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By Dr Solomon A. Dersso
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Acknowledgements

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Thank you all so very much, including those I did not mention by name.

Solomon Ayele Dersso
Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAAJ  African Anti-Jihadist Alliance
AFISMA  International Support Mission to Mali
AFISM-CAR  Support Mission to CAR
ASF  African Standby Force
APSA  African Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM  Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb
AMISOM  AU Mission in Somalia
AU  African Union
AUC  AU Commission
AUHIP  AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan
AUTE  AU Team of Experts
BINUCA  UN Integrated Office for Peace-building in the CAR
CAR  Central African Republic
CEMAC  Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CENI-T  Independent National Electoral Commission for Transition
CES  Special Electoral Court
CM-FPR  Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Forces and Movements
COFCs  Counter-LRA Operation Fusion Centres
CONOPs  Strategic Concept of Operations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPJP</td>
<td>Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSKP</td>
<td>Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMIB</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces nationales de libération</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPUs</td>
<td>Formed police units</td>
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<td>FROCCA</td>
<td>Front for the Return of Constitutional Order in Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNC</td>
<td>General National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNF</td>
<td>Coalition of National Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCUA</td>
<td>Higher Council for Unity of Azawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRDDDP</td>
<td>Human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG-CAR</td>
<td>International Contact Group on CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG-M</td>
<td>International Contact Group on Madagascar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced people</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>International Neutral Force</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Justice and Construction Party</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIOC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Operations Centre</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPSM</td>
<td>Joint Political and Security Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICOPAX</td>
<td>Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR</td>
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<td>MAA</td>
<td>Arab Movement of Azwad</td>
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<td>MDSF</td>
<td>Malian Defence and Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MNLA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Mission in the DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>MUJWA</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council of the AU</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde</td>
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RDF Rwandan Defence Forces
RCI-LRA Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA
REC Regional Economic Community
RTF Regional Task Force
SADC Southern African Development Community
SAF Sudan Armed Forces
SDBZ Safe Demilitarised Border Zone
SLA-AW Sudan Liberation Army faction of Abdul Wahid
SLA-MM Sudan Liberation Army faction of Minni Minawi
SNA Somali National Army
SNSF Somali National Security Forces
SNSI Somalia National Security Institutions
SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM-N Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement – North
SRF Sudan Revolutionary Forces
SSC Supreme Security Committee
TCCs Troop contributing countries
UFDR Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
UNSOA UN Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOM UN Assistance Mission in Somalia
UN United Nations
UNISFA UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMISS UN Mission to South Sudan
UNOAU UN Office to the AU
UNSC UN Security Council
US United States of America
2013 has not been a particularly good year for peace and security in Africa. There was a resurgence of conflict and violence on a scale not seen in the past several years. Despite the notable efforts made by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU since its establishment to endow Africa with a mechanism to protect its peace and security effectively, the responses to Africa's conflicts and crises during the year left much to be desired. Apart from raising fundamental questions about the adequacy of the AU’s peace and security mechanisms in their current design and form, failure to marshal effective responses on two occasions created the need for the deployment of French troops.

This 2013/2014 Annual Review of the Peace and Security Council provides data relevant to policy and analyses of both the peace and security issues of concern in Africa in 2013 and the responses of the PSC and others working with it. Africa’s greater conflict and instability in 2013 was reflected in the emergency faced by Mali at the beginning of the year, the collapse of the Central African Republic (CAR) into violence anarchy, the surge in instability and violence in northern Nigeria, Libya and Egypt, the continuing conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan and Southern Sudan, as well as by protracted instability in Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau, and the tragic descent of South Sudan into a destructive civil war. The Central African, North African, and the East and Horn of Africa regions showed a substantial deterioration their peace and security situations, while West Africa and the Sahel region had to contend with existing conflicts and expanding insecurities.

The conflicts and insecurities experienced by various parts of the continent are a manifestation of the serious and changing threats the continent continues to face. While armed rebellion and internal conflicts remain the main threats, many parts of the continent, particularly in West Africa and the Sahel, and in North and East Africa, additionally face increasing levels of terrorism, organised
crime, a proliferation of arms and crises increasingly related to governance, including unconstitutional changes of government. Despite the fact that many of the threats to peace and security are not new, they manifest changes in at least two respects. The first is the changing nature of armed opposition groups, and the other the increasing transnational or trans-regional character of conflict.

Signifying the rise in conflicts and insecurity in Africa, the PSC held its greatest number of meetings in 2013 since it became operational in 2004. Despite the expectations raised by the establishment of the PSC and its work towards achieving Pax Africana, its increased engagement in the continent’s crises in 2013 in many instances did not produce the responses the situations required. While there were few instances where AU/regional engagement produced negative outcomes, in many cases peacekeepers failed to deploy in good time and respond effectively, hence achieving little outcome. In Mali, it was the launch of Operation Serval by France that prompted the AU and ECOWAS to fast track the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Even then, a number of factors, including disagreements between African states, and mistrust and rivalry between the AU and ECOWAS undermined the deployment and effectiveness of AFISMA and Africa’s engagement in Mali. Concerning the eastern DRC, with the UN and sub-regional organisations assuming leadership with respect to both security and the political processes, the role played by the PSC (and the AU) was similarly insignificant. In the CAR as well, the AU was not able to take over from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and deploy forces in good time to arrest the rampage of Séléka rebels and the sectarian violence that erupted in the country. That the situations in Mali and the CAR manifested a failure of African leadership became apparent when both brought about the deployment of French forces, a clear indication that African states still lack the capacity and resolve to be in charge of Africa’s peace and security.

While there were major failures, the PSC’s engagements were not all without a positive outcome. The most notable success in 2013 was the progress registered in Madagascar, which explains the improvement in the peace and security outlook of the Southern African region compared to that of 2012. The AU-led Central African operation against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) also registered encouraging military gains. AU and regional actions prompted by the PSC also contributed to helping Sudan and South Sudan to overcome disagreements that threatened some of the progress made following the signing of the September 2012 agreements on post-secession issues.
A number of issues are brought to the fore as regards the peace and security challenges experienced in 2013, and Africa's responses to these. The experiences demand an improvement in the role played by the PSC and the regional mechanisms. First, the changing trends in Africa's peace and security situations raise questions about the need to change or adapt the methods and tools employed by the PSC and about the suitability of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in its current design to facilitate rapid deployment. Second, the increasing transnational and trans-regional nature of peace and security threats means that the responses similarly need to be transnational or trans-regional in scope.

Concerning the response of the PSC and regional actors, issues that require attention include a) the commitment, willingness and ability of AU member states to take full responsibility so as to give effect to their desire to assume leadership over and ownership of the peace and security agenda of Africa (among others, the mobilisation of resources and the articulation of a united and coherent position); b) the availability of effective political processes and national leadership; c) testing the adequacy of APSA in its current design and the tools that are commonly deployed by the PSC, including the need to shift from a ‘fire-fighting’ approach to conflict prevention, d) determining the respective roles of the AU and regional mechanisms with regard to conflict prevention, management and resolution, and e) the reality and necessity of drawing on the support of international partners.
On 25 May 2013 the AU celebrated the 50th anniversary of the founding of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), under the theme ‘Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance’. The occasion presented an opportunity to reflect on the 50-year journey of the OAU/AU. In the realm of peace and security, one of the ambitions of pan-Africanism has been to equip the continent with a mechanism for maintaining Africa’s continental stability. This is best expressed in terms of what Ali Mazrui, the renowned Kenyan political scientist, called *Pax Africana*. According to Mazuri, *Pax Africana* represents a peace ‘that is protected and maintained by Africa herself’.¹

In the 21st century, *Pax Africana* is very much associated with and is given expression through the pan-African political ideal of ‘African solutions to African problems’.² The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU represents the institutional embodiment of this ideal. Although Africa is far from achieving *Pax Africana*, with the PSC it at least has a greater chance of realising the ideal.³

While the AU takes pride in the modest achievements registered during the past half century, which include the institutionalisation of a robust peace and security regime anchored in the PSC,⁴ the continent remains faced with numerous challenges, the threat to peace and security being among the most serious of these. As expressed by the PSC, ‘Africa still faces persistent conflicts, insecurity
and instability in different regions of the continent, with the attendant humani-
tarian and socio-economic consequences.5

Indeed, the various peace and security issues that have been a feature of the
continent’s political landscape in 2013 attest to the continuing vulnerability of
African countries to conflict and other forms of insecurity. Following the success
of the Institute of Security Studies’ (ISS) first edition of the Annual Review of
the PSC 2012/2013, launched in January 2013 on the margins of the 20th ordinary
session of the AU Assembly, this second edition, offers a thorough analysis of the
African peace and security issues of significance in 2013, and lists the measures
that the PSC adopted in an effort to deal with them.

The 2013/2014 Annual Review presents data and analysis relevant to policy,
both with regard to the work of the PSC during the year and to major develop-
ments shaping the peace and security landscape of Africa in 2013. As such, it pro-
vides comprehensive information on and analysis of the decisions adopted by the
PSC in its attempt to maintain peace and security in Africa. The Annual Review
furthermore examines the year’s peace and security issues of concern and high-
lights changes and mega trends in the continent’s security situation. It also offers
insights into the PSC, the AUC, regional mechanisms and international actors
working with the PSC on areas requiring further institutional and policy refine-
ment and change. In addition, an overview is provided of the major issues in 2014
for which members of the PSC and the AUC may possible need to be prepared.

For regional and international organisations, as well as the wider diplomatic
community, the review provides a comprehensive picture of regional and con-
tinental power dynamics that impact on decision-making where peace and se-
curity in Africa is concerned. The Annual Review also provides insight on how
to engage with and support the efforts of the PSC in order to achieve policy co-
herence and operational coordination. Valuable contributions are made on how
to improve the framework of working relationships, collaboration and coherent
decision-making between the PSC on the one hand and the AUC; regional mecha-
nisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution;6 the UN; and the
wider international community7 on the other.

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

The PSC Annual Review draws heavily from primary sources. These include
decisions of the PSC issued in the form of communiqués, as well as PSC press
statements and reports. Other such sources include the reports of the chairperson of the AU submitted to the PSC, decisions of regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and reports, statements and resolutions of the UN Security Council. In addition, the review is also based on data obtained through direct communication, such as interviews and consultations with AUC officials, member states of the PSC, and representatives of RECs and international organisations, most notably the UN. In the course of writing this review I also consulted a number of individuals from the AUC, PSC member states and the UN. Their insights and advice have been invaluable in developing the analyses contained in this publication. I am grateful to each and every one of them, but any errors remain my own.

An effort was also made to enrich the Annual Review with inputs from the other PSC stakeholders. This was done by means of a seminar held on 29 November 2013 in which the preliminary findings of the research for this Annual Review were shared with all stakeholders. Furthermore, use was made of secondary sources, including published scholarly articles, media reports and opinion pieces.

A combination of both quantitative and qualitative assessment is used to examine the PSC’s efforts to deal with the continent’s major peace and security issues of 2013. The quantitative assessment covers a statistical analysis of the number of meetings held, the number of decisions taken and the number of peacemaking and conflict management initiatives launched by the PSC. The qualitative review involves an analysis of the nature of the measures adopted by the PSC, the processes and political dynamics that shaped the measures adopted, and the chance of progress or success that such measures appear to be having.

OUTLINE OF THE ANNUAL REVIEW

Together with this chapter consisting of the executive summary and this introduction, the Annual Review has seven chapters. Chapter II critically examines the state of peace and security in Africa in 2013. This offers both a global picture and a regionally disaggregated analysis of the peace and security terrain of the continent. This will assist to discern changes and megatrends in Africa’s peace and security situation. Importantly, this background analysis of conflict situations in the different regions of the continent serves as an analytical framework for interrogating the work of the PSC and the outcomes thereof during 2013.
Chapter III presents an analysis of notable institutional developments, including insights into PSC membership changes, decision-making dynamics at the PSC and institutional developments in and relating to the PSC.

The response of the PSC to existing and new conflict situations is addressed in Chapter IV. This is followed in Chapter V by a brief prospective overview of the peace and security issues that may require the attention of the PSC in 2014. Finally, Chapter VI lists the conclusions that can be drawn and makes policy recommendations that are considered necessary for consolidating the effectiveness of the PSC and enhancing the quality and impact of its initiatives for maintaining peace and security in Africa.
In 2013, Africa witnessed a number of political and security events that had huge implications for the continent’s peace and security. The new offensive launched by militant Islamist groups in North Mali in January precipitated a major intervention by France, Mali’s former colonial power. While the armed rebellion by the Séléka that overthrew President Bozize culminated in the CAR’s descent into violent anarchy, the M23 rebellion in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) led the UN to authorise the deployment of an intervention brigade with an offensive mandate. Apart from the destruction and mayhem terrorist attacks continued to cause in northern Nigeria, major acts of terrorism affected Algeria and Niger in West Africa and the Sahel, and Somalia and Kenya in East Africa.

As the following pages reveal, the major peace and security issues facing Africa can be grouped into three broad areas, which are often interlinked. The first involves the insecurity and conflict associated with a fragile peace pertaining to fragile states. As the exemplified by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Guinea Bissau, societies with fragile state institutions and governance structures face various forms of instability and armed conflict, including coups, armed rebellion and
insurgency. Political crises of this nature remain a significant source of threats to peace and security.

The second major peace and security issue involves transnational threats, which often assume the form of terrorism, banditry and organised crime. They are becoming a major threat to many parts of the region. The third area covers crises induced by deficits in democratic governance and human rights protection. These mainly take the form of electoral violence, unconstitutional changes of government, and popular protests and riots. Additionally, ethno-cultural and regional disparities, not only in terms of participation in political decision-making but also in socio-economic development and access to resources, remain a major governance issue in many African societies. Apart from the unconstitutional change of government in Egypt, governance-related instabilities affect a large number of countries on the continent.

CENTRAL AFRICA

In 2013 the security environment of the Central African region worsened considerably. Key events included the overthrow of the government of President François Bozizé of the CAR by the Séléka armed rebels and the subsequent collapse of state authority in the country. While a dangerous downward spiral in the CAR’s stability was the major factor, the surge in regional insecurity was also attributable to the armed conflict in the eastern DRC and the continuing attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

Displacement and refugee numbers in the region, one of the strongest indicators of rising insecurity, increased sharply. In the CAR alone, about 1 million people fled their homes since the resumption of the Séléka rebellion on 21 March 2013 and the collapse of the state. Over 70 000 of these fled to neighbouring countries.

The Central African Republic

The collapse of the CAR is one of the major security crises to arise in Africa in 2013. While the failure of the government of President François Bozizé to implement the terms of the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2008 was the immediate cause of the recent crisis, political divisions, weak (or absent) state and security institutions, and regional politics explain the country’s persisting tribulations. Although Bozizé secured a second term in office only in 2011
through an election disputed by the opposition, his failure to make progress with respect to the Libreville peace agreement and his inability to arrest the CAR's worsening fragility precipitated the emergence of the Séléka armed rebellion late in 2012.8 On 10 December 2012, the Séléka launched an offensive and in just a few weeks swept the CAR army from many major towns and brought Séléka forces to within 40 km of the capital Bangui.9

In an effort to save his government from being overrun by the Séléka, Bozizé accepted the peace process the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS) proposed in January 2013. The new peace deal signed in Libreville on 11 January 2013 provided that President Bozizé would remain in power until the end of his term of office in 2016; that a prime minister with full executive powers would be appointed from the opposition; that a national unity government representing all armed groups and political forces would be established and assume the responsibility for preparing elections; and that political prisoners would be released.

While the agreement rescued Bozizé’s government from being swept away by the Séléka, this latest accord only marked the end of the first round of the Séléka rebellion and did not remain in effect for long. Assured of his authority under the accord, Bozizé opted to consolidate his power and fell back to his old habit of ignoring signed peace deals. In a move that angered Séléka and regional powers, he secured the deployment of additional South African troops to Bangui in January and bought military helicopters. Contrary to the Libreville accord, he also remarked at a rally in Bangui that the Séléka have to ‘beat me at the ballot box in 2016 before I leave power’.

After issuing a 72-hour ultimatum, Séléka launched a second-round of offensives on 21 March 2013. After three days of fighting Séléka seized Bangui and forced President Bozizé to flee to neighbouring Cameroon. Michel Djotodia, the leader of one of the Séléka factions, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), declared himself president of the country. While ECCAS forces present in the CAR did not act to stop Séléka, South Africa lost 13 soldiers in Séléka’s attack on Bangui, the biggest loss in South Africa’s international military operations since the end of apartheid.

Not unexpectedly, Séléka’s victory over Bozizé’s government did not usher in an era of stability for the CAR. Rather, it started a new period of insecurity characterised by the collapse of state authority and the triumph of violent armed groups, including the militia opposing the Séléka known as the ‘anti-balaka’, meaning anti-sword or anti-machete. The UN reported that Séléka forces looted and ruined most of the infrastructure supporting the justice system, including courthouses, appeal courts, court dossiers, prisons, prison registers and prosecution files; destroyed administrative files relating to birth and citizenship; and dismantled national security, including the defence forces and the police.

Despite the fact that Séléka’s leadership assumed government power, the new government lacked effective control over the various armed forces that formed Séléka and had joined its ranks as the movement marched on Bangui.
situation prompted the new president to declare the dissolution of Séléka on 13 September and call on all non-state armed forces to disarm.\textsuperscript{17} This notwithstanding, ‘Séléka continues to pillage and kill’.\textsuperscript{18}

Apart from the total breakdown of law and order in the country, there was a proliferation of arms and fighting occurred between various armed forces. Although the level and nature of insecurity remained difficult to establish, the head of the UN Office in the CAR told the UN Security Council in May that ‘indiscriminate and often targeted killings, rampant rapes and assaults on the innocent population, flagrant recruitment of children as soldiers, looting of homes, not just of the rich but even of already struggling citizens’ has become widespread.\textsuperscript{19} Fighting between Séléka and the ‘anti-balaka’ vigilante militia groups reportedly broke out in September.

The risk of further militarisation of the crisis has also increased following the emergence of other armed groups opposed to Séléka.\textsuperscript{20} On 5 May 2013, one such group known as the African Anti-jihadist Alliance (AAAJ) was formed by an ethno-regionalist and strongly anti-Islamic alliance made up of a pro-Bozizé Christian movement and rebel militias mainly from the Banda, Gbaya, Pygmie and Yakoma ethnic groups. August saw the formation of the Front for the Return of Constitutional Order in Central African Republic (FROCCA) comprising former army officers, rebels and self-help armed groups opposed to Séléka violence. The fighting that broke out in the north-west of the country in early September continued into the following months, indicating the deepening of armed violence.

The anarchy in the country involved widespread human rights violations and created one of the largest humanitarian crises in Africa during 2013. As of 17 December, there were more than 700,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in the CAR, including some 214,000 displaced in the capital Bangui in December.\textsuperscript{21} With the insecurity limiting humanitarian access, it is feared that hunger and lack of medical care has exacerbated an already dire humanitarian situation.\textsuperscript{22} In some parts of the country that were affected by the fighting that erupted in September, notably around the towns of Bossangoa and Bouca, entire villages and towns have been destroyed or been abandoned completely.\textsuperscript{23}

Increasing disaffection over the worsening insecurity in Bangui and other areas has fuelled anger against Séléka and Muslims more generally. On 13 April 2013, heavy fighting broke out in Bangui between Séléka troops and the local population when an Séléka operation to collect civilian weapons was marred by lootings, arbitrary arrests and rapes.\textsuperscript{24} The crisis also began to acquire a
new dimension, pitting Muslims against Christians with looting, destruction of property and killings reportedly perpetrated along sectarian lines.\textsuperscript{25} The UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Adam Deng, went as far as to warn that ‘If we don’t act now and decisively, I will not exclude the possibility of a genocide occurring in the Central African Republic’.\textsuperscript{26}

The crisis in the CAR also threatens regional peace and security. Apart from the pressure the spillover of the crisis may create in neighbouring countries such as Cameroon and Chad, the participation of significant numbers of fighters from Chad and Darfur in Séléka’s rebellion means that there is a high risk of cross-border trafficking and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region. The situation has also interfered with the ongoing, AU-authorised operation against the LRA, which suspended operations in the CAR in August 2013.

At least four dimensions of the crisis can be identified. The first is the breakdown of law order, the proliferation of armed groups, and the resultant human rights violations and armed fighting. The second is the dire humanitarian situation that worsened alarmingly in the months following the March coup. Third, is the issue of the establishment of a legitimate government and restoration of constitutional order. The last dimension is the destruction or collapse of state institutions and infrastructure, as well as rising polarisation of the country along regional and sectarian lines.

The eastern DRC

The civil war that broke out in the eastern DRC following the launch of an armed rebellion by the M23 in May 2012 continued to rage on for much of 2013. Although the M23 withdrew from the regional capital, Goma, after pressure from regional leaders\textsuperscript{27} at the beginning of the year, it retained much of its military bargaining power. The group also reinforced its control of a significant portion of North Kivu Province.\textsuperscript{28} However, it suffered increasing losses as the year progressed.

Intermittent fighting both between rival factions of the M23 and between the M23 and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) continued for much of the year. Early in the year, the rivalry between contending factions of M23 led by the commander, Sultani Makenga, and his rival, Bosco Ntaganda, respectively (prompted by the prospects of peace talks with the government) escalated into confrontation. On 24 February this erupted into full-scale fighting between the two.\textsuperscript{29} Ntaganda eventually fled to Rwanda on 16 March
and surrendered himself to the US Embassy, which handed him over to the International Criminal Court on 22 March. Although weakened by the fighting, Makenga stood out as the leading figure of the M23.

In response to the UN's decision to deploy an intervention force as part of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the M23 escalated its posturing. It hijacked six MONUSCO trucks and issued media statements and open letters threatening the UN and countries contributing troops to the intervention brigade. Major incidents of fighting between the M23 and the FARDC were also reported in May and July 2013. During the latter, the FARDC pushed back the M23 and gained some territory around Kibumba, north of Goma.

The first major fighting involving the UN Intervention Brigade took place in August 2013. After the M23's attacks against the FARDC and its shelling of Goma and of MONUSCO positions during the week of 20 August 2013, which resulted in the death of eight civilians and one Tanzanian soldier, FARDC launched an offensive against M23 positions on 28 August with the active backing of the Intervention Brigade. With a better organised FARDC and the critical support of the UN forces, the offensive forced the M23 to retreat.

The fighting that broke out during the last week of October ended the war between government forces and the M23, 20 months after it first broke out. This development started on 25 October. By 30 October 2013 the Congolese army, with support from MONUSCO's Intervention Brigade, had dislodged the M23 from all the major towns the group had been controlling – Kibumba, Rumangabo, Rutshuru, Kiwanja and Bunagana. After the M23 had abandoned their last positions in Runyonyi and Chanzu, the DRC government declared total victory on 4 November 2013. In a statement issued a day later, the M23 declared the end of its rebellion and brought to a close the latest round of fighting.

