



DRAFT REPORT

3rd GIBSA PARTNERS' MEETING

ISS CONFERENCE ROOM, TSHWANE, SOUTH AFRICA

2-3 APRIL 2009

**Organised by the Institute for Security Studies with the financial support of the Hanns
Seidel Stiftung**

3RD GIBSA MEETING

Introduction

1. There is an emerging consensus that shifts in the global balance of power also impact upon the global political economy. Some of these changes necessitate re-ordering and revitalization of the current systems of global governance and it is increasingly acknowledged that developing countries should become key partners in shaping global governance. This is mostly due to the emerging countries' economic size and growth rates, their relevance for regional politics and security stability and their share in social and environmental problems with global impact.
2. This realisation has prompted a number of countries to create a platform for a structured dialogue with key emerging countries with the aim of exploring and identifying common ground for shared global responsibility. The Heiligendamm Process (HDP) is one such initiative.
3. Related to the HDP is the informal GIBSA initiative (Germany, India, Brazil and South Africa), launched in Berlin in 2007, by the Berlin based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The other founding partners of this initiative include the Indian based Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which has its head office in South Africa and the Brazilian based Centre for International Relations (CEBRI).
4. The aims of the GIBSA Initiative are two fold and can be conveniently summarised as follows:
 - a) To facilitate and enhance mutual learning. And
 - b) To create platform for sharing of perspectives through continued and enriching dialogues on global political and economic issues.

- 5 Though closely related to the Heiligendamm Process¹, this self-styled Initiative differs from the Heiligendamm Process and other initiatives such as IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), which is a trilateral initiative aimed to strengthen South-South cooperation, promote themes of mutual interest in the international agenda.

11. Aims and Objectives

- 6 The 2009 GIBSA South Africa meeting, organised by ISS and supported by the Hanns Seidel Foundation, followed a 2008 meeting in Rio de Janeiro meeting and a earlier meeting, in 2007, in Berlin. The 3rd GIBSA meeting aimed at providing the partners, invited diplomats, donor partners, academics and business people an opportunity to deliberate on a number of issues pertaining to the emerging global political and economic order. The meeting particularly aimed at deliberating on the following subjects;
- a) South African domestic politics
 - b) Key developments and key shifts in power
 - c) African geopolitics
 - d) European African relations
 - e) Global governance
- 7 The 2009 GIBSA meeting also aimed at building upon the outcomes and successes of the previous meetings. In addition, based on the discussions on these areas, the meeting aimed at outlining areas of discussion for future GIBSA meetings.

12. Organization and Structure of the Meeting

- 8 The meeting held at ISS Conference Room, Tshwane, South Africa on 02-03 April 2009 brought together a total of 25 participants from various backgrounds (see attached list of participants and final programme).
- 9 The two-day meeting was structured into five sessions excluding the opening session and the closing session. Each of these sessions was arranged to involve the main presentation, a response that tease out the various issues from the presentation and structured discussion on the subject of the presentation. The following is the structure of the sessions:
- a) Session I: South African Politics

¹ Where the G8 meeting under German chairing occurred in June 2007

b) Session II:	Key Developments and Key shifts in power
c) Session III:	African Geopolitics
d) Session IV:	European African Relations
e) Session V:	Global Governance

Day 1: Wednesday 1 April 2009 (Evening Dinner) – Session I: South African Domestic Politics

13. On the 1st of April 2009, the Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Dr. Jakkie Cilliers hosted an informal evening dinner held at Cynthia's Restaurant and Art Gallery, Garsfontein, Pretoria.
14. The topic for the evening was framed under the theme of 'South African domestic politics'. Mr. Prince Mashele, the Head of the Crime, Justice and Politics Programme at ISS, introduced the theme.
15. Mr. Mashele provided a succinct overview of the South African politics. Locating his presentation to the Post- Apartheid South Africa, he focused on the political dynamics within the ruling party, arguing that they are central in understanding recent developments in the South African body politic.
16. He also talked about the normalization of South African politics, looking at this against the background of regional geopolitics. When looking at South Africa few years ago in comparative terms with other African countries, particularly those democracies that emerged after Huntington's *third wave of democratization* that swiftly moved through the Sub-Saharan region in the early 90s, one would argue that South Africa was different. But if you look at today's South Africa, one would find that it is not that much different. Was this the end of South African exceptionalism?
17. In concluding, the speaker briefly talked about the coming election on the 22 April 2009. Clearly the African National Congress will not lose power but rather it would be returned with its current third majority. He predicted that the ANC might get anything between 58-63%. Talking about the ANC splitter party Congress of the People (COPE), he said that if the United Democratic Movement (UDM) was able to get 3.4% when it first entered SA politics that COPE was capable of getting, at least the same.

