South Africa:
A future research agenda for post-conflict reconstruction

Richard Gueli*

Introduction

South Africa wants Africa’s wars to end, mainly because they pose a grave danger to its national security – the kind of danger that creates floods of refugees, hinders regional development, and keeps foreign investment away. So, for South Africa, assisting broken states in its own backyard, or providing indirect support to others who do, may yield rich dividends in terms of its national interests and commitment to create a ‘better Africa’ (ANC 2007).

The problem that South Africa faces is to understand what form of foreign assistance is needed to stop people taking up arms during or shortly after peace negotiations.

* Richard Gueli is a researcher for the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in Pretoria, South Africa.
According to UN officials this is largely an African problem, and it persists despite several international and local attempts to keep conflict under control. To improve this record, much has been said and written about ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ and the degree to which it can nurture and sustain peace agreements. While there is no common definition of the term, it is used broadly to describe a foreign intervention that aims to rebuild a country devastated by war. This kind of assistance, the experts say, extends beyond keeping the peace and disarming combatants to providing the building blocks for self-governance, security, economic exchange and development – for creating a ‘minimally capable state’, as Hamre and Sullivan (2002) suggest.

Perhaps the best known and only successful example of post-war reconstruction is the Marshall Plan, the American-backed programme to rebuild Western Europe after World War II. Since then things have only got worse for reconstruction, particularly in Africa (Montgomery & Rondinelli 2004). This is what usually happens: after accepting a political deal armed militants turn away from violence and enter mainstream politics; before long, local authorities and international aid agencies lose the confidence of citizens, as they both fail to provide basic needs (food, shelter, clean water, education, health care, and so forth) and create opportunities for work. The result: more conflict.

Presumably, then, modern post-conflict reconstruction is not working because there is, to this day, no standard recipe for planning reconstruction nor any doctrine for conducting it in the field. One might think that eliminating these uncertainties would be a top priority – but if you thought that you would be wrong. The African Union, for instance, is putting the final touches to a document that aims to establish and guide African reconstruction and will be called the Policy framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development (AU 2006). On paper, the framework identifies big goals. To the unwary these goals look impressive – until, that is, they learn that the majority of states in Africa are, for example, largely oblivious of the quality and quantity of their engineering and construction industries. In fact, not only is the AU unclear on how to rebuild Africa, it also lacks African ‘statebuilders’, and this imbalance is forcing it either to rely on foreigners to do the job, thus perpetuating the problem of African dependency, or to turn to military solutions, which tend to fail.

What is South Africa, a leading member of the AU, doing about supporting reconstruction? Simply put, far too little. For example, since 2003 South Africa has been charged by the AU to lead African reconstruction efforts in Sudan, and so far has done precious little. In the southern Sudan, basic infrastructure is almost non-existent and development is simply not taking place (Business in Africa 2006). Levelling criticism at South Africa’s foray into the enterprise of development, however, is easy on paper. In reality, reconstruction poses a big challenge for any country, big or small: the United States, for all its experience and power, is still trying to grasp the basic know-how, even after years of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Reconstruction does not come cheap either: a study conducted by the Rand Corporation estimates that operations can cost
anything between US$1.5 billion to US$15 billion a year and can last between five and ten years (Dobbins et al 2007).

So, does it make sense for South Africa to help other states with development, and in the process burn up billions of dollars in aid money which could instead be used to tackle its own service delivery problems? The answer is yes. South Africa cannot avoid dealing with dysfunctional states because its own safety and prosperity are invariably linked with the stability of its neighbours. After all, the thinking behind South African President Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance was to ‘bind South Africa to the cause of peace and democracy in Africa’ (Vale & Maseko 1998). On a more practical note, Sidiropoulos (2007) reminds us that ‘not only can [South Africa] not be insulated from developments in the region, but much of [its] prosperity comes from creating stability zones’. To summarise: there seems to be no evading the conclusion that South Africa has an inescapable responsibility to rebuild Africa; this responsibility is not just a moral imperative but a matter of sheer self-interest for the country itself.

So far, peacekeeping has been South Africa’s policy instrument du jour for helping needy neighbours (Kagawanja 2006). But this is not good enough. Experience shows that the biggest challenges often arise after peacekeepers have left. Establishing an international aid agency in government, as proposed recently by the African National Congress (ANC 2007), does not look like a good option either. Again, experience shows that dishing out loans often fails to help the suffering poor, and the money all too often ends up in the well-lined pockets of their leaders instead. This is precisely why Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy-chair of the South African Institute for International Affairs and brother of President Mbeki, suggests that ‘the more aid [is] poured into Africa the poorer Africans [seem] to get’ (Mbeki 2007).

