

VIEWS AND ANALYSES FROM THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

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# The rise of the FIFA man

Several years ago Samuel Huntington coined the somewhat disdainful notion of the 'Davos man' as a reflection on internationalists who no longer had national roots. The Davos men – for there are very few women in this club – are rich and powerful, with no national ties and often no loyalty other than the pursuit of profit and power.

Perhaps it is now time to talk about the FIFA man.

In 2008 I wrote how corporate economic influence is often more powerful than politics. This trend, I predicted, will accelerate, at least in the West, where the balance of power is shifting away from governments.

Following the recent global recession in large parts of the world and the accelerated shift of power and economic weight from West to East, some disagreed.

Critics argue that the rise of the 'Chinese model' of state-led economic liberalisation, whilst holding democratisation in abeyance, presented an alternative road. They believe this also applies in Africa, where more than one government has been overthrown at the behest of corporate interests.

This, I believe, takes a short-term view of the path of global development.

In his powerful 2008 account *The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World* (Penguin Press), Harvard professor Niall Ferguson details the rise of money, credit and banking and the associated global decline of ideology, indeed of politics, as citizens of countries such as the United States become consumers. These citizens are increasingly focused on their iPhones and instant gratification, while government policy is based on opinion surveys, reflecting short-term political

pandering to local fads and voter gratification.

In fact no country demonstrates this trend better than China – an avowedly Communist country more nakedly capitalist in its pursuit of a better life for its subjects than any in the West.

In his revealing book on super elites, *Superclass – The Global Power Elite and the World they are Making* (London: Little, Brown, 2008), David Rothkopf presents a fine account of the increased influence of the elite without any real national loyalty. This is Huntington's 'Davos man'.

One of the unintended consequences of globalisation has been the rise of transnational corporations and financial institutions that are more powerful and richer than many countries. They have empowered international elites that share common values and interests and often set the global agenda.

Enter the FIFA man.

FIFA, an organisation more powerful than some governments, is the demonstration of how commercial interests are able to trump national law. More blatantly than any of the traditional 'evil' multinational corporations, generally represented by 'big oil' such as BP or Shell, or arms manufacturers such as BAE Systems (now the world's number one arms producer), FIFA is able to instruct governments to build and invest in infrastructure worth billions of dollars, literally irrespective of local development needs.

In the run-up to the Soccer World Cup in South Africa, FIFA president Sepp Blatter and his team strong-armed the South African government into spending, among other things, US\$1,1 billion (R8,4 billion) on building

five new soccer stadia and upgrading another five. This tab is to be picked up by the South African taxpayer as the blowing of vuvuzelas hides the ringing of the FIFA cash register. FIFA's 2010 South African Soccer World Cup will be the most lucrative yet for the Association.

The extent to which globalisation is driving development is evident when one considers that, according to South Africa's Standard Bank, the global gross domestic product (GDP), in nominal terms, almost doubled from US\$32,1 trillion in 2000 to US\$61,2 trillion in 2008. Simultaneously, world trade, also in nominal terms, has increased from US\$13,1 trillion to US\$32,1 trillion over the same period – an increase of 245 percent. Clearly, trade growth has outstripped GDP growth by a substantial margin. Meanwhile, global exports have tripled.

So what do we make of this? Quite simply, it is business, jobs, trade and money that drive the world, and this is also evident in Africa. China (now Africa's number-one trading partner), together with India, Brazil and others such as Turkey, presents us with tremendous opportunities to trade and govern our way out of the deep hole that post-liberation politics have dug us into.

In this process, international assistance will play an important part, for the market is no answer if we are to defeat malaria, or provide the necessary infrastructure to enable African trade. Hence the need for development assistance to support success and trade, and for Africans to pursue strong institutions and not strong leaders.

By Jakkie Cilliers

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# Our contributors



Sandra Adong Oder is a senior researcher with the ISS Peace Missions Programme. She argues that the Ugandan parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for early next year are unlikely to provide that country with any real test of its democracy, since the shortcomings that beleaguered the last two elections (in 2001 and 2006) arguably still pervade the Ugandan polity.



William Gumede is author of the influential biography *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC*. He posits that the failures of many independence and liberation movements-turned governments has been their inability to transform themselves effectively from resistant movements into governing parties.



Dr Paul-Simon Handy is head of the African Conflict Prevention Programme at the ISS. He makes a case for club governance (an African G8), where a small number of powerful African countries club together to drive the continent's development agenda and provide it with an original problem-solving tool.



S'busiso Mseleku is Sports Editor with City Press newspaper in South Africa. He reviews the poor performance of the African teams at the first Africa-hosted 2010 FIFA World Cup that ended in South Africa recently. He also looks at the salient economic aspects of the World Cup and the hosting management skills that Africa gained.

Correction: In the previous edition of The African.org, in our interview with the writer Michela Wrong, we accidentally misspelled the name of the Kenyan town Kisumu. Our sincere apologies for this error.



*Provision of clean and safe drinking water remains a challenge in Africa*

## 2010 World Water Week

More than 2 000 participants and 200 collaborating organisations are expected to convene in the Swedish capital, Stockholm, for World Water Week from (5-11 September), which will be hosted by the Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI). The conference promotes the exchange of views and experiences between the scientific, business, policy and civil society communities.

The theme for 2010 will be 'The Water Quality Challenge – Prevention, Wise Use and Abatement'. It will be the second year under the niche 'Water: Responding to Global Changes'. Since its inception in 1991, the World Water Week's symposia have placed continued multi-layered focus on specific water-related problems.

Many African countries have participated in past symposia, due to the many water challenges they face. While dealing with a fast-growing

urban population, the continent's rural areas are still constrained by some of the world's lowest levels of access to water and sanitation. Vulnerable to climate change and with large disparities in water availability, the continent is prone to both droughts and floods. Africa has over 80 major trans-boundary lakes and rivers, and the need to manage water across borders is an aspect that adds even more complexity to the equation. To meet these challenges, there are many promising examples in Africa to learn from, and World Water Week will focus on

a number of these through workshops, seminars and side events

## Tanzania goes to the polls

Tanzania is to hold both presidential and parliamentary elections on 31 October 2010. An estimated 17 million eligible voters are expected to select their representatives from array of 18 registered political parties, the main among them being the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the Civic United Front (CUF), the recently added Chama Cha Jamil (CCJ), and the National Coalition for Democratic Movement (NCDM). However, the long-ruling CCM currently holds 80% of the parliamentary seats while the official opposition, the CUF, has 11%.

President Jakaya Kikwete has remained unchallenged for CCM candidature and is expected to win the presidential race. The persistent thorn in the side of the CCM has always been the isles of Zanzibar and Pemba, which

were incorporated into the mainland in 1977. Apparently, in a move aimed at averting a repeat of the 2005 post-poll violence, the CCM has signed a power-sharing agreement with the Isles' main opposition party, the CPU, last November. This was regularised through a referendum at the end of July.

Two other outstanding issues that might taint the Tanzanian poll are related to campaign finance and independent candidates. The controversial campaign finance law seeks to restrict or control the funding of political parties, which the opposition view as disadvantageous. The CCM is also vehemently opposed to independent candidates, contrary to constitutional guarantees.

## Comoros schedules new elections

Political leaders of the Comoros, with help from the African Union, have agreed to a timetable for new elections. Gubernatorial races for the semi-autonomous islands of Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli, as well as presidential primaries, are now scheduled for 7 November, with a second round due to take place on 26 December. The African Union hopes the agreement will ease political tensions in the Union of Comoros. The constitution mandates that the presidency rotate among the three islands, but the current President, Mohamed Abdallah Sambi, has remained in position past the expiration of his term. Sambi's opponents have accused the president of clinging to power, while he maintains the country has lacked the financial resources to administer new polls. Also according to the agreement, each island will send a representative to the government, with Sambi remaining president until the next elections. Comoros has experienced at least 20 coup attempts since 1975. ☐

# Newswatch

## Guinea Bissau attracts punitive action

The abduction of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior and former army Chief of Staff General Jose Zamora Induta on 1 April came as a shock to many observers. This event could not be taken lightly, as it occurred in Guinea Bissau, just emerging from political turmoil. Gomes and Induta were arrested during a short army mutiny led by the deputy army Chief of Staff, Antonio Indjai, who disapproved of their reformist stance and the sidelining by the government of former navy chief Bubo Na Tchuto. The latter was accused of plotting a coup in 2008 but had recently returned to the country and been cleared by a military tribunal.

Following the 1 April mutiny, Indjai released Gomes Junior but kept Induta in custody. While regional and international pressure is mounting for his release, another development took everyone by surprise: President Malam Baca Sahna appointed Indjai as the new Chief of Staff.

Although President Sanha's nomination of Indjai could be based on strategic considerations such as gaining control over the army, his analysis of the situation failed to anticipate the reaction of the donor community. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Sanha has the necessary leverage to rein in the army. For if he was able to allow Indjai to take over from Zamora as the new Chief of Staff without due process, there are fears that Indjai's next move could be to depose the President.

Guinea's benefactors, the United States and the European Union, have reacted swiftly to these developments. The US halted its military cooperation with the Guinea Bissau army on the grounds that Sanha's actions weaken civilian control over the armed forces and violate the rule of law and democratic principles. The US has further threatened to withdraw from the post-conflict reconstruction process, while the EU has threatened to cancel its €102.8 million development aid.

## Former SA police chief convicted

Former commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and Interpol head Jackie Selebi was convicted on one count of corruption by Judge Meyer Joffe in early July.

Selebi now faces the prospect of spending 15 years in prison, as the crime of corruption carries a minimum sentence in South Africa. In his judgment, Judge Joffe rejected Selebi's defence of a conspiracy against him by the now-disbanded special investigations unit, the Scorpions, and accepted the state's argument that Selebi was corrupted by convicted drug-trafficker Glenn Agliotti. In return for slightly over US\$170,000 and clothes for him and his family, Selebi showed Agliotti top-secret reports and attended meetings with underworld characters whenever Agliotti wanted him to.

Joffe slammed Selebi in his judgment, encouraging other police officers not to "emulate" his behaviour. "Every day society in general rely on the honesty and truthfulness of policemen and women ... It is not an example that must be emulated by members of the SAPS. A great deal of trust is placed on their integrity and credibility," he said.


(See Behind the Scenes on page 64)

## EAC common market now in operation

After years of negotiations and false starts, the East African Community (EAC) appears to have finally merged its five member-nations into one market, with effect from 1 July 2010. Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda have officially opened up a single market following the signing of the common market protocols last November. The initiative will culminate in a political federation in 2015.

The Customs Union and the Common Market Protocols promise free movement of people, goods, services and capital in and between the five countries. The enlarged trading bloc will offer investors a larger market, and in the long term will aim to build a monetary union.

Such a move is expected to boost intra-regional trade and enhance the accessibility to a larger trading bloc currently hindered by fragmented markets in the five countries. While the regional bloc has a relatively small combined GDP of US \$73.3 billion, with a total population of 127 million, trade among the EAC states has jumped to 49% since 2005, according to the EAC Secretariat.

The benefits of such a move will undoubtedly mainly benefit Kenya, which has the region's strongest manufacturing, retailing and banking industry, but the smaller economies will also benefit. 

### Urgent need to exorcise the 'resource curse'

Your last two editions (April/May and June/July 2010) carried articles on the use or rather abuse of African resources by the national elite. The articles: 'Save for the future' and 'Uganda may face an oil curse' were highly informative. I just hope the Ugandans heed your advice and reverse the resource curse – if it is not too late already.

One would have expected Ghana and Uganda, as late entrants to the 'black gold' league to have been able to avoid the oil curse pitfall. Most of the sub-Saharan states that are blessed with the most sought-after commodity have little to show for it, as the authors rightly pointed out. At least, the north African oil producers such as Libya and Algeria have ploughed back the proceeds into the development of their countries and people. The same, however, cannot be said of the sub-Saharan governments, where the national elites are the sole beneficiaries.

In the case of Ghana, the initial discovery was followed by welcome and heart-warming talk of following the practical, equitable and environmentally friendly Norwegian model of managing oil resource. Many of us thought 'now here is one African country that will wisely and prudently use its new-found resource.'

It was therefore with shock "to hear that Ghana has already borrowed against two-thirds of the value of its oil money," as your writer noted. This is beyond shocking. The new east African oil arrival, Uganda, is poised to outdo the Ghanaian record. The sum-total of the Ugandan deal is seemingly a bundle of environmental disasters that place profiteering by investing firms beyond everything else. Your article further noted they are also splashing on luxuries. Curiously, the Ugandans were initially also said to be following

the Norwegian model, which they appear to have since abandoned.

Instead the two new oil entrants have, by all intents and purposes, adopted lock, stock-and-barrel the time tested model of looting the national resources as perfected by sub-Sahara's major petroleum producers of Nigeria and Angola. Like Angola, Uganda is said to be clandestinely negotiating oil deals behind closed doors. Like Angola, Ugandan president is riding on the wave of petro-dollars en-route to life-presidency.

What a ruse! Sometimes I want to believe those who believe in this 'curse of resources' thing. On the other hand, I want to believe that it can be exorcised, firstly by African leaders putting the interest of their people first. The other way, is to re-open criminal charges against them after they have left power. Even death should not stop such cases of corrupt excesses being revisited. Our leaders lack positive pride and conscience. Sometimes, I wonder how does it feels like for them to rule over impoverished masses while they (national elites) live in opulence. Until our African leaders start respecting the very people who 'elect' them to power, this curse will be with us for a long time.

*Karabo Modise  
Gaborone, Botswana*

*(Also see Opinion on page 39)*

### Tanzanians still besieged by pan-Africanist contradictions

I would like to comment in passing on the contradiction the late Julius Nyerere was facing as a Pan-Africanist (The-African.org Issue 7.June/July 2010) – 'Nyerere and the road to African Unity'. That contraction is still affecting the Tanzanians today who find themselves uncomfortable in welcoming the

new East African Community (EAC). It will take the Tanzanians longer to accommodate the idea of one East Africa, as compared to the other partners, the Kenyans and Ugandans, due to this historical contradiction. Thanks once more for the informative magazine.

*Darlington Akabwai  
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### Two kinds of justice

Your insightful article, 'Very expensive milk and cookies' (Issue 7) just serves to confirm my long-held conviction that the so-called modern criminal justice system is only meant to deal with the poor. It is there to protect the influential power brokers and the wealthy, some of whom could have gotten their wealth through illegal means. I couldn't agree more with the writer that the courts are so vindictive against the poor. The poor chap you reported about had just helped himself to basic necessities – milk and biscuits (all worth a mere \$7).

Evidently, it is a crime to be poor in Africa. Otherwise how does one make sense of being incarcerated for four months for stealing milk and biscuits.