18. During the discussions participants raised the future status of the current official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). He said DA believes that it will get 20% and polls are saying COPE will get 16%. If COPE gets this percentage that would lead to the decline of DA as the official opposition. In his view the widest margin between DA and COPE would be 3%.
19. Participants observed that election manifestos of the various parties reflect little substance police matters and that the current election regime in South Africa promoted the (typical African?) personalisation of politics. Like a number of other countries South Africa is experiencing the personalization of politics- the penetration of personalities at every level of the society and like Kenya; politics has apparently become impressively corrupt in a very short space of time – although corruption does not (yet?) appear to have become a structural feature of the civil service.

Day 2: Thursday 2 April 2009

20. The Meeting started with a welcoming note by Dr. Jakkie Cilliers. He welcomed the GIBSA partners and participants and expressed his appreciation to the Hanns Siedel Foundation for supporting the event and for its long-standing partnership with the ISS. Dr. Cilliers further briefed the participants about the institute's work in the field of human security, a complimentary paradigm to that of state security.
21. On behalf of HE Dieter W Haller, German Ambassador to South Africa, Mr. Ingo Herbert (Minister Counselor from the German Embassy) welcomed the participants and made some opening remarks. He thanked the ISS for hosting the meeting and Hanns Siedel Foundation for the generous financial support. Making a reference to the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) initiative, he said that although GIBSA is still a new kid on the block, both have the potential to play a meaningful role in shaping global governance in an interdependent world.

Session II: Key Developments and key shifts in power (Chair: Dr. Jakkie Cilliers)

22. Chaired by Dr. Jakkie Cilliers and framed under the theme of 'Key developments and key shifts in power', this session consisted of two presentations; one on the meaning of power

by Dr. Markus Kaim (Head of Research Division International Security, SWP, Berlin) and a second on the shifts in power from West to East by Major General (Rtd) Dipankar Banerjee (Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Dehli, India).

23. The first presentation by Dr. Kaim sought to lay a theoretical grounding for the discussions that followed. He concentrated mainly on the concept and empirical meaning of power. After defining power he talked about three types of power; namely hard, soft and smart power. Locating this concept in academic debates on international relations, he said that there is no consensus on the international literature on what power is. There is an idea that some powers are more powerful than others (this generating a heated debate during the discussions). According to him, power describes a relationship in which one actor can achieve his or her will against the resistance of others. He said that power remains a common denominator in global affairs today. He posed a question as to whether power equals influence? He said that if power is a relationship, then three types of power could be differentiated along resources of power and the mode in which power is exercised.
24. Traditionally, international relations thinking has focused on hard power. Focusing on hard power he said, within the neo-realist paradigm, states seek to dominate others to ensure their survival in a system in which no overarching authority can grant their security. In such a zero-sum game, war and conflict are modes of action. The power resources, centrally to hard power are GDP (economic power), military (military spending, military personnel and expenditure for R&D) and other resources (such as size of territory and population). According to him US global hegemony was a myth although it is still appropriate to define US as the global military power in the international arena.
25. Contrary to hard power, soft power is about making others want what you want, meaning that the mode of action is persuasion and cooperation. According to Dr. Kaim, the power resources at play here are internationally attractive culture and ideology, knowledge and international institutions. Still on soft power, he said that NGOs play a vital role in international relations and can influence (persuasion) states policies, depending on the cooperation of non-state actors. Pointing to the role of NGOS in providing aid in Afghanistan, some of the participants seemed to agree with him on the capacity of

multinationals and NGOs to influence policies, processes and decisions. A question then was, how to define the role of NGOs in power?

