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Introduction

The African Union is only five years old, having been launched in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. In the intervening years it has established a range of bodies, mechanisms, protocols and institutions. A sufficient amount of effort has been focused on creating a peace and security architecture to combat the multitude of challenges that the AU is facing. Current efforts by the AU invite comparisons with its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This article will assess the emergence of the AU and examine what innovations it proposes in order to effectuate a paradigm shift from the limited achievements of the OAU. The evolving role of the AU in peace operations will also be considered.

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Contextualising peace operations

The 1992 report *An agenda for peace*, written by the first African secretary-general of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argued for proactive peacemaking and humanitarian intervention (Boutros-Ghali 1992). The report outlined suggestions for enabling intergovernmental organisations to respond quickly and effectively to threats to international peace and security after the Cold War era. In particular, four major areas of activity were identified:

- Preventive diplomacy
- Peacemaking
- Peacekeeping
- Post-conflict peacebuilding

Preventive diplomacy strives to resolve a dispute before it escalates into violence. Peacemaking seeks to promote a ceasefire and to negotiate an agreement. Peacekeeping proceeds after the outbreak of violence and involves ‘the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, [hitherto] with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992:20). These initiatives are ideally coordinated and integrated to ensure post-conflict peacebuilding, which includes programmes and activities that will sustain peace and prevent any future outbreak of violent conflict, and may include addressing diplomatic, political, social, military, security and economic development issues. Peace operations over the years have demonstrated that peacemaking and preventive diplomacy are much more cost effective than peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The precursor to the African Union: The Organisation of African Unity

The inauguration of the OAU on 25 May 1963 represented the institutionalisation of pan-African ideals. There were heated debates about the shape and function of the organisation. On the one hand, the radical point of view promoted by leaders such as Nkrumah of Ghana, Nyerere of Tanganyika (present-day Tanzania) and Nasser of Egypt pushed for ever closer political unification. Nyerere argued, rightly so, that the boundaries dividing African states were ‘nonsensical’ as they had been arbitrarily drawn by Europeans in the 1885 ‘scramble for Africa’ (Nyerere 1979:1). The more conservative African leaders were unwilling to take such a step and preferred to retain the ‘illusion’ of national independence. As a result of these differences, the OAU was in effect impotent
in its efforts to positively influence national policies, monitor the internal behaviour of member states, and prevent human rights atrocities.

The preamble to the OAU Charter of 1963 outlined a commitment by member states to collectively establish, maintain and sustain peace and security in Africa. However, in parallel, the same OAU Charter contained the provision to ‘defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the member states’ (OAU 1963:2). This was later translated into the norm of non-intervention. The key organs of the OAU – the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government – could only intervene in a conflict situation if they were invited by the parties to a dispute. At the time, many intra-state disputes were viewed as internal matters and the exclusive preserve of the governments concerned. Regrettably, due to the doctrine of non-intervention, the OAU became a silent observer to the atrocities committed by some of its member states. Eventually, a culture of impunity and indifference became entrenched in the international relations of African countries during the era of the ‘proxy’ wars of the Cold War.

A decade of violence

Historically the OAU’s record indicates that the policy of non-intervention was applied to the extreme: African nation states oppressed their own people with impunity and did little or nothing to prevent massive human rights abuses in neighbouring countries. The OAU was perceived as a club of African heads of state, most of whom were not legitimately elected representatives of their citizens but self-appointed dictators and oligarchs. This negative perception informed people’s attitude towards the OAU. It was viewed as an organisation that had no genuine impact on the daily lives of Africans. In effect, the OAU was a toothless talking shop, a silent observer to the atrocities being committed by its member states.

