Niger Delta militancy and the challenge of criminalising terrorism in Nigeria

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Introduction

‘With the high rate of militant activities in [the] Niger Delta, attack[s] on oil installation[s], kidnapping and other violent activities in the region, one wonders if we have not acquired a terrorist status. We need this bill to end it all.’

– Senator Anyim Ude

‘We should ensure that we do not go back to draconian ways where freedom of expression will be hampered by the bill. We need to revisit the bill to propound a national security bill that will capture our culture, tradition and political development. We cannot jump into it because developed nations are doing it. It must be in tandem with our socio-economic and political development.’

– Senator Nkech Nwogu

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‘… the Senate would be mistaken to relate the genuine agitation of the Niger Delta people for justice to terrorism.’
– Senator Emmanuel Pualker

The statements above capture the dilemma inherent in Nigeria’s quest to provide a legislative solution to what is perceived as the greatest threat to international peace and security (terrorism) and what has gained notoriety as Nigeria’s greatest security challenge (Niger Delta militancy). Recognising it in his seven-point agenda, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua acknowledged that the Niger Delta crisis gives his administration nightmares. However, it appears that in spite of the president’s anxiety over the Niger Delta situation, the Nigerian Legislature (National Assembly) is resolved to risk controversy by using a legislative strategy to deal with terrorism, in particular to remedy the Niger Delta militancy situation.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council passed several resolutions in condemnation of international terrorism and called on all member states to enact or amend existing legislation to criminalise all acts of terrorism. In Nigeria the National Assembly seized the opportunity of criminalising terrorism to subsume the Niger Delta militancy, since they argued that the latter had taken on a terrorist dimension.

Accordingly, the Nigerian government initiated two pieces of legislation to address its security challenges. The first was the inclusion of two sections in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004, followed by the presentation of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill to the Senate in 2006.

However, both these pieces of legislation met stiff opposition from some sections of the Nigerian population, and especially from the Niger Delta community, who contended that the bill was a ploy by government (using the Legislature) to criminalise their legitimate agitations for resource control. Their sustained opposition and criticism from other groups led to the defeat of the bill in September 2006, with most senators arguing that the definition of terrorism in the bill was too wide.

In 2007 the government resolved to enact comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation, basing its necessity on the escalating Niger Delta upheavals. This culminated in a new anti-terrorism bill before the Senate, but with the same content as the 2006 bill. Intriguingly, the unanimous rejection of the 2006 bill witnessed a dramatic reversal, as most senators gave the new bill qualified approval.

From the foregoing the following questions arise: Is the militancy in the Niger Delta terrorism a liberation struggle or mere criminality? Is an anti-terrorism law the solution to the perennial conflict in the Niger Delta? How can Nigeria criminalise terrorism without thereby exacerbating the Niger Delta crisis?
Niger Delta militancy: Causes, origins and dimensions

The Niger Delta region covers an area of about 75 000 km² in landmass and is located in the southernmost region of Nigeria. It is Africa's and the world's third largest mangrove grove, one of the world's biggest freshwater swamps and Nigeria's most bio-diverse area. The Niger Delta is home to over 30 million people who live in about 13 400 aboriginal communities, mainly farmers and coastal fishermen, and belong to over 40 ethnic groups. The region has an estimated 40 billion barrels in oil reserves in addition to its enormous wealth in forest and water resources. The Niger Delta region is of critical geo-strategic importance in the global energy equation and for national economic survival. In 2002 Nigeria was the fifth largest supplier of crude oil to the United States, with exports averaging nearly 600 000 barrels per day. This figure trebled by 2006 before the upsurge of militancy in the region.

Despite the enormous natural resources of the Niger Delta, its strategic significance to global energy security, and its importance to Nigeria's national survival, the region has suffered perennial neglect. Although oil is produced from its bowels, the Niger Delta remains in poverty, deprivation and environmental despoliation. The magnitude of the environmental impact of oil exploration/extraction activities in the Niger Delta area has been documented in the literature. Poverty in the region is on the increase and is the highest of all six of Nigeria’s geo-political regions. In its Human Development Index the 2006 Niger Delta Human Development Report paints a gloomy picture of the delta, recording a score of 0.564 with 1 being the highest score.

