptable definitions for PSCs, PMCs or mercenaries.

Newell and Sheehy (2006, 71) argue that the term mercenary ‘includes a person who is foreign to a conflict participating in combat with the aim of securing personal gain’. In an effort to distinguish a mercenary from a PMC, they argue that this definition cannot be applied to PMCs owing to the latter’s wide range of services (ibid.). It would therefore seem that the only point of distinction lies in the wide range of services that the private military/security companies (PMSCs) have to offer. The ‘personal gain’ referred to in the definition is mostly pecuniary in nature. Caution must be exercised in grouping PMSCs together, as it blurs the need to control them properly, as mercenaries do not need regulation but rather prohibition.

Singer (2003, 91) offers the most practical explanation of what PMSCs represent today. He categorises the PMSC industry through what he refers to as a ‘tip of spear’ metaphor. It is important to consider this categorisation in order to understand the nature of the private security phenomenon. Three broad types of units linked to their location in the battle space are identified in Singer’s categorisation. First are the units that operate within the general theatre. Second are those in the theatre of war. Third are those in the actual area of operation, i.e. the tactical battlefield. In his ‘tip of spear’ metaphor, Singer identifies three types of PMCs: military provider firms, at the frontline or tip of the spear and providing implementation and command services; military consultant firms, in the middle of the spear and providing advisory and training services; and military support firms, furthest from the tip and providing non-lethal aid and assistance (ibid.). The question whether those PMSCs at the frontline or tip of the spear should be outlawed is what African states need to deliberate.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY ACTORS IN AFRICA

Africa often looks like a bloodbath as a result of the considerable number of protracted conflicts on the continent. Current peacekeeping missions in Africa
are UNMIS (Sudan), UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire), UNMIL (Liberia), MONUC (DRC), UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea) and MINURSO (Western Sahara). United Nations peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo have also outsourced their supply and logistical needs to private security companies. The recent Darfur crisis also presented a number of challenges to the African Union and the United Nations. As a result, the continent has not been spared the infiltration of foreign private security actors, which results largely from African states’ inability to provide adequate security for their citizens, especially in conflict situations. At times peacekeeping efforts require the use of private security actors for logistical support. Private security actors are also contracted for training security forces as part of post-conflict reconstruction processes.

Mineral resources fuel most African conflicts, and the interest of ‘foreign’ states (including foreign private security actors) in Africa’s mineral resources has also spawned increasing numbers of foreign private security actors on the continent, as well as playing a role in fuelling African conflicts in their drive for profit maximisation. Sometimes the extractive industries have been used to pay for the services of the private security industry. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the government hired the now defunct PMC Executive Outcomes to impede rebel forces in exchange for diamond mining concessions and later an additional $35 million (Creutz 2006, 39). Having succeeded in their mission, Executive Outcomes proceeded to retake the diamond fields from the rebels in order to secure their own payment. The prominent involvement of mineral resources in prolonging a conflict (for which the private security industry becomes involved) has not only been questioned by researchers, but also condemned by the international community. It is for this reason that the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict, breaking the link between the illicit trade in rough diamonds and armed conflict, as a contribution to the prevention and settlement of conflicts (UNGA 2002).

DynCorp International is a private company that, like Blackwater, is a member of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA). It is currently operating in Nigeria, Liberia and Sudan through contracts awarded by the US government. In 2004, the US government awarded contracts worth more than $20 million to two companies, the PAE Group and DynCorp International, the latter being a leading professional services and project management firm, to provide logistical support for African forces headed to Sudan’s troubled western region of Darfur. They were contracted to support the anticipated arrival in Darfur of some
3 500 troops from the African Union. In 2005, DynCorp started helping the US government to demobilise and retire members of Liberia’s armed forces and to train a new, modern army to serve Liberia’s future interests. At present DynCorp is championing a security sector reform programme in Liberia. In 2007, the US State Department hired DynCorp to help equip and provide logistical support for international peacekeepers in Somalia, giving the United States a significant role in the critical mission without it assigning combat forces. Perhaps the recent Blackwater scandal in Iraq will act as a catalyst for African states to consider putting in place mechanisms that will address the emergence of the private security industry, which is no doubt here to stay.

**ADDRESSING PRIVATE SECURITY WITHIN SSR**

The importance of addressing private security within SSR cannot be overemphasised. Bryden argues that SSR concepts bridge security policy, the promotion of peace and democracy, and development assistance. This cross-sectional character (which has an integrating effect) enables SSR to reach out beyond the state to actors like armed non-state participants (Bryden 2006, 3), which suggests that it is critical to consider the debate around the regulation of the private security sector in Africa in addressing the African SSR strategy. According to the OECD (2007, 211), ‘[i]f the [private security] sector is neglected in broader SSR, then in time it may come to represent an unaccountable and essentially parallel sector industry in competition with reformed state security provision.’ Within the African SSR strategy, it is important to note, as Bryden rightly argues, that the effective regulation of PMCs and PSCs requires an ‘interlocking framework of national, regional and international control mechanisms’ (Bryden 2006, 10).

Within the African context, the interlocking framework should include revising the 1977 OAU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, which does not cover the issue of privatisation of security in Africa. As the new phenomenon of private security is likely to undermine Africa’s security, there is a need to put measures such as registration and licensing of PMSCs and regulations (including self-regulation) in place, at regional, sub-regional and national levels. Measures put in place at the sub-regional and national levels should be informed by consensus among the African states through the African Union. The AU, whose objectives include promoting and defending African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples (AU 2000, Article
3(d)), is the best forum for addressing the private security phenomenon, which is undoubtedly an issue of interest to Africa and its peoples.

There have been efforts towards regulation of private security actors at the national level in various African states. The best example is South Africa, where private security actors are regulated and controlled under two frameworks, namely the Private Security Industry Regulation Act of 2001 and the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act of 2006 (Mercenary Act), which is to replace the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998. While the Private Security Industry Regulation Act is aimed at regulating private security actors within South Africa (at the national level), the Mercenary Act is, as the name suggests, aimed at prohibiting mercenary activities and regulating certain activities in countries of armed conflict.

The Mercenary Act provides a legislative measure to curtail unauthorised and obscure PMCs/PSCs operating in a regulated country or area and to regulate the recruitment of SA citizens and permanent residents. It prohibits any person from becoming involved in mercenary activities, i.e. participating as a combatant for gain in an armed force; directly or indirectly recruiting, using, training, supporting or financing a combatant for private gain in an armed conflict; directly or indirectly participating in any manner in the initiation, causing or furthering of an armed conflict or a coup d’état, uprising or rebellion against any government; or directly or indirectly performing any act aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining the constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state (section 2).

The Mercenary Act specifically prohibits and regulates certain assistance or rendering of services in country of armed conflict. Section 3 specifies that no person may undertake, within the Republic or elsewhere, the following without the authorisation of the Arms Control Committee:

- Negotiate or offer to provide any assistance or render any service to a party to an armed conflict or in a regulated country
- Provide any assistance or render any service to a party to an armed conflict or in a regulated country
- Recruit, use, train, support or finance any person to provide assistance or render any service to a party to an armed conflict or in a regulated country
- Perform any act that has the result of furthering the military interests of a party to an armed conflict or in a regulated country.
The Mercenary Act further prohibits and regulates the enlistment of South Africans in armed forces. No South African citizen or permanent resident is permitted to enlist with any armed force other than the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), including an armed force of any foreign state, unless they have been authorised to do so by the Arms Control Committee (section 4). In the event that such authorisation is granted, it may also be revoked if the authorised person takes part in an armed conflict as a member of an armed force other than the SANDF.

In section 5 the Mercenary Act also prohibits and regulates humanitarian assistance in a country of armed conflict. This means that no South African humanitarian organisation is permitted to provide humanitarian assistance in a country of armed conflict or a regulated country unless it registers with the Arms Control Committee for that specific purpose. This provision also seeks to control those PMSCs that are involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance in areas of armed conflict or regulated countries. For a country to be regulated, it has to be proclaimed as such by the President in the Government Gazette in terms of section 6 of the Mercenary Act.

The reasons that the Arms Control Committee may advance for denying authorisation include the following:

- That such authorisation is in conflict with South Africa’s obligations in terms of international law
- That it would result in the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the territory where the assistance or service is to be rendered or the exemption granted
- That it endangers the peace by introducing destabilising military capability into the region or territory where the assistance or service, or humanitarian aid, is or is likely to be provided or rendered
- That it would contribute to regional instability or negatively influence the balance of power in such region or territory
- That it in any manner supports or encourages any terrorist activity or terrorist and related activities (as defined in section 1 of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, Act 33 of 2004)
- That it in any manner initiates, causes or furthers an armed conflict, or a coup d’état, uprising or rebellion against a government
- That it prejudices South Africa’s national or international interests
In so far as the domestic dimension is concerned, the 2001 Private Security Industry Regulation Act is very important because of the increasing numbers of private security actors within South Africa’s borders. The fact that the number of staff employed by private security companies (PSCs) and the size of PSC budgets both exceed those of public law enforcement agencies should be a cause for concern. There are, for instance, 129 583 South African police officers (excluding civilians) and the ratio of police officers to citizens is 1:365. According to the latest statistics provided by the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, there are 4 763 active private security businesses and 296 901 active registered security officers (PSRA 2006, 35, 40). This means that the private security officers outnumber the police officers by two to one.