While the military defeat of the M23 has been attributed largely to the deployment of the UN Intervention Brigade with its robust offensive mandate and to changes in the preparation and organisation of FARDC, it is believed that Rwanda's withdrawal of its support for the M23 was also critical. During the year there have been reports that Rwanda, which, together with Uganda, had been implicated in 2012 for supporting the M23, was continuing to support the M23. In early October, the US announced that it was suspending military aid to Rwanda for its support to the M23. Rwanda categorically denied these claims. Rwanda and DRC also traded accusations. While DRC accused Rwanda of supporting the M23, in a letter addressed to the UN, Rwanda ‘alleged collusion between
the Congolese armed forces and the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR), as well as collaboration between the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade and FDLR.36

An occasion that brought the conflict in the eastern DRC closer to descending into an open regional conflict with the direct involvement of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) arose during the August fighting. When shells landed on Rwandan territory killing three civilians and wounding more than two dozen, Rwanda reported the incident to the UN and warned that it would not tolerate further attacks. At the same time, the RDF reinforced its troops along the border along the eastern DRC.37

Various armed groups operating in the region once again took advantage of the war situation in the region. The FDLR, Mayi-Mayi militias and the Forces nationales de libération (FNL) heightened their operations in the eastern DRC, perpetrating atrocities against civilians and deepening insecurity in the region. In February 2013, MONUSCO advised the UN Security Council (UNSC) about its concerns at the re-emergence of the armed groups.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Zimbabwe

As pointed out in the inaugural issue of the Annual Review, 2013 was ‘a make-or-break year in addressing the situations in Madagascar and Zimbabwe’. With respect to Zimbabwe, the Global Political Agreement of 2008 that established the Government of National Unity (GNU) was envisaged to end in 2013. The expectation was therefore that the protracted and highly contested transitional process would be brought to a close by the adoption of the constitution and the holding of general elections.

After Zimbabwe’s parliament unanimously adopted the proposed constitution on 6 February 2013, the stage was set for holding a constitutional referendum. Even though members of the GNU supported the adoption of the constitution, the run-up to the referendum was marred by acts of intimidation, and the harassment of political activists and civil society representatives. Notwithstanding this, the referendum, which took place on 16 March 2013, was conducted in a largely peaceful environment.

While the adoption of the constitution by an overwhelming majority of Zimbabweans paved the way for the holding of general elections to end the
transition period, a number of reforms that were required to create the conditions for holding free and fair elections had not been concluded. Insufficient attention had been paid to such processes as voter registration and education, and the establishment of a single and clean voters roll. Reforms regarding the regulation of the media, and security sector reform remained neglected. Despite these outstanding reform issues, the elections were finally held on 31 July 2013. Although not free from controversy, they were not marred by violence as had been the case in 2008.
The outcome delivered a decisive victory to the ZANU-PF and its leader President Robert Mugabe. The refusal of MDC-T leader Morgan Tsangarai to recognise the outcome of the elections did not go far enough in its rejection, and a court challenge of the election results was abandoned. With Southern African Development Community (SADC) and AU observers expressing satisfaction with the conduct of the election and its outcome, albeit with reservations on some issues, Zimbabwe’s transition came to an end.

Madagascar

At the end of 2012, there were two major problems to be overcome for ending Madagascar’s protracted political crisis. The first was to resolve the deadlock between the two rival political factions, one representing the incumbent, Andy Rajoelina, and the other the ousted President Marc Ravalomanana. The second was to complete the implementation of the roadmap, including the establishment of the necessary institutions. At the beginning of 2013 a breakthrough was achieved when, in accordance with a decision by SADC in December 2012, the two rivals withdrew their candidatures for the presidential elections set for May 2013.

However, another stalemate arose when on 14 April the Ravalomanana camp announced Mrs Lalao Ravalomanana, the wife of Mark Ravalomanana, as their candidate for the presidential election. In response, Mr Rajoelina now declared himself a presidential candidate once again. Curiously enough, on 3 May the list of candidates approved to stand for the election released by the Special Electoral Court (CES) of Madagascar, one of the institutions established to create the conditions for free and fair elections, included the names of both Mr Rajoelina and Mrs Ravalomanana. The resultant crisis led to the postponement of the elections set for that month.

As discussed in the following chapter, the crisis prompted the AU and SADC to initiate diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing Madagascar back on track. It was not only necessary to ensure that disqualified persons did not stand for election, but the CES, which failed to uphold the legal requirements of candidature, needed to be reconstituted. On 9 August the Malagasy Council of Ministers selected 11 new members of the CES and on 17 August the new CES removed eight illegal candidates. Four days later it announced the final 33 candidates for the first round of the presidential elections, and a day thereafter the Independent National Electoral Commission for Transition (CENI-T), another body established
for creating conditions for free and fair elections, announced the dates both for the first and second rounds of the presidential and parliamentary elections, namely 25 October and 20 December respectively.

The first round of election was held as planned. Although the leading candidates for the presidential election represented the two rival camps, this did not affect the conduct of the elections. Election observers declared the first round free and fair. Since Robinson Jean Louis, who received the most votes, did not obtain the required number of votes, a run-off election became necessary. In this, Robinson Jean Louis of the Ravalomanana camp was set to face Hery Rajaonarimampianina of Rajoelina’s party. Given that the run-off poll was to take place simultaneously with the legislative elections, the electioneering efforts of the parties were divided, which may have helped to lower the level of fierce contestation over the presidential election.

The run-off took place as planned on 20 December 2013. Given the tight outcome, it was not unexpected for the losing party to cry foul. Indeed, following the CENI-T’s announcement that Rajaonarimampianina won 53.5 per cent of the vote, Jean Louis called for recount of the votes and filled almost 300 complaints to the CES, despite the fact that most observers declared the election to be free and fair. On 19 January the CES announced its ruling upholding Rajaonarimampianina’s victory. If Jean Louis holds to his pledge of challenging the election outcome through legal channels without resorting to the streets, the political crisis that has destabilised the country for the past four years will come to a close.

WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL

The insecurity that dominated the Sahel and parts of West Africa during 2012 persisted in the course of 2013. Terrorism and armed insurgency affecting Nigeria and countries of the Sahel have continued to wreak havoc in ever larger parts of the region. The crisis in Mali remains at centre of the wider crisis in the Sahel.

Mali

The multiple crises of a military coup, an armed rebellion and the proliferation of terrorist groups in the northern regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu remained unresolved at the end of 2012. After defeating the mainly separatist armed
rebellion by the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), armed Islamist groups such as the Tuareg-led Ansar al Din, Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the AQIM splinter group, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), established dominance in the three northern regions. The transition remained fragile and suspicion and tensions between communities unchecked.

At the beginning of 2013 the armed rebellion and the terrorist threat took a dangerous turn when the Islamist armed groups launched an offensive, a move that many believed was a precursor for taking over the whole of Mali. Blaming the government for failing to negotiate in good faith, Ansar Din in alignment
with AQIM broke a ceasefire signed with the interim government in December 2012 and launched an attack on 10 January and seized Konna. The threat this development posed to Bamako and other parts of southern Mali prompted the president of the interim government to ask France for help. France, which was prepared for a possible engagement to arrest the expansion of terrorist armed groups, responded by launching a military intervention dubbed ‘Operation Serval’ on 11 January. France was backed by strong Chadian forces deployed on 17 January in accordance with the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).

Initially Operation Serval was limited to air strikes by Special Forces air units. For three days airstrikes were launched at many northern territories, including Konna, Lere, Douentza, Agharous Kayoune and Gao. French ground forces, backed by Malian and AFISMA forces, then deployed into the northern territories to chase out the Islamists. They seized the two major northern regions of Timbuktu and Gao within three weeks. After taking control of Kidal, the other northern city, on 28 January, the Tuareg MNLA (with tacit approval by France) declared its opposition to the redeployment of Malian defence and security forces in Kidal under the pretext of having to guard against reprisal attacks against the Tuareg. In a more important move, the French and Chadian forces ‘managed to clean out the rebel stronghold in the Adrar des Ifoghas region, north of Kidal, where the rebels had spent the last decade building up secret camps.’

While the high-profile military campaign of the French and Chadian forces succeeded in averting the threat against Bamako and created the possibility of the Mali government restoring control over its northern territories, it did not crush the militant forces completely. Many were pushed into border territories and neighbouring countries. In one major incident on 16 January 2013, AQIM attacked and staged a siege against the Amenas gas site in south-western Algeria in which 800 people were taken hostage. Others ‘assimilated’ with local populations in the region. Needless to say, the military campaign has not dealt with the political/institutional and socio-economic issues that various armed groups take advantage of to orchestrate their operations in northern Mali. In fact, in the short term it created the space for opportunistic attacks against people in the region and compounded the issues.

With the military campaign enabling the Malian army to return to most parts of the north, the inter-ethnic and inter-regional polarisation that the crisis in northern Mali created increased sharply. Apart from prompting civilians to flee
from their homes into safe zones and to refugee camps in neighbouring countries, a number of reports also established that Malian forces undertook retaliatory attacks against the Tuareg and Arab communities for their alleged ‘support’ of the armed rebellion.\textsuperscript{45} Violations included arbitrary arrest, torture, summary execution and disappearances.

Not unexpectedly, when their fierce resistance to the French-led military campaign failed, the armed groups involved changed their tactics by resorting to asymmetric warfare. Soon after they lost the territories under their control they started using terror tactics such as suicide and roadside bombings, guerrilla attacks and the abduction of foreigners. On 8 and 10 February suicide bombings targeted Malian forces in Gao. On 21 February a car bomb exploded near a French military camp in Kidal. On 30 March an army checkpoint was attacked with a suicide bomb. A similar attack on 12 April in Kidal killed 3 Chadian soldiers. On 24 April a roadside bomb killed a French soldier and another died on 28 May during an assault on a convoy in Kidal. Chadian forces suffered the most casualties with nearly 30 soldiers killed.

There has also been low-level sporadic fighting involving Islamist armed groups, the MNLA, Malian and French Forces. Incidents include fighting between Malian forces and the MNLA over Kidal and surrounding territories. As the Arab Movement of Azwad (MAA) gained government support, tension and fighting between the Tuareg and Arab communities in northern Mali have escalated. Clashes between Tuareg and Arab communities were reported in Ber (60 km from Gao) and Anefis (90 km from Kidal). The mistrust and antagonism between the Tuareg and other northern communities has worsened as the MNLA is stigmatised for creating the conditions that allowed Islamist militants to perpetrate violence against the people of the region.\textsuperscript{46}

Apart from changing the balance of power in favour of Bamako, the French intervention also changed the politics in Northern Mali.\textsuperscript{47} It created an opportunity for the MNLA to reassert its power in the region, as demonstrated by its control of Kidal, and hence gain a basis for bargaining. Significantly, it induced a proliferation and a restructuring of Tuareg armed groups.\textsuperscript{48} While the military campaign was underway, Algabass Ag Intallah announced the creation of the Islamic Movement for Azawad on 24 January 2013, an opportunistic move manifesting an act of jumping from ‘the sinking ship of Ansar Dine’.\textsuperscript{49} On 19 May, Mohamed Ag Intalla, the elder brother of Algabass and son of the Ifogha Amenokal, a traditional leader of the most powerful Tuareg community, announced the establishment
of the Higher Council for Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and its merger with the Azawad Islamic Movement (Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad, or MIA). On 17 September, the MAA, the HCUA, the Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Forces and Movements (CM-FPR) and the MNLA agreed to collaborate.

On the political front, the gains achieved following the successful conclusion of the elections remain fragile. Divisions remain on how to tackle major outstanding issues ranging from national reconciliation and full restoration of the authorities of the state to the reforming Mali’s armed and security establishments. Many people in Bamako and generally in the south of the country remain strongly opposed to any concessions to the Tuareg rebellion. The unravelling of the June 2013 agreement created an additional threat to the tenuous security situation in northern Mali, with tension and fighting between the MNLA and Malian forces increasing.

While the French intervention dented the activism of the pro-coup forces in government, they continued to exert influence. The divisions in the army between those allied with the coup leaders – the Green Berets – and those opposed to the coup, represented by the Red Berets of the 33rd Paratroop Regiment, who also served as the presidential guard, has persisted. On 8 February a gun fighting erupted in central Bamako as soldiers attacked a camp of elite paratroopers loyal to ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré. On 14 August, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, leader of the March 2012 coup, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. He was also put in charge of a committee established to oversee the reform of the army. In the meantime, infighting emerged within Captain Sanogo’s camp by soldiers demanding promotion and the payment of allowances promised to them by Sanogo. The tension escalated in late September as ex-junta staged a mutiny in Kati, which forced the army to intervene.

**Guinea-Bissau**

Despite some progress, no breakthrough was registered in 2013 to end the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau and restore constitutional order in the country. For much of 2012, very limited progress was made because of the inability of the various political forces in the country to agree on an inclusive transitional process. Although a political transition pact and a political agreement were signed by the military junta and 17 political parties on 16 and 18 May 2012 respectively, the major opposition party, Partido Africano da Independência da
Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which dominates parliament, and four other parties opposed the pact and the agreement. The situation deteriorated further when an attempted coup was reported at the Bissalanca air force base in Bissau.

One of the major positive developments in 2013 was the decision by the PAIGC on 17 January to join the political transition pact and the political agreement signed in May 2012. This was expected to facilitate the parliamentary review of both documents, as well as the drafting of a new transitional regime pact. It was also expected to promote consensus on a roadmap that would clarify the modalities of the transition, including its duration and the timeline for elections and the voter registration system.

Nevertheless, rivalry and divisions between the transitional government and the parliament, as well as between the PAIGC and the military-backed Party for Social Renewal frustrated the adoption and implementation of a transitional roadmap. While in February 2013 the Speaker of Parliament suggested that a vote of no confidence should be held on the transitional government, in March the transitional president expressed frustration with the divisions and rivalry between competing political parties and threatened to resign if disagreements over the transition persisted.

Following the submission of a draft regime pact by the parliamentary commission established to review the political transition pact and the political agreement in March 2013, in an extraordinary meeting held from 27 to 29 May 2013 the national assembly adopted a Transitional Pact and Political Agreement, a Transition Roadmap and an Agreement on Principles for the Restoration of Constitutional Normality. The new Transitional Pact and Political Agreement provided for amnesty to be granted for those involved in the April 2012 coup, and for the establishment of a consultative council as a forum for dialogue by the signatories of the pact and agreement.

A bill granting amnesty to the perpetrators of the April 2012 coup was tabled in parliament but failed to receive the 51 votes required for approval and was thus rejected. Progress was registered with the formation of a more inclusive transitional government in June 2013 and the appointment of Rui Duarte de Barros as the prime minister. However, in the process of constituting the new leadership of the National Electoral Commission and issuing a decree setting 24 November for presidential and legislative elections, technical issues relating to voter registration and political problems characterised by the transitional president as
promoting the ‘vested interests’ of some government members obstructed the conduct of elections in November.

Another issue that continues to be a problem is the lack of civilian control and oversight over the defence and security forces. Ongoing attempts by some politicians to manipulate the military for sectarian benefit are another factor that continues to hamper the effective functioning of state institutions and the transitional process. The country witnessed perpetration of politically motivated human rights violations, including assassinations, beatings and abductions.

Elections, which are seen as a prerequisite for a return to constitutional order were postponed a number of times in 2013. Initially, elections were scheduled to take place in April. Because of continuing disagreement over the transition, these were later postponed to November. As this timeline also passed and the elections were rescheduled for 16 March 2014, the transitional period, scheduled to end on 31 December, was also extended.

Amid the persisting political turmoil, Guinea-Bissau’s economy experienced serious deterioration. The growth rate was estimated to have declined from 5.3 per cent in 2011 to a negative 1.5 per cent in 2012. With the transitional government facing a huge budget deficit, in part because of the suspension of international support since the coup, it is being kept afloat by members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), notably by Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, and the West African Monetary Union.

The country has continued to be associated with drug trafficking activities in the region, earning it the status of being Africa’s narco-state. There have been reports of state officials being involved in facilitating drug trafficking. Clear evidence of this was the detention of the former Navy Chief of Staff, Bubo Na Tchuto, in the US on drug trafficking charges, and the indictment by the US on 18 April 2013 of the current Chief of General Staff, General António Indjai, for alleged trafficking.

NORTH AFRICA

Despite the fact that there had been progress in the region’s security situation during 2012 compared to the tumultuous year of 2011, many of the risks of instability created by the wave of government changes began to materialise in 2013. Transition in all three North African countries affected by popular uprisings of 2011 faltered as each suffered setbacks. Libya, Egypt and Tunisia all experienced increasing levels of political upheaval and violence during the year.
The deterioration of Libya’s political and security situation worsened throughout 2013, stoking fears that the country risks total anarchy and civil war. Violence and instability has expanded in certain parts of the country, while the level of insecurity, particularly in such areas as Tripoli and Benghazi, has deepened. The failure to re-establish state authority; the continuing control exercised by diverse and rival armed groupings; the polarisation and militarisation of politics; regional and tribal divisions; fighting, political assassinations and increasing extremism; and acts of terrorism have become the defining features of Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition.

On the security front, the various armed formations and revolutionary brigades that waged the war that toppled Gaddafi were not integrated into a unified national security architecture. Instead, the granting of official recognition to a large number of armed groups under the Transitional National Council encouraged the consolidation of these brigades, known locally as Katibas. The recognition brought many of them under the nominal authority of either the defence or interior ministries, but for most part they continued to act independently. Over the course of 2012–2013, the various armed elements evolved into different politically and ideologically oriented groupings. While only an estimated 50 000 Libyans fought in militias against Gaddafi, the number of brigades has grown and...
the country’s Warriors Affairs Commission believes that there are now 250 000 militiamen under arms.55

The government’s attempts at asserting authority over the brigades has continued to face fierce resistance owing to a lack of trust in the government, the hatred against Gaddafi-era people serving in government, and the rivalry for influence. The case of the Supreme Security Committee (SSC), one of the many militia groups the government recognised officially to become a parallel police force, is a good example of this type of resistance. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) put it, ‘[D]espite several attempts to integrate at least parts into the police force and its stated intention to dismantle the SSC by December 2012, the government encountered strong resistance, and some units continue to operate.’56

Similarly, although the General National Congress (GNC) adopted Decision 27 mandating the Ministries of Defence and the Interior to remove from the capital all ‘illegitimate armed formations’ following two days of fighting between the Zintan brigades affiliated to the Ministry of Defence and others affiliated to the SSC, on 27 July 2013 GNC President Abu Sahmain authorised a coalition of revolutionary brigades to protect Tripoli, citing the inability of the army and the police to do so.57 On 7 November, fighting erupted in Tripoli that saw the use of automatic gunfire as well as heavy weaponry, including anti-aircraft guns and rocket-propelled grenades.58 Although two days earlier Prime Minister Zeidan announced that the government would, by the end of that year, stop paying militiamen who refused to join the fledgling regular forces, such fighting and previous failures cast serious doubt on the strength of the government to enforce such decisions.59

Following the election of the GNC in November 2012, one of the major political divisions that emerged to shape Libyan politics has been between the Coalition of National Forces (CNF) and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party (JCP). While the JCP fears that anti-Islamist tribes supporting CNF are joining pro-Gaddafi forces to unseat the government, the CNF is alarmed by and opposed to the rise of Islamists. With the polarisation deepening, on 4 July 2013 the CNF took a decision ‘to suspend the participation of its members in the GNC, except for the discussion and adoption of the electoral law for the Constitution Drafting Assembly’.60 Greatly concerned about the consolidation of the Islamists’ grip on state institutions, especially after the passing of the controversial political isolation law that excludes many of the Islamists’ opponents from positions of power, the CNF demanded agreement on a future roadmap to guard against the extension of the GNC mandate beyond its term ending in February 2014.61
The political polarisation took on a military dimension as various armed groups resorted to force to influence the GNC. Threats from armed groups prompted legislatures to suspend the GNC in mid-March 2013. Perhaps the incident that best exemplifies the trend of the militarisation of politics is the siege armed groups staged at several government ministries, including those of foreign affairs, the interior and justice, on 28 April 2013. The siege, which lasted two weeks, forced the GNC to adopt the controversial Political and Administrative Isolation Law that seeks to remove Gaddafi-era officials from government and bars them from participation in public life for ten years. This law prompted the resignation of Mohammed El-Magariaf as president of the GNC and first vice-president Juma Attiga on 28 May and 16 July respectively. In a major headline incident that further elucidates the dangerous trend of political militarisation, a militia group temporarily detained prime minister Ali Zeidan, who was properly elected a year earlier by the GNC.

The situation in Libya has furthermore exhibited a trend towards political assassination, increasing extremism and acts of terrorism, with Benghazi and Tripoli being affected by such incidents in particular. In Benghazi, growing pressure against armed militias from the side of the public and government security forces precipitated a surge in violent incidents that targeted government security officials and government establishments, as well as activists. In one major incident on 8 June 2013, a clash between demonstrators opposed to armed militias and one of the Shield brigades escalated into an exchange of gun-fire in which 30 people lost their lives. The incident prompted the resignation of army chief of staff Youssef al-Mangoush.

In Tripoli, incidents of a similar nature include the storming of the Justice Ministry and Tripoli’s main Jadaida Prison on 28 March and 1 April respectively, and two days of fighting between rival brigades from 24 to 26 June in which six people died and 97 were wounded. There were also a number of attacks against embassies. On 22 April, a car bomb exploded outside the French embassy in Tripoli, injuring five people. A rocket attack targeted the UAE embassy on 25 July. An attack on the Russian embassy on 3 October killed two people and prompted the evacuation of diplomatic staff. On 11 October a car bomb struck the Swedish-Finnish consulate in Benghazi.

Yet another dimension of the dangerously escalating Libyan crisis in 2013 was the surge in regional and tribal divisions and fighting. In early March, fighting broke out between the Zwaya and Tabu tribes, but ended upon mediation and
the deployment of a government-affiliated brigade to the region. On 1 June, the Transitional Council of Barqa, which brings together pro-federalists in the east, unilaterally declared eastern Libya an autonomous federal region. This was accompanied by the seizure of oil fields and the announcement of the establishment of an oil corporation and an eastern central bank. Similarly, the southwest region of Fezzan declared itself an autonomous federal province.

**EAST AFRICA AND THE HORN OF AFRICA**

Compared to the progress made in 2012, there was no notable improvement in the peace and security condition of this region in 2013. Despite the promising improvements registered by Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan in 2012, these three states experienced setbacks. While Al Shabaab showed increasing dynamism and sophistication in undertaking attacks, despite its declining popular standing, and the momentum in stabilising Somalia slowed down, implementation of the agreements signed between Sudan and South Sudan proved difficult and tension over borders, security and Abyei worsened.

Although the crises in Somalia and the two Sudans continued to dominate the region’s peace and security agenda in 2013, the region also witnessed a number of developments with significant ramifications for peace and security. These include the mutiny in Eritrea early in the year, the March 2013 general elections in Kenya, rising tensions within Sudan, internal infighting in South Sudan and the regionalisation of the terrorism threat represented by Al Shabaab, as demonstrated by the Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi, Kenya.

At the end of the year, the peace and security situation of the region worsened as South Sudan descended into armed conflict on 15 December 2013.

