Bad order at sea: From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea

Francois Vreý

Background

At the dawn of the 21st century – in particular as a result of increasing bad order at sea – maritime matters have increasingly edged their way upwards on national and international security agendas. Kaplan recently reiterated the conflict–commerce and resource connections in an essay published in *Foreign Affairs* in which he depicted the Indian Ocean as the future battleground between the rising powers of India and China.1 In a similar vein, Forrest and Souza2 pointed to the Gulf of Guinea in the western Atlantic as a maritime zone of international strategic importance, but one showing growing disorder at sea.

In 2009, events off the Horn of Africa, as well as off the West African shoreline in the arc of the Gulf of Guinea, continue to draw international attention due to, among other
things, a steep rise in maritime threats grouped broadly under the rubric of piracy. Subsequently, both these African maritime arenas reflect a growing maritime awareness and cooperation to prevent or deal with the threats to humanitarian and commercial interests and the endangerment of important resources and seaways. Together with international attention turning back to Africa, African seas are increasingly assuming new importance as actors stake their maritime claims.

This article attempts to set the current piracy scourge off the African coast within the ambit of good order at sea and explain the insecurity off the west and east African coasts. The first section covers good order at sea and the general deterioration of security at sea and gives a wider classification of threats at sea. The following section highlights the growing insecurity off the Horn of Africa and introduces the reader to an important African maritime threat landscape. The third section outlines threats in the Gulf of Guinea in particular before suggesting alternatives for promoting maritime security in this region. The discussion closes with a brief comparison between the eastern and western seaboards.

**Bad order at sea: towards maritime insecurity**

Since the last decade of the 20th century Till has warned repeatedly about the growing problem of disorder at sea – a threat that is bound to commandeer the attention of naval and other maritime agencies. Resources, transportation and trade, and the sea as a means for exchanging information to further human development represent matters that cannot be ignored. Elements of Till’s warning rang true for Africa as by the middle of 2008, maritime insecurity along stretches of the coast of sub-Saharan Africa began to dominate the news, in particular the daring raids on shipping by pirates off the coast of Somalia.

The growing threat to good order at sea off Somalia compelled the United Nations to announce on 7 October 2008 an amendment to its earlier resolution to fight piracy. This amendment called for even sterner military action by countries to eradicate piracy. The constituent elements of good order at sea, however, reside at the heart of the threats and vulnerabilities unfolding along the African coast and represent much more than the piracy hype that tends to obscure the scope of the emergent insecurity.

The African case reflects a geographic manifestation of a general upsurge in maritime insecurity. It also shows a need to establish conceptual and legal order to deal with the threatening events that now taint the African maritime landscape. In retrospect and at the global level, the UN through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) went some way towards demarcating threats at sea, and piracy in particular. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) went further and set
outlines for acting against illegal and threatening events at sea, but the matter remained unsettled and the vulnerabilities became ever more visible off the Horn of Africa. At the 2009 Sea Power for Africa Symposium in Cape Town, South Africa (8–11 March), the idea was mooted that UNCLOS had been in need of urgent revision for more than twenty years. Taking action against dangerous threats at sea – even against blatant attacks such as those off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden – has become a thorny problem.9

Some classification of threatening events at sea has become vital. Although piracy is currently the most visible of the threats to good order at sea, it is hardly a credible collective term for such threats. That most threats are conveniently grouped under piracy is a misconception pointed out by Till, who depicts the threats to good order at sea as a spectrum of local wars, terrorist attacks and piracy.10 Once the inaccurate use of the concept piracy is analysed, a clearer picture of the maritime threat cluster emerges.

An indiscriminate approach to piracy makes it difficult for governments and their security agencies to respond to maritime threats, as the responsibility to react to such threats or prevent them becomes confusing. A clearer framework is required, and Dillon suggests a typology (see table 1) to mitigate some of the difficulties that stem from these threats being labelled piracy.

