Somalia: The quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping
Research seminar report

The publication of this report has been made possible by the generous support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the Federal Foreign Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, general Institute funding is provided by the Governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
Somalia: The quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping
Research seminar report

Compiled by Solomon A Dersso
Hilton Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya, 10 and 11 December 2008
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The seminar and the publication of this report has been made possible by the generous support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the Federal Foreign Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.
### Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSTA</td>
<td>African Peace Support Trainers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force (of the African Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASBRIG</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESBRICOM</td>
<td>Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGASOM</td>
<td>Regional Military Mission, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>LECIA</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government, Somalia</td>
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<td>TFP</td>
<td>Training for Peace Programme, ISS</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Nations International Task Force</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
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One of the aims of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) is to undertake applied policy research that facilitates debate and information exchange among APSTA member institutions on current developments in the field of peacekeeping in Africa, and to examine the application of emerging norms and concepts such as the responsibility to protect.

Considering the formidable challenge that the ongoing conflict in Somalia poses to peacekeeping, and the degenerating humanitarian situation in that country, a research seminar was held by APSTA in Nairobi, Kenya, on 10 and 11 December 2008 to focus on peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia.

Since the failed US-led UN intervention in early 1990s, the Somali conflict received marginal attention. The situation changed dramatically following Ethiopia’s armed intervention in late 2006. In the subsequent period the country experienced the worst fighting following the collapse of law and order in 1990. According to a BBC report entitled ‘24 hours in Somalia’, broadcasted on 6 October 2008, about 8,000 people had lost their lives in the conflict since late 2006. Thousands more were injured, assaulted and raped. At least 10 per cent of the population of Somalia were displaced or became refugees. South-central Somalia was affected the worst.

As the conflict escalates, each day adds to the number of deaths, injuries and displacements. Today, Somalia is probably the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with more than three million people in need of humanitarian aid. The country’s civilians, but especially vulnerable groups such as children, women and the elderly, require protection from the violence. As there is no authority in Somalia capable of providing such protection, it is incumbent upon members of the international community to provide this.

Although the adequacy and effectiveness of international efforts are open to debate, there has lately been increased activity by the UN and the AU to try and achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The AU deployed a peacekeeping mission in Somalia known as AMISOM, while the UN initiated a peace process that resulted in the Djibouti Agreement of June 2008 and culminated in the establishment of a national unity government in late January 2009.

Notwithstanding the serious humanitarian crisis that has unfolded in Somalia and the new peace initiatives, the implications of that country’s volatile security situation on peacemaking and peacekeeping have not been explored adequately. There is insufficient research to inform policy-makers and other interested actors. There is also little, if any, research on the process that has led to the deployment of AMISOM and the composition of that force. It is important to draw out lessons from the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts currently underway in that country.

Introduction
Aims and objectives

The seminar, organised under the title ‘The quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia’, had the purpose of offering researchers from APSTA member institutions and policy-makers from the AU, AMISOM and other actors an opportunity to deliberate on the challenges and prospects for successful peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia. A further aim was to identify lessons learned from past and current peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in order to guide peacekeeping training and inform the doctrine on peacekeeping of the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF). The research seminar thus set itself the task of examining the following topics:

- Current efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping, and the internal and external dynamics and challenges for peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia.
- Lessons to be learned from the deployment of AMISOM.
- The application of relevant international norms and concepts/doctrines.
- The role and current state of AMISOM.

Based on discussions in these areas, the seminar sought to make recommendations for successful peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia, ways of preventing the failures of AMISOM, and the possibilities of its replacement by a UN mission.
Organisation and structure of the seminar

The event was held in Nairobi on 10 and 11 December 2008 and was organised by the APSTA Secretariat, hosted by the Institute for Security Studies. The seminar brought together 25 participants from diverse backgrounds. They included representatives from APSTA member institutions, the AU, AMISOM, the Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (ESBRICOM), the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

The seminar was structured into eight sessions, as listed below. The six main sessions were arranged around a presentation, a response to tease out the various issues from the presentation, and structured discussion on the topic of the presentation.

1. Opening Session: Welcome and introduction
2. Session I: Background: history and current state of the Somali crisis
3. Session II: Current peacemaking efforts in Somalia
4. Session III: Peacekeeping where there is no peace to keep – the case of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
5. Session IV: Internal and external dynamics and challenge for successful peacemaking and peacekeeping
6. Session V: International norms and their application to the Somalia conflict: Normative imperatives versus practical realities
7. Session VI: Lessons learned
8. Closing Session
The seminar was opened by Peter Edopu, Nairobi Office Director, ISS, who welcomed the participants. He expressed the hope that the seminar would contribute towards ongoing efforts for peacemaking and peacekeeping by identifying policy recommendations that are practicable and relevant to the situation in Somalia.