For such absurdities to be avoided, in addition to decongesting the courts from petty crimes, is it not time for African countries that don't have customary courts system in place to reconsider them?

*Mwesa Kasongo  
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# Rwanda is no Singapore

*MTN is the biggest investor in Rwanda*

As Rwanda goes to the polls with President Paul Kagame the undisputed favourite, **Greg Mills** says the way Rwanda's elite run the country is detrimental to real economic success.

In August 2009, on a three-nation Africa safari, World Bank president Robert Zoellick was, in the words of his communications officer, "finding hope".

A six-day trip that took him to Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda was "an opportunity to see first-hand the impact of the financial crisis on Africa, assess progress on post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction, and explore ways to stimulate donor support and help the continent weather the crisis ... assess the region's infrastructure needs, spotlight the importance of regional integration, and better understand opportunities for enhancing agricultural productivity and food security." He must have been a busy man. In Rwanda he took a "short" boat ride on Lake Kivu "to a floating plant that produces 2.5MW of electricity from methane gas drawn up from the

lake". Impressed with the pace and path of reforms in Rwanda, Zoellick noted: "On issue after issue, this is a country on the move and it is a country that brings great momentum; it recognises the need to develop regional integration, and has a president and a team that has garnered respect."

Certainly Rwanda has a tremendously positive image among many in the donor community. Outwardly, the country appears to work. Kigali is clean, apparently making best use of scant resources. The government is accessible to all visitors; from the many evangelical (usually American Christian) groups to the ubiquitous international NGOs and donors. President Paul Kagame's patter is polished and presentable. He knows how to comfort visitors, realising the diplomatic value in doing so.

Kagame's Rwanda has much to admire. He is a leader who has brought his country back from beyond the brink after the genocide, one who has realised that aid alone will not save his country and, indeed, that donor support has many perverse disincentivising aspects to it. He has not submitted to the institutionalised ineffectiveness of the United Nations and the pervasive insecurity in the Congo; rather, he has found his own means to deal with matters. He has proven both arch-pragmatist and idealist in building a post-genocide society.

But just underneath the diplomatic skin, Rwanda is in many respects no model reformer at all. Things look like they should work, but for some reason they don't. And it is not just because of a lack of physical infrastructure and human capacity; it's because the Rwandan ruling

elite (because let's face it, Rwanda is no democracy) led by Kagame is happy to run things its own way.

Ambitious Rwandans have liked to see their state as an analogue to Singapore. Small, with few national resources, confronted by internal ethnic division and external security problems, and with an overbearing colonial past. The differences between the two countries are viewed as a matter of years of development, not of circumstances or leadership. Kagame's role has been compared to that of Singapore's founding patriarch, Lee Kuan Yew. While Lee had a vision for a post-colonial society and set out single-mindedly to achieve it, Kagame apparently has a vision for a post-ethnic Rwanda. And his intelligence is similarly much admired among his colleagues, verging at times on a personality cult.

Rwanda's policymakers have viewed Lee and Singapore as a prototype to emulate. They have studied Singapore (among other countries) and recruited Singaporeans to assist in Rwanda. But in so doing, too often they have cherry-picked the lessons, taking the juicy segments and avoiding the less digestible bits. Rwanda is open to learning from others, but there has been a tendency to replicate structure and process over people, skills and mindset. This is the Powerpoint mentality: if you have the right presentation and diagrams, the rest will follow.

For one, Kagame has not tolerated dissent, even from among his closest military colleagues, who brought him to power in 1994. Yet Lee's memoirs are testament to how the Prime Minister regarded the opinion of his colleagues, and how often there were fierce arguments within the government on key issues. Singapore made sure that the best and brightest were attracted, that they were properly paid, and that they were given full

support by leadership to do their job. With delegated power and authority, of course, came responsibility.

There are also profoundly different ways of running the economy. After 1994 Rwanda's economic strategy has been underpinned by Tristar Investments, a business corporation

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**“... just underneath the diplomatic skin, Rwanda is in many respects no model reformer at all.”**

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founded that year by the Rwanda Patriotic Front to fund the party. In some ways its evolution and expansion over the next ten years have been akin to Singapore's Government Investment Corporation and the state-linked Temasek Holdings. By the end of the 2000s, Tristar's activities extended into every sector of business: from private schooling to bricklaying, construction to airlines, helicopters to cargo aircraft, coffee shops to video outlets, hotels to telecommunications. In 2009, Tristar accounted for 35% of the investment of the cellular giant MTN, the largest company in Rwanda (it had been 50% until 2007). However, the spectacular rise of Tristar raises questions about why Rwanda needs an entity whose initial rationale was to fund a guerrilla struggle, especially one that was managed in an increasingly opaque manner. It seems that the (winning) ethos of the guerrilla army has persisted, if not grown, during peacetime.

Kagame's record of political stability and reform since 1994 has been recognised by the country's rise up the World Bank's 'Doing Business' indicators, gaining the 'top reformer'

slot in 2009. But the cold benchmarks and warm image have not matched the reality of doing business on the ground in Kigali, Kivu, Ruhengeri and elsewhere. Coupled with a growing controversy about how the leadership spends its income (for example over the regime's purchase of presidential corporate jets), this threatens to blow the very aspect of clean government that has set Kagame apart from other African leadership and attracted donors.

The Rwandan government has spent much time trying to attract new investors, but comparatively very little time in looking after existing ones. This is puzzling, given that the way in which investors are treated will inevitably flow back to others. After all, they talk just as much, if not more, than political leaders. The Singaporean model was predicated on government investment in areas where foreign investors preferred not to go, but with these projects nevertheless run along commercial lines. The government withdrew as quickly as foreign partners could be found so it could recycle its finances into new areas. On the other hand, in Rwanda the model has been the inverse: Foreign investors have been encouraged in to take over moribund businesses and then, over time, squeezed out by government actions, apparently to insert Rwandan interests in their place.

Much of this is seemingly predicated on the Rwandan government's sense of mission and purpose – it knows what is right for its economy, and wants to be in the pilot's seat. This self-belief and desire for control may explain why Kagame has been willing to tweak the tail of the donors, letting them know who is in charge, despite his reliance on their funds for most of his government's budget. As he argued in the Financial Times in May 2009, 'Unfortunately, it seems that many still believe they can solve the problems

of the poor with sentimentality and promises of massive infusions of aid.' Notwithstanding the need for domestic leadership on development issues, this loses sight of how others have used aid to their advantage and, particularly, how foreign investors were viewed. Singapore has sought the need to attract foreign investors not only for capital but also for technology, modern management systems and, above all, the value of the perception of the city-state in the global marketplace of foreign investors. It has also sought aid for strategic purposes, and never to use against the donors.

The bottom line: Kagame and his Rwanda Patriotic Front will ultimately be measured by their ability to deliver economic growth to their people. So far it has been delivered at too slow a pace, storing up major social and political upheaval. At Rwanda's 2008 population growth rate (2.8% annually) versus the annual economic growth rate (6%), the country will find it impossible to provide for the youth bulge that will appear on the employment market (and likely in Kigali, given the lack of land and the pressure already on it) around 2017, at the time that Kagame will (if he wins the August 2010 election as is expected) supposedly leave office. At this rate of increase, the population would double every 25 years, reaching more than 20 million by 2020. The country is already the most populated in Africa, with 230 people per km<sup>2</sup>, compared to the African average of 30 per km<sup>2</sup> (and the global average – excluding Antarctica – of 50 per km<sup>2</sup>). The relative lack of delivery means that inter-ethnic tensions continue to boil beneath the surface; one group fearing it could happen again, the other waiting for their chance and refusing to be ruled by the minority.

The apparent delay in getting things done is not just about capacity. This was, after all, a country, in the view

of one seasoned observer, that had a "whoop-ass military" able to maintain a "tempo of operations second to no army." Kagame has explained this in terms of his role, that he nurtured the military (specifically the RPF) from the ground up, which is why it was so efficient. But politics, he says, is a matter of compromise, where he is forced daily to sit with people with blood on their hands from the genocide. He has a point, but things do (and don't) happen for a reason.

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**"They have studied Singapore (among other countries) and recruited Singaporeans to assist in Rwanda. But in so doing, too often they have cherry-picked the lessons, taking the juicy segments and avoiding the less digestible bits."**

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Change is also about political will – and about the role of influential, vested interests in the growth and liberalisation agenda.

The answer to why things do or don't happen in Rwanda is no different from most countries. It partly lies in the fixation on doing things the Rwandan way – understandable and indeed necessary for local ownership – which invariably leads to a lot of frustrating reinventing-the-wheel and related delays. It partly also resides in the fixation on maintaining control. This is also entirely understandable in the aftermath of the genocide, but it

crowds out the private sector. A failure to take action has also partly been a result of an unwillingness (and fear) to take responsibility and live with the consequences. African governments hope that they will mimic success without becoming embedded in the deeper, complex side of it – in the difficult choices that this involves, and the democratic management of the political costs and advantages.

The government in Kigali, like others across the continent, knows the 'donor patter' very well and is good at delivering it to those audiences – hence Bob Zoellick's conversion mentioned above. But it is not as good at doing development, in spite of Mr Kagame's belief that only economic growth can deliver reconciliation and long-term stability.

Development matters in Rwanda are highly politicised (in the small sense of the word), keeping things in the party's ambit, rather than true checks and balances on government. Crucially, few who understood the private sector have the ear of the President. And security concerns, not growth, ultimately rule decisions. In essence, Kagame personifies the Rwanda dilemma: he realises that development will come through liberalisation and openness; yet his security instincts mean that he keeps a tight control on the economy as local and even, in the east of the Congo, regional politics. So ultimately Rwanda has neither the growth it needs nor the stability it craves. ■

*Dr Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation. He served as Strategy Adviser to the President of Rwanda in 2008. This article is based in part on his forthcoming book, *Why Africa is Poor – and What Africans Can Do About It* (Penguin), to be launched in August 2010.*

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

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# Governing on a pressure cooker



Love him or hate him, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has tripled the country's GDP and instilled peace following the genocide.

**Annie Chikwanha** asks whether a 'minority ethnic autocracy' is sustainable in the long run.

President Paul Kagame has recently been accused of turning his back on the NGOs that have contributed to his development efforts. His curt response to this accusation was telling:

"Non-governmental organisations are welcome in Rwanda as long as they serve the interest of their members, and our country is no exception in understanding NGOs in this fashion. What we have difficulty with are self-serving NGOs – some of them with hardly any members to serve but narrow interests."

This statement reveals his intimate knowledge of the role of NGOs in the democratisation and development processes on the continent. He understands the value they add at community level, but like many other African leaders he is also aware of their use by political power contenders. In his country, memories are still fresh of how such institutions can be manipulated into serving interests, with deadly consequences. And he doesn't seem ready to tolerate NGOs battling with government over human rights issues.

However, by sidelining its NGOs, Rwanda is violating its constitution's Article 24 on tolerance and justice, as well as going against its commitment outlined in Preamble 6; namely 'to build a State governed by the rule of law, based on respect for fundamental human rights, pluralistic democracy, equitable power sharing, tolerance and resolution of issues through dialogue.' He thus puts a lid with a faulty valve onto a simmering pressure cooker.

These criticisms are partly concerned with his style of governance in a country that has been described as a 'minority ethnic autocracy', where the reconciliation efforts so far seem to form a socio-economic dictatorship that is benefiting one ethnic group. Scholars in the region argue that true reconciliation hinges on people having equal access to money, social benefits, jobs, property rights, equality in front of the courts, and educational opportunities, and that Hutus are denied these opportunities. Many also point out that Hutus have been largely excluded from important positions of power in the government.

Political control is exercised in many ways. Some use state agencies to inflict horror and fear on 'wayward' citizens – wayward simply because they may choose to support the

other. Some deny those citizens resources and opportunities altogether, and some just use threatening language to exclude them. Some keep memories of past horrors alive to instil fear and rein everyone in.

President Kagame may have chosen to sideline NGOs in his onward march to prosperity and peace, but what does he stand to lose? In fact, what do all leaders lose out on when they shun civil society, of which the NGO sector is a large component? A lot of expertise with regard to governance, indigenous knowledge and conflict mediation capacity resides in this sector, where information flows freely and exchanging ideas is the norm.

Sustainable development and the continued consolidation of democracy require some understanding of the environment and its interconnectedness to other processes that ultimately enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of government programmes. Likewise raising awareness of government policies is something that NGOs can do better – critically, maybe, but still better, and their reach is broader. Just as NGOs lobby governments, governments can also use them to mobilise support for their policies, and this removes the need for excessive regulation and, in many cases, unnecessary surveillance.

Acknowledgment and cooperation with NGOs encourages initiative, innovation, entrepreneurship, rapid technology transfer, and adaptability to the development process at the local level. This is a win-win situation, which all of Africa is yet to grasp. Under normal circumstances, NGOs are essential for the development of alliances that bring together government, commerce and civil society with a shared purpose of building a strong and successful nation, but then these are not yet normal times for Rwanda in many ways.


The issues confronting Rwanda are many, so what comes first: democracy or development? The question plagues the country and many other African countries. The balancing act is not easy for the wire is

very thin. There certainly hasn't been one path to development; though we cannot condone the all-powerful hand of President Kagame, he forces us to ask important questions.

Kagame's advantages lie in his astuteness and his use of

cost-benefit analysis methods to make decisions. He has aptly rewarded the British for their loving hand by joining the Commonwealth, which might as well (in Africa at least) be called the Commonlanguage or Commonpoverty. He has strategically positioned himself in the regional economic communities by joining the East African Community, and he has anglicised Rwanda. A Beninoise once remarked to me in a discussion on progress in Rwanda, "If I were the president, I would say English for all." He has been very helpful in enabling British access to the wealth and opportunities in the region.

The ensuing aid from Washington and London has been used effectively indeed. But the same donors prefer to channel aid to Zimbabwe through civil society because government does not use it effectively and transparently. Now any smart or even not-so-smart person can ask why one would bother to have a strong and formidable civil society to contend with if they can do good all by themselves. For instance, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees openly regretted that the UN agencies and NGOs were not able to contribute more efficiently to the speedy evacuation of the internally displaced persons from the camps after the genocide was stopped. And this, the president has not forgiven.

Hate him or love him, President Kagame does herald the sort of leadership Africa dreams of with regard to stabilising his country and positioning it to attract investment. And this can only be done through an efficient and effective administration. Even though the reconciliation process has been fraught with contestation and even resistance, it is holding the country together, both the centre and the periphery. 

## What's going wrong in Rwanda?

The Rwandan government has been severely criticised for its apparent clampdown on the opposition and all dissenting voices in the country in the run-up to the 9 August 2010 elections.

