Whose security? Understanding the Niger Delta crisis as a clash of two security conceptions
Ufo Okeke Uzodike and Christopher Isike

Introduction

From a strict security perspective, there are two primary sources of violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Driven by the federal government’s historical neglect of the development aspirations of the region while simultaneously extracting the vast bulk of Nigeria’s foreign exchange revenues – by centralising the ownership and control of oil resources in such a way that it impairs the interests and competitiveness of the region – the native population groups have become increasingly restive and uninclined to undertake anti-state and anti-social activities.1 Armed with little by way of a coherent, visionary or sustained economic and social policy, and heavily dependent on oil revenues from the Niger Delta, the alarmed federal government has responded (in recent years)

Keywords traditional security, human security, Niger Delta, militarisation, armed conflict, environmental despoliation
to the increasing level of tension and violent protests by suppressing dissent with brute force rather than addressing the more prickly and long-term demands of the people. This, in many ways, is at the heart of the complex and growing political wrangle and insecurity that has not only permeated the Niger Delta region but also now threatens to shatter the notional peace, security and integrity of the Nigerian state.

As it is constituted now, the Niger Delta is a powder keg of competing and sometimes irreconcilable interests. The principal actors in the crisis, the Nigerian government, its agencies and allies on one hand, and the people and their agencies (ethnic/communal militias) on the other, have grounded their positions and actions on a well-articulated need to secure their various interests. The clash of these divergent interests, which manifests in occasional violent clashes between federal government forces and various ethnic militias and armed gangs, defines and sums up the Niger Delta crisis as a clash of two divergent but mutually reinforcing conceptions of security. A state-centric conception is held by the state together with multinational oil corporations, while the human-centric conception is held by the deprived and displaced people of the Niger Delta and expressed through their militia forces. However, the question is whose security is the state obligated to protect, and against what threats is it aimed? Also, what are the constituents of these divergent security perspectives? And how does this security contention perpetuate conflict in the Niger Delta?

The article argues that these questions remain a dominant feature of the crisis, thus reaffirming the need for a paradigm shift by the Nigerian state with regard to its security focus from an authoritarian state-centric perspective that views citizen agitation and resistance as ‘terrorism’, to human-centric perspective that will justify its Lockean essence. This shift in perspective is particularly apt now that it is becoming obvious that the state’s militarisation of the region is only stoking the flames of ethnic-nationalism and exacerbating violence and criminality with attendant consequences for Nigeria’s political economy. Such a shift will help rebuild the confidence in the government and will serve to recreate the basis for the state (government) to reclaim legitimately its role as the primary mode of societal organisation and state building.

Conceptual framework: traditional and non-traditional conceptions of security

A conceptual clarification of national security and human security remain germane to the arguments presented in this paper. Traditionally, the notion of security is rooted in political realism which sees security from a state-centred perspective and which restricts the application of security to threats in the military realm. Traditionalist security scholars equate security with peace and the prevention of conflict by military means like deterrence policies and non-offensive defence through public policy and law. One such
Essays

scholar is Stephen Waltz, who sees security as ‘the study of the threat, use and control of military force. It explores likely conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent or engage in war.’

In the same realist vein, Buzan and his co-authors restrict the security discourse to state security, with insecurity being equated with threats to the existence of a designated referent object, often the state, incorporating government, territory and society. Although this conceptualisation of security includes society as a referent object, its state-centredness is clear as the threat to society refers to external and not internal threats to the existence of a state. Therefore, as Simpson argues, for traditional security scholars that state or governing regime was perceived to be secured, provided that the state was able to preserve its territorial borders, its governing regimes and structures from attacks or any threat to its existence, and its economic relations with the international community.