However, we cannot dismiss the OAU entirely. It undertook and led decolonisation and anti-apartheid struggles that contributed towards bringing about the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. In addition, the OAU utilised preventive diplomacy and peacemaking strategies, even though the terminology was only developed at the end of the 20th century. To fulfil its peacemaking role, the OAU, in article XIX of its charter, established a Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA). At the 1993 summit in Cairo, the African Heads of State and Government decided to establish a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. One year later saw the devastating tragedy of the Rwandan genocide that was characterised by unrelenting ruthlessness and brutality despite the existence of the OAU’s mechanisms for conflict prevention and management. The Rwandan tragedy demonstrated the virtual impotence of the OAU in the face of violent conflict within its member states. The UN did not fare any better: all its troops, except the Ghanaian contingent, pulled out of the country, leaving Rwanda’s people to their
fate. Subsequently, both the OAU and the UN issued reports acknowledging their failures (OAU 2000; UN 1999). The impetus for adopting a new paradigm in the promotion of peace and security in Africa emerged in the wake of the tragedy in Rwanda.

During the 1990s Africa witnessed an unprecedented decade of violence. Somalia remained unmanageable. Sierra Leone and Liberia were subject to turbulent and brutal violence. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) erupted in 1998 while fighting in Angola and Sudan raged on. The only ray of hope came from Mozambique where the UN managed to broker peace in 1992.

A paradigm shift in peace and security

The year 1999, five years after the Rwandan genocide as well as five years after the liberation of South Africa from the yoke of apartheid, saw the OAU reaching its stated aim to liberate the African continent from colonialism. In this year, African leaders met in Sirte, Libya, to review the OAU Charter. This meeting emphasised the importance of strengthening solidarity among African countries and reviving the spirit of Pan-Africanism, borrowed from the ideas of thinkers such as W E B du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah and Léopold Senghor. Faced with mounting problems and the challenges of living in a globalised world there was a movement among African leaders to forge even closer unity on the continent and adopt a project of regional integration. The AU project was born in Sirte in 1999 with the decision to draft an act of constitution. The AU’s Constitutive Act was subsequently signed in Lomé, Togo on 11 July 2000. The official inauguration of the AU took place in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa and represented the next level in the evolution of the ideal of Pan-Africanism.

The transition from the the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union

Learning from the lessons of the OAU, the AU has adopted a much more interventionist stance through its legal frameworks and institutions. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004 through the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 2002 (AU 2002). The AU’s 15-member PSC is mandated to conduct peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Of the PSC’s fifteen member countries ten are elected for a term of two years and five for a term of three years. The chairperson of the AU is assisted by a commissioner in charge of peace and security to provide operational support to the PSC and take the steps necessary to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The PSC assesses a potential crisis situation, sends fact-finding missions to trouble spots and is empowered to authorise and legitimise the AU’s intervention in internal crisis situations. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act affirms
the right of the AU to intervene in a member state in crisis situations (AU 2000:4). Specifically, article 7(e) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council states that the PSC can ‘recommend to the Assembly [of heads of state] intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments’ (AU 2003:9). This represents a major qualitative difference between the charter of the OAU and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. With the adoption of these legal provisions, for the first time in the history of Africa the continental organisation, working through an appointed group of states, has the authority to intervene in internal situations that may lead to atrocities being committed against minority groups or communities at risk within states. To reinforce this provision the AU is working towards the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010 to cooperate, where appropriate, with the UN and subregional African organisations in conducting peace operations. In effect, the AU will maintain a working relationship with the UN and other international organisations, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECASS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The ASF is to comprise five brigades from each of Africa’s subregions: Southern, East, Central, West and North. A Continental Early Warning System and a Panel of the Wise will also be established to assist with peacemaking on the continent.

The African Union’s peace operations

The AU has only been operational for five years and inherited both the assets and liabilities of the OAU. Therefore, the AU has not conducted extensive peacebuilding operations on the continent despite the significant need for peacebuilding. The AU did however intervene in Burundi to build peace and enable the establishment of a more robust UN peace operation. The AU is also involved in promoting peace in the Darfur region of Sudan through the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The AU has a rather weak mandate in Darfur, namely to monitor the humanitarian crisis effectively and to coordinate efforts to advance the cause of peace. This narrow mandate does not provide the AU with the leeway to implement peacebuilding initiatives, nor does the organisation have the wherewithal to finance comprehensive peacebuilding operations.

