

The potential of nonviolence in building security in sub-Saharan Africa

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Introduction

African wars of the past 15 years do not fit the traditional concept of wars that involve two sides trying to defeat each other. A number of analysts (for example Keen 2000, Duffield 2000) interpret African wars as a means of gaining profit, power and protection, often in relatively small areas, and not as a way of taking political control of a country. Based on this reasoning, capture of territory is important because of the greater access it gives to natural resources.

One of the unexpected facts concerning the extent and intensity of war is that both aspects have decreased significantly since 1990 (Human Security Centre 2005). In

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1991 the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Lindgren et al 1991:345 ff) reported 30 'major armed conflicts'; in 2005 (Harbom & Wallensteen 2006:108 ff) there were 17. In the case of Africa, there were eight major armed conflicts in 1990 and 11 each in 1998 and 1999, after which the number fell progressively to three (Burundi, Sudan and Uganda) in 2005. The civil wars which have almost totally replaced interstate wars as the major justification for military forces themselves appear to be waning. This suggests that a reconsideration of the nature and size of military forces is timely.

Over the same period, world military expenditure (measured in real US dollars using 2003 prices and exchange rates) reached its lowest level since 1990 in 1998, after which it rose rapidly following September 11, 1999. Most of the global increase in military expenditure occurred in the United States, which was responsible for 63 per cent of the increase in the decade 1996–2005 and for 48 per cent of world military expenditure in 2005. The military expenditure of 46 sub-Saharan African countries increased by 42 per cent over the same period and made up 0,72 per cent of the world total in 2005 (quoted by Omitoogun & Skons 2006:297 ff).

At the same time, sub-Saharan Africa is the world's poorest region. This is clear from table 1 which provides a comparison of sub-Saharan African and world figures for the components which make up the human development index of the United Nations Development Programme. Furthermore, 63 per cent of those infected with HIV and Aids live in the region. This amounted to 24,7 million people at the end of 2006, an adult infection rate of 5,9 per cent. Some 2,8 million new infections occurred during 2006 and there were 2,1 million deaths due to Aids. Only 23 per cent of the 4,6 million in need of anti-retrovirals were receiving them (UNAIDS 2006).

Table 1 Sub-Saharan Africa and world figures on key development indicators

Indicator	Year	Sub-Saharan Africa	World
Life expectancy at birth (years)	1995–2005	49,6	68,1
Adult (15+ years) literacy rate (per cent)	2005	60,3	78,6
Combined gross enrolment ratio (primary, secondary and tertiary education)	2005	50,6	67,8
GDP per capita (PPP US \$)	2005	1 998	9 543

Source: UNDP (2007).

This should not be taken to mean that there has been no progress. The latest *Human Development Report* (UNDP 2007), for example, reports improvements between 1990 and 2004 in the proportion of the region's population using improved sanitation (from 32

to 37 per cent), the proportion using improved water sources (48 to 55 per cent) and the proportion of the population which is undernourished (36 to 32 per cent). Nonetheless, the magnitude of poverty remains huge and progress is patchy. Willett (2004:102) reports that the economies of 33 of the 43 sub-Saharan African countries shrank during the 1990s and per capita incomes in 16 countries were lower in 1999 than in 1975. The final report of the UN Millennium Project concluded in 2005 that the region is poorer now than it was ten years ago (Wiharta 2006).

The traditional definition of security has come, over the past 20 years, to have limited relevance to developing countries. The traditional definition focused on territorial security – on external military threats to nation states – and military power to deter or resist such attacks was seen as the prerequisite for national security. Recent redefinitions focus on the threats posed to developed countries by corruption, organised crime and terrorism. Of far greater relevance to sub-Saharan Africa is the range of insecurities first listed by the UNDP (1994) under the heading of human security, namely economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. The extent to which such thinking has become accepted, at least at the level of policy statements, may be judged by the following extract from the South African National Defence Force website:

The greatest threat to the people of SA at present are socio-economic problems such as poverty, unemployment, lack of education, lack of housing, the high crime rate and violence. One of the policy priorities of the Government, therefore, is socio-economic development and upliftment (quoted in Harris 2002:77).

Between 1990 and the present, then, the number and intensity of wars have decreased significantly in the region, while poverty levels have remained very high. The meaning of security has been redefined. Over the same period, the region's military expenditures increased by 46 per cent in real terms.