Although these definitions to a large extent posit the state as the major actor within the international system, the post World War II global system – especially after the Cold War – altered and widened the nature of security significantly. With its new and relatively unmatched emphasis on the sovereign authority of states (and peoples) as well as its collective security claims through the authority of the United Nations Security Council – and, as some would argue, the net unintended benefits of a nuclearised bipolar system – the world experienced an unprecedented era of state emergence, security and stability. For many states – particularly those in the developing parts of the world – the change to a more benign international security environment meant a concern not for external threats but for internally based (albeit externally supported) security issues. Given this context, it seems that realist notions have changed over the years: in essence there has been a shift away from ideas about a state’s quest for surviving interstate wars to intrastate conflicts and wars that are fuelled not only by the imperatives of the global East–West ideological battles but also the challenges associated with nation-building in environments that are often marked by severe resource starvation and competing interests. This has been the experience in Nigeria, for example, where government dysfunctionality and ineffectiveness have led to an exacerbation of centrifugal tendencies and intrastate conflict. In these states, people have died in large numbers as a result of non-traditional threats such as poverty, disease, environmental hazards, unemployment and crime, rather than from guns and nuclear weapons used in interstate wars. This has given rise to a rethinking of the security concept beyond its traditional preoccupation with the state and it has broadened to encompass people as referent subjects, thus giving birth to the concept of human security.

The human security conceptualisation accommodates a wide range of issues that not only constitute threats to human existence, but also breed insecurity and societal
anarchy. It views security from the perspective of human well-being and includes broad issues of human concern, such as security from poverty, disease, famine, illiteracy, environmental despoliation and unemployment, which singly or jointly contribute to impairments of human existence.12 According to the UN Development Programme, threats to human security occur in at least seven distinct areas of human existence, namely community, economic, environmental, food, health, personal and political threats.13 Kaul, in equating human security to the security of people and not just security of nations, underscores the primacy of human security in contemporary times thus: ‘[W]hat is needed today is not so much territorial security – the security of the state – but human security, the security of the people in their everyday lives, one that is reflected in the lives of our people, not in the weapons of our country.’14 Today, hazards from non-traditional sources are a greater threat to human existence, global peace and security than interstate war and aggression.

The analytical distinction between traditionalists and non-traditionalists is not meant to suggest that consensus among the latter has been reached either. Indeed, there is disagreement between two sub-groups – the so-called ‘wideners’ and the ‘deepeners’.15 The wideners, among them Mohammed Ayoob, argue that a predominantly military definition does not deny that there are other threats to state survival, such as environmental, social and economic threats, but that these must be sufficiently politicised to enter the national and international (humanitarian) security agenda.16 The deepeners, on the other hand, are concerned about those whose security is threatened and thus support the construction of a definition that allows for individuals or groups, for instance women, to be the referent subjects of security rather than the abstract entity called ‘state’.17 According to Thomas and Tow ‘this trend, in turn, spawned greater efforts to conceptualise and implement a more precise “human security” concept [because] if the human security is to be analytically useful, it must meet a fundamental criterion relative to threat definition: it must provide tangible threat parameters against which relative security environments and situations must be measured’.18 It is to satisfy this requirement as well as measure its applicability to the Niger Delta reality that this paper utilises Ayoob’s conceptualisation of the third world security predicament in both national and human security terms. According to Ayoob:

Security–insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that threaten to have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes that preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally.19

Though this definition is state-centric, it recognises that there are domestic sources of vulnerabilities that can be hazardous to the survival of the state and its peoples, provided that they are sufficiently politicised to enter the national security agenda. This condition gives Ayoob’s definition the flexibility to deepen security without taking away
its state-centred nature. Even then, he justifies this state-centredness by arguing that the state system remains the primary mode of organisation for Third World states in their move towards statehood. Other vulnerabilities, whether economic or ecological, become integral components of the definition of security only if they become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, institutions or regime survival. This position reinforces the belief that national security and human security are mutually reinforcing and complementary, and therefore provides a basis for convergence as the one does not necessarily supplant the other. Indeed, as Hubert argues, building a developmental democratic state that values its people and protects minorities is a core strategy for promoting human security, just as improving human security of people strengthens the legitimacy, stability and security of a state.