Burundi: Operationalising African Union peacebuilding

In 1993, Mohammed Ould Abdallah, then special representative of the UN secretary-general to Burundi, wrote a book entitled Burundi on the brink: a special envoy reflects on preventive diplomacy. More than a decade later Burundi is still ‘on the brink’ and requires substantial peacebuilding initiatives. The AU, UN and other partners have made a
concerted effort to prevent the genocidal tendencies that have so devastated the Great Lakes region from resurfacing in this country. The 2003 AU peace operation in Burundi, also known as the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), was the first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members. It represents a milestone for the AU in terms of self-reliance in operationalising and implementing peacebuilding. As far as Burundi is concerned, the AU mission was effectively mandated to build peace in a fluid and dynamic situation in which the country could relapse into violent conflict. In this regard, the AU mission was a peacebuilding initiative.

In April 2003, the AU deployed AMIB with more than 3 000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique to monitor the peace process and provide security (Murithi 2005:91–95). The AU appointed Mamadou Bah as its special representative in Burundi to assist with the peacebuilding effort. One of the tasks of the AU force was to protect returning politicians who would take part in the transitional government. Other peacebuilding tasks included opening secure demobilisation centres and improving the ability of AMIB to reintegrate former militia into society. These demobilisation centres supervised the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process that is a fundamental pillar of peacebuilding. AMIB was also involved in creating conditions that would allow internally displaced persons and refugees living in the eight Burundian provinces and three refugee camps in Tanzania to return to their homes. This was very much in keeping with the AU and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) policy frameworks that were subsequently developed.

AMIB also had the task of establishing conditions that would allow for a UN peace operation to enter the country. (The UN was reluctant to enter a situation that had the potential to relapse into conflict.) AMIB’s crucial role in this case was to create conditions through which peace, albeit fragile, could be built in the country. By the end of its mission AMIB had succeeded in establishing relative peace to most provinces in Burundi, with the exception of the region outside Bujumbura where armed resistance, in the form of the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), remained a problem. In the absence of the AU Mission Burundi would have been left to its own devices, which probably would have resulted in an escalation of violent conflict. AMIB was therefore engaged in peacebuilding through preventing violent conflict and trying to lay the foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction. Throughout its period of operation AMIB succeeded in de-escalating a potentially volatile situation and in February 2004 a UN evaluation team concluded that conditions were appropriate for establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in the country.

As the UN was planning to take over, a host of challenges remained in Burundi, including the reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees into their communities. This included ensuring that returnees would have access to land in order to ensure their own livelihood. On 21 May 2004 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1545 to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Burundi. On 1 June 2004
Kofi Annan, then UN secretary-general, appointed a special representative, Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, to head the mission. The former AMIB troops were incorporated into the UN Peace Operation in Burundi (ONUB). As of October 2006 some 20 000 military personnel have been demobilised, but many still lack economic opportunities and could pose a potential security threat (Nhlapo 2006). Therefore, there are clearly still peacebuilding challenges in Burundi.

Whether or not the foundations laid by the peacebuilding process will be sustained remains to be seen. ONUB departed in December 2006, and was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) which is coordinating international assistance. BINUB is providing technical assistance in developing a comprehensive security sector reform plan that includes the training of Burundi’s national police and army. BINUB is also completing the national programme for the demobilisation and integration of former combatants, as well as providing training for employment and access to micro-credit schemes (Nhlapo 2006:3). Even though the UN took over from the AU, the case of Burundi demonstrates that the continental body can in fact make useful peacebuilding interventions on the continent. The AU, UN and its partners will of course need to continue their concerted effort to ensure that peace prevails in Burundi.