**Somalia: Between change and continuity**

The coordinated military pressure applied by the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as well as Kenyan and Ethiopian forces, against Al Shabaab from the end of 2011 was not maintained in 2013. AMISOM’s capacity was stretched to the limit by the need to stabilise liberated areas. This placed increasing demand on its capacity, which remained limited by a lack of force enablers and multipliers, such as helicopters and maritime assets. In the context of the transition in Somalia in the past year and the apparent weakening of Al Shabaab, a tendency seems
to have crept in to discount the group’s remaining strength. With regional and international attention shifting to other problem areas, the military campaign against Al Shabaab slowed down during 2013. Indeed, following the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Hudur, the capital of Bakool province, on 17 March 2013, Al Shabaab forces regained control of the territory.
It is true that Al Shabaab had been weakened very considerably. Since 2011, Al Shabaab suffered from deep internal divisions and in-fighting pitting a Somali nationalist faction against a radical jihadi faction. Significant numbers of Al Shabaab fighters also deserted the group. Significantly, Al Shabaab’s dislodgment from the port of Kismayo dealt it a strategic blow both in terms of its capability to raise millions of dollars through port taxes and for procuring arms from the Arabia peninsula and other areas. Militarily, the capacity of the group was depleted substantially in force size and access to weaponry.

However, the slowdown in the military pressure against it gave Al Shabaab the opportunity to regroup and adapt its tactics. Internally, in June 2013, Al Shabaab undertook a massive cleansing and restructuring exercise to overcome the infighting. Ahmed Godane's more radical group defeated rival groups, amongst others by assassinating some of the rival leaders, including Omar Hammami (also known as Abu Mansur al Amriki) and Ibrahim al-Afghani. With power concentrated in the hands of Godane, the Al Shabaab now adapted its organisation and its modus operandi. This saw the consolidation of the amnayats, a special operations division, under Godane's control. Organised in small numbers with reconnaissance, bombing and suicide squads, Al Shabaab shifted to the increasing use of the hit-and-run tactics of asymmetric warfare and abandoned direct conventional fighting against AMISOM or Somali forces.

Taking advantage of the slow-down in the military campaign against it, the group increased its attacks in liberated areas, particularly in Mogadishu, where a large number of suicide attacks, assassinations and bombings were undertaken in 2013. In March 2013, a car bomb targeting senior Somali security officials exploded near the presidential palace, killing ten people. In the worst incident in Mogadishu since 2011, an attack on a courthouse on 14 April led to more than 50 civilian deaths, according to an estimate by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In another major incident, on 19 June, Al Shabaab attacked a UN compound in Mogadishu, resulting in at least 20 deaths, including five civilians, four Somali security guards, three foreign contractors, one UN international staff member and seven Al Shabaab militants.

In apparent determination to increase the regional spread of its attacks, Al Shabaab pursued a plan to expand its presence and links in the region, notably in Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. In the boldest regional attack in the history of the group, Al Shabaab elements attacked the Westgate Mall at the centre of Nairobi, Kenya, on 21 September 2013. Seventy-four people lost their lives in a siege that
lasted for four days.\textsuperscript{78} Two incidents were reported in Ethiopia in the following month with security alert in the country elevated to very high.

Progress with the establishment of the Somalia National Security Institutions (SNSI) remained dismal. According to the report of the AU-UN joint benchmarking exercise and AMISOM review, ‘the capacity of the SNA (Somali National Army) in the past two years fell short of the levels anticipated in 2010/2011’.\textsuperscript{79} Factors that have limited the building and restructuring of the SNSI include a lack of basic logistics supplies;\textsuperscript{80} command and control issues resulting from a diversity of leadership in which senior officers, clan leaders, warlords and official military commanders are involved; an inadequate number of well-trained senior officers; the absence of collaboration between various brigades; uncoordinated training; and salary issues.\textsuperscript{81}

On the political front, much of the focus has been on the leadership that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has increasingly sought to provide. The FGS initiated steps with regard to national dialogue and reconciliation, and the establishment of local administrations within the framework of the six-pillar strategy it adopted in October 2012.\textsuperscript{82} In 2013 there were two major challenges that limited progress on the political front. The first and most serious one related to the question of the form that federalism should take in Somalia, including the nature and role of government at the federal and regional-state levels. The other one concerned the achievement of a government with a cohesive leadership.

Concerning the implementation of a federal administration, disagreement emerged over the establishment of the Jubaland administration, a process that began in June 2012, prior to the establishment of the current government. A conference held in Kismayo announced the establishment of the ‘Jubbaland State’ on 15 May 2013 and elected a Raas Kamboni militia leader, Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam aka Madobe, as the president, a position that had been claimed by five other individuals. This triggered tension within Somalia and between Somalia and Kenya. The FGS rejected the process for not complying with the government’s bottom-up approach for the formation of regional states and declared the process unconstitutional.

Despite the fact that the president and prime minister of the FGS worked relatively well together in the past year, differences between the two over lack of progress in various areas has soured their relationship. While parliamentarians abandoned a motion of no confidence initiated against the prime minister in May 2013, another vote of no confidence on 2 December resulted in the prime minister
being voted out. This development, reminiscent of the divisions and infighting common during the days of the Transitional Federal Government, has raised doubts about the government’s ability to build institutions, ‘ushering Somalia into a new era of inclusive politics’.83

Sudan and South Sudan

Despite the breakthrough achieved when agreements on many of the post-secession issues separating Sudan and South Sudan were signed on the 27 September 2012, disagreements between the two countries on the implementation of key aspects of the agreements persisted into 2013. The establishment of a demilitarised border zone and the final status of Abyei remained major sticking points.

The security agreement of 2012 commits Sudan and South Sudan to the establishment of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ), but two major areas of contention have blocked progress in this regard. The first relates to the inclusion of the territory known as the 14 Mile area, one of five disputed territories along the Sudan-South Sudan border.84 Despite the fact that the agreement stipulates that the establishment of the SDBZ does not affect the status of the border between the two countries, the inclusion of this particular area has faced fierce resistance in South Sudan. People in the area are concerned that the establishment of the SDBZ would force the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to withdraw from the area and make it vulnerable.85 The second area of contention is the determination of the centre-line of the SDBZ. Since the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) map does not indicate a centre-line for the SDBZ, from which the 10 km extent of the demilitarised zone can be measured, it has made it easy for the two sides to counter allegations of violations of the SDBZ.86

The border between the two countries has remained tense and witnessed sporadic clashes. Incidents of skirmishes and bombing have been reported from early in the year. On 14 February, South Sudan accused Sudan of bombing the disputed area of Jaw on the border of Unity State, an allegation confirmed by the UN Special Representative to South Sudan. Jaw is one of the most important SPLA military bases on the Unity-South Kordofan border. On 3 July, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) conducted an aerial bombardment of and the SAF’s 17th division launched ground assaults on SPLA positions around Jebel Megeinis, one of the five disputed border areas on the Upper Nile-White Nile border. On 5 August, there were further clashes on the Unity State border when SPLA troops encountered
SAF soldiers within the SDBZ around Tishwin. On 7 September, the SAF again bombed SPLA positions around Jaw.

Implementation of the September 2012 agreements was also made difficult by continuing allegations that South Sudan was failing to suspend its support to rebel groups fighting against Sudan. Following attacks by the Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF), the coalition of Sudanese armed opposition groups formed in 2011, on the towns of Abu Karshola and Um Ruwaba, which the SRF captured temporarily, President Bashir of Sudan announced on 19 May it was his government’s intention to shut down the oil pipeline to Port Sudan. He alleged that the SRF attacks were only made possible by South Sudan's continued support for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North) and the SRF. On 8 June he announced that the decision would take immediate effect, which, if implemented, could have led to the shutting down of the pipeline at the end of a two-month period.

The situation in Abyei has remained a bone of contention between the two sides. The lack of progress in settling the dispute over Abyei has increased tension in the region, with some incidents of violence being registered. The major one was on 4 May 2013 when armed Misseriya ambushed the convoy of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee being escorted by UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) peacekeepers. After many hours of standoff, Kuol Deng Kuol, the Ngok-Dinka paramount chief in Abyei, was killed sparking major tension. In addition, one UNISFA peacekeeper died and three others were injured.

No progress has also been made on the final status of Abyei. On 21 September 2012 AUHIP had proposed that the final status of Abyei be determined by a referendum among members of the Ngok Dinka and ‘other Sudanese residents having a permanent abode within the Abyei area’. Despite the fact that the proposal was endorsed by the AU PSC as ‘a fair, equitable and workable solution to the dispute between the two countries’ and a referendum was proposed for October 2013, Sudan continued to object to the proposal and the referendum did not take place.

In a move displaying the deep frustration of the Ngok Dinka community and the lack of control by Juba over the issue, a unilateral three-day referendum was held by the community on 27 October. In the vote that saw the participation of 64,433 of the 64,775 people registered to vote, 99 per cent voted in favour of Abyei joining South Sudan. The initiative received no support, not even from South Sudan. Instead, it garnered strong criticisms from all sides and the Misseriya threatened to undertake a counter referendum. The stalemate over Abyei was
unresolved by the end of 2013. With no movement on the AU proposal, there is little prospect in the short term for peacefully overcoming the stalemate.

Both Sudan and South Sudan also continue to face armed rebellions and internal instability. Although South Sudanese insurgencies have decreased further during 2013, David Yau Yau’s rebellion has not abated. On 26 and 27 January the SPLA clashed with former Yau Yau rebels in Pibor town, Jonglei state, displacing thousands, and another attack on 8 February resulted in the death of 100 and the abduction of an unknown number of people. Repeated clashes were reported between the SPLA and Yau Yau forces in Jonglei – on 25 and 26 March the army suffered over 100 casualties in a clash near Kalbat and in Akelo. Similarly, on 30 April one SPLA soldier and three rebels were killed in attack on Pibor town.

Fighting continued into the following months, resulting in significant displacement and refugee flows into neighbouring countries. In Jonglei, the inter-communal conflict involving the Lou Nuer and Murle continued during 2013 as well. The armed rebellion by Yau Yau forces showed convergence with the inter-communal fighting. In early July, fighting between Lou Nuer and Murle left scores dead and hundreds injured.

As attention started to shift from South Sudan’s relations with Sudan to its domestic politics, a power struggle within the SPLM also began to surface. This struggle came to the open when former Vice-President Riek Machar, who fought on the side of Khartoum against Garang following the 1991 split of the SPLM, declared his intentions to challenge President Kiir for the leadership of the SPLM. The tensions culminated in President Kiir dismissing his vice-president and the entire cabinet on 23 July 2013. Not unexpectedly, this further escalated the crisis in the SPLM. On 15 December 2013, major gun battles and exchanges of fire were reported in the capital Juba near the headquarters of the SPLA. This forced more than 100 people to seek refuge in the compounds of the UN Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS). The following day, President Kiir announced at a press conference that his government had foiled an attempted coup, which he said had started following attacks on the army headquarters by ‘a group of soldiers allied to the former Vice-President Dr Riek Machar and his group’.

This turn of events has put South Sudan on a very dangerous path since this is not simply a power struggle between political elites. Given that President Kiir and Dr Machar represent the two major ethnic groups of the Dinka and the Nuer respectively, this crisis easily reignited communal tension and conflict along ethnic lines. Additionally, the history of the SPLM shows that political fallout
often culminates in an insurgency or armed rebellion. Machar refused to end the matter without a fight and resorted to armed rebellion. He followed the path of other disgruntled figures such as Gorge Athor and used his and his co-accused senior SPLM/A officials’ not-so-insignificant following in the army.

In the following weeks, the situation evolved into an armed conflict that affected three of the country’s ten states. As rebel forces seized control of parts of Jonglei and all of the oil-rich Unity state, as well as parts of Upper Nile, these territories saw major fighting as government forces sought to retake the territories. The conflict spilled over to community level. In Juba, forces targeted members of the Nuer ethnic group, while Nuer militiamen targeted the Dinka in Jonglei.

The speedy descent of the country into conflict led to a high number of displacements. Some 80 000 civilians are now crowded into five UN bases, including more than 20 000 at two bases in Juba. An attack by Nuer militias on the UN base in Akobo in Jonglei state on 19 December led to the death of more than two dozen Southern Sudanese and two UN peacekeepers. According to the UN, while more than 1 000 people have lost their lives, more than 180 000 people have been displaced.

In 2013, Sudan continues to fight armed rebellion on two fronts: in Darfur and in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Since not all armed groups are involved in the Doha peace process for Darfur, armed rebellion in that region has not ended. Darfur-based members of the SRF, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army factions of Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), continue to fight against the government in Khartoum. This and a surge in inter-communal conflict has affected various areas of the region. On 22 May 2013 the UN’s Humanitarian Chief, Valerie Amos, reported that some 300 000 people had fled their homes in Darfur since the start of the year because of the upsurge in fighting.

The major civil war in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in the southern part of Sudan continued between the Sudan People Liberation Movement – North SPLM-N and the SAF. From 14 to 17 February 2013 heavy fighting occurred in the Muffa area of Blue Nile, with the SPLM-N alleging that the SAF had targeted civilians through air and ground operations. Sudan claimed that 66 SPLM-N troops were killed in the fighting, while the SPLM-N alleged that it had killed 86 SAF troops. The SPLM-N has also claimed that the fighting displaced 8 000 civilians. In response to alleged aerial bombings by Sudan, the SPLM-N shelled Kadugli on 12 April, killing three people and wounding ten. The SAF has continued its counter insurgency operation, including aerial bombings, in these states.
Political tension has also been deepening in Khartoum. While the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has experienced infighting and instability, opposition against the government has been mounting. On 6 January 2013 various opposition groups signed a major political document known as the New Dawn Charter in the Ugandan capital, Kampala. The Charter, which provides for the establishment of a secular Sudanese state, calls on parties to work together to topple the regime through either ‘democratic civil peaceful means’ or ‘revolutionary armed struggle’. The government reacted by launching a crackdown on the opposition. At the end of September 2013, opposition to the government’s decision to cut fuel subsidies erupted into large protests with thousands marching in Khartoum and other cities throughout the country. As the protests persisted into the following month, they took on a political dimension involving calls for change of government.

With the government responding heavy-handedly, the protests turned deadly with casualty figures varying from over 60 according to official sources to about 200 according to some human rights organisations. The situation exacerbated opposition within the NCP against the leadership. More than 30 of its top members, including the former parliamentary caucus head, Ghazi Salah Al-Deen Al-Attabani, presented a memo to President Bashir in September in which they criticised the government’s decision to remove subsidies on fuel and other basic commodities, saying it impacted ‘harshly’ on Sudanese citizens. The memorandum also chided ‘the government for its excessive use of force against protesters’.96

In an attempt to stem opposition and consolidate the NCP and its grip on power, President Bashir introduced a major cabinet reshuffle on 8 December 2013.97 It saw the replacement of First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, who preempted the reshuffle by tendering his resignation, and the departure of Nafie Ali Nafie, who was the vice-chairman of the NCP and President Bashir’s assistant. However, as significant as it was, it is far from certain that the reshuffle will be enough to satisfy demands for major reforms in the country.

AFRICA’S PEACE AND SECURITY BALANCE SHEET IN 2013

The foregoing analysis of the major peace and security developments of 2013 can be summarised in two ways. The first is by discerning the major trends and
changes in threats to peace and security in Africa. The second is by distilling the peace and security outlook of 2013 through a comparative assessment of how the different regions fared.

Trends and changes in threats to peace and security in Africa

Whether in DRC, Mali or the CAR, many of the countries that slipped back to conflict did so because of an unravelling of existing peace agreements in a context of national and regional power struggle. All the states involved are ‘characterised by weak and incompetent institutions, which consequently suffered from an inability to control their own territory and populations’.98 As the events in Mali, the eastern DRC and the CAR showed, without external support state authorities are not in a position to repel attacks by insurgents, terrorist groups or armed rebels.

Despite hopes for increasing stability, Africa continues to face serious and changing threats to peace and security. While armed rebellion and internal conflicts remain the major sources of threats, many parts of the continent, particularly in West Africa and the Sahel, North Africa and East Africa, continue to face increasing levels of terrorism, organised crime and a proliferation of arms. The peace and security landscape of the continent is also increasingly being shaped by governance-related crises, including unconstitutional changes of government.

Many of these threats are not new, but they indicate changes in their manifestation and scale. One of the areas of change pertains to the nature of armed opposition groups. Unlike the case in traditional civil wars, armed opposition groups today tend to be poorly organised and highly fragmented.99 Developments in 2013 that attest to this include the division and fighting between various factions of the M23, the diverse composition of the Séléka, and the splintering and proliferation of militant groups in Northern Mali and terrorist groups in Nigeria. In addition, many of the armed opposition groups tend to increasingly combine organised criminality, terrorism and insurgency. Many of the groups, be it Al Shabaab, Ansar Din, AQIM or even M23, have also shown a tendency to engage more in guerrilla tactics and asymmetric warfare than in conventional fighting.

Another feature of many of the threats to peace and security in Africa is that they are increasingly of a transnational as well as a transregional nature.
The crisis in Mali has affected not only countries in West Africa but also those in North Africa and the Sahel. Similarly, the instability in Libya affects and carries huge risk for the entire Sahel region, extending from West Africa to Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. The regionalisation of Al Shabaab's terrorist networks as demonstrated by the major attack the group orchestrated at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, and Boko Haram's infiltration into neighbouring countries such as Niger or Cameroon, are manifestations of the transnational and transregional character of threats to peace and security. Terrorist threats in West Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa even tend to take on global orientation and character.
These developments have important implications for the work of the AU PSC. First, the trends and changes noted above raise questions about the need to change or adapt the methods and tools employed by the Council to maintain peace and security in Africa. The AU’s increasing resort to and advocacy of offensive and counter-insurgency operations is a development of particular significance. Second, there is the question of the adequacy of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in its current design. In this regard, a major issue is the suitability of the African Standby Force (ASF) in its original design and current development to meet the increasing demand for rapid response to emergency situations.

The other, which in a way is related to the ASF, touches on the role of the regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, which have come to assume an increasing role under APSA. Here the major issue is whether the institutionalisation of APSA along distinct regional lines limits the possibility of responding effectively to the trans-regional nature of peace and security issues on the continent. The trans-regional nature of some conflict situations means that no single regional mechanism is in a position to deal with such a situation on its own. Here, the question of the role of regional mechanisms vis-à-vis that of the AU becomes paramount.

As the operation against the LRA and the Framework Agreement for DRC illustrate, peace and security issues that assume transnational or trans-regional character necessitate the employment of responses that cover all the affected or concerned countries. For example, in addition to the desirability of deploying a peacekeeping operation in Mali, there is also a necessity to pursue a Sahel-wide strategy. This illustrates the need to adjust the AU’s responses to the increasingly transnational and trans-regional character of peace and security issues in Africa.

African regional peace and security outlook in 2013

The analysis of the peace and security situations in Africa’s regions in the previous section reveals that while the security of one region improved, all other regions registered deterioration or stagnation, as represented in the map on page 35.

As can be gathered from the direction of the arrow, the region that registered progress in its peace and security outlook in 2013 compared to 2012 was southern
Africa. This was mainly the result of positive developments in two of the region’s countries with major peace and security concerns, namely Zimbabwe and Madagascar. In Zimbabwe, the peaceful conclusion of the constitutional referendum and elections brought its transition to a close, while an end to the stalemate between the rival camps and the holding of elections in Madagascar gives the country the opportunity to remove itself from four years of instability, political paralysis and regional and international isolation.

Notwithstanding the significant achievements registered in the campaign against the LRA, the central African region showed the most deterioration in its peace and security outlook in 2013. The descent of the CAR into violent anarchy and a retaliatory cycle of sectarian violence accounts for much of the decline in the peace and security outlook of the region.

Another region that witnessed a worrying decline in its peace and security condition is North Africa. Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have all experienced serious political instability, albeit to varying degrees. In Egypt, the fierce contestation between opposition groups and the newly elected government culminated in the overthrow of the government and the deepening of violent polarisation in the country. With regard to Libya, polarisation and the militarisation of politics, the increasing influence of and fighting between rival military brigades, rising extremism and acts of terrorism, widening regional divisions and a surfeit of weapons is stoking fears about the country’s descent into full anarchy and civil war. Although Tunisia’s troubles are not at the level of those in Egypt or Libya, it had its own share of political turbulence in 2013.

Concerning the existing conflicts in Somalia and the two Sudans in the East Africa and Horn of Africa region, no positive progress was recorded in 2013. If anything, the progress achieved in these countries in 2012 was not sustained. While in Somalia the momentum against Al Shabaab stagnated and the political process failed to deliver the expected level of progress, in the Sudans the agreements signed in September 2012 remain largely unimplemented. While there was a significant escalation in the regionalisation of Al Shabaab’s terrorism operations, as exemplified by the Westgate Mall attack, internal political instability in both Juba and Khartoum has compounded the insecurity in and between the two countries. The political instability and the fighting that erupted in South Sudan, if not arrested and settled peacefully, could develop into a civil war that would have devastating consequences for the tenuous security situation in the region and beyond. On the brighter side, the successful conclusion of the general elections
in Kenya that ended its volatile transition was a major positive development for the region.

Fragile and conflict zones in West Africa and the Sahel remain highly insecure. Despite security gains and progress on the political front following the holding of general elections, the situation in Mali remains worrying both on the security and political fronts. For the West Africa and Sahel region, with its highly fragile countries that are at risk of descending into instability, the major issues are the very considerable threats of a surge in terrorist attacks and an emerging convergence between organised crime and terrorist networks.
The PSC held two retreats to consider a revision of the working methods adopted in Dakar, Senegal, from 5 to 6 July 2007. During the first retreat held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, from 15 to 16 November 2012, the PSC introduced a number of revisions to its working methods. These include the role of the PSC chairperson; the organisation of the work of the PSC; the decision-making processes; the format of the outcome of meetings; follow-up on the implementation of decisions; the establishment of subsidiary bodies; the PSC’s role in the preparation of the report on its activities; the implementation of provisions of the PSC protocol relating to the PSC’s working relationship with relevant bodies, including the UN and non-African regional organisations, as well as civil society organisations; and the framework for PSC field missions.

Concerning the role of the monthly chairperson of the PSC, the Conclusions of the Yaoundé retreat provided that ‘new members should queue at the rear so as not to change the subsisting order of succession’ of the rotating PSC chair. This ended the previous practice whereby the existing line of rotation was disrupted as newly elected members were allowed to jump the queue in alphabetical order.
This had the effect of practically excluding some members of the PSC from having a chance of serving as PSC chair.\textsuperscript{101} It was also stipulated that the monthly chair should at all times be present and that the stand-in chair is the next month’s chairperson.

As pointed out in the last Annual Review\textsuperscript{102} and addressed in detail below, a great deal of emphasis in the election to PSC membership is on regional representation and rotation. The other requirements for PSC membership have generally been discounted. Implied that this can affect its effectiveness, the Conclusions stressed ‘the need for effective membership in the Council, including satisfying its obligations as elaborated in Article 5(2) of the PSC Protocol’ and ‘the need for periodic review by the Assembly of the Union with a view to assessing compliance by members of the PSC’ with those obligations.\textsuperscript{103} It remains to be seen whether the AU will muster the required consensus and will to implement this decision strictly. While this is a welcome provision, putting it into effective operation will only be realised if clear guidelines are developed that make it possible for the Assembly to make an assessment.

With regard to the organisation of its work, the Yaoundé Conclusions stated that ‘the incoming Chairperson, with the support of the PSC Committee of Experts, shall elaborate a monthly programme of work two weeks before assuming chairmanship’.\textsuperscript{104} Increasing effort was made during 2013 to give effect to this provision, with incoming chairs having consultations with regard to the timely preparation of their programme of work. A new addition introduced in Yaoundé was the establishment of an annual PSC work programme. To this end, in the Yaoundé Conclusions, the PSC ‘decided to energise the Committee of Experts to, among others, prepare its Annual Work Programme in collaboration with the Commission’.\textsuperscript{105}

By the end of November, consultations were underway to prepare the Annual Work Programme of the Council for 2014. With respect to time management, which was another issue concerning the organization of the PSC’s work, the Yaoundé Conclusions stipulated ‘the need for strict allocation of time to speakers, including ensuring that the allocated time is observed in all the meetings of the Council,’ with the chairperson of the PSC expected to exercise active control to ensure focused and substantive consideration of the issues on the agenda of the PSC.