The importance of the Mercenary Act lies in the fact that it is aimed mainly at regulating the provision of assistance or service of a military-related nature in a country of armed conflict, the enlistment of South African citizens and permanent residents in other armed forces, and the provision of humanitarian aid in a country of armed conflict. The Act also applies extra-territorially in terms of section 11. It should be noted that the majority of South Africans whom the Act seeks to cover are former apartheid security personnel. While at face value, the Mercenary Act seems to provide a regulatory framework, a closer look suggests otherwise; the Act is arguably a prohibitive mechanism that will see a complete ban on South Africans with security or military expertise operating abroad. The South African government views the export of security or military expertise as a security threat. The Blackwater incident in Iraq attests to the fact that if not effectively regulated, private security actors in conflict situations can pose a security threat to innocent civilians.

It is not only African states like South Africa that are being challenged by the emergence of a private security industry at the national level. In the United States, since the 1970s, private security guards have outnumbered public police officers by a ratio of 3:1, with the Americans spending more than twice as much on private security guards ($90 billion) as on public police ($40 billion) every year (Rosky 2004, 897). As the industry continues to grow, there is now a fine line between ordinary security guards and military operatives. Owing to the demand-supply phenomenon, many private security companies, such as Blackwater, have had to refocus their operations. Scahill (2007) gives a succinct narration of the rise of Blackwater USA, the ‘world’s most powerful mercenary army’. He argues that Blackwater’s true fame and fortune was gained in the aftermath of 9/11 when it formed Blackwater Security Consulting in 2002. Regrettably, like other private
contractors in Iraq, Blackwater was arguably not regulated or controlled by Iraqi law. In terms of Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) Order 17, dated 27 June 2004, private security companies were granted immunity from Iraqi law.

In addressing the African SSR strategy, there is a great need for African practitioners to rethink of strategies that could best regulate and control the private security industry in Africa. This can only be achieved through a thorough understanding of the dynamics around the privatisation of security, which must come before the enactment and possible strengthening of effective laws can be undertaken. Such laws should not only be put in place, but also effectively enforced. It is essential that the regulation of private security be undertaken at all levels. The regulatory frameworks should cover the following: roles and types of services that private security actors can provide; criteria for licensing and deregistration: application of the regulatory frameworks within and outside the territory in which they are established; control of the use of force and firearms; training and professional requirements; vetting and licensing of security operatives; and standards for transparency and oversight mechanisms.

On the question of oversight, it is important that all programmes that address oversight in relation to public police and military also include consideration of the private security industry. Parliamentarians, among others, should be involved in the privatisation of security debate at both national and regional levels. At the level of the AU, in fulfilling its mandate of promoting peace, security and stability on the continent (AU 2001, Article 3(5)), the Pan-African Parliament should also be involved in shaping the African SSR strategy by, among other things, becoming involved in the debates around the regulation and control of the private security industry in Africa. Parliaments are the representatives of the African people and in principle their opinion will reflect what the African people want in relation to the privatisation of security in Africa.

Another strategy that has emerged within the private security industry is that of self-regulation, whereby private security actors form associations and establish voluntary codes of conduct in order to promote professionalism and set standards for the industry. This strategy should be promoted and supported as part of the African SSR strategy. A ‘Code of Conduct and Ethics for the Private Security Sector’ developed by the European Security Services (CoESS) and the Union Network International, Europa (UNI-Europa) in 2003 furnishes a good example in this regard. In the African context, it is important to note that as much as this strategy is supported, the drawing-up of a self-regulatory code should be undertaken by the private security actors themselves and not
simply imposed on them by the African states. Non-legislative best practices should always be promoted in addressing the private security industry within the SSR.

**CONCLUSION**

Addressing the privatisation of security with the African SSR strategy must always be context-based. It must address the needs of the African people. It would be imprudent to address the privatisation of security in Africa without understanding the private security industry in the African context. Hence there is a need to escalate the debate around the privatisation of security in Africa. While the dynamics related to private security actors in Iraq can offer some lessons for Africa, regulatory frameworks within Africa should be informed by the potential dangers they pose and are likely to pose to Africa’s peace and security. Indeed, an unaccountable private security sector could facilitate human rights abuses or inappropriate links between itself and political parties, state agencies, paramilitary organisations and organised crime (OECD 2007, 211).

The privatisation of security is a global trend that could be beneficial to Africa. It is also important to effectively regulate and control the private security phenomenon in Africa in order to promote peace, security and stability. This paper has reflected on the privatisation of security in Africa, which is very important for Africa, for without peace, security and stability no development can take place. Secondly, it gave a brief explanation of the private security sector. Thirdly, the paper highlighted some of the private security operations in Africa. Lastly, consideration was given to how best to address the privatisation of security within the African SSR strategy. This included examining the South African regulatory framework both within and beyond South Africa’s borders. As the subject of private security remains topical, Africa’s engagement on how best the industry could be regulated and controlled remains critical.

**NOTES**


2. The Act was passed on 17 November 2006 by the National Council of Provinces and was assented to by the President of the Republic on 12 November 2007, after which it came into force by Proclamation in the *Government Gazette* in terms of section 16 of the Act.
LIST OF REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War era has seen an unprecedented growth in the use of private military companies (PMCs) in a variety of roles. This has sparked intense debate among scholars, policy-makers and the military in relation to the long-term implications for public security of outsourcing military tasks to civilians. While these trends are not entirely new – as far back as the 14th century professional companies of soldiers were hired on contract to provide specific services to states for almost the same reasons – at no time have they been so integral to the functioning of national armed forces as today (Fredland 2004, 206).

The expanding presence of PMCs within the military domain is driven by a number of systemic forces. The first coincided with the end of the Cold War and the peace dividend, which sparked the massive downsizing of professional armed forces. No sooner was this process underway than a number of violent but strategically less significant conflicts flared up around the world. With many of the great powers reluctant to intervene in these messy inter-state conflicts, a gap opened for private security companies to provide this service (Ballard 2007, 43). Here it was the South African-based company Executive Outcomes (EO), comprising mostly former South African Defence Force (SADF) members, that drew the attention of the world. The success of EO in fighting off UNITA rebels on behalf of the Angolan government in the early 1990s and later in Sierra Leone, where they drove rebel forces out of the diamond region, highlighted their potential influence – and efficiency (Avant 2007, 430).
While companies like EO and Sandline are at one end of the spectrum, it was the growing dependence on PMCs that provide support to the armed forces that absorbed the greatest share of the private security market. This was driven by another force, the increasing reliance on technologically advanced equipment and off-the-shelf commercial technology, which needed to be operated and maintained by civilian specialists. At the same time many governments succumbed to the pressure to privatise public functions considered non-core to save costs (Singer 2005, 119). This led to the massive restructuring of the armed forces and the subsequent segmentation of military employment into core and peripheral tasks. For the armed forces, the option to outsource non-core tasks seemed a viable alternative, given the manpower shortages they were experiencing. Little did they know that the outsourcing of military tasks to civilians would shake the foundations of the military profession.

Driven by cost incentives, few considered the long-term impact on the armed forces and their monopoly over collective management of violence. Consequently, this paper attempts to draw attention to the implications outsourcing has on the military profession. In the first section, a brief overview of the changed security environment and how armed forces have restructured to cope with the new demands placed upon them is provided. Thereafter, the types of tasks being outsourced are described, before some of the benefits of outsourcing for the armed forces are briefly spelled out. Against this background, the final section moves closer to the crux of my argument, namely how the civilianisation of military tasks is eroding the military profession as we traditionally know it, the overall effectiveness of armed forces and the status of the profession. From this, some conclusions are drawn for the SA army of the future.

POST-COLD WAR RESTRUCTURING

With the collapse of communism, the virtual enemy against which most armed forces were geared to fight disappeared. Many believed that this marked the beginning of a more peaceful world and politicians eagerly grabbed the opportunity to cut back on defence expenditure. Worldwide, this resulted in a notable demobilisation of soldiers, as well as extensive cutbacks in defence budgets and military equipment. In a global context, more than seven million servicemen were thrust into the employment market with little more to peddle than their military skills (Schreier and Caparini 2005, 3-4). No sooner was this process underway than violence flared up in various parts of the world, posing new threats to global
peace and security. Most were non-military threats, but only the military had the immediate legitimate means to respond to these emergencies.