Dr Linda Darkwa from the Legon Centre for International Affairs (LECIA), University of Ghana, delivered the keynote address on behalf of APSTA member institutions. Dr Darkwa spoke about the importance of the seminar and how it fitted into APSTA’s mission and objectives. She observed that Somalia is a country that has been described with many adjectives, none of them favourable. Although conflict was endemic to human nature, violent conflict was not. When conflict degenerate into violence, as had happened in Somalia, there were approaches to be followed for their resolution. However, the Somali situation had defied resolution, despite various international initiatives. She identified four reasons why this situation had arisen.

The first was what she called the ‘same prescriptions syndrome’. Some of the efforts had failed because they did not take adequate account of the peculiarity of the Somali conflict, which called for new approaches. The second reason was a lack of political will. Dr Darkwa pointed out that there had not been a co-ordinated, concerted and sustained effort on the part of the international community to address the Somali crisis. Rather, most efforts had been characterised by piecemeal attempts involving a touch-and-go approach. The third factor was what she called ‘too little, too late’. Some of the interventions had not been made in time and in most instances they had been inadequate. Even in the face of mounting catastrophes, members of the international community had failed to deliver on their promises to protect, had deployed poorly-equipped missions with inadequate numbers of personnel and, most importantly, had provided weak and problematic mandates.

The last reason identified by Dr Darkwa was lack of focus and failure to address root causes. Somalia had become a theatre for many activities, including the fight against terrorism and piracy, humanitarian assistance etc, and this had resulted in a lack of focus and coordination. Most important, in her view, was the fact that much of the focus had been on addressing the symptoms of the conflict rather than the root causes. Current efforts to resolve the Somali conflict should avoid repeating these mistakes in order to achieve success.

Dr Darkwa informed participants that as part of its objectives, APSTA sought to contribute to high-quality peacekeeping effectiveness in Africa by facilitating research. The seminar was a key vehicle in APSTA’s effort to understand the underlying causes of conflict, the impact of conflict on Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, and the efforts required to resolve such conflict. This, she said, would assist training institutions to provide relevant and up-to-date training that would contribute significantly to the resolution of conflicts.
Session I

Background

History and current state of the Somalia crisis

In the first session, Solomon Dersso, Senior Researcher, ISS, dealt with the background to the Somali conflict. By outlining the historical, political and social processes that led to the genesis of the conflict, his presentation laid the foundation for the subsequent, more specialised sessions. He pointed out that the conflict in Somalia did not have its origin in a sudden eruption of hostilities, but was the result of an interplay of long-term historical, political and socio-economic factors.

The conflict had its roots in the colonial history of the country, in particular the division of the people of Somalia into different sovereign units and the institutionalisation of unequal relations between various groups and the state. The most important factors for the outbreak of hostilities included the inequality between different Somali clans, perpetuated and exacerbated by Siad Barre’s regime; the rise of an authoritarian and corrupt system of governance; the effects of the Cold War, including the failure of the socialist economic policy and the militarisation of Barre’s government; the resultant proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country; and the longstanding rivalry and conflict with neighbouring states, in particular Ethiopia.

Concerning early attempts by the international community to resolve the conflict, Mr Dersso made reference to the UN intervention in the form of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the US–led, UN-approved force, known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). He highlighted the weaknesses of these interventions, including UNOSOM’s failure to contain the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation despite the force having been enlarged to 5 000 personnel, and UNITAF’s focus on the humanitarian side of the conflict without having an appreciation of the context of the conflict. Another weakness was the lack of common understanding of the mandate by forces coming from different countries, which led to contradictory approaches towards the conflicting parties.

In his conclusion, Mr Dersso indicated that one of the most important factors that had continued to fuel the Somali conflict was rivalry between various warlords that purported to represent the different clans and sub-clans. In his view, all peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Somalia had to be informed by the historical, social and political processes underlying the conflict if they were to be successful. All the dynamics and facets of the conflict and their changing character should be appreciated fully, be analysed individually and comprehensively, and be approached in an integrated manner. He emphasised the need to understand the nature of the conflict adequately and to design solutions suited to the particular circumstances pertaining to Somalia.

