The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and prospects for success

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With the security situation in Darfur remaining grim, the international community passed United Nations Security Resolution 1769 that authorised a more robust peacekeeping force. This article addresses the security concerns motivating the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), highlights the mandate and implications of the force, and compares the potential command and control issues to the experiences of the Somalia intervention in the 1990s. It closes by analysing the prospects for success of the intervention and offering some limited recommendations on ways to mitigate the risks associated with the peacekeeping effort.

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**Introduction**

Since the start of internal conflict in Darfur in 2003, the international community has haggled back and forth over the appropriate collective response to the violence in western Sudan. Of the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, the positions and votes have generally been divided between the United States, United Kingdom and France, which favour harsh action against the government in Khartoum, and China and Russia, which tend to favour the status quo. On a proposed resolution on the use of force on 31 July 2006, China and Russia both abstained but the vote passed. However, because the language of the resolution ‘invited the consent’ of the Sudanese government rather than requiring that the international community intervene on behalf of a state that had shown itself unable to provide security for its citizens, the status quo continued.

Having addressed some of the reservations of China, Russia and Sudan, Resolution 1769 was passed unanimously almost a year later. It proposed a 26 000 person hybrid UN-AU force, one that would be ‘African in character’ and which would take over authority from the AU forces on 31 December 2007. What are the implications of this new resolution? What will be the responsibilities of the new hybrid force? Is it likely to be more effective than the AU force? These are the questions that are addressed in this article.

The chronology of the peacekeeping effort in Darfur from AMIS to AMIS II is traced first, then the limitations of the current peacekeeping effort in Darfur and the reasons that have motivated the creation of a more robust peacekeeping force are discussed. This is followed by an outline of the proposed UN-AU hybrid force, to be known as the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and both the provisions contained within the Resolution and those that are absent are addressed. Next, the peacekeeping intervention in Somalia as a case study of another UN-authorised hybrid force is examined in order to evaluate the potential command and control challenges that can arise from an intervention that is authorised by a multilateral body and executed by a different entity. The article concludes with an analysis of the prospects for UNAMID’s success in fulfilling the provisions of Resolution 1769.

**The Africa Union Mission in Sudan**

The narrative of multinational involvement in Darfur’s internal conflict is a long and troublesome one. It starts with the humanitarian crisis in 2003, the negotiation of ceasefire talks between the Sudan Liberation Movement / Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the recognition within the AU that regional personnel should monitor, verify, investigate and report transgressions of the humanitarian ceasefire agreement of 2004 (Appiah-Mensah 2005).
Initially, the AU and European Union sent nominal personnel to support this effort, but it soon escalated as the AU first authorised 150 Rwandan troops to protect the monitors, followed by 150 Nigerian troops, and then an additional 600 troops, all as part of the AU Mission in Sudan I (AMIS I). The AU then authorised a larger, follow-on force of 3,000 (AMIS II) and later 7,000 to monitor deteriorating security conditions (see AMIS 2007). Adding credibility to the AU efforts, and incentives for the Sudanese government to cooperate, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1564 which would enable it to consider sanctions if the government in Khartoum did not accept the expanded AU peacekeeping force. Algeria, China, Pakistan and the Russian Federation abstained, arguing that the Sudanese government was honouring its commitments to resolve the conflict (UN 2004). The UN followed this by adopting Resolution 1590, which authorised a Chapter VII mission (UNMIS) to support the comprehensive peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the SLM, AMIS, UN personnel, as well as humanitarian assistance efforts in Darfur (UN 2005).

During its deployment to Darfur, the AU force was often the only line of defence between the Janjaweed militia and Darfur civilians, but its efforts to provide effective security were hampered in a variety of ways. The main problem was the extent of resources available to the AU peacekeeping force. AMIS has been consistently underfunded. As of May 2007, many of the AU peacekeepers had been unpaid for months: In the words of AU Chairman Alpha Oumar Konare: ‘Today, we have soldiers who have been waiting three or four months to be paid.’ The result is that the AU has been forced to conduct fewer patrols, which has led to a diminished ability to protect civilians and peacekeepers. In one instance, a Ghanaian peacekeeper was carjacked 300 meters from the mission’s headquarters but nearby Gambian troops did not come to his aid (Lynch 2007:A17). The death of seven AU peacekeepers in the spring of 2007 brought the total number of AMIS fatalities to 17.