A wave of arrests of opposition members, the assassination of opposition leader André Kagwa Rwisereka, and the attempt on the life of Lieutenant General Kayumba Nyamwasa, an opponent of president Paul Kagame, have all raised alarm.

On 24 June, Jean-Léonard Rugabage, a journalist for the suspended bimonthly magazine *Umuwugiz*, was also killed in Kigali.

Some say that the ethnic boiling pot that is Rwanda is threatening to explode once again. "While it was taboo to talk about ethnicity after the genocide, people are again saying: 'I'm a Tutsi and we are in power'.

Yet some analysts say that in fact the problem is dissent within the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

According to ISS analyst Dr Paul Simon Handy, the defection of General Kayumba, who fled to South Africa in January this year after being accused by the regime of trying to destabilise Rwanda, is just one indication that there is a problem.

"The panic and repression we see in Rwanda is evidently [the result of] a government decision to clamp down against all dissent," says Handy.

"I don't think the opposition really poses a threat to president Kagame, but what he fears is the formation of an opposition by his former comrades."



*Will these young Rwandan women get a better deal than women in the rest of the continent?*

## Gender Equality's fact or fiction?

Rwanda is known for its excellent gender policies. **Cheryl Hendricks** and **Sandra Adong Oder** ask whether this really means a better deal for women in Rwanda.

Rwanda has made great strides in enhancing gender equality in its post-conflict reconstruction agenda by adopting a more inclusive political framework to advance women's political participation and development. Indeed, the Rwandan legislature now has the highest representation of women (56% in 2008) of any legislature in the world, and gender mainstreaming has been operationalised in all government institutions. Why has Rwanda succeeded in 'getting the numbers right'? Has

increased representation improved women's livelihoods and status in society? And what are the implications of current political trends on the future of women's empowerment?

The position of Rwandan women prior to the 1994 genocide was typical of most African patriarchal societies; ie, with unequal gendered power relations in the domestic sphere. Men were designated heads of households and customary law prohibited women from inheriting property – quite the opposite

in fact: women were regarded as men's property. Education opportunities for girls were limited, as the role of women was primarily constructed as that of housewife, child-bearer and mother. In this milieu, domestic violence was rampant. Unlike in other African countries, however, Rwandan women have long been included in political decision-making. Women were allowed to vote and to stand for elections in 1961, and by 1965 the first female had entered parliament. Prior to the genocide, Rwanda was already streets ahead of other countries in terms of women's representation in parliament, with 17% of the seats in the legislature held by women. In July 1993 Agathe Uwilingiyimana was appointed Prime Minister: one of just 18 female prime ministers the world had known until that date! (She was assassinated in 1994.) By world standards, therefore, Rwanda was already at the forefront of allowing women to be involved in decision-making, although this was yet to translate into gender equality in the society at large.

## After the genocide

In 1994, Rwandan society was deeply traumatised by 100 days of brutal mass murder, and all social institutions were rendered non-functional. The experience of women in Rwanda during this genocide mirrored that of women in other conflict settings, including repression, rape, abduction and mass displacement as women, in effect, become a weapon of war. In Rwanda women on both sides were not only victims but also active participants, fighting alongside their male compatriots.

During the genocide and in its immediate aftermath, it was

Rwanda's success in gender representation can be attributed to a number of interrelated factors: (1) Political will, reflected by both the activism of women and in the corridors of government under the leadership of Paul Kagame; (2) The pressure by the international community to incorporate gender equality and the corresponding funding that they availed for gender issues; (3) The genocide's complete disruption of the social structures and fabric of the society, thereby necessitating a revisioning of society; (4) The opportunity provided by the reconstruction of society; (5) The RPF victory that, unlike with peace agreements and their ushering in of governments of national unity, creates a leeway for the new government to push through its own vision; (6) The establishment of structures, policies and processes that provide a framework for translating the vision into practice, and, last but not least; (7) The fact that women had already enjoyed substantial representation in the legislature prior to the genocide.

## Prior to the genocide, Rwanda was already streets ahead of other countries in terms of women's representation in parliament, with 17% of the seats in the legislature held by women.

predominantly women who engaged in humanitarian relief efforts and advocated for peace and reconciliation on the local level. Elisabeth Powley noted in a report of a United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Expert Group Meeting that "women immediately assumed multiple roles as heads of households, community leaders and financial providers, meeting the needs of devastated families and communities. They were the ones who picked up the pieces of a literally decimated society and began to rebuild: they buried the dead, found homes for nearly 500,000 orphans and built shelters."

In constructing a new government, Kagame strongly advocated for gender equality and the empowerment of women, saying, "My understanding of gender is that it is an issue of good governance, good economic management and respect for human rights." The political will of Kagame and his executive was matched by the mobilisation of women to use the opportunity of reconstruction to achieve their empowerment. For example, in Rwanda's first parliament after the

events of 1994, only eight of the 70 seats (11.4%) were held by women, less than prior to the genocide. Women's representation in the Chamber of Deputies, however, increased in 1997 to 17.1% and again in 2000 to 25.7%.

But it was women's organisations, supported by international organisations like UNIFEM, who organised at grassroots level to garner input from women into the constitutional making process. They succeeded in having a 30% representation quota (the standard set in continental legal frameworks) included in the constitution.

The government worked towards establishing the structures required for the promotion of gender equality. For example, in 1996 it established a National Women's Council, which is represented at all administrative levels and is a forum for mobilisation of women, advocacy and empowerment. In 1999 the government created a Ministry for Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF, formerly known as the Ministry of Gender and Social Affairs) tasked to mainstream gender in development policies and programmes and women's empowerment in all domains; and in 2009 a Gender Observatory was established to monitor and assess compliance with gender indicators.

## Mixed results

In accessing the corridors of decision-making, women have had mixed results in terms of improving the livelihood of ordinary women. Women's increased representation in parliament has not been matched by an increase in policy outputs. More gender-related policies emerged prior to 2003 than when women achieved the 30% quota. Since 2003, only one gender-specific law has been passed, namely the Law on the Prevention, Protection and Punishment of Any Gender-Based Violence. Devlin and Elgie note in a 2008 report in the British Parliamentary Affairs journal

# Rwanda

Gender



*Rwanda goes to the poll on 9 August. Is it a de facto one-man presidential race?*

Parliamentary Affairs that 'The presence of the women does not seem to have caused the introduction of gender onto the list of priorities, although it does seem to have eased the discussion of such issues in parliament.'

With regard to education, the NEPAD/UNIFEM report of 2006 indicates that an 'Education for All' policy has been adopted, and this has led to a steady progression in school enrolment, with the girl-boy ratio being largely equal except for a few regional disparities. In higher education, we also see an improvement in the intake of women, notably at 40% in 2005, but a breakdown of these statistics from the National University of Rwanda indicated that only 19% of students studying agriculture and 16% of science and technology students were women. This is despite the fact that the majority of women remain locked into the rural subsistence economy.

Infant and child mortality rates were among the highest in the world in the 1990s, at 106 per 1 000 but by 2009 this number was reduced to 72.

Violence against women, forced marriage and sexual harassment remain high, even though Rwandan law penalises this behaviour. The Rwandan


National Institute of Statistics indicates that 31% of women surveyed in 2005 reported domestic abuse; the rate is slightly higher (37%) among married women. A UNDP news report noted that Rwanda police records on reported cases of violence from January to September 2008 show that there were 428 cases of physical assault, 307 cases of rape of adults, 1,652 cases of rape of children under 18, and 75 cases of domestic homicide. However, it is an established fact that only half of all gender-based violence cases are ever reported.

The face of poverty in Rwanda remains that of women, particularly rural women who continue to live below the poverty line. The NEPAD/UNIFEM Report on Rwanda contends: "Statistics show that the poverty incidence is higher among women than in men, and the households headed by women are poorer than those headed by men and boys." Although the government has sought to address the feminisation of poverty, the gender dimension of poverty relates to women's lack of access to financial resources (given the collateral required by financing institutions for loans but women's continued lack of "land, houses and livestock"). Women also

lack access to information on economic empowerment. Micro-credit, therefore, remains one of the chief means through which women access finance. To address this issue it is imperative that women gain access to land and property – but land, in Rwanda is itself a scarce resource.

Current political trends in Rwanda have set off alarm bells around a growing authoritarianism in the country. Rwanda goes to the polls on 9 August 2010, with its political destiny apparently chequered with episodes of violence, fear and intimidation. The government has been criticised for its intolerance of dissent. If this is correct, what does it spell for future gender relations?

We know that there is a positive correlation between democratisation and gender equality, but does this necessarily imply the reverse, especially in the case of Rwanda? We already noted above that the prioritisation of gender has been backsliding since 2003. When a government feels under threat, it will reprioritise its issues, placing state security and self-preservation at the top of its agenda. The number of women in parliament may not be a sufficient indicator to assess the extent of gender equality within a society.

Kagame's record of providing stability and economic growth can be applauded, as can the generally positive impact that his policies have had on gender equality. This has led to a transformation where the cultural narrative of 'women' and 'daughters' enables them now to envision themselves differently and courageously, as demonstrated in the presidential aspirations of candidates Alvera Mukabaramba and Victoire Ingabire. Regrettably, though, Alvera failed to get clearance after she was charged in court with promoting genocide ideology, whilst Mukaramba's candidature is seen with apprehension after she stepped down in 2003, in favour of Kagame. 

# A G5 for Africa?

## The case for...

While the African Union and its structures welcome all African states, **Paul-Simon Handy** argues that it might be time for a small club of powerful countries to get together to kick-start the continent

Africa has to invent new tools to drive regional integration, and new ideas and options should be explored. A possible way out could be for responsible powers in the continent to engage in what is generally referred to as club governance, a sort of African G5 or G7.

Why is this necessary?

After decades of civil war,

political instability and economic mismanagement, a majority of African countries seem to have entered into a new phase of consolidation. Although unevenly distributed and by far not irreversible, encouraging trends are emerging in terms of governance, economic growth and regional integration.

The magnitude of Africa's transformation requires a more differentiated view of the continent's socio-political developments than was the case in the '80s and '90s.

The African unity debate, mostly dominated by sentimentalism, wishful thinking and mythology instead of ideas and scholarship, needs to be



*A security detail raises the flags of the 13 countries participating in the East African Standby Brigade. The writer argues that regional organisations are not yet strong enough to transform Africa.*

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Samuel Rogers

reconstructed along the utilitarian lines of efficiency, common values and norms such as delivery on issues like good governance and human rights.

The creation of the African Union (AU) and the revitalisation of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have set a new momentum towards the establishment of supra-national bodies who, to varying degrees, have been busy setting up collective norms of peace and development for the continent.

The positioning of these not-so-new actors as norm entrepreneurs on the African scene poses some challenges for the understanding of African governance. What is being debated is not the nature of the principles and rules that these organisations are mandated to set (and that are widely considered as legitimate) so much as finding the right instruments to enforce these self-imposed principles in order to have a significant impact on the ground. The ability of African regional organisations, particularly the AU, to develop a persuasive and coercive capacity within the continent and to represent their constituencies in global forums should be given greater scholarly and policy attention.

### The limits of the all-inclusive model

The debate around what are the right instruments to drive African integration and give Africa a stronger voice in the world is not new. However, it has gained a new dimension due to the pace of the continent's current metamorphosis and the need to manage it at local, national and regional levels.

Part of the problem faced by the AU in mainstreaming efficiency lies in the historical mode of its creation and perpetuation. Today, every African country is part of the AU by virtue of geography, unless it decides – like Morocco did in 1993 – to quit the organisation. This is one of the major

**“In a sense, the consensual model, so powerful to fight colonialism and apartheid in the continent, has reached its limits.”**

differences between the AU and the EU. The EU started its development after World War II with a restricted number of countries gathered around a utilitarian economic agenda. It then grew organically and became a group of successful economies sharing democratic norms before opening its membership to other countries willing to abide by the same rules and principles. The so-created incentives, based on free will and the promise of economic prosperity and political stability, can retrospectively be considered the most powerful transformation tool in the modern world. As a result, the creation of the EU managed to radically transform a huge part of Western Europe into an economically prosperous and democratically solid entity whose attraction goes far beyond the traditional European sphere.

But by starting from the end, the AU was trapped with same ills and anomalies as those suffered by the UN general assembly: legitimately getting everyone on board, managing irreconcilable differences, and looking for the most common and therefore weakest consensus at the cost of efficiency. Despite its remarkable progress in establishing collective norms and framing an African voice in global governance discourse, the AU still lacks a governing body that will be legitimate and strong enough to enforce the huge body of political, economic and social

‘norms’ that have been created but remain unimplemented. In a sense, the consensual model, so powerful to fight colonialism and apartheid in the continent, has reached its limits.

### The value added by a club

Since the 1970s, club governance has emerged in international politics as a reaction to the growing incapacity of international organisations to manage the challenges posed by a rapidly changing world. As a result, the world's most powerful nations have come together in a sort of multilateral forum or ‘club’, in which global problems could be addressed and solutions suggested in an informal but efficient way. The most prominent example of club governance today is the G8. Originally created in 1973 as the G7 (the Group of the world's seven most industrialised countries), it was formally joined by Russia in 1999. The rise of additional countries in recent decades has formally transformed the distribution of power in the international arena, which has then generated debate about the reform of international institutions like the UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank and even the very informal but powerful G8 (which recently became the G20).

Let us be clear – unlike traditional international organisations, the ‘G’ groupings are neither formal nor representative: their membership is not based on a treaty and they don't seek to reflect the different identities of the world. Like the UN Security Council, where almost all big countries in the world would like to be represented, they (the ‘G’ groupings, not the member countries) are not even democratic. Instead, they are based on a certain conception of power, authority and responsibility. Countries like Germany or Japan are not part of the G7 because of the width of their military arsenals or their capacity to deploy troops around the world. The losers of WWII made

it into the elitist club because of the strength of their economies and the capacity of their diplomacy to exert influence as civilian powers over a range of issues.

Transposed into the African context, club governance would positively impact on at least two developments. Firstly, it would reinstate the idea of merit and discipline at the centre of African integration rather than geography and other considerations. Secondly, it would boost decision-making and policy implementation in the continent. The only indirect attempt from African states to move into a fairly different path was the APRM. Although severely criticised, the NEPAD initiative could have built the nucleus of African club governance if the myth of Pan-Africanism hadn't succeeded. But basing African club governance on a 'democratic few' might lead to a coalition of the weak, which would not change the current rules of the game. Rather, African club governance should be centred, *inter alia*, around the following principles:

Some criteria for a club

- **Economic power:** As with the EU, which was initiated by France, Germany and four other countries, African economic strongholds should acknowledge the responsibility that derives from having a higher GDP than others. A high GDP, a sizeable population and a certain economic diversification could be considered as important criteria.