Eager to justify their existence and expenditure, nations deployed their armed forces in an ever widening spectrum of tasks. These ranged from classic peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, to more muscular peace enforcement operations abroad, to rendering assistance to police in controlling mass immigration, averting ethnic conflicts and dealing with incidents of urban terror and a range of other criminal activities (Burk 1998). It soon became obvious that with their current force structure and existing budgets they would need to restructure to meet the demands posed by these expeditionary missions.

With too little money and too few full-time soldiers to provide the numerical and functional flexibility to fulfil their obligations, armed forces were compelled to review how they employed and deployed personnel. Similar to the private sector, the armed forces came to adopt post-Fordist employment practices that segmented military work into a core professional component supported by civilians employed either on term contracts, as part-time reserves or as peripheral to the organisation (the outsourced component). While civilianisation of military tasks was not entirely new and was noted as a major issue in the 1970s and 1980s, this trend intensified in the post-Cold War era as military work became reorganised around new technology and flexible specialisation.

The much smaller core professional force whose activity became more directed towards military-specific tasks was now surrounded by a growing cohort of civilians employed in supportive roles (Kelty and Segal 2007, 215). Whereas initially the civilianisation of former military posts remained within the domain of the armed forces, progressively these as well as military support posts were filled by civilians hired on contracts outside the purview of the military. One of the distinguishing features of post-Cold War armed forces is the systematic outsourcing of support roles, not only because civilians are cheaper to employ than expensively trained military professionals, but because they often fulfil tasks that require some degree of continuity or specialised skill.

The need to meet the numerical demands for military-specific tasks proved a little more challenging. With the increase in deployments abroad on potentially dangerous missions, Western armed forces struggled to build up the capacity as well as call up sufficient reserves. This bolstered the reliance on a new reserve – the ‘civilian’ reserve of military professionals who had entered the military security domain. As time progressed, more and more tasks once the domain of national armed forces became outsourced to PMCs. Their growth has been so
profound that every major US and British military operation in the post-Cold War era has relied on contractor support. In effect, these major armed forces have become combat-ineffective without PMC support. These new entrants claim not only to offer the means to wage war or build peace, but to substitute regular military forces (Bharadwaj 2003, 70).

OUTSOURCING: THE WAY TO GO?

Outsourcing was intended to cut costs, provide support, create flexibility and free up service members to focus on core activities. As time progressed, and major states such as the US and UK became drawn into the wars with Iraq, so contractor involvement proliferated. These companies unwittingly offered the military 'their' skills across a wide spectrum of tasks, from combat to strategic planning, intelligence collection, operational support, logistics, training, procurement and maintenance of arms and equipment.

Accordingly, Singer (2005) has placed PMCs into three categories based on their proximity to combat activities. The first are PMCs that offer tactical military assistance, including actual combat services that closely resemble military competencies, namely armed operational support or combat on the battlefield. These are the most controversial of all the PMCs, and EO and Sandline (British-based) (both now defunct) fall into this category. The controversial US-based company Blackwater is another. The second category is the typical consulting companies that provide strategic advice and military training to military personnel. Examples include MPRI, DynCorp and Global Options (Avant 2005, 124). They generally do not operate in-theatre, but play a strategically important role in shaping the armed forces. The third category includes those that provide support in the form of logistics, intelligence and maintenance services both at home and in-theatre. They specialise in non-core tasks that the military is unable to build or sustain. They are the largest and most varied sector and include companies such as Haliburton, Kellogg, Brown and Root, Bechtel and Falconeer (a South African firm), among many others (Avant 2005, 125).

PMC involvement in military activities is extensive. In Iraq alone it is estimated that there are over 80 companies working for the US government, with between 20 000 and 40 000 employees. To date the biggest clients of PMCs are the US and UK, which use these companies as so-called 'force multipliers'. Some weak states have also turned to PMCs to augment their fighting capability. This demand coincided with major powers’ unwillingness to assist unstable regimes
in the early nineties and it is no surprise that most of the countries requesting assistance were in Africa (Sanchez 2006, 1). The prime example here is the role played by EO in Sierra Leone. Another PMC claimed that it could have intervened to stop the killing in Rwanda within 14 days at a cost of $600,00 per day. The UN operation took much longer, cost $3 million per day and did not stop the genocide (Schreier & Caparini 2005:81).

The service rendered by PMCs has not been limited to governments. They provide assistance for humanitarian organisations, NGOs and UN agencies operating in conflict zones and in peacekeeping operations – but also to more sinister groups. Even though by far in the minority, some PMCs have even been involved in training rebel groups and have acted as combatants on behalf of besieged governments, rebel groups and insurgents in war-torn societies (Schreier and Caparini 2005, 40). Others have been hired by private corporations to protect their investments, but with little consideration for the long-term stability of these countries (Buchner 2007, 397).

But returning to the legitimate reasons why national armed forces support the use of PMCs, the benefits are obvious. In the highly fluctuating and volatile security environment they provide the military with both numerical and functional flexibility. In addition, they cut down on other direct personnel and administrative expenditure. Hiring contractors means the military no longer has to be concerned with the career planning of employees, their service benefits, administration, the hiring and firing of personnel, their training or supervision. They are also able to draw support and expertise from the civilian labour market, which is cheaper, more efficient, competent and professional. A further benefit is that contractors enhance the military’s response rate. Both the provision of services and the response rate of PMCs are generally faster than national armed forces. The state is obliged to follow rigid, costly, strict bureaucratic procurement procedures to purchase goods and services. Unhampered by such bureaucratic constraints, PMCs are quicker both to mobilise and to deploy.

A further advantage often obscured by the economic benefits of outsourcing is the political spin-offs. Unlike national armed forces, PMCs are unfettered by political constraints in terms of how or where they are used, or how many members they employ to do the job. This takes the pressure off states, especially in unpopular missions such as Iraq, where PMCs can be used to avoid hard choices about deploying more military personnel or calling up reserves, or bringing in allies to support them – which may involve political compromises. They also don’t have to carry the political cost of dealing with casualties among PMCs.
Keeping PMCs under wraps have provided the US executive with a means to evade congressional limits on troop strengths. This has, according to Singer (quoted in Schreier and Caparini 2005, 69) created ‘opportunities for the government to evade public accountability’ and allowed PMCs to develop into a force ‘somewhat beyond the control of the US military’. As their numbers grow and so too the range of tasks they fulfil, a compelling question is what is the long-term impact of PMCs on the military profession?

THE DEMISE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Some claim that the changed security environment, coupled with the civilianisation of military tasks, has ‘ripped the profession apart’ (Hedahl 2005, 12). With the intrusion of so many outsiders into the military domain, what constitutes the military profession, as all PMCs claim to be professionals? Segal and De Angelis (2007: 30) rightly ask whether this ‘expertise [is] now shared between military personnel and civilians … are civilians now in the same profession (or professional community) as the military personnel?’ Have armed forces in their quest for cost-effectiveness, flexibility and deployability lost control of ‘their profession’, and what are the implications for military effectiveness and the nature of the military career?

Traditionally, the military profession has developed within a formal organisation – the armed forces that hold the monopoly on organised violence on behalf of society. As a bureaucratic profession, the typical traits of the profession are hardly distinguishable from those of the institution, implying a kind of institutional/professional duality (Nuciari 2003, 69). Added to this, as a ‘total institution’, almost all functions and activities have been internally geared to achieve the goals of the institution ‘to the exclusion of all else’ (Uttley 2004, 146). This gave the military a degree of independence and self-sufficiency. Clearly the extensive use of PMCs has eroded this and made the armed forces reliant on external resources and support. This dependence has grown as armed forces assume more tasks removed from their ‘core’ function – war fighting – which is the rationale for their existence. Even today fighting wars or maintaining readiness to fight wars is the prime purpose of national armed forces.

While many a civilian would argue that to be trained for mass destruction or to kill is hardly an activity conjuring up images of a profession, the status of the military profession as a profession is largely accepted. It embodies the same principle characteristics as other professions, such as the monopoly over a body
of theoretical and practical knowledge, a high degree of autonomy and control over their activity, a sense of corporateness, a system of internal controls regulating the behaviour of its members, and a professional social ethic which ensures that members of the profession use their skill to the benefit of broader society (Nuciari 2003, 69). Given that these are the key features of the profession, it soon becomes obvious how the marketisation of security by the state (and military leadership) has ‘sold out’ the military profession.

One of the distinguishing features of a profession is that it monopolises the knowledge and skills associated with that profession. According to Huntington 1957, 11) the military profession differs from other professions or occupations because it monopolises the knowledge and skills related to the management of violence. This is central to a profession, as Abbot (1991, 363) states: ‘Knowledge is the cultural capital from which a profession derives income and power’. In the armed forces, this knowledge is acquired through lengthy education and training and is generic to the profession of arms and has traditionally been provided by the profession itself. Today, PMCs are assuming this role. This, according to Avant (2002, 181) is weakening the control of the armed forces over their own profession, as it cedes this central activity – the education of its own professionals – to outsiders. She goes on to say that in effect when government pours money for the training of military personnel into private companies it ‘encourages private rather than public expertise … every contract PMCs gain takes away from developing comparable internal training experience’ (ibid.,185).