In the application of these provisions by the AU, AU partners has experienced restriction in having access to PSC meetings. Until a consistent practice emerges in this regard, it will inevitably cause frustrations on the part of partners who, until
recently, enjoyed relatively good access to PSC consultation meetings. This has adverse consequences on the AU’s collaboration with partners such as the EU.\textsuperscript{106}

Regarding other issues concerning the organisation of the PSC’s work, the Yaoundé Conclusions specified with respect to PSC meetings that consultations are ‘restricted to Members and those specifically invited to provide briefing. Non-members are not allowed to listen to consultation’\textsuperscript{107} and that closed sessions are limited to members only, with open sessions reserved to participation.\textsuperscript{108} Furthermore, while the AUC is expected to submit documents for PSC meetings in two of the working languages of the AU (English and French) only, these should be circulated ‘within 3 working days before the meeting’.

With respect to the establishment of subsidiary bodies of the PSC, the Yaoundé Conclusions called on ‘Members, in consultation with the Commission, to immediately bring into operation the subsidiary bodies, namely the Committee of Experts, Committee on Terrorism, and Committee on Sanctions’. During 2013, some efforts were made to bring these bodies into operation with various degrees of success. Despite efforts to bring into being the Military Staff Committee (MSC), particularly during Angola’s tenure as PSC chair, no satisfactory progress has been made in this regard. While about one-third of the members of the PSC do not have defence attaches, there is lack of interest in participating in the MSC on the part of a number of defence attaches of other member states.\textsuperscript{109} A far greater interest and willingness has been displayed in bringing the Experts Committee into operation.\textsuperscript{110}

Another interesting addition to PSC working methods concerned PSC field visits. The Yaoundé Conclusions states that members agreed to ‘the need to undertake field missions, especially to the conflict areas’. It is commendable that acting on this stipulation, the PSC undertook field visits to a number of major conflict zones, notably Darfur in Sudan, Goma in the eastern DRC, Mogadishu in Somalia and Abyei in South Sudan. This is the highest number of visits undertaken by the PSC in one year. The practice facilitates the PSC’s direct engagement with affected communities and enables the council to gain first-hand understanding about the conflict situations under its agenda.

**DECISION-MAKING DYNAMICS**

As the analysis of the PSC’s responses to various peace and security issues on the continent shows, decision-making in the PSC reflects the interests and
dynamics of a number of actors with significant influence on a particular peace and security issue and on the implementation of the PSC’s decisions. The activities of the PSC in 2013 show that these actors are part of the established decision-making dynamic of the PSC, although not all have a constant role across time and issue.

At the centre of these role players are obviously the member states of the PSC and the AUC. Their role is perhaps the most consistent element of the PSC decision-making process, more or less across time and all issues. Understandably, not all member states have an equal interest and influence on all situations. ECOWAS members (particularly Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire) and Algeria were much more active with regard to Mali, while PSC members from the SADC region were more involved with the situations in Madagascar and the eastern DRC. As noted in the previous Annual Review, the AUC, on account of its institutional position, occupies a special place when it comes to shaping PSC decisions.

The next level of role players are lead neighbouring countries and the regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, which are critical to the PSC for the implementation of many of its initiatives. That the efficacy of some of the decisions of the PSC depends on the buy-in and support of these players was born out in 2013 by the reluctance of ECCAS member states to abide by the PSC’s decision to isolate the new leadership of the CAR and the inability of the PSC to force compliance with that decision. The review of the PSC’s responses in 2013 that follows in subsequent chapters shows that the role of the regional mechanisms of SADC, the ICGLR, ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) significantly shaped the PSC’s responses to the situations in Madagascar, the eastern DRC, Mali, Guinea Bissau, the CAR, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan.

Of the other actors, the UN plays the most recognised role in the PSC’s responses to various peace and security issues on the continent. This is particularly the case with respect to decisions that require political and financial support of a global nature for their effective implementation. The UN has assumed an increasing role in almost all major crises, notably in Mali, the eastern DRC, the CAR and Somalia. As such, it has had a very considerable impact on the PSC’s responses in all these situations.

As the cases in Mali, the CAR, Somalia and the AU-authorised operation against the LRA show, the EU, the US, the UK and France are also important role players. In some instances, as France’s military operations in Mali and the CAR
illustrate, these external powers substantially shape PSC responses by how their actions affect the situation on the ground.

An examination of the responses to the various peace and security situations in 2013 show, a division of labour is in the making, with each role-player increasingly being associated with a particular function. The AU/PSC is increasingly recognised for its capacity to conceptualise, plan and deploy conflict management tools that take the form of peace-support operations and peace enforcement. The lead role the AU assumed with regard to the deployment of AFISMA and the African-led Support Mission to CAR (AFISM-CAR), and its continuing role in the AMISOM illustrate its particular role in this area of peace support operations. The same is true of its role with respect to applying the norm on unconstitutional changes of government, as demonstrated by its action on Egypt.111

Regional lead countries and regional mechanisms use their political and socio-economic leverage to initiate or lead on first-instance responses. As the mediation role of ECOWAS in Mali and Guinea Bissau, ECCAS and the ICGLR in the CAR and the eastern DRC, IGAD in Somalia and the Sudans, and SADC in Madagascar indicate, regional mechanisms are also demonstrating an increasing desire and willingness to assert leading role in shaping political transitions or peace-making efforts in their regions.

The UNSC is recognised in terms of its role of providing global legitimacy through underwriting regional initiatives, in leading on political/institutional reform and peace-building activities, and in supplying mission support and technical expertise notably with regard to the planning of missions.112 Of the other actors, the EU has been the most significant, particularly in the areas of providing funding and the development of capacity to support the AU and regional mechanisms. Of other global actors, France’s deployment in both Mali and the CAR has given it the most influence in shaping regional and continental responses to these crises.

The 2013 election of the members of the PSC

The tenure of five members of the PSC (Table 1) terminated at the end of March 2013 after serving a three-year term. Article 5 of the PSC Protocol stipulates that the council’s membership is to be decided according to the principle of ‘equitable regional representation and rotation’. For their three-year term seat, each of the five regions is represented by one member.
Table 1 PSC members whose term ended in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>States whose term ends in 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The five regions were invited to submit their candidates for the five seats expected to be vacant at the end of March 2013. Table 2 shows the list of candidates that competed for the five seats. Some of the candidatures were received directly from member states rather than through the regions. Although the submission of candidature through regions is the preferred path, any state party to the PSC Protocol is entitled to submit its candidature.\(^{113}\)

Table 2 List of regional candidates for PSC membership in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Candidates for 2013 PSC election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from Eritrea, all the other candidates have served on the PSC at least once. Equatorial Guinea served once during the 2010-2013 term. Similarly, Mozambique and Uganda served the PSC once, but for a two-year term only from 2004 to 2006 and 2006 to 2008 respectively. Ethiopia and Algeria each served two consecutive terms of three years from 2004 to 2010. Nigeria has been member of the PSC since
2004 and has emerged as a de facto permanent member of the PSC on the three-year term slot for West Africa.

As the list of candidates shows, the only region that did not come to an agreement on a single candidate was East Africa. Four countries, including the incumbent, Kenya, competed for the new three-year term seat. Ethiopia withdrew from the election and Eritrea did not succeed in garnering the required support. As Kenya was campaigning for immediate re-election, Uganda ultimately received the required support to become the new member of the PSC for East Africa.

**Table 3 Members elected to serve on the PSC for the period 2013 to 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Re-elected or newly elected members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mozambique is the only country from Southern Africa that has not served on the PSC since 2006. Its emergence as the only candidate for the region accordingly represents the continuation of the region’s strict adherence to the principle of rotation. It also indicates the level of cohesion in the region and higher tendency of countries of the region to play a representative role of the region in the PSC.

The result of the election by the Executive Council of the AU revealed that while Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea were re-elected, the other three were newly elected to the PSC.

The continued re-election of Nigeria to the PSC suggests the emergence of a practice in the West Africa region of reserving the region’s three-year-term seat for Nigeria. Although each region is given discretion to determine the modalities for the selection of candidates, the emergence of a country within a region as a permanent member obviously goes against the requirement of rotating membership of the PSC.
Algeria only had a three-year break when it resumed its seat on the PSC in April 2013. This reflects a limited rotation of seats among countries of the North African region. The successful return of Uganda to the PSC to occupy the seat formerly held by Kenya makes it the third country in the East Africa region to hold the three-year term seat.

Clearly, there are variations between the different regions on their adherence to the principle of rotation. Although the principle of regional representation is fully observed in the technical sense, practice shows that the extent to which members of the PSC represent the views of their respective regions varies from region to region. Actual regional representation is more evident on the part of members coming from Southern Africa than from West Africa. Commitment to the regional representation by other PSC members seems to be weak in general, although there have been instances, such as in East Africa, where individual states were willing to play a representational role.

Apart from regional representation and rotation, the PSC Protocol and the modalities for the election of members of the PSC lay down additional election criteria. These include a commitment to uphold the principles of the Union; contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa; provision of capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership; respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights; and the availability of a sufficiently staffed and equipped Permanent Mission at the AU Head Quarters (HQ) and the UN.

An analysis of the PSC membership process shows that in practice the requirements of a good record in human rights, good governance, the capacity to shoulder responsibilities and the contribution to efforts for peace and security, are secondary considerations to regional representation and rotation. The current membership of the PSC (see Table 4) indicates that the secondary criteria for PSC membership are not complied with strictly. Not all of the current members of the PSC respect constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights. Indeed, in March 2012, Mali, which was then a member of the PSC, experienced a military coup while the PSC was holding a ministerial-level meeting in the capital, Bamako. Similarly, not all current members of the PSC contribute to the promotion of peace and security, or possess the capacity to assume substantive responsibilities for regional and continental peace-making and conflict resolution efforts.
Table 4 Membership of the PSC as of 1 April 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Uganda, Djibouti, Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Algeria, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the PSC’s determination that the overthrow of the government of former President Morsi was unconstitutional, Egypt was suspended from participating in AU affairs on 5 July 2013. The PSC thus conducted its activities for the rest of the year with the remaining 14 members.

Of the 54 AU member states, 52 have signed the PSC Protocol, while 47 have signed and ratified it. As at May 2013, Cape Verde and South Sudan had not signed the protocol, while the CAR, the DRC, Liberia, Seychelles and Somalia had not ratified it. Of the 47 states party to the PSC Protocol, the number of states that have so far served on the PSC is 37.
The PSC in 2013

One of the features of the PSC is that it operates on the basis of the principle of collaborative security. This is clearly articulated in the various provisions of the PSC Protocol that call on the PSC to work in collaboration with both African regional bodies and global actors, notably the UN. As such, the PSC ordinarily takes actions in concert with or through other actors having related responsibility on any situation of concern for the PSC. The analysis in this section interrogates the measures taken by the PSC by contrasting and synthesising these with the initiatives by African regional bodies and relevant global actors.

PSC AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: RECLAIMING ITS ROLE?

In 2012, the PSC did not deal with any Southern African peace and security issues, not even that of Madagascar, which was suspended for an unconstitutional change of government in 2009. Such total disengagement has invited the question whether it manifested a case of total delegation of authority to SADC, or the abdication of its responsibility. However, in 2013 the PSC dedicated a number of sessions to Southern Africa, specifically to the crisis in Madagascar.
Situation in Madagascar

At the extra-ordinary summit held in Dar-es-Salaam on 7 and 8 December 2012, SADC took the position that ‘Mr Marc Ravalomanana and Mr Andry Rajoelina should be persuaded not to stand for election’. SADC adopted this measure after two rounds of direct talks between the two had failed to bear fruit and it became clear that the rivalry between them was ‘a stumbling block’ to returning the country to constitutional order. The ousted president was the first to respond positively to SADC’s decision by announcing the withdrawal of his candidature on 10 December 2012. Mr Rajoelina followed suit on 15 January 2013.

While SADC continued with its mediation role, others, the AU in particular, stepped up their effort for resolving the crisis in Madagascar. After having left the Madagascar issue to SADC for the whole of 2012, the PSC brought the item back for consideration at its 355th meeting of 13 February 2013. In the communiqué it adopted at that meeting, the PSC welcomed ‘the renunciation by Mr Andry Rajoelina and Mr Marc Ravalomanana of their respective candidatures for the forthcoming presidential election’, and called on all Malagasy political parties ‘to implement fully the Roadmap for the country as the only viable mechanism to put an end to the crisis in the country’.

While the willingness of the two rival political leaders to renounce their candidature was a major breakthrough in the effort to return the country to constitutional order, the renunciation proved to be precarious. This became clear when the Ravalomanana camp on 14 April announced its decision of have Mrs Lalao Ravalomanana, the spouse of Mr Ravalomanana, to be its candidate for the presidential election. This prompted Mr Rajoelina to renounce his earlier decision and present himself as a presidential candidate. In addition, Didier Ratsiraka, a former president, and 40 others applied for candidature. Curiously, despite the fact that Mrs Ravalomanana and Mr Ratsiraka did not comply with an electoral law requirement of a minimum of six months of residence in the country before the elections, and that Mr Rajoelina submitted his application for candidature after the deadline, the CES, which had been established under the September 2011 Roadmap, included their names in the list of 33 presidential candidates announced on 3 May 2013.

As this development constituted a reversal of the progress registered at the beginning of the year, it attracted strong opposition from both SADC and the AU. In the communiqué of the Summit of the SADC Troika of the Organ on Politics,
Defence and Security Cooperation of 10 May 2013, SADC expressed grave concern about the Special Electoral Court’s decision and ‘urged Andry Rajoelina, former President Didier Ratsiraka and Madam Lalao Ravalomanana to consider withdrawing their candidatures to ensure peaceful conduct of elections and stability in Madagascar’. Similarly, the PSC expressed its deep concern ‘on the decision of the Special Electoral Court (CES) of Madagascar to validate the illegitimate candidatures’ and decided ‘that the AU will not recognise the Malagasy authorities that would be elected in violation of the relevant AU and SADC decisions’.

In an attempt to rectify this development, the AU initiated further steps. On 26 June 2013, the AUC convened the 7th meeting of the International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M). This body had not convened since December 2011, possibly because of the divergent views held by some members, of whom, e.g. France and the US, had a significant influence on the situation in Madagascar. The meeting was convened in an attempt to leverage regional and continental efforts by tapping into the influence of international partners and establishing a solid consensus. Indeed, the key resolutions taken by the ICG-M included that the CES should be reconstituted and the election set for 24 July 2013 should be rescheduled. A decision was also taken not to recognise the Malagasy authorities elected in violation of the relevant decisions of both the AU and SADC.

Apart from the representation of the AU in some of the meetings of SADC, SADC has presented its views at all PSC meetings on Madagascar either through its mediator for Madagascar, former President Joaquim Chissano, or the representative of SADC’s chairperson. SADC and the AU also launched a joint mission in pursuit of both their respective decisions and the outcome of the 7th ICG-M meeting. The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Lamamra, together with President Joaquim Chissano led a delegation of the ICG-M to Madagascar from 9 to 13 July 2013 and presented the proposals for putting the transition back on track. Both representatives visited Madagascar again on 1 and 2 August 2013.

These efforts were not without results. On 9 August 2013, the Malagasy Council of Ministers issued a list of 11 new members of the CES. It also approved a draft Ordinance revising some of the provisions of Organic Law No. 2012-015 of 1 August 2012. This vested the CES with the authority to revise the list of candidates in accordance with the applicable electoral laws. As a result, the newly constituted CES removed eight candidates on the basis of insufficient qualification from the list of candidates for the presidential election on 17 August 2013, and
issued a final list of 33 legally eligible candidates on 21 August 2013.\textsuperscript{130} This paved the way for the Independent National Electoral Commission for Transition (CENIT), which was supported by the UN, to adopt a revised calendar for the election. The first round would take place on 25 October and the runoff in combination with the legislative elections on 20 December 2013.

In light of these developments, the PSC at its 394\textsuperscript{th} session of 5 September decided to lift the sanctions imposed on 109 Malagasy political personalities.\textsuperscript{131} As to the country’s participation in AU activities, however, the council decided to wait until after the runoff presidential election had been held and the new president had assumed office.\textsuperscript{132}

The first round of elections took place as scheduled on 25 October, and regional and international observers declared them to be free and fair. Robinson Jean Luis of the Ravalomanana camp won 21.1 per cent of the votes against the 15.93 per cent of Hery Rajaonarimampianina of the Rajoelina camp. These two candidates participated in the runoff on 20 December 2013.\textsuperscript{133}

The progress achieved during the year culminating in the holding of the general elections in Madagascar attests to the fact that bringing the leverage of all significant actors to bear on the effort to end a protracted political crisis has been crucial. It illustrated that concerted effort of African actors that leverages on and mobilizes coherent international support is key to a successful African-led effort to secure peace. In this regard, the PSC’s reengagement, the reactivation of the ICG-M and the high level AU-SADC joint diplomatic missions to Madagascar were of particular importance. Additionally, the funding that the EU made available for holding the elections and the technical support of the UN in elaborating the electoral timetable provided key operational support for the process. It is believed that the change of leadership in France disposed the country to back the mediation process,\textsuperscript{134} and that this was key for the firm international support of the AU-SADC mediation, and indeed for reactivation of the ICG-M.

PSC AND CENTRAL AFRICA

Situation in the CAR

When the Séléka rebellion broke out first in December 2012, the response of the AU did not go far beyond condemning the rebellion. With respect to resolving the crisis, the AU initially seemed content with ECCAS playing the lead role.
In one of its communiqués, the AU accordingly encouraged ECCAS member states to assist the CAR in overcoming the crisis.\(^{135}\) Betraying the inadequacy of its operation known with by its French acronym MICOPAX (Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR), ECCAS countries deployed additional troops (mostly from Chad) to the CAR at the end of December 2012, increasing the size of MICOPAX to 700 troops.\(^ {136}\) Additionally, ECCAS also mediated, after three days of peace talks that ECCAS mediated in Gabon’s capital, Libreville, Gabon, by the end of which on 11 January 2013 the Séléka coalition of rebel groups and the government of President Bozize signed a ceasefire and a political agreement on 11 January 2013.

The PSC considered the situation in the CAR at its 350th meeting three days later. In its subsequent communiqué it not only commended ECCAS and emphasised the need for implementing the new agreement, but also ‘requested the chairperson of the Commission to submit to it, as soon as possible, a comprehensive report on the situation in the CAR on the role of the AU in the implementation and follow-up of the agreements reached by the CAR parties’. By the time the second round of the Séléka rebellion broke out on 21 March 2013, no such report had been submitted, nor had a mechanism been put into place for any AU follow-up on the implementation of the January accord.

On 23 March, at its 362nd meeting, the PSC strongly condemned the resumption of conflict, reminded the parties of their obligations to uphold human rights and humanitarian law and decided ‘to impose sanctions [including a] travel ban and asset freeze against those CAR political and military actors involved in acts to undermine the Libreville Agreements and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights’.\(^ {137}\)

After the Séléka rebels took control of the capital, Bangui, the PSC at its 363rd meeting decided ‘to immediately suspend the participation of the CAR in all AU activities’, as well as to impose sanctions, including travel bans and an asset freeze, on leaders of the Séléka group. It urged AU member states and its partners to ‘completely isolate’ the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change of government in the CAR.\(^ {138}\) The sanctions targeted seven leaders of the Séléka, including the self-declared president of the CAR, Michel Djotodia.

While the second rebellion was for the most part a product of the lack of full commitment by the signatories of the January agreements, it appeared that the Séléka could not have succeeded in dislodging Bozize from power without the full knowledge of ECCAS members and the assent of their troops in the country.\(^ {139}\)
This stood in contrast to the intervention of ECCAS troops during the first rebellion in December 2012, which stopped the rebel advance in Damara, about 75 km from Bangui. According to one report, the ECCAS troops did not make any similar effort when the Séléka crossed Damara in March. Despite the fact that a senior official of the ECCAS peacekeeping force justified the inaction of the troops with reference to their lack of a mandate to act unless attacked, their inaction was believed to result from increasing disaffection by neighbouring governments with Bozize and their desire to ditch him.

Despite the sanctions imposed by the PSC and its urging of AU member states to isolate the Séléka leadership completely, various members established links and welcomed Djotodia’s visits. In violation of AU sanctions, Djotodia travelled to Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the Sudan during the reporting period. In addition, he was invited to participate in a summit of Heads of State of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) held in Libreville on 14 June.

In some ways, this divergence in action between the AU and countries of the region seem to be a result of a strong interest by ECCAS members, supported by the wider Francophone countries, to shape the political situation in the CAR in a way that would meet the needs of the countries of the region, most notably Chad, which has become a strong ally of France in the region. Despite this ambition, while ECCAS was in a position to exert pressure on the transitional authorities, including Djotodia, it proved to be poorly equipped to address the security and institutional failures that ensued in the aftermath of Séléka’s occupation of Bangui.

ECCAS countries did, in fact, shape the political process that established the roadmap for an inclusive transitional process. At its 4th Extraordinary Summit held in Ndjamen on 18 April 2013, ECCAS adopted a roadmap on the composition and functioning of a National Transitional Council (NTC) for the CAR and the priority areas of government action during the transition period. The Ndjamen Declaration adopted at the end of the summit affirmed the Libreville agreement as the basis for the transition. It confirmed that the head of the transition could not remove the prime minister during the 18-month transition period, stipulated the main tasks and nature of the government of national unity, and the role of the NTC, and called for the establishment of a transitional constitutional court. In addition, the declaration established that the head of state, the prime minister and the members of the government of transition, as well as the chairman and members of the NTC Bureau, could not stand for the forthcoming elections.
Although ECCAS decided to increase the size of MICOPAX to 2,000 troops and provided it with an adequate mandate, it lacked the capacity to undertake an effective peace support mission. As the AU assessment mission to the CAR pointed out, the inadequacies affecting MICOPAX included ‘possession of a mandate that does not suit the situation on the ground, the lack of clarity in its chain of command, the lack of logistics and financial resources, the lack of clarity in the security plan for Bangui and the disproportionate size of its headquarters compared to the size of the Mission.’\textsuperscript{145} When conditions on the ground deteriorated further, ECCAS progressively passed on to the AU the role of leading the peace support operation in the CAR for upholding security and its reconstituting the country’s security infrastructure.

At its meeting of 10 May 2013, the AU PSC requested the speeding up of the cantonnement process of the Séléka elements, as well as the re-establishment of the core of the police and gendarmerie. Council requested the AUC to ensure the necessary follow up for bringing into operation the envisaged security arrangements at the earliest opportunity. Following the recommendation of the AU Assessment Mission for an increasing the role for the AU and international actors, the PSC at its 19 July 2013 meeting decided to authorise the deployment of the African-led mission to CAR (AFISM-CAR) for an initial period of six months. It was to have a total strength of 3,652, including 3,500 uniformed personnel (2,475 for the military component and 1,025 for the police component) and 152 civilians.\textsuperscript{146} The mandate was envisaged to include protection of civilians, restoration of public order, stabilisation of the security situation, reform of the defence and security sectors, and facilitation of the provision of humanitarian aid. The force strength of AFISM-CAR was increased to 6,000 military and police personnel during the 408\textsuperscript{th} PSC meeting of 13 December 2013.