### Table 1 Expanded categories of maritime insecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current format</th>
<th>Suggested format: expanded categories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Piracy as the cover-all term</td>
<td><em>Corruption:</em> Acts of extortion or collusion against marine vessels by government officials and/or port authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Piracy:</em> An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act</td>
<td><em>Sea robbery:</em> Attacks that take place in port while the ship is berthed or anchored</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Piracy:</em> Actions against ships under way and outside the protection of port authorities in territorial waters, straits and on the high seas</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Maritime terrorism:</em> Crimes against ships by terrorist organisations</td>
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The sudden increase in the number of incidents off the African coast, while littoral states are displaying little capacity or political will to police or defend their maritime domains, requires a more systematic classification, as set out in table 1. In a sense, the above typology calls for an appropriate response hierarchy to guide policing and other security agencies. What is needed is a hierarchy of agencies capable of dealing with threats from the land to the high seas. It is therefore not surprising that literature on piracy and other maritime insecurities sometimes calls for closer attention to the research agenda in order to better understand the complexities involved.11 Apparently, stemming the tide of piracy
off the African coast does not automatically translate into stemming the bad order at sea continuum depicted in table 1 and emphasised by Till.

The frequency of the 2008 and 2009 maritime incidents off the African coast\textsuperscript{12} and the slow responses from littoral African governments reflect elements of some maritime regime on paper, but a weak or inappropriate operational capability that falters when good governance by the appropriate authorities is called for. By April 2009, piracy remained the ‘flavour of the month’, and one embedded in an array of threats and vulnerabilities flowing between the land and the sea.\textsuperscript{13}

Ultimately, African governments have to secure their maritime domains through good governance. It is therefore not surprising that good governance at sea underpinned the 2009 Sea Power for Africa Symposium in South Africa but, as delegates pointed out, it ultimately remains the responsibility of African governments to accept and react to the resolutions put forward by African navies.

**Bad order at sea off East Africa**

Ninic identifies piracy incidents off the African coast, and in particular events along the coast of Somalia and into the Gulf of Aden, as the outfall of not maintaining good order at sea around Africa.\textsuperscript{14} Neglecting the protection of maritime resources, transport of goods by sea, communication and dominion individually or collectively promotes maritime and eventually national insecurity. The seas off the Horn of Africa and the attention they attract coalesce with landward matters in no uncertain way. Simply put, the international attention directed towards the seas off the Horn of Africa revolves around threats to commerce while on land, international attention is largely focused on humanitarian vulnerabilities in Somalia, Sudan, and perhaps in Kenya as failed or weak states. Nonetheless, landward and maritime insecurity are interdependent, as insecurity on land eventually causes maritime insecurity.\textsuperscript{15} In turn, the latter obstructs the potential benefits from good order at sea to flow to communities on land through order, vibrant trade, safe sea lanes and effective dominion.

Lloyds daily bulletins reflect a determined response by non-African states to redirect naval resources to tackle piracy off the east coast of Africa. However, this laudable and in no way insignificant response became entangled in a conundrum created by a patchwork of international law, politically correct rules of engagement, and sovereignty issues that collectively obstructed actions to defend the growing number of vessels being attacked at sea.\textsuperscript{16} With African political will and naval capacity lacking, and with too many state and private enterprise rules disrupting or preventing rapid and effective international action against pirates, disorder at sea off the Horn of Africa continues. In a sense, the international armada assembling off the coast of Somalia created expectations of quickly mitigating the
piracy threat through deterrence and intervention. In contrast, however, the pirates quickly sensed and exploited the opportunities created by the asymmetry of the international response of modern navies attempting to clamp down on maritime piracy.