Another feature of professions is the autonomy they have over matters affecting their sphere of activity. The military profession has the authority to make decisions regarding membership, organisation, recruitment, education, standards, equipment and the needs of the profession. It also has its own system of self-regulation that controls/regulates the conduct of its members. A unique feature, however, is that it can only exercise such control within the confines of state policy and legislation. In this respect the subordination of its own needs to higher political authority is considered a sui generic feature of the military profession. A further requirement is the commitment to political neutrality. Most countries legally prohibit officers from becoming involved in partisan politics or other activities that could erode the impartiality of their service to society (Downes 1985, 161). So how is this being eroded by PMCs?

In the first instance, the armed forces have no formal authority over how PMCs conduct their business, who they recruit, the standard of their training, the equipment they use or to whom they report. Issues of accountability are one
of the key concerns of contractor involvement in military operations. Contractors are not subject to military law and regulations. They are responsible for their own oversight, management and punishment of contractors (Kopecki 2006). While national armed forces are accountable to higher political authority through the chain of command, the same level of accountability does not apply to PMCs (Schreier and Caparini 2005, 66). It is precisely this unregulated nature of the private security industry that underlies the concern states feel. Consequently, South Africa, which is seen as a main provider of PMC services, has taken the lead in trying to regulate the industry through various punitive laws such as the recently enacted Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act, 2006.

This brings us to the next distinctive feature of the military profession: its heightened sense of corporateness. For the military profession, group solidarity, interdependence and teamwork are embraced as functional requirements for combat effectiveness (Downes 1985, 161). This sense of corporateness is derived from the combat training experience, bond of work and shared social responsibility of the occupational group towards the goals of the organisation and towards those serving in the military (Segal and De Angelis 2007, 14). While the soldier may join the military for a variety of reasons, actual willingness to fight is based on the cohesion of the fighting unit. Hence feelings of esprit de corps and brotherhood among soldiers are integral to mission success. Contractors do not form part of this cohesive group or of the military hierarchy. Yet in many instances they operate alongside military personnel in close–combat support operations where their actions and commitment to mission success are paramount. This ‘us-them’ dichotomy has potentially deleterious implications for operational effectiveness, as will be pointed out later.

Furthermore, civilian military contracts don’t share the same set of ethics and values as are associated with military service. The image of the military professional is one with a deep sense of responsibility to use their skill to the benefit of the broader society that they have been commissioned to defend (Huntington 1957, 13). According to Downes (1985, 159), the military profession perhaps more than any other must seek to convince society that their actions are motivated by an ethic of selfless service. Without this commitment, she claims, ‘society would be loath to allow the military profession to retain its monopoly over the profession’. While these virtues have long begun to erode, even in national armed forces, they are threatened even further by the presence of PMCs (Schreier and Caparini 2005, 62). PMCs are driven by profit, not altruism. They can walk off
the job, end their contract if things become too difficult or dangerous, or pursue better opportunities at any time (Singer 2005, 3).

THE EROSION OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

These normative issues have raised concerns among both civilian and military leaders regarding the long-term impact privatisation may have on the armed forces (Kelty and Segal 2007, 236). As they less able to operate without PMCs support, and stand in competition with other organisations and professions in providing military services, so the armed forces become devalued in the eyes of their clients (Snider and Watkins 2000, 5). At the same time commanders stand almost powerless in maintaining their operational effectiveness as these companies encroach on their terrain.

Many argue that the practice of outsourcing has gone too far in that it has eroded the in-built capacity of the military to conduct operations independently of contractor support. Here Uttley (2004,147) is particularly critical of the UK Department of Defence (DoD). He claims that not defining what exactly constitutes ‘core functions’ has meant British armed forces now lack the personnel to fill mission roles if contracts are not present, or available. This has placed armed forces at the mercy of contractors, who are in a position to exploit this vulnerability at times when the armed forces are most desperate – in times of conflict. Worse still, contractor support comes at a double expense, as they poach the best trained personnel from the military to provide these services and then sell their services back to the military at a higher rate.

Although there is no doubt that PMCs provide armed forces with greater flexibility in terms of manpower, commanders claim it reduces their flexibility on the ground. As contractors serve under specific contractual obligations, their ability to adapt various procedures or logistical structures to dovetail with changing mission requirements is reduced. Neither can they compel contractors to comply with orders, or discipline them in terms of military law if they refuse to follow instructions. Furthermore, contractors are not part of the regular military hierarchy and do not fall under a unified chain of command. This makes the planning, synchronisation and management of operations more arduous, difficulties that are compounded in situations where the commander is dependent on PMCs for operational success (Schreier and Caparini 2005, 46).

As PMC support increases, commanders tend to devote more energy and time to dealing with contractor shortcomings and problems. Many of these problems
are contractual issues over which the commander has little control but that affect operations. Unlike a dependable logistics team that can be cross-tasked, PMCs may not be trained or authorised to perform tasks that are not part of their job description. The flipside of this is that military personnel are no longer able to perform the tasks done by contractors. This is especially worrying in areas such as weapons support that may compromise mission success. Schreier and Caparini (2005, 49) claim that ‘this contingency is likely to dominate battle planning for military commanders of the next generation’. So while it may be more cost-effective to outsource certain support functions, this may be at the expense of military effectiveness.

Besides this, contractors come with a number of hidden costs that cannot be calculated in monetary terms. These concern not only the reliability of services, owing to high turnover of staff in contracting firms, but issues of contractor protection and physical security in operational areas. Then there is the issue of operational security and concern over contractors’ own internal security arrangements that may compromise operational success or create opportunities for enemies to infiltrate, sabotage or disrupt communication systems. As previously mentioned, contractor personnel are not subject to the same screening and vetting as regular force personnel. Opposing forces may also find it relatively easy to infiltrate contractor staff (Schreier and Caparini 2005, 50). Uttley (2004, 155) claims that this ‘introduces inherent tensions between the armed services security goals and the contractor’s imperative to maximise profits’. Thus, the more private security moves into the public sphere, the greater the challenges to control and manage the diverse workforce involved in ensuring global security.

Controlling and regulating the conduct of contractors is another concern. When contractor violations occur, commanders are often at a loss as to how to deal with such misdeeds. Although now an integral part of military operations, PMCs are not subject to the same codes of conduct or restrictions as military personnel. Often it is not clear who is responsible for investigating, prosecuting and punishing offences or crimes committed by PMCs. Unlike soldiers, who are accountable under their nation’s military code of justice wherever they are located, contractors have a murky legal status, undefined by international law, as they do not fit the formal definition of mercenaries (Singer 2005, 4). A prime example of this is the discrepancy in the way contractors and military personnel were dealt with in the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal (Grofe 2007:83). This duality in the regulation of the conduct of civilian and military personnel has an inevitable impact on military personnel in terms of their own conduct and frame of reference.
IMPACT ON THE STATUS OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Driven by neo-liberal cost-cutting ideals, few governments have considered the long-term impact these trends are having on the military profession and on those who make up the profession – military personnel. Frost (2002, 41) expresses the view that ‘downsizing coupled with the contracturisation of military employment has damaged the morale and ethos of the military’. Many have become apprehensive about their future career prospects, as the number of posts decline, are restructured or are outsourced and competition for remaining posts becomes fiercer. Those opting for a military career now know that when they join the armed forces they will be subjected to back-to-back deployments in conflict zones. Some believe that this is exacerbating present retention and recruitment problems within national armed forces (Manigart 2003, 337; Uttley 2004, 158).

To mitigate these effects, armed forces have become obliged to invest more time and money in the ‘people dimension’ to attract and retain personnel. Directly and indirectly outsourcing has pushed up labour costs, as the more functions are outsourced, the more issues of equity with military pay and service conditions arise (Avant 2002, 193). Military personnel constantly draw comparisons with their civilian counterparts and this affects not only pay, job satisfaction and organisational commitment, but the likelihood of their remaining in the military (Kelty and Segal 2007, 233).

For many, the growth in the private military security sector has provided the option of a second career, but this too has contributed to the exodus of key military personnel. For example, there are more former British Special Forces working for PMCs in Iraq now than there are in the entire British armed forces. This is not limited to the UK; across the world armed forces are losing their most experienced professionals to PMCs (Maninger 2007, 69). Not only do they receive between two and ten times more pay than they would from their home militaries, but they enjoy far greater freedom than military personnel. They get regular days off, get paid overtime, can resign at any time and have more personal freedom, all luxuries military personnel do not have (Avant 2002, 193). This inevitably conjures up feelings of resentment, as soldiers are unable to negotiate their employment contracts (Kelty and Segal 2007, 234).