In terms of Nigeria's legal regime, ownership of land and all mineral resources vest in the state. In terms of section 44(3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, the entire property in and control of all mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon the land or territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of Nigeria are vested in the federal government. Similarly, state ownership of land in Nigeria has also been given statutory authority. In terms of section 1 of the Land Use Act, all land is vested in the state and held in trust for the use and benefit of all Nigerians. The combined effect of these provisions is that the federal government, through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, grants exploratory and production rights to multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) through joint venture agreements. The result of this exploitation has been that the host communities are excluded from participation and do not share in the benefits, either.

The exclusion of local communities from the economic benefits of oil production triggered demonstrations against the entrenched legal order by those demanding resource ownership, leading to sporadic revenue-sharing configurations. From the initial post-independence formula in which each region was allowed to retain 50 per cent of the
tax revenue derived from the area, the formula depreciated persistently until it was later abolished in 1982 and replaced with a special package of 1.5 per cent of federal revenue for the development of oil-producing areas. The special fund was increased to 13 per cent in 1996 but has since stagnated.

Attempts at increasing the revenue received by the Niger Delta region have met with vicious opposition from the government, which is representative of three major ethnic groups. Okaba argues that ‘as an integral part of the pathologies of the state-led accumulation process, elites of the big three (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo) have in spite of their occasional squabbles united themselves in their outrage against the principle of derivation which has drastically declined now that the major resources have shifted from cocoa (in the Yoruba West), groundnut (in the Hausa/Fulani North), and palm oil (in the Igbo East) to oil and gas extracted from the bowels of the minority ethnic groups who inhabit the Niger Delta wetlands’. This assertion was manifest at the last political reform conference in 2005, where the major ethnic groups ganged up against the Niger Delta delegation and denied its request for a 50 per cent share of income derived from resource exploitation.

The militancy in the Niger Delta is therefore occasioned by the endemic poverty of the locals, flagrant environmental degradation and destruction of livelihood sources by MNOCs, marginalisation and inequitable distribution of revenue, repression and human right abuses. A preponderance of scholarly works give credence to these assertions; for instance, Imobighe argued that instead of creating real wealth for the people of the Niger Delta region, the prosperity generated from oil production in the region has brought about environmental dislocation, instability, corruption and repression. It is paradoxical that rather than guarantee social and economic security, oil has become a source of insecurity to the aborigines, and rather than a guarantor of human security in the delta, the state has become its major violator.

Niger Delta militancy is not a new phenomenon. As early as 1966, Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, a former police officer from the delta, led a rebellion against the Nigerian state with the aim of achieving liberation for the Niger Delta people. Boro recruited 40 men into an organisation known as the Niger Delta Volunteer Force and trained them in the use of firearms and explosives. On 23 February 1966 the men attacked a police station at Yenagoa, raided the armoury and kidnapped some officers (including the police officer in command of the station), blew up oil pipelines and engaged the police in a gunfight. They further declared the Niger Delta an independent republic. However, this republic lasted only 12 days, after which Boro and his men were arrested, tried for treason and sentenced to death (though the sentence was not carried out).

In the 1990s the resurgence of local resistance against the Nigerian state and the MNOCs took a more radical but non-violent turn. In 1990 Ken Saro-Wiwa, an Ogoni
environmental activist, founded the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) to fight persistent human and environmental rights abuses, continuous economic deprivation and social and political disenfranchisement. The movement used non-violent strategies similar to the civil rights movement of the 1960s in the US. The MOSOP drafted the Ogoni Bill of Rights which sought to secure a share of the oil revenues from Ogoni land, reduce environmental degradation by the MNOCs and secure political autonomy and participation in the affairs of the republic as a distinct and separate entity. The activities of MOSOP received local and international attention and permeated to other Niger Delta communities, so that protests against the activities of MNOCs escalated. On 4 January 1993 MOSOP organised a mass protest which attracted approximately 300 000 participants. This was followed by a riot in May 1994 during which four pro-government Ogoni leaders were murdered by irate youths, thus setting the stage for the arrest and subsequent hanging of Saro-Wiwa and eight of his colleagues by the military junta led by General Abacha.