26. Talking about smart power, Dr. Kaim said that in order to shape global politics today, hard and soft power need to be combined wisely and it is only this way that power will translate into influence. The central tenet of this form of power holds that the “US must become a smarter power by investing once again in the global good-providing things that people and governments in all quarters of the world want but cannot attain in the absence of American Leadership”. He concluded by proving some few advantages and disadvantages of these different forms of power. Notably, one of the advantages of power is that it does not only have good concepts in specifying scope and domain of international relations, it is also used as the currency of international relations. Its disadvantage is that all three types of power remain largely state-centric while central problems of international politics, such as piracy today deal with non-state actors.
27. During the discussions one participant rightfully observed that in many instances, debates on power tend to follow Marxist theoretical framework, defining power in terms of resources. Another interesting perspective of this concept was raised, that of a power as a chance ‘not to learn’. Yet the US does appear to have learnt some lessons from Iraq and despite its challenges, the US is still able to rejuvenate and reinvent itself.
28. Major General Banerjee was the next speaker and addressed the theme of the shifts in power from West to East. He talked about the current shifts in the global power, saying that this phenomenon is not something that is fundamentally new in the global political economy. However, what raises eyebrows is the pace and speed on which the current changes are moving. Today’s global power shifts are happening more rapidly and more substantively than before.
29. Looking at the historical genesis of this change, he noted that until the industrial revolution transformed the global power to the West, the East has been the centre of global power. Economic power throughout history has been located in the Asia, China and India. The rise of Japan, with massive technological innovation, that took shape in the 1980s should also not be overlooked when reviewing these developments. Brazil, India and China are major emerging powers in the world today. The ‘Chindia’ (China-India) factor is also important in the current geopolitical power shifts.

30. Talking about the recent global economic meltdown, Major General Banerjee noted that, it has far-reaching ramifications for the global economic and political order. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism is another important factor. Citing European conflicts in the 19th and 20th century, Major Banerjee said that power shifts have always been linked to major conflicts, sustained conflicts and it inevitable create some tensions and lead to conflict. This global power shifts necessitate very focused questions in dealing with peace and security issues.
31. In concluding, Major General Banerjee raised some critical issues. He asked questions as to; what might be the impact of these shifts in developing policies? And how does one adjusts and re-orientates the global political and economic order? In addition to this, he noted the importance of ecological and environment security as very important and the imperative to understanding the extent on which they can affect international security and economic order. He concluded by saying that political leadership, political authority and political stability become critical factors both in China and India. Leaders need to understand and appreciate the impact of their decisions.
32. During the subsequent discussions participants talked about this idea of the East challenging the monopoly of the West. It was observed that universal norms have largely been derived (imposed) from the West. This is advantageous because China has no consensus on what it calls as its national norms. Looking at the rise of Brazil, China and India, a question was asked then as to whether they are becoming more Western and/or less Eastern? Some participants alluded to the fact that, the power paradigm shift from West to the East is a story without a clear ending. Some participants were of the view that, though China has become a powerhouse and an interesting power broker, the US has a remarkable rejuvenating potential and still unsurpassed in providing an exemplary economic model. Some participants expressed their view that the world is moving towards a multipolar world where a variety of pools of regional authority will dominate, competing with one another for hegemony in their particular geographical sphere of influence.
33. Most participants echoed the sentiments that there is no inevitability about the shifts in the balance of power. However, according to some emphasis should not only be on economic aspect of power but also on other equally important power imperatives. One participant

asked a candid question on the involvement of Africa in these power shifts. Why was India, China and US coming to Africa? Is it because of her weakness and vulnerability? According to the participant, there is a need to focus more on what will be Africa's role in this shift. Are these actors capacitating Africa to play an important and meaningful role in this paradigm? By 2050 Africa will have more people than any other continent (population growth is an economic driver) and it's going to be an important consideration when considering the future of the world.

34. A number of questions were asked about the influential role of non-state actors in exercise of and dispersal of power to the extremities in the international system. The participants seemed to agree that there is a need for a broader understanding of power to be combined with a particular domain and context from which power is exercised. The participants agreed that the shifts in global power balance were inevitable
35. Following the presentation by Major General Banerjee, Dr. Cilliers provided the participants with a summary of Mr. Garth le Pere's (Director of the South African based Institute for Global Dialogue) paper titled 'a multipolar or non-polar world?: Only if you engage the unipolar'. Garth le Pere speaks of four patterns of polarity; multipolarity, bipolarity, unipolarity and non-polarity. His paper provides conceptual clarifications on these four patterns of polarity.
36. According to Le Pere, the term polarity has become a standard part of the IR (International Relations) grammar for analysing and conceptualising such shifts but it is also used to assess the pattern of organisation among states in the international system. Le Pere posits that this term is mainly associated with Realist and Neo-Realist theories of international relations and is essentially used to describe which state (or states) exert dominant or influential power over other states; as such it is used to identify where power centres (or poles) are located in world politics.
37. In this paper Garth le Pere submits a number of theses. In his first thesis he argues that the current position of the US in the international system is unassailable and without precedent in modern times and nullifies Richard Haas's recent submission that "today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated power". In his second thesis he asserts "since the Cold War ended, the US has actively sought to maintain its global primacy by preventing other states from challenging its pre-eminent position". The

third thesis posits “new terrorist and asymmetric threats certainly have major implications for US security but the immediate emergence of any serious challenger to or geopolitical rival of US primacy is patently doubtful”.