The laudable naval response has been crippled by the apparent inability of naval contingents to quickly adapt to international rules and to overcome (self)imposed obstructions; the tendency of navies to depart when their own interests or citizens are no longer under threat; and maritime transgressors not being significantly deterred by the naval show of force. The fact that the international naval task force only took shape in response to direct threats to the international shipping trade is also significant. For some time a general lack of law and order has characterised a large swath of the African east coast from the Red Sea southwards to South Africa, where the South African Navy probably represents the first credible African maritime buffer against disorder at sea. Commercial and bio-piracy along the coast and on the high seas, even as far south as Tanzania, are thus not surprising. Both commercial shipping and fishing stocks are raided, as no East African littoral state has the maritime means to prevent or terminate the scourge. In a sense, the navy–pirate asymmetry and lack of an African response have been benefiting the pirates, but indications are that as the naval response and cooperation gather momentum, the naval noose is bound to curb the freedom enjoyed by the pirates. As more actors step in and master the challenge, naval successes are bound to increase.

The controversial but perhaps practical option of self-help assumed growing importance after reports that a private security contractor was preparing to fill the gap by protecting merchant vessels along the Horn of Africa. In response, the matter of private contractors helping to establish good order at sea emerged as a parallel debate in the saga of maritime threats and vulnerabilities. As the positive results of naval coercion seemed to take effect very slowly, shipping off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden remained under threat and in need of protection. By April 2009, regular interference with shipping around the Horn of Africa and further south continued, with 60 attacks reported by April 2009 and 16 ships remaining in the hands of pirates.

In effect, a triad of dilemmas unfolded: the incapacity of littoral countries to combat the scourge; responses hindered by rules imposed by the international community; and ongoing controversy on whether private actors should be employed to help stem the wave of piracy. In a sense, each have a role to play, as was demonstrated during the attack upon the *Melody* passenger vessel on 25 April 2009 when Israeli security guards on board helped to fight off the pirates and a nearby naval vessel escorted it to Jordan. A day later, Yemeni security forces rescued a hijacked oil tanker by killing two pirates and arresting 11 others. Almost simultaneously the Seychelles coast guard intercepted pirates at their northern maritime boundary after receiving an early warning from a French naval vessel. Collectively, some success transpired through multiple agencies cooperating, although the hijacking of vessels continues unabated.
Reports on piracy tend to reflect technical details about the incidents, placing them in categories. What often remains unsaid is the wider setting in the Horn of Africa, where the cover-argument remains that instability on land is merely finding its way to sea, but the continuum of insecurity that stretches from the land to the sea is not recognised. The fact is that weak regimes on land eventually give rise to weak maritime regimes. The resultant maritime insecurity then extends from the harbour to the high seas, the latter being the most visible. For example, Somalia, Eritrea, Aden and Djibouti show little capacity or political will to deal with maritime matters, and the arc formed by their ungoverned maritime domains constitutes the hub of pirate attacks against international vessels.

Pirates in the Somali–Aden–Eritrea triad thus focus on opportunities presented by heavy shipping in nearby lanes. In addition, pirates adapt rapidly to tactical events such as naval escorts and local maritime control. One lesson that emerges from the insecurity off Somalia is how quickly the perpetrators shift their operations to greener pastures. The ungoverned seas to the south offer transgressors room to quickly extend the maritime theatre of bad order to an even larger tract of sea. In a sense, the almost unprecedented international response to commit a significant number of naval vessels to secure the seas off the Horn of Africa is a mere interim arrangement to establish some order at sea off the Somali coast. As pirates continue to expand their area of operations off the African east coast further south, events off the west coast of Africa cannot be ignored. For this emergent maritime domain of international importance – albeit for different reasons than the seas off the Horn of Africa – bad order at sea holds equally dire consequences. It is, however, important to learn from the eastern seaboard just how rapidly instability at sea can unfold if matters on land continue to regress and are allowed to become embroiled with maritime matters.

**Bad order at sea off the coast of West Africa**

The Gulf of Guinea is fast emerging as an important region because of its landward as well as its maritime domain. Its large population offers a potential market combined with abundant energy resources typified by the proximity of large oil producers (Angola and Nigeria), maturing oil producers (Congo Brazzaville), mature producers showing signs of decline (Cameroon and Gabon), and new producers (Equatorial Guinea and Chad).