The extreme repression of the protests by the military government momentarily calmed down the agitators. However, the resistance resurfaced with greater intensity in 1998, when Ijaw youths gathered in the town of Kaiama to endorse what would later become known as the Kaiama Declaration. The youths declared that all land and natural resources within the Ijaw territory belonged to Ijaw communities and further denounced all laws that robbed their people of their land and resources. The Kaiama Declaration was the harbinger of the contemporary form of violence by the militants, who abandoned the non-violent stance of Saro-Wiwa, and embraced massive disruption of oil installations, car bombings, taking of hostages (especially expatriate workers and politicians), and indiscriminate attacks on and killing of security/military personnel as their modus operandi.

Unfortunately, whereas the genuine agitations of the Niger Delta people for environmental and resource equality attract sympathy, the struggle has been fouled by being mixed with obviously criminal substance, thus begging the question whether their activities constitute terrorism, a liberation struggle or sheer criminality. In the next part of this article an attempt is made to answer this question.

**Niger Delta militancy: Terrorism, liberation struggle or criminality?**

Scholars and analysts are still grappling with this intractable question. Nevertheless, the analysis below attempts to provide a thesis that gives qualified justification to the people’s dissent as a form of liberation struggle against human rights violations by the state and
In order to provide an analytical solution to this question, it is necessary to start with a short conceptual analysis of terrorism and liberation struggles.

Section 15 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, which is the existing law on terrorism, defines it as follows:

… any act which is a violation of the Criminal Code or the Penal Code and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing an act, or to adopt or abandon a particular stand point or to act according to certain principles; or disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or create general insurrection in a state; or any promotion, sponsorship of, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any acts stated above …

On the other hand, a revolutionary struggle is associated with a political programme aimed at a fundamental transformation of a social order. It is defensive in nature because it does not aim at attaining privileges or protecting vested interests of one group at the expense of others. Instead, it usually takes the form of resistance against obvious social evils such as exploitation, domination, repression and discrimination. Its goals are greater equality, justice and freedom for an increased number of the population. A liberation struggle, otherwise known as ‘self-determination’, is an important principle of international law and indeed regarded as a fundamental human right.

The operational basis of the right to self-determination is, however, subject to deception, as states generally concede it only to the extent to which exercising it will not lead to any action that could cause the disintegration of the sovereign state or violate its territorial and political integrity. States have persistently argued that only colonised peoples, people under foreign political, economic or cultural domination and the entire population living in an independent and sovereign state qualify as ‘people’ for the purpose of exercising the right to self-determination. Consequently, states generally resist attempts by the UN, its organs and scholars to expand the frontiers of this right to cover minority groups.

The boundary between legitimate dissidence or freedom fighting and terrorist activity is a difficult one which involves a question of perspective and which is vulnerable to
changes in judgement over time. Africa has a history of colonial subjugation by Western powers and many African nations earned their liberation through revolutionary violence, which the West regarded as terrorism. Indeed, great African leaders like Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Sam Nujoma were labelled terrorists and the revolutionary movements they founded to achieve self-determination as terrorist organisations.

Viewed against the definition of terrorism in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, the militancy in the Niger Delta may therefore appear to constitute terrorism. In practice, however, the issue is more complex. One problem with a general and all-inclusive definition of terrorism (as the one in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act) is that it could criminalise the legitimate acts of persons struggling against state oppression or to set up a free state and hence conflict with the right to self-determination.

For the Niger Delta people, the struggle in the region is for self-determination against expropriation of their natural resources by the Nigerian state and not terrorism as the state asserts. Analysts on the whole support the view that the conflict in the region is a result of a history of injustice, inequality and inequity. On this basis, therefore, their violence against the state and the oil companies that personify this injustice, is justified in accordance with the principles of a liberation struggle.

Second, the militant groups in the Niger Delta enjoy substantial local support. From the Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1990 to the Kaiama Declaration of 1998, the people of the Niger Delta have always been unanimous in their desire to assume ownership of their resources and they have consequently endorsed a militant approach to realise these goals. Although the political elites in the region may seem removed from the militants as far as political goals are concerned, the fact that they do support the aim of resource control is indicative of their underlying support. This support of the Niger Delta political elites is also implicit in the sophistication of the militant groups (in terms of armament and strategy), the enormous resources at their disposal and the elite’s persistent opposition to branding the militants as terrorists.

