

SA ARMY SEMINAR 21

The Revision of the South African Defence Review and International Trends in Force Design: Implications for the SA Army

Presented by

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The ISS is a regional human security policy think-tank

Our mission is to conceptualize, inform and enhance the debate on Human Security in Africa

ISSUES INFLUENCING THE FORCE DESIGN OF THE ARMY

1. The definition of the primary and secondary roles of the SANDF and SA Army
 2. The new demands being placed on the SA Army by Africa's emerging defence and security architecture
 3. The role of the part-time component of the SA Army
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- A decorative graphic consisting of several concentric circles, resembling ripples in water, is located in the bottom right corner of the slide. The circles are light blue and fade out towards the bottom right.

Recommendations

1. To revisit the definition of the primary function of the SANDF
2. To initiate studies on the applicability and feasibility of the principles and concepts of confidence-building defence for South Africa
3. To initiate a re-consideration of the role of the part-time component of the SA Army including the territorial reserves (commandos)

CONSTITUTION

(Act 108 of 1996)

“The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”

Interim Constitution

(Act No. 200 of 1993)

“The Defence Force may be employed;

- a. for service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;**
- b. for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;**
- c. for service in the preservation of life, health or property;**

Interim Constitution

(Act No. 200 of 1993)

- d. for service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;**
- e. for service in upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and**
- f. for service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment”**

DEFENCE STRATEGY

(DEFENCE WHITE PAPER: 1996)

- 1. Political, economic and military co-operation with other states;**
- 2. The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means; and**
- 3. The use or threat of force as a measure of last resort**

DEFENCE HIERARCHY

1. **The prevention of conflict and war;**
2. **The containment of conflict and war;
and**
3. **The employment of military force as
the last option.**

PRIMARY FUNCTION

The primary function of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression. The other functions are secondary.

The size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will therefore be determined mainly by its primary function. However, provision will have to be made for the special requirements of internal deployment and international peace support operations.

REASONS

1. Historic: Use of the SADF
2. Internal expectations for crime reduction due to RDP
3. Peace and development in Africa
4. Interests of the defence establishment

Thus: Professional conventional Defence Force with limited functions

Effect

1. Design SANDF for primary function
2. Execute secondary functions with collateral utility
3. Peace Support Operations are secondary functions
4. Force design based on defence of SA

Post 1998 developments

- The conflict situation in Africa;
- The new African defence and security architecture;
- The internal crime situation in South Africa;
- The deterioration in the capacity of the Part-Time Component of the SA Army; and
- The strategic defence acquisition packages.

International Trends in Conflict

- End of Cold War
- Internal (geographically limited) conflicts
- Rebels and warlords
- Threats to human security - war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, threats to legitimate order
- Terrorism

International Trends in Force Design

- Need for rapid intervention at distance
- Need for **expeditionary operations**
 - Rapid reaction
 - Far from home base
 - Logistic support and sustainment
- **Homeland defence - reserve forces**

Defence News, 13 September 2004

The **four Nordic countries** are changing the sizes, shapes and roles of their land forces, a transformation that began after the Cold War and gained focus in the post-Sept 11 global security environment. In the space of just seven months, all four will have unveiled plans **to improve their ability to deploy forces overseas and deal with terrorists at home.**

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Defence News, 13 September 2004

Denmark

- Denmark has abandoned a mobilization force structure, and is **sharpening the role of the Home Guard** to defend the country against natural or terrorist incidents

Norway

- Norway is moving its **part-time soldiers into home defense** units, while professional troops are going into a new, **deployable brigade** called Brigade North.

Sweden

- Details of the Swedish transformation scheme, due to be revealed this week, were expected to follow the general trend **away from conventional home defense towards internationally more capable forces.**

Defence News, 13 September 2004

Sweden's Defense Ministry soon will ask lawmakers to approve a defense bill that would crystallize into cold budget figures the broad theme of Swedish military reform: moving from a Cold War, territorial defense force to a lean, sophisticated force that can help keep the peace around the world. And it sets out a plan for doing so with less money.

- “Today, international operations are the most important part of the Swedish Armed Forces’ tasks,” Lt. Gen. Jan Jonsson, the commander of the Joint Forces Command, said during a briefing at Ronneby Air Base south of here.

Defense News, 20 September 2004

Canadian Army

- The nation's 1980s defense posture emphasized continental defense over strategic mobility. By contrast, today's forward defense posture requires **a more versatile, deployable force** able to operate in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond in a wider range of contingencies.
- The service is switching to a **predominately wheeled vehicle fleet**.
- The Army's Leopard tanks and tracked M109 self-propelled howitzers will be removed from service as part of the transformation plan.
- To improve its **deployability**, the Army is looking at pre-positioning stocks of equipment near ports on Canada's east and west coasts
- Prime Minister Paul Martin promised to **boost the Army's reserve force** from 15,500 to 18,500.