Located off the Gulf of Guinea, West African countries border an important sea lane that shows a visible connectivity with local energy commodities. Different from the seas off the Horn of Africa, the West African region is located in a major consumer market. It also has no narrow straits confining shipping and thereby increasing vulnerability. Furthermore, the region is nearer to Europe and the US than the Middle East and Asia.
In addition to the maritime sphere and energy resources, other commodities are also important. Important minerals like diamonds, the region’s rain forest habitat, agricultural commodities such as cocoa, and tourism all form hubs of economic importance with international appeal. In effect, the Gulf of Guinea region depicts what Murphy calls a ‘scramble for the sea’, as the Gulf is viewed increasingly as a partial solution to ever-increasing needs regarding energy, population, food and territory. But such a hub of activity also draws crime and other competition with maritime activities (good and bad) increasingly entering the fold. When the focal point of growth, wealth and power is situated offshore, maritime boundaries are disputed and interstate tensions tend to escalate quickly. These volatile conditions also favour insurgent-styled activities at sea, but these are merely elements of a larger set of events amidst a rising disorder at sea.

**West Africa: a rising maritime threat landscape**

In Africa, the bastions of regime security and political power cannot be readily challenged from the sea, but are definitely at threat from the land. This is quite apparent in the Gulf of Guinea region. Nigeria is combating a rebellion in its southern Delta region while the religious North–South divide regularly lapses into violence. Cameroon finds itself confronted by a threat from the Bakassi Peninsula where local inhabitants have felt excluded and unhappy since Nigeria handed the territory back to Cameroon. The ongoing government–rebel stand-off in Chad, simmering tensions in the Republic of Congo, the legacy of civil war in Angola with the Cabinda secession in the north not yet settled, fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and a recent mercenary-style coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea all attest to real threats to incumbent regimes. It is therefore not surprising that decision-makers in the Gulf of Guinea generally perceive their threat landscape as predominantly continental and largely emanating from within their own territories.

In a sense, the tendency to perceive threats as predominantly landward and armies (land forces) at the forefront of opposing such threats is now changing. This shift in the nature of threats to national security is characterised by an emerging maritime threat domain for countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea. In contrast to the seas around the Horn of Africa, where the threat is to some foreign entity and the reaction configured by a foreign response, the maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea hold real dangers for the countries of the Gulf of Guinea and their dependency on the resources and commerce originating from the Gulf. While much of the insecurity off the Somali coast stems from the collapse of governance and law and order in Somalia, in the Gulf of Guinea the situation is somewhat different. The wider nexus between disorder at sea and continued order on land holds dire consequences for the littoral countries. The maritime landscape in the Gulf of Guinea is more closely integrated with the well-being of littoral states and encompasses much more than threats to shipping.
Events such as the attack by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on the Shell Bonga oil platform (June 2008) and by the Bakassi Freedom Fighters on the tug Bourbon Sagitta (October 2008)\(^7\) pose a threat to offshore oil operations and have a direct impact on the land when operations are shut down. Aggressors like MEND use a deliberate campaign at sea to influence decisions about landward matters, and the oil industry with its maritime footprint offers lucrative opportunities. Dependency on oil – bearing in mind that the oil reserves now coming on line are located offshore, in the Gulf of Guinea – demonstrates the benefits for Gulf of Guinea states to have jurisdiction, surveillance and the capability to defend and assert sovereignty at sea. However, the abundant resources in the Gulf of Guinea do not augur well for the region, as the income derived from them is bound to sustain conflict-prone and authoritarian governments.\(^38\)

The Gulf of Guinea recently featured prominently as a result of insecurity at sea through attacks on ships, hostage taking and destruction of energy infrastructure by rebels that extended their political agendas offshore. The mix of actors and their interests is driven by a combination of greed or grievance that holds various strands of conflict potential for the region:

- Local or regional conflicts resulting from socio-political matters as in Chad
- Criminal-related activities stemming from attacks against oil installations as in Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea
- Oil production causing separatist insurgencies as in Cabinda, Angola
- Oil production playing a role in civil wars as in Congo Brazzaville
- Interstate conflict resulting from resource location and exploitation demonstrated by Nigeria and Cameroon regarding the Bakassi case\(^39\) and between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon about a maritime boundary and islands\(^40\)

One important matter that draws the attention is that in some way every strand outlined above has some connection to the Gulf of Guinea (directly or indirectly) and thus demands good order at sea.

In the Gulf of Guinea, there are several examples of how good order at sea is threatened. First, shipping in the Gulf’s sea lanes is threatened. Although attacks are not as frequent as those off Somalia, the Gulf of Guinea is still seen as a hub of threats to shipping – as shown in the records of the International Maritime Bureau.\(^41\) Second, companies that exploit resources are threatened by attacks on offshore oil infrastructure and the vessels that service this industry. Not only the lucrative offshore oil industry is threatened, as the fishing industry in Ghana is already hiring private security agents to protect it.\(^42\)
As for dominion, with the exception of Nigeria, few if any of the littoral states in the Gulf of Guinea have the means to enforce governance over their maritime sovereignty. Hence – and not unlike events in the eastern littoral – the good order at sea in the Gulf of Guinea is strained.

**West Africa: reviewing maritime security arrangements**

Although navies are generally viewed as being at the forefront of efforts to promote or defend maritime security, two observations suffice. First, naval limitations became apparent from events off the east coast and, second, matters in the Gulf of Guinea are more complex than that off the Horn of Africa. Therefore, the wider one stretches the norm of maritime security, the more challenging a naval solution. In this vein Till argues for defending good order at sea in broader terms: having a multi-agency approach, integrated regional approaches, and navies acting in a constabulary manner. In essence, Till envisages a lesser role for navies, but anticipates that the role of navies will become more cooperative and will involve other security agencies and partners below the war-fighting level.

States bordering the Gulf of Guinea need decisive action to promote maritime security, as events off the African east coast clearly show the consequences of continuous neglect of or weak responses to maritime threats. From a national and regional perspective, some progress has been made in maritime awareness in the Gulf of Guinea region: local naval forces providing surveillance of territorial waters; local maritime administrations enforcing the maritime code; compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code; and port state control. Gaps remain, however: there is a limited visible presence in the exclusive economic zone; joint search and rescue is not yet well developed; and the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention is not yet being implemented. As far as piracy is concerned, there is no regional arrangement for hot pursuit across national maritime boundaries.

Nonetheless, the Gulf of Guinea also portrays some movement towards Till’s suggestion that intended as well as unintended threats and threatening cargoes need to be taken care of. In a sense, the inclusiveness implied by Till has featured prominently in the Sea Power for Africa conferences (2006 and 2009) where delegates cited the imperative of collaboration on a range of measures to secure the maritime domain. A clear understanding of and commitment to maritime security by African players is evident, but progress towards an operational capability appears intermittent and weak and unfortunately shows a foreign rather than African presence.

Projects entailing maritime partnerships seem to be the envisaged arrangement for maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea. Examples are the implementation of the
ISPS code, port state control and search and rescue alongside maritime rescue coordinating centres, sea-basing in partnership with the US, and a sub-regional coastguard network. However, inter-agency cooperation among numerous countries presents its own set of difficulties – one being that maritime domain awareness in Africa remains wanting.