Noting the desperate security and humanitarian crisis that continued to unfold in the country, the AUC together with ECCAS, acting on the request the PSC (366\textsuperscript{th} meeting of 16 April 2013) and a decision of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Extraordinary Summit of ECCAS, established the International Contact Group on CAR (ICG-CAR) with the view to mobilising international support and action. The ICG-CAR convened its first meeting on 3 May 2013 in Brazzaville and its second meeting on 8 July in Addis Ababa. In the Brazzaville Appeal the ICG-CAR urged the international partners to provide multifaceted support for the transition, including the establishment of a trust fund for the reactivation of the administrative and public services. At its second meeting, the ICG-CAR underlined the need
to provide the proposed African mission known as AFISM-CAR with a robust mandate and ensure troop contribution from the wider AU membership. It also urged the UN to consider how it could support and facilitate the deployment of the proposed mission.

Séléka's forcible seizure of power was accompanied by the widespread perpetration of human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian norms. While asserting the responsibility of those who committed atrocities, the PSC at its 366th meeting requested the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to launch a Commission of Inquiry into the abuses perpetrated in the CAR since December 2012.

Alongside regional and AU efforts to steer the implementation of the transitional roadmap by the transitional authorities, efforts were under way to bring AFISM-CAR into operation. A Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was prepared and submitted to the UNSC on 9 August 2013. The transition process from MICOPAX to AFISM-CAR, and preparations for the operations of the AU force commenced on 1 August 2013. Apparently after lengthy negotiation, the AU announced the leadership team of the mission only on 22 November 2013, less than a month before the transition was concluded at a ceremony held on 19 December 2013. For the first time in the recent history of AU peace support operations, both the head of AFISM-CAR and the force commander came from the same region.

The operationalization of AFISM-CAR however has proved to be very slow, however. First, the transition from MICOPAX to AFISM-CAR did not go as swiftly and smoothly as required. It demanded consultations between ECCAS and the AU to achieve clarity on various aspects of the transition and their respective roles, since ECCAS countries sought to remain in the driving seat. As reflected in their joint press release of 3 September 2013, ECCAS and the AU had to complete a number of tasks, including the establishment of a mission headquarters with all its components, the generation of the required forces, the operational planning for deploying AFISM-CAR and the signing of an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two.

The slow pace was also in part due to the failure of the international community, particularly the UNSC, to achieve consensus on endorsing the mission and authorising a support package for it as envisaged in the CONOPS. In a statement issued on 14 August the UNSC went only as far as expressing its willingness to consider all potential options to stabilise the CAR and its expectation that further
discussions would be held with the AU. Equally significant was the failure of contributing countries to meet the mandated force size of AFISM-CAR.

Although the UNSC expressed support for AFISM-CAR when it adopted resolution 2121 to revise the mandate of the UN Integrated Office for Peace-building in the CAR (BINUCA), it postponed a decision on the type of support it would provide. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to report to the UNSC on the planning of AFISM-CAR with detailed options for international support to the mission, including the possible option of a transformation of AFISM-CAR into a UN peacekeeping operation, subject to appropriate conditions on the ground. To this end, the UN deployed an assessment mission to the CAR from 27 October to 8 November 2013.

Two factors seem to account for lack of firm and swift action by the UNSC. First, the CAR was treated mainly as a humanitarian crisis that had few security implications for major countries such as the US. Importantly, France was reluctant to have the CAR on the agenda of the UNSC for a number of months, and did not support AU’s measure of sanctioning the Séléka leadership. Second, there was little appetite among France, the US and the UK for replicating the AMISOM model in Somalia. There was also a problem of mobilising resources because of the demands of the new UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the divergence between France and the UK in prioritising between the CAR and AMISOM. The pledge by the EU to contribute financially to the deployment of AFISM-CAR within the framework of the African Peace Facility, and by the US to support the deployment and sustenance of AFISM-CAR during the 3rd ICG-CAR meeting held in Bangui on 8 November, has proved critical in addressing some of the issues slowing down the full deployment of AFISM-CAR. At the end of December 2013 the force strength of AFISM-CAR was about 3,730 troops and 630 police originating from ECCAS countries and others including Burundi and Rwanda.

Conflict in the eastern DRC

In 2012, neither African and nor international actors initiated any meaningful response to the war that broke out in the eastern DRC as a result of the M23 rebellion. It took several months before the PSC started to consider the crisis. Even then it dedicated only four sessions and these produced no major initiative for resolving the crisis. Despite a problem of legitimacy because of alleged
involvement by key member states in the DRC (Rwanda and even Uganda, which is the current chair), the ICGLR proposed two initiatives, namely mediation between the M23 and the government of the DRC, and the deployment of an neutral international force. However, most UNSC members were ‘sceptical about the feasibility of establishing an international neutral force in the near future’.\textsuperscript{152} As such, apart from imposing targeted sanctions against M23 and other responsible parties, no substantive conflict management and resolution initiative was adopted.\textsuperscript{153}

The year 2013 saw a sea of change in the nature of engagement of African and international actors with the eastern DRC. On the political front, two initiatives were launched. The first one was initiated and led by the UN with region-wide support. In a step that breathed new life into the international engagement in the DRC, the UN Secretary-General formulated a new peace and security framework agreement for the DRC. The framework was intended to comprehensively tackle the underlying governance, socio-economic and regional issues defining the eastern DRC crisis. As part of this effort, the Secretary-General held a summit-level meeting for the signing of the political framework agreement by countries of the region. Although it was expected that the eight countries from the ICGLR and SADC (the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola, Congo, South Africa and Tanzania) would sign the agreement, concerns by SADC countries over aspects of the agreement and a lack of consultation led to the postponement of the signing.\textsuperscript{154}

After consultations and some adjustments,\textsuperscript{155} the DRC Framework Agreement on Peace and Security was signed in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013. It became a new blueprint for mobilising African and international actors to tackle both the national dimension of the crisis involving weak and dysfunctional national institutions, and the regional dimension, in particular cross-border meddling and armed incursions. To pursue the implementation of the framework agreement, the Secretary-General appointed former Irish President Mary Robison as his special envoy.\textsuperscript{156}

The second major process was an effort to mediate between the government of the DRC and the M23. This process started on 9 December 2012, with the ICGLR under the chairmanship of Uganda facilitating the talks in Kampala. The Kampala process did not progress as expected and it was interrupted on a number of occasions. Initially, there were disagreements about the scope of the negotiations, with M23 seeking negotiation on wider national issues and the DRC
government focusing only on the M23 rebellion. It was only early in 2013 that discussions began on substantive issues.

When the two sides started negotiating a draft agreement, the M23, because of its military strength, was relatively well-positioned to secure some deal, although it could not expect everything it demanded. As the year progressed, several factors weakened the position of the M23. First, internal infighting left the group weakened. Second, the possibility of a framework agreement being signed eroded opportunities for regional support. Third, the authorisation of the UN intervention brigade and its subsequent deployment led to the DRC and its backers increasingly losing interest in the negotiations. During the last round of talks in October 2013, the major sticking point was the provision of amnesty for leaders of the M23.

These political processes were complemented by a military approach. During its deliberation on the report of the PSC, apart from extending its full support to the efforts of the ICGLR, the AU Assembly at its 20th ordinary session in January 2013 emphasised the need for ‘the rapid deployment of the International Neutral Force (INF), on the basis of a linkage with MONUSCO, whose mandate should be revised to be more coercive’.

In this regard, a major development was the decision of the UNSC on 28 March 2013 to authorising the deployment of an intervention brigade possessing a coercive mandate as proposed by African actors. In the words of Resolution 2098, MONUSCO ‘shall, … on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping, include an “Intervention Brigade” … with the responsibility of neutralising armed groups … and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilisation activities’. In a cautiously worded formulation of the brigade’s role, the resolution authorised the intervention brigade to carry out targeted offensive operations ‘in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralise these groups, and to disarm them’.

With the arrival of the MONUSCO intervention brigade the military calculations on the ground changed in favour of Kinsahsa and against the M23, which considered the development a major threat and responded with threats against...
the UN and the countries contributing troops to the intervention brigade. M23 also made a desperate attempt to launch attacks on a few occasions. None of these deterred the intervention brigade’s deployment. The brigade consisted of 3,069 troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi, and was headed by a Tanzanian general.

In August 2013 the intervention brigade undertook its first offensive operation against the M23. When fighting resumed between the M23 and the FARDC on 21 August, the intervention brigade responded by engaging its air force, artillery and infantry. As one report pointed out, the heaviness of the campaign in the 10 days of fighting that pushed the M23 back was on display when on August 24 the intervention brigade’s attack helicopters fired 216 rockets and 42 flares on M23 positions in Kibati.158

No doubt the deployment of an intervention brigade with such a coercive mandate and willingness to use force was a game-changer, at least as far as the M23 rebellion was concerned. Not only did it bring much needed firepower to bear on the DRC government’s push against the M23, but it also created the conditions for the FARDC to defeat the M23 militarily and for Kinshasa to make very few concessions in the Kampala talks.

The new momentum that the framework agreement and the deployment of the intervention brigade created might have had a positive spin-off effect in defusing the tension between SADC and the ICGLR. In a significant development underscoring the necessity of inter-regional cooperation, the two organisations held a joint summit on the situation in DRC.

The ramification of these developments was not always positive. The deployment of the MONUSCO intervention brigade and the offensive launched by the FARDC against the M23 escalated the tension between Kigali and Kinshasa. As noted previously, during the August 2013 fighting, Rwanda came close to joining the fighting. The collective intervention of the AU, the UN, the US and the EU through their respective special representatives was critical in defusing the regional tension and avoiding the direct involvement of Rwanda in active hostilities.159

It emerges quite clearly from the foregoing that the leading role in both the political and military responses was assumed by either the UN or sub-regional organisations, namely ICGLR and SADC. The AU/PSC mainly acted in a co-partnership or a supporting role. There is room for the AU to play a more active role, also with regard to the implementation of the framework agreement. In this regard, one option the AU could consider in 2014 is to increase the profile of the special representative of the chairperson.
The LRA

In 2012, one of the major initiatives launched by the PSC through a cooperative framework of affected countries was the establishment of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA), a security operation to end the LRA menace affecting the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan.

The RCI-LRA is built around a number of approaches. The first is the military approach. The second is the supporting efforts for socio-economic recovery and the building of national governance and security institutions in the affected regions. The third involves efforts to encourage the defection of LRA members and surrender themselves for rehabilitation and a return to society. Much of the effort in 2013 has been directed at making all the three approaches fully functional. The UN has assumed major responsibility in the last two areas.

On the military front, the AU dedicated its efforts to achieving the mandated force strength of the Regional Task Force (RTF) of the RCI-LRA and bringing its various structural elements into operation. As far as deployment of forces is concerned, in February 2013 the DRC contributed 500 troops to the RTF, adding to the 2,850 troops deployed or promised by the CAR, South Sudan and Uganda. This means that of the 5,000 troops mandated, 3,350 troops had been contributed as follows: Uganda, 2,000; the DRC, 500; South Sudan, 500; and the CAR, 350. The RTF troops are reinforced by US military advisors.

The strategic documents required for the RCI-LRA, including the RTF command directives, concept of operations, rules of engagement and standard operating procedures, were finalised and approved at the meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the Joint Coordination Mechanism held in Addis Ababa on 15 January 2013. In terms of bringing the structural elements of the RCI-LRA into operation, the RTF HQ with its Joint Operation Centre (JOC) based in Yambio, South Sudan, became operational in February 2013. Comprising 29 officers from the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan and Uganda, the RTF HQ operates under the command of Brigadier General Dick Prit from Uganda. The next steps were to establish a) communication infrastructure to link the RTF HQ with AU HQ and with the country-based sectors of the RCI-LRA, and b) the intelligence and analysis capabilities of the mission through the Joint Intelligence Operations Centre (JIOC) in Dungu and the Counter-LRA Operation Fusion Centres (COFCs) established by US military advisors in Nzara and Obo.

In operational terms, the RTF registered notable achievements. In January 2013, Joseph Kony’s former Chief of Security, Brig. Vincent Okumu Binany, was
killed in the south-eastern CAR while leading LRA elements who were transporting ivory to an LRA base. In August 2013, the RTF launched an offensive called ‘Operation Monsoon’. On 28 November the AU reported that the campaign had resulted in the dismantling of one of the key LRA camps in the CAR. According to the report, since the launch of Operation Monsoon the RTF has rescued a number of civilian abductees, destroyed several LRA camps in the CAR and in the DRC, disrupted the group’s logistical networks and diminished its fighting capacity. In a major development, the AU next reported that on 6 December 2013, 19 LRA fighters under the command of ‘Lt. Col.’ Obur Nyeko, aka Okuti, had defected with weapons and ammunition to a detachment of the Ugandan contingent of the RTF at Zemio in the CAR.

For its effective operation, the RCI-LRA draws heavily on the support of the international community. In operational and technical terms, it receives much support from the US and the UN. Until recently, the US maintained 100 military advisors to assist the RCI-LRA, among others, with the collection of intelligence and the establishment of its capabilities. The US also made available aerial surveillance capabilities, which helped to track LRA activities and identify the main areas of regular LRA activity. It is to be recalled that in its communiqué of 22 May 2012, the PSC requested the UNSC and the UN Secretary-General ‘to consider modalities of enhanced support through the UN peacekeeping missions present in the area of operations of the RCI LRA, including by adjusting as may be necessary their mandates.’

As the insecurity and terror inflicted by the LRA attracts attention, the launch of the RCI-LRA and the PSC’s request for a robust UN role culminated in the adoption of a UN strategy. This facilitated cooperation between the AU and the UN both at strategic and operational levels. As part of the former, the special representatives of the UN Secretary-General and the AU chairperson have been undertaking joint activities. At the operational level, the RTF was able to have access to and make use of existing UN mission resources in the region. UNMISS in South Sudan provided logistical support to the RTF HQ, particularly in terms of air transportation to and from Juba and Yambio, while MONUSCO in the DRC extended operational support to the RTF in the Dungu Sector. The RTF and the AUC are also working closely with the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) in the RTF planning and support process. The EU provides financial support for the mission.

Despite the not insignificant military successes registered against the LRA, various challenges remain. The major one relates to the weakness or total
absence of state governance and security institutions in the affected regions. The effort made to build such institutions suffered a major blow when the CAR collapsed into anarchy following the Séléka rebellion. The crisis in the country also undermined the RCI-LRA operations in the region. As a report of the AU chairperson pointed out, following Séléka’s seizure of power, military units deployed as part of the RCI-LRA in the Obo sector dispersed. In addition, attacks by Séléka forces on the RCI-LRA troops deployed in that sector led to the suspension of counter LRA operations in the CAR and only resumed after diplomatic intervention from the AU and UN.

The first edition of the Annual Review of the PSC revealed that the ‘limited, if not the total lack of, involvement of the Sudan in the RCI-LRA efforts has left a missing link in the fight against the LRA’. This continued to be a problem in 2013. Although denied by the Sudanese government, it is reported that LRA maintains a base in the disputed Kafia Kingi region on the border between the CAR, South Sudan and Sudan. The RTF has also yet to achieve its full-mandated force strength of 5,000 troops.

In several respects the RCI-LRA is a unique experiment. First, it brought together the countries of the region under one framework and facilitated the articulation of a common approach. Second, it is unlike a typical AU or UN mission in that the troops are not deployed in the territory of one state only. In covering all the affected territories of the concerned countries, the RTF responds to the cross-border nature of the threat that the LRA presents. The RCI-LRA may thus prove to be a model that can be adapted to similar situations involving transnational and trans-regional threats to peace and security.

PSC ON WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL

Situation in Mali

At the beginning of 2013, the major crisis of concern to the PSC, and indeed the wider AU system, in West Africa and the Sahel was the conflict in Mali. With developments taking a dangerous turn, triggering intervention from Mali’s former colonial ruler, France, the situation mobilized the AU at the highest levels. The resultant response took three forms. The first involved the mobilisation of countries of the continent and beyond for committing political, military and financial support to stabilise Mali. At the AU’s 20th Assembly of Heads of State and
Government held on 26 and 27 January, Mali was the issue that really got the attention of the continent’s governments.

The earlier PSC meeting at the level of heads of state and government on 25 January 2013 took decisions demanding the revision of the concept of operations so as to increase the force size of AFISMA, the immediate appointment of the Special Representative of the AU Chairperson to head AFISMA, and the speedy deployment of the Malian Integrated Task Force. The PSC also took the unprecedented step of recommending to the AU Assembly to cover part of the budget of AFISMA from assessed contributions of AU member states. Although, legally speaking, the AU was supposed to cover the cost of its peace and security initiatives thus far almost the entire funding for such initiatives had come from partners. The PSC demand to the AU was thus a significant development. As part of mobilising support to AFISMA, the PSC also reiterated its request to the UN for ‘the establishment of a support package funded by UN assessed contributions, as well as of a Trust Fund to support the Malian Defence and Security Forces’.

On 28 January 2013, the AU Assembly unanimously adopted a Solemn Declaration on the Situation in Mali in which it fully endorsed the communiqué of the 353rd session of the PSC. Importantly, ‘stressing Africa’s responsibility to extend utmost solidarity with Mali …’, the Assembly decided ‘that the AU shall contribute a total amount of $50 million out of the budget for AFISMA’. On Tuesday 29 January the AU and ECOWAS co-chaired a pledging conference on Mali. Although in the initial concept the plan was for AFISMA to deploy 3 300 troops, following the meeting of ECOAWS Chiefs of Defence Staff on 26 January the strength of AFISMA was elevated to 8 000 and the budget increased to $950 million a year. Of this amount, the pledging conference raised $455 million.

The second African response involved the fast-tracking of the deployment of AFISMA. The new security environment prompted ECOWAS and the AU to bring forward the timeline for the start of deployment from September 2013 to January 2013. Nigeria deployed its air force on 17 January. By 20 January, 855 troops from Benin, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo were on the ground. By early March, the deployment had reached 6 117 personnel with Chad and Nigeria’s 2 015 and 1 186 troops respectively making up half of the troops. On 7 March the PSC approved the revised joint strategic operations concept for AFISMA and the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF), which had been finalised on 20 February at a meeting of Malian, AU and ECOWAS officials, EU military advisers in Mali and UN military and civilian planners. AFISMA revised its total strength to 9 620
personnel, consisting of 171 civilians, 590 police officers and 8,859 military personnel.\textsuperscript{168} It should be noted, however, that AFISMA never reached its mandated force strength. At the time of its transition to MINUSMA, AFISMA’s strength was about one-third less than its mandated size.

The process of AFISMA’s deployment did not occur without difficulties. Although the initial deployment for mission start-up was arranged jointly between the AU and ECOWAS, this practice was not continued. At the political level, the leadership role the AU had assumed over the situation in Mali was not fully accepted by ECOWAS. An air of rivalry continued to affect their positions, negotiation over how to bring AFISMA into operation and, notably, the composition of the leadership of the mission.\textsuperscript{169} With the head of mission representing the AU and the deputy ECOWAS, there was lack of clarity about AFISMA’s chain of command. Despite the fact that the Special Representative of the ECOWAS chairperson was appointed as deputy to Special Representative of the AU Chairperson President Buyoya, he never assumed that position and signed his contract with the AU.\textsuperscript{170} Apparently, ECOWAS also operated on the basis of its own preferred division of labour whereby it controlled and headed the force headquarters, but left it to the AU to take care of establishing and running the mission headquarters.\textsuperscript{171}

The institutional rivalry and mistrust between the two institutions was also reflected in the lack of consensus on the division of assets and liabilities accrued while managing AFISMA. Much of the tension and rivalry between the AU and ECOWAS was over the management of resources that come for peace support operations. ECOWAS negotiated directly with the EU and received 50 million, which it used for setting up and operating the force headquarters of the mission. The AU on its part relied on the AU trust fund for AFISMA to which AU member states, among others, had pledged and made contributions. Incidentally, in a clear manifestation of lack of coherence, there was also a UN trust fund for AFISMA. Apart from a lack of transparency, this trust fund was apparently used for equipment and other expenses just before AFISMA’s transition to MUNISMA.\textsuperscript{172}

Following their deployment, AFISMA troops accomplished a number of tasks. They undertook some of the combat operations that enabled Mali to recover territory that had been under the control of militant groups since early 2012. In late-February, at least 23 Chadian soldiers died fighting Islamist rebels in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains. Significantly, by deploying in strategic locations, AFISMA troops contributed to the process of stabilising northern Mali, despite the fact
that their efforts were hindered by a lack of logistics support and the militants’ use of asymmetric tactics.

The third response involved the recalibration of AFISMA so that it could facilitate and support the transitional tasks required for establishing an elected government in Mali. Initially, the AU’s preference was for consolidating AFISMA through a support package funded by UN-assessed contributions. A number of factors, including the preference of the Malian authorities for an integrated UN stabilisation mission to take over from AFISMA, as well as a reluctance of UNSC members to authorise and fund an AU mission with a coercive mandate, militated against the AU’s preferred option. In a communiqué of 7 March 2013 in which the PSC expressed support for AFISMA’s transition into a UN mission, it outlined the parameters for a UN takeover of AFISMA. The following parameters would, it believed, contribute positively to the consolidation of the progress made in Mali:

1. a robust mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter defined in consultation with Mali, the AU and ECOWAS … including the fight against criminal and terrorist networks operating in the North of Mali;
2. the UN … consult closely and adequately with the AU and ECOWAS throughout the proposed transformation process of AFISMA into a UN operation, as well as the appointment of the future Special Representative of the Secretary-General who will lead the planned Mission in a spirit of continuity;
3. mobilisation, in favour of AFISMA, of financial and logistical support … particularly through the establishment by the UN of an appropriate logistical support mechanism; and
4. support for the central political role of the AU and ECOWAS.

On 25 April, the UNSC adopted resolution 2100 authorising MINUSMA to take over from AFISMA. However, the resolution did not meet the AU’s expectations on a number of counts. First, contrary to AU’s expectation of a UN mission with a robust mandate, the UN assigned the task of undertaking combat operations against militants to French forces operating in Mali outside of MINUSMA’s command. Second, resolution 2100 was seen as having left no adequate space for AU and ECOWAS to continue to play a substantive political role in supporting Mali to achieve stability and peace. Third, the draft resolution was not shared with African actors at the stage of negotiation where substantive changes could be
proposed. Apparently, it was shown to the AU only at the very end of the process of formulating the resolution, a day before it was adopted.\textsuperscript{176} This gave the AU no opportunity to make input into the resolution. African members of the UNSC did not raise this as a major concern during negotiations on the resolution.

In a communiqué adopted on the same day the UNSC resolution was adopted, the PSC expressed its displeasure. Specifically, it noted with concern ‘that Africa was not appropriately consulted in the drafting and consultation process that led to the adoption of the UNSC resolution authorising the deployment of ... MINUSMA to take over AFISMA’ and ‘that the resolution does not adequately take into account the foundation laid by the African stakeholders’\textsuperscript{177} and, indeed, the central political role the AU and ECOWAS expected to play.