38. In his fourth thesis Garth le Pere contends that “While US statecraft has been directed at maintaining its unipolar position and global primacy, especially in matters of the high politics of war and peace, it has also acted as a ‘benign hegemony’ by making use of multilateral processes and institutions that promote the provision of global public goods, but which also increase its leverage for enhancing its influence among both developed and developing countries while dampening any incentives for states to enter into collusive balancing against it”. In his last thesis he argues the “global financial meltdown and its attendant pathologies notwithstanding the US remains the world’s most capable state in critical spheres of where and how power is exercised: military, economic but increasingly also technological and ideological”.
39. For Le Pere’s this would suggest that the US will remain the pre-eminent power in the international system for some time to come. His paper ends by posing a question as to whether a multi-polar or non-polar world is a realistic possibility?

Session III: African Geopolitics (Chair: Klaus Liepert)

40. In introducing the topic, Mr. Liepert said that the global geopolitics requires Africa to be unified in order to be able to confront its challenges and play a meaningful role in the new emerging world order.
41. In her presentation, Ms Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, the National Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) unpacked the concept of geo-politics. According to her definition, geopolitics explains and predicts international behaviour, primarily in terms of geographical variables such as location, size, climate, demography, natural resources and technological development.
42. Geo-economics on the other hand is about interdependence and ordering of world politics based primarily on economic considerations rather than strategic ones. According to her it is geo-economic that is defining the world today and where Africa and access to its resources fits into the global value chain.

43. Talking about the importance of Africa, she said that the continent is rich in resources that are central to many technologies that drive the world. It is an energy producer and is still a frontier continent, not fully exploited. Although Africa is well located geographically (located in between the two big oceans, the Americas, Asia and South of Europe) it does not have the ability to control the waters around it - only few African countries have that capacity. More so, the continent has a number of weak states with very little effective capacity and this in turn creates opportunities for external actors to exert influence, especially at this period where there is a recalibration of global power dynamics.
44. According to Ms Sidropoulos one cannot talk of Africa as a single actor. She posed a critical question as to, what extent African States are proactive in playing the new geopolitical and geo-economic game? Are they responding to how others view them in these new dynamics and shifting global system? In terms of power relations, she argued in favour of a two tier matrix evolving on; a more traditional power engagement between more capable, globally assertive states and the outside world and a more traditional donor-recipient relationship on the other.
45. Talking about regional powers within the continent, the last decade has seen the emergence of few new leaders in the continent, who in varying degrees also flexed their muscles in their engagement with external powers. Some of these are Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Angola, Libya and Kenya. These are seen playing hegemonic roles in their respective regions and in the continent. Capacity, legitimacy and ability are the key underpinning elements of hegemony. Ms. Sidiropoulos concluded by noting that these countries have some capacity to engage in the unfolding geopolitical game or to make calculations about their potential to do so.
46. This session also generated a very lively discussion. Many issues were raised and participants strongly raised issues around the legitimacy of many African states. Some international actors were puzzled as to which African to invite for engagement and who will fully and genuinely represent Africa? The continent has a problem in the lack of countries with wider acceptance or legitimacy to represent Africa. The view from many external commentators appears to be of the view that the continent as having somehow 'failed'. The sub-regional approach has worked in Latin America, a question was asked as to whether this can work in Africa?