Consistent with the African Union’s position on terrorism and the theoretical extrapolations reviewed above, one can therefore argue that the Niger Delta militants are not terrorists but liberation fighters. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s response to the liberation struggle is consistent with state practice in relation to self-determination. The Nigerian state crushed a cessation attempt by the Igbos between 1968 and 1970 and the Adaka Boro 12-day revolution in 1966, and refused to acknowledge the Ogoni Bill of Rights of 1991 or the Kaiama Declaration of 1999. It is therefore unlikely that the renewed insurgency in the delta will be treated differently, particularly as the state refers to their activities as terrorism and the Joint Task Force has declared war on the militants.
Equally, it is inappropriate to refer to the militants as common criminals or ‘criminal terrorists’ as some scholars do. Although the concept of criminal terrorism in itself is confusing, Wilkinson defines criminal terrorism as the systematic use of acts of terror for objectives of private material gain. This definition does provide a framework for the determination of whether Niger Delta militancy should be regarded as terrorist or criminal activity. This type of terrorism is often carried out by an individual or a few individuals, and is geared towards personal enrichment or satisfaction, with no gain for the masses. It has no bearing on the struggle for reform, social justice and human rights in the society. In terms of this definition criminal terrorism is therefore organised crime that has no relevance to the people.

It is noteworthy that the Niger Delta struggle – like most armed struggles – has some criminal ramifications; for instance emerging indices show that militant groups like the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) force are actively deployed and were paid by high-ranking politicians to disrupt election proceedings. These groups are also engaged in the illicit ‘blood oil’ traffic. There is no question that oil bunkering does indeed fund various militant activities, and that some of them certainly belong to organised criminal groups. Furthermore, the purpose of more than 90 per cent of the kidnappings that took place in the region between 2002 and 2005 was to extort ransom from the state and oil companies. A recent research report has also revealed that over 96 per cent of the cases of hostage taking, pipeline vandalism, election rigging, political cultism and other forms of criminality in the Niger Delta region were sponsored and masterminded by politicians in control of state power to achieve personal aims.

It is nevertheless argued that organised crime – not simply extortion and sabotage – and legitimate grievances can coexist. However, although criminal activities provide the requisite finances for the rebellion, the criminal ramifications of the struggle should not overshadow its core objective of attaining self-determination. As eloquently argued by the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD):

[T]he wall between economic crisis and political agitation is a very thin one, and there are now indications that some ‘economic’ hostage-takers of yesterday have evolved into political activists in their own right, seeing the kidnapping of oil workers as not only a legitimate form of political protest but also a practical means of raising funds to finance their struggle for self-determination.

From the analysis above, one can argue that the coexistence of certain criminal activities with genuine liberation violence in the Niger Delta does not mean that it should be equated with terrorism, but neither is it organised crime simpliciter.
Anti-terrorism legislation in Nigeria:
The problems with the solution

Since 2002, the National Assembly (NASS) has embarked on a legislative pathway to criminalise terrorism via the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act. However, the inchoate nature of counterterrorism provisions in the Act led to the exploration of a more comprehensive legal framework, and in turn to the presentation of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill to the Senate in 2006. Although it was defeated, a similar bill presented two years later, in 2008, has passed the second reading amid intense debate among senators on the appropriateness or otherwise of some provisions, especially as they relate to the violence in the Niger Delta.

It would undoubtedly be short-sighted to suggest that Nigeria does not require a law on terrorism, but the concern is the arbitrary definition of terrorism and the replication of Western provisions without considering the unique sociopolitical and legal developments in Africa. Africa endured prolonged Western imperialism where sociopolitical relations were characterised by repression and state violence. Colonial laws were not just made to confer economic advantages on the colonisers but – most importantly – to repress the resentment and resistance of the colonised peoples.