- **Bureaucratic and diplomatic capacity:** In addition to economic strength, bureaucratic and diplomatic capacity is an important criterion for being part of the most important club in Africa. The capacity to frame African economic, political and developmental issues requires a widespread diplomatic network, both within the continent and outside it, as well as well-educated and experienced diplomats who understand and are able to articulate the complexities of African and world issues.

- Also important are the will and ability to exert authority, as well as to look beyond the national dimension to embrace issues of Africa-wide importance, both in the continent and in international fora. This authority should not only be based on a country's economic and financial potential, but also on its legitimacy and authority in the region.

Looking at these criteria, it appears that only few countries in the continent would make it to an African G5. Some that enjoy an impressive growth are for various reasons either unable or unwilling to do so. In the same vein, a couple of African countries have shown great diplomatic ambitions

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### "basing African club governance on a 'democratic few' might lead to a coalition of the weak"

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without having the capacity to sustain their vision. In that sense, an African G5 should not necessarily be reduced to the current so-called 'Big Five': the five countries that account for about 75% of the African Union's budget. Nor should the G5 be reduced to a club of democratic few.

The most important argument against a small group of powerful countries taking the lead on common matters revolves around the question of legitimacy and representation. As seen in the EU, whose governance system has been significantly weakened since the last integration round, smaller countries tend to oppose any move towards building a governance system that is not inclusive. Although understandable, it is important to note that a G5 would be an informal setting where a few powerful countries would try

to build the widest possible consensus on crucial issues relating to international trade, development cooperation, climate change and other future endeavours like monetary unions. The informality of the setting would allow for greater flexibility in addressing the issues at stake, and it would give room for new and iconoclastic ideas to be discussed at length.

But these kinds of informal gatherings are relatively rare in Africa, where leaders generally meet for formal meetings in which matters of protocol and of formality are more important than the really important issues. Also, this form of meeting would allow for a higher level of cross-regional exchange between countries that don't necessarily enjoy this opportunity in the current groupings.

There is of course a wide range of important outstanding issues related to the envisaged club governance. The first revolves around the links between the AU and RECs with the 'G' club. Whether the club should be a parallel and largely independent structure, or rather, with variable geometry, a sort of spear group in African integration, should be discussed. Also, the roles and functions of the club (whether its main concern should be international relations or peace and security) would have to be specified in order for it not to undermine but rather reinforce existing structures at AU and regional levels.

On a more political note, it is evident that the non-consideration of quotas (linguistic, regional) will spark controversies about representation and similar concerns. But this shouldn't prevent this idea from being explored further. An African club governance would certainly not be the panacea to the continent's problems, but it would probably provide African countries and the AU with an original problem-solving tool that would enhance the continent's capacity to face the variety of challenges that confront it. 

### Thembanani Mbadlanyana

argues that there are too many unanswered questions surrounding a proposed G5 for Africa.



U.S. Navy MC2 Jesse B. Awalt

*There are serious doubts whether club governance will be sweet music to the collective ear of the African Union.*

# A G5 for Africa?

## The case against...

With the growing prominence of global club governance arrangements, there are calls for the creation of similar structures elsewhere. It is argued that Africa needs to formalise its club-like structure or create a so-called G5 or an A6.

To the advocates of African club governance, the consensus-building model of the African Union (AU) is not effective and regional groupings are seen as suffering from capacity deficiencies and marred by disjunctures and/or divergence of interests. It is then concluded that regional hegemonies such as South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, and middle powers such as Senegal, Kenya, Ghana and others, should organise themselves and formalise a club of like-minded leaders or states to take the African agenda forward. We are told that the African club will not only be a meeting

of minds and a small platform for strategic conversations about African governance futures, but it will also be a flexible and informal forum to address the shortcomings of African multilateralism.

However, a few caveats need to be in order at the outset. If accepted without critical scrutiny, club governance can be problematic in the African context. For instance, it is not clear whether this will be an informal ad-hoc coalition or a permanent arrangement. What will be the agenda of this A6? Is this arrangement going to be able to balance national interests of member countries with a shared responsibility and commitment to the continental public good? Is the club governance model going to contribute to a rules-based political system in the continent? What are the implications

for the work of the AU? Will it focus on complementing the work of the AU and address the shortcomings of its consensus building approach? Or will it focus on collective management of African commons? Where will the power be, in the club or in the AU? Is the AU going to remain the only legitimate and legitimising body?

Firstly, the issue of legitimacy or acceptability is an important one that the advocates of the club governance model decide to trivialise. Since membership to this club will essentially be self-selecting, the club might lack acceptance by others. There is a presumption that excluded African countries will, without any resistance, blindly accept the club.

Many countries in the continent have legitimacy problems; their leaders are often dictators and violators of human

rights. Some are still struggling to entrench the principles of democratic governance in their systems. A question then is, if domestic legitimacy is going to be used as the main requirement for joining, who is going to determine who is eligible to join the club? Is the club not going to create a feeling of resentment among those who are excluded from joining?

German analyst Dr Stefan Mair posits that effectiveness and power resources should be used as a criterion for membership. It is not clear whether he is referring to hard power capabilities or soft power assets. But presuming that he is talking about the former, the most obvious problem with this is that many countries in the continent lack hard power capabilities. Those who have capabilities such as military forces often appear to lack the acumen to project them and effectively use them to maximise their national interests and geostrategic aspirations.

The problem with effectiveness and power resources is that the less effective, less assertive and not-so hegemonic countries, fully aware of their limitations or inabilities, might also want to play a role in the African configuration of power, only for political expediency. If not given that opportunity, they might try by all means to discredit and even destabilise the new arrangement. In this regard, it is likely that the move towards an A6 will create more fragmentation and competing polarities. Lest we forget, Africa is not a homogenous and united continent. There are countries that are continuously in competition with each other over the leadership of the continent and within their respective regions. The formation of a like-minded political club could, therefore, engender more confrontation than cooperation, and even lead to the resurfacing of regional 'rebel' states.

Furthermore, the debates about

African club governance fail to recognise that not all governments see the same issues as equally important. Some seem to be concerned about traditional domestic matters such as poverty alleviation, the rule of law, and development while others are in a space and world of their own, seeking a broader role on the continent (Senegal would be a good example) or as part of matters essentially of limited African relevance (Egypt and its engagement in the Middle East, for example). A question then is whether the countries will manage to reconcile their differences, synergise their efforts and reach a consensus. Who will set the

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### "who is eligible to join the club?"


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agenda? Whose rules are they going to follow? To what extent will the A6 help Africa shape and set the global agenda to prioritise African issues? And how to engage with initiatives such as the BRICs, the G20 and suchlike, never mind UN Security Council reform?

The notion of club governance has been postulated either implicitly or explicitly on images of new or postmodern governance arrangements elsewhere – self-selecting global coalitions of the powerful. In many respects it appears as if Africa is not ready for the club governance model, at least for now. Challenges at AU and RECs level still abound and regional political dynamics (competing interests and leadership aspirations) create conditions that are not conducive for the creation of a selective club. More so, if club governance is working elsewhere, it does not follow that it will work in Africa.

However, if African leaders want to adopt the club governance model, they need to do so fully aware of the

threat it poses to African unity. It is desirable that, before even thinking about an A6, they first address some inconsistencies or irreconcilable interests in their regional groupings. Many of the economic regions overlap and there is often double (or even triple) membership between organisations such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which is not helping to advance the African agenda. The leaders will also need to decide what they are going to do with 'pariah' states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, which would doubtlessly work assiduously to undermine the role of any club that might further pressurise for domestic reform and accommodation.

Unless the club governance is 'collective', it will face resistance and be seen as competing with the African Union and suffer the fate of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). If African leaders formalise the club structure in the continent in the absence of clear articulation of critical questions around leadership and legitimacy of that structure, we will not have substantive reasons to pursue and celebrate African unity in the future. Therefore, this is an argument for a two-pronged approach to the evolving African governance architecture. Emphasis needs to be put on relooking into the AU's consensus building model and addressing the shortcomings of the African multilateralism and membership overlap within regional arrangements. Only once such issues are resolved can African leaders start thinking about an inclusive and complementary club outside of the AU. 

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) celebrated the 50th anniversary of its independence on 30 June this year, amid new calls for the United Nations to withdraw from the country. **KOEN VLASSENROOT** writes that it is in President Joseph Kabila's interest to secure peace in his eastern DRC power base if he is to survive next year's presidential poll.

Recent developments in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) indicate that despite considerable efforts to deal with some of the main causes of insecurity over the last two years, there is still a long way to go. Reports point to the return of *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) units to the areas where they were operating before the joint Congolese-Rwandan military campaigns against them were first launched in early 2009.

Then hopes were high in eastern DRC that a solution would finally be found to some of the destabilising factors in the eastern Kivu provinces.

Earlier that January, a rift had emerged within the leadership of the main Congolese rebel force, the Laurent Nkunda-led *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* (CNDP), paving the way to a major shift in the movement's position on Kinshasa and raising hopes for a final resolution of the conflict in



Congolese celebrated 50 Years of Independence on 30 June this year.

# The politics of disorder

North Kivu. On 5 January 2009, CNDP chief of staff Bosco Ntaganda announced that he had taken over leadership, but barely two weeks later – coinciding with the launch of *Umoja Wetu* – Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda.

The CNDP had reportedly reached agreement with Kinshasa on an immediate cessation of hostilities and a rapid integration of its forces into

the Congolese national army (FARDC). Other armed groups, including the Pareco and Mayi-Mayi militias, soon made similar statements and joined the rapid-integration exercise. On 23 March 2009, final peace agreements were signed between Kinshasa, the CNDP and the North Kivu and South Kivu armed groups. These agreements included the rebel groups' transformation into political movements, in return for their integration into the army, police and political and administrative state units.

The units based in North Kivu temporarily retreated to South Kivu, but the conclusion of *Umoja Wetu* left a security void, and soon they returned to their previous positions. In retaliation for the military operation, the FDLR reportedly increased its attacks on Congolese civilians, killing many and causing massive displacement.

A month later, in response, a new FARDC operation against the FDLR was

**Rather than reducing the security threat from the FDLR, Kimia II further complicated the local political and military situation, and it also had a dramatic humanitarian impact.**

launched: Kimia II. In this campaign, the rapidly mixed brigades composed of FARDC and former militia combatants were also deployed to South Kivu. Rather than reducing the security threat from the FDLR, Kimia II further complicated the local political and military situation, and it also had a dramatic humanitarian impact. The operations dislodged FDLR units and remaining Congolese militias from their strongholds (including mining sites and checkpoints) and the FARDC regained authority over territories that for years had been controlled by foreign and local armed groups.

But in the process, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced and civilians were increasingly targeted in reprisal attacks by FDLR units. Even more worrisome was the conduct of the Congolese army brigades – including the newly integrated –, which were increasingly reported to be involved in gross human rights violations including random killings of civilians in the new territories of control. Though significant numbers of FDLR combatants were disarmed and repatriated to Rwanda, reports of new recruitment among the Congolese Hutu populations and in Rwanda suggest that the number of FDLR combatants has hardly decreased as a consequence of Kimia II.

Limited progress was also made in implementing the 23 March agreements between Kinshasa and the Kivu-based Congolese armed groups. This lack of implementation and limited progress in security-sector reform are increasingly frustrating the armed groups, and nourishing doubts about the sincerity of the Kinshasa government. Issues such as the recognition and allocation of rank within the FARDC are translated into growing irritation with Kinshasa. Despite the militia commanders' reiterated support for the integration process, and increasing numbers of combatants being demobilised or integrated, the army's command structures remain weak and

tend to be dominated by former CNDP commanders. The CNDP has also largely kept its parallel structures of command and political control in its Masisi stronghold, as well as gaining access to several mining sites that were previously under the control of the FDLR or Mayi-Mayi groups, thereby successfully expanding its politico-military influence.

In early 2010, the Kimia II operations were replaced by a new FARDC-led

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**With elections scheduled for next year, President Kabila has to secure his popular base, which is mainly concentrated in the east – but the developments in the Kivu provinces are turning this into an arduous task.**

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military campaign against FDLR called *Amani Leo*. Some successes have been reported, but not enough to reverse the local dynamics. The military operations against the FDLR, and attempts to forge local peace through the integration of armed groups into the Congolese army, have had limited impact on the local security situation and even risk further complicating the politico-military context. Rather than tackling the root causes of violence and militia formation, the outcomes of the recent peace efforts have provoked additional tension. For example, the recent repatriation of Congolese Tutsi refugees to areas under CNDP control is reviving old feuds related to land access and control between ethnic groups.

In Masisi, the *Alliance des patriots*

*pour un Congo libre et souverain* (APCLS) is mobilising the local Hunde and Hutu communities and operating in alliance with the FDLR against what is locally explained as Tutsi-Banyarwanda expansionism. Also in South Kivu, however, the dominant position and brutal conduct of CNDP commanders in the Kimia II operations is provoking disquiet among the local population, which is increasingly raising its voice to demand protection. Another recent development is the unprecedented defections of integrated Mayi-Mayi commanders from the FARDC. Frustration, lack of support and preferential treatment of CNDP members are cited as the main reasons. It is also clear that ethnic tension is rising again within the FARDC. In addition to this, several new armed groups have recently entered the scene in South Kivu, further complicating the security conditions. Lack of conclusion to local conflict dynamics, along with growing ethnic tension, lack of progress in the security-sector reforms and the demobilisation of former combatants, are all fertile ground for the mobilisation efforts of these groups.

The Congolese government has proven that it lacks capacity to deal with these dynamics, and this explains the developing paradox. What for Kinshasa early this year looked like a diplomatic victory (improved relations with Rwanda followed by a joint strategy against the FDLR) today risks becoming a military and political nightmare. With elections scheduled for next year, President Kabila has to secure his popular base, which is mainly concentrated in the east – but the developments in the Kivu provinces are turning this into an arduous task. Once the celebration of Congo's 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of independence is over, Kabila has no choice than to achieve success in the east if he wants to secure his position of power. 



# Kenya's Vision 2030 a mirage

*The internecine post-election violence was unforeseen when the country's Vision 2030 was drafted in 2006*

Can Kenya become a world-class economy? **Abeba B Amene** laments the lack of progress made in implementing the high ideals for Kenya's future.

The plans to transform Kenya into an industrialised, middle-income country within two decades may not be realised after all. This is the conclusion of a group of economists who claim that *Vision 2030*, Kenya's development policy paper, needs to be thoroughly reviewed in line with the changes in risk profiles.