47. In his presentation on Africa's international role in the international politics, Dr. Stefan Mair from SWP said that power resources are a critical in understanding this role. They can be categorized in hard and soft power, neither of which are well developed among African states. They can hardly compete with other powers in the world in terms of hard power, i.e. human resources, economic and military power as well as administrative capacity. In most African states soft power is very much limited to the charisma of the respective leader. Nevertheless, African states differ with regard to power resources. South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt are certainly more powerful than all the other African countries, followed by another group of countries comprehending Angola, Sudan, Algeria and Libya
48. But power resources are only a part of the story. Almost equally important is the will to exert power, to lead and to carry the material and political burden which comes with it. In addition, Dr. Mair also talked about the continental organizations like AU. He opined that, although AU is making some serious strides in the area of peace and security (making reference to the building of the African Peace and Security Architecture structures like the African Standby Force), difference on a number of issues undermine its credibility.
49. He went further in arguing that, it is difficult to see the common African position on important issues that are in the international agenda. None of the African countries have the power to influence the outcomes and decisions in the international arena on its own, they will only be able to exert some influence in concert. Only South Africa plays a substantive role in international affairs but is often punching above its weight. In addition, many African countries follow South Africa's engagement with great mistrust suspecting that it might use its role as speaker for Africa to dominate the continent. .
50. In concluding, Dr. Mair said that African countries need to strengthen co-operation on global governance issues. Taking into account the size and heterogeneity of the AU membership the continental institution might not be the adequate agency to facilitate this co-operation and co-ordinate Africa's participation in global governance.
51. As an alternative he recommended that the continent strengthen club governance, with a leadership drawn from different countries. African countries along the G-Lines (G8, G20), maybe come up with A5 or A6 formations in order to reach collective bargaining

and desired relevance in the international arena. He observed that, so far, the only interest African countries have in the global political economy is to mobilise more resources and support for their own development and good - not for the continental public good or governance and certainly not to improve global governance.

52. During the discussions a number of issues were raised, with most participants believing that Africa need to take ownership and responsibility to get rid of its paralizing sense of victimhood. Some asked when the post-colonial period would end and when would the post-colonial thinking stop? It was opined that the answer to these questions might help Africa to map the way forward and find solution to its problems. The idea of club governance that was raised by Dr Mair, was generally perceived as positive – the emergence of a group of forward thinking African countries that can lead development on the continent. In this vein some discussants lamented the extent to which South Africa and the African Union has adopted the politics of the weak or trade union politics (the need to mobilise and garner solidarity) and the need to go beyond this.
53. The possible role of Africa as a meaningful and powerful actor in international relations was discussed on length. The participants generally agreed that Africa has not been an important actor but rather a field of action – more object than an actor of international relations. Due to the divisions and mistrust amongst African countries, Africa is not able to influence decisions in the international arena to the extent possible and does not contribute effectively to the global public good.

Session IV: European African Relations

54. During the second day of the GIBSA meeting, the Hanns Siedel Foundation hosted an evening dinner with a keynote speech by Mr. Christian Hegemer (Director, Institute for International Contact and Cooperation, HSS, Munich). In his speech (which was actually only delivered the following day) he talked about the European African relations. On a very positive note, he said that, although many countries in the continent suffer from instability, state failure, regional strife, economic disruption, massive movements of refugees, violent political competition and other assorted ills, there is no doubt that Africa is not a doomed continent as many people think, it does have a future. The continent has a young population, abundant mineral resources and an inherent dynamism.

55. Mr. Hegemer also said that, Europe couldn't afford to sit on the sidelines and dismiss these troubles as if they had no impact in their society. Citing about 16 different European military missions (carried out in the framework of ESDP), he said that negligence is not an option for Europe. The European Union has developed a complex array of political, economic and financial instruments to support the development of all the countries in Africa as well as those in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In concluding, he said that EU members must above all recognise that Africa's ills have to be dealt with by Africans. The debates during this session shifted from the European African Relations to the issue of ODAs, which in itself generated heated debates.

Day 3, Friday 3 April 2009 Session V: Global Governance (Chair Dr. Volker Perthes)

56. This session sought to discuss global governance issues. Mr. Peter Wittig from the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the first presentation on the future of the Heilegendamm Process. His presentation was divided into three parts; the first part dealt with the achievements, the second part with the potential of the HDP and the last part dealt with the way forward. Started during the G8-Summit 2007 in Heiligendamm, the process started with the aim of initiating structured dialogue of the G8 with the G5 countries. The four HDP clusters of topics were identified as:

- a) Investment and corporate social responsibility
- b) Innovation and intellectual property rights
- c) Energy, especially energy efficiency
- d) Development cooperation, especially in Africa

57. Talking about the potential of the HDP, Mr. Wittig said that there is an emerging consensus among the participating countries that the HDP should be extended for another two years. From a German point of view it is desirable to broaden the agenda towards a more political approach. Questions of the global economy and the global threats and challenges should be included, like energy and climate, water, food-security, green growth, etc.. The need for cooperation on an equal footing could be highlighted by establishing a system of co-chairs of the G8-presidency with a G5-country at the level of steering committee. There might also be a joint declaration of the heads of state of

government of the G8 and G5 in La Magdalena in Italy in July 2009, which would send out a strong political signal for a closer future arrangement.