Another problem is the relatively low number of peacekeepers in relation to the size of the area. For a region roughly the size of France, a force of between 5,000 and 7,000 soldiers is woefully inadequate for providing meaningful security. The International Crisis Group (ICG) estimated that at least 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers were needed on the ground in Darfur to protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) and villages against attack, provide security for humanitarian operations, and act as a counter-force to the Janjaweed militia (ICG 2005). The relative scarcity of troops for this size limits the ground that the AU can cover on its patrols, leaving Darfurians largely unprotected and vulnerable to attack.

Moreover, shortfalls in funding – US$173 million in 2005 and continued deficits since then – have gone hand in hand with inadequate equipment for logistics, intelligence, communications, mobility and the like (IRIN 2005). AMIS lacked strategic lift capability and has had to rely on Greek C-130s and US C-17s for
airlift as and when they are available. In addition AMIS lacks armoured forces or high mobility infantry units. Fuel needed for operations and maintenance is limited because only seven trucks have been available to bring fuel to Darfur in spite of the increase in peacekeeping troops in the region. Troops lack a data management system, including good intelligence on the Janjaweed as well as an advanced command and control system for distributing information (O’Neill & Cassis 2005). Early warning or advanced information on potential attacks or ambushes is therefore limited, as is any ability to distribute available information to those who may need it for defence of themselves or others.

More specifically, the civilian police function has encountered significant challenges. While the challenges result in part from the militia’s numerical superiority, several additional factors play a role. The first is that the AU has never before employed a police component and therefore lacked any precedent on recruiting criteria, training, operational plans and logistics. Second, the police have limited mobility: they have four vehicles for 250 police, a significant barrier to their effectiveness. Third, the number of countries from which the police come, creates language difficulties that make unity of effort close to impossible. Fourth, the police tend to be inadequately trained. They all received a four day series of briefings on strategic objectives, their responsibilities and safety, but are not versed in the local laws and human rights issues (O’Neill & Cassis 2005).

Though the AU force seeks to run patrols effectively and mediate conflict, their efforts have fallen short when it comes to combating the violence of the region, which continues relatively unabated. Shortfalls in resources have contributed to the AU’s difficulty in stemming the attacks on IDPs, humanitarian personnel (such as the ambush on the UN World Food Programme convoy that was attacked in 2005) and AMIS personnel themselves.1 International interest in assembling a more robust peacekeeping force that might be better equipped and therefore better able to stem the killing has gained momentum as a reaction to the continued violence in Darfur.

**UN resolutions 1706 and 1769**

Noting the AMIS resource deficiencies, the deteriorating security conditions in Darfur, and the threats of some AMIS member states to withdraw participation (Africa Action 2007), the international community began to unite more firmly around the idea of collective intervention in 2006. Prompted by threats to international peace and security, Argentina, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Slovakia, the UK, Tanzania and the US co-sponsored a resolution on a UN peacekeeping force that would send 17,300 military and 3,300 civilian police personnel to Darfur as a Chapter VII mission. The aim of the resolution was to reinforce the AMIS effort and reduce the large-scale violence in...
Darfur (UN 2006). Two main factors doomed it to failure. First, several states – China, Russia and Qatar – abstained, arguing that the 22 000-strong UN force would be a violation of Sudanese sovereignty. The abstention of these states, in particular China which has strong economic ties with Sudan, reduced international pressure on Sudan to comply with the resolution. Second, the resolution used language that allowed Sudan to opt out of compliance, as it stated that it would ‘invite the consent’ of the host government, a consent that President Omar al-Bashir ultimately withheld, likening any UN force to ‘Western colonisation’ (Bloomfield 2006). The move towards intervention therefore failed.