Launched in 2006, *Vision 2030* is anchored on three pillars – economic, social and political – and seeks to make Kenya a globally competitive country by registering an annual growth rate of more than 10 percent and sustaining it to the year 2030. Moreover, it seeks to create a just, cohesive and equitable social development, in a clean and secure environment, under an issue-based, people-centred, result-oriented and accountable democratic system.

A report by the Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF) asserts that from the time the long-term economic development strategy was initiated, a number of issues that can materially affect the realisation of the vision have arisen. Among the concerns that need to be factored in are the post-election violence, the formation of a grand coalition government and the spill-over effects of the world economic crisis. These issues have had a major impact on the country's anticipated economic trends, as well as its social equity and governance.

The government of Kenya is also aware that the road towards this vision is now increasingly bumpy. An audit of the progress by the Ministry of Planning shows that numerous challenges are

slowing the process. According to planning minister Ho Wycliffe Oparanya, the country's economy was initially projected to grow by 6 percent in the 2008/2009 financial year, but in fact it only registered a 2.5 percent growth.

To say that Kenya is in the midst of a challenging period is an understatement.

The grand coalition government formed after the disputed December 2007 elections is now seeking to simultaneously undertake various processes: to hold accountable those responsible for the violence, deliver promised constitutional reform and advance on the broad goals of promoting pro-poor growth and improving public services, among others. None of these processes comes cheap, either financially or politically.

The country is still reeling from the effects of the post-election violence that almost brought the nation to its knees. The sectors most adversely affected were tourism and agriculture. The effects of loss of revenue, as well as missed production targets, are still being felt three years on, in the form of food insecurity, high unemployment, etc. It is clear that the development strategy paper did not provide for such risks and was conceptualised with pre-2006 economic indicators in mind.

Furthermore, *Vision 2030* did not anticipate the formation of a grand coalition government. Instead of a lean government, Kenyans were saddled with a negotiated government that was anything but lean. Besides its being an expensive venture, squabbles within the government inevitably mean that there is little coherence in government policies, which adversely affects the realisation of *Vision 2030* objectives. There are myriad examples of different factions of the government pulling in opposite directions on any particular issue. It is also well documented that a directive from a principal made on one day is often overturned by another principal on the following day. Clearly, *Vision 2030* requires a cohesive political climate and a measure of consensus if any of its targets are to be met.

The constitutional reform process that many say has been in the making for two decades is another expensive exercise that was not included in the economic development strategy. As things stand now, it is estimated that the costs of the campaigns leading up to the referendum amount to billions of Kenyan shillings of taxpayers' money. This amount is in addition to costs related to expenses incurred by the Committee of Experts overseeing the constitutional reform process, as well as civic education.

Climatic shocks in the form of floods, as well as extended periods of drought,



*Can a bloated cabinet and the increasingly divided government, with incoherent policies, offer an ideal political climate for the realisation of Kenya's Vision 2030?*

have further posed challenges to the provision of basic services. That these droughts are being experienced in areas that are home to vulnerable farming communities just aggravates an already bad situation.

For the country to achieve some of the milestones set, political sacrifices will have to be made by those in power, particularly by being more accountable to the taxpayer and

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**The country is still reeling from the effects of the post-election violence that almost brought the nation to its knees.**

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addressing the dragon of corruption and the misappropriation of public funds. A leaner cabinet would also save the exchequer much-needed finances for development, especially infrastructure across the country, in order to achieve the ends outlined in *Vision 2030*.

It is worth remembering the popular saying that an electorate gets the leadership it deserves. This time

could be a turning point if the ballot power was used positively to identify a leadership with national interests as opposed to some of the self-seeking politicians who have been involved in one scandal after another while paying little or no attention to the provisions set out in *Vision 2030*.

The electorate also needs to be more proactive in decision-making rather than being driven by populist theories that often come laced with insincere ethnic overtones. Indeed, the electorate has a duty to hold its leaders accountable, not only to achieve *Vision 2030* but also to receive a fair share of tax and revenue collected by government to reduce poverty and improve health, education and personal security.

The inability to meet targets contained in *Vision 2030* consequently means that even the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) becomes a herculean task. In light of this, it is clear that Kenya's economic experts need urgently to review the development strategy paper by taking into account the challenges to its implementation and define a clearer strategy; one that is alive to the economic, social and political realities of today's Kenya while paying attention to immediate concerns that affect the majority. 

# East Africans vow to mop up Somali terrorists

While attending the FIFA World Cup final in South Africa, Kenya's foreign minister Moses Wetangula spoke to **Keto Segwai** about Rwanda's upcoming elections and regional peace and security issues. Less than a week before the devastating terror attacks on Ugandan civilians, he also warned about the security threat Somalia poses to all in East Africa.

**What is Kenya, as a regional power, doing about security in the East Africa region?**

Somalia remains the region's biggest headache. Kenya and the rest of the region, through IGAD (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) have heightened the engagement in early July with a summit in Addis Ababa. A decision was taken that we must now engage fully, on all fronts, to beef up the security of Somalia, and this can include the mopping up of terrorist elements that are still causing mayhem. We would like Somalia to emerge from a failed state into a modern state that will be able to play a constructive role in the region. We have taken this matter to the AU (African Union) and I am happy that the AU is moving fast.

**Do you foresee piracy in the horn of Africa being brought under control any time soon?**

Piracy has had a devastating effect on the economies of East Africa. The

failed state of Somalia remains a major challenge. As long as we have a failed state we'll continue having piracy. As Kenya, we have pushed very hard by prosecuting pirates. And now, through our efforts, the Seychelles, Mauritius, Tanzania, Mozambique, the Yemen and Uganda have also agreed that wherever pirates are captured they'll be able to join in by prosecuting them. But more importantly, you don't fight piracy by simply prosecuting those you have captured. We must fight the root cause, which is the failed state of Somalia. Normalcy in Somalia will help bring about the end of piracy. That is why Kenya is at the forefront in fighting all issues of Somalia – at the IGAD level, the AU, UN and more importantly as a front-line state. Only last week we got the UN to declare piracy an international crime, and now we are working on actualising this so that everybody, with the UN on the front line, should be able to deal with it.

**What measures is the East African Community putting in place to make**

**sure that proceeds from piracy are not being laundered in the region?**

We have legislated in the EAC (East Africa Community) anti-money-laundering laws to deal with the effects of money-laundering activities. We must make it painful for those who carry out such activities, for them to realise that the folly of crime is pain and that crime does not pay. So in Kenya we have passed legislation against organised crime, which includes piracy. I think this a major step





in fighting this crime. We are agreed that the country needs wealth, but we definitely don't need criminal wealth. We need clean and legitimate money coming into the country.

**Have you had cases of Somali piracy proceeds finding their way into Kenya, such as in the buying of real estate?**

To the extent that people have been arrested, arraigned in court, prosecuted and convicted, no. But in terms of innuendo and conjecture, yes.

**Rwanda is about to conduct elections amid allegations of the suppression of the opposition. Have there been calls for Kenya's intervention?**

I was sent by my president to Rwanda recently. I had a meeting with President Paul Kagame and several players in the politics of Rwanda. I was left in no doubt that the noises coming out of Rwanda are a storm in a teacup. There is also no doubt that given the recent history of Rwanda and the role played by President Kagame in stabilising

and normalising Rwanda to how it is now, he is a very popular man. But there are those who are competing with him, and when in an election a weak candidate is competing with a very strong candidate, they resort to making all sorts of noises. I've seen this in my own country. I have seen it in many democracies. I have no doubt whatsoever that Rwanda, like many other African countries, has its own internal challenges, particularly ethnic imbalances, leading some groups to

# Interview

Kenya

feel that they have been edged out or are being disenfranchised. But the overall picture is that the election is going to be peaceful. The picture that I got from talking to a cross-section of people is that he [Kagame] is going to be re-elected by an overwhelming majority. There is some token opposition from other players who don't seem to be very strong.

forgiven, or if a serious political player is found money laundering we don't touch him until after the election. What kind of a country is that? Laws must be applied evenly and equally at all times. Otherwise, since during an election period, the visibility of certain individuals rises, when they brush with the law they have the perfect excuse and can say they are being targeted because of politics.

believe the elections in Rwanda must go on, and they must be peaceful. Instances of the compromise of human rights are not acceptable. We want to see, within the context of East Africa, all the countries in the region move in tandem with the expectations of the international community, in respect of practice of democracy, respect of individual liberties and the right for people to have a free and fair election.



**But some people find it strange that you have an obviously popular president, assured of re-election, and then he seems so harsh on his political opponents?**

I don't know. I am not president Kagame's spokesman. But what I can tell you is that sometimes we allow ourselves to be judged harshly. And we judge each other very harshly. The fact that there is an electoral process in any country, including Rwanda, does not give one a reason to take leave of the law. If somebody commits a criminal offence, he or she will be dealt with regardless of the mood or the events taking place in the country. Otherwise, if you get into the electoral process and you decide laws related to hate speech should be suspended, then laws related to criminal defamation are also suspended. If a serious political player commits murder he or she is

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**"The noises coming out of Rwanda are a storm in a teacup."**

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**And the recent assassination attempt on General Kayumba Nyamwasa in South Africa?**

Of course I asked president Kagame when I saw him about the attack on General Nyamwasa here in South Africa, about the events that I have been seeing in the papers, and he gave me what I thought were cogent explanations about his non-involvement. I was not interrogating him; I just asked him a question and he gave me an answer. But the overall picture we have as a region is that we

**Is the Sudan peace process unfolding according to plan?**

In the Sudan you know that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was negotiated in Kenya, and Kenya remains the chairman of the three CPA guarantors (US, EU and Kenya). We are very deeply committed to the cause of Sudan. Sudan of course has the Darfur challenge, but our immediate focus is the north and south Sudan issues. In the CPA there are two benchmarks: the first one was that the two sides, the NCA (National Congress Party) and the SPLM (the Sudan People's Liberation Movement) were to strive to hold Sudan as a unitary state by making unity attractive. The second was that if unity did not appear sufficiently attractive then the south would go for what is called the self-determination referendum. There were two major events built into that process. The general elections in the whole of Sudan, which have already taken place, and the election of President Omar al Bashir. And we have said, with IGAD and Kenya as a neighbour, that despite the imperfections noted in the electoral process, it was a step in the right direction. We think it's a milestone, a positive benchmark in the CPA that was achieved.

**What can be expected from the referendum scheduled for January 2011?**

From my perspective I believe that the unitary government has not made unity sufficiently attractive for the south. So

they are going to the referendum step more than ever before determined to cast a vote for self-determination. But the assurance we received from President Al Bashir after the national elections is very refreshing to the region. He said he would want to see a united Sudan, but if the south votes for self-determination, he will respect their will, which is very encouraging. And that is why Kenya, as a country that wields reasonable power and authority in the region, had insisted that the issues of Sudan should be resolved within the context of peace, security, stability and justice. I salute former president Thabo Mbeki as the leader of the high panel of imminent personalities that are dealing with Sudan. They have thought in the same direction and emphasised the four components that are critical to peace of in Sudan. Southern Sudan has already written to the EAC saying that in the event of us getting our self-determination, we want to be part of the EAC, which is an exciting development.

#### And the situation in Burundi?

Two weeks ago, I led a delegation of EAC foreign ministers to Burundi to talk not only to the president but also to all opposition groups and other stakeholders, and they have given the region firm assurance that they are going to have a peaceful, participatory and positive election. We have also wielded the carrot-and-stick and told those who have any ideas of disrupting the peace and security that have been painstakingly fought for and achieved in Burundi that the region will not just sit and watch. We will sanction them and we will deal with them, so they know that peace for Burundi is also peace for the whole East African sub-region.

**On 1 July the EAC operationalised the common market agreement, what are the potential benefits of this?**

The benefits are enormous. First of

all you can trace this back in history. Before the eastern African federation collapsed in the 1970s due to Idi Amin's intransigent dictatorship, we were highly advanced in terms of regional integration. We had common customs, common currency, common postal services, common rails and harbours. We were ahead of many regions in this regard. The region realised much sooner rather than later that integration is not an option: our people are literally one; they speak a common language, they share colonial historical ties, and we have brought it to Burundi and Rwanda because we are bound by the

same language – KiSwahili. We have no doubt that there are enormous benefits to be derived from this cooperation. Those who are ahead of others would pull others to some parity. But, more importantly, we will benefit from the economies of scale. We have a population of 127 million, and that, by any standard, is a very strong market that is more attractive as an investment destination. Admittedly, when you embark on a development of this nature, it has benefits and challenges – and others having doubts about it. But I think the aggregate of what will come out of it is much greater. □



Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni has been in power for 24 years. October this year marks the official start of presidential campaigns for the January 2011 presidential poll, but **SANDRA ODER** writes that it will probably not be a real test for democracy in the country.

Uganda's political legacy reflects a common narrative in sub-Saharan African where, since the early 1990s, legislative and presidential multiparty elections have taken place in 42 of the 48 states. The majority have convened fourth and fifth elections, suggesting that regularised elections have become the norm. Indeed, even when the elections leave a lot to be desired, arguably, a process of repeated, competitive elections can eventually generate adherence to good governance and democratisation norms.

At the same time, analyses of 120 legislative elections in sub-Saharan Africa conclude that the weakness of opposition parties is a striking characteristic of the multiparty system on the continent. As economist Dominique Van de Walle contends, the meagre situation of the opposition can also be seen in the context where elections may be nominally free but where the governments engage in extensive gerrymandering, manipulation of voter registration and harassment of opposition parties.



*A Ugandan woman folds her ballot paper at a polling station in 2006 during the country's first multiparty election in two decades.*

# Untangling a web of complexities

Perceived as a tool for effecting meaningful change, the 2011 electoral terrain in Uganda can be expected to present a situation reminiscent of the 2001 and 2006 elections. There is a general feeling within the opposition that while some progress has been made in respect of electoral laws, it is still not enough to ensure that next year's general election will be different from those of 2001 and 2006 – two key elections which the Supreme Court concluded were marred by electoral irregularities.

In analysing the prospects for Uganda's 2011 elections, in spite of the reintroduction of multipartyism in 2006, one needs to reflect on the current political landscape, which is embedded in the historical and political legacies since her independence in 1962.

In its current state, based on current statistics, a first-round victory for President Yoweri Museveni in the 2011 presidential elections appears unlikely. His margin of victory against the opposition has shrunk, from 52 percentage points in 1996 when he got 76% of the vote to 11 percentage

points in 2006 when he got 59% and the opposition got 41%.