The early post-colonial African states were not fundamentally different in their approach to sociopolitical and legal relations from that of the Western colonial governments. Although political independence brought some change in the composition of the state governments, the character of the state remained much as it was in the colonial era; it continued to be totalitarian in scope, presented itself as an apparatus of violence, had a narrow social base, and relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority. With the proliferation of military regimes during the bipolar era, African dictators inflicted the most gruesome human rights abuses on their subjects through draconian decrees, while taking refuge under the protective shield of their superpower patrons. It is against this background that the new wave of legislation on counterterrorism in Africa is feared as a tool for undermining democracy and personal liberty in the guise of fighting international terrorism.

In Nigeria, the arrest of opposition political stalwarts on trumped-up charges of terrorism seems to validate this assertion. Just before the 2007 general election, the director general of the Atiku Abubakar campaign, Dr Iorchia Ayu, was arrested and charged under the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act for funding terrorism. Ayu allegedly donated 1.5 million naira (US$12 500) to Paul Santos Ofana and Timi Frank, who were charged with receiving the money with the intent of using it to recruit and mobilise terrorists and sponsor acts of terrorism in the Niger Delta region. This is in line with the provisions of sections 8(1), (2) and (4)(a) of the anti-terrorism bill before the Senate which seeks to confer on the President powers to declare an individual or a group a terrorist or terrorist organisation respectively, where it
appears reasonable that the person or organisation constitutes a risk to national security. Given the level of political intolerance in Nigeria and the demonstrated contempt for opposition, this provision will be a licence for tyranny.

Specifically, one should ask what the underlying problems are with Nigeria’s efforts to criminalise terrorism in the context of the Niger Delta crisis. First, the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation is aimed specifically at the Niger Delta region. Even in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, the definition of terrorism was couched in such a manner that it would include the Niger Delta militants. The 2006 bill expanded the boundaries of the definition to cover acts that may occasion serious economic loss, thereby subsuming sabotage to oil installations with their accompanying economic losses, under the definition of terrorism. The intention of criminalising the Niger Delta militancy became blatantly obvious in the last Senate debate on the anti-terrorism bill of 2008. The point of departure of most senators was the need to enact an anti-terrorism law because of the escalating violence in the Niger Delta.45

Second, the adoption of a Western-style definition of terrorism is problematic, for according to the Niger Delta inhabitants the application of terrorism as defined in the bill will certainly lead to the Niger Delta militants being classified as terrorists. This will give the state the licence to treat the militants as terrorists and criminals. Although the Senate initially excluded the definition of terrorism from the new bill, the Niger Delta senators insisted during the second reading that a definition is essential to clarify the matter. In the words of Senator George Sekibo from the Niger Delta: ‘I want us to define what terrorism actually means. Until that is done, we will not be able to identify who a terrorist is. We cannot use America’s definition here in Nigeria.’46

These issues account for the persistent opposition to the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation by the Niger Delta communities. In 2006 the leaders of the Ijaws (the major ethnic group spearheading the Niger Delta struggle) condemned the Prevention of Terrorism Bill as ‘a forerunner of possible genocide, aimed at Ijaws and everyone who dares to challenge government’s injustice against citizens’.47 This was reiterated in the Kaiama Declaration which stated: ‘We are tired of being labelled saboteurs and terrorists. It is a case of preparing the noose for our hanging. We reject this labelling.’48 At the second reading of the Anti-Terrorism and National Security Bill of 2007, Niger Delta senators unanimously declared that the agitation of the Niger Delta people for justice should not be equated with terrorism. Opposition to the bill is supported by the locals and militant groups, which portends grave danger to national security if it is not resolved.

The fact that an institution like the NASS referred to the Niger Delta militants as terrorists has highlighted that the government intends to include the militants in the definition and put in doubt its sincerity to tackle socioeconomic problems in the
delta region. This is in stark contrast to the federal government claims to be genuinely concerned about finding a lasting solution to the problem. As was stated earlier, the Yar’Adua administration has identified the Niger Delta crisis as one of its greatest challenges and has made the economic transformation of the area a priority. The Niger Delta featured prominently in Yar’Adua’s seven-point agenda and continues to feature in government pronouncements. Practical efforts include the constitution of a technical committee to harmonise the various recommendations made in several studies and ultimately create a Niger Delta ministry to implement the master plan.