There are a plethora of threats against the community, economic, environmental, food, health, personal and political security of the Niger Delta peoples. According to Simpson the integrated effects of oil production activities on human security in the region permeate the entire gamut of the human security indicators outlined above. While these are not analysed individually here, all the threats to human security in the Niger Delta to a large extent result from environmental hazards occasioned by the oil exploitation activities of oil companies in the region, as Simpson rightly observes. Therefore, this article is confined to a brief analysis of how environmental despoliation of the Niger Delta resulting from oil exploitation activities compromises the human security of the people, and how these affect their relationship with the Nigerian state.

**Oil exploration and environmental insecurity in the Niger Delta**

Oil exploitation in the region creates environmental hazards, including gas flaring, product spills, discharge of refinery effluents into fresh water sources, drill wastes and degeneration of forests. The extensive and systematic degradation of environmental resources have imposed a huge burden on much of the Niger Delta because of problems such as land degradation and food and water poisoning (food insecurity) which have led to extreme poverty, disease that is exacerbated by little or no access to social amenities such as electricity, health care services (health insecurity) and schools.

The greenhouse effect caused by gas flaring affects not only people in the Niger Delta, but also the wildlife in the area. The resultant food scarcity has contributed to the migration to urban centres as well as occupational displacement, as inhabitants of the region are mostly farmers and fishermen, a factor which intensifies the unemployment problem (economic insecurity). An environmental development strategy for the region in 1995 estimated that as much as 76 per cent of all associated natural gas from oil production in Nigeria is flared compared to 0.6 per cent in the United States, 4.3 per cent in the
According to Agbo, the Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states experience more than 300 major product spills annually, with each discharging about 2,300 cubic metres of oil. Oil spills degrade farmlands, forests and aquatic fauna and flora, with attendant harmful effects on not only the primary farming and fishing occupations (economic insecurity) of the people, but also on their health. Furthermore, in several oil-producing communities across the Niger Delta, high-pressure pipelines carrying crude oil, diesel and gas criss-cross roads that children step across on their way to school. Often corrosion and other factors lead to leakages as some of the pipelines are over 30 years old. These pipelines and other oil installations are rarely maintained by the oil companies and the government, thus resulting in leakages and spills which destroy wildlife, farmlands, forests, aquatic and human lives as evidenced in the inferno that gutted Egborode in 1998, Jesse in 2003 (Delta state) and Onicha-Amiyi in 2003 (Abia state).

The discharge and dumping of refinery effluents (harmful liquid waste from the refineries during the process of refining crude oil) into freshwater sources and farmlands are also a major concern. There is no doubt that it destroys the environment and contributes to food shortages. According to IDEA studies, ‘these effluents contain excessive amounts of very toxic materials like chromium and mercury which can be stored in the brains of fishes for a long time thus causing food poisoning’.

In the final analysis people’s health security is threatened by oil exploitation-related environmental despoliation; their economic security is threatened by the resulting health insecurity and disassociation from their traditional economies of farming and fishing; their community security is threatened by the resultant poverty, which gives rise to social unrest and erosion of cultural values. Compared with other oil-producing regions of the world, the Niger Delta region’s human development index score, a measure of well-being encompassing longevity, knowledge and standard of living, remains at a low value of 0.564 (with 1 being the highest score). This compares poorly with the score of, for example, Saudi Arabia, which was 0.800 in 2000 and 0.815 in 2008, and those of the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Libya, Venezuela and Indonesia, which also achieved increased scores of 0.818, 0.864, 0.896, 0.886 and 0.834 respectively between 2003 and 2008.