Military personnel themselves are also concerned about the impact privatisation of security is having on their profession. When PMCs are seen to be better paid and better equipped, become the preferred advisors to government, have more authority over certain tasks and are seen as more able to perform certain tasks, this
inevitably causes a decline in feelings of self-worth. When PMCs are contracted for military roles, usually at the decision of government, it is often taken as proof that the military are not able to perform these duties adequately (Schreier and Caparini 2005, 63). This has caused considerable bitterness and a loss of trust by military personnel in military leadership’s ability to defend their professional interests.

Armed forces are entirely dependent on the state to protect their interests. Unlike other professional groups, there are no professional associations to articulate their concerns and no professional boards regulating the profession (which may now include civilians). The question is whether this will prompt military professionals to become more assertive in defending their profession. As Ward (1979: 468) states, ‘The view that the professional should have the right to authoritative judgement in his own sphere is as applicable in the army as it is to other professions.’ In recent years, the armed forces have found it exceedingly difficult in the absence of any legal protection to maintain their professional autonomy. In this regard, there seems to be some creeping evidence that military professionals are becoming more aggressive in defending their interests. For example, the European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL) has grown from seven representative associations/unions in 1972 to the current 34 associations and has taken many issues concerning military personnel up with the European Parliament (EUROMIL 2005).

The question is whether this will transform into attempts to uphold or redefine the profession as a whole, or continue to focus on merely the material concerns affecting soldiers – and with what consequences for civil-military relations. Finer (1962, 42) for example warns that ‘the anxiety to preserve its autonomy is one of the most widespread and powerful motives for intervention in politics’. Here Schreier and Caparini (2005, 63) point out chillingly that ‘bitterness at exclusion and lost prestige, resulting from the introduction of new parallel forces, has been the driving force behind many coups throughout history’. They cite the example of Papua New Guinea in 1997 when the government hired Sandline to restore order in Bougainville at a cost of roughly 150% of the army’s yearly budget. The army later toppled the government. Rising discontent among military personnel in any form whatever should therefore serve as a warning sign to government that its armed forces are in distress. Few have considered the impact of government’s neo-liberal economic policies on the armed forces from this point of view.

Although national armed forces are bound to retain their advantage over private competitors in terms of available resources and the military domain, the reality is that many face a deployability crisis. Not only do they find it difficult to
recruit, deploy and retain sufficient personnel for military operations, but social forces such as the decline in the interest and status of the military, together with declining birth rates in Western states, limit both the quantity and quality of personnel able or willing to serve in the armed forces (Maninger 2007, 70). Even South Africa, with abundant human resources, is experiencing a shortage of skills and capacity to deploy sufficient troops for peace support operations. Unlike in Western armed forces, this will increasingly be hampered by the impact of HIV/AIDS in time to come. The restrictions placed on the use of PMCs under current government legislation may further curtail the deployment capacity of the South African armed forces in this regard.

CONCLUSION: SOME LESSONS FOR THE SA ARMY

Drawing on the preceding discussion it is clear that ‘outsourcing security’ to the private sector has certain definite benefits – particularly as a force multiplier – but at the same time has dire consequences for the military and the profession as a whole. The first challenge the SA army needs to address is to determine which military-related tasks are to be fulfilled by uniformed personnel, reservists and civilian personnel and which should be outsourced. Here it is crucial not to make the mistakes made by the UK and US, but to identify up front which functions are critical to operational success, even where they may not be core fighting tasks.

The second challenge is to determine which functions can be outsourced to PMCs without compromising operational effectiveness. It would be short-sighted to ignore the benefits PMCs can provide in enhancing the numerical and functional flexibility of the SA army. As we know, acute shortages are already being experienced in certain critical posts and the army is at present struggling to meet deployment demands. Should civilians be contracted to provide these services, a key consideration is under what contractual conditions and obligations. How these contracts are structured in terms of the expectations of contractors, authority relations, jurisdiction of contractors and the profiles of contracts are all important considerations that impact on military effectiveness. A concern is that the newly promulgated Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act, 2006 (as noble as its intent is) may impede the ability of the SANDF to contract in order to retain its organisational and operational effectiveness.

Looking beyond the possible benefits of using PMCs, one should not ignore the normative impact civilians have on the military profession as a whole. Where
military personnel work alongside civilians, there will inevitably be an erosion of the uniqueness of military tasks and pressure to offer more comparative employment conditions. Ignoring these realities not only creates resentment, impacts on morale and exacerbates retention problems, but may even fuel labour unrest within the ranks, as has already been witnessed. Similarly, it is critical that the legal boundaries, codes of conduct and mechanisms of redress in case of misconduct of both contractors and military personnel are clearly defined and understood.

Central to problems commanders experience in using contractors is the impact they have on the conduct of their daily duties. The way that PMCs are to fit into the military hierarchy in terms of command and control, communication and the synchronisation of activities is crucial to operational effectiveness. These are important considerations. So too are issues of security, both security of civilians in-theatre and operational security. The more civilian actors enter the sphere of public security, the more complex these broader security concerns become.

Perhaps most important of all is how these civilianising influences affect the morale and commitment of military personnel. Where military personnel experience a sense of relative deprivation in comparison with other groups in their sphere of activity, resentment is inevitably conjured up. This extends beyond pay, to how employee relations are managed in general. The mere fact that we have unions in our midst that were prepared to throw caution aside and protest at the opening of Parliament should serve as a warning to government. Clearly, outsourcing of military tasks to civilians will be an issue of intense negotiation with the officially recognised unions.

But ultimately the responsibility rests with military leadership to articulate the concerns of military personnel at the political level, and if they do not do so, it seems the unions will. Military personnel swear allegiance to the state and in return expect the state to take cognisance of the difficulties they face. Failure to do so may have dire consequences for the future effectiveness of the armed forces and for civil-military relations.

LIST OF REFERENCES


Downes, Cathy. To be or not to be a profession: the military case. Defence Analysis 1(3) (1985), 147-171.


Singer, Peter W. Outsourcing war: understanding the private military industry. *Foreign Affairs* 84(2) (2005), 119-135


Chapter Thirteen

The revolution in military affairs
Technological solutions for budget-tight and manpower-scarce armed forces

Prof. Lui Pao Chuen

INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s, the two superpowers, the USA and USSR, were locked in combat through their proxies on all continents to defend and advance their respective political ideologies. The success of Communism in Vietnam was viewed by the United States as the fall of the first domino, with the rest of South-East Asia going red soon after, and so they felt the need to draw a line in the sand and throw the entire might of the US military at propping up the South Vietnamese Government. President Lyndon Johnson escalated the war soon after he took office in 1963, after the assassination of President Kennedy. President Nixon, who was elected in 1968, soon realised that the war in Vietnam could not be won and began peace negotiations. US troops were withdrawn in 1973. South Vietnam fell two years later. The US military was completely demoralised by their defeat in Vietnam. They had the most advanced weapons in the world. The world’s first precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were used to bring down bridges to cut the North Vietnamese lines of communication. Helicopters became the work horses of the army, with a quantum improvement in troop mobility. Airborne jammers and anti-radiation missiles were fielded in the dedicated Wild Weasel Phantom jets to suppress the Russian-made SA2 SAMs that North Vietnam had deployed to protect Hanoi and Haiphong. Agent Orange was used to defoliate jungles that gave cover to the Viet Cong. With the exception of nuclear weapons, nearly all the high-tech weapons in the arsenal of the US military were used in the Vietnam War.
But high-tech weapons were not enough; they had to deploy a large number of soldiers to secure the ground. To meet this need, they had to use the draft. Thousands of poorly trained and poorly motivated soldiers were sent to fight against an enemy that had been battle-hardened since action in the 1950s against the French. To make things worse, college students were exempted from the draft, creating resentment among the more poorly educated youth. The war was also fought in the US between the government and the public who opposed the war.

Many lessons can be drawn from the Vietnam War, of which I would like to mention only two. First, high-tech weapons cannot compensate for a lack of fighting spirit. Second, a war can be lost if the people back home do not support it – hence the vital need for winning the hearts and minds of the nation in support of a war. The US military leadership began to reconstruct their forces after the Vietnam War, scarred by the memories of all that had gone terribly wrong there.

With the end of the Vietnam War and the election of Jimmy Carter as president in 1976, the US became preoccupied with domestic issues of economic recession and inflation. There were few foreign policy initiatives, the most memorable being the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 and the recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1978. Carter sought to improve relations with the USSR through various détente initiatives. This encouraged Leonid Brezhnev to believe that the US had gone soft on Communism and he took the window of opportunity to invade Afghanistan in 1979, to settle a potential threat to the USSR’s southern flank.

Although the USSR did not have to deal with the same degree of public resistance to the war in Afghanistan as the US did during the Vietnam War, they faced the same problem of using poorly motivated and poorly trained conscripts. They too learnt the lesson that high-tech weapons were not sufficient to defeat battle-hardened and committed guerrillas. At the end of the Afghan War there could no longer be any doubt in the military that fighting spirit is the main ingredient for victory. The lack of fighting spirit cannot be compensated for by the deployment of high-tech weapons.