Given this background, this article aims to answer two main questions. The first concerns the feasibility of sub-Saharan African countries relying on nonviolent ways of building security. A related question is whether nonviolent action has a reasonable chance of success. Before attempting to answer these questions, some terms need to be clarified.

The meaning of conflict, violence and nonviolence

Like any discipline, peace studies use words in particular ways. In this section I will briefly and non-technically review the most important of these in order to help make sense of later parts of the article.

A conflict refers to an incompatibility between the interests or needs of two parties, be they individuals, groups or nations. Conflicts are common and inevitable.

Direct violence refers to physical or verbal abuse, or threat of abuse, by one party to another. Domestic violence and war are obvious examples. The prevention of such violence is known as negative peace. Structural violence is a term coined by Johan Galtung, one of the founders of the discipline of peace studies, as a result of fieldwork in Rhodesia under colonial rule. Galtung became increasingly aware of the limitations of defining peace as the absence of violence. He noted that while there was little direct violence by the colonial authorities against the native population, there were structures in society which had significant negative effects on them:

In a certain sense, there was harmony, cooperation, integration. But was this peace? With the blatant exploitation, with blacks being denied most opportunities for development given to whites, with flagrant inequality whereby whites were making about twenty times as much for exactly the same job as blacks? Not to mention the basic fact that this was still a white colony (Galtung 1985:145).

These structures, procedures and policies, it should be noted, were not intended to cause harm, but nonetheless did so. To Galtung, they represented a 'quiet process, working slowly in the way misery in general, and hunger in particular, erode and finally kill human beings' (1996:145). Apartheid represents a classic example but many if not most developing countries of Africa demonstrate high levels of 'social neglect'. Structural violence, then, describes the structures which maintain the dominance of one group at the centre of power over another group at the periphery. At a practical level for those at the periphery, it can mean low wages, landlessness, illiteracy, poor health, limited or non-existent political representation or legal rights and, in general, limited control over much of their lives. If those who suffer structural violence resist or try to change it, they may be met with direct violence.

The exploitation, neglect and exclusion which are features of structural violence kill slowly in comparison to direct violence, but kill vastly more people. Deaths due to structural violence can be estimated by subtracting the world average life expectancy from the highest national life expectancy, year by year, and dividing that number by the highest life expectancy. This provides a rough indicator of preventable, premature deaths. For the period 1945 to 1990, William Eckhardt (1992) estimated this to be 28 per cent, noting that the proportion fell from 43 per cent in 1945 to 20 per cent in 1990. This translates into 17 million people per year, mostly children under five years in developing countries, who died from hunger or preventable disease. Eckhardt summed up these 'surplus deaths' as a result of government action or inaction between 1945 and 1990 as follows, and shows that structural violence killed 36 times more people than war during the same period:

■ Civilian deaths in war	14 million
■ Military deaths in war	8 million
■ Civilians killed by their own government	48 million
■ Civilian deaths due to structural violence	795 million

Positive peace is the alternative to structural violence. It involves the building of structures and processes which emphasise economic, social and political justice for all. The process of establishing positive peace is termed peacebuilding.

Nonviolence is much more than the absence of violence. Gandhi's use of the Sanskrit word *ahimsa* emphasises not just the absence of violence but the positive quality of its opposite. To Gandhi and Martin Luther King, nonviolence was an intensely positive attitude towards human beings, including those with whom they were in conflict, which motivated them to change any desire to injure an enemy into an attitude of love. They identified this with *agape*, the Greek word for spiritual love. The action which stems from *agape* is *satyagraha* and has three main principles: respect for persons, an emphasis on persuasion instead of coercion, and consistency between the ends aimed for and the means used to achieve these ends. The distinction between non-violence (the replacement of violence by other ways of defeating an enemy) and nonviolence (built on love and respect for opponents and without the intent of defeating them) is a crucial one. To better understand this, consider Gandhi's statement concerning his opponents in the struggle for Indian independence:

My attitude towards the English is one of utter friendliness and respect. I claim to be their friend, because it is contrary to my nature to distrust a single human being or to believe that any nation on earth is incapable of redemption. I have respect for Englishmen, because I recognise their bravery, their spirit of sacrifice for what they believe to be good for themselves, their cohesion and their powers of vast organisation. My hope about them is that they will at no distant date retrace their steps, revise their policy of exploitation ... and give tangible proof that India is an equal friend and partner in the British Commonwealth to come (King 1999:240).

Is a national policy of nonviolence possible?