Indeed, oil exploitation has harmed the Niger Delta environment, causing severe damage to flora and fauna, degrading water quality and impairing the aesthetic value and utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, agricultural and forestry purposes, all of which serve to degrade the quality of life of local communities (community security). For the people of the Niger Delta, these security needs and issues are all related to environmental degradation which constitutes the most
dominant threat to human existence and security in the region.\textsuperscript{37} In many ways, the government’s neglect of the human security needs of the Niger Delta people has served to exacerbate conflict in the region. The government’s failure to guarantee these needs has compromised the essential legitimacy of the state, and the people, convinced that their security interests are different from those of the government and will be better served by alternative authorities,\textsuperscript{38} have resorted to mobilising themselves in protest against the state, its agents (state security forces) and allies (oil companies) thus creating a climate of antagonistic relations between the people and the state. The question that remains is how has the government responded to the people’s discontent?

**State-centric securitisation, militarisation and armed conflict in the Niger Delta**

Present and past Nigerian federal governments have continually chosen to regard the people’s agitations as threats to ‘national security’ and ‘state survival’ and have accordingly declared war against those they label as ‘criminal’, ‘terrorist’, ‘dissident’ or ‘rebels’ elements within the Niger Delta to ‘secure’ the region and Nigerian state. The government has often responded to the anti-state activities of militant groups such as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA) with force, usually by deploying a joint task force of the army, police and navy to curb anti-state violence, inter- and intra-communal conflicts and prevent oil theft.\textsuperscript{39} These militarist actions have served to exacerbate armed conflict in the region, for such a violent response exacerbates the very conditions that gave rise to it in the first place, creating a classic ‘conflict trap’ from which escape is extraordinarily difficult.\textsuperscript{40}

It is not easy to understate the importance of the Niger Delta to the Nigerian economy. The oil-rich region accounts for over 40 per cent of the gross national product and about 80 per cent of Nigeria’s export earnings.\textsuperscript{41} It is therefore of strategic importance to the survival of the nation and its governing elites, including the multinational oil corporations (mainly Shell, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Texaco, Agip and Totalfina Elf), and other transnational actors.\textsuperscript{42} It is understandable that any attempt by the local people and their agencies such as COMA or MEND to challenge the status quo is regarded not merely as a threat to ‘national survival’ and by implication ‘national security’, but also as an act of war. To the state, security in the Niger Delta is defined in terms of an uninterrupted production of crude oil.\textsuperscript{43} There can be no doubt that these actions have resulted in a well-documented militarisation of the region.\textsuperscript{44}

The construction of a naval base in the Niger Delta, the government’s invitation to US marines to help secure oil installations in the region\textsuperscript{45} and the subsequent military cooperation between Nigeria, the US and the UK to provide training to help halt the
incessant kidnappings in the Niger Delta, confirm that this traditional security approach to dealing with the Niger Delta crisis dominates the state’s thinking. The question is, what impact has state militarisation had on conflict in the region?

State militarisation and armed conflict: Gramsci’s explanation

Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and counter-hegemony is useful for explaining the armed conflict between the state and the people’s militias in the Niger Delta. Gramsci builds on the theory of Marxism, using it to explain the struggles for positions and the maneuver characteristics of social formations, and to depict the relationship between the state and civil society in a neo-liberal political system. According to Gramsci the bourgeois state cannot depend only on economic power (usually assisted by the use of force) to ensure its continuation and ultimate survival, but must seek to obtain the consent of a majority of its citizens in order to legitimise and maintain itself. Therefore the state assumes a dominant position of hegemony; a process by which ‘spontaneous consent is given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group’ so that it not only justifies the position of the dominant group and helps it to maintain its domination but also succeeds in obtaining the active consent of other groups.