Till also points out the difficulty for navies in particular to operate in a new strategic milieu where maritime forces are occupied with an ever-increasing range of duties – duties not always amenable to what navies are trained and equipped to do. The latter difficulty is currently aptly demonstrated off the Somali coast where a rather strong international (non-African) naval task force is attempting to protect merchant vessels against acts of piracy and other threats on a lawless sea. Entertaining the naval option in the Gulf of Guinea must therefore consider the difficulties of turning to a naval solution – whether individually or collectively – as this step constitutes only a partial solution.

Although much is being said about intra-African partnerships (from the Gulf of Guinea in particular), other actors are at play as well. The growing role of the US in this Western maritime region can no longer be ignored or labelled mere interference or a presence raising hostility and scepticism. An early US contribution to assist in and contribute to safety, order and security in the maritime landscape is becoming all the more visible. The US has simultaneously established a permanent US naval presence for training and operational purposes that constitutes a vibrant multilateral maritime partnership in the Gulf of Guinea. In a similar vein, it appears that countries from the region realise the importance of cooperation to stem threats and vulnerabilities through partnerships and cooperative endeavours.

While interstate arrangements still dominate, cooperation with non-state actors are prevalent as well. Public-private partnerships to improve maritime awareness and security show promise, despite being somewhat controversial. Such partnerships can enhance the all-important but limited maritime surveillance over the Gulf of Guinea – of which the significance grows alongside the value of the Gulf itself. Providing a consistent and dependable information stream is vital and is made possible by sub-contracting. Good information about their maritime domains is not only the basis for sound decisions by states in the Gulf of Guinea, but also represents the softer and less controversial asset for national and regional decisions. A lack of maritime domain awareness remains an issue – a matter acknowledged by two speakers from West Africa at the 2009 Sea Power for Africa Symposium in Cape Town.

A second possible, but nevertheless emerging, partnership is the cooperation between governments and private enterprise to physically secure the offshore domain. Agreements between governments and non-state parties to assist with crucial security matters at sea remain an option, although these are being kept low-key. Training by private companies to bring about an indigenous capability for the future does take place.
MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated) involvement in Nigeria and the leaders of Equatorial Guinea turning to MPRI and Israeli security agencies to assist with training are but two examples.\(^5^4\)

A further step is cooperative partnerships with private security agencies to assist with security beyond mere training. As such, co-deployment of state and private capabilities take place where both parties contribute elements towards a common security concern. Whether part of a multinational corporation or an independent contractor, cooperation under strict rules offers opportunities where indigenous security forces are ill equipped and ill trained to protect, prevent and secure. Such partnerships do exist and extend offshore – for example in Nigeria – to secure, among others, vital oil infrastructure. Although controversial, public-private security arrangements between private security, multinational companies, police and military establishments continue to exist in order to augment defence and security services traditionally offered by the state.\(^5^5\)

In West Africa, collective arrangements with a maritime imperative are growing. On a more military note (a domain preferably kept out of the privatisation debate) cooperative naval arrangements to ensure good order at sea are emerging. Being an arrangement squarely located in the state and interstate domain, naval cooperation remains important, but immature. The culture to protect matters maritime is weakly developed as cognition of the threat and suitable interstate arrangements has not yet progressed sufficiently.\(^5^6\) Regional integration must be accompanied by military integration, and this is not yet the case in West Africa – least of all in the maritime domain. Naval cooperation assumes an extraregional rather than intraregional profile with West African – US maritime cooperation being more salient than intra-African developments.