Since the abstentions in August 2006, international response has been aimed at addressing the reservations that China, Russia and Sudan had about the potential peacekeeping response. The outcome was Resolution 1769, which unanimously passed on 31 July 2007 and calls for the creation of an AU-UN hybrid force that will replace the AMIS force with UNAMID. The Resolution authorises a force with the following characteristics and responsibilities:

- UNAMID will be a 26 000 strong joint UN-AU force, with 19 555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, 3 772 international police officers and 29 special police units with 2 660 officers

- UNAMID will take command of the region from AMIS by 31 December 2007

- UNAMID is charged with implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement and protecting personnel and civilians

Further, according to the Resolution, details on the force’s mandate were drawn from the 5 June 2007 meeting between the Secretary-General and the AU Commission (AU 2007) and the resulting report. The following other tasks can be deduced from paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Resolution:

- Help restore security conditions for economic development, provide humanitarian assistance and return IDPs

- Protect civilian populations under imminent threat of violence and prevent attacks against civilians

- Monitor and observe compliance with the Darfur Peace Agreement

- Assist with the political process

- Promote respect for and protection of human rights and the rule of law in Darfur
Monitor and report on the security situation in Chad and the Central African Republic

Monitor, verify and report on efforts to disarm the Janjaweed

Taking into account Khartoum’s concern about Western imperialism, the resolution asserts that the force will be ‘African in character’ and comprised predominantly, if not entirely, of African forces.

The peacekeeping force is tasked with supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, an ambitious agreement that calls for the disarming and demobilisation of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese Government of National Unity; the integration of former combatants into the Sudanese armed forces; upholding of the right of the people of Darfur to elect their leaders and determine their regional status; and the establishment of protective buffer zones around IDP camps (Darfur Peace Agreement 2006). The resolution calls for unity of command and control and for the UN to be responsible for command and control structures. The hybrid force is expected to protect personnel, facilities and installations, and to facilitate the deployment of light and heavy support packages, which include signals and communications units, logistics support, helicopters and tactical military staff (IRIN 2007). Ambitious in its goals, the resolution appears to represent genuine interest in improving human security in Darfur.

Acting on that interest, however, will likely be limited to African states because of the structural provisions within the resolution. Unlike Resolution 1706, which called for an unfettered UN force, 1769 requires that the intervention force as far as possible be sourced from African countries. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Egypt, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda gave early indications of their interest in contributing troops (Sudan Tribune 2007b). In general, however, the AU has had difficulty in finding forces for large operations, such as for example the planned 8 000 soldier Somalia intervention (BBC News 2007). Indeed, the Sudanese government may have banked on African forces being insufficient to constitute a 26 000-strong soldier force, and may have insisted on a primarily African force to ensure the continuation of Sudanese balance of force dominance over the peacekeeping forces (Sudan Tribune 2007a).

Though the contributions will come largely from African countries, the resolution asserts the need for ‘unity of command and control which, in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping, means a single chain of command’, and makes provision for UN ‘command and control structures and backstopping’. In other words, while the commander on the ground is likely to be Nigerian General Martin Luther Agwai, the control structures as well as decision making at strategic level would reside in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is located in New York. The command and control language is written ambiguously and, as will become clear from the discussion below, introduces the possibility of severe coordination problems.
To the extent that the international community has authorised a peacekeeping force, Resolution 1769 may be considered an important step forward towards that end. But as French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner (2007), who helped negotiate the agreement, has conceded, the international community asked for a UN force for Darfur for two and a half years before the UN unanimously approved one. Moreover, the resolution that passed is the product of compromise, and reflects the lowest common denominator along the putative action-status quo spectrum.

In general, Resolution 1769 is far less severe or expansive than that of 1706. The threat of sanctions against Sudan if it does not accept the force has been dropped. The UK and France had proposed that it should refer to ‘further measures’ if the Sudanese government failed to comply with the resolution but these terms were removed, which diminishes incentives for Khartoum to cooperate with the peacekeeping initiative. Nor does the resolution include terms condemning or seeking to punish Khartoum for its non-compliant behaviour, whether in obstructing or harassing humanitarian relief efforts, violating the arms ban or contributing militarily to the violence with its aerial assaults. Such terms were removed to accommodate the protests of Sudan’s UN ambassador, Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohamad, who called it ‘ugly and awful’ (Sudan Tribune 2007c). This further eroded the censuring elements of the resolution and by implication tolerates the Sudanese government’s complicity with the Janjaweed’s actions. The fact that peacekeeping troops will not be allowed to confiscate illegal weapons – excluded from the resolution in order to produce a unanimously passed resolution in the Security Council (Times Online 2007) – may well limit their ability to control the Janjaweed militia.²

Lessons learned in Somalia?