Hegemony as social control therefore takes two forms, namely domination and direction. Domination is the state’s overt or external control of the people’s behaviour and is usually

Table 1 Militarisation of the Niger Delta, 1990–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Operating force</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1990</td>
<td>Umuechem</td>
<td>Security Protection Unit</td>
<td>□ Killed 80 unarmed demonstrators □ Destroyed 495 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Umuechem</td>
<td></td>
<td>□ Razed houses and destroyed properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Odi</td>
<td>Army and mobile police</td>
<td>□ Razed the entire community as every house and properties worth millions of naira were burnt down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td>Uwheru</td>
<td>Operation Restore Hope</td>
<td>□ Killed 20 persons □ Burnt down 11 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>Egbema</td>
<td>Operation Restore Hope Joint Security Task Force</td>
<td>□ Used gun-boats, military helicopters and bombs to destroy 13 communities □ Razed a total of 500 buildings □ 200 persons, mostly women and children, are feared dead and are still missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>Olugbobiri and Ikebiri</td>
<td>State security operatives</td>
<td>□ Killed 16 youths for agitating for a better deal from multinational oil corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Odioma</td>
<td>Joint Security Task Force</td>
<td>□ Killed 77 persons, including youths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Compiled by the authors, August 2006
achieved through law enforcement, while direction concerns the state’s control of the people’s minds through the implantation of values and norms which they accept as their own. Direction operates through such institutions as the media, religious bodies and political parties. Accordingly, a state is hegemonic if it succeeds in making direction the primary instrument of its rule, and only occasionally resorts to domination. This stage of the hegemonic process, where the ruling class has succeeded in persuading other classes in society that its class interests are synonymous with the interests of all other classes, is referred to as ‘the universalisation of the particular’.

However, hegemony does not preclude opposition and resistance, as according to Gramsci it dialectically creates its opposite, in the form of counter-hegemony. This is because there is the likelihood that not all citizens will unquestioningly consent to the state’s imposition of dominant values. As people become more conscious of the ‘universalisation of the particular’ fiction, they develop counter-hegemonic tendencies and establish movements that challenge the state and its ability to direct the actions of the people. If such a failure of direction occurs, the state may resort to domination which further intensifies the people’s counter-hegemony. This happens because with each act of coercion, the bourgeois state reveals its true nature and alienates an ever-increasing number of people. This eventually creates genuine grounds for anarchy, for the state’s violent response to the people’s counter-hegemony activities perpetuates a cycle of violence and conflict.

Although Gramsci’s theory points to the fact that the state is an important site for the political struggle between contending groups in society, it does not escape the general criticism of economic reductionism levelled against Marxism. Gramsci, too, accepts that economic factors are primary in determining political outcomes. This theory can nevertheless also be used to analyse intergroup relations in a state, because the state is not an oppressive organ of one class, but an oppressive organ per se that can be used by different groups, including ethnic groups, within society to leverage power. In line with this perspective Ibeanu has described the Nigerian state as essentially a repertory of violence used against specific groups, instead of a repository of all the interests of the people-nation.

Taken as a whole these arguments reveal that the Nigerian state, as an instrument of domination by particular ethnic groups within Nigerian society, has failed in its hegemonic bid to make direction (nationalism) the instrument of its rule, since the Niger Delta minorities have seen through the state’s ‘universalisation of the particular’ fiction. The people have accordingly sought to counter state hegemony by means of various militia groups who by their actions question the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state. For example, human security threats, such as environmental despoliation and its attendant negative effects on the livelihoods and health of the Niger Delta people, have contributed to the indignation, social discontent and frustration the people feel. These
feelings are directed at the state, leading to what Nafziger describes as the mobilisation of deprivation into collective violence by militias against the state. The state has in turn often responded with military force (domination) to these militia outbursts and this has further militarised the region and perpetuated a cycle of violence with attendant negative consequences for social stability, peace and development in the Niger Delta region.

In short, the combination of environmental despoliation, the economic, health, personal and communal insecurities it creates, plus the people’s anti-state activities emerging from these insecurities as well as the government’s militarist response to the people’s agitation, have exacerbated armed conflict in the Niger Delta leading to a ‘conflict trap’ or cycle of endless conflict and violence.