Instead, because the key to ending Africa’s wars is generally thought to lie in development work (as opposed to talking about it in conference halls and communiqués), this paper proposes that post-conflict reconstruction be recognised, and treated, as a high priority in South African foreign policy. This is not to say that South Africa has lacked the political will to promote development in Africa’s trouble-spots, but rather that there has been no credible, well-researched plan to back this commitment. This paper is about developing such a plan.

**The need for a plan**

Both the latest annual report and strategic plan of South Africa’s top government department, The Presidency, fail to mention the concept of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’. This is remarkable because South African officials are increasingly more enthusiastic about the concept as a tool for preventing future conflict. For example, in July 2005
President Mbeki noted at a regional conference that ‘the challenge of the reconstruction of the African economies must be … part of [the] African progressive agenda’.5 A few weeks before this occasion the minister of foreign affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, argued in her budget vote speech that ‘without post-conflict reconstruction and development, countries … in no time slid back into instability and conflict’.6 A year later her deputy, Mr Aziz Pahad, remarked in Europe that ‘[South Africa] will place a lot more emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction since it is evident that the continent is moving into a phase where [this strategy] will take centre stage’.7

But exactly how South Africa plans to reconstruct a country after war remains a mystery, despite the promises of ‘African solutions’. Even President Mbeki has expressed his concern about the problem. In July 2005 he admitted, ‘[the] reconstruction of the African economies … is a challenging issue and I am not quite sure that we [South Africa] quite know what … to do’. Mbeki’s sentiments are still true today because Pretoria’s policymakers lack practical guidelines to enable them to understand what South Africa can, and cannot, do about reconstruction. There is also very little research activity in this field. An overview of the literature reveals that few local studies, if any, have attempted to document and analyse best practices from post-conflict situations. Research that focuses *directly* on the technical aspects of reconstruction is almost nil. This kind of empirical work, furthermore, has yet to make its way into the fabric of South African foreign policy (which partly explains why officials are battling to determine whether or how South Africa can make the AU policy framework on reconstruction operational). In that case, what can South Africa do to master the art of post-war reconstruction?

This article proposes that researchers, both from academia and industry, should jointly prepare a research agenda that would guide South African thinking about reconstruction and identify strategically important themes for future research. This assignment, as obvious as it may seem, has never been done before. The implications of this work are enormous, not least because it would require that South Africa’s leading academic institutions and other centres of excellence work closely together to research a common problem, something they rarely do.

While the purpose of this study is not to answer fully or even partially all the many questions that need to be addressed, it will attempt to raise specific research themes on reconstruction that may provide interesting leads for future studies. The themes identified are:

- **Theme 1: Align development with diplomacy and defence**
- **Theme 2: Establish a needs assessment capacity**
- **Theme 3: Invest in science and technology**
- **Theme 4: Partner with business**
The relevance of each theme will be explained and possible courses of action will be put forward. These themes are, obviously, not set in stone. More research and deeper debate is needed to explore in greater detail the potential benefits of making post-conflict reconstruction a working instrument of South African foreign policy.

**Theme 1: Align development with diplomacy and defence**

*Integrate all elements of state power – diplomacy, defence and development – to make foreign assistance more strategic and effective*

One of the main criticisms of post-war reconstruction is the lack of cooperation among different development actors. ‘Doing your own thing’ has served only to delay the delivery of public services to villages and teeming cities for months or even years, and this has lead some societies to slide back to war (Eide et al 2005). Integrated systems of planning and delivery are needed for what Natsios (2005) calls ‘the new development climate’.

The launch of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005, intended to serve as a ‘central node’ for the world’s major development actors, is a tangible product of this thinking. So too is the recent establishment of new inter-governmental reconstruction agencies in the US, Canada and the United Kingdom. Not only have these agencies been mandated to coordinate the actions of different national entities that deliver foreign assistance, but also to give development ‘an equal footing and independent standing alongside defence and diplomacy’ (Brainard 2007). This is a strategy well worth exploring for any government – including South Africa – that considers promoting peace and development as its topmost foreign policy goal.