Towards good order at sea: comparing the East and West African maritime domains

Threats to good order at sea feature quite prominently along the African coast, and in particular off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea. Around the Horn of Africa, ungoverned or weakly governed continental spaces (Somalia in particular) are blending with an ungoverned maritime landscape. The area is almost totally deprived of naval means and has limited maritime agencies to establish some semblance of order. In this climate, disorder at sea is increasing rapidly with piracy merely reflecting a sector of the insecurity. The international naval response under the auspices of governments, regional and global bodies demonstrates the seriousness with which the international community views maritime disorder off the Horn of Africa. Nonetheless, events off the Horn and recently further south show the dangerous nexus of political collapse on land and economics-driven maritime disorder and illustrate just how expansive, threatening and costly bad order at sea can become.
For the Gulf of Guinea in particular, the picture is less disturbing but more complex, for it involves a triad of events on land, on sea, and below the surface of the sea. Although disorder at sea has not yet reached the levels found along the east coast, much more is at stake. Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea is more directly politically driven. In Nigeria politics on land directly result in offshore actions, causing the hub of insecurity on land in the Niger Delta region to spill into the Gulf to promote bad order at sea. Although many of the events take place on the surface, what is located below the surface underpins much of the involvement of state, sub-state, non-state and regional actors.

In contrast with the eastern seaboard, multiple arrangements to promote good order at sea are emerging between a plethora of security agencies in the Gulf of Guinea. Whilst piracy off East Africa has become a rallying call for international intervention to restore order, much is already being done off the West African coast. To the western seaboard, the costs of bad order at sea are more direct as a range of economic and political, ecological and societal sectors are threatened. Regime security (territorial disputes and terrorism), economic security (oil and gas disruptions), ecological matters (deliberate pollution and the tourism industry), and food security (threats to fisheries and arable land) ultimately stand to impact severely and threaten the densely populated littoral states.

Notes

4 During the Third Sea Power for Africa Conference at the International Convention Centre, Cape Town, attended by the author, cooperation and collaboration at sea to meet rising challenges became a refrain as speakers from African navies and security institutions without exception reiterated this theme.
10 Till, Seapower, 315–316.
11 Nincic, State failure and the re-emergence of maritime piracy, 3–4.
14 Nincic, State failure and the re-emergence of maritime piracy, 10.
15 Kaplan, Centre stage for the 21st century.
16 Stares, This is the man tasked with keeping pirates at bay.
22 News24, Cruise ship fights off pirates (AFP), Media24 News Channel (Africa), 26 April 2009; News24, Seized oil tanker freed, Media24 News Channel (International), 27 April 2009.
23 Petretto, Weak states offshore, 11.
26 Nigeria, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of the Congo, Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe, although there is now a tendency to include Ghana and the DRC as well.
28 Mane, Emergence of the Gulf of Guinea in the global economy, 11.
29 Safe tourism off the east African coast is an important industry and interference and warnings to avoid this region if possible hold a potential ripple effect for Kenya, the Maldives, Seychelles and Zanzibar. See C K Daly, Somalia: pirates of the Gulf, ISN Security Watch, 12 March 2009.
31 Equatorial Guinea: shoot out at the presidential palace, Africa Research Bulletin 46(2) (March 2009), 17867–17868.
32 Murphy, Suppression of piracy and maritime terrorism, 33.
36 Forest and Souza, Oil and terrorism in the New Gulf, 213.
37 Musa, Cameroon says pirates repulsed in border peninsula.
38 N Jenson and L Wantchekon, Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa, *Comparative Political Studies* 37(7) (September 2004), 816–841.
39 Paes, Oil production and national security in sub-Saharan Africa, 96–97.
47 Addico, Maritime security threats and responses in the West and Central African Sub-region/Gulf of Guinea, 4.
48 Matter raised by Rear Admiral O S Ibrahim of the Nigerian Navy on 10 March 2009, at the Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium, Cape Town, 8–12 March 2009.
52 M N Murphy, The role of ‘public-private partnership’ in maritime awareness and security, Paper prepared for the State and Regional Intelligence Fusion: Experiences and Best Practices in Interdisciplinary Collaboration, Medford, USA, 16 October 2007, 4.
53 Speakers from Nigeria as well as Ghana pointed out the lack of maritime awareness, the need for its enhancement and the fact that the undue embracement of sovereignty obstructs the required wider cooperation, Sea Power for Africa Symposium, Cape Town, South Africa, 8–11 March 2009.
54 Dare, The curious bonds of oil diplomacy.