Meanwhile, through the 1970s, the Soviet economic performance gradually worsened and widespread corruption and inefficiency were evident. A major change in leadership took place in 1982 upon the death of Leonid Brezhnev, after an 18-year reign as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Yurii Andropov, who succeeded him, died two years later without doing anything memorable. The next General Secretary, Konstantin Chernoko, lasted one year before dying in March 1985. The lack of suitable successors
created the way for Mikhail Gorbachev, who was then the youngest member of the Politburo, to take over the Communist Party.

He began a policy of glasnost (openness), which provided a greater degree of freedom in politics. It also allowed the development of nationalism in Russia and the other states of the Soviet Union. In June 1988, Gorbachev announced the introduction of a two-tier legislature, elected by open elections at the first Extraordinary Party Conference since 1941. The elections for the new USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in March 1989 saw many reformist politicians, including Boris Yeltsin, win seats. In May 1989, the Congress elected Gorbachev Executive President of the USSR. The events in the Soviet Union during this period of rapid changes after 18 years of Brezhnev’s stifling rule are fascinating.

As far as Afghanistan was concerned, Gorbachev concluded that the war could not be won and began negotiations for withdrawal soon after he assumed power. The Soviet troops began their withdrawal in 1988, after suffering a similar humiliation to the American troops at the hands of an enemy armed with low-tech weapons but filled with an indomitable spirit.

President Reagan took a completely different tack from his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. Instead of detente, he went onto the offensive to confront the Soviet Union, which he called the evil empire. He reasoned that as the Soviet Union could not be defeated with arms without the US also suffering unacceptable losses, he would defeat them economically instead. The deterioration of the Soviet economy was apparent. They could not match the US in spending more money to build up their order of battle (ORBAT) nor counter the US in their military interventions in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

The two major initiatives of President Reagan to which the Soviets had no answer were the 600-ship navy and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The ships gave the US Navy the capacity to conduct war right in the backyard of the Soviet Union, the Barents Sea. The SDI gave CONUS (continental United States) an umbrella against Soviet strategic ballistic missiles, giving the US the advantage to being able to strike without fear of retaliation. This put an end to the strategic balance achieved by the MAD (Mutually Assure Destruction) strategy that had been in place since the 1950s.

As the Soviets could not afford to match the Americans in spending on their version of SDI, they tried to use diplomacy to eliminate this destabilising weapon system. They projected an image of the US as a warmonger, escalating the arms race and militarising space in order to pressurise the US into negotiating the
termination of SDI. Although Reagan announced that SDI was intended for peace and the US would be willing to share the research findings with the USSR, he refused to negotiate the termination of the project.

Soon after Gorbachev came into power, he met Reagan at Geneva in November 1985. Although they did not reach an agreement on major arms control issues, the meeting was a landmark, signalling a return to a less confrontational relationship between the two countries.

Besides escalating the build-up of military power though large spending, Reagan also demonstrated his fighting spirit in the use of this power. Examples were the military occupation of Grenada in November 1982, the shooting down of Libyan fighters in a naval exercise in the Gulf of Sirte in March 1986, and the clash with Iran in the Gulf in 1987 to protect Kuwait’s petroleum tankers.

Gorbachev finally completed negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in April 1988 and the agreement for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops was signed by the USSR, the USA, Afghanistan and Pakistan. All Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan in February 1989.

Negotiations on arms control suffered a setback in October 1986 when Gorbachev failed at a two-day meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, to persuade Reagan to scale down the US commitment to SDI. A positive outcome of this meeting was the agreement to remove an entire class of ballistic missiles – medium-range nuclear missiles – from Europe by 1992.

In September 1987, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty was signed by Gorbachev and Reagan. This treaty eliminated all stocks of medium-range and short-range nuclear missiles. The two leaders also agreed to pursue negotiations to reduce long-range nuclear weaponry by up to 50 per cent under a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

In 1988, Bush was elected president, succeeding Reagan. The first meeting between Gorbachev and Bush took place at Valletta, Malta, in December 1989. They finalised the agreements on the monitoring of chemical weapons and the procedures for the verification of limits on strategic forces and nuclear tests.

The withdrawal from Eastern Europe by the USSR in late 1989 and early 1990 opened the way for the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990. This led to a further improvement in the US-Soviet relationship and US economic aid for Eastern Europe. A treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), which provided for bilateral limits on the number of non-nuclear weapons that would be allowed between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains, was also signed.
At the end of 1990, the Cold War was finally laid to rest with the USA, the USSR and 32 other countries signing a charter, declaring the end of the post-war era of confrontation and division in Europe.

With the end of the Cold War, both the USA and the USSR were less constrained by problems in their own backyards. The US marched into Panama on 23 December 1989 to capture General Manuel Noriega, its leader, for trial in the US on drug trafficking charges. The condemnation by the UN Security Council of the invasion of Panama was ignored by the US.

On the hand, the US expressed dismay and displeasure with the USSR for Gorbachev’s heavy-handed treatment of independence movements in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were considered part of the USSR.

THE PEACE DIVIDEND – NOT FOR THE MILITARY

Two issues of top priority for the newly-appointed Bush government were containing the ballooning federal budget deficit and the arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. A reduction in arms would relieve pressure on the budget. The bills for weapons ordered during the Reagan administration still had to be paid.

The 1980 defence budget based on 1994 financial year dollar values was around US$250 billion. Reagan’s arms race had escalated this level by US$20 billion per year to reach a peak of US$370 billion in 1985 and it remained at an average of $350 billion until 1991.

With the end of the Cold War, the defence budget was scaled down to below US$250 billion by 1994 and was to remain around that level for the foreseeable future. The impact on military spending was drastic. The estimated reduction in each category of spending between 1985 and 1994 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget category</th>
<th>FY85</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
<th>FY94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td>$88B</td>
<td>-21,8%</td>
<td>$18B</td>
<td>$70B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations &amp; maintenance</td>
<td>$102B</td>
<td>-13,6%</td>
<td>$14B</td>
<td>$88B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>$129B</td>
<td>-64,1%</td>
<td>$83B</td>
<td>$46B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDT &amp; E*</td>
<td>$45B</td>
<td>-7,1%</td>
<td>$3B</td>
<td>$42B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$14B</td>
<td>-5,9%</td>
<td>$8B</td>
<td>$6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$378B</td>
<td></td>
<td>$126B</td>
<td>$252B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* RDT & E = research, development, test and evaluation
It can be seen that the biggest cut was for the procurement of new weapons systems. This 64 per cent cut drastically affected not only the future force structure of the military, but also the survival of many companies in the US defence industry.

Without the Soviet Union as an enemy, all the forces that had been developed to deal with the Soviet threat now had a greatly diminished value. What good is an attack submarine if there are no ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to hunt?

To achieve this level of budgetary reduction, a slimming exercise at a health club would not do. Muscles on the top of fat had to be shed. Reagan’s goal of a 600-ship navy was not achieved before it was scaled back to a more sustainable level. This had to be accompanied by a draw-down on the number of officers and sailors recruited for the huge navy. This cutback on personnel was to haunt the US Navy for 20 years.

Beyond the US, various European countries also saw the requirement to invest in defence sharply reduced with the evaporation of the Soviet threat. A 30 per cent cut in the defence budget became the order of the day. Similar to what happened in the US, the major budget cut fell on capital procurement. With a reduction of some 50 per cent of the budget for procurement, it became a challenge to the armament procurement agencies to stretch the dollar. Some efficiencies could be achieved with the adoption of commercial procurement practices. This was done. The US Department of Defence tore up its books on managing acquisition and wrote new ones. The UK Ministry of Defence had earlier employed Lord Peter Levene, the chairman of a company, United Scientific Instruments, as chief procurement executive. The French armaments authority, the DGA, is presently headed by Mr Hemmer, a former president of Peugeot.

The best commercial procurement practice could save perhaps 20 per cent of the procurement budget. Further efficiencies have to come from the creation of innovative ways of fighting wars and the purchase of new systems to enable these new ways of fighting.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Admiral Owen as its spokesman, pushed for the development of a system of systems for war fighting and to achieve information dominance for the US Armed Forces in the US’s new role as the only superpower and policeman of the world.

The reduction in defence budgets in the West has created a window of opportunity for the countries that buy weapons from them. Advanced technological
weapons that were hitherto not releaseable are being offered for sale in order to sustain the defence industrial base. For countries that can benefit from the release of advanced defence technologies, there is an opportunity to acquire them and make their weapons superior to those on the market.

**LEAN PRODUCTION: THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD**

**RCP: Military value vs. book value**

As is well known, the relative combat power (RCP) of two forces cannot be measured just by counting physical assets. The value of a business is many times the value of its physical assets as indicated by its book value. The military value of a fighting unit, a tank battalion, a fighter squadron, a missile corvette squadron is many times the cost of the hardware it operates. The leverage is in the intangibles, i.e. the quality of its people, doctrine and relationships and confidence and trust between units. The intangible value of fighting units should increase with each level aggregation. For example, the military value of a brigade must be significantly more than the sum of the value of its constituent battalions. The synergy that can be achieved with the battalions fighting together is, however, offset by the time and staff resources needed by the brigade commander to plan and coordinate all the activities of the entire brigade.