The above notwithstanding, the PSC affirmed the intention by the AU and ECOWAS to continue to play an active role in Mali after AFISMA’s change to MINUSMA, and provided for setting up a joint AU-ECOWAS office in Mali, although the AU did not maintain the level of engagement it has had. A particular area of dissatisfaction by African actors as far as the re-hatting process was concerned related to the leadership changes at MINUSMA. Apparently on account of reservations over his past history in the war in Burundi, the UN decided not to retain the services of President Pierre Buyoya, AFISMA’s head and the Special Representative of the AU chairperson. Similarly, rather than AFISMA’s force commander Major General Abdulkadir Shehu of Nigeria, the UN appointed Major General Jean Bosco Kazura as MINUSMA’s force commander. This is believed to be one of the factors of Nigeria’s decision to pull out its troop battalion from MINUSMA.\textsuperscript{178}

Reflecting the continuing problem of deploying forces at the required scale, at the time of its transition to MINUSMA, AFISMA did not achieve its mandated force strength. Its force strength was about one-third less than its mandated size.

On the political front, the approval on 29 January 2013 by Mali’s National Assembly of the roadmap for transition, as outlined by the interim government, paved the way for focusing attention on the pursuit of agreed priorities. The roadmap established the three main priorities for the authorities in the transition process: the restoration of the territorial integrity of Mali; the establishment of a dialogue with groups that respect the territorial integrity and reject armed struggle; and the holding of free and fair elections.\textsuperscript{179} In pursuance of the roadmap, the interim government established a Commission of Dialogue and Reconciliation on 6 March and its members were appointed on 30 March.
In preparation for creating the conditions under which national elections could take place, peace talks were held between the interim government and the MNLA, which retained control of Kidal, as well as the government-backed High Council for the Unity of Azawad. From 3 June 2013, indirect talks were brokered under the aegis of the ECOWAS by Foreign Minister Djibril Bassolé of Burkina Faso who presented a draft framework agreement for direct negotiation by the parties on 7 June. The Preliminary Agreement to the Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali signed on 18 June 2013 paved the way for the return of Malian authorities to Kidal and the participation of people of the region in the presidential elections.

The transitional period was concluded successfully with the holding of free and credible presidential elections in July 2013, including in many parts of northern Mali. Although this success offered the opportunity to pursue political and security reform, and implement the national dialogue envisaged under the agreement, internal divisions and regional antagonism continued to pose challenges. While the deployment of AFISMA and MINUSMA subsequently remain critical to the stabilisation of northern Mali, the security situation in the region continues to be very fragile as Islamist militants increasingly resort to asymmetric warfare.

The failure of African countries to deploy rapidly to Mali, and France’s launch of Operation Serval highlighted major gaps in the AU’s peace and security framework. It is no wonder that the subsequent processes initiated by the AU and ECOWAS came to be seen as scrambling after the fact. While the processes were no doubt more than just face-saving measures, their effectiveness was limited by the lack of synergy between ECOWAS and the AU. The AU faced further disappointment in the transition of AFISMA to MINUSMA.

**Situation in Guinea-Bissau**

Guinea-Bissau has been on the agenda of the PSC since its suspension from AU activities following the military coup that took place in April 2012. There was much concern about how to overcome the disagreement in Guinea-Bissau over the transitional process and to implement a consensual roadmap for restoring constitutional order in the country. ECOWAS issued a communiqué on 28 February 2013 encouraging interim President Manuel Serifo Nhamajo to propose a feasible transitional roadmap for the conduct of free and fair general elections.
during 2013, and urging the National Assembly to promptly adopt the plan and extend the transitional period until 31 December.181

In an effort to achieve convergence on the situation in the country and encourage the key political actors to achieve an inclusive transition, the AU led a joint assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau from 16 to 21 December. The mission comprised personnel from the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, the UN and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). The AU submitted the joint mission report on 22 March 2013. The report, which urged the adoption of the regime pact involving the agreement that rival political parties participate in the transitional process, identified the major issues in the Guinea-Bissau crisis. These included a stalled transition and electoral process, the need for security sector reform, human rights violations with impunity, drug trafficking and socioeconomic decline.

The PSC at its 361st meeting of 22 March welcomed the findings of the assessment mission and urged the participating organisations to continue their efforts to build an international consensus and promote collective action.182 As regards the political actors in Guinea-Bissau, the PSC urged the local stakeholders to persevere in their efforts, the transitional president to accelerate the elaboration of the roadmap for the transition for adoption by the National People’s Assembly at the earliest opportunity, and the Parliamentary Committee to expedite the finalisation of the Pacte de régime, which has the aim of making the transition process as inclusive as possible.

During its 371st meeting of 24 April, the PSC called for the speedy finalisation of the process for the adoption of the Roadmap for Transition, the ‘Regime Pact’ and the formation of an inclusive government. On the problem of drug trafficking, the PSC expressed its deep concern and urged the Guinea-Bissau authorities and the international community to take immediate and effective measures against all persons, whether military or civilian, involved in trafficking. Acknowledging ‘the important role of ECOWAS’, the PSC appealed to AU member states and international partners to provide support to the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB).183

As agreed on 26 January 2013, the original five organisations joined by the International Organisation de la Francophonie undertook a second joint assessment mission to Bissau from 8 to 11 July 2013. The mission recommended reviving the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau in the coming months, including the establishment of a Bissau-based chapter.184 It also recommended
the establishment of a follow-up mechanism to integrate the Bissau-based representatives of the AU, the UN, ECOWAS and the EU. The mission encouraged the CPLP and the International Organisation de la Francophonie to deploy representatives in Bissau.

The divergence of opinion between ECOWAS and the AU over whether the transitional government should be recognised and the suspension of Guinea-Bissau should be lifted persisted during 2013. Given that ECOWAS countries have born the burden of the suspension by all major financial and donor agencies, including the African Development Bank, the EU, the World Bank and the IMF, the lifting of the suspension by the AU is seen as the key for the resumption of international assistance to Guinea-Bissau. Such a development would greatly relieve the pressure on the countries in the region supporting the country.

Accordingly ECOWAS has repeatedly urged the AU to recognise the transitional government and lift the suspension. At their extraordinary summit on 19 January 2013 in Abidjan, the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS reiterated their call on the AU to urgently consider its view and urged the UN, the CPLP, the EU and other international partners to resume cooperation with Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS repeated this call again at its summit held from 17 to 18 July. In his address to the summit, President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria echoed these requests, stating that ‘the challenges facing Guinea-Bissau are complex in nature’ and urging the EU and the AU ‘to recognise the transitional government and lift the sanctions on Guinea-Bissau to allow the resumption of bilateral cooperation with the international community’. Many members of the PSC remain opposed to the suspension of sanctions on Guinea-Bissau. Apart from concerns that lifting the sanctions before the holding of elections and the restoration of constitutional order would set a bad precedent, there is a genuine belief that the transition in Guinea-Bissau lacks the qualities warranting recognition.

Together with the disagreement between ECOWAS and the AU over Mali, the lack of policy coherence on Guinea-Bissau between the two has further soured their relations. As became apparent during the annual meeting of the AU, the UN and the RECs in Abuja, Nigeria, in November 2013, the role of AU vis-à-vis initiatives launched by RECs has come under increasing scrutiny. ECOWAS insists that it should leader as regards issues in its region and that the AU should play a supporting role. This is not a position acceptable to non-ECOWAS members of the PSC. As one PSC member put it: ‘The PSC is not a rubber stamp of decisions taken by RECs’.
PSC AND NORTH AFRICA

In 2013, the situations in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have continued to be of concern, even though the PSC considered only the situation in Egypt.

Situation in Egypt: A principled approach

The opposition against President Mohamed Morsi that picked up pace during the second quarter of 2013 culminated in huge street protests on 30 June, the day that marked the first anniversary of Morsi’s election as president of Egypt. The situation became a matter of direct concern to the AU when the Egyptian military intervened on 3 July with a request to the president to resolve the standoff or face consequences. The AUC issued statements on 3 and 4 July. In the first, the commission, while reminding the Egyptian authorities of the AU’s position on unconstitutional changes of government, underlined the need for all Egyptian stakeholders to work towards a resolution of the current crisis through dialogue in order to find an appropriate response to the popular aspirations within the framework of legality and Egyptian institutions. In the statement of 4 July, the AUC made an overt indication that Egypt had breached AU’s norm on unconstitutional change of government.188

A day later, the AU PSC considered the situation in Egypt at its 384th meeting. Members of the PSC were faced with the question whether or not the overthrow of Mr Morsi constituted an unconstitutional change of government contrary to established AU norms as reflected in the Constitutive Act. The deliberations, which were attended by the AUC chairperson, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, were preceded by briefings from the AU Commissioners for Peace and Security, and for Political Affairs, and a statement by Egypt’s Permanent Representative to the AU.

In the communiqué adopted at the meeting, the PSC highlighted the major elements of the political situation in Egypt. First, it noted that ‘while significant progress has been made in the transition, notably with the election, in June 2012, of a President of the Republic, Egypt continues to face serious challenges, marked by the growing frustration of many Egyptians over the management of the country, cumulative economic difficulties, deteriorating security, political and social polarisation, and lack of consensus on the best way forward’. Second, the PSC observed ‘the escalation of the situation over the past few days, which led to the overthrow of the elected President Mohamed Morsi, the suspension of the
Constitution adopted by referendum in December 2012, and the appointment and
swearing in of a caretaker Head of State.’ In reflecting on these developments,
the PSC drew attention to both Egypt’s enormously difficult process of transition
and how the overthrow of President Morsi nullified the country’s first democratic
election and a constitution adopted through popular referendum.

Not surprisingly, after having determined in closed session that the over-
throw of the democratically elected president does not conform to the relevant
provisions of the Egyptian Constitution and, therefore, falls under the definition
of an unconstitutional change of government, the PSC decided ‘to suspended the
participation of Egypt in the AU’s activities until the restoration of constitutional
order’. In an effort to contribute to what it called Egypt’s early return to consti-
tutional order, the PSC encouraged the AUC chairperson to establish a high-level
team to support a peaceful and inclusive transition and the restoration of con-
stitutional order in Egypt. The AU chairperson announced the establishment of
such an AU High-Level Panel on 8 July 2013.

A number of factors make this decision of suspending Egypt stand out. First,
the overthrow of Morsi’s government was demanded and supported by a massive
popular protest staged over three days. Second, it was the very first time that
the principle of unconstitutional government changes was invoked against one of
the big five contributors to the AU budget. Perhaps, it was for this reason that the
decision was not taken with absolute consensus. At least two of the 15 members
of the PSC, namely Djibouti and Uganda, reportedly expressed their reservation
about the decision.

A number of factors informed the AU’s decision to suspend Egypt. Most
notably, the prevalent view in the AU is that the ousting of an elected president
by a military order is contrary to established norms. The fact that millions of
people supported the ousting does not make it legitimate, particularly if there are
significant others in the society who oppose it. According to AU Commissioner
for Peace and Security, the ‘principal guide for the PSC was the fact that there is
now an elected president who continues to claim that he is the legitimate leader
and has supporters that agree with him’. Furthermore, the role played by the
military was an important consideration in deciding the unconstitutionality of
the ousting of President Morsi.

While the demand for Morsi to leave office came from millions of Egyptians,
the military’s intervention was decisive in overturning Morsi’s government. In
this context, a major motivation for the PSC’s decision could have been to avoid
the Egyptian situation from setting a bad precedent. The fear was that if the Egyptian army was allowed to get away with overthrowing an elected president in the name of ‘the will of the people’, others could be encouraged to use people on the streets as a pretext for ousting governments they did not like.

While on the face of it the AU decision seems to have no apparent bearing on Egypt, a close analysis reveals that it is not without significant ramifications for that country. Considering the internal dynamics of Egypt, this decision, despite its limited material impact, undermines the standing of the new authorities while lending some legitimacy to those protesting against Mr Morsi’s ousting. Regionally and globally, it does not reflect well on Egypt’s political and diplomatic standing. Within the AU, Egypt will have no say in any of the policy decisions that will be taken until its reinstatement. Similarly, like other countries suspended from AU, such as Madagascar and the CAR, Egypt will not be eligible for election to any of the policy-making organs of the AU.

Accordingly, despite the fact that the new military-backed authorities in Cairo took offense by the AU’s decision to suspend Egypt, they launched a diplomatic offensive in an attempt to have the decision rescinded. While Egypt was reluctant to welcome the AU’s High-Level Panel, after a visit of the Egyptian interim president’s special envoy to the AU as part of the diplomatic offensive, the panel undertook several missions to Egypt. While the increasing polarisation and violence witnessed by Egypt in the following months vindicated the AU’s principled position, it sabotaged Egypt’s campaign for having its suspension reversed.

Since its session of 5 July, the PSC has considered the situation in Egypt at four of the remaining meetings in 2013. At its 387th meeting of 29 July 2013, the PSC expressed its concern at the incidence of violence in the country and reminded the Egyptian authorities of ‘the need for respect of human rights, sanctity of human life and fundamental freedoms’. It also urged all sides to ‘show restraint’ and ‘work together towards an inclusive transition that will lead to the early return to constitutional order in the country’. Following the violent crackdown on people protesting against the interim government on 14 August, the PSC in the communiqué of its 389th meeting ‘strongly condemned the acts of violence that led to the loss of numerous human lives in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt today and urged all Egyptian stakeholders, in particular the interim authorities, to exercise utmost restraint’. Despite deploiring the violence, the PSC did not go further by demanding an investigation into the incident.
As sporadic violence and clashes continued to occur in the country, the 14-member PSC gave further attention to the situation in Egypt at its 390th meeting. In the communiqué adopted after that meeting, the PSC reiterating its condemnation of all acts of violence, ‘expressed deep concern at the escalation of violence in Egypt and strongly deplored the considerable loss of human lives, the injuries sustained and the property damaged in Cairo and elsewhere in the country’. At its 395th meeting of 13 September, the PSC received briefings from the AU High-Level Panel on its second mission to Egypt and the overall situation in the country. In the press release it issued at the end of its meeting, the PSC stressed ‘the need for all parties to eschew all forms of violence and uphold the spirit of dialogue, inclusivity and national reconciliation’. The PSC took a principled position in treating the overthrow of Mr Morsi’s government as a breach of its established norm against unconstitutional changes of government and suspended Egypt. Despite the fact that the AU also established a High-Level Panel on Egypt, none of these measures registered any significant impact on the ground, highlighting an instance in which measures taken by the PSC have very little practical effect. The internal political situation of the country has continued to follow its own path, with the interim authorities adopting a series of measures aimed at dismantling the Muslim Brotherhood and targeting dissenting protest. While it shows the commitment of the AU to Egypt, it is far from clear whether the AU’s deployment of its High-Level Panel will have any substantive impact on the course of political events in that country.

PSC ON EAST AFRICA AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

Situation in Somalia

At the beginning of 2013, Somalia continued to experience improved security and a better political environment. A number of strategic areas were recovered from Al Shabaab, including the port of Kismayo. The government of President Hassan Shaikh Mohamoud displayed an increasing willingness to assert his leadership and initiated consultations for boosting government’s national legitimacy and nurturing national reconciliation, although views on the success of these initiatives are divided. However, as noted previously, in the course of the year the security situation deteriorated, with Al Shabaab continuing to perpetrate attacks
both in Somalia and in the region, as demonstrated by its well-planned major attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September.

Consolidating the security of areas liberated from Al Shabaab not only required stabilizing the areas, but also supporting the building of state institutions to extend the authority of the Somali state in those areas. The situation also created increasing popular expectations and the need to undertake peace support and peace-building activities. This included the provision of training and support for building security institutions and local governance and state administration capabilities, and dealing with the demobilisation of forces that had defected from Al Shabaab. Many of these initiatives had not gone far enough by the end of the year. As the new federal government of Somalia began to assert its leadership based on its own priorities, AMISOM had to align its support with the priorities and needs of the FGS.

All these considerations demanded that the AU undertake a strategic review of AMISOM to determine the kind of changes required, the nature of AMISOM’s presence and the composition of the mission, and the preferred form and kind of UN collaboration anticipated. Although the exercise would have been best undertaken jointly with the UN, the two organisations undertook separate reviews.

The AU review was submitted to the PSC in February 2013. Noting the progress made in Somalia in both the political and security spheres, the review stated that the situation provided Somalia, the AU and international actors with ‘a strategic opportunity to consolidate the political and security gains made thus far by investing in the restoration and extension of state authority through effective governance, rule of law and the delivery of peace dividends’.

In the light of the changes in Somalia and the resultant demands, the review identified three options for redefining AMISOM’s presence in the country. The first option was to hand over of the mission to the UN, but it was noted that the time for this had not yet arrived. The second option was to enhance AMISOM’s mandate, and force strength and capacity along the lines required. The review recommended this as an interim measure. However, to address the longstanding concern on predictable funding effectively, the preferred option recommended by the review was option three, which envisages a joint AU-UN mission.

The report accordingly made a strong case for reconfiguring and strengthening AMISOM. This would entail the transformation of the mission into a fully fledged, multi-dimensional operation. Such reconfiguration would require a significant expansion of the civilian component ‘to enable it to support the mission’s
consolidation and stabilisation efforts ... including in the areas of governance, reconciliation, human rights, gender and early recovery at local community level.195 With regard to the military component, the new context demanded the strengthening of its capability for undertaking peace-enforcement and counter-insurgency operations, and reclaiming additional territories under Al Shabaab control. The force should be equipped with force multipliers and enablers, including dedicated air and maritime assets. A police component would play a key role in consolidating the security of areas liberated from Al Shabaab and in building the Somali police force. Among other requirements, there was also a demand for a training capability, and the structure and facility for delivering such training.

Clearly, such an expanded structure would require substantive increases in the supply of adequate logistical and mission support to AMISOM. The review concluded that AMISOM should remain a large multi-dimensional force, dedicated to continued peace enforcement operations, but with an enlarged political and peace-building mandate to focus on supporting the FGS.

In the communiqué it adopted at its 356th meeting, the PSC endorsed the second option, which required the mission to (a) maintain a robust posture, with the required multipliers and enablers, in order to facilitate the recovery of the areas that are still under the control of Al Shabaab, (b) establish special training teams to enhance the capacity of Somalia's national defence and public safety institutions, and (c) enhance its civilian capacity to support the efforts of the FGS to restore effective governance, promote reconciliation, human rights, the rule of law and ensure service delivery in the recovered areas.196

The PSC decided in addition that AMISOM, as a multidimensional peace support operation, shall be mandated to a) take all necessary means to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; b) assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS; c) provide support for the FGS in the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and the delivery of basic services; d) provide technical and other support for building the capacity of state institutions; e) support the FGS in establishing the institutions and conditions for conducting the national elections planned for 2016; f) provide assistance in the provision of humanitarian assistance, the resettlement of IDPs and the return of refugees; and g) provide protection to AU and UN personnel and facilities.197

In the light of the reconfigured composition and mandate of AMISOM, the PSC called on the UNSC to authorise the expansion of the support package to
In addition, the PSC requested the UNSC to partially lift the arms embargo imposed on Somalia as per the request of the FGS and IGAD. It is interesting to note that AMISOM was given a clear mandate to protect civilians. However, there were two areas in which the AU and the UN diverged. First, the two were not able to conduct a joint strategic review of the situation in Somalia. The result was two separate reviews with diverging proposals. Second, there was scepticism in some quarters of the UN Secretariat about the request of the AU to transform AMISOM into a multi-dimensional mission with enhanced civilian capacity mandated to provide civilian support to the FGS as ‘the UN sees itself as having established expertise and comparative advantage’ in these areas.

In Resolution 2093, adopted on 6 March 2013, the UN Security Council extended AMISOM’s mandate until 28 February 2014. The resolution endorsed the mandate of AMISOM as revised by the 27 February 2013 PSC communiqué to include the provision of assistance to the government in extending state authority in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. Reflecting the divergence over the AU’s move to expand AMISOM into a multi-dimensional mission, the resolution did not address the request of the PSC to enhance the support package to AMISOM. The resolution simply mandated the UN Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM for a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel until 28 February 2014.

When the UN adopted Resolution 2102 authorising the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), it again failed to address the AU request for additional support for AMISOM, despite the fact that the UN Secretary-General’s report on the technical assessment mission to Somalia recognised the need for further support to AMISOM’s military and civilian components. In a communiqué issued on 10 May, the PSC reiterated its call ‘for greater support to AMISOM’ and requested the chairperson of the AUC to report within 30 days on steps taken to deal with issues raised in resolution 2093. The report of the chairperson submitted to the PSC on 13 June 2013 identified the limits of current UN support for AMISOM that frustrated the mission’s ability to undertake expansion operations. The problems of UN support were low budgetary allocations, slow logistics, poor equipment servicing, and insufficient armoured personnel carriers and helicopters for the area of operation.

In the communiqué it adopted after reviewing the report of the chairperson, the PSC, noting with serious concern that AMISOM forces had reached their operational limits and were unable to conduct expansion operations, called on the
UNSC to take steps to (a) providing the mission with the required force multipliers and enablers, (b) adjust the concept and enhance the delivery of the UN logistical support package to AMISOM, (c) authorise the provision of basic logistical assistance to the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) by the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) when they are engaged in joint operations with AMISOM, (d) provide dedicated funding for training and capacity building, and (e) effectively address the issue of the guard force, bearing in mind the limitations facing the mission in terms of strength, resources and logistics.204

During the course of 2013, AMISOM helped to secure additional areas, albeit on a limited scale. On 27 February, Somali government forces supported by AMISOM troops secured the town of Buur Hakba on the Afgooye – Baidoa corridor in the Bay region. This was significant as it would enable the reconnection of Mogadishu with Baidoa, an objective that was achieved by 1 April. With its capacity stretched to the limit and the progress of increasing the capacity of the SNA stalling, AMISOM suspended the further expansion of operations.205

In the light of Al Shabaab's increasing attacks in Somalia, in particular in Mogadishu, as well as the region, notably the 21-24 September attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the AU and the UN undertook a joint benchmarking mission to Somalia and the region. The review confirmed that AMISOM’s operations in 2013 had stagnated and that if matters continued in the same vein, Al Shabaab was likely to increase its targets outside Somalia.206 Noting the need for additional capability in the form of more troops, force multipliers, enablers and formed police units (FPUs), the review recommended, among other things, that the size of AMISOM be increased by 6 235 personnel to bring its total strength to just under 24 000.

The PSC endorsed the recommendations of the joint review in its communiqué of 10 October and called on the UNSC to authorise the revision of the UN logistical support package to enable the size of AMISOM to be increased, and to provide the required force enablers and multipliers, as well as non-lethal support to the SNSF, through UN-assessed contributions.207 On 12 November, the UNSC adopted resolution 2124 that, apart from authorising an increase in AMISOM’s force strength from 17 731 to 22 126, and expanding the the mission's authorisation to October 2014, increased the UN support package to AMISOM, and supported the need for AMISOM force enablers and multipliers, encouraging contributions from member states. Concerning support for SNSF, the resolution requested UNSOA to provide the Somali forces with non-lethal support.
This was to be financed from a trust fund of voluntary contributions rather than from UN-assessed contributions.