There are three common ways of trying to deal with a dispute. The use of power – physical, military, economic – usually results in victory for the most powerful. The use of rights, in a legal sense, also most often results in victory for the most economically

powerful, as they can afford the best legal resources. Attempts to reconcile the interests of the parties are based on the hope that, by uncovering their underlying needs and interests, parties to a conflict can achieve a mutually satisfying outcome.

The problem with the first two is that they result in a winner and normally leave the underlying causes of the conflict unchanged. They may appear to be quicker than the third option but they are costly, they leave the relationship between the parties in disarray and sow the seeds for the subsequent re-emergence of conflict (Ury et al 1988:3–19). It is obvious that individuals could commit themselves to the nonviolent resolution of conflict and insist on reconciling the interests of the parties to a dispute. Experience suggests, however, that even where their numbers exceed a small minority (as with the Peace Pledge Union in the United Kingdom during the 1930s), their commitment often fades away in response to the drums of war. The question examined here is whether a nation can be pacifist.

Let me first say that neutrality is not the same as pacifism. Neutral countries such as Switzerland and Sweden have large military expenditures and military forces and are significant producers and exporters of weaponry. Pacifism is based on a decision not to use power to deal with conflicts, reinforced by a constitutional decision to do away with military forces.

There is a number of countries without military forces, mostly small island countries, but stronger evidence of its feasibility comes from Central America, where three countries have demilitarised. Costa Rica, which has a current population of four million, abolished its army in 1948, following a brief civil war. Haiti (population 8,1 million) disbanded its 7 600 strong military after the military government was replaced by a civilian administration in 1994. Panama (2,9 million) disbanded its military in 1990, following its heavy defeat during an invasion by the US. Each country has made alternative arrangements for its security. Costa Rica has paramilitary forces of around 8 400, comprising a civil guard (equivalent to a national police force) of 4 400, border security police numbering 2 000, and a rural guard of 2 000 (International Institute for Security Studies 2004). Its border security police operates an air surveillance unit (which has no combat aircraft) and coastal patrol vessels. Haiti has a national police force of 5 300. It has a coastguard of 30 persons and, since 1995, no air force. Its military equipment was destroyed after 1994. Panama replaced its military with a national guard comprising 11 000 national police and maritime and air services with 800 personnel.

Inspection of the social and economic indicators for the six Central American countries (Harris 2004a) shows that Costa Rica ranks first for almost every indicator and has achieved first world levels despite a modest gross domestic product per capita. Such a performance in areas such as health and education does not come about overnight. It depends upon policy decisions, in this case of public sector expenditure decisions made in the past, and

the effectiveness with which these decisions were implemented. The demilitarisations in Haiti and Panama are too recent for clear social and economic consequences to have emerged. Costa Rica, on the other hand, has had over 50 years for such effects to become apparent and the next section is devoted to a consideration of whether its impressive social and economic indicators can reasonably be attributed to its decision to demilitarise.

Before examining the possible links between Costa Rica's demilitarisation and its socio-economic performance, first some basic issues of causality. There are, for the purpose of this article, four possible causal linkages:

- Low military expenditure causes high socio-economic performance
- High socio-economic performance causes low military expenditure
- A variable (or group of variables) causes both low military expenditure and high socio-economic performance, or vice versa
- Low military expenditure and high socio-economic performance are not linked, that is, separate variables cause low military expenditure and high socio-economic performance

The first possible explanation is that low military expenditure in Costa Rica allowed relatively high public expenditure allocations to education, health and other social activities. Costa Rica's first national health plan, which commenced in 1971, had a twofold strategy. The primary health care component extended the coverage of preventive health services, improved water and sanitation services and included an extensive immunisation programme. Second, medical services were improved and broadened so as to reduce the number of hospitals but to double the number of centres offering outpatient services and the number of physician hours provided. The results were impressive: for example the under five mortality rate fell from 76 per 1 000 live births in 1970 to 31 in 1980. The UNDP (1994:41,51) concludes that this experience shows that well-structured government expenditures can result in dramatic social improvements over a short period, even with only moderate growth and a poor distribution of income.