A further analysis of the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections indicates that President Museveni triumphed in both elections because he was able to win western central and mid-eastern Uganda, which, statistically, are the most populous voting blocs in Uganda. However, the conduct of the 2006 elections was contested on the grounds that proper institutional arrangements and political tolerance were not in place to guarantee free and fair elections. In the eyes of Ugandans, the anticipated gains of multiparty elections, such as alternate policy articulation, accountability, prudent fiscal management and peaceful change of government, may not be realised as the country heads to the second multiparty elections in 2011.

If a positive note can be sounded, it comes from a historical perspective, which shows how much political change has happened in the last 30 years. In the minds of many Ugandans, since the advent of independence, elections have

been few and far between, and for the youth born since the 1980s, many may not have any recollection of Uganda's volatile and violent history.

The first major national election was held in April 1962, where Milton Obote's Uganda Peoples' Congress won and led Uganda to independence later that October. Initially, it was a multiparty system, but became a one-party state in 1966, led by Obote. In 1971, Obote was deposed by the army, which under the leadership of General Idi Amin, established one of Africa's most brutal dictatorships. Eight years later (in 1979), Amin was overthrown by a rebel army, supported by Tanzania. Elections in 1980 returned Obote to power, but his rule triggered more armed resistance and he was deposed in a military coup in 1985, which subsequently was defeated in 1986 when the National Resistance Army led by Museveni captured Kampala.

During the 20 years of the 'Movement' political system that he pioneered, the National Resistance Movement, now a political party (the NRM-O) has held power with two previous (1996 and 2001) presidential elections. The two main contenders in 2001, as in 2006, were the incumbent president Museveni and his former personal physician Dr Kiiza Besigye.

The political reorganisation that took place in 2001 was a combination of internal civic pressure and external pressure from donors and the World Bank. While the 2001 election was conducted under the 'Movement' system without political party participation, the NRM-O government that same year announced a referendum that included a proposal on a return to multiparty democracy. The 2005 referendum, in which the Movement campaigned for a 'yes' vote on a multiparty system, saw that vote prevail, and political parties were thus free to participate in the 2006 elections. Thus, the elections held on 23 February

2006 – the first multiparty elections since 1980 – represented a new stage in the development of Uganda's polity.

The 2011 poll sees the arrival of new entrants, Olara Otunnu of the Uganda Peoples' Congress and Mao Norbert of the Democratic Party who are both from northern Uganda, where the ruling party has failed to make significant inroads. Their participation would hurt opposition chances in 2011, as they

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**In the minds of many Ugandans, since the advent of independence, elections have been few and far between, and for the youth born since the 1980s, many may not have any recollection of Uganda's volatile and violent history.**

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seem to fragment traditional electoral blocs and offer no significant challenge to the incumbent president's traditional strongholds.

Two important shortcomings that will be crucial for the 2011 elections revolve around the performance, achievements and failures of the opposition parties and development partners. The opposition parties' failure can be attributed to a complex historical legacy that has greatly impacted on their mode of institutional functions, and whose relevance is further weakened by an uneven playing field and their inability to function as real institutions.

The proposal for a coalition under the Inter-party Cooperation in the coming elections does not improve the

situation since bringing together single weak parties does not create a strong coalition. The greatest challenge that remains for the opposition parties lies in the arduous task of garnering credibility and legitimacy. If Ugandans saw their immediate relevance in their daily lives, they would contribute and participate voluntarily in party organisation and no additional funding for parties would be necessary.

A second hurdle that faces the electoral process in Uganda is the involvement of development partners. Donor funding accounts for 30% of Uganda's national budget. The influence of these partners is visible at government and non-governmental levels, and more importantly the funds that they provide to the state budget enables them to set the policy agenda. Arguably, one of the most revealing effects of donor funding is that it has offered an infrastructure of support for the government to retain power. Such assistance, based on democratisation notions and subsequent funding from bilateral governments and related efforts by non-governmental and multilateral organisations, carries the assumptions that Uganda's democratic transition is built on coherent, accountable and responsive interests.

Increased international scrutiny regarding Uganda's preparation for the polls may come a little bit too late. Notwithstanding its interests in maintaining the status quo, in January 2010, the US Congress directed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to monitor preparations for the 2011 elections in Uganda closely. Its Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for the 2010 fiscal year call on the US State Department to 'actively promote the independence of the electoral commission, the need for an accurate and verifiable voter registry, the announcement and posting of results at polling stations, the freedom of movement and assembly and a process free of intimidation, the freedom of the

media and the security and protection of candidates.'

In the months leading up to next year's polls, concerns still arise on the independence of the Electoral Commission, whose commissioners were appointed unilaterally by President Museveni in accordance with legal requirements, which however do not preclude the president from consulting with opposition parties and civil society on Electoral Commission appointments.

This recent exclusion of key stakeholders from the reappointments process compromises the Commission's independence and may damage the credibility of next year's electoral process. In addition, the electoral laws that have recently been passed would be in vain in the absence of an overhaul of the current Electoral Commission. In May this year, the opposition unsuccessfully pushed for a constitutional amendment to restructure the commission, as well as to restore presidential term limits and effect constitutional provisions to compel the army to be subordinate to civilian authority.

And, since there are concerns with the voter registry, there is also a pressing need to establish an accurate and verifiable voter registry.

The constitutional requirement for the results to be announced at polling stations does not also seem to be working out. During the 16 February by-election, the Electoral Commission voided results from seven entire polling stations due to procedural errors by presiding officers. Opposition parties accused the Commission of sanctioning deliberate attempts by these presiding officers to invalidate entire ballot boxes.

Other concerns include restriction on opposition leaders' freedom of movement and opposition parties' freedom of assembly; restrictions on the local media; and the security and protection of candidates. The Presidential Elections Act requires the




*Taking a critical step in the long way to the consolidation of the democratisation process.*

**The political reorganisation that took place in 2001 was a combination of internal civic pressure and external pressure from donors and the World Bank.**

Electoral Commission to ensure that the relevant organs of the state provide protection and adequate security to each candidate during the campaign period. It has, however, indicated that it is not responsible for the security of political leaders in advance of 14 October 2010, which is the official starting date of presidential campaigns.

Presuming that next year's elections go uncontested and are widely accepted as free and fair, it will be necessary for the country to move to address underlying issues of marginalisation that will undermine any attempts to consolidate durable democratisation in the country's polity. So long as the

electoral processes remain an event in the political narrative, strategic competition for state power will remain a dominant theme and will further extricate debate on salient issues that affect marginalised groups, such as the youth, who are prone to violent expression of their frustration and of their dissent to their continued exclusion from political and economic windfalls.

Compared to any plausible alternative, the current democratisation process is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major upset in the coming elections. It is comparatively benevolent for the 2016 elections to be seen as testing the principles of economic and political liberalism that the current democratic processes profess to uphold. A consolidation of democratisation processes may only come to pass after the 2016 elections, when the political parties have consolidated their incipient democratic structures, making them more resilient and responsive to the needs of Ugandans. One can only assume that next year's elections will push the country to untangle a complex web of uncertainties, while maintaining the conviction to move forward even if the future remains unclear. 

I hope to see my children graduate top of the class  
 I hope my kids can go to a good school  
 I hope to preserve my pension fund  
 I hope I have enough money to send him on that soccer tour  
 I hope we're always this happy  
 I hope I'll pull through  
 I hope she doesn't fall  
 I hope he has every opportunity that I didn't have  
 I hope I can have a dignified funeral  
 I hope she gets accepted into university  
 I hope I get my driver's licence  
 I hope to go to Rio one day  
 I hope my professional practice continues to be a success  
 I hope we can do the renovations to the house  
 I hope to be the best dad in the world  
 I hope I can buy that house someday  
 I hope my broker gets the trade done before the market moves  
 I hope we can travel together  
 I hope I can show him my hometown one day  
 I hope I get the financing for my business  
 I hope to live out my dreams  
 I hope I can always take care of her  
 I hope my children will be taken care of  
 I hope I find Prince Charming  
 I hope she says, "yes"  
 I hope my offshore investments perform  
 I hope they can get study materials  
 I hope I can pay my medical bills  
 I hope this phase blows over  
 I hope I have enough for my retirement  
 I hope to, one day, own that house on the hill  
 I hope I can afford this holiday  
 I hope I can study overseas  
 I hope my hard work pays off  
 I hope I can get that car  
 I hope to see the Northern Lights  
 I hope this idea works  
 I hope my business succeeds  
 I hope I can do that again  
 I hope I am giving our employees the best  
 I hope to dive with dolphins  
 I hope the rest of my studies run smoothly  
 I hope I can afford a plasma TV  
 I hope for trading at the right price and at the right time  
 I hope I can provide for my family

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Thinking ahead

# Party split leads to disarray

**Mesh Moeti** traces the origins of the recent breakaway Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD) and its implications on Botswana politics

Botswana's only ruling party since independence from Britain in 1966, the Botswana Democratic Party, has split. Some now warn that the BDP could suffer the fate of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), Zambia's United National Independence Party (UNIP), and the Kenya African National Union (KANU).

Those who broke away from the BDP blame Lt Gen Ian Khama, President of Botswana and first son of the country's founding President, Sir Seretse Khama. Ironically, Khama Snr had already warned that the only party that could remove the BDP from power would be the party itself.

A dominant force in the nation's politics since independence, the BDP has over the years recorded a decline in the popular vote, but not enough to loosen its grip on power. This is mainly due to the country's electoral system. Botswana practices a 'first past the post' system – an inheritance from the former colonial power.

This has ensured the party's stronghold – for instance, although the BDP got 53.26 percent of the popular vote at last year's polls, it was able to claim 45 of the 57 contested seats in the National Assembly.



*Botswana's President Ian Khama, is he presiding over a disintegrating ruling party?*

However, the split (the first in BDP's 48-year history) is being felt even in the sitting arrangement within Parliament. When the legislative body reconvened after its break in July this year, the opposition ranks swelled by four MPs, some of whom are founder members of the BMD. They include Botsalo Ntuane, a young and gifted debater who only a few years back was seen as one of the ruling party's rising stars and had served as head of the party's Secretariat. However, in parliament his independent streak proved a thorn in the party's side. He opposed some of the government's recent manoeuvres, which he described as a clampdown on civil liberties. These include 14 controversial extra-judicial killings carried out by suspected state agents since Khama ascended to presidency in April 2008.

The stinging force of the criticism has been unsettling for President Khama. In one instance, for example, Ntuane provocatively claimed that Khama's anti-alcohol drive was turning Botswana into "another Iran". In response, the president ordered the MP to author a public apology.

Still, despite this reprimand, the MP received many expressions of support

from the public, especially among the young and professional urbanites who increasingly express disquiet at the direction the country is taking under its fourth president.

Khama, a former army commander who trained at Britain's Sandhurst Military Academy, is seen by many as dictatorial. He says discipline is one of the values he wants to instil in his nation, starting with the party he leads. Khama has been characterised as an authoritarian who threatens not only to overrun the nation and undermine its values, but also of to privatise the party and the state.

Such discontent led to what amounted to defiance of the party leader at last year's Central Committee elections. Despite being elected unopposed as party leader and openly campaigning hard for his preferred candidates (all from a faction known as the 'A-Team') to serve on the Committee, none made it into the party's governing body. Instead, the Barataphathi faction, organised around party chairman Daniel Kwelagobe, made a clean sweep of all the seats on offer. Gomolemo Motswaledi, a youthful chorister and charismatic

speaker, was installed as the new secretary general.

The night he was elected party president Khama danced, which is something he is known to be averse to. But it seems the president's opponents blinked that night, and by sparing him further criticism, they left him room to dribble past the defence.

The BDP constitution allows for five additional members to the Central Committee. Khama unilaterally appointed his own people without consultation with the new Central Committee. He went even further, by unilaterally constituting the party's 77-member sub-committees with his own allies.

It was shock and awe. Never before had a BDP leader undermined the Central Committee in that manner. Motswaledi was suspended as secretary general and recalled as the party's parliamentary candidate for Gaborone Central. A subsequent disciplinary hearing banished him from the party for five years. This was after a failed court bid to reverse the president's action. The High Court dismissed the case because Khama's legal team had evoked a constitutional clause that protects a sitting president from litigation in his private and official capacity.

In a recent statement to the media, Ntuane recalled that "there was absolutely no way in which people reared on a diet of democracy and accommodation of dissension could countenance this right being taken away from them to satisfy the whims of a leader who served at their pleasure."

In April this year, at least five BDP MPs and over 300 delegates met in Mogoditshane, a peri-urban village that borders the capital Gaborone, to deliberate on a single item: Did they still have a future in the BDP? All spoke in favour of decamping from their political home.

The meeting had gone ahead in spite

of a warning from the party leadership that it was an illegal gathering; a thinly veiled threat that the Mogoditshane delegates held as yet another sign of a party that had become tyrannical. Having been defied, the leadership issued an ultimatum that those who had attended the meeting should hand over their party membership cards within 48 hours or face a disciplinary hearing (as failure to surrender the BDP cards would mean they were bound by its rules). The delegates ignored the order.

Sensing a fissure in an organisation he had helped found, former President Ketumile Masire offered to mediate between Barataphathi and Khama's

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**"The incumbent president does not want to fail his father's legacy. He fears the likelihood of leading his father's party to its first electoral defeat"**

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group. However, Masire's offer was not enthusiastically received by those around Khama, who sensed that any movement towards rapprochement would be to their own political cost. For instance, some might have to be dropped from cabinet to accommodate the sidelined faction.

On the back of the cold shoulder given to Masire, Barataphathi announced the formation of the BMD in April with Ntuane as interim chairman, a position he handed over to Motswaledi on 29 May.

There is now talk of realignment in Botswana's opposition politics. The BMD has been received with open arms by existing opposition formations, mainly the leading ones like the Botswana

Congress Party (BCP) and the Botswana National Front (BNF). There is a glimmer of hope that BMD might help bring together Botswana's deeply divided opposition. Ntuane, who is emerging as one of the key strategists for the new party, often talks of a grand coalition of all opposition formations to mount an effective challenge to the BDP at next elections in 2014.

In the meantime, the biggest dilemma the BDP has is its chairman, Kwelagobe. His allies are with the BMD, but he has chosen to remain in the ruling party. Even senior figures within the ruling party sometimes openly voice the suspicion that Kwelagobe is BMD's Trojan horse. He makes uncomfortable remarks, such as at the recent BDP's National Council when he declared that inner party democracy was under threat and that discipline was applied in an even-handed manner.

Where does this leave the president? He is obviously worried. The defections have been unnerving. The incumbent president does not want to fail his father's legacy. He fears the likelihood of leading his father's party to its first electoral defeat. His attention could have been drawn to the fate of other liberation movements and post-independence parties on the continent. The common feature is that when Africa's parties of independence experience a split in their ranks, they lose power; and when they do they slide into oblivion.