Apart from welcoming resolution 2124, the AUC initiated consultations with troop contributing countries (TCCs) and others involved in bringing about the relevant provisions of the resolution. A major development was the subsequent announcement by Ethiopia to contribute troops for AMISOM. Since Uganda had also expressed an interest in contributing additional troops, the AU was left with more pledges than it needed to fill the authorised number of uniformed mission personnel. By the second week of December, the AU was still in the process of consulting with the concerned authorities and stakeholders. At the same time, the AU, the TCC’s and Ethiopia held a meeting of experts to prepare the new AMISOM operations concept.

On the political front, IGAD emerged as the major facilitator of political dialogue between Somali actors. It initiated dialogue between the FGS and the Jubaland authorities. In execution of a decision by the 21st extraordinary summit of the IGAD heads of state and government, a high-level fact-finding and confidence-building mission travelled to Mogadishu and Kismayo from 16 to 19 May 2013. At the 22nd extraordinary session held in Addis Ababa on 24 May, the IGAD heads of state and government, on the basis of the fact-finding mission’s report, urged the FGS to convene a reconciliation conference, with IGAD’s support, while consulting with key stakeholders in the Juba region to chart a roadmap for the establishment of an interim administration in preparation for a permanent regional administration. Ethiopia, in its capacity as IGAD’s chair, initiated the dialogue between the FGS and local authorities in Kismayo in June 2013. After a week-long second-round of talks in Addis Ababa in August 2013, the parties finally signed a deal that end a major disagreement.

Under the ‘Agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubaland delegation’, the status of Jubaland was changed from a state to an interim administration with Shiekh Ahmed Mohammed Islam Madobe, who led a militia known as the Ras Kamboni, as its leader. The administration will last for not more than two years, during which time a permanent federal member state is to be established. For its part, the interim administration recognised the FGS as the legitimate government of Somalia and agreed to it taking over the administration of federal institutions and infrastructure in the region, including the Kismayo airport and seaport, after a period of six months. With respect to security forces and militias, the agreement provided for the
integration of all militias into the SNA. As envisaged in the agreement, the FGS convened a reconciliation conference between its representatives and the Juba Interim Administration in Mogadishu from 3 to 6 November. Despite this progress, the Jubaland process continues to face opposition from some members of the FGS, notably the speaker of parliament.

The foregoing discussion shows that during 2013 the PSC’s engagement on Somalia was directed at recalibrating AMISOM both in an effort to consolidate the gains achieved, including the stabilisation of areas freed from Al Shabaab, and to provide support for the establishment of a government administration. On the political front, it supported the initiative of IGAD to play an active role in facilitating and supporting local political dialogue and national reconciliation efforts.

**Situations in the Sudans**

Although the two Sudans signed a plethora of agreements on post-secession issues on 27 September 2012, disagreements over the implementation of security arrangements, the establishment of the demilitarised border zone, the temporary administration of Abyei and the on-going conflicts in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states continued to impede progress. With regard to the implementation of the security arrangements, the parties disagreed, among other things, on the geographical definition of the length of the ‘14 Mile Area’. This is one of the five disputed border areas whose status was referred to a team of experts. The two states also disagreed on allegations of continued support by South Sudan for the SPLM/A-North. Concerning Abyei, the process on the establishment of the Abyei administrative bodies stalled following disagreement over the number of persons each state was to appoint to the Abyei Area Council.

The PSC summit-level meeting of 25 January expressed its concern over the persistent difference between the parties over the implementation of the agreements and the tense situation that existed along their common border. Regarding the demilitarised border zone, the Council ‘stressed that disagreement on any particular part of the SDBZ should not prevent its establishment, and the resolution of any disagreement should be pursued within the framework of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM)’.

While expressing its disappointment over the delay in the establishment of the Abyei administrative bodies in accordance with the agreement of 20 June
2010, the PSC urged the parties to complete the establishment of the bodies. The PSC also reaffirmed that ‘the proposal submitted by the AUHIP on 21 September 2012 on the final status of the Abyei Area represents a fair, equitable and workable solution to the dispute’. The PSC requested AUHIP to report to Council in March 2013 on progress with the negotiations on the final status of Abyei. The Council requested AUHIP to submit its final report on the activities undertaken by it since 2009 at its July meeting.

Although UNSC resolution 2046 of May 2012 envisaged the imposition of sanctions on the parties for failing to make progress with respect to outstanding issues, the PSC, partly because of an aggressive campaign by Sudan, opted not to refer the matter to the UNSC. In an effort to give new impetus to the efforts of AUHIP to help the two countries achieve consensus on the outstanding issues and pursue the full implementation of the 27 September agreements, the new AU chairperson, Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn, convened a meeting between the presidents of Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and South Africa and the presidents of Sudan and South Sudan. The two leaders committed themselves to work hard at implementing the agreements and to observe the outcome of the PSC meeting of Friday 25 January 2013.

After debating the report of the PSC, the AU Assembly stressed ‘the need and obligation of the countries to scrupulously implement the commitments made’ under the 27 September 2012 agreements, as well as the outcome of the summit between President Bashir and President Kiir from 4 to 5 January 2013 in Addis Ababa. The assembly encouraged the AUHIP and Ethiopia, as chair of IGAD, to continue their efforts to achieve full settlement of all disagreements between the two countries.

In March 2013, AUHIP convened a meeting of the representatives of the two countries to consider and adopt the matrix and modalities for the implementation of the September 2013 agreements. The signing of the Implementation Matrix on 12 March paved the way for the resumption of oil production in April 2013.

However, following Sudan’s announcement on 8 June that it would shut down the pipeline, AU and IGAD initiated new efforts to forestall a further deterioration of the situation. While the AU and IGAD implemented an AUHIP proposal to establish and deploy an Ad Hoc Investigation Mechanism to verify allegations of support for rebels, Ethiopia and AUHIP undertook diplomatic missions to Khartoum to urge the government not to act on its threat of shutting down the pipeline. Acting on a proposal by AUHIP, the AU also agreed to make a conclusive
technical determination of the location of the SDBZ centre-line on the ground, in accordance with the AUHIP map.  

Continuing its efforts to facilitate a negotiated settlement over the conflict in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, AUHIP convened talks between the government of Sudan and the SPLM-N in April 2013. Following acceptance by both sides during initial talks to agree to a ceasefire, to permit humanitarian access to war-affected populations, and to negotiate political and security measures to resolve the conflict, AUHIP proposed a 'Declaration of Common Intent', which included an immediate cessation of hostilities for humanitarian purposes, and the beginning of direct talks on political and security issues. However, a rift in the positions of the parties over the document frustrated further talks. The situation deteriorated further when fighting erupted between the SRF and the SAF following the SRF’s capture of the towns of Um Ruwaba and Abu Karshola in north of South Kordofan. Subsequent fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile involved the regular shelling of the South Kordofan capital of Kadugli, causing death, displacement and a humanitarian crisis.

In the communiqué issued on 29 July, the PSC expressed its ‘grave concern that the smooth implementation of the Cooperation Agreement is threatened by continuing disagreements between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan over the implementation of the Security Agreement, in particular as it applies to the redeployment of their armed forces out of the SDBZ, and the allegations of continued support to rebel groups opposed to the other state’. While urging the two countries to cooperate with the two mechanisms referred to above, the PSC urged ‘the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to respect all aspects of the Implementation Matrix, notably as they relate to the redeployment of forces out of the SDBZ’ and ‘the government of Sudan to suspend any actions to halt the transportation of oil from South Sudan until such time as these mechanisms have completed their work’.

With respect to the stalled process on the finalisation of the work of the AU Team of Experts [AUTE] assigned to produce a non-binding legal opinion on the status of the disputed border areas, the PSC called on ‘the parties to exchange their written submissions as soon as possible, leaving the AUTE to determine, by reference to the historical documents, the definition of the geographical territory with respect to Kaka’.

The conflict in the two areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile and the lack of progress on Abyei were also issues of particular concern to the PSC, which
expressed its ‘grave concern’ over the lack of implementation of the Agreement on the Temporary Administrative and Security Arrangements for the Abyei Area despite the commitments made by the leaders of the two countries on 5 January 2013. It urged them to immediately meet and resolve their differences on this issue and on the implementation of the AUHIP proposal on the settlement of the final status of Abyie. Concerning the conflict in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, the PSC emphasised the need for the government of Sudan and the SPLM-N to engage in direct negotiations aimed at political settlement and requested AUHIP to continue to avail itself to facilitate the urgently needed political negotiations. Although AUHIP arranged for talks between the two sides to resume on 12 December, it was postponed following the death of former South African President Nelson Mandela on 5 December 2013.212

Given the political situations in the two countries and the vicious cycle of deeply interlinked conflicts, it does not appear that the prevailing situation with regard to the various outstanding disputes and conflicts will change. The fact that both governments are not always in control of significant constituencies in conflict areas exacerbates an already convoluted political and security environment. Despite all the commendable efforts, the PSC, acting through AUHIP, and IGAD do not seem to be in a position to do more than attending to new tensions and ‘putting [on] a bandage’ to avoid existing ones from deteriorating further. Even then success is not always guaranteed. Under these circumstances the leverage of the PSC remains very limited. Not only is the PSC unable to place the two countries under sanction, but many of its members do not believe that sanctions will achieve the expected outcome. The UNSC, which could impose sanctions, has not been inclined to do so. At least in the short term, all that can be done is to keep on trying within the framework of AUHIP.

It is interesting to note that the PSC through AUHIP has adopted and used a wide range of tools. These include mechanisms for investigating the alleged violation of agreements, technical teams to assist with the implementation of technical agreements, an independent team of experts, and implementation and follow-up bodies.

It is well known that AUHIP is the PSC’s most dynamic and longest mediation and peacemaking framework. While AUHIP has perhaps delivered far more than any other mediation initiative launched by the PSC since its establishment in 2004, its work remains incomplete. This notwithstanding, the PSC at its meeting of 24 September 2013 expanded the mandate of AUHIP to cover the
entire Horn of Africa region\textsuperscript{213} and extended the mandate of the panel until December 2014.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF PSC RESPONSES IN 2013

As at 20 December 2013, the PSC had held 61 meetings, with only three meetings at presidential level and three at ministerial level (see annex 1). As discussed in the previous section, the PSC took a wide range of decisions on a number of peace and security issues that affected various parts of the continent. The table below provides a summary of PSC actions and summarises the results of those actions in maintaining Africa’s peace and security.

Table 5 Activities of the PSC in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>PSC activities and outcomes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Considered situations in the region 19 times. The outcomes included suspension of the CAR from AU activities for unconstitutional change of government; initiation of the establishment of ICG-CAR; the launch of a military operation in the CAR; contribution to shaping the UN decision over the authorisation of an intervention brigade that helped to end the M23 rebellion in the DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Considered situations in the region 19 times. The outcomes included a review of AMISOM and expansion of its force size; provision of support to help Sudan and South Sudan to resolve disputes over the implementation of the agreement they signed in September 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Considered the situation in the region five times, all of which focused on Egypt. The outcomes included suspension of Egypt for unconstitutional change of government and the launch of a high-level panel on Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Only one situation featured in the PSC’s four deliberations on the region, namely Madagascar. The outcomes included reactivation of the ICG-M, mediation efforts to break the stalemate on transition, and assistance with the establishment of conditions for the holding of general elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Situations in the region featured in the deliberations of the PSC eight times. The outcomes included mobilisation of diplomatic efforts for restoring constitutional order in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, culminating in the holding of national elections in Mali and an agreement on a final schedule for the holding of elections in Guinea-Bissau, and the deployment of a joint AU-ECOWAS mission (AFISMA) to help Mali regain control over its northern territory.</td>
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Source: Author’s compilation
The PSC’s meetings in 2013 produced 70 communiqués and statements. Of these, 43 were communiqués bearing binding decisions. As the data in the above table and annex 1 shows, over 70 per cent of the agenda of the PSC was dominated by situations in two regions, namely Central Africa and East Africa and the Horn of Africa. The two regions accounted for 19 statements/communiqués each. Situations in West Africa, North Africa and southern Africa resulted in the adoption of eight, five and four statements/communiqués respectively, and accounted for less than a third of the agenda of the PSC in 2013.

Reflecting on the peace and security outlook of the region in 2013 as compared to 2012, the amount of space that situations in the Central African region received on the agenda of the PSC increased by over three times. The situations in West Africa demanded one third less attention than was the case in 2012, which was mainly due to the transition of AFISMA to MINUSMA and the PSC’s increasing disengagement from the situation in Mali. In 2012, the PSC did not consider any situations in two of the five regions of the continent, namely Southern Africa and North Africa. In 2013, at least one situation from each of these two regions attracted the PSC’s attention.

As regards individual cases, the situation that attracted the most attention was the crisis in the CAR, which resulted in the adoption of 11 PSC communiqués/statements. Similarly, the situations in Sudan and South Sudan, including issues between these two countries, and situations in Darfur and in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, dominated a similar amount of the PSC’s agenda as the situation in the CAR. The eastern DRC crisis and Somalia received an equal proportion of the PSC’s agenda, with each resulting in the adoption of six communiqués/statements.

In 2013, the AU deployed new missions in Mali and the CAR. Unlike previous AU missions, both of these were deployed in collaboration with the respective regional mechanisms, namely ECOWAS and ECCAS. While the PSC mandated AFISMA in Mali with a force strength of 9 620 personnel, AFISM-CAR’s mandated force strength was 6 000 personnel. The PSC also authorised an increase in AMISOM’s force strength by 6 235, making Somalia the AU’s largest operation with a total force strength of just below 24 000 personnel, although the number the UN had authorised was about 22 000.

The total of 21 855 personnel mandated to be deployed in 2013 makes this the largest number of personnel mandated for deployment by the PSC in a single year. This can be understood in a number of ways. First, it reflects the increasing
capacity of the AU and regional mechanisms to deploy peace-support operations. Second, it can also be seen as a manifestation of the dominance of military conflict management tools in the PSC’s response to the crises on the continent. It also reflects a surge in conflict situations that demand deployment of peace support operations.
In 2014 the term of ten members of the PSC, shown in the table below, will come to an end. The election of ten new PSC members for the two-year term will take place during the 22nd Ordinary Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of AU Member States in January 2014.
In West Africa, given that Cote d’Ivoire has served two consecutive terms as member of the PSC, there will be another West African country assuming its place. Since Ghana has been a candidate for membership in the last two rounds, it is very likely that it will come back to the PSC in 2014. If the membership of the Gambia and Guinea is not renewed, the most likely other candidates are Niger and Sierra Leone, who, although parties to the PSC Protocol, have never served as members of the PSC.214

In the Central Africa region, the general practice has been for countries to serve two consecutive terms. If this practice continues, both Cameroon and the Republic of Congo are likely to remain members of the PSC for another term.

In North Africa, Egypt cannot stand for another term as it is under suspension. This means that countries such as Mauritania and/or Tunisia may come in as candidates.

Given that it is the tradition of Southern Africa to rotate the region’s seats on the PSC, it is likely that Angola and Lesotho’s seats will go to Botswana and Malawi, since these SADC members have not served in the PSC for the longest time.

The East Africa region is very difficult to predict as it does not have a particularly discernable practice in terms of rotating membership on the PSC. However, since Djibouti has served two consecutive terms, its seat will surely pass to another state. It is very likely that one of the candidates will be Eritrea, which has been seeking membership unsuccessfully in the past two elections. The Comoros and Mauritius may also stand as candidates as neither of them has ever served on the PSC. Others that could stand as candidates include Tanzania and Ethiopia. The latter was a candidate in both 2012 and 2013, although it withdrew its candidacy in the 2013 election.

As the foregoing discussion indicates, the membership of the PSC in 2014 is likely to include at least three countries that have not previously served on the council, while the others could be renewals. It will be interesting to see whether the Assembly will pursue the recommendation from the Yaoundé Retreat on ‘the need for periodic review by the Assembly of the Union with a view to assessing compliance by members of the PSC’ with the requirements of Article 5(2) of the PSC.215 Given the lack of clear guidelines to help the Assembly make assessments, there is only a very slim chance that there would be a buy-in for enforcing the requirements of Article 5(2) at the January 2014 elections.
PSC IN 2014: MAINTAINING AFRICA’S PEACE AND SECURITY

Following the same methodology of regional analysis for 2013, this section looks at the direction in which the peace and security situation of the five AU regions could develop in 2014. It does so without pretending to offer an exact prediction of how things unfold in the different regions.

North Africa

One of the most worrying developments in North Africa has been the deterioration of the political and security situation in Libya during 2013. The violence and instability has expanded to more and more parts of the country, while the level of insecurity, particularly in areas such as Tripoli and Benghazi, has increased. Although the country has not as yet descended into total anarchy and full-scale civil war, should the current trend persist, many fear that Libya will develop into a full-blown crisis.

Given the large amount of weapons moving around the country and from there to neighbouring countries, the precarious security situation in the Sahel and West Africa, and the surge in terrorist movements, a descent by Libya into anarchy is sure to affect not only North Africa and the entire Sahel region, but would be felt as far away as Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. In the light of this, the major areas of concern for the PSC on Libya in 2014 would be the continuing instability and insecurity in the country, and the spillover risks on neighbouring regions.

Egypt has also not as yet come out of conflict-ridden polarisation. In 2014, it will continue having to contend with both festering political instability in the country and insecurity in the Sinai. Other than the referendum on the constitution drafted under the military-backed transitional authorities, the challenge of a return to constitutional order after holding free and fair elections will be a major area of concern for the PSC. For the AU, a major test will be how to deal with the emergence of General Al Sissi, the Chief of the Egyptian army responsible for the unconstitutional change of government for which Egypt was suspended from participation in AU activities. He is a candidate for the presidential elections and could even emerge as its eventual winner in 2014.
West Africa and the Sahel

The situation in the wider Sahel region, the problems of terrorism and the proliferation of terrorist groups will probably be of major interest to the PSC and ECOWAS in 2014. In this regard, the insurgency into northern Nigeria, and incidents of terrorist attacks and the abduction of foreigners in countries such as Niger are certain to destabilise this region. This will no doubt be compounded further by instability in the North African (Libya and the activities of terrorist and insurgent groups) and Central African regions. A heavily securitised response as witnessed in Nigeria is unlikely to be effective, and the impact thereof will continue to be felt in neighbouring countries, especially in Niger and Cameroon.

Although PSC’s engagement would continue to remain limited in 2014, Mali will continue to contend with a number of crises. These include asymmetric warfare by insurgent groups in the North, inter-communal clashes and fighting between Malian army and Tuareg fighters operating in northern Mali.

In terms of country situations, the stalled transitional process in Guinea-Bissau will continue to occupy both organisations, with a major area of concern being the possibility of establishing the conditions for free and fair general elections and ensuring that the elections are held in March 2014, as rescheduled. Depending on how the elections go, the PSC is expected to revisit the suspension of Guinea-Bissau from AU activities. This would be critical to countries of the region, who are currently bearing the burden of keeping Guinea-Bissau financially afloat. This could also pave the way for the reengagement of international partners. Given the critical importance of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau, the PSC could lend important support to ECOWAS in its efforts to mobilise international support for the ECOMIB mission currently in the country.

Southern Africa

As things stand, apart from the situation in Madagascar, which has been ongoing since the third quarter of 2013, the PSC expects no major issue of concern to arise in this region. Concerning Madagascar, what requires the attention of the AU and SADC is the successful conclusion of the protracted transitional process and the restoration of the country to normalcy and full constitutional order. By the end of December 2013, as Madagascar held presidential
and legislative elections, the anticipation was that the PSC would revisit the suspension of Madagascar from participation in the activities of the AU early in 2014. The instability in Mozambique, if it escalates further, could necessitate PSC’s engagement.

**East Africa and the Horn of Africa**

The situations within and between the two Sudans and in Somalia will remain on the agenda of the PSC. In Sudan and South Sudan, apart from the implementation of the September 2012 agreements and the modalities signed in 2013, the situation in Darfur, the resolution of the Abyei dispute, and, importantly, containment of the conflicts in Sudan’s Blue Nile and South Kordofan states will be the issues that require the attention of the PSC and IGAD.

In Somalia, stabilisation of the areas taken from Al Shabaab, building Somalia’s security institutions, establishing government structures and pursuing national reconciliation remain the major areas of concern. In this context, the AU is expected to take the necessary steps to implement fully the decisions taken by the PSC, as well as the UN resolutions concerning AMISOM’s mandate and its increased force size. It was anticipated that in early January 2014 the AU would have the revised CONOPs ready for consideration by the PSC and the UNSC. Following its adoption, the additional troops are expected to be deployed quickly to reach AMISOM’s new force size. In the light of the rise in the threat Al Shabaab poses to the region, the offensive operation AMISOM is expected to launch in conjunction with the SNA to reclaim territories that are still under Al Shabaab control will be followed with great interest.

The situation that will attract much of AU’s efforts, at least for much of early 2014, will be the conflict in South Sudan with all its humanitarian and regional consequences. Given that the conflict shows no sign of abating and that the parties remain apart on major issues in the mediation effort taking place in Addis Ababa, the conflict will continue to cause huge destruction and displacement of people in the affected areas. The inter-ethnic dimension of the conflict would also continue to deepen.

In terms of early warning issues, the political situation in Eritrea, which appears to be deteriorating, is worth paying attention to. Similarly, given the developments witnessed in 2013, the political situation in the Sudan also requires close attention.
Central Africa

It is anticipated that the situation in the CAR will be the Central Africa’s dominant issue on the PSC’s agenda in 2014. The deployment and management of AFISM-CAR is the most urgent and crucial issue facing the AU. Major issues to be addressed include achieving the full mandated size of the mission, bringing the mission HQ into full operation, and securing the necessary funding and logistical supplies. Alongside the need by AFISM-CAR to restore law and order and facilitate the restoration of constitutional order in the country, the widespread human rights violations perpetrated in the country, and the division and animosity that now exists between the various communities also need to be addressed in order to bring the CAR back to normalcy. Apart from supporting the transitional process, the PSC should, in collaboration with the UN, pursue the deployment of a commission of inquiry and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.

As regards the situation in the eastern DRC, the activities of various armed elements in the region will continue to cause insecurity. FARDC supported by the intervention brigade will engage in fighting with these armed groups. The operation against the FDLR will be of particularly interest to neighbouring Rwanda and hence has huge regional security importance. For the PSC, this is an area where there is room for the AU to play a much more active role related to the implementation of the Framework Agreement. Apart from facilitating closer collaboration between ICGLR and SADC, other areas for consideration should include increasing the profile of the special representative and articulating a joint strategy on the implementation of both the Framework Agreement and the Kampala Agreement signed in Nairobi between Kinshasa and the M23.
6 Conclusion and Recommendations

The peace and security landscape of Africa remains fraught with existing and emerging challenges. In 2013 the continent witnessed much more instability and insecurity than in 2012. This is reflected by the fact that Central Africa and North Africa experienced dramatic deteriorations in their peace and security status, while West Africa, the Sahel, and East Africa and the Horn of Africa did not experience any great improvement in the level of their insecurity and instability. Indeed, by the end of the year, the insecurity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa worsened following the eruption of conflict in South Sudan on 15 December 2013.

The experiences in the DRC, Mali, the CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt show that a significant number of African countries remain under the dark shadow of violent conflict and major political instability. Indeed, if the events witnessed in 2013 are anything to go by, one fully understands the AU’s rare admission that ‘Africa still faces persistent conflicts, insecurity and instability in different regions of the continent’. And this is despite the economic successes of many countries in Africa.