This explanation is certainly the one which Costa Rica's leaders accept. Oscar Arias Sanchez, President of Costa Rica between 1986 and 1990 and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, asserts that the country's social performance is directly attributable to its low military expenditure:

International development agencies recognize that Costa Rica today has a standard of living comparable to that of the industrialized countries. It is universally accepted that the extraordinary advances of my country in the fields of education, health, housing and social welfare are basically due to the fact

that we do not dedicate our resources to the purchase of arms. The absence of an army has strengthened the Costa Rican democratic system, making it one of the most consolidated democracies of Latin America. To us, these are the dividends of peace. These are the dividends that would be within the grasp of all third world countries if they did not dedicate a very important part of their resources to the purchase of arms (SIPRI 1991, quoted in Harris 2004a:190).

It may be that Costa Rica is a 'special case' and that it is not possible to build any theory of disarmament on its experience. My assessment is that the only special aspect of Costa Rica is that despite its location in a region of violence, it has consistently dealt with internal conflicts and potential external conflicts in broadly democratic and nonviolent ways. It is, indeed, this third causal possibility which is best supported by the evidence: it is this commitment to democracy and nonviolence which has resulted in both high socio-economic development and low military expenditure.

What, then, is needed for a country to successfully demilitarise? The basic requirement is that the decision should be acceptable to the vast majority of society. In the case of Costa Rica, this acceptance was built on a popular commitment to, and confidence in, civil means of handling the conflicts inherent in achieving societal objectives. Two supporting factors may also be mentioned. The first is that the resources saved by minimal spending on the military are allocated to other socially desirable objectives. The Costa Rican experience is that great improvements in social indicators can occur, given well-planned government programmes, over quite short periods of time. The rewards to society of low military expenditure, as well as the success of civil means of achieving national objectives, seem to be mutually reinforcing. On the other hand, demilitarisation simply as a means of saving government expenditure will probably not last long. The second factor is therefore that the new governments of Costa Rica, Haiti and Panama were presented with a particular opportunity – when the military was weak and low in status – to implement demilitarisation, and this opportunity was grasped.

The potential outcomes of demilitarisation, then, are positive and such a policy makes sense for the small countries of southern Africa. These are, in any case, generally incapable of defending themselves militarily against a determined invader.

Does nonviolence work?

In the previous section, we saw that the best example of sustained demilitarisation appears to have resulted in major social and economic benefits. In that respect at least, Costa Rica's commitment to nonviolent means of conflict resolution has worked. In this section I examine a related question: if a government persists in some undesired practice, can nonviolent action by its citizens cause it to change?

There seems to be a general belief that military power is effective in dealing with conflicts and that nonviolent efforts are not. As to the effectiveness of the military, consider a number of recent wars. The Falklands War of 1980 resulted in a military victory but the unresolved tensions between the UK and Argentina require that a permanent British military garrison be stationed on the Falkland Islands. The Iran–Iraq war of 1980–1988 cost half a million lives but brought about no change in the boundaries over which the war was fought. The Gulf War of 1990 resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Iraqis but the underlying issues were not dealt with. This resulted in the subsequent deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians as a result of sanctions and the US/UK invasion of 2003, which defeated the Iraqi army but has resulted in an extremely costly civil war. Inter-ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia was largely ended by heavy NATO bombing of Serbia, but 60 000 NATO troops remain in Bosnia and Kosovo to keep the peace. In Africa, civil wars are characterised by their duration. Since 1976, five civil wars – in Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan – have each lasted for more than 20 years. Wars shatter societies, and it may take decades for them to recover. The effectiveness of the military, other than in achieving a negative peace, is certainly open to question.

Two studies of US military interventions support the contention that force does not result in sustainable peace. Pei and Kasper (2003) studied the 16 ‘forced regime changes’ in which significant numbers of US ground troops were involved in the 20th century. These were designed either to prevent a regime collapse or to bring about a regime change. Of the 16, four were judged to be a success in terms of the establishment of a democracy ten years or more after the US withdrawal, namely Germany, Japan, Grenada and Panama. In a related study, Dobbins (2003) examined six major nation-building operations since 1990 in which US military forces helped effect a transition to democracy. Of the six, two (Somalia and Haiti) were clear failures, while the outcome in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq is still pending, but hardly look promising. In a recent study Sullivan examined 122 military interventions by the five major powers (China, France, the UK, the US and the USSR/Russia) between 1945 and 2001 against much weaker opponents (in other words, asymmetric wars). She found that 39 per cent of these ‘failed to attain their primary political objective’ (Sullivan 2007:498). In terms of civil wars, a study by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) showed that high military expenditure on the part of developing countries does not deter internal rebellion and that low military expenditure does not encourage it. In short, military solutions seem to be of limited effectiveness in achieving sustainable peace.