The complexity and peculiarity of the conflict were recognised and deliberated upon during the discussion. There was consensus that the history of the country (the colonial legacy), socio-economic conditions (clan system and inequalities), political factors (post-colonial governance), deep mistrust and the north-south divide had all contributed to the current situation. Some argued against the utility of describing Somalia as a failed state, maintaining that it was only the government that was dysfunctional, while Somalia existed as a state. It was noted, however, that this was a matter of definition and its utility lay in identifying what had to be fixed in Somalia if peace was to be achieved.

Participants pointed out that the approach of the international community to the crisis in Somalia had been seriously flawed. The focus had been on reconciling warlords, who carried responsibility for the protracted conflict, and on mitigating the suffering of the Somali
people. Little attention had been given to the role of the many other important Somali actors, including religious leaders, civil society organisations, businesses and Somalis living abroad. There was a need for the peace process to be all-inclusive and participatory. It was also suggested that while putting in place mechanisms to address inequalities and rivalry among Somali clans, considerable focus should in addition be placed on identifying and institutionalising the commonalities that unified Somalis as a people.
In this session, Ibrahim Farah, a Somali scholar at the University of Nairobi, delivered a presentation on current peacemaking efforts in Somalia. His presentation included an analysis of the ongoing UN-led Djibouti peace process. It highlighted the dynamics of this initiative and the issues at play. Mr Farah also put the Djibouti process in context by referring back to the many previous, unsuccessful initiatives. Based on the interest the Djibouti process had attracted and the wide support it had received, it was argued that this new initiative was the only game in town and that it had to be given a chance by all. Even more so as there was no alternative process on the table beside the Djibouti peace process.

Mr Farah’s overview on the Somali peace talks looked at the major peace initiatives. The first was the UN initiative (1991 to 1994), which ended with the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia, leaving the country in a state of anarchy. This was followed by the European Commission initiative (1995 to 1996), the Arta peace process (1999 to 2000) and the Eldoret/Mbagathi peace process (2000 to 2004).

Mr Farah identified various reasons for the failure of these initiatives. In the first instance, most of the processes focused on warlords to the exclusion of other Somali actors. This legitimised the position of warlords in the country, resulting in fragmentation and a multiplication of the number of warlords over the years. Then there was the problem of peace processes being limited to achieving the reconstitution of state structures, and hence failing to deal with the social and relational dimensions of the conflict. Some of the peace processes, such as the Djibouti-initiated Arta process, failed because of lack of support by some Somali actors and influential countries in the region, in particular Ethiopia.

The Djibouti Agreement presented Somalis and the international community with an opportunity to resolve the Somali issues. According to Mr Farah, it brought a glimmer of hope, though not light at the end of the tunnel, and should encourage cautious optimism. However, the Somali conflict itself was far from over as the actors in Djibouti were incapable of ending it. Peace-building and state-formation required reconciliation, mending of relations and restoration of trust. But state formation was at the same time characterised by competition, anxiety and tension.

The Djibouti process faces many challenges, including implementation of the transitional plan, which required the drafting of a new constitution acceptable to all Somalis, the taking of a census, and the holding of a referendum and elections, as well as peace building and post-conflict reconstruction activities such as disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDR), security-sector reform and, critically, reconciliation. Other challenges included political Islam, which had become increasingly dominant in the current conflict, and the challenge of maintaining the continued engagement of the international community.

The responses to Mr Farah’s presentation raised important points that opened the way for a lively discussion on issues such as the role of various Somali actors, the importance of involving key external players, and the question of what distinguished the Djibouti peace process from others and the chances of success. There was also a provocative question on whether Somalis were really interested in peace or whether peace was being imposed on them.

Mr Farah pointed out that the lessons learnt from previous peace initiatives indicated that unless the process was inclusive it could not win support and might even face opposition, a factor that would contribute to
its failure. Also, without the support of countries in the region and major powers in the international community the peace initiative would not succeed. Although there were many challenges facing the Djibouti process, which made it susceptible to suffering the same fate as previous initiatives, the many positive factors this time round increased the chance of success. The actors involved in the process had displayed a reasonable degree of commitment. Despite opposition from key actors, in particular al-Shabab, the process had the backing of many Somalis.

Moreover, unlike other previous initiatives, the Djibouti process was attracting wide support from within the region and from major powers in the international community, including the US, the AU, the EU and the Arab League. If the momentum and strong engagement of the international community were sustained, there were strong chances that the Djibouti process would succeed. Mr Farah pointed out that it was not a lack of interest in peace on the part of Somalis that led to the failure of previous initiatives. Like other peoples, Somalis wished to live in peace and security. It was the actions and inactions of certain internal and external actors that frustrated peace from returning to Somalia.
In this session on AMISOM’s peacekeeping efforts there were two presentations, the first by Xavier Ejoyi of ISS TFP Nairobi and the second by Commander Frank Hanson of the UN/AU Planning Team of AMISOM. Mr Ejoyi addressed the issue of keeping peace where there is no peace to keep, while Cmdr Hanson discussed the challenges that the new dynamics of the conflict, including roadside and suicide bombings, posed to the peacekeeping effort.