The explicit UN-AU hybrid structure may be unprecedented for UN peacekeeping operations, but there are analogies with other interventions that may serve as a guide for the potential hazards of convoluted command structures. Bosnia’s ‘dual key’ approach in which both NATO and the UN were required to sign off on strategic and tactical level decisions demonstrated some of the difficulties of conducting an intervention by means of two multilateral security organisations.

It is especially the intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s, particularly the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) from March 1999 to March 1995, that offers insight into the difficulties of multinational operations with ambiguous command structures. While the US maintained its own national chain of command, it was nonetheless subsumed under the UN structure. The commander, Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir, was from Turkey, and US army Major-General Thomas M. Montgomery was his deputy. But Montgomery was also the commander of US Forces in Somalia
(USFORSOM) under marine corps General Joseph Hoar, CENTCOM commander. Other command positions were held by officers from Ghana, Guinea, Malaysia, Ireland and Ghana (UNOSOM 2005).

Twenty-nine nations and almost 30 000 soldiers participated in the intervention, making it a difficult exercise to coordinate, much like the proposed hybrid force for intervening in Darfur. Language differences and differences in tactics, techniques, procedures and training all contributed to those coordination challenges. Though not excessively problematic for a standard peacekeeping mission, the differences and their consequences are magnified with the increased operational tempo of the intervention attaching to a peacemaking mission. For example, though the Somalia intervention culminated in dramatic fatalities to the peacekeeping personnel, its early phases were conducted in an atmosphere of relative (if uneasy) calm. During these phases, any problems resulting from language and capability differences within the multinational operation were minimal. After an ambush in June 1993 in which 24 Pakistani troops were killed, however, the security situation deteriorated quickly, making closer coordination imperative but also more challenging. The account of the situation in which the US Army sought to assemble a relief column with Malaysian and Pakistani forces illustrates the additional time required to explain the procedure because of language differences and the challenges in incorporating different equipment into the US infantry elements. The outcome was that a Malaysian armoured personnel carrier went off track and was ambushed by Somali militiamen (Stewart 2002).

The tactical level challenges of multinational coordination were consistent with the difficulties of a complex command and control structure. The UN generally made strategic level decisions about the overall goals of the intervention, as provided for in Resolutions 814 and 837 that expanded the mission in Somalia, urged disarmament, and authorised ‘all necessary means against all those responsible for the armed attacks’. US commanders made operational and tactical decisions about how to achieve these goals. US assets (organised around Task Force Ranger) remained under American command and control and not that of the UNOSOM II commander. Perhaps neat by design, the execution was less so. In an early misstep, Task Force Ranger hit a UN compound, the consequence of a poorly coordinated operation between the US forces and UN personnel. Furthermore, the US commanders and their UN counterparts met for the first time when they arrived in the field, a meeting at which only 30% of the UN personnel had arrived and were present, and US personnel had been convened hastily from army units worldwide (Allard 2002). The haste led to insufficient planning and coordination, and contributed to the disastrous outcomes.

More problematic command and control issues arose when the UN Secretary-General asked President Clinton to task his troops to capture General Muhammed Farah Aideed, leader of the Somalia National Alliance, a shift that changed the nature of the mission
from a peacekeeping to an offensive operation. In addition, a UN force commander issued Fragmentary Order 39, which stated: ‘Organized armed militias, technicals, and other crew served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM Forces and may be engaged without provocation’ (Fowler 1999:14). This guidance, which clearly escalated coalition involvement to include combat operations, differed from the original strategic guidance on the operation. Such strategic level changes prompted accusations that the UN was guilty of ‘mission creep’ on US forces.³ Moreover, the UN approach differed significantly from the preferences of American commanders and civilians, creating disparities between the expectations and priorities in the UN and those of the operational level commanders in which national interests were not heeded by UN officials (New York Times 1993). These divergences ultimately led to the withdrawal of US troops, the largest contingent, and the fracturing of UNOSOM II.

Even if UNAMID’s coordination of multinational and multilateral deployments can be arranged so as to avoid those that plagued UNOSOM II, the issue of how an intervening force will be received remains an issue. The Janjaweed’s adversarial treatment of the AU force in Darfur is a harbinger of the unwelcome treatment that a hybrid force is likely to receive. In this regard the experience of Somalia is also reason for concern. The Somali militia’s disrespect for the UN peacekeeping mission was evident throughout the course of the intervention. On 5 June 1993 the Somalia National Alliance ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers working as part of UNOSOM II. The UN Security Council reacted by adopting Resolution 837, which established a more aggressive military stance and requested more troops and equipment from member states. However, the intervention continued to deteriorate and reached an all-time low during an ambush on 3 and 4 October 1993 in which 18 Americans and two Malaysians were killed and 60 members of the coalition forces were wounded (Stewart 2002).