We do not know, of course, whether nonviolent alternatives would have worked in these situations. Typically, nonviolent and less violent interventions are tried for a time before the military option is used. But what if the military option was simply not on the list of alternatives? Is confidence in nonviolent methods based on evidence of success, or is it a triumph of hope over experience?

A number of researchers have evaluated the effectiveness of nonviolence (eg Galtung 1996; Zunes et al 1999; King 1999; Ackerman & Duvall 2000; Holmes & Gan 2005; Sharp & Paulson 2005). Galtung (1996:117–119) lists ten ‘amazing successes’ of nonviolence in the 20th century and these, and many others, are examined in one or more of the preceding references:

- The campaign for Indian independence led by Gandhi, 1920–1947
- The protest in Berlin by the Aryan wives of Jewish men arrested by the Nazis, in February 1943
- The campaign for civil rights for blacks in the US, led by Martin Luther King
- The anti-Vietnam war movement in the US and elsewhere
- The campaign by Argentinean mothers in the Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires
- The ‘people power’ campaign against the Marcos government in the Philippines, 1986
- The nonviolent campaign of many facets which resulted in the ending of apartheid
- The nonviolent campaign in occupied Palestine for justice from Israel
- The Beijing campaign for greater democracy, 1989
- The Solidarity/DDR movement which resulted in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War

The list above is by no means exhaustive. Gene Sharp (1971a) lists 84 cases, not all of which were successful, and the end of slavery in the early 19th century, the nonviolent Czech resistance to Soviet forces in 1968, the campaign which led to the ban on the manufacture and use of landmines in the 1990s, the nonviolent campaigns which overthrew the Milosevic government in Serbia in 2000 and that of Shevardnadze in Georgia in 2003 and the Treatment Action Campaign’s current efforts in South Africa spring to mind. Galtung (1996:117, 118) comments that to assert that ‘nonviolence does not work’ is ‘uninformed’. He notes:

Of course, no case is ever totally clear and pure. But in these cases major direct violence was averted, and major structural violence was averted or reduced. Other factors were also at work; but if instead of using nonviolence, the threatened, exploited and/or repressed had engaged in major violence, not only would that have invited major counter-violence, but the oppressive

conditions would probably have remained unchanged. This we cannot know, since we cannot run history over again. But it certainly seems highly plausible.

Two questions arise. First, nonviolence may have worked against the British in India, but can it work against a 'ruthless aggressor', as in countries that had been occupied by Nazi Germany? Second, if it works so often, why is it not used more extensively? Why is it, in the words of Theodore Roszak, that we 'try nonviolence for a week and then when it doesn't "work" ... go back to violence, which hasn't worked for centuries' (quoted by Nagler 1999:239).

The first of these has been specifically examined by Ralph Summy (1994). Briefly, the evidence is that extensive and successful nonviolent resistance against ruthless aggressors has indeed occurred, for example in the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway under Nazi occupation. The second question may be harder to tackle and I will suggest two possible answers, apart from the misconception that military solutions are more effective than nonviolent approaches. First, there is a widespread belief that violence is natural and is inherent in human (especially male) nature. This belief has been challenged by the Seville statement on violence (1986) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) which makes it clear that humans are not genetically programmed to be violent. Violence and wars are human constructs and we have the capacity to choose to engage in them or to choose nonviolence. To quote the well-known UNESCO statement, 'since war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed'. The discipline of peace studies is based on the belief that violence is a learned behaviour; it can be unlearned and effective nonviolent methods of dealing with conflict can be learned.

Second, violence and war fit in with the desire for quick, decisive action which has a clear end date. We are often impatient. We want something to be completed, dealt with so that we can move on. The military provides us with an instrument to do this when we become impatient with slower moving alternatives. An alternative to invading Iraq could have been for the UN to have set up an office of Iraqi affairs charged with trying, by the widest possible range of nonviolent means, to achieve the desired changes within Iraq. A 20-year commitment might possibly have been necessary but we would not have a society shattered by sanctions and an invasion and civil war from which it will take decades to recover.

Some practical steps

Margaret Thatcher is credited with the phrase 'there is no alternative' which has since become known by its acronym TINA. There is an alternative acronym – TAAA – 'there are always alternatives'. Violent solutions to issues based on TINA are often a lazy and

impatient way out. That is, rather than thinking through an issue, listening to what relevant parties are saying, putting forward nonviolent alternatives and implementing them, we choose a quicker, easier but ultimately less effective route. Fundamentally, we need to move ourselves and others from TINA to TAAA. In this section, I discuss four necessary conditions.