Mr Ejoyi provided a concise background to the conflict in Somalia, briefly presenting an overview of the peace processes in Somalia, from UNOSOM to AMISOM. He examined the mandate of AMISOM and highlighted the following factors affecting its mandate:

- AMISOM’s force-generation challenges.
- The question of legitimacy – the limited leverage of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and various armed groups over the security situation in Somalia.
- The prevalence of a war economy – security, piracy and clan-based economic empires.
- Weak central authority – centres of power that lie with clan leaders and businessmen.
- External actors – Ethiopia and its support for the TFG.
- Major challenges faced by AMISOM – limited funding, complexity of the political process, insecurity and attacks on the AMISOM base.

Mr Ejoyi posed the question whether AMISOM was engaged in peacekeeping or in ‘peace courting’. As things stood, there was no peace to keep in Somalia and AMISOM was unable to fulfil its peacekeeping mandate. As the Somali conflict was not a conventional conflict, there was no need to look at conventional conflict resolution approaches. Mr Ejoyi suggested that it was necessary to broaden the role currently being played by AMISOM, with focus on localised peace-building initiatives. In his view there were three viable options, namely pursuit of the Djibouti peace process, a multinational peacekeeping successor that included Morocco, Jordan, Indonesia and Malaysia, and the ‘blue-hating’ of AMISOM, that is a UN Somali mission. The latter option was to be considered by the UN in June 2009.

During the discussion participants talked about the dilemma that a possible withdrawal of Ethiopian forces would create. The resulting security gap would expose AMISOM to increasing attacks from opposition forces. Concerning the deployment of a UN force, it was felt that, given the high level of insecurity in Somalia, it was unlikely that the Security Council would agree to such a step. Even if such an agreement was secured, it was unlikely that UN member states would be willing to contribute the necessary forces, especially in the light of lack of consensus on action to be taken in Somalia and the risks involved. Even in Darfur, the (UNAMID) has yet to achieve its mandated size. It was one of the unfortunate facts of peacekeeping operations that their implementation depended on the willingness of states to contribute forces, the availability of logistical support and the provision of the necessary mandates.

Cmdr Hanson then addressed AMISOM’s operations, the Djibouti Agreement and its implications for AMISOM. AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Mandate IGASOM (Regional Military Mission of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development – IGAD) of 12 May 06 and PSC Mandate AMISOM of 19 Jan 07 provided the legal basis for AMISOM’s operations. The mandates permitted AMISOM to conduct peace support operations in Somalia for a limited period of six months to stabilise the situation and to create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an immediate
take-over by the UN. The activities undertaken by AMISOM ranged from providing VIP protection to the TFG leadership and others involved in the peace process, to protecting key Transitional Federal Institutions and installations so that humanitarian assistance, such as medical care for the wounded and sick, could be provided. However, for AMISOM to implement its mandate significant progress would have to be made in the peace process.

Cmdr Hanson then listed the parties to the conflict and identified the threats that affected AMISOM in the execution of its mandate. Parties to the conflict included the TFG police, the TFG military force, the Ethiopian forces and hostile or insurgent groups, including the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, al–Shabab, al–Itahad al-Islamiya, various groups involved in criminal activities, Old Guards, loose militias and undisciplined troops. The threats include insurgent actions in the form of roadside bombs, mortar and RPG attacks, and piracy. The general insecurity created by these threats had made it very difficult for humanitarian agencies to operate effectively.

A range of questions were asked and discussed after the presentation. These include the nature of the mandate, particularly with respect to the protection of TFG institutions, the implications for peacekeeping, the importance of increasing the AMISOM force to its mandated size, and the challenges facing AMISOM. It was indicated that AMISOM’s mandate to provide protection to TFG institutions should not normally be a problem, but under the prevailing conditions created difficulties for AMISOM as it gave the perception that AMISOM was siding with the TFG. It tended pull AMISOM into the conflict and its forces had already suffered multiple attacks from al-Shabab forces. The failure of contributing countries to provide the personnel promised by them placed a limitation on AMISOM’s presence in the country. Because of this, AMISOM was deployed only in key sectors of some of the areas in which it was mandated to have a presence.