58. In concluding, Mr. Wittig said that, in their view, HDP has stood the test of the first two years and has proven its value as a successful platform for further development of the G8 and for new era of global governance. Mapping the way forward he said that there is a need to look at three issues in the future; the quality of cooperation (more participation, but also willingness on the part of the G5 to assume increased responsibility on substantial issues), size and numbers (question of enlargement to a G14, G 15or G16) and lastly the relationship to other fora (G20 and others).
59. Following Mr. Wittig's presentation, Ambassador Joser Botafogo Goncalves from CEBRI talked about the future of key multilateral institutions like IMF and World Bank. Focusing on the three institutions, WTO, IMF and WB, he said that, USA, UK and Western Europe decided to prolong, in an informed way, the future of Bretton Woods's institutions. The idea behind this according to him is to show that the Western World, in spite of the growing importance of China and India, still can retain control over the financial and economic acquisition of the world.
60. Looking at the consequences of the G20 meeting in London he said that IMF will move from growing irrelevance to critical importance, arguing that there is no solution outside the capitalist world. When lending to countries, the classic formula of excessive policies is going to be replaced by more sophisticated policies, though conditionalities will remain important. Conditionality will become complicated, with lots of politicking.
61. The speaker noted that the World Bank is facing negative financing because there is no fresh money coming from repayments of loans from many countries. He said that there will be an increase in ODA for poor countries because World Bank has to show solidarity to fight poverty. Looking at the kinds of loans that are bound to accelerate recovery in the short term, he highlighted infrastructure, environment (energy renewable), education and health.
62. Talking about the recent G20 meeting in London, he said that the meeting talked on free trade and the need to restore order in the global financial order. His impression was that nobody is in favour of protectionism as a measure to control the economic crisis. Talking about regional economic arrangement, he said that they will remain relevant and

important. Looking at the voting issue within these institutions he said that he doesn't see the possibility of US giving up its voting powers. Amb Botafogo said that during this economic meltdown world will continue to work in a more geometrical nature.

63. Following Ambassador Botafogo's presentation, Ambassador Marcos de Azambuja, also from CEBRI, talked about the emerging concept of club governance. He said that the concept is his preference for multilateralism based on formal structures, treaty based or charter based universal or at-least open participation with transparent rules and procedures. He said that when structured multilateralism is unavailable, informal arrangements are necessary in filling that gap. However, these should be seen as interim arrangements to be eventually replaced by more stable and mature structures.
64. He pointed out that, clubs, regimes, arrangements, systems, like-minded groupings (whatever the name is), are indications that associative impulse could not move in the direction of an established and mature structuring. Ambassador Azambuja observed that in the 1970s and early 1980s there was a marked reluctance in the United States and in its leading partners to accept the creation of other international agencies and institutions. The reasons he identified for this reluctance included legitimisation reasons. International agencies had become too bloated, too ineffective, too expensive to run and at times just places to create unnecessary jobs and bureaucracies. According to him, the proliferation of club governance is a result of two-folded impulse; they are, in many ways the flexible and money saving way of running things rather than through the expensive creation of yet more institutions. To a larger extent, voluntary participation institutions or clubs are not regulated by rules and treatise; there is a degree of flexibility.
65. Exploring the historical developments of these like-minded clubs, he said that the Cold War is the only important cycle of recent history to have ended without a corresponding impulse to bring about re-organization of international life. It ended up with no effort to re-organise and re-order the world, unlike other wars like Second World War II. This failure and inability to respond to the changing needs of the society has also led to burgeoning of informal clubs. Highlighting the shortcomings of the old institutions, he said that these have not been geared to be relevant to the new challenges like environmental issues.

66. Closely related to these like-minded clubs is the letter proliferation of various groups (G5, G6, G8, G20) , the buzzword of this 21st century and becoming omnipresent. In the midst of this unfavourable reality, there is a need to ask questions as to how the multiplicity of the emerging institutions can be streamlined - there are lots of Gs! The world needs to be prepared to act in a two level system; the formal and informal, both indispensable and complimentary to each. Nonetheless, this informality should not be interpreted as to mean acceptance of less transparency and lessened accountability.
67. He also provide an analysis of the 2 April 2009 G20 London meeting, which, according to him was the finest hour of informal club diplomacy as the G20 had rescued the world, only for now, from the greatest financial crisis since the great depression of the 1920s and early 1930s.