Future research in South Africa could focus on this strategy from several angles. To start with, the policy that governs South African foreign assistance, the White Paper on South African participation in international peace missions, may need to be revamped or replaced. Tabled in 1999, and yet to be updated, the white paper focuses mostly on the task of training soldiers and police and deploying them for peacekeeping. It is not an explicit policy for promoting development abroad; it does not deal particularly well with the problems that occur in today’s hard-to-solve conflicts (such as ‘disarmed’ and ‘demobilised’ fighters not being ‘reintegrated’ into civilian life); and neither does it propose ways to synergise the activities of different government departments and other players, particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector. These are issues that need to be considered in future attempts to improve the current policy.

As a cornerstone of this new policy, the South African government could explore the idea of establishing a single agency for reconstruction. At the moment there are no
structures in government, except at cabinet level,¹¹ that jointly focus on the problem of conflict in Africa. Because of this the lower-level bureaucracy usually pieces together ad hoc committees or teams for each new crisis. The obvious disadvantage to this way of planning is that it is not designed to spot and prevent potential trouble, but only to respond to it. A permanent agency, on the other hand, would promote optimum sharing of information among all branches of government involved in fighting poverty. (This would include foreign affairs and defence, plus those departments with experience in service provision, such as public works, agriculture, health, and science and technology.) Better coordination would make it easier for analysts to develop detailed options for policymakers on how to avoid conflicts before they start and how to rebuild after they have ended. The proposed agency would preferably be placed in the Presidency, as real inter-departmental coordination in South Africa primarily emanates from this office.¹² The ability to convene, coordinate and take action would also depend on whether a new ‘umbrella agency’ for reconstruction is given sufficient budget authority and legislative muscle to support integrated development planning and action.

Ultimately, the ability to leverage limited resources, and still make a difference in the lives of the poor, would be the litmus test of South Africa’s new legislative mandate on reconstruction. The principle of leverage in reconstruction is linked closely to the next strategy, namely needs assessments.

**Theme 2: Establish a needs assessment capacity**

*Develop a robust assessment capacity to ensure ownership of reconstruction*

Generally speaking, post-conflict reconstruction proceeds in three phases. In the first phase, assessment, international and local experts collect data and analyse the needs of a post-conflict state. In the second, funding, money is raised, usually at a donor conference, to fund development programmes. In the third, implementation, agreed plans and actions are finally executed on the ground. Clearly, describing the problem is one thing, footing the bill and doing the work is quite another. This is especially true for reconstruction, a process that can take generations to complete, and therefore is better left alone if one lacks the political will and resources to stay that long (Hazen 2007). Indeed, a job half-done is just as dangerous as not doing anything at all, as unmet expectations can lead to more conflict (Madlala-Roudledge & Liebenberg 2004).

The point is that the complexity of reconstruction and the high costs involved should lead Africa to adopt a smarter approach. This should focus, at least for now, on making needs assessments – or ‘[getting] the truth of the situation on the ground’ (Rachel 2005). Assessments provide a basic starting point for considering *what* needs to be done to reconstruct a country, *how* it should be done, and *who* should do it. In other words, they
help to ensure local ownership, which Natsios (2005) describes as ‘perhaps the most important … principle of development’.

However, it must be said that the AU rarely conducts its own assessments in the field. Often, this job is done by outsiders, as was the case for Sudan in 2005. The inconvenient truth is that even if the AU did prepare a plan for rebuilding a country, international aid agencies would probably ignore it. There are good and bad reasons for this. The bad reasons are that international donors often want to maintain a high profile in conflict areas in order to secure funding, and in the process may overlook opportunities training and giving work to local staff. The good reasons concern the limited, at times non-existent capacity of post-conflict governments to lead reconstruction from beginning to end. In short, the AU wants ownership of reconstruction processes, yet few, if any, African governments are doing anything to challenge the factors that perpetuate the ‘donor domination of the development agenda’, to borrow a phrase from Kiiza et al (2006).

South Africa should consider following two strategies to make reconstruction a truly African-owned enterprise. First, it should look at establishing a credible and reliable assessment capability, consisting of a group of ‘on-call’ technical experts than would assist the AU with post-war planning. This group would be multi-disciplined in nature and its purpose would be to analyse key developmental needs and consider options to meet them. In a time of tight budgets, these options would have to be affordable for Africa. Value for money would be a key issue. As critical as this step is, however, a better African assessment capacity would not by itself ensure that reconstruction belongs to Africa. South Africa should find ways to leverage its standing as a regional ‘peace broker’ and encourage the highest levels of international leadership to legitimate African thinking around reconstruction, ideally by using the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

Effective reconstruction is not just a question of leadership and ownership alone. Africa, at some point in the future, will need to implement and monitor successful reconstruction operations on its own. As the next section will argue, this effort will require increasing the status and role of science and technology (S&T) in development.