The Darfur region of Sudan: The African Union’s peacemaking efforts

The Darfur situation has become the AU’s most significant test to date and defies simplistic analysis. The root causes of the conflict extends back at least to the 17th century when Arab incursions led to the establishment of a sultanate amongst the indigenous Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa people of the region. A history of coexistence among the pastoralists and the agrarian societies in the region was put under pressure by drought. Social and economic marginalisation of Darfurians by the ruling regime in Khartoum laid the foundations for the rebellion that was launched in February 2003. The government retaliated with a combination of its own military offensive and a proxy fighting force, today known as the infamous Janjaweed. Darfur has become an unwilling and unlikely victim of the legacy of Sudan’s history and culture of violence, notably the nearly 40 years of North/South conflict. This protracted conflict was interrupted between 1972, when the Addis Ababa peace agreement was signed, and 1983 when the South Sudanese People’s Movement/Army (SPLM/A) launched their armed resistance.

To date the war has displaced at least two million people into more than 100 camps in Darfur and in neighbouring Chad. Despite a peace deal signed with one of the three main rebel movements in May 2006, new fighting has made a further 50 000 homeless. In early 2008 Sudan is still under intense international pressure over the four-year conflict in its western region after the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for 20 000 UN troops to replace the African Union’s 7 000-strong force.
Intransigence of the Sudanese government

Throughout 2007 the government of Sudan – also known as the Government of National Unity because it is composed of members of the National Congress Party and the SPLM – was quite adept at maneuvering against the establishment of a UN-peacekeeping force. In 2007 it had indicated that the UN would be given humanitarian access and that a peacekeeping force would be accepted. The Khartoum regime doggedly rejected the presence of a UN force in Darfur. During this intervening period President Omar Al-Bashir regularly categorically stated that the presence of a UN force would be tantamount to the recolonisation of Sudan.

What emerges from the situation in Darfur is that there are at least three overlapping and interlocking dimensions to the situation.

First, there is the national dimension in that the Khartoum regime sees the Darfur situation as a purely internal affair. It argues that the long-held principles of non-intervention in the affairs of states and of territorial integrity should not be discarded.

Second, the regional or continental perspective under the leadership of the AU seeks to find a political solution while undertaking peace operations to alleviate the suffering of Darfurians. The AU’s monitoring mission leaves much to be desired and a more robust peacekeeping force is required to effectively dissuade the silent genocide that is taking place in Darfur. However, the AU’s peacemaking initiative in Abuja, Nigeria, under the tutelage of the former secretary-general of the OAU, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. That only the Minni Minnawi faction of the SLA signed the agreement means that the DPA was by no means a comprehensive peace agreement in the mould of the South Sudan agreement. The recent failure of the peace talks convened in Tripoli, Libya, in October 2007 is a further indication that there is no peace to keep in Darfur. Essentially the conflict is not over since a durable ceasefire has not been established. The armed resistance groups have even begun to fight each other, and the situation has deteriorated into a military, political and diplomatic conundrum.

The international dimension has so far been spearheaded by the UN, since a former envoy to the North/South dispute became embroiled in the conflict in Darfur. The UN resolution authorising the establishment of a peacekeeping force has not yet been implemented. Key players in the international community have their own reasons for wanting a resolution of the Darfur issue. NATO is assisting with the provision of logistical support, particularly airlift, in Darfur. In October 2006, senior US and British envoys travelled to the capital, Khartoum, to urge the ruling coalition government to allow peacekeepers access to the region. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with the Sudanese regime in Khartoum several times in 2007, yet the regime is persistently
intransigent in showing good faith and allowing the operationalisation of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

In the United States Darfur has become a *cause célèbre*. With a number of celebrities throwing their hats into the ring and picking up the fight for the people of Darfur, we are effectively witnessing the ‘celebrification’ of an international conflict. However, it is still important to try to unravel the competing and multilayered agendas of some of these actors and governments.