The first and most crucial is a change of mindset away from violence and towards nonviolence. This has two components. We need to spread the news that nonviolence works by expanding awareness of successful campaigns and the techniques of nonviolence. We need to be able to offer well-researched alternatives to violence which have reasonable prospects of success in terms of positive and sustainable peace. What would the outcome have been if, in the words of economist Jeffrey Sachs (2002), the US had offered 'weapons of mass salvation' – in the form of generous aid – to Iraq rather than focusing on alleged weapons of mass destruction? In particular, we need to spread the principles of nonviolence – the *ahimsa*, the *agape* and the *satyagraha* mentioned earlier – throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Faith communities have a particularly important role in promoting the principles of nonviolence – common across many religions – to their members.

At the same time, we need to spread the news that the military has reached its use-by date. This follows from a belief that violence and force are morally and spiritually unacceptable; from the fact that nonviolent methods are less costly, more effective and able to be learned; from the fact that invasions have become rare and that countries' security needs embrace far more than simply territorial security; and from the recognition that there are cost effective alternative ways of achieving security. Table 2 compares the cost-effectiveness of eight alternatives under three headings – transforming the military, reducing the incidence of disputes and building dispute-resolution capacity with that of a conventional military approach. Each of the eight is considered more effective than the conventional military approach.

The second requirement is a plan. Whether demilitarisation is rapid or more gradual, it needs to be based on a plan which meets the needs of society for security and does so using appropriate means. That is, the process of demilitarisation itself must reflect the new mindset, and specifically the need to manage or resolve conflicts by nonviolent and democratic means. The benefit of a gradual approach is that a careful plan can be worked out; the danger is that countervailing forces may gain strength and the opportunity to demilitarise may be lost. Each country needs a demilitarisation plan, ready to be brought out at an opportune time.

Third, the plan will need a means of implementation. The number and complexity of the tasks involved in demilitarisation mean that they cannot be left to the usual government departments which have their own specific tasks and agendas. A new body needs to

Table 2 *The cost-effectiveness of various ways of building security*

Method	Likely costs	Likely effectiveness
Conventional military	High	Low to moderate
A transformed military		
Non-offensive defence	Reduced	Increased
Civilianised military functions	Reduced	Increased
Social defence	Low	Moderate
Reduced incidence of disputes		
Befriending the neighbours	Moderate	Moderate to high
Promoting democracy and development	High	High
Building dispute resolution capacity		
Education in conflict resolution and management	Moderate	High
Building conflict resolution institutions	Low	Moderate

Source: Harris 2004b:200.

be established and one possibility is the national ministry of peace under consideration in a number of countries (Suter 2004). Of necessity, these would be senior ministries, outranking particularly the ministry of defence, and staffed by personnel who are committed to a demilitarised society. Such a ministry's responsibilities would include oversight of

- Education of the population in nonviolent ways of dealing with conflict
- Building good relationships with neighbouring countries at all levels of society by all manner of means
- Demilitarisation, including the reallocation of non-core functions currently undertaken by the military to other government departments or civilian bodies and a reallocation of resources from the ministry of defence to the ministry of peace
- Building and supporting peacemaking and peacebuilding institutions and organisations.

Fourth, the plan will need to be adequately financed. It is tempting to think that demilitarisation will result in a peace dividend which is available for other government purposes, but experience suggests this is unlikely. Demobilisation and reintegration is complex and expensive as illustrated by the experience of Mozambique, for example (Ball & Barnes 2000). Demobilisation and reintegration need to be well planned and well-funded to avoid the real possibility that ex-fighters will recommence fighting or resort

to crime and banditry. Where demobilisation follows the end of a war, some sources of wartime finance, including ‘war taxes’ and the cavalier exploitation of natural resources, may no longer be available. Then there are the additional costs of the alternative means of achieving security. Almost certainly, foreign financial aid will need to be tapped. The arguments raised below are relevant whether demilitarisation is occurring following the end of war or as a result of a decision made during peacetime.