**Theme 3: Invest in science and technology**

*Invest in science and technology to develop tangible and sustainable solutions to lift people out of poverty*

Developmental experts are increasingly seeing technology and innovation as engines of growth for all nations, even those shattered by war (Wagner et al 2001). Significantly, the idea of utilising cutting-edge research for advancing development is touched upon
in the AU’s *Policy framework for reconstruction*. It proposes that Africa ‘develop appropriate technologies for the rehabilitation and development of key social sectors such as housing, energy, water and sanitation [and] for physical infrastructure’. Unfortunately the framework does not elaborate on its meaning of ‘appropriate technologies’, but the mere mention of the concept is important because it highlights two fundamental truths: S&T is important for infrastructure provision, in so far as every stage of an infrastructure project involves the application of a wide range of technologies (Rust et al 2007); technological development, conversely, is impossible without adequate infrastructure (Ridley et al 2006).

But herein lies a major predicament for Africa. Africa’s current infrastructure stock is inadequate and too disintegrated to support development and trade (Black et al 2006). Meanwhile, Africa has few ready candidates with the technological know-how and finance necessary to address the poor state of its infrastructure. This dilemma may be minimised, however, if South Africa, a country with a rich heritage in scientific research and development, decides to project its technological footprint in the arena of post-conflict reconstruction. Until now considerably less attention has been given by South Africa to investing in emerging post-war economies, with neighbouring countries such as Botswana and Mozambique comprising by far the largest share of technology transfer (Thomas 2006).

Encouragingly, a report from the South African Department of Science and Technology (DST) suggested in 2004 that the department would ‘make S&T interventions a cornerstone of a post-conflict reconstruction effort in Africa’ (DST 2004). That intention, however, has yet to materialise. Still, there is no doubt that South Africa is well positioned to develop and adopt new technologies that could boost African reconstruction. A good start in this regard would be to help operationalise key elements of the AU reconstruction framework. ‘Elements’ is the operative word here, because no individual country, not even South Africa, will be capable of addressing every detail of the framework. A better option for South Africa would be to pilot projects on issues where significant domain expertise already exists locally, and that are crucial for international development, such as mine-clearance (to make roads safe and stimulate the exchange of goods), labour-based construction (to create jobs for ex-combatants and restore essential services), and geographic information systems (to enhance development planning). Research into these and other areas of interest could one day place South Africa in a stronger position to participate in, and perhaps even lead, African reconstruction.

As always, the big question when talking about development work in Africa is money. Another common area of concern is skills. Keeping these two points in mind, the next section of the paper suggests that African governments and regional organisations are unable to rebuild war-torn states on their own and will need to enlist the private sector to get involved – something that big business, until now, has been cautious to do.
Theme 4: Partner with business

Team up with big business because considerable untapped skills needed for reconstruction exist in this sector

During his tenure as UN secretary-general Kofi Annan was extremely supportive of the role that business can play in alleviating poverty, ending conflict and promoting development (Kelly 2005). Even so, there has always been an implicit tendency to assume that investing from early on is counter-productive, if not pointless, unless fighting has stopped completely. While this may well be the case, post-conflict countries usually face a bitter paradox: they are the areas that have experienced significant levels of infrastructure destruction and — critically — where violent conflict is likely to re-emerge. One could therefore hypothesise that commercial activity is as important for ‘normal’ societies as it is for ‘normalising’ conflict societies.

In that case, can a case be made for a role for business in conflict resolution? One thing is fairly certain: private companies around the world are increasingly being hired off the global market to do business in war-torn regions, with or without widespread support (Orr 2004). This trend is influenced by multiple factors, two of which are worth mentioning here:

- ‘War profiteering’, or working for money to provide a crucial service that other key players are unable or simply unwilling to provide
- ‘Market creating’, or establishing new environments conducive to doing business

There can be no doubt that the presence of valuable resources, such as oil and gas, helps to explain why some companies might decide to work in politically risky regions.