Conclusion and Recommendations

68. In general, the 3rd GIBSA meeting helped to provide a forum and a platform to examine various issues that are critical to global governance. Some of the key factors of the debate revolved around the issue of African geopolitics, key developments and key shifts in power, more especially the shift from West to East, power relations within Africa and the continent's international role.
69. A consensus was reached in the meeting that the shifts in global power balance was inevitable. During the discussions on the issue of power and the emerging global economic and political order, participants had different opinions on whether the world will remain a multi-polar or unipolar enterprise or whether we will live in a non-polar world. Some argued that US will remain the pre-eminent power in the international system for some time to come and others argued that US hegemony is going to be strongly challenged by China and India. Nevertheless there was a degree of consensus that the US has both hard and soft power and it is capable of strategically turning these two into a smart power. Still on the issue of power, the possible role of Africa as a meaningful and powerful actor in international relations was also discussed. The participants seemed to agree that Africa is still not an important actor but rather a field of action. Due to the extent of mistrust amongst African countries themselves, Africa is not able to influence decisions in the international arena and does not have the muscle to

contribute to the global public good

70. The issue of European African relations was also discussed at length and many participants were of the view that Africa needs to take ownership and responsibility for its challenges. The European Union has developed a complex array of political, economic and financial instruments to support the development of all the countries in Africa as well as those in the Caribbean and the Pacific. There was a strong belief that Africa's ills have to be dealt with by Africans. The meeting generated some heated debates on the issue of ODAs, though this area was not part of the agenda.
71. In addition, the panellists also provided a critical interrogation of this emerging concept of club governance. The last part of the meeting specifically focused on this issue by looking at the future of the Heiligendamm Process and the future for multilateral institutions. There was a consensus that there is group proliferation (G5, G6, G8, G20) and it has become the buzzword of the 21st century. In the midst of this unfavourable reality, there is a need to ask questions as to how the multiplicity of the emerging institutions can be streamlined. The world needs to be prepared to act in a two level system; the formal and informal, both indispensable and complementary to each other.
72. Looking at the role of multilateral institutions like WB, IMF and WTO, it was agreed that they still have a role to play in the global economic order. The participants also discussed at length the outcomes of the G20 meeting in London (perhaps this is because the GIBSA meeting coincided with the G20 London meeting). There was a consensus that the meeting was a success and that it brought hope during a time of recent economic meltdown. There were some views that said IMF will move from growing irrelevance to critical importance because there is no solution outside the capitalist world. With regards to the success and the future of the HDP, the meeting was told that it has stood the test of the first two years and has proven its value as a successful platform for further development of the G8 and as a new platform of global governance.

Recommendations

73. It was acknowledged that the insertion of the African perspective on the discussions was very useful and it was then recommended that the 4th GIBSA meeting in India, 2010

should also try to do the same and add the Eastern/Asian perspective on the discussions

74. As done during the 3rd GIBSA meeting, it was recommended that political dynamics of the host country will need to be also discussed in the next meeting as well. On the issue of African governance and the role of the continent in international affairs, it was recommended that Africa should also consider the club arrangements (e.g A5 or A6)
75. It was also recommended that the procedural principles coming from the HDP were worth studying when discussing how to reform other institutions.
76. The meeting agreed that the 2010 meeting should discuss how to coordinate the various international actors on the ground and how to streamline their activities so as to be effective and value driven
77. It was also recommended that the next meeting should also have a session on geopolitics, power relations and governance structures. It should be structured along the same way as the Pretoria meeting (divided into three days and thematic areas).

Closing Session (Dr. Jakkie Cilliers)

78. Before closing, the participants were given an opportunity to share their ideas on the sessions and the overall running and organization of the meeting. Participants agreed that the meeting was very enlightening and that it had been a huge success. Dr. Cilliers thanked the participants and closed the meeting. A meeting of the key GIBSA partners was convened afterwards.

FINAL PROGRAMME

Wednesday 1 April 2009

- Participants arrive. ISS guests will be picked up from OR Tambo airport and transported to the Cascades guest house on Main Street, Waterkloof, Pretoria
- Wednesday evening at 7 pm supper with keynote speaker Mr Prince Mashele on **South African domestic politics**. Venue Cynthia's on Garsfontein and Pachas.