According to Cmdr Hanson, the low pace of force generation, lack of operational equipment and the absence of mission infrastructure and unpredictable funding, coupled with the military threats it faced, made it difficult for AMISOM to execute its mandate effectively. Even so, AMISOM continued to win the hearts and minds of the Somali population by providing urgently needed medical and humanitarian assistance. In addition, despite the unprovoked attacks on it, AMISOM continue to hold the most vital footprint for operations in Somalia. According to him, the development of a strategy for force generation and the holding of a donor conference for AMISOM would go a long way towards easing its path forward.
The fourth session was devoted to an analysis of the internal and external factors and actors of the Somalia conflict that have a critical bearing on peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts. Dr Abdulahi Osman of the University of Georgia, USA, introduced his topic by quoting the Serbian politician, Vesna Pesic, who said: ‘Ethnic conflict is caused by fear of the future, lived through the past’. This set the tone of his presentation and contextualised the Somali conflict. According to him, the central question of the Somali conflict, as expressed by Professor Ahmed I. Samatar (1993) is: ‘… why and how could this society, one of the few nations in the continent with one ethnic group, one culture, one language, and one religion, find itself in such parlous circumstances – verging on self-destruction?’

Dr Osman identified two schools of thought that seek to explicate the linkages between social dynamics and conflict in Somalia. The ‘homogeneous’ school maintains that homogeneous societies experience less conflict than heterogeneous ones. With respect to the Somali conflict, it assumes that the Somali people originated from southern Arabia, share the same language and culture, have a common ancestry, subscribe to Islam, engage in camel nomadism and, most important of all, unlike the rest of Africa, regard themselves as a nation. As expressed by the quotation of Prof. Samatar, this school finds it difficult to explain how and why Somalia slipped into conflict.

Concerning militarisation of the society, he made the following shocking revelations about military expenditure during the country’s long history of internal conflict. In pursuit of a Greater Somalia at independence, the country embarked on an unprecedented military build-up. Because of its strategic location there was no shortage of suppliers. Between 1960 and 1990 Somalia spent an average of 20.45 per cent of its budget on the military and had an average of 8 soldiers per 1000 population, well above the regional average of 3.4 soldiers per 1000 population. The military expanded from 5000 troops in 1960 to 165,000 in 1990.

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In the 1960s, Western countries provided arms to the value of US$10 million, but under the treaty signed with the Soviet Union in 1974 arms to the value of $30 million were to be supplied. However, between 1980 and 1989 the US provided military aid worth $390 million in the form of grant aid, credit sales, military training and security-related ‘Economic Support Funds’, plus a further $200 million in cash sales. The total US expenditure of $600 million equated to about $100 per Somalian. Between 1980 and 1985 Somalia was the fourth highest recipient
of US military aid, and from 1986 onwards it was the biggest recipient in sub-Saharan Africa.

According to Dr Osman, this excessive military spending was one of the contributing factors to Somalia’s internal wars. As Siad Barre’s government weakened and eventually collapsed, the weaponry accumulated over the years ended up in the hands of various players, whose rivalry for power immersed the country into the abyss of anarchy and war. With the ousting of Siad Barre in January 1991, clan-based warlords began to jockey for political power. The focus of international initiatives to reconcile those Somalis with the most weapons led to the legitimisation of warlordism, leading to the fragmentation of Somali political forces and a multiplication of the number of warlords. In 1991 there were four warlords; today there are more than 100, and more warlords are emerging every year.

Looking at the Somali calamity critically, Dr Osman argued that war in Somalia was more about growth and protection of entrenched economic interests than about people’s interests. The key features of the Somali conflict were now war-making, war-proﬁtting and the suffering of the silent majority. He identiﬁed the following patterns in the conﬂict:

- The concentration of the war in the southern part of the country. The inhabitants of this area continued to suffer the bulk of death and destruction.
- The inhabitants of the most fertile parts of the country had become the main victims of starvation. First, their food stores had been looted, then they were blocked from productive activity and, ﬁnally, they were blocked from receiving food and medicine from the international donor community, or it was taken from them. This resulted in the disproportionate death of tens of thousands of southern Somalis.
- The overwhelming majority of warring factions, including the Islamic Courts and the TFG, stemmed from the nomadic clans of the central and north-eastern regions.