Khama seems to have heeded the advice of those within his circle who suggest a conciliatory approach in dealing with Barataphathi, which has not yet decamped to the BMD. In addition, accepting calls for a new strategy to increase his popularity, Khama has followed the BMD's example: he is on Facebook, for example, where he gets to interact with online friends. The idea is to give him a makeover, with an aloof and distant President 'befriending' the youthful internet generation. □

# Why liberation movements make bad governments

As many African countries celebrate 50 years of independence, **William Gumede** looks at why so many post-colonial governments fail.

At the heart of the governance failures of many African independence and liberation movements is their inability to effectively transform from resistance movements into effective governing parties.

Because of their history of opposing colonial governments or white minority regimes, many African liberation movements, just like the African National Congress, come to power with an extraordinary amount of legitimacy. This comes from their leading roles in the independence or liberation struggle and gives them a much stronger political, economic and moral mandate than that of governing parties

in other developing countries (with the exception, perhaps, of East Asia, where countries have often also emerged from colonial domination).

As a result, these movements can mobilise society behind their programs for long periods.

However, this also means that for long periods they can also get away with service-delivery failure, autocratic behaviour and wrongdoing, in the name of advancing the liberation or independence project. Many even argue that they have the right to rule forever, based on their struggle credentials.

Most African countries at independence are basically crisis states.

To overcome the huge challenges they face demands special leadership, sharing benefits and pains evenly, acting in the broadest national interest rather than in the interests of the political, social or economical elite, and using scarce resources in ways most beneficial to the country as a whole.

### Immoral behaviour of the party elite

Most dominant African independence and liberation movements have not made optimal use of the legitimacy bequeathed by the liberation struggle to create equitable economies, quality democracies and ethnically inclusive

*ANC supporters celebrate their election victory in the streets of Johannesburg outside Luthuli House, ANC headquarters on the night of the 23 April. ANC President Jacob Zuma addressed supporters, thanking them for their vote*



societies. Amílcar Cabral, one of the great thinkers of African liberation ideology, said the success of liberation-movements-turned-governments will depend on the personal moral behaviour, decency and honesty of their leading leaders and members. Cabral argued that the decency, honesty and moral behaviour of the party elite were more important in government than adherence to ideology and mechanical dedication to the rules and policies of the party. One of the reasons why most African liberation movements have failed in government is because they claim justification for governing solely on the basis of their liberation legacy, rather than on the basis of accountable, moral and decent behaviour while in power.

In power, they have an additional legitimising tool: the new state and its apparatus. If used for the widest possible national public good and democratic interest, this combined legitimacy should, arguably, be a powerful tool to transform societies for the better. Yet most of these movements have, once in power, wasted the overwhelming legitimacy that comes from a widely shared liberation struggle.

## A top-down structure

During their struggle for independence or liberation, most independence and liberation movements are run by a very small group of leaders, and in some cases even families. In power, these leaders and families become the new ruling aristocracy, replacing the old colonial or white-minority political establishment. Rather than governing in the widest interest, as has been the case in the successful East Asian economies, these movements more often than not spurn a patronage system linked only to the liberation or independence leadership aristocracy.

Because liberation movements have such hegemony, when they assume

power, the political culture manifested within them is often replicated within the new state. The difficulty for many African countries is how to reverse the negative impact on the state if the political culture of the dominant movement turns undemocratic, autocratic or authoritarian. Given the nature of the struggle, many of these movements are organised in a top-down, secretive and military-like fashion, with power in the hands of a small leadership group.

In their attempts to transform their societies, leaders of these movements fuse their parties with the new state to form a kind of 'party-state', with the movement and the party becoming one and the same entity. There is no firewall between the party itself, the executive and legislative committees, and public institutions. In fact, independent democratic institutions are seen as an extension of the party, and not only are the heads of such institutions 'deployed' there by the party leadership, they are also expected to defer to the party leadership. The problem is that if the party is rotten to the core, the state and society will also be so.

## Us and them

Most independence and liberation movements see themselves as the embodiment of the 'people' and therefore speak for the whole nation, with the leader the tribune of the 'people'. The forces in the liberation struggle become divided into those on the side of the liberation movement and those aligned with the colonial or minority government or its allies. In power, many independence and liberation movements still divide the world into those on their side and those belonging to the old order. During the anti-colonial struggle, some indigenous movements allied with the colonial governments or with white-minority regimes. In many cases, in fact, the opposition parties allowed in the post-

independence era have either been the former white colonial ruling parties or, if black, supporters thereof or even, in some cases, opponents to the end of colonialism. This means that, at independence, many of those groups lacked the struggle legitimacy of the dominant independent or liberation movement.

More often than not, colonial governments hand over power in a compromise settlement, with some power still in the hands of groups associated with the colonial government. It is easy for independence and liberation movements to blame such groups or political movements associated with colonialism and white-minority rule (now often opposition parties in the post-colonial era), and the former colonial government, when things go wrong. Opposition or criticism, either from within or from outside the independence or liberation movement, is then (often wrongly) seen as 'opposing the people'. The only way for the ANC to prevent the moral decay of other African independence or liberation movements is for it to transform itself into a wholly internally democratic organisation. Its members, supporters and activists must play more active roles in keeping the ANC democratic and holding its leadership accountable.

## The ANC's watchdogs

In South Africa we are fortunate that there exist a range of progressive groups with 'struggle' legitimacy. Some of these movements are outside the ANC family: the Pan African Congress, for example, and the Black Consciousness Movement. These have of course now lost most of their struggle legitimacy, since not only have they become irrelevant in terms of leadership and policies, but they have also self-destructed in the face of a dominant ANC. But, importantly,

ANC allies such as the South African Communist Party (SACP) also have struggle legitimacy in their own right. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and other unions also have this legitimacy, because both the progressive trade union movement and the SACP opposed apartheid rule on their own (even when they were at times in alliance with the ANC).

Because of the United Democratic Front civic organisations, some struggle NGOs and progressive church movements have their own struggle legitimacy independent from that of the ANC. One way to stop the ANC from backsliding into undemocratic behaviour is for all these movements to act as a watchdog, as well as an ally, of the ANC. Pro-democracy activists of the ANC, together with progressive civil society groups, unions and SACP members could, for example, form a pro-democracy lobby within the ANC and push for the total internal democratisation of the party at all levels, whether in participation in decision and policy-making or leadership election, especially the election of the president.

But African and South African societies must also be less tolerant of non-delivery, mismanagement and autocratic behaviour by leaders. Cosatu general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi summed it up when he said, "The election of a progressive leadership (does not) mean the end of the struggle, and that now we must step back and hand over everything to these progressive, trusted leaders as though they are messiahs and will deliver everything on a silver platter while we are in our beds sleeping."

In the post-independence and liberation period, not many individuals, institutions and groups with struggle credentials are critical enough when their governments start to misrule. In fact, many are prepared to overlook the

## Pro-democracy activists of the ANC, together with progressive civil society groups, unions and SACP members could form a pro-democracy lobby within the ANC and push for the total internal democratisation of the party at all levels

first signs of misrule by arguing that the new government either needs more time, or that it needs to be protected because it is besieged by pro-colonial enemies from within and without. Others argue that only a few leaders are irresponsible, and the movements will miraculously return to the straight and narrow once those few rotten apples are rid of. However, in most cases, by the time the internal critics finally wake up, the rot in these parties is so deep it can no longer be reversed.

If a critical mass of individuals, institutions and communities from within the ANC who also have struggle credentials continually dissent when the ANC goes wrong, the ANC leadership will likely be forced to become more accountable and responsive to criticism, and dismissing such criticism as being opposed to the liberation project will lack credibility. Yet, unless they do so now, with urgency, the ANC will have ossified to such dramatic levels that it will no longer be able to be made democratic. Botswana and Cape Verde can be seen as the most successful post-independence societies. In Mauritius, the independence movement (represented by the Labour Party) split

in half a decade after independence, with the Left breaking away. The split went right through the middle, with the Labour Party itself, as well as the trade unions and civil society groups aligned to it, also splitting. Now, both the old and the breakaway movements had 'struggle' credentials, which meant that the electorate could choose between two 'legitimate' progressive movements. The problem with the Congress of the People, which broke away from the ANC, is that, although its members have struggle legitimacy, it has been unable to shake the perception that it is the representatives of the leadership elite of the ANC that backslid. Now, of course, it is engulfed in similar leadership struggles to those that imploded the PAC and Black Consciousness movements.

The mistake that the opposition Democratic Alliance made in the past is that it did not position itself as a liberation movement, albeit from a 'liberal' strand. Its policy and leadership positioning in the past reinforced the perception among the black majority that it was there to defend the interests of a white minority or even the old apartheid order. If Africa does not want to repeat the wasted 50 years of independence, its citizens must move urgently to democratise their independence and liberation movements, including jettisoning old-style leaders who are only in power because of their struggle credentials, rather than because of their leadership record. If those movements and their leaders are too rotten, African civil society and its trade unions, civil movements and churches must form new parties out of the ashes of independence and liberation movements. ■

William Gumede is author of the forthcoming *The Deocracy Gap: Africa's wasted years*



A burning oil pipeline in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The writer believes oil is not the cause of African ills.

# No such thing as an oil curse

Many blame Africa's ills on the 'resource curse' – the notion that oil and other sought-after commodities lead to conflict, fluctuating exchange rates and unequal societies. **Duncan Clarke** believes this opinion is based on ignorance.

The myth of Africa's so-called 'oil curse' stems from the oft-quoted statement by the then Minister of Oil in Venezuela that oil was the devil's excrement ("el excremento del Diablo").

A host of journalistic accounts and analysis, often based on limited exposure to the oil industry, claim to justify these words of gloom and doom, and the public is led to believe the worst: that Africa is a victim of oil, industry is the predator, and most (if not all) ills in African oil states derive largely from this alleged "paradox of crude" – itself somehow a mysterious and almost inexplicable harbinger of acute or accentuated poverty.

No one should believe that the developing world's oil industries do not need wise management, especially in turbulent environs such as those found in Africa. That's not at issue. Nor are

criticisms of attempts to improve oil-industry management and resource governance on the continent.

What is fundamental is to diagnose the many 'curse' claims within either their original theoretical framework or in the guise of modern variants, and base judgement on relevant empirical evidence. It is precisely all this that is lacking among the critics. Without it, the 'oil curse' epithet becomes merely a slogan, a catchphrase, a rubric of limited use and no value.

Can we really pin proof of the curse of oil in, say, Angola, if it exists, onto a few numbers correlated over two or even three variables for the last 10 or 15 years? This is in effect what the gurus working with econometric-based neo-classical models and restricted studies want us to believe: to me, it's voodoo economics at best. No one in Angola or elsewhere

should be persuaded.

As the modern oil curse models and the evidence mooted for them have come into more serious question, so pundits have manufactured 'new ideas' to bolster their arguments. They have postulated additional and fast-evolving notions to underpin the claims of the oil curse, especially so for Africa, which for some reason is the focus of most of the debate. It seems they want the world to assume that "Africa is cursed by oil": ergo, oil is bad for Africa. However, a number of these notions can be easily debunked.

Firstly, the claim about oil development causing states to "live off their capital" is plainly untenable. Discovery generates wealth, converts natural capital into produced and productive capacity, and thereby creates capital and income streams: it's what development is about. Every African government's officials I have met wants this sort of development, oil-driven or otherwise. It seems only the 'analysts' wish to contest this revealed preference.

A second argument is that of oil creating enclaves. What then of the litany of other post-modernist claims defending Africa's oil curse thesis? Oil and gas linkages into local economies are increasing and substantial, the more so in producer states such as Angola and Nigeria, with fabrication yards, marine bases, and a host of interstices emerging with companies providing related industries and services. This has added to the direct and indirect employment impacts of the African oil industry, which contributes heavily to fiscal receipts and sustains modern job creation.

Then there is the naive claim that African states lack equivalent expertise and bargaining power in negotiations with oil companies. Foreign private oil companies no longer command the oil game in Africa. Many find it tough going. Growing competition comes from state players from elsewhere (over 30

active in Africa, with widening portfolio, as compared to a handful at the turn of century). Moreover, the concept of 'foreign' nowadays incorporates private companies from six continents, many in joint-venture or equity deals with African players of one type or another: it's no longer any sort of 'Western' thing.

The next argument says that oil is the primary cause of inequality in Africa. This is fanciful, as those who have observed the facts can attest. Inequality has long been an embedded phenomenon; moreover it is equally rife in non-oil states. The pattern is shaped by complex factors including drivers from outside the oil world, such as demography, plus many socioeconomic forces attributable to Africa's political complexion. With predictably worsening future demographics, inequalities may well worsen across the continent.

Another argument is that there is no skills creation in oil. Though not all exploration is high-tech, the industry in the full cycle to enhanced production does rely on more advanced technology and technical skills. However, the African oil landscape is composed of many types of technologies and oil/gas field configurations, including many using lower levels of skills and unskilled labour. The African oil industry at large is a highly diversified one, with a wide variety of technical skills and cutting-edge technologies deployed. These are essential for Africa, for its modernisation, and for the enormous wealth creation that is generated by the industry.

A further point relates to Africa's weak exchange rates. There is no mystery over how best to control, mitigate or iron out expected volatilities in oil cycles that could potentially in many cases impact monetary inflows (driven by shifting extraction rates, produced quantities or crude/product prices). Many methods of macroeconomic stabilisation can be deployed, including sovereign wealth funds and offshore accounts. It is up to

the government to do this, and it is the industry's fault if the government does not. Moreover, most volatility in African currencies has its roots elsewhere, outside oil: in political risks, currency management, fiscal imprudence, and institutional or monetary structures. Here the image of oil generating foreign-import reliance is an old myth, and one that has been overtaken by local content development, industry maturation in many countries, and it is only a partial view as it neglects the income/revenue generating impacts of oil on domestic and export market growth.

The idea that the industry's presence inevitably leads to rentier states is, I think, a misconception based on imperfect analysis. What is more typically found is an elite/class (or ethnicity) within the state that monopolises power and benefits flowing from oil. Usually the dominant faction was already dominant prior to the discovery or tapping of oil, or it captured power later. More pertinently, the very fragility and nature of most African nation states – as vehicles for 'ownership' claims from competitive elites – predispose the outcomes found. In other words, it is Africa's medievalism that remains at issue, not its oil industry. In this arena, spoliation and theft – kleptocracy even – may often occur more readily, given that the rule of law is indeed weak across the continent, worse in some environs (not limited to oil states), and most prominent within the state complex (not the corporate world).

Conflict may be found in oil states, and more may lie ahead. But careful examination of antecedent causality has in most instances shown oil development as secondary to the primary determinants involved. Likewise, the authoritarian nature of Africa's political leadership finds its primary sources of control outside the oil field, in social and governance practices adapted to its own perceived political necessities. There is found the "curse of politics" – the fundamental

driver of flawed realpolitik in Africa.