**Between state security and people security: whose security is paramount?**

Third World states, especially those in Africa, have a peculiar security predicament given their historical colonial background and its implications for state-making. According to Ayoob, the major underlying cause of conflict and insecurity in the Third World is the early stage of state making at which postcolonial states find themselves. In their move towards statehood, the state and national security are of vital importance, as the state is the primary mode of organisation.

As a third world state struggling with issues of nation building, legitimacy and state collapse, and emboldened by a successful effort in dealing with a rebellion (the Nigerian civil war of 1967–1970), successive Nigerian governments have not only taken positions and acted in ways that reflect realist considerations of state survival, but have also used state violence to ‘protect core national interests’ which masquerade as group interests.

However, in the light of emerging threats to national and global security, and considering that people are the means and end of the development process, a people-centred approach to securing the Niger Delta has become imperative, all the more so because state securitisation of the region has served to fan the flames of conflict. In the face of this no-win situation for both the state and the people, a convergence of security interests through dialogue is the best way to achieve sustainable peace and development in the region. This is where Ayoob’s conceptualisation of security becomes relevant: it underscores the need for a paradigm shift in the security conception and practice by the Nigerian state. Indeed, environmental despoliation occasioned by oil exploitation activities in the Niger Delta has become sufficiently politicised not only to threaten, but potentially bring down the Nigerian state and its structures, both territorial and institutional, as well as the governing regimes that inform these structures. Therefore, as Hubert contends, for the state to survive, be stable and secured, it must become
legitimate by improving the human security of its people. The people cannot enjoy human security in the face of the violent conflict, criminality and social anarchy which pervade the Niger Delta. Concisely, while state and people security are important in any security equation in the Niger Delta and in Nigeria as a whole, they converge in ways that make them mutually reinforcing for bringing about those peaceful conditions in which development can thrive.

Conclusion

In spite of the divergence in security conceptions held by the major stakeholders in the Niger Delta crisis, two realities stand out and provide a basis for mutual dialogue to resolve a complex crisis. First, in a developing and plural state like Nigeria, the government remains the primary mode of organisation, nation-building and development, and this should be recognised by the Niger Delta people. Second, because people are the means and end of development, the chronic human and infrastructural underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region is a legitimate basis for discontent, especially given the region’s strategic relevance to Nigeria’s survival. The federal government needs to confront this reality for peace to reign and for development to thrive. This is particularly relevant as it is clear militarising the Niger Delta has not secured it.

Accordingly, we suggest first that the security approach be rethought. The federal government must demilitarise the Niger Delta to prove that it is ready for genuine dialogue on the human security issues that underlie the anti-state activities of the people’s movements and militias as well as those of criminal elements within society. This gesture will allow the Niger Delta people to tone down their belligerent attitudes and meet the federal government at the negotiation table. Second, the government and the multinational oil corporations should show serious commitment to environmental security by enforcing existing environmental protection laws as well as putting in place and implementing a new regime of environmental protectionism that will involve oil-producing communities. Last, the government must show that it is serious about democratising and decentralising the Nigerian state through a review of the 1999 constitution and by addressing the key issues of power devolution, self-determination and resource control (including land and its resources), in line with the practice of true federalism. Although this is a long-term solution, these are core issues in the neglect and marginalisation that the Niger Delta people experience within the Nigerian federation.

Notes

1 A Ikelegbe, The perverse manifestation of civil society: evidence from Nigeria, *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39(1) (2001), 1–24, describes the activities of these groups as the perverse manifestation of civil
society in that they play negative roles through the construction of platforms for ethnic militancy and violent confrontation with other groups and the state, which combine to undermine democracy, as opposed to playing the vital role of democratisation and democratic consolidation of civil societies.