In an attempt to demonstrate the role of external actors and the challenge of peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts being completed successfully in Somalia, he listed the efforts that had been made towards resolving the conﬂict from 1991 onwards, as follows:

- UNITAF, 1992 to 1993
- UN Security Council Resolution 733 (weapon’s embargo), January 1992
- UNOSOM I & II, 1992 to 1995
- Black Hawk Down, 2001
- Djibouti conferences, 1991 to 1992

Dr Osman identiﬁed various external factors that had contributed to the failure to resolve the Somali conﬂict despite so many initiatives having been undertaken. According to him, the problem with many of the initiatives lay with the misguided assumption of a panacea of Western-style democracy for Somalia. This led to an uncritical focus on building democratic institutions. Another problem lay with the division and rivalry among neighbouring countries that backed one group against another. In addition, Egypt, Libya and other Middle Eastern countries provided support to Islamic groups that were currently opposed to the government and the Djibouti process.

In his concluding remarks, Dr Osman submitted that ‘the Somali war is a zero-sum game where warring factions are fighting either to become Siad Barre, or not to allow others to become Barre.’ Peace would not be achieved by merely bringing the war to an end, but rather by a holistic approach to human wellbeing. The focus of those striving to end the conﬂict in Somalia should not just be on ‘negative’ peace initiatives, the achievement of which was limited to diplomatic and military efforts, but on ‘positive’ efforts that dealt with underlying structural factors, e.g. injustices, prejudices, marginalisation etc. Dr Osman suggested the following three approaches to resolving the Somali conﬂict:

- Engaging the diaspora community that has money, inﬂuence and is educated
- Enhancing the roles of clan and religious leaders within the country
- Punishing the wrongdoers, e.g. the warlords

Broad recommendations were then made by Dr Osman:

- Control the ﬂow of weapons
- Put into place a truth and reconciliation commission
- Conduct a census to expose the myth of majority, e.g. the unfair 4.5 formula for power sharing
- Rebuild state institutions
- Attracting Somalis living outside the country
- Send in peace-making forces
- Rebuild the country’s economic infrastructure
- Educate the Somali people

An issue raised in response to Dr Osman’s presentation concerned the link between heterogeneity and conflict. It
was argued that the theory that heterogeneous societies are more prone to conflict than homogenous ones was based on the understanding that although diversity by itself was not a source of conflict, the existence of ethnic or other divisions in a society created the foundation on which conflict could occur. On the basis of this, some questioned the validity of the view that homogenous societies were more prone to conflict than heterogeneous ones. Rather, it was the historical, political and socio-economic conditions, coupled with triggering factors, that occasioned conflict.

Addressing a question on the relevance of democracy, Dr Osman argued that for Somalia democracy was a luxury. The focus should rather be on creating stability and achieving peace. Attention should be paid to processes, including traditional and religious processes that led to stability and peace, even if these were not based on accepted Western democratic principles. Some argued, however, that in the contemporary world it was widely accepted that democracy was the only basis for organising political power in society as well as for achieving sustainable peace, and that for any process to gain the support of the international community it needed to conform to established democratic standards.

The other issue discussed was the priority to be given to negative peace and positive peace processes. It was argued that in the absence of negative peace, positive peace could not be pursued since it was only when the guns were stopped and a certain degree of stability was achieved that institution-building, post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation, DDR and other initiatives could be implemented. Nevertheless, there was agreement about the importance of working on positive and negative peace initiatives in tandem. In this regard, it was noted that although the deployment of AMISOM was a highly commendable move, its role was of a military nature with only a limited humanitarian component, and that regrettably it has no peace building and reconstruction components. For the peacekeeping operation to have more substantive impact on the ground, it should increasingly focus on these components.
The fifth substantive session addressed the relevance of international normative frameworks and their application to the Somali conflict. Mr Solomon Dersso of the ISS outlined existing and emerging international norms that are of particular importance to the current Somali crisis, in particular norms pertaining to human rights law and humanitarian rules, and to human security and the responsibility to protect.

Mr Dersso maintained that the current security and humanitarian situation in Somalia was of such a nature that it imposed an obligation on members of the international community to take the measures called for by international norms. Somalia was going through a war the violence of which had not been seen since the war started in the 1990s. As a consequence of war, insurgency and state failure, international human rights and humanitarian law had been violated on a large scale. A humanitarian catastrophe had been occasioned in which tens of thousands had perished, hundreds of thousands had been displaced and about 3.1 million people were in need of emergency food aid, with children in particular being exposed to malnutrition.