Thursday 2 April 2009: 9 am to 5h30 pm

Transport departs from Cascades at 08h30 am

Welcome remarks: Ingo Herbert, Minister Counselor on behalf HE Dieter W Haller, German ambassador to South Africa

Morning: **Key developments and key shifts in power** (Chair: Jakkie Cilliers)

- The meaning of power (hard, soft, smart), *Markus Kaim*
- Shifts in power from West to East, *Dipankar Banerjee*
- A multipolar or non-polar world? *Garth le Pere*

Afternoon: **African Geopolitics** (Chair: Klaus Liepert)

- Power relations within Africa, *Elizabeth Sidiropoulos*
- Africa's international role, *Stefan Mair*

Transport from the ISS to Cascades departs at 5h30 pm

Transport departs from Cascades for supper at 6h45 pm, back at 9h30 pm

Evening supper hosted by the Hanns Seidel Foundation at 7 pm: **European African relations** with keynote speaker Mr Christian Hegemer, Hanns Seidel Stiftung.

Friday 3 April 2009: 9 am to 5h30 pm

Morning: **Global governance** (Chair Volker Perthes)

- The future of the Heiligendamm Process, *Peter Wittig*
- What future for multilateral institutions? *José Botafogo Gonçalves*
- Club governance: G8, G15/16, G20, *Marcos de Azambuja*

Afternoon: **Concluding discussions** (Chair: Jakkie Cilliers)

Lunch: 1 pm until 2 pm – light finger lunch at the ISS

Tea/coffee: From 10h30 to 11h00 and from 3 pm to 3h30 pm

APPENDIX B

FINAL LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

SWP

Prof Dr Volker Perthes, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin)

Dr Stefan Mair, Director of Studies, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin)

Dr Markus Kaim, Head of Research Division International Security, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin)

ISS

Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria)

Dr Paul-Simon Handy, Programme Head, African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria)

Mr Thembani Mbadlanyana, Junior researcher, Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria) - Conference report

CEBRI

Amb José Botafogo Gonçalves, president, Centro Brasileiro de Relacoes Internacionais (Rio de Janeiro)

Amb Marcos de Azambuja, vice president, Centro Brasileiro de Relacoes Internacionais (Rio de Janeiro)

IPCS

Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retd), director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (New Delhi)

HSS

Mr Gerd Linska, South African representative, Hanns Seidel Stiftung (Johannesburg)

Mr Christian J Hegemer, Director, Institute for International Contact and Cooperation, Hanns Seidel Stiftung (Munich)

Mr Wolfgang Kleine, Namibian representative, Hanns Seidel Stiftung (Windhoek)

Mr G Hopwood ???

Mr Klaus Liepert, Head of Department for Sub-Saharan Africa, Hanns Seidel Stiftung (Munich)

South African think-tanks/academics

Ms Elizabeth Sidropolous, National Director, South African Institute of International Affairs (Johannesburg)

Dr Garth le Pere, Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue (Johannesburg).
Only on 2nd April

Mr Aziz Pahad, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Johannesburg)

Dr Matlotleng Matlou, Chief Executive Officer, Africa Institute of South Africa plus one colleague (Pretoria)

Mr Paul Graham, Executive Director, Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Pretoria)

Diplomats

Ambassador Dieter W Haller, German ambassador to South Africa (Pretoria) only on 3 April

Mr Ingo Herbert, Minister Councillor, German embassy to South Africa (Pretoria)

Ambassador José Vincent de Sá Pimentel Ambassador of Brazil to South Africa (Pretoria)

Mr Pedro Cardoso, embassy of Brazil to South Africa (Pretoria)

High Commissioner Rajiv K Bhatia, Indian ambassador to South Africa (Pretoria) - only morning of 2nd April

Ambassador Dr. Peter Wittig, Director General for United Nations and Global Issues/ Federal Foreign Office (Berlin)

Mr B Kwabe plus one more SA department of foreign affairs (two reps) (Pretoria)

Journalists

Mr Jean-Jacques Cornish

Business

Mr Saki Macozoma, Stanlib (Johannesburg) – dinner on 1st April only

Mr Siegmur Proebstl, CEO, Siemens Southern Africa (Johannesburg)

Dr. Hans-Peter Keitel, President of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) (Berlin)

Logistics:

Ms Grace Mulinge gmulinge@issafrica.org