In addition al-Qaeda has allegedly issued a statement on Darfur stating that any UN troops entering Darfur, which they see as Muslim territory, will represent the forces of global imperialism and should be repelled with all means. Of course, we have to recall that Osama bin Laden spent some time in Sudan prior to relocating to Afghanistan. Consequently, in the eyes of regional and international actors Darfur is viewed through the lens of the post-9/11 world and the so-called war on terror. Whether or not we agree with this view, it will definitely begin to affect peace efforts in Darfur.

In Darfur, the AU found itself with a test case that it was ill-equipped institutionally and under-resourced to resolve successfully. The politicisation of the situation in Darfur means that there are now no easy answers. Certainly, it is right and proper for the AU to be in Darfur, or for some form of international peace operation to be staged there. Regrettably, while the AU’s peacemaking efforts are to be applauded, its monitoring peace operation is floundering and enabling government forces, the Janjaweed, and the armed resistance groups to continue fighting amongst themselves and to continue the carnage and destruction of the lives and property of Darfurians.

*The emerging UN-AU relationship*

UN Security Council Resolution 1706 requested the secretary-general ‘to take the necessary steps to strengthen AMIS through the use of existing and additional United Nations resources with a view to transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur’ (UN Security Council 2006:1). On 31 July 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1769 authorised and mandated ‘the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months, of an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)’. UNAMID ‘shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light Support Packages to AMIS, and shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising of up to 140 personnel each’ (UN Security Council 2007:3). There are efforts to reassure observers that this is not an effort to reestablish the asymmetrical relationship that prevailed in the early decades of the UN, but rather an effort to create something new – a hybrid partnership. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is already supporting AMIS through its UN Assistance Cell in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, where the AU has its headquarters. More specifically, the DPKO and the AU Peace Support Operations Division signed an agreement to develop a joint action plan. In July 2006, the UN created a dedicated integrated capacity to oversee the implementation of the action plan. The integrated capacity will involve the ‘collocation’ of UN staff within the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. This innovative approach of embedding UN staff within the operational structures of a regional organisation represents a completely new form of partnership. There is an emphasis on the fact that this is not an asymmetrical partnership, but an entirely new arrangement established through the mutual consent of both parties. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is not explicit on the possibility of establishing such a hybrid partnership, therefore there is significant leeway to operationalise such a relationship if both the UN and the regional organisation are compliant. In fact, article 52 states that ‘the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council’. This provides a legal basis for embedding UN staff within the AU.

*Hybrid partnership or hybrid paternalism?*

Even though the UN-AU partnership is taking a new direction, it is important to determine what the new relationship represents. Is the hybrid partnership in effect a hybrid form of paternalism in that AU troops and personnel will do the basic and dangerous work on the ground guided by the all-wise and ‘fatherly’ coterie of UN advisors? Does this evolution in the UN-AU partnership represent a paradigm shift in relations between both organisations, or is it a case of old wine in new bottles? Certainly, it remains an asymmetric relationship due to the fact that the UN is a much older institution with more resources and experience than the AU. Therefore, in this relationship advice and resources are more likely to be unidirectional – flowing from the UN to the AU. Naturally, as the regional organisation, the AU has an important role to play in orienting efforts in a way that respects local sensibilities. However, it is not clear to what extent the AU can declare total ownership of the conceptualisation, design, planning and implementation of its peace operations, when ‘collocated’ UN personnel maintain a dominant presence in its affairs. It is too early to pass a definitive judgment on this emerging hybrid partnership. The AU has to remain vigilant to ensure that it does not descend into a relationship of hybrid paternalism. In particular, the AU should guard against allowing the UN’s historical paternalism to remanifest under a new guise, with UN brawn being used to direct African bodies on the ground.

*The African Union Mission in Somalia*

The collapse of the central government of Somalia in 1991 came after years of dictatorial rule by Siad Barre, which had fostered civil war. After 16 year of difficult peacemaking and
peacekeeping initiatives Somalia is still in search of peace. Recent violent confrontation, in May 2007, caused tremendous damage and loss of life and prevented humanitarian relief operations.

