THREAT OF TERRORISM DURING THE FIFA WORLD CUP

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Mozambique training camps: Nampula & Tete (Somali, Pakistani & Bangladesh)
- Nationals from Senegal, Guinea & Mali receive training
- ‘Illegals’ arrested with ‘large amounts’ of US$ in Mozambique

Training camps in SA: KwaZulu/Natal, Gauteng and Eastern Cape

SA officials not informed...
‘How amazing could the match United States versus Britain be when broadcasted live on air at a stadium packed with spectators when the sound of an explosion rumbles through the stands, the whole stadium is turned upside down and the number of dead bodies are in their dozens and hundreds, Allah willing. Al-Qaeda, who managed to deliver 50 grams of explosives to the Detroit plane, after infiltrating dozens of US security barriers, al-Qaeda, who enabled brother martyr Abul Kheir (Abdullah Asiri) to get into the palace of Mohammed bin Nayef, al-Qaeda, who humiliated the world’s greatest intelligence apparatus through the operation of Mujahid Abu Dujana al-Khorassani (Humam al-Balawi), who shattered the pride of the CIA and the Jordanian intelligence combined. Al-Qaeda will have a presence in the games, Allah willing. Not only the US and Britain, but other countries are on the hit list of the terrorist group, including France, Germany and Italy: All those countries are part of the Zionist-Crusader campaign against Islam’. 
Plot against the World Cup uncovered from Iraq

- Abdullah Azam Saleh al-Qahtani alias Sinan al-Saudi
- Denmark and The Netherlands
Terrorism & Sport

- 1972 Munich Olympic Games
- Eric Rudolph attack at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games
- East Turkestan Islamic Movement attacks in China during 2008 Olympic Games (secondary targets - police)
- 1998 FIFA World Cup plot in France
  - US Embassy, US Team, on-pitch assault on England-Tunisia game
- 2002 FIFA World Cup plot in Japan
  - KSM planned an attack, but unable to get operation in place
- 2006 FIFA World Cup plot in Germany (6)
  - 31 July attempt originally planned for the World Cup
  - 2 suitcases on a train that failed to detonate
Threat of Terrorism in SA 2010

• Threat perception:
  - History of terrorism
  - FIFA World Cup vs other international events

• Media attention / foreign delegates & visitors

• 15 May 2004
  - Planning
  - Access

• SA & Transnational Terrorism
• Vulnerability indicators
South Africa & Transnational Terrorism


Haroon Rashid Aswat arrested in Zambia - through SA (implicated in the London bombings).

2004: Pakistani authorities arrest: Dr Feroze Ganchi & Zubeir Ismail

2007: US/UN ‘red flag’: Dr Junaid Ismail Dockrat Moulana Farhad Ahmed Dockrat

Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal
Visiting South Africa in 2009
Deported from Botswana (and Kenya - al-Shabab) in 2009 for recruiting attempts to target the FIFA World Cup
Visit other countries in the region: Angola, Nigeria, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania

Saud Memon ‘arrested’ in SA in March 2003

Al-Akhtar Trust, Pakistan
Rashid Rauf was arrested with a forged South African passport, Pakistani authorities August 2006

Mohammed Gulzar moved to JHB in 2004 - went to London to execute attack
Gulzar was in contact with Mohammed Patel. He travelled to UK with a South African passport made out in the name of Altaf Ravat with his wife Zora Siddique.
Got married in Nigel

Abdullah Ahmed Ali
Assad Ali Sarwar
Abu Hamza Rabia
al-Qa’eda operational chief
Linked to the Madrid bombings... killed in Pakistan on 1 Dec 05

Rangzieb & Zilur travelled from China - Dubai (Dec 05) - SA

Habib Ahmed
AQ - UK

Rangzieb Ahmed

Both convicted in the UK in Dec 08

Mohammed Zilur Rahman
Travelled to SA in Dec 05 before returning to the UK

‘Imran’
South Africa

Both convicted in the UK in Dec 08
Strategic Vulnerability assessment

- Domestic Threat
  - Existing grievances

- Transnational threat
  - SA part of the international community

Difference between:
  a. Country used as a safe-haven
     ‣ Other ‘threats’ divert attention
  b. Target Country
     ‣ Availability & protection of targets
     ‣ Access to weaponry & explosives (ATM bombings)

- Safety to operate - possibility of being caught & prosecuted?
  ‣ Implementation of CT strategy (Pro-active holistic approach)
  ‣ Liberal constitution

- Ease to enter and exit the country without being noticed
  ‣ Border Control
    • Uncontrolled areas
    • Formal / informal points of entry
    • Corruption & capacity of Security Forces (SA Passports)
Populated areas outside the ‘control’ of government and security forces

1. Inter-marriages with locals

2. Assistance to poor communities - conversion to Islam NOT equal to terrorism

3. Migration and immigration (Somali & Pakistani communities)
   ‣ Pockets of support
   ‣ Isolation = difficult to infiltrate
   ‣ Question of integration / xenophobia
   ‣ Loyalty to nationality, religion and cultural heritage
   ‣ Inter-communal conflict / generalization
   ‣ Search for identity

▪ Communication infrastructure (radicalization & command / control)

▪ Relationship between state / security forces and the public

▪ Traditional assessments vs. ‘reality’
  - Structure & operations
  - ‘Training camps’
  - Success = ability to stay ‘hidden’
Direct Threat

- Organisation
  - Lone wolves - decentralized cell structures
- Targets: Driven by media attention
  - Stadiums; hotels associated with the event - hardened by security measures
  - Fan parks etc - access control (softer target)
  - Possible attacks not limited to “high value countries”
- Modus Operandi: Availability & Objectives
  - Bomb threats
  - Bombings
  - Firearms
Concluding Remarks

- World Cup or any other major event = opportunity to ‘voice’ frustrations (domestic & international) & use platform
  ‣ Service delivery
- Security planning vs operational thinking of ‘terrorists’
- Uneducated public & communal responsibility?
- Insufficient ‘partnerships’ with public on security
- Public: Low threat perception - “it will never happen to us” = comfort zone
- Informing vs. spreading fear
- SAPS preparations for the World Cup