The review of these various situations indicates that three major factors seem to account for this new surge in conflict and instability in Africa. The first relates to changes in the internal power dynamic of affected countries and/or
the emergence of opportunities for such changes and the resultant violent power struggle between rival actors. This is particularly the case with respect to Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Mali and Egypt. The second major factor is the existence of peace agreements whose implementation (or lack of) created disaffection on the part of interested actors. This was a major factor in the crises in eastern DRC and the CAR. Regional factors including security and other interests of neighbouring countries and the spillover effects of a conflict situation in a neighbouring country constitute the third factor. These regional factors played significant part in the crisis in Mali, eastern DRC, CAR and even South Sudan.

The situations PSC engaged reveals that the PSC and regional mechanisms continue to show a willingness to respond to situations on the continent, notwithstanding the fact that the PSC’s engagements in 2013 achieved less than in 2012. While there were rare instances where AU engagement produced negative outcomes, in many cases such engagement resulted in little progress.

The most notable success story in 2013 was the progress registered in Madagascar, which explains the improvement in the peace and security outlook of the Southern African region compared to what it was in 2012. The AU-led regional operation against the LRA also registered encouraging military gains. AU and regional actions prompted by the PSC also contributed to helping Sudan and South Sudan to overcome disagreements that threatened some of the progress made following the signing of the September 2012 agreements on post-secession issues. With much of the effort directed at the issues between the two countries, little attention was paid to the mounting intra-South Sudan political crisis until it erupted into violent conflict in December 2013.

African actors also continue to shape the engagement of international actors. In 2013, this was particularly visible in the unprecedented decision of the UN to deploy an intervention brigade as part of its peacekeeping operation in DRC to undertaking offensive operations against identified targets.

Another area where progress was registered was with respect to the PSC’s efforts to improve its effectiveness through reviewing its working methods and increasing the frequency and nature of its engagement. Convening a total of 61 sessions, the PSC met more times in 2013 than it has since becoming operational in 2004. The PSC also showed an increasing willingness to have a direct and close understanding of the situations it deals with, and thus undertook the highest number of field visits ever in 2013.
While Mali saw improvement in its political and security conditions compared to 2012 as it regained control over its northern territories and successfully concluding general elections, the contribution of the AU to these successes was limited. This was partly because the AU and ECOWAS failed to assume leadership during the advance of Islamist militants towards Bamako. Quite apart from the rivalry and lack of understanding between various African actors, the AU’s inadequate contribution to resolving the crisis in Mali was also in significant measure attributable to the preference of Malian authorities for non-African (French) intervention and for a subsequent UN takeover of AFISMA.

The role the AU played with regard to the situation in the eastern DRC was similarly insignificant. There are at least two explanations for this. First, the AU did not assign a high-profile representative for the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes Region. As the UN and/or regional mechanisms (ICGLR and SADC) took leadership of the military and political processes to resolve the crisis, the AU’s role remained marginal and subsidiary. Second, the AU was unable to reverse the reluctant and quiet position it adopted after the M23 rebellion broke out in 2012.220

Despite the fact that the PSC dedicated the largest percentage of its agenda to the situation in the CAR, it managed to deploy no effective response other than suspending the CAR from its activities and putting together the ICG-CAR. It did not manage to initiate a rapid and effective deployment to arrest the rampage of Séléka rebels and the sectarian violence that ensued following the fall of Bangui. In an abdication of its responsibility, or its impotence to assert its authority over regional actors, the PSC failed to assume leadership over the situation in the CAR in the face of the double failure of ECCAS forces. First, despite their mandate to protect Bangui, ECCAS forces, by failing to act, allowed Séléka rebels to enter the capital, hence paving the way for the country's descent into violent anarchy. Second, after allowing them to take over the country, ECCAS forces utterly failed to take any meaningful action to stop the Séléka and other armed groups from perpetrating the widespread violations that brought the country to the verge of a genocidal civil war. As was the case in Mali, once again (AU) African countries failed to come to the rescue of the people of the CAR. As in Mali, in a curious turn of events, it was France, a former colonial power supportive of Séléka’s forcible seizure of power from Bozize’s government, that rose to the occasion and filled the apparent vacuum by deploying its forces to the CAR within the framework of a UNSC resolution.
As became apparent from experiences in Mali and the CAR, the willingness of the PSC and regional mechanisms to act is generally not backed by the required resources and capacity. Similarly, despite the surge in Africa’s peacekeeping deployment capability, the problem of ‘too few good wo/men’ remains a challenge as the inability of AFISMA, AFISM-CAR and the RTF of the RCI-LRA to meet their mandated force strengths have illustrated.

Not unexpectedly, the ability of the PSC to deal with conflicts and crises varied from case to case. Factors that affected the PSC’s role in 2013 include divisions between AU member states, their inability or failure to mobilise the necessary diplomatic, financial and military resources, and failure to take measures that are appropriate and timely. External factors that affected the PSC’s role and influence included the nature of the involvement of international actors and the level of convergence between the AU and the UN.

Despite its increasing role and importance, the political authority of the PSC vis-à-vis regional mechanisms is also not firmly established and well recognised across the regional spectrum. The role of the PSC as the principal site of engagement with the major issues and controversies of the day on peace and security in Africa has faced serious challenges, particularly in relation to the situations in Mali and the CAR. Indeed, a tendency of defying or refusing to accept the role of the PSC has been witnessed on the part of some regional mechanisms. One manifestation of this was the refusal of ECCAS countries to comply with the decisions of the PSC to isolate the Séléka leaders.

As the AU-SADC joint effort for resolving the stalemate in Madagascar illustrated, success demands that regional mechanisms and the AU recognise each other’s roles and show willingness to work together. In this context, due regard should be had to the commitment made under the PSC Protocol regarding full support to and cooperation with the PSC for implementing its decisions.

It is clear from the foregoing that AU member states did not show the required commitment to supporting the opportunity the PSC offers for realising Pax Africana. In some instances, AU member states were either unwilling or unable to do all that they could or, as in the CAR, to do things right, in order to resolve crises. The situations in Mali and CAR demonstrate this vividly. The responses marshalled by African countries, whether acting through regional mechanisms or the AU, were too little or too late on both occasions. The ensuing security gap prompted France, a former colonial power in both countries, to come to the ‘rescue’. In other cases, African states lacked the required
capacity and leverage for deploying the responses needed to resolve crises. In the meantime, the AU continues to rely on the financial, diplomatic and logistical support of non-African actors.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Role of AU member states

There is now a need to ask and seriously debate whether AU member states are doing all that they can to resolve the conflicts and crises that the continent continues to face. As long as they are not doing all they can and do not do so the right way, the AU will remain unable to marshal the responses required for maintaining peace and security on the continent. The failure to deploy effective responses in a timely manner will create a vacuum that will allow external actors to assume control over the peace and security agenda of the continent.

There is a need for leading member countries to assume responsibility of achieving consensus on responses to conflicts and mobilising the larger AU membership to act on such consensus. Without strong pan-African leadership, the divisions and lack of common action witnessed in 2013 is unlikely to be reversed. Equally important, AU member states should also live up to the commitment they made under the PSC Protocol by mobilising not only diplomatic efforts but also the required military and financial resources. This is key if the opportunity of realising Pax Africana and to it having any realistic prospect of coming to reality anytime in the foreseeable future.

African Peace and Security Architecture

The events witnessed in 2013 and the responses they triggered require critical reflection on the adequacy of the APSA as it was originally conceived and is currently designed. There is no doubt that African peacekeeping deployment capability has increased exponentially. This notwithstanding, African states were unable to undertake rapid and effective operations. Even the strongest armies on the continent lack the air and transport capabilities for undertaking an operation similar to Operation Sevral. The ability of the AU to deploy an effective response to more than one situation also remains limited.
While the ASF is one way through which AU member states hope to rectify some of these limitations, it remains unrealised. Given that the trend in conflicts and security threats demands deploying rapid, robust, agile and effective operations, it is not clear if the ASF, made up of contributions from all member states and organised into five regional standby forces, is suitable for undertaking operations of this kind. In the light of this, it may be time to consider a parallel path that taps on the available capacity of countries with recognised capacity and a proven record of deployment. In this context, the AU proposal for the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis should be seized as an opportunity for thinking outside the box to create an effective approach to enable the AU to undertake rapid deployment.

The institutionalisation of APSA along regional lines also raises questions about the role of regional mechanisms vis-à-vis the AU in situations that require intensive military intervention, continental engagement and are trans-regional in their scope.

There is also the increasing need for shifting from the current ‘fire-fighting’ approach that dominates the PSC’s responses to conflict prevention. In this regard, it is imperative to make increasing use of various preventative tools and early warning and early response mechanisms. This requires devoting increasing time to considering and reviewing the situation of fragile countries and countries in transition from conflict that indicate a risk.

**AU and regional mechanisms on conflict prevention, management and resolution**

As the differences between the AU and regional mechanisms over Mali and the CAR have illustrated, it has also become imperative that the gaps in the current cooperation and consultation framework between the PSC and regional mechanisms are fixed if policy disagreements and political paralysis are to be reduced. First, it is necessary that both the AU and regional mechanism recognise each others roles and allow themselves to work together. Second, there is a need to clearly settle the issue of priority between the AU and regional mechanisms on peace and security and articulate a commonly accepted division of labour to determine who takes what actions, when and how. Third, both the AU and regional mechanisms should accept and develop a mechanism of undertaking regular consultations when considering decisions on issues of common concern.
It should be a requirement that the input of the other is sought and considered before any one level adopts a decision on such issues.

**Necessity of partnering for peace in Africa**

No single actor can by itself alone resolve conflicts and crises in Africa. While it is understandable and crucial that African actors play a central role in the search for solutions, in most cases they are not in a position to take the actions necessary to achieve peace, either because they lack the resources or because the taking of such actions requires the participation of others. It comes as no surprise that in most of the AU’s responses to the peace and security issues in 2013, the role of a wide range of actors has been crucial.

In this regard, it is now well established that cooperation with the UN and mobilising support from partners is a critical component of successful African efforts to tackle the plethora of challenges to peace and security. It is necessary that the AU takes full advantage of the available international goodwill and support. In the context of its relationship with the UN, this is particularly the case with respect to the opportunity that non-permanent members of the UNSC present for advancing the cause of Africa within the UNSC. This should not be limited to African non-permanent members of the UNSC only. It should significantly include other non-permanent members who can give visibility and voice to the views of the AU within the UNSC.

The trick for successful partnerships for peace and security in Africa is in finding a flexible framework that best combines African leadership that searches for a solution and the valuable (political, technical, resource and logistical) leverage that the UN and others bring to bear for the effective implementation of initiatives. Unfortunately, the visible failure of African countries to prevent the deterioration of situations in Mali and the CAR, and the resultant intervention by the French, indicates that there is currently not enough supply of the required African leadership. Similarly, the risk of global powers taking advantage of their role for advancing their interests in a way that undermines the immediate resolution of crises and the interests of affected societies is an issue warranting candid and serious consideration.

As things stands today, the ideals of *Pax Africana* can only be implemented by tapping into a partnership that draws on the comparative advantages of all significant regional and global actors.
Notes


2 This formulation is a problematic one for it assumes that there is a common African approach and that the problems are just African. Its reformulation as 'African-led solutions to problems in Africa' best captures the essence of this ideal.

3 As this review will show, the possibility of achieving this ideal through the PSC depends on the willingness and ability of AU member states to assume full responsibility for the peace and security of the continent by living up to the commitments they made under the PSC Protocol.

4 When the PSC was launched in March 2004, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Council heralded the inauguration of the Council as an 'historic watershed in Africa’s progress towards resolving its conflicts and building durable peace' on the continent. See PSC communiqué, 10th meeting of the PSC, PSC/AHG/COMM(IX), 25 May 2004.

5 Report of the Peace and Security Council to the AU Assembly on its activities and on the state of peace and security in Africa, May 2013, Assembly/AU/5(XXI) para. 6.

6 This is the expression used in the PSC Protocol to refer to sub-regional peace and security mechanisms, which are commonly known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

7 In this context, ‘the wider international community’ refers to non-African countries and organisations acting independently of the UN with respect to peace and security issues in Africa.

8 The Séléka, a name that means alliance in the Sango language, is a coalition of several armed groups, such as the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the newly formed Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and the Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention (CPSK). They are joined by fighters coming from Chad and Darfur.


11 ICG Africa Report 203, above, 15.


14 Ibid.


16 See ICG Africa Report No. 203, above, 19-20. Ibid.


22 According to the UN Food Programme, more than a million people are at the risk of hunger See http://allafrica.com/stories/201311081466.html?aa_source=slideout (accessed on 8 November 2013)


26 See Alison, above.

27 The communiqué of the ICGLR of 24 November 2012 was the basis for M23’s withdrawal from Goma.


36 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 30 September 2013, para 17.

37 Ibid. para. 16.

Consultation with an officer of the Election Unit of the Department of Political Affairs, AU Commission, 4 December 2013.


The plan was for AFISMA to be deployed in September 2013, but with the situation on the ground changing so fast deployment started with support from the US, France, the UK and Canada in January 2013.


See Mali: The rush to the vote, *Africa Confidential* Vol. 54 No. 10, (10 May 2013) 5-6.


See A tenuous solution in Mali: between internal constraint and external pressure, ECOWAS Peace and Security Report, Issue 5 (ISS, 5 July 2013), 2; Dorrie, above.

Dorrie, above.

Some of the soldiers involved in the mutiny were executed extra-judicially and a colonel disappeared. Sanogo was moved from the Kati military barracks to a residence in Bamako and some 20 officers, including Sanogo's deputy, were arrested.


Ibid.


Ibid.

The siege on the GNC on 5 March, which forced the legislative body to suspend its activities temporarily; an armed attack the same day on a vehicle carrying the then-president of the GNC, Mohammed El-Magariaf; the temporary detention of the prime minister in October; and the shutting down of gas pipeline by Berber protesters on 30 September citing marginalisation exemplify the trend.


Incidents include the 14 June attack on security buildings that killed nine soldiers; the 19 June bombing of the National Security Directorate building; the attacks against Hamed al-Hassi, the military chief of the Cyrenaica Council, and air force Colonel Fathi al-Omami on 4 and 15 July respectively; the 24 July bomb attack on the Benghazi police station; and the assassinations of activist Abdelsalam al-Mismari, reporter Izzedin Qassad and anti-explosives officer Mustafa al-Maghribi on 27 July, and 9 and 23 August respectively.


This despite the fact that a UN Monitoring Group Report clearly identified Al Shabaab's strength, areas of control and incidents of Al Shabaab attacks.


84 The other four disputed areas are Kafia Kingi, Kaka town, Jebel Megines and Joda.


88 Ibid.


91 See Annual Review of the PSC 2012/2013, 29.


97 Ibid.


100 Conclusions of the Yaoundé Retreat on the Working Methods of the PSC (16 November 2012), para. 2.

101 This happened with Zimbabwe. Despite the fact that it was a member of the PSC until April 2013, it did not have a chance to chair the PSC.


103 Conclusions of the Yaoundé Retreat, para. 5.

104 Ibid., para. 8.

105 Ibid., paras 6 & 7.

106 In a consultation I had on 5 December 2013 with an official of the EU Delegation to the AU it was stated that there is increasing lack of clarity on when and who participates in PSC meetings, since partners are being excused from participation even in sessions that directly concern them.

107 Conclusions of the Yaoundé Retreat, para. 10.

108 Ibid.

109 Consultation with a defense attaché of a member of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 24 May 2013.

110 Consultation with a member of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 7 November 2013.

111 See AU PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXXIV), Communiqué on the situation in Egypt, 384th meeting of the PSC (5 July 2013).

113 See Modalities for the election of members of the PSC, para. 7.
114 See Modalities for the election of members of the PSC, para. 9.
115 See PSC Protocol, Arts. 7(1)(j) & 16.
116 Ibid., Arts. 7(1)(k) & 17.
118 See Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, 8 December 2013, para. 8.4.
120 Lesotho, one of the Southern African members of the PSC, held the chair for the month.
121 PSC communiqué on the situation in Madagascar, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.1 (CCCLV), para. 4.
122 Communiqué of Summit of the SADC Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, 10 May 2013 (Cape Town, South Africa), paras. 7.4 & 7.7.
123 PSC communiqué on the situation in Madagascar, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXVI), paras. 3 & 5.
124 See communiqué of the 7th meeting of the International Contact Group on Madagascar (26 June 2013).
125 Ibid., para. 7.
126 Ibid., para. 8.
127 Ibid., para. 9.
128 Following his departure from the AU to assume a new role as Foreign Minister of Algeria, Ambassador Lamamra was replaced by Ambassador Samaïl Chergui, who previously served as Algeria’s Ambassador to Ethiopia.
129 See AUC communiqué, AU and SADC intensify their joint efforts to accelerate the resolution of the crisis in Madagascar (2 August 2013).
130 See AUC communiqué, The African Union welcomes the decision of the Special Electoral Court of Madagascar regarding the list of candidates for the forthcoming election (17 August 2013).
131 PSC communiqué on the situation in Madagascar, AU Doc. PSC/PR/2.(CCCLXXXV), para. 8.
132 Ibid.

In operation since 2008 with a force strength of 730 troops, MICOPAX is composed of forces from the DRC, Congo, Cameroon and Gabon. It deployed in Bangui and in the localities of Kaga-Bandoro, Ndele and Paoua. The principal objectives of MICOPAX are to ensure the security of the capital and the rest of the country, and to provide support to humanitarian action and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

PSC communiqué on the situation in CAR (23 March 2013), AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLXII), para. 6

PSC communiqué on the situation in CAR (25 March 2013), AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLXIII), para. 8.

Exchange with an UN expert on the situation in the CAR, 24 October 2013.


Ibid.

Exchange with a UN expert on the situation in CAR, 24 October 2013.


According to the concept of operations, while the core of AFISM-CAR was mainly to be composed of MICOPAX elements, it would also be reinforced by contingents from other countries. See http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2013_476.pdf


Under the AMISOM model the UN provides logistics support to UN-authorised AU missions from UN-assessed contributions, rather than from voluntary contributions and trust funds.

151 Communication with head of AU PSD, 4 January 2014.


153 The UN has been considering how to reinforce its current mission in DRC, MONUSCO, to enable it to discharge its mandate on the protection of civilians and to monitor the flow of arms.

154 Two major areas of concern were raised. The first was the mechanism envisaged for monitoring the implementation of national commitments made under the framework agreement by the government of DRC. The second was the proposed deployment of an intervention force and the need to adjust MONUSCO’s mandate.

155 The version of the framework agreement signed on 24 February left out the international mechanism for monitoring national commitments envisaged in the initial version. Agreement had also been reached on the deployment of an intervention brigade within the framework of MONUSCO, but with coercive mandate.

156 Initially the plan was to appoint former AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping as the Special Envoy. But this did not go down very well with the AU Commission, hence the appointment of former President Mary Robison.


159 See Report of the UN Secretary-General, 30 September 2013, para. 16.


161 See Report of the UN Secretary-General on the activities of the UN Regional Office to Central Africa and on the Lord’s Resistance Army affected-regions, 20 May 2012, UN Doc. S/2013/297.


164 Ibid.

165 Communiqué of the 321st meeting of the PSC, 22 May 2012, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCXXI), para. 7.


169 Interaction with an official of a member state of the PSC, 2 December 2013; interaction with officials from EU delegation, 5 December 2013.

170 Interaction with a senior policy officer at AU PSD on 6 December 2013.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.


174 AU PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLVIII), communiqué on the situation in Mali, 358th meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2013 para. 13.


176 Consultation with a senior officer at the AU PSOD on 16 May 2013.

177 AU PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI), communiqué on the situation in Mali, 371st meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 25 April 2013, para. 10.


185 Ibid.

186 These mainly include PSC members from South Africa.

187 Consultation with a member of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 7 November 2013.


193 According to a senior official of the UN, this decision was taken for reasons having to do with internal UN issues, (from the records of the ISS Seminar on the State of Peace and Security in Africa and the response of the PSC held on 29 November 2013, on file with author).


195 Ibid., para. 21.


197 Ibid., para. 9.

198 Ibid., para. 11.

199 Ibid., para. 13.


201 AU PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCCLXXV), communiqué on the situation in Somalia, 375th meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 10 May 2013, paras. 4 & 5.


203 Ibid., para. 60.

204 AU PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLXXIX), communiqué on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM, 379th meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 13 June 2013, para. 7.

205 See AU PSC/PR/2.(CCCLXXIX) para. 27.


207 AU PSC/PR/2.(CCXCIX), communiqué on the Joint AU-UN benchmarking exercise and review of AMISOM, 399th meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa 10 October 2013, paras 10 & 12.


210 The team of experts consisting of two jurists and one cartographer was established in August 2012 and operates with the support of technical advisors. It is chaired by a former judge of the International Court of Justice, Judge Abdul G Koroma.


213 PSC/AHG/COMM/2.(CCCXCVII), communiqué on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan, 397th meeting of the PSC, New York (23 September 2013), para. 16.

214 Other countries from the West Africa region that have not served on the PSC are Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia. Of these only Guinea-Bissau is a party to the PSC Protocol, but cannot serve on the Council because of its suspension.

215 These requirements include a) commitment to uphold the principles of the Union; b) contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa with experience in peace support operations being an added advantage; c) capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership; d) participation in conflict resolution, peace-making and peace-building at regional and continental levels; e) willingness and ability to take up responsibility for regional and continental conflict resolution initiatives; f) contribution to the peace fund and/or special fund created for a specific purpose; g) respect for constitutional governance in accordance with the Lomé Declaration, as well as the rule of law and human rights; h) having a sufficiently staffed and equipped permanent mission at the AU HQ and the UN to be able to shoulder the responsibilities that go with the membership; and j) commitment to honor financial obligations to the Union.


217 Ethiopia is anticipated to provide the full supplement of additional troops, something many of the major AMISOM TCCs are not particularly happy about. Consultation with a senior PSO planning officer at AU PSD, 19 December 2013.


219 See note 5 above.

## Sessions of the PSC in 2013

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*Source Compiled by author and Lydia Atomsa*
From the Central African Republic (CAR) to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Egypt, Libya and Mali, Africa experienced a resurgence of conflict and violent instability in 2013. These and other crisis situations drew a wide range of responses from the Peace and Security Council (PSC) – the body that offers Africa the opportunity to realise Pax Africana. The 2013/2014 Annual Review presents data and analysis relevant to policy, both with regard to the work of the PSC during the year and to major developments shaping the peace and security landscape of Africa in 2013. As such, it provides comprehensive information on and analysis of the decisions adopted by the PSC in its effort to maintain Africa’s peace and security. Drawing on experiences in various crisis situations, including Mali, Madagascar, CAR and Somalia, it also critically examines the roles of the PSC, the African Union Commission (AUC), regional mechanisms and international actors working with or alongside the PSC, highlighting areas where these diverse role-players did and did not work well together and the implications thereof. In so doing, the Annual Review draws attention to existing and emerging issues requiring attention for improving Africa’s response and international engagement on peace and security in Africa.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Solomon Ayele Dersso is a Senior Researcher at the Addis Ababa office of the Institute for Security Studies. As a researcher on African Union (AU) affairs, apart from studying and publishing on the Peace and Security Council of the AU for several years, he briefed the Council on different occasions. He recently served as the Legal Advisor to the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) Team of Experts on the boundary dispute between Sudan and South Sudan. Solomon holds a PhD degree in constitutional and international law from the University of the Witwatersrand.