In sum, experiences of UNOSOM II show that a multinational operation with a complex command structure – one that is created to satisfy member states, or, in the case of Darfur, the host nation – introduces several potential operational challenges. One key issue is coordination within the coalition, which involves several different countries that are likely to speak different languages and have different training and capabilities. A second challenge is the command and control issue associated with a structure in which the UN headquarters drive strategic decisions, but national command determines operational and tactical decisions. This carries the seeds for disunity of command and effort that could undermine the overall objectives. This is particularly problematic when the intervention is open-ended, as was the case with the Somalia intervention, and is likely to be the case with the Darfur intervention. Such open-endedness creates the possibility of mission creep in which the objectives or nature of the operation shift midway through the operation. The third issue is that the intervening force may not be welcomed by the host nation, whether by the government itself or militia groups within the country. This increases the likelihood that peacekeeping forces will be overwhelmed
or ambushed or that the nature of the mission will become more offensive than was originally intended.

**Prospects for UNAMID success**

While past is not necessarily prologue, the record of peacekeeping missions similar to that proposed under Resolution 1769 is not promising. The Somalia intervention, though it did stem the starvation and was reported to have saved at least 100 000 Somali lives (Clarke & Herbst 1996), suffered critical command and control failures that made the operation’s outcome doubtful. The Bosnia intervention in which in one instance Serbs massacred Bosnian Muslims as 400 armed Dutch peacekeepers stood by, is another dubious experience of peacekeeping. The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been tainted by internal scandals about drug trafficking and sexual exploitation (Human Rights Watch 2007), so is not a model of success either. Can the intervention in Darfur improve on this dubious record of achievement, and if so, how could this be achieved?

That the international community has come together and passed a peacekeeping resolution is encouraging. The force level is also heartening: While there is some debate over the appropriate military force level for an area of responsibility, it is clear that the 7 000-person AU force was inadequate to patrol an area the size of France. A force of 26 000 is a good start, assuming that the AU and international community can recruit, train, equip and deploy this number of troops. An additional positive sign is that, with the passing of Resolution 1769, the international community appears committed to funding the intervention at adequate levels, which should take care of the pay and equipment issues that undermined the effectiveness of AMIS.

Despite these encouraging steps, previous interventions and the nature of humanitarian intervention in general offer several points to make success more likely. First, the command and control experiences in Somalia suggest that establishing clear structures is paramount to successful execution of any peacekeeping mission. Just as Somalia was the first intervention in which US forces had been committed to a UN-led peace operation (which contributed to the haphazard and confusing way that UNOSOM II was brought about and executed (Allard 2002)) the command structure of UNAMID is relatively novel and likely to present similar potential for command and control confusion. With the bulk of the force being drawn from the AU, the UN element being primarily from Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and the operation under Nigerian command, the potential for coordination challenges and confusion about the chain of command is high (Couglin 2007). Rather than allow the command structures to remain ambiguous, the UN and AU should coordinate them in advance, and ideally so that direction comes from commanders in the field rather than observers from afar.
One prominent critic of the enduring nature of the Darfur conflict has charged that Resolution 1769 has a ‘dilatory time-frame’ for the deployment, as it is not expected to be in place until the end of 2007 or some time in 2008 (Reeves 2007). The examples of hasty, ad hoc procedures in Somalia and other parts of the world illustrate that the consequences can be catastrophic in themselves. Therefore, if the time is used to resolve the issues, particularly with regard to command and control, this would be expeditious enough. Indeed, it would be wise to defer deployment until these command structures, organisation and objectives have been clarified.

On a more positive note, some of the deficiencies AMIS has suffered from were the result of insufficient resources and may not be repeated if UNAMID receives adequate funding. Soldiers must be paid, equipment acquired and maintained and patrols undertaken for an intervention to be successful, and all these require funding. Other deficiencies could result from inadequate recruiting procedures and insufficient training and education, particularly among the police force. In the case of AMIS such deficiencies were largely because it was the AU’s second ever peacekeeping mission. Similar problems could be addressed through learning the lessons from this previous mission.