Ethiopia launched an incursion into Somalia, with US backing, ostensibly to route the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Previously, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia had been established in Nairobi. The TFG is one of the transitional federal institutions (TFIs) of the Somali government defined in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) adopted in November 2004 by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), the legislative branch of the TFG.


In July 2007 the Somali National Reconciliation Congress was launched so that representatives of the various parties and stakeholders in Somalia could discuss national peace and reconstruction. The Congress will continue deliberations and outline a roadmap for the remaining transitional process until the elections are held in 2009.

**African Union Peace and Security Council Decision on Somalia**

Following a report of the chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in Somalia (PSC/PR/2(LXIX)) and the evaluation and recommendations of the AU Military Staff Committee, the AU Peace and Security Council authorised the deployment of AMISOM, which is still operational in Somalia, with the following mandate:

- To provide support for the TFIs in their efforts to stabilise the situation in Somalia and to further dialogue and reconciliation

- To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance

- To create conditions conducive to long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia

On 20 February 2007 the UN Security Council adopted SC Resolution 1744, authorising the deployment of AMISOM. The UN supports AMISOM by means of an assistance cell to the AU in Addis Ababa and by providing military planners. The UN Security Council met with the AU Peace and Security Council on 16 June 2007 to discuss the modalities for deeper collaboration. In particular, both bodies discussed the importance of stabilising Somalia.
AMISOM was launched in March 2007 with 1,700 Ugandan troops. Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi and Burundi have also pledged to deploy troops. The AU’s PSC indicated that ‘the concept of logistic support for AMISOM shall be based on the model of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)’. This effectively means that ‘the AU Commission shall mobilize logistical support for the TCCs, as well as funding from AU member states and partners to ensure that TCCs are reimbursed for the costs incurred in the course of their deployment, based on AU practice’ (AU Peace and Security Council 2007).

AMISOM is trying to stabilise parts of Mogadishu and Baidoa and has a role to play in creating the security conditions required to enable the complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. AMISOM is also supporting dialogue and reconciliation.

The European Union is supporting the deployment of AMISOM with €15 million. In June 2005 the UK pledged to finance AMISOM with €1.3 million. The UK is also providing planning assistance to several potential troop-contributing countries and logistical support for the AU military cell in Addis Ababa. The AU has requested NATO to provide air transportation in support of AMISOM troops.

Resource mobilisation for African Union peace operations

African leaders need to commit money to back the institutions of the African Union. The AU should strive to take a stronger stand and mobilise the necessary resources where required. To confront its peacekeeping challenges, the AU will need to address issues of financial and logistical weakness and the lack of political consensus among African leaders on collective security norms and practices. Due to the limited availability of resources to implement peace operations the AU should explore how it can demarcate a division of labour among Africa’s security actors and subregional organisations, as envisaged in the establishment of the ASF.

Donor support

In terms of the Tenth European Development Fund (EDF) the EU has pledged support for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and will provide €300 million towards the facility for an initial three-year period, from 2008 to 2010. The EU seeks to support long-term capacity building, including military and civilian crisis management, to enable of Africa’s ability to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. This includes the establishment of an EU fund to support AMIS.
Conclusion

The AU has begun to take a stronger stand on conflicts and peace initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi and Darfur. The relatively early stage of the African Union’s development means that we cannot pass a definitive judgment on the organisation. It is evident that specifically with regards to peace operations the AU has already acquired substantial experience, but it has faltered in its ability to monitor and implement its own decisions. The AU’s experience in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia suggests that the organisation has much to do to improve its ability to deliver peace and security to African citizens. However, it goes without saying that the AU’s peace and security architecture will be a vital component of Africa’s strategy to consolidate order and stability on the continent. The AU will need to seriously orient the political leadership of the continent and take decisive and necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring successful peace operations will not be met.

Notes

1 The 15 members of the AU PSC are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tunisia, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zambia.

References