However, the divided government attitude to the crisis has led to cynicism and a general dearth of trust and confidence among the locals about the government’s intentions, leading them to reject a Niger Delta summit and the creation of a Niger Delta ministry.49 A strategy is therefore required to tackle terrorism in Nigeria in a way that will prevent the escalation of the Niger Delta crisis.

Conclusion: Suggested reforms

The impact of the issue of terrorism and the Niger Delta crisis on Nigeria’s national security requires absolute caution to prevent the state from being negatively affected by the process of solving the militant and perceived terrorist issues. Combating terrorism in Nigeria will require measures that extend beyond the introduction of specific counter-terrorism legislation to the implementation of democratic principles.50 An attempt to criminalise local agitations for resource control by labelling it terrorism may create more security challenges for Nigeria than it solves; accordingly, this article offers the following dual strategy for addressing the Niger Delta militancy and combating genuine terrorism in Nigeria.

Political approach

The following political measures are suggested:

- Consolidation of democracy, which includes respect for the rule of law and fundamental human rights, independence of the judiciary and the development of a sound electoral system that will guarantee stability and political succession

- The entrenchment of good governance that among others ensures government accountability to civil society, reduction of corruption, initiation of sustainable economic reforms, and civil society participation in decision-making. According to the UN Development Programme failure of governance, characterised by endemic corruption and rent-seeking in the Niger Delta, is the fundamental source of frustration and disillusionment in the region.51 The entrenchment of good governance is therefore fundamental to the reduction of dissent in the region
Sustainable economic development, which guarantees an equitable distribution of wealth and the realisation of public good for a greater number of people. Sustainable economic development will reduce the incidence of dissent and conflict in the Niger Delta

**Legislative approach**

In spite of the utility of legislation to the maintenance of security, the Legislature must divorce its legislative efforts in combating terrorism from the Niger Delta issue by avoiding reference to the militants as the basis for the enactment of an anti-terrorism law.

Specifically, this article suggests the following legislative measures:

- The amendment of the penal laws to capture elements of the crime of terrorism that are lacking at present. Acts such as attempting to injure with explosive substances, kidnapping, deprivation of liberty, compelling action by intimidation and destroying or damaging an inhabited house or a vessel with explosives are offences in Nigeria’s existing penal codes. Therefore it would be more appropriate to include other elements of terrorism that are reasonable within the context of the Nigerian socio-political milieu into the existing penal regime. This will avoid the antagonism inherent in the enactment of fresh legislation

- Constitutional and legislative reforms to amend provisions that have ceded all mineral resources and land in Nigeria to the state. This will give the local communities a substantial stake in their land and resources, while allowing the federal government to retain some regulatory control. In this regard, parties to the memoranda of understanding for oil exploration and exploitation should include not only the federal government and the multinational oil corporations, but also the host communities.

**Notes**


10 Ibid.


14 Okaba, Petrodollar, the Nigerian state and the crisis of development in the Niger Delta region, 27.


17 Ibid.

18 Adeola, Environmental injustice and human rights abuse, 51.


20 See Adeola, Environmental injustice and human rights abuse, 55.

21 For more details, see Emeka, Conflict in the Niger Delta.

22 See the full text of the Kaiama Declaration at http://www.dawodu.net/kaiama.htm (accessed 14 October 2008).


24 Ibid.

25 See among others articles 1(2) and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations.

26 For instance, see the Speech of Xie Bohua (alternate representative of the Chinese delegation to the UN) to the Third Committee of the General Assembly on 10 November 2003, in UN Doc A/C.3/58/SR.27.


35 The concept is confusing in the sense that terrorism in itself is a crime, which means that the prefix ‘criminal’ is rather superfluous. An act can therefore be terrorism simpliciter or another crime called by this name.
37 O Nwolise, Terrorism: evolution and dimensions, Lecture delivered to course 15 participants, at the National War College, Abuja on 7 November 2006, 6.
39 Okaba, Petrodollar, the Nigerian state and the crisis of development in the Niger Delta region.
41 Watts, The rule of oil, 45.
45 Aziken and Inalegwu, Niger Delta senators bicker.
46 Ibid.
50 Anneli Botha, Initiatives to prevent and combat terrorism in Southern Africa, in Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha (eds), Understanding terrorism in Africa: building bridges and overcoming the gaps, Pretoria: ISS, 2008, 73.