While the hybrid nature of the force does introduce complications, it also has the advantage of involving the UN, which has conducted numerous such interventions and does have the skills, experience and assets to help obviate some of the challenges facing the intervention. In fact, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU states, ‘where necessary, recourse will be made to the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa’. Whether the AU will accept such assistance, with anecdotal evidence pointing to the contrary (O’Neill & Cassis 2005:32), remains to be seen. It is essential that AU forces and leadership be willing to take advantage of UN lessons learned and apply some of these to its own policing and peacekeeping efforts.

AMIS faced a trained, cohesive, well-equipped, well-supported and motivated killing force that operated in a large and dispersed area in which the attacks were diffuse rather than concentrated, and in conditions in which it was difficult to move troops and supplies quickly (Bernath & Gompert 2003:19, cited by O’Neill & Cassis 2005:17). Some of these issues, including the distribution of fighting across a large area, should be addressed by the larger force. However, the adversary and terrain will have not changed appreciably and will in all likelihood provide a huge challenge even for a larger peacekeeping force.

Moreover, it is not yet clear that the new force will have the capabilities that two key military experts have argued are needed for protecting at risk civilians, namely an adequate warning system for imminent attacks; comprehensive and timely intelligence; an ability to distinguish between combatants and allies; an ability to command and control
distributed forces (network ability); small and agile forces; and quick reinforcement capabilities (O’Neill & Cassis 2005:22). Few peacekeeping forces can meet these requirements. The NATO reaction force is potentially mobile enough to act in a rapid and sustainable manner, but is not permitted to operate in Darfur because Resolution 1769 proscribes a predominantly Western force. Even the UN would have difficulty in meeting the requirements for mobility, and an AU force will certainly be deficient in these areas and thus have a limited ability to protect civilians unless reinforced by organisations or states that do have these capabilities.

Lastly, the peacekeeping effort should not take place independent of political negotiations. Resolution 1769 urges the Sudanese government and rebel groups to negotiate a permanent political settlement. Though there is little additional weight in the Resolution to enforce such a settlement, it is important to bear in mind that the purpose of peacekeeping is to facilitate this political process and the implementation of the peace agreement. Peacekeeping cannot replace the political and diplomatic processes needed to reach agreement and reconciliation in the longer term. Therefore the international community should continue to exert diplomatic and economic pressure on Khartoum and contribute to the conditions that might lead to peace in that region of Africa. In the words of a US army document, ‘the best soldiers in the world can only lay the foundation for peace; they cannot create peace itself’ (Stewart 2002:26).

Conclusions

Though AMIS serves as an important interim measure while the international community negotiates a more robust and better equipped peacekeeping operation, the lack of resources, training and coordination meant that AMIS has continued to be overwhelmed by a well-supported and motivated adversary. Resolution 1769, which authorises a large multinational peacekeeping force, is therefore a necessary next step in the protection of Darfur. That said, the multidimensional mission – with its mandate to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian access, return refugees and IDPs, and facilitate the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement – will be a highly ambitious undertaking. It may also be fraught with operational challenges if command and control issues are not addressed prior to deployment.

The command and control challenge includes working out the dual reporting line from the operational level (the field mission) to the strategic level, whether in New York or Addis Ababa, in a way that will minimise confusion (Malan 2007). To this end the lessons learnt from Somalia may be a guide as to what to avoid and what should be addressed. Added to this are the lessons to be learnt from AMIS and the outcomes associated with an inadequately funded and under-resourced peacekeeping operation. While the UNAMID force is to be predominantly African in character, the consequences
of inadequate resources and insufficient compliance in Khartoum are the responsibility of the international community writ large. Unless these actors play their part, a well-intentioned operation may nonetheless fall well short of its goals.

Notes

1 For a 2006 account of the security situation in Darfur, see the report from the Peace and Security Council’s 45th meeting (AU 2006).
2 Excluding this last provision is not extraordinary and indeed is analogous to the limitations of the UN force responsible for peacekeeping in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
3 For a good analysis of the challenges between strategic level guidance and operational and tactical planning and execution, see Beech (1996).
4 For a discussion on appropriate levels for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, see O’Hanlon and Singer (2004:77–100).
5 See the description of the NATO reaction force’s capabilities in NATO briefing (2004).

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