Halliburton is one company that readily springs to mind when thinking about these issues. For example, Halliburton-subsidiary, Kellog, Brown & Root (KBR), has played a major part in helping the US government reconstruct Iraq, especially the country’s oil infrastructure. Admittedly, the economic revival of Iraq has been stalled by several American failures, but this situation can reasonably be blamed on politics, and not on the privatisation of peace efforts. Singer (2004) points out that ‘it is thought that the Iraq contracts for Halliburton will ultimately be worth as much as US$13 billion … [this amount] is roughly 2.5 times what it cost the US government to fight the 1991 Persian Gulf War’. (Incidentally, the same amount is roughly 3.1 times the amount the international community has pledged to rebuild southern Sudan.)

The point to be made here is that post-conflict communities often cry for quicker action and, in the opinion of Gerson (2001), meeting this challenge, will require ‘courting the
private sector’. This is because, Gerson goes on to say, ‘there is a gnawing realisation that breaking the cycle of poverty and war may exceed the capability of the World Bank and the United Nations’. Sidiropoulos (2007) shares this view when she suggests that ‘successful post-conflict reconstruction can occur only through partnerships between governments and business. It is in this area that much more can be done by both actors.’ Sidiropoulos’ thinking is critically important given that the skills required for reconstruction — engineering, construction and project management, manufacturing, public administration, urban development and environmental management – are readily available in the private sector worldwide, including Africa.

South Africa’s business community is one of the strongest in Africa. ‘South Africa [is] a colossus in the African economy,’ argue Daniel and Lutchman (2006) in a study that looks at the county’s rapid corporate expansion into Africa since 1994. But like business anywhere this expansion has been fuelled mainly by profits and market share and not by ending poverty. Daniel et al (2003) make this point very clearly when they quote the thoughts of a South African bank manager, who once remarked: ‘[We are] not investing in Africa for altruism … we’re investing in Africa to make some money.’

Comments like these are understandable considering that there is virtually no published research in South Africa on how business can be used successfully to abate conflict and make profit in the process. Future research, therefore, would do well to explore how the South African government can enlist local companies in reconstruction and also ‘ensure that the private sector … is more in tune with [its African] agenda’ (Sidiropoulos 2007). Thus far close cooperation between government and industry to promote development abroad has been wanting, in part because state officials have done a poor job of convincing business leaders to invest their money in dangerous places. For example, in private conversation, a delegate at the 2007 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Projects Conference held in Sandton, South Africa, claimed: ‘I will not invest my money in high-risk, long-term joint ventures until someone at this [NEPAD] meeting can tell me what my return on investment is going to look like … so far I have not seen any figures, only NEPAD propaganda.’ Intuitively, investors will not accept great risks in exchange for hazy expected returns.

It should also be kept in mind that good opportunities now abound in South Africa itself owing to the surge in building projects in preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In other words, local firms are not thinking of expanding outside any time soon. That thinking, however, may prove short-sighted for two main reasons: First, the infrastructure boom in South Africa will not last forever, so looking outside, at least after 2010, may be a worthwhile option. Second, South African companies can literally not afford to miss the opportunity presented by African reconstruction. As Christianson (2006) points out, ‘there is undoubtedly money to be made in post-conflict reconstruction,’ although he also warns, ‘the ride is not for the faint of heart’. Gerson (2001) makes a compelling case
for those willing to undertake ‘expeditionary’ ventures in post-conflict environments, when he argues:

> By engaging in commercial activity in a region that others consider too risky, businesses can lay the groundwork for future long-term profits despite short-term risk. Early-entry businesses can establish a loyal consumer base, customise infrastructure for their own purposes, enact favourable deals … with local governments and already-existing business, and secure concessionary rights to [valuable] resources that will sustain future profits.

To sum up: playing a part in establishing law and order could be good for South Africa business. In fact, the best example we have of successful reconstruction, the Marshall Plan, has shown that restoring the power of local business as a growth engine is better than any grand aid programme (Hubbard & Duggan 2007). Charity has usually produced neither good government nor development in Africa. So, can Africa learn anything from the way the Americans planned to rebuild Europe after 1945? And can ‘SA Inc’ play a positive role in bringing Africa’s long-standing conflicts to a tangible end through real infrastructure investment? At this stage, no one can say for sure.

**Conclusion: Reconnecting with the world**

The key to real reconstruction in Africa – to realising the African Renaissance – is ultimately trade (Eizenstat et al 2005). Only by engaging in global trade can African governments hope to promote development and ensure their own stability. But reconnecting with the outside world will not be easy. The world’s major powers are less likely to open up their markets if Africa does not get its house in order; conversely, Africa’s poor countries are more likely to deteriorate without trade and foreign investment. This is a major predicament, but not an impossible one to overcome if Africa finally takes the issue of post-war reconstruction beyond talk-shops and meetings to where it matters most – into the field, at the grassroots. The problem is that the time for action is now, but no major African state or organisation seems to be moving fast enough.