Information technology has been used to support the staff-work of the brigade staff and has led to an improvement in the agility of a brigade. A computerised command and control (C2) system with an electronic map that shows own forces and enemy forces in real time, a planning system that can test plans and an order dissemination and reporting system has been proved to be a very cost-effective way to improve military value. A computerised C2 system was a real force multiplier for the military that first put it into operation. But the military value goes down when both contending forces are similarly equipped. The leverage would then depend on the staff who can use their system in a more innovative way.

Advances in information technology have, however, not changed the business of war fighting to the same degree as in other businesses like banking, retailing, manufacturing and air travel. There is much that we can learn from the world of business and apply to the business of war-making besides just the exploitation of information technology to do business differently.
Learning from the business world

There are countless examples in the business world where a small company came from nowhere, beating the giants of its industry in a relatively short time. Some modern examples are Toyota, Wal-Mart and Microsoft. Toyota makes cars, a prime product of the industrial age, which has changed the way we live. Wal-Mart is a retailer, using information-age technology to sell products more effectively than its competitors. Microsoft makes software, a knowledge product of the information age that has become as ubiquitous as electricity and provided mankind with the power to do things more efficiently. Toyota is an example of how to succeed by daring to do things differently. The company pioneered the new production process commonly known as ‘lean production’, which found its way into aircraft companies like Lockheed Martin in the early 1990s.

Toyota’s background

Toyota was founded in 1937 by Kiichiro Toyoda. Soon after its incorporation, the company was forced by the Japanese military government to build trucks for the war effort. After the end of World War II, the company struggled to build cars by the craft method, i.e. handmade. At the end of 1949, the company had to retrench a quarter of its workforce because of recession and they could not sell their cars. The workers went on strike and returned to work only after Kiichiro Toyoda resigned. By 1950, 13 years after the company was formed, it had produced only 2 685 cars. At that time Ford was pushing out 7 000 cars a day at its Rouge Plant in Detroit, the most modern and efficient car-producing plant in the world.

In the spring of 1950, Eiji Toyoda, a nephew of Kiichiro, spent three months at Ford’s Rouge Plant. He reported to HQ that he thought there were some possibilities for improving the production system.

Mass production as perfected by Ford was obviously not a model for Toyota. To survive as a car producer, they had many problems to overcome, the main ones being the following:

- A tiny domestic market that required a wide range of vehicles
- New labour laws introduced by General McArthur that restricted the sacking of workers
Lack of funds
Foreign competitors

The Japanese government responded to foreign competitors by prohibiting direct foreign investment in the Japanese motor industry. Car imports were kept out through a high tariff barrier. The domestic car manufacturers resisted the government’s move to merge them to make them more competitive against the ‘Big Three’ car-makers in the US.

Toyota had the impossible task of trying to compete with the most efficient mass producers of cars in Detroit. Even if they had had the capital to buy a modern car producing plant from the US, they would not have been able to compete with Detroit as they did not have the same economy of scale nor the same know-how in running plants.

Fortunately for Toyota, they did not have money to throw at the problem. To compete, they had to find a different way to make cars and to beat the Americans. A tight budget is not necessarily a bad thing, as it forces one to exercise one’s mind to come up with innovations. Taiichi Ohno, the creative chief engineer of Toyota, was forced to innovate.

Ohno’s innovation in car-making

Car bodies are made by welding some 300 metal parts stamped from sheet steel. Manufacturing begins with the ‘blanking’ press to produce a stack of flat blanks from a roll of sheet steel. The blanks are then inserted into massive stamping presses that press them into three-dimensional parts. The massive and expensive presses then in production were designed to meet the mass production needs of the ‘Big Three’ car manufacturers in Detroit for maximum production rate. These presses could punch out a million parts a year operating at 12 strokes a minute, three shifts a day.

But Toyota made only a few thousand cars a year. These presses could be retooled to make different parts, but changing the massive dies would require more than one day’s work by specialist technicians. A couple of such presses would be sufficient to make all the parts for Toyota’s cars. The only snag: after each production run of a few hours, the presses would lie idle for 24 hours for retooling. What would the workers do during retooling? How would it be possible to compete with Detroit with such low productivity?
Toyota’s chief engineer Taiichi Ohno solved this problem by designing new tools on rollers. He made tool changing so simple that it would need only three minutes. Now it would make economic sense to change tools every few hours. The process of tool changing was so easy that the production workers could do it as part of their work.

Ohno discovered that making small batches of stampings cost less per part than large production lots. This was against conventional wisdom of economies of scale. He found that he could achieve a lower unit cost because he was carrying a smaller inventory cost and there was less wastage. An error of stamping would be detected as soon as the part was used and so large quantities of defective parts needing to be reworked or thrown away, as happened in mass production plants, could not happen at Toyota.

This also led to the just-in-time inventory system, in which suppliers delivered components directly to the production line just in time for their assembly into the vehicles. In 1985 Toyota carried about two hours’ worth of parts inventory in their factories.

The workers in Ohno’s factory would have to be multi-skilled and highly motivated. If workers did not prevent problems from happening, the whole factory would come to a halt.

The lifetime employment of workers required by the new labour law imposed by the Americans made the hiring of each worker a deliberate act, as they would become a member of the Toyota family for life. Investment in the continual training of workers made sense, as they would become an appreciating asset by learning and improving their contribution to the company over their lives.

In exchange for this iron rice bowl, i.e. job security, the employees of Toyota had to agree to be flexible in work assignments and to be active in promoting the interests of the company by initiating improvements rather than merely doing what they were told to do. In mass production factories in the Detroit, the workers were not required to think. They were told to ‘leave their brains at the door’ when they reported for work. In Toyota they were required to use their brains in their work.

It took Toyota more than 10 years to perfect lean production. Other Japanese car-makers followed their success. In 1955, Japan made less than one per cent of the cars in the world. Thirty years later, in 1985, Japan had captured 28 per cent of the world motor vehicle market.

The superiority of Lean Production can be seen in the following comparison of productivity at General Motors and Toyota:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GM</th>
<th>Toyota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross assembly hours</td>
<td>40,7</td>
<td>18,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Assembly hours</td>
<td>31,0</td>
<td>16,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly Defects/100 cars</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventories Parts</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>2 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Toyota took half as much time as GM to make a car with 35 per cent fewer defects. The size of the parts inventory carried by Toyota was less than six per cent of GM’s.

**Lesson on lean production**

The lesson to draw from Toyota is not how to make cars more efficiently, but daring to break away from conventional solutions to meet operational requirements. The availability of technology is not usually a problem. We can buy technology or employ technologists to develop the technology needed. It is not the technology of weapons systems but the technology of motivating and organising forces and the boldness to do things differently from conventional practices that will create higher military value.

Our challenge is to dare to dream. We must dare to dream about doing things differently and be able to make the dream a reality. A dare-to-dream cycle is a learning cycle of thinking, doing and observing and shows how dreams can be transformed into operating capabilities. One gets bolder with each cycle, as each success inspires greater successes.

**TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS FOR BUDGET-TIGHT ARMED FORCES**

**Tight budget is not necessarily bad**

A shortage of budget to build the forces needed for operational capabilities will challenge us to think of unconventional solutions. The challenge is not to create more operational capability with more money. Anybody can do that. Only an intelligent and daring armed force can create more operational capability with a small budget. Information technology has enabled businesses to achieve
quantum leaps in their performance by giving them the means to create new ways to compete. The same can be achieved in the business of war.

**Positive example of information war**

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) in 1982 demonstrated how a high-tech war in the information age should be fought. Electronic jamming and deception denied the Syrian Air Force a current air situation picture, whereas the IAF had a real-time air situation picture. In every dog fight, the IAF had information dominance, with the final score of 80 kills to one loss. The Syrian pilots were also psychologically defeated by their fear of the F-15s that had just been delivered and constituted only a fraction of the IAF. It was the welding of information warfare systems with tactics that made such an astounding success possible.

**Negative example of information war**

The US Air Force in Operation Desert Storm in Iraq used an average of 11 tons of PGMs or 44 tons of bombs to destroy each target. In the first five days of the war, when low-level tactics were employed to avoid medium-level surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), some 31 USAF and allied fighters were shot down. This worked out at 6.2 losses per 1000 strikes. The ban on flying below 12 000 feet to avoid shoulder-launched SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) reduced aircraft attrition, but it also reduced the effectiveness of PGMs, as most of them did not have a clear line of sight to their targets.