From the perspective of established international human rights and humanitarian norms, it was incumbent on the parties to a conflict not to violate international humanitarian norms. When there was such violation, however, it was expected that mechanisms put into place by the international community for the purpose of redressing the situation were implemented by the international community. Such mechanisms could include the establishment of a judicial inquiry and, in the worst case, the instituting of a legal case against the perpetrators within the framework of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In addition, emerging new normative concepts on human security and the responsibility to protect, as articulated in various UN resolutions and reports, and as legally established within the framework of the AU Constitutive Act (Article 4 (h)), called upon the international community to take certain measures, including direct intervention, in order to avert a humanitarian crisis, ensure human security and thereby establish international peace and security in the affected country. These measures included preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, with the latter having to be implemented according to certain principles relating to impartiality and legitimacy, among others.

Echoing a statement by the AU Panel of the Wise, Mr Dersso argued that the reality of the Somali situation made it clear that there were few countries in the world where there was such an acute need to translate into action the much heralded principle of the responsibility to protect. He said that when examining the actions of the international community through the prism of stated norms, it left much to be desired. The conclusion to be drawn was that the international community had failed the Somalis, beginning with a failure to recognise and categorise the situation in Somalia and ending with failure to call for the application of the principle of the responsibility to protect. Some went as far as to argue that the international community was standing on the sidelines while Somalia was bleeding. Mr Dersso posited that the debacle surrounding AMISOM and the failure to achieve a limited force strength of even 8 000 personnel showed that despite important changes having been achieved under the AU, the organisation still suffered from many of the same institutional and political limitations as its predecessor, the OAU. Its paper promises on the responsibility to protect had yet to be translated into action to end the violence that millions of Africans continued to endure.
During the discussion, participants underscored the importance of international norms, but noted that in terms of their application the international community lacked consistency. Although applied in some parts of the world, these norms were not implemented in Africa consistently. Somalia was not the first instance on the continent where the international community had failed to honour its promise to protect. Delegates expressed their regret at this double standard, noting that Africa continued to be affected as it was not yet in a position to fill the gap because of the AU’s institutional weakness and resource and capacity constraints.

Other issues raised by delegates related to the difficulties or limitations being experienced in applying some of the principles regulating peacekeeping operations. Some argued that the principle of impartiality, in particular, limited the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces as it forced them to stand by and watch while violence raged around them. However, it was pointed out that this was a common perception among members of the general public resulting from the conflation of impartiality and neutrality. As long as the right mandate was in place, modern peacekeeping forces were generally expected to protect civilians against attacks and take appropriate measures against combatants that target civilians. The principle of impartiality did not require them to be neutral in the face of such violence, but merely committed them not to side with any particular group in the conflict.
The sixth session, presented by Mr Andrews Atta-Asamoah of the ISS and Dr Linda Darkwa of LECIA in Ghana, looked at the lessons learnt during the seminar. The most important lessons identified included the peculiar character of the Somali conflict and the need for approaches that took these particularities into account, including the form disarmament should take, the training required for peacekeepers, the nature of state-building and the imperative of changing the roles of warlords and civil society actors in the peace processes. More specific lessons could be summarised under four headings, namely:

- Response to the crisis
- The peace processes
- International norms and modern peacekeeping
- Mission planning and deployment

**RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS**

There is a need for a well-coordinated, sustainable, multifaceted and comprehensive approach in response to protracted and complex conflicts such as in Somalia. The international community should move away from its firefighting approach of responding to situations that are only symptomatic of the Somali crisis such as the deployment of naval forces to fight off piracy and the provision of humanitarian assistance, and adopt an approach that both stabilizes the situation and responds to the root causes of the conflict.

The massive increase in the number of warlords involved in the Somali conflict is partly the result of the international community until now not having taken any decisive action with regard to the warlords and warring factions, who still enjoy their freedoms without sanction from the international community. This has implications for the impunity with which they commit atrocities in Somalia.

**THE PEACE PROCESSES**

Internal historical, economic, political and social factors and external geo-political and strategic-interest factors underlie the Somali crisis and the dynamics of the conflict. Any realistic effort for peace in Somalia must take these factors into account.

Somalia is not a homogeneous society, although homogeneity in itself, as has been demonstrated elsewhere, has not proved to be a guarantee for stability. Principles of peaceful co-existence that harness diversity should be promoted to improve the possibility of conflict resolution. The clan system is an important point of divergence among the Somali people and an attempt should be made to identify areas where the various clans converge as a point of entry to finding a solution to the clan factor in the conflict.

Clan politics, nepotism and inequality are at the centre of the Somali conflict and it is imperative that mechanisms capable of addressing these problems form part of the solution to the conflict without making clan membership the basis for access to power and resources.

The fact that formal diplomacy and resolution efforts in Somalia have generally focused on warlords to the exclusion of actors such as civil society organisations, who also matter in the political dynamics of the country, has resulted in failure. The Arta peace initiative failed in part because it focused on institutional processes instead of the underlying causes of the conflict.