South Africa, despite its prominent position in Africa, is very far from mastering the art of reconstruction. It still lacks an explicit plan to support African reconstruction efforts. This paper, it is hoped, has raised a number of questions, both from a scholarly and a practitioner’s perspective, as to why South Africa ought to develop a research agenda for reconstruction. A number of possible areas of future research were highlighted in the discussion, although it is fairly clear that these are not the only ones. Much more research is needed to ensure that South Africa adopts a better strategy to fight poverty and prevent conflict. The present research, perhaps with some modifications, could also be utilised towards the development of an African doctrine for reconstruction.
In conclusion, South Africa cannot alone be responsible for Africa’s development. As Vale and Maseko (1998) note, the rest of Africa would probably prefer it not to. But this does not mean that South Africa should avoid playing a leadership role in reconstruction. Too often the thought of upsetting nervous neighbours has become an excuse for neglect or inaction, usually at the expense of countless human lives. True, the price of reconstruction is extremely high, but the cost of failure is even higher.

Notes

1 An abridged version of this article, entitled ‘New strategies for helping to mend the African fabric’, appeared in Business Day on 3 September 2007.
2 Both the UN and the World Bank have found that, in their experience, countries emerging from war have a 50 per cent chance of relapsing into conflict within five years of signing a peace agreement. The UN Peacebuilding Commission was established precisely to reverse this worrying trend.
3 Policymakers and academics alike often use the term ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ interchangeably with the terms ‘peacebuilding’, ‘statebuilding’ and/or ‘nationbuilding’.
4 Both these reports can be accessed at the official website of the Presidency at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za.
5 Address delivered by South African President Thabo Mbeki at the Progressive Governance Regional Conference, Sandton, 28 July 2005.
6 Address by the South African minister of foreign affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, on the occasion of the budget vote of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 15 April 2005.
7 Address by the South African deputy-minister of foreign affairs, Mr Azziz Pahad, entitled Conflicts in 21st century Africa: promoting peace and stability in the region, at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, 31 January 2006.
8 A number of other countries are reported to be investigating the possibility of establishing government-wide reconstruction agencies, including Germany, Australia and France.
9 See DFA 1998.
11 The Mbeki administration has introduced an integrated process for executive decision-making by ‘clustering’ various ministries into cabinet committees. The committee responsible for international security issues is the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) Cluster.
12 Vale and Maseko (1998) underscore this point in the context of South African foreign policy when they argue that ‘the distinguishing feature of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy is how obviously [it] has moved from the ministry of foreign affairs into the president’s office — particularly, it seems, into the hands of [President Thabo] Mbeki’.
13 Sudan’s framework for economic recovery, called the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), was co-developed and sponsored by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, with minimal AU involvement. To date, there is little evidence to suggest that the JAM actually had a positive impact on economic development in Sudan, not least because the framework lacked real support at the local level.
14 The Peacebuilding Commission would be an important platform to leverage international support for African planning processes because it brings together a membership drawn from the three principle organs of the UN (namely the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council), as well as major financial donors, troop-contributing countries, and top international financial institutions.
15 See AU 2006. It is worth noting that the CSIR played a key role in ensuring that S&T issues were incorporated into the final draft of the AU’s official policy on reconstruction.
16 Apart from KBR’s more lucrative and controversial involvement in restoring Iraq’s oil production capacity to pre-war levels, the company has played an important role in rebuilding Iraq, one of the largest and most
complex reconstruction undertakings of the past half century. For example, in 2004 KBR successfully restored, without military force protection, one of Iraq’s biggest power substations in Al Ameen, outside the capital city, Baghdad. The substation ostensibly provides electricity to large parts of Baghdad and to other surrounding regions.

17 There are cases, of course, in which South African companies have become involved in social projects in post-war settings. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, considerable amounts of money have been invested by firms like AngloGold and BHP Billiton, not only in mining operations, but also in supporting local infrastructure.

18 The NEPAD Projects Conference was held at the Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa, on 8 and 9 October 2007. The South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Trade and Industry, together with the NEPAD Business Foundation and NEPAD Secretariat, co-hosted the conference. The aim of the conference was to mobilise the South African business community to help implement flagship NEPAD projects.


References


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