The Americans had high-resolution images from space, but these images belonged to the CIA and were not released to the ground commanders until it was too late. There was insufficient battle damage assessment, which resulted in multiple attacks on the same target. The air campaign became a war of massive use of force instead of a war of precision. The aircraft most feared by the Iraqis was not the high-tech F-117 stealth fighter but the aged B-52s with a belly-load of 100 dumb bombs. The CNN reports on TV of one bomb destroying one target was only propaganda to convince the Americans back home that they would win the war with high-tech weapons without spilling precious blood.

The lesson to be learnt from the Gulf War is the need to integrate resources and information across organisations, as the cost of not using information can be very high, as demonstrated by the USAF’s score of 11 tons of PGMs or 44 tons of dumb bombs to destroy a target. No other country would have the luxury of
time, quality and quantity of forces employed by the US in Desert Storm, so try not to imitate what the Americans did in Desert Storm.

Information vs. inventory

In the business world information has driven out inventory. Just-in-time delivery of goods and services has achieved dramatic improvements in service levels and reductions in costs. Toyota carries just two hours of parts in the factory. For the military, the greatest leverage of a balanced combination of information systems and guided weapons would be in the elimination of reserves. Maintaining reserves to cover a lack of intelligence, uncertainties and the fog of war is standard practice in the military. Following the doctrine of keeping one-third of the forces in reserve will result in contact with 29 per cent of the forces. If there is information dominance and a central reserve of highly mobile forces, there is an excellent chance of increasing the forces in contact to more than 50 per cent. Think how much more could be accomplished if one dared to go flat-out with no reserves, trusting in the higher echelons to provide reinforcements when required with having to be asked.

Making the investments necessary to achieve information dominance will enable successful manoeuvre warfare and destruction missions, with much smaller expenditure of weapons and losses than were experienced by the Americans in Operation Desert Storm.

TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS FOR MANPOWER-TIGHT ARMED FORCES

Lean production

In mass production factories, workers are not required to use their brains. They are supposed to leave their brains at the door when they report for work. In lean production, every worker is expected to contribute ideas on how to improve the operation of their plant. Lean production has displaced mass production in many factories around the world. With better educated soldiers there is greater scope for their development. Significant savings in manpower can be expected from substituting quality for quantity:
Automation. A second technological solution is the greater use of automation. The US Navy has set a target of 95 sailors to crew the DD21 destroyer under development, a reduction of 305 from the current manning of 400 for a destroyer.

Manpower savings. Even if we introduce no new technology, we can still achieve a significant reduction in manpower if we do not waste time. Another way to look at this issue is how to maximise the utilisation of our forces. If time is managed as tightly as money, we would be able to detect all the waste that is going into waiting or doing things that add little of military value.

CONCLUSION

Ohno of Toyota designed the tools for his presses to be changed in three minutes as compared to the 24 hours required in other car-producing factories. As the US Navy Smart Ship project team has found, the greatest obstacle to the reduction of manpower on ships was tradition. To reduce manning by doing things differently will require officers with daring. It is comforting to follow the footsteps of others. It is less risky. To build up a sustainable competitive advantage over potential enemies, one has to learn continuously and dare to be a pioneer. One must dare to dream and have the perseverance and fortitude to fight for one’s ideas and make one’s dreams come true.

NOTE

1. This article was published in The Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces (Vol. 25, No. 3, July-September 1999; see http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safi/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_3/v25no3.htm). With the permission of The Pointer Editorial Board, it was made available to SA Army Seminar 21 (2008) for publication purposes. The article is based on a lecture by Prof. Lui Pao Chuen to the Singapore Command and Staff College on 13 May 1998.
In the first paper of this book the author states, ‘The nature of future conflict in Africa and the attendant security responses are two sides of the same coin’. He expounds the intra-state nature of African conflicts and argues for African leaders to provide the leadership that will bring security and development to the African people. In so doing, he focuses the attention of the debate on the argument that security is all about the creation of conditions under which the people of Africa can pursue their political, economic and social aspirations without fear of threat from state or non-state actors.

The next three papers emphasise the important developments around the African peace and security architecture (APSA). Africa is coming to the realisation that peace and security cannot be pursued and achieved purely as national issues. Peace and security in Africa can only be achieved in a regional (continental) and sub-regional context. This requires Africa and Africans to define and take charge of their own peace and security agenda. The developments around the Peace and Security Council, the Common African Defence and Security Policy, the Continental Early Warning System and the African Standby Force are therefore to be welcomed and supported by all Africans. Similarly, the sub-regional collaborative security developments in the Southern African Development Community, such as the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, the Interstate Defence and Security Committee, the SADC Brigade and the Mutual Defence Pact, are equally to be welcomed and supported. Specifically, the SA Army needs to play an important role in the development and operationalisation of the ASF and the SADC Brigade. South Africa and the South African National Defence
Force cannot escape their responsibilities within Africa and the SADC sub-region. As stated in the first paper, ‘leadership’ is what Africa needs and South Africa must play its part.

The fifth chapter of this book asks one of the fundamental questions of the current security debate in Africa, the one about decision-making: ‘Who decides on the issues and their respective priorities?’ For years the civil-military relations debate has been restricted to the national level and ignored the collaborative and collective security perspective. Even so, at national level, civil-military relations remain tenuous and much needs to be done on the African continent to establish democratic oversight of military forces. But as Africa moves towards more collaboration in defence and security matters, the development of healthy civil-military relations also needs to take cognisance of the regional and sub-regional dimensions. The paper asks the question, ‘Who or what serves as the political control mechanisms of the African defence and security architecture and are they accountable to elected constituencies?’ This argues for a greater role for the Pan-African Parliament and the sub-regional parliamentary forums in the development of collective defence and security policies and protocols as well as in the oversight of their execution.

Chapters 6 to 10 examine peace mission deployments by other armies and underline the importance of integrated mission planning, good intelligence, logistical support for operations and pre-determined exit strategies. They also underline the design criteria for armies facing deployments in peace missions in Africa and elsewhere. These include strategic and tactical mobility, interoperability, accurate delivery of firepower, good self-protection and a high degree of professionalism. Peace support operations, the primary task that will be undertaken by military forces in the future African scenario, occur in complex operational environments where the military must cope not only with armed opponents but also with national and local authorities, the local population, international bodies and NGOs and cooperating military forces. This calls for good leadership and good soldiering and emphasises the need to enhance good military training and force preparation with proper civic education focused on military operations in conjunction with civilian authorities and bodies and amongst civilian populations. The paper on cultural intelligence and the contemporary security environment emphasises the need for cognitive, motivational and behavioural capacities to understand and respond effectively to the beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of individuals and institutions of other groups, societies and cultures under complex and changing circumstances in order to effect the desired change. In particular, military forces employed on
peace missions must be trained at all levels to understand and be able to respond to the context of the national, international, host nation and local arenas. It must be emphasised that during such peace missions soldiers at all levels will be in regular contact with the local population and international actors, including the media, and need to be schooled in both professional soldiering and military diplomacy. General civic education thus needs to expand during pre-deployment training to include specific training for the mission based on an understanding of the host country, local populations and participating actors.

Chapter 7 deals specifically with the South African military and offers an analysis of the preparedness of the SA Army for peace missions in Africa. It finds that the army is severely restricted in its ability to play its role, owing to the imbalance between defence policy and funding. Whilst the SA Army is technically well prepared for the African operational scenario, problems of availability of soldiers owing to the Army’s age and health profile place restrictions on the army’s ability to deliver the quantity and quality of soldiers demanded by both African expectations and SA foreign policy. The deficiencies in SA defence policy and the imbalance between policy and funding are also placing a burden on the SA Army in requiring it to develop and prepare the forces that will be needed to support the concepts and demands of the African Standby Force and the SADC Brigade.

The penultimate chapters of this book look at the effects of the privatisation of security and outsourcing on the SA Army and argue for the maintenance of the core functions of the army as one of the essential instruments of the state to execute its national, regional and international obligations. Privatisation of these functions boils down to abdication of responsibility.

In the final chapter, the case is made for technological solutions to support the demands that are placed on armies by the complex modern operational environment. In this context, technology is not only about expensive weapons systems, but more about innovation and finding practical solutions to operational demands. Investment in people is probably the best investment that the SA Army can make to ensure success in the future. The modern SA Army needs to invest in the education and training of its people at all levels and in all mustings. The current level of education and lack of personnel with higher academic qualifications is a matter of grave concern.

In summary, there can be no doubt that the SA Army needs to and will play a crucial role in bringing peace, stability and security to Africa and its people. Africa needs military and security forces that can support and bolster the African peace and security architecture. Without such forces, the policies, protocols and
conventions are but worthless paper. But Africa needs military and security forces and services that are designed to be appropriate to the challenges facing our continent, adequately developed and trained to stand up to these challenges both effectively and professionally. Services must be accountable to civil authorities and affordable in the light of their focus on service delivery. The SA Army can and should play a leading role in pursuing this goal. The initiative taken by the Chief of the SA Army, through the Army Vision 2020 project, is an admirable endeavour towards the achievement of this vision.