3 Isike, Emerging threats in the Niger Delta.


5 According to the report of the Special Security Committee on Oil-producing Areas set up by the government in 2001, the disruption of oil operations by community disturbances, pipeline vandalisation and illegal bunkering reduced production by 15–20 per cent (300,000 to 400,000 barrels per day) on an ongoing basis. In 2006, this figure had gone up to 500,000 barrels per day (25 per cent of the total production) (Military asks for go-ahead to attack militants, Vanguard, 8 March 2006). According to the report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee set up by the Yar Adua government in 2008, the situation is worsening and this figure now stands at almost 30 per cent valued at about US$20.7 billion. This excludes another estimated US$3 billion lost to oil bunkering over the first seven months of 2008 (Technical Committee on the Niger Delta Report, November 2008, 9).


7 S Waltz, The renaissance of security studies in a changing world, International Studies Quarterly 35(2) (June 1999), 212.


10 Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS), Enhancing the capacity of women leaders of community organizations towards peace-building in the Niger-Delta region, Nigeria, Port Harcourt: CASS, 2005, 8.


17 S Peterson, Feminist (re)visions of international relations theory, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1992.


19 Ayoob, The Third World security predicament.


21 Ayoob, The third world security predicament, 9.


23 See E Akpofure, L Efere and P Ayawei, The adverse effects of crude oil spills in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Urhobo Historical Society, 2000; A Onduku, Confronting the human security dilemma: towards

25 Ibid.
28 Studies have shown that gas flaring has a negative effect on agricultural production – see UNDP Niger Delta Development Report; Simpson, The paradox of resource wealth and human insecurity.
30 Ibeanu, Oiling the friction; see also the World Bank Report on indiscriminate gas flaring in Nigeria.
32 Obi, Oil, environment and conflict in the Niger Delta; Akpofure et al, The adverse effects of crude oil spills; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Democracy in Nigeria, Continuing dialogue(s) for nation-building, 2000.
33 Agbo, The dying Delta, 58.
35 IDEA, Democracy in Nigeria, 147.
37 Simpson, The paradox of resource wealth and human insecurity, 66.
38 Rosenau calls this a pervasive authority crisis which occurs when a people lose faith in the existing social, political and economic order. According to Rosenau they then transfer authority to ethnic minorities, local governments, religious and linguistic groups, and environmental and political organisations (in C Ukeje, Oil communities and political violence: the case of ethnic Ijaws in Nigeria's Delta region, Terrorism and Political Violence 13(4) (Winter 2001), 15–36.
40 See Ibeanu, Oiling the friction, 25.
41 IDEA, Democracy in Nigeria, 142.
42 In an interview with journalists, the public affairs officer of the US consulate in Lagos, Tim Gerhardson, while speaking on the Niger Delta crisis, reiterated that 'Nigeria's strategic importance to global economy made it imperative for the US to be involved in protecting people's investments' (The Nigerian Punch, 10 August 2007).
43 Ibeanu, Oiling the friction, 26.
47 Ibid, 238–239.
48 Ibid, 239.
50 Ibid, 39.
51 Ibeanu, Oiling the friction.
55 Ojakorotu and Uzodike, Oil, arms proliferation and conflict in Niger Delta of Nigeria.
56 Ibeanu, Oiling the friction.
57 Ibeanu (in Oiling the friction) argues that the Nigerian state has not proved itself to be popular/national as ‘instead of appearing as the representation of the general interests of the people/nation, the Nigerian state has been “privatized” and “parcelled-out” as “means of production” for regional, ethnic, religious, class, and other special interests’.
59 See excerpts of Air-Vice Marshall Gbadebo’s testimony to the Committee on Defense of the House of Representatives in 2006. According to Gbadebo ‘it is possible for the whole of Bonny town to be wiped off the face of the earth as it would take more than six months to put off any fire ignited by the militants … they [militants] have gone beyond oil bunkering. They now collude with foreigners to undermine the country. They have unlimited access to sophisticated weapons and they enjoy press coverage’ (*Vanguard*, 8 March 2006). See also the Special Security Committee on Oil-producing Areas, Report, 2001.
60 Hubert, Human security: safety for people in a changing world.