NETHERLANDS

Defence News 18 September 2006

“We are making our armed forces more suitable to operate abroad. (...) Of course, an **expeditionary force** is not just putting so many troops into an aircraft. It is a combination of elements, and we have taken measures to do that. For instance, we have good arrangements to get troops and armored vehicles to ships. We have our own capabilities with the Rotterdam and the airlift, and we proved that during Exercise Joint Caribbean Lion 2006 in the Dutch Antilles.”

LT GEN HANS SONNEVELD: VICE CHIEF OF DEFENCE

Homeland Defence

Defence News, 27 September 2004

The Pentagon is preparing a new **homeland defense strategy** that directs a major overhaul of U.S. naval capabilities, increased spending on a wide range of technologies and **more reliance on the reserve components**. A draft version of the new “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” calls for a plan to **expand the use of the National Guard and other reserve component capabilities for [...] homeland defense and civil support missions [...] to the support local and state authorities to deal with a disaster’s aftermath.**

- To deal with the wide range of new missions, particularly on the water, the Defense Department plans to **expand its reliance on the Reserve and National Guard** in air and missile defense, maritime security and land defense.

Recommendation 1

To revisit the definition of the primary function of the SANDF



The primary function of the SANDF can be postulated to be **“To act as an instrument of force for Government in conflict prevention and conflict intervention”** and should include the following tasks:

- The provision of credibility to government's diplomatic initiatives;
- **The provision of capabilities for expeditionary and peace support operations;**
- The provision of capabilities for military diplomacy and contributing to collective defence in Africa in line with the Common African Defence and Security Policy; and
- **The provision of military deterrence through credible operational capabilities.**

Recommendation 2

To initiate studies on the applicability and feasibility of the principles and concepts of confidence-building defence for South Africa



Implications for Force Design

- 1 The size and capabilities of the SANDF, in the context of government's defence policy, should not be seen as threatening by other states in Southern Africa. The emphasis will be on **confidence-building defence**.
- 2 **Force levels will be limited to what is needed to maintain essential capabilities and expertise.**
- 3 The potential for expansion should be consistent with a realistic appreciation of warning times for the development of military threats. Participation in regional early warning structures will reinforce such appreciation.
- 4 **SANDF doctrine requires an emphasis on defensive rather than offensive force elements. Manifestly offensive armaments and weapon systems have therefore been excluded from the force design. Other potentially offensive weapon systems which give undue strategic reach have been limited in number.**
- 5 The design of the SANDF should allow for dispersion of own forces.
- 6 **Great reliance will be placed on the Part Time Component.**
- 7 Where practically possible and financially viable, mobile and offensive forces will be drawn away from border areas to deeper internal bases.
- 8 **Training and force preparation should be consistent with defence policy, posture and doctrine.**

Defence Review Force Designs

- **Option 4: Defensive operational Concept Force Design**
- “Option 4 involves major deviations from present capabilities and doctrine, and will require more study before it can be recommended. If future tendencies are in this direction, Option 1 will be an acceptable base for such development.”

Recommendation 3

To initiate a re-consideration of the role of the part-time component of the SA Army including the territorial reserves (commandos)

Reasoning

- **PTC consists of conventional and territorial reserves**
- Conventional reserves support concepts of confidence building and efficiency
- **Territorial reserves (as above) and play an important role in asymmetric threats e.g. terrorism and trans-border organised crime.**
- Also mainstay of defence capability for restoration of law and order, disaster relief and maintenance of essential services.

Recommendations: Summary

1. To revisit the definition of the primary function of the SANDF
2. To initiate studies on the applicability and feasibility of the principles and concepts of confidence-building defence for South Africa
3. To initiate a re-consideration of the role of the part-time component of the SA Army including the territorial reserves (commandos)

Conclusion: Implications for SA Army FD

- **Protracted deployments over vast distances**
- **High mobility and air and sea transportability**
- **Long range logistics support**
- **Interoperability with other national forces**
- **Flexibility for operations in different geographic area, climates and terrain**
- **The ability to conduct operations against asymmetric threats**

The emphasis, therefore, shifts from heavy ground mobile forces to light air and sea mobile forces

CONCLUSION (Continued)

In the **short-term** it is important to:

1. Reprioritise the force development and force preparation of the SA Army towards its crucial role in Africa
2. Build the capacity of the SA Army's Reserve Component for homeland defence and stop the phasing out of the Commandos as a matter of priority
3. Ensure the maximum efficiency in the expenditure of the defence budget
4. Ensure alignment of the defence budget with policy

In the **longer-term** the results of this review process should directly inform the future force design of the SA Army and any future defence acquisitions.



THANK YOU
Q & A