The current Djibouti Agreement should be supported and efforts should be made to make it more inclusive.
What is needed is coordinated and strong international engagement in the peace process, not only during the negotiation stage, but also and most importantly during the implementation stage.

Peace building and state rebuilding are interrelated in the Somali context and should not be treated as mutually exclusive. They should be pursued side by side, not sequentially.

There have been attempts to impose western solutions to the Somali crisis, but these have not succeeded and are not likely to succeed without a formidable political space within which such solutions can thrive.

Peace will not be achieved by merely bringing the war to an end, but rather by a holistic approach to human wellbeing. Negative peace can be accomplished through diplomacy, but positive peace can be achieved only by addressing atrocities, administering justice and confronting the underlying causes of conflict. An holistic approach to the quest for peace, which incorporates both military and diplomatic efforts as well as peace-building initiatives, is required.

The Somali diaspora, clan elders and religious leaders have an important part to play in the realisation of peace in Somalia. There is a need to create space for their active and genuine involvement in the initiatives.

Attempts need to be made to bring to the realisation of warlords’ incentives for building economies around Somalia's insecurity or peace processes.

**INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND MODERN PEACEKEEPING**

Not only contemporary international human rights law, but also the emerging norms relating to human security and the responsibility to protect, define the basis for international action and the nature of such action. These should address a conflict that engenders a serious humanitarian crisis and poses a threat to international peace and security.

However, the international community appears to have difficulties with the principled application of these norms, as illustrated by the case of Somalia. The community has failed to honour its promise with regard to the responsibility to protect, since its actions do not match that which is required. The AU needs to achieve the required level of capacity in terms of the operationalisation of the ASF to make attainment of these norms a reality on the African continent.

From peacekeeping experiences across the continent it is evident that sometimes a peacekeeping force has to find the peace before keeping it. This was the case of ECOMOG in Liberia and it is the case of AMISOM in Somalia.

AMISOM’s experience indicates the challenges that the ASF will face when it becomes operational in 2010. The first difficulty it will need to overcome will be to generate and deploy a mission with the necessary capability in the time stipulated. Although AMISOM is mandated to have a force of 8,000, after two years it is operating with less than half this force. Other serious challenges will include funding, management capability and the provision of logistics.

There is also the issue of implementing peace-building programmes at the same time as keeping the peace.

**MISSION PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT**

Understanding the culture of the people in a mission area is critical to appreciating the underlying historical, political and social processes that underpin the conflict. A realistic assessment of force requirements and the capacity to meet that requirement is important for the success of any peacekeeping mission. The force strength of UNISOM I had to be beefed up when it became clear that the number of troops deployed affected its performance.

UNISOM and UNITAF failed in Somalia partly because of their lack of strategic response to the root causes of the Somali conflict. These forces had a limited purpose and did not intend to stay in Somalia for long. Integrated peace support operations should be planned to extend over a sufficient period of time to permit a realistic impact to be made.

Hurried deployment without operational plans and management structures in place subjects a peace mission to unnecessary challenges and lessens its impact. In the case of AMISOM, for example, troops were deployed before the planning and management unit was established.

The AU should develop a permanent structure and the capacity for mission management and support along the lines of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This will enable the AU to plan new missions properly and provide the necessary technical leadership and support for missions already established.

There needs to be effective implementation of the UN Program on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (or Reinsertion or Rehabilitation) as this will build a population's confidence by creating an environment of security. Efforts should also be made to demilitarise the population.

Good understanding of the local context of conflict and the factors that drive the opposition, as well as the reasons for opposition to and attacks on peacekeepers is essential. The response to such opposition and attacks should be adequately informed by a constant analysis of the local situation based on accurate information.
The seminar concluded with closing remarks by Mr Solomon Dersso. He thanked the participants and expressed the wish of ISS to see a stable Somalia in the not to distant future. He also acknowledged the financial support of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, which had made the seminar possible. Mr Dersso indicated that a seminar report would be published and distributed to the participants and APSTA member institutions, as well being presented to various stakeholders. In addition to this seminar report, the presentations will also be developed into papers that will in addition contain recommendations for all those involved in the Somali peace process.

Based on the richness of the presentations, the diverse composition of the presenters and the depth and quality of deliberations, the seminar could be considered very successful. The participants looked forward to seeing the seminar report and in having a follow-up for integrating the recommendations and lessons learnt in the on going efforts for peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia.
# Annexure A

## Attendance at the APSTA seminar on peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia, Nairobi, 10 and 11 December 2008

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