Table 3 Sources of finance for demilitarisation

Domestic	Foreign
■ Saved expenditures – the peace dividend ■ Private savings ■ Taxation ■ Borrowing from the public through the sale of government bonds	■ Development assistance – Bilateral – Multilateral – Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) ■ Borrowing from commercial banks – Public and publicly guaranteed – Multilateral – NGOs ■ Borrowing from commercial banks – Public and publicly guaranteed – Private ■ Direct investment ■ Portfolio investment

The first item in table 3 is the traditional ‘peace dividend’ and involves the diversion of expenditure away from war to other government expenditure categories. Non-government forces will also save on expenditures. In both cases, resources potentially become available for demilitarisation. However, while a reduction in military spending is feasible to some extent, such a re-allocation may offer only limited possibilities of a peace dividend in the short term. Although expenditure on weapons may drop substantially in the post-war period, weapons do not often make up the bulk of military expenditure. Rather, personnel costs absorb most of the military budget and, unlike weapons, these cannot be reduced so rapidly. Where tensions with neighbouring countries persist in the immediate post-war period, the possibility of a peace dividend in the short term becomes even less likely.

The fiscal implications of peace can also initially be discouraging. It could take the form of a redirection of spending from the military to the civilian sector and governments could reduce the revenue they raise. However, although such peace dividends would allow the private sector to retain more financial resources and may be large when compared to the time of armed conflict, they may be very small when the yardstick used is the pre-war situation. Indeed, the ability to raise revenue may actually decline in the post-war period. In wartime Ethiopia, for example, the state used coercive revenue-raising measures which had to be abandoned when peace was achieved, but without leaving the government with a viable alternative for financing its expenditure. Often the

only major revenue increase is the enhanced flow of foreign aid that typically follows the end of a war. Thus there should be no short-term expectation of any substantial domestically generated peace dividend, either for the economy or for the government, as expenditure needs will be high and revenue raising capacity low. In addition, if there were a peace dividend, there would be pressure from bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to use it to cut budget deficits or taxes.

With the uncertainties of armed conflict at least diminished, incentives to save rather than consume immediately will increase for those with sufficient income, although they may be pressured to spend money on deferred consumption items. Incentives facing business people and the government to invest in physical capital items will also expand. The matter of investment is discussed further below.

Governments may receive increased revenue via the taxation system but will be subject to two constraints: first, given the desire to involve the private sector in recovery, a government will have to be careful not to remove too much of that sector's surplus available for investment. Second, the population's willingness to pay high taxes in order to win the war is not likely to continue when the war ceases. A possible source of finance may be the sale of government bonds to its citizens, provided that there is some kind of market structure for securities.

Foreign sources of funds have the inherent advantage of being in the form of foreign exchange, a supply of which is essential for the purchase of the imports necessary for recovery. Development assistance can come from other countries, from multilateral bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank or regional development banks and from NGOs. Apart from NGOs, this assistance may be conditional, and there may in fact be demands for government expenditure constraints at the very time when such expenditure is or seems essential for recovery. The experience of a number of countries is that the price for obtaining the financial resources needed for recovery have been to virtually hand over control of economic policymaking – Mozambique is a classic example of this. On the other hand, generous foreign contributions may be crucial in overcoming opposition to demilitarisation, as it may make it possible to compensate individuals and groups who would lose out in consequence.

The willingness of foreign commercial banks to lend and that of local and foreign business people to invest in productive assets or shares will depend on an optimistic assessment of the likelihood of returns and profit. The end of a war does not in itself signal the beginning of economic security. Despite the onset of peace, potential investors may continue to be cautious in committing their investment funds, because of a perceived lack of economic security. The main dividend from peace derives from a gradual recovery of confidence, which is also expressed in the repatriation of financial and human capital from abroad.

At the risk of oversimplifying matters, it is ultimately in the international community's interest to invest in war-to-peace transitions. Not only will the cost of intervention for the international community rise if peace is not maintained – as peacemakers, peacekeepers and peacebuilders are called in again – but peace has inherent environmental, cultural and spiritual benefits for the international community, let alone the citizens of the country. While less immediately tangible, these benefits far outweigh the short-term costs of financing war-to-peace transitions.

Finally, it might be asked how African nations would fare if they were faced with an aggressive military threat if they had demilitarised and moved towards nonviolent ways of building security. One response is the African Standby Force currently being formed, which will consist of five brigades based across the continent and totalling around 25 000 military personnel. It is designed specifically to intervene, under African Union direction, in situations of actual or threatened invasion or human rights abuse. As former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias has noted (1996:17), 'the present situation of each country maintaining its own military forces is as wasteful as if every house in a community maintained its own fire engine'.

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