Many initiatives exist to improve Africa's industry governance and oil management. Angola is talking of a sovereign oil fund built on the Norwegian model. Nigeria's audit of oil to improve transparency was a first and partially flawed step, one that could be greatly improved. Both Ghana and Uganda have taken on petroleum industry reform in advance of oil development, even while they have yet to prove their mettle.

Clearly, more reform is needed. Corruption in state bodies in Africa remains and several oil states are still overtly and unnecessarily secretive on their oil revenues. Anxiety remains in societies at large about the management of the African oil industry by political elites. Almost all of this concern relates directly to the grey areas and issues surrounding presidents, families, ministers, clans, leaderships, state energy industry politicians, regulators, oil officials, and connected parties in problematic oil states: in a nutshell, to the "curse of politics" around oil. Very little and rarely are core concerns connected to the industry itself, or the corporate players. These fundamental distinctions need to be kept in mind.

The so-called African 'oil curse' idea is a lazy rubric of dubious convenience that forestalls deeper understanding of Africa, its oil history, petroleum industry impacts, and evolving political economy of oil. The 'theory' as articulated is highly flawed, the evidence unpersuasive (and mostly plain wrong), and it ignores many of the key impacts of oil development in Africa. ■

Duncan Clarke is Chairman & CEO, Global Pacific & Partners, Johannesburg, and author of *Africa: Crude Continent: The Struggle for Africa's Oil Prize*, Profile Books, 2008, now a Film-Documentary made by CNBC-Africa for release in 2010.

# Outcry over cost of Nigeria's 50 Years celebrations

While Nigeria is still plagued with serious economic problems, including falling oil revenues, **Dianna Games** reports Nigerians are up in arms about unnecessary government spending

As fast as Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan was making new friends abroad at the 2010 G8 and G20 meetings, he was losing support at home with the announcement that the government planned to spend a massive (\$66 million) 10 billion naira on the country's 50th anniversary celebrations in October.

The news followed another outcry against wasteful expenditure on a business summit in London, also to mark the 50th anniversary of Nigeria's independence from Britain, which was due to be attended by the president as well as dozens of ministers, governors and officials.

Bowing to public opinion, the president cancelled the visit at short notice, angering potential investors who planned to attend.

Expenditure on these sorts of jamborees goes well beyond the official budgets, with a raft of per diems and

other allowances swelling the figures.

Similarly, the amount earmarked for the local celebrations, which do not appear to be designed to uplift Nigeria – or its image – is just the tip of the iceberg. What it is, Nigerians say, is one big looting opportunity that is more likely to shame the nation than celebrate anything.

The modest former president, Umaru Yar'Adua, had budgeted \$400 000 to mark the occasion.

The \$66 million is contained in a supplementary budget put forward for approval several months after Jonathan signed into law a \$31bn (4.6 trillion naira) budget, which represented a 50% increase over the previous year.

Nigerians are now asking - what is it exactly that Nigeria is celebrating after 50 years.

The nation barely has power, the bulk of economic activity is still in the informal sector, poverty remains

pervasive, national savings are going down, manufacturing is stuttering along and problems in the Niger delta continue to dog production of Nigeria's main revenue generator – oil.

Attempts to address the problems are continually frustrated by official corruption perpetrated by the very people who could change all this – legislators, senators and ministers among them.

It is a pity that Jonathan appears to be reverting to the excesses that Nigerians have become used to from their leaders, as his short tenure has otherwise shown real promise.

For example, rather than assuming the extra post of defence minister when ascending to the presidency, he nominated himself minister of power,

*Scavengers collect scraps at Olusosun dump in Nigeria's commercial capital Lagos.*

Finbarr O'Reilly/REUTERS

giving the ailing sector immediate priority.

In June he ordered the power ministry to fully implement the sector reforms, which have been moving at snail's pace, in order to make room for private investment to improve performance in a sector that currently generates less than 4 000MW of power - compared to South Africa's 43 000MW, for example.

Nigeria's dire power situation is a major impediment to realising the country's vast economic potential. Apart from the cost to development, millions of naira that could be spent on productive pursuits are swallowed up by spending on generators.

Jonathan also took advantage of his appearance on the international stage in June to drum up investment interest in Nigeria at meetings with political and business leaders from around the globe.

His words probably didn't fall on deaf ears given that the G8 countries - America, Britain, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Canada and Russia - are active investors in Nigeria.

But Nigeria, which was considered to be one of the most attractive emerging market economies in the middle of the decade, has not only suffered from the fallout of the global financial crisis, it has had some serious internal problems.

A crisis emerged in the key banking sector, one of the drivers of economic growth, in late 2008, when the extent of rampant speculation and high levels of unsecured debt by half a dozen large banks was exposed.

Nearly \$2.6 billion has been injected into the ailing banks to forestall the systemic risk they pose to the entire banking system. The government is setting up an asset management

**"Nigerians are now asking – what is it exactly that Nigeria is celebrating after 50 years. "**



*Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan waves after an official visit to the family house of late president Umaru Yar'Adua in the northern city of Katsina May 8, 2010.*

Akintunde Akinleye / Reuters

company to buy the bad assets of troubled banks, allowing them to clean up their books in anticipation of new investment in their assets.

Notwithstanding the problems, the government is looking to the sector to fund its growing budget deficit, which is likely to have a negative effect on growth, particularly given that 60% of the expanded budget signed into law this year is for recurrent expenditure.

Lower oil prices mean the state has had to reach ever deeper into its savings to keep the three tiers of government afloat. The excess crude oil account, which captures price windfalls of more than \$67 a barrel, has diminished from \$20 billion to about a quarter of that, not just because of lower prices and reduced production, but also because of ever-increasing demands from state and local governments for a share of the profits.

Jonathan is agitating for the benchmark price to be dropped to \$60 a barrel to increase the savings. He is also scheduled to announce a new licensing round in the oil sector. This is likely to generate significant funding for the national fiscus, particularly from Chinese investors who are eager to get a sizeable foothold in Nigeria's energy sector.

The economic difficulties Nigeria is currently facing can only be exacerbated by excessive spending on the forthcoming 2011 election and rising political risk.


Delivery on political promises is also likely to be compromised as Jonathan's focus shifts to his political chances in the poll, as he is planning to stand

for re-election. As the incumbent, he has been thrust into pole position by an unlikely twist of circumstance but whether he can use this to his advantage remains to be seen.

The unofficial, but powerful, geographical axis of Nigerian politics – the north-south divide - is not in his favour. Hailing from the Niger Delta, he is regarded as a southerner and the northern politicians believe it is still the north's turn to rule as Yar'Adua failed to serve two of the presidential terms "zoned" for northerners.

Jonathan is therefore expected to stand down and allow a northerner to stand as the presidential candidate for the ruling People's Democratic Party. He has some strong contenders within the party from the north including former military leader Gen Ibrahim Babangida, and former vice president Atiku Abubakar who disgraced himself in a long-running public spat with his one time boss, then president Olusegun Obasanjo.

Jonathan, never a power broker in the high-stakes game of Nigerian politics that relies on geography and ethnicity, rather than meritocracy as criteria for power, has risen to the top as a result of several lucky breaks and may not have the political weight to be voted in as the PDP candidate for 2011.

These are testing times for Nigeria's economy but, as usual, economic policy and performance are likely to take second place to the political agenda for some time to come, which is not going to be helpful in getting the economy back on its feet. 

# Rushed, ill considered and presumptuous?

## Delving into South Africa's national Integrated Resource Plan for electricity

Establishing a viable energy planning strategy for South Africa has been a highly contentious process. **Trusha Reddy** believes the way the Department of Energy has gone about it is highly flawed – and that the goal as described by the Department is not progressive.

One of the biggest energy-related planning processes in South Africa, the national Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2, is well underway. The process is to set the electricity-planning agenda for 20 years, determining the role of renewable energy, nuclear energy, coal-fired power, imports, the independent power producers and thus Eskom, and the country's carbon-reduction commitments. The policy is also likely to hold implications for the region in which South

African energy interests are invested and Eskom's tentacles gripped. Yet there are several aspects to the formation of the IRP2 that already look problematic. Aside from it following a highly flawed IRP1 process, the government having already approved a controversial new infrastructure build programme – initially pegged at R343 million – and the electricity regulator having approved two tariff hikes.

There is no doubt that South Africa needs to extricate itself



from its dependence on the cheap, dirty electricity on which it claims to have achieved global competitiveness for decades. Almost 80% of South Africa's greenhouse gas emissions are generated by the energy sector, and the country is ranked amongst the top twenty energy-related emitters in the world. The Department of Environmental Affairs, which is drafting a climate-change policy later this year, also acknowledges this. In particular, it emphasises that the country must diversify its energy mix, establish far-reaching energy efficiency measures, invest in the development of new and cleaner technologies and industries, and begin the journey to a lower-carbon economy. It also considers the need for carbon constraints and for substantial emission reductions in the energy sector to be central to the energy policy processes, of which the IRP2 is key.

But thus far the IRP2 process has been contentious. The timetable being pursued is extremely ambitious, with just five months until it is 'gazetted' (put out officially in the public domain).

## Timing

Another related contention is that of timing. The Integrated Energy Plan is due to be completed later this year when in fact it should be done prior to the IRP2, given that electricity planning is only a subset of the wider energy issues. In fact, the Department agrees to the order of the processes, as stated in a letter to civil-society actors. However, the letter whimsically concludes by stating that the two plans are distinct and the Department prefers to focus on the IRP at this stage.

Then there is the matter of the special task team that has been appointed by the Department to run the entire process. Representatives from big industrial and mining companies including Xtrata, AngloAmerican,

Exarro and BHP Billiton have been appointed to the team. BHP Billiton is one of the 138 corporations that have benefited from special pricing agreements with Eskom, having received power at 12c per kwh – which is below even the cost of production.

In the letter referred to above, the Department also revealed the names of the people on the team – but the team's actual role remains opaque as, its members have been asked to sign confidentiality agreements stipulating that they are not allowed to speak

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There is no doubt that South Africa needs to extricate itself from its dependence on the cheap, dirty electricity on which it claims to have achieved global competitiveness for decades.

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directly with the public or the media. The Department argues that the task-team members were chosen for their individual 'technical expertise', and stresses that the IRP2 document is ultimately a technical output.

## Conflict of interests

What is most telling here is that the favourable treatment industry already receives from the government is echoed in the running of the process. More to the point, the process reflects a serious conflict of interests that pits elite lobbying interests against national public interests, in a situation where the majority of people suffer the brunt of punishing electricity price hikes

and live in a state of 'energy poverty'. These issues are particularly stark when considering that community- and civil-society representation on the team is glaringly absent.

The draft parameters of the IRP2 list a set of assumptions with some serious gaps. As far as the supply side goes, the key assumptions appear to include unquestioning acceptance of a continued reliance upon coal and nuclear energy. The assumption that the new build programme is going ahead as initially envisaged back in 2008, when we had an electricity crisis with rolling blackouts, is a source of serious concern. Kusile, the coal-fired power station next in line in the new build programme after Medupi, is considered a done deal. This despite the fact that there is no money for such a massive project: the national electricity provider, Eskom, has declared a funding gap of R110 billion in the next three years. There will also be no savings on carbon emissions. In fact, Kusile (like Medupi) will emit 24 megatons of carbon, equivalent to the entire emissions of a small Western European country like Norway. Clearly, the station needs to be considered a business-as-usual scenario rather than an assumption.

## Veiled threats

Eskom's message, as with that of the Department of Energy, contains veiled threats about security of supply with a firm message that the new build options must continue and 'cannot be deferred', to prevent 'negative consequences for the economy'. In fact, many if not most of the parameters are about security of supply to the exclusion of environmental considerations. Nuclear and renewables (listed as one unit) are the only carbon-related parameters. If one reads Eskom's and the Department's presentations together, there is a



Vismedia

*Instead of moving towards carbon-free sources of electricity, South Africa is increasingly becoming dependent on coal as energy source.*

certain harmony of thinking that ought not be there if the IRP2 policy is a forward-looking document. Perhaps Eskom's funding model, which places its own survival next to security of supply, should be a critical departure (or fault line) for the Department. Locking in these assumptions, or accepting the conventional wisdom, will ultimately mean that genuinely exploring renewable options to meet carbon emission targets, and diversifying power supply options including considering independent power producers, will effectively be taken out of the mix.

Supply options in particular need to consider the kind of technologies, like diversifying and democratising

ownership, and the role of clean technologies in contributing to environmental or health improvements. Getting nuclear-driven, foreign companies like Areva driving solar in the country, or indeed coal-mining companies like Exarro building wind power stations, sets up other complex questions which IRP2 must grapple with.

Another worrying issue, despite the Department stating that the process is 'neither prejudicial nor (will) pre-empt any particular outcomes', is that it and other government departments have been openly speaking about their commitment to building more nuclear power stations. This confusing rhetoric detracts from a process which

should consider all electricity options with an equal weighting then carefully evaluate them on the basis of their claims to improve energy security, and have environmental, social and health integrity.

Planning should also consider demand side management. This should not only relate to energy efficiency measures but also to changing (or, rather, reducing) demand. Considering that up to 75% of electricity is consumed by industry, the effort should be on transforming industry's functioning itself. This could mean changing prices to make electricity a more valuable resource, which is also an equity issue, and diversifying to smaller industries. Industrial

policy must thus also harmonise with electricity planning. Tackling these issues head on also means challenging some of the myths around demand that may be created in order to justify untenable new build projects.

Clarity and consensus on the concepts is vitally important if just and effective outcomes are to be achieved. Yet the goal described by the Department isn't clear – 'sustainable development' is in fact used interchangeably with 'sustainable economic growth'. Development is not contingent upon growth, at least not where growth means gross domestic product, which is the interpretation most consistent with government thinking.

## Elite interests

Then, in the context of the IRP2 planning, there is mention of 'externalities', which is an odd and obfuscating construction of language. Aside from the concept being highly contested because it reduces environmental, health and social factors to a narrow quantification of

their economic costs, these issues are actually excluded from the list of externalities altogether. The limited scope of the list only includes emissions and then a motley collection


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**Tackling these issues head on also means challenging some of the myths around demand that may be created to justify untenable new building projects.**

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of issues, including financing and policy directions on technology. It is also questionable whether policy directions on coal, nuclear and renewable energy should be considered an externality. If it is a long-term plan, should the IRP2 not

be determining the policy direction of technology development and deployment, and not the other way around? The way the process is currently set up creates the impression that once again elite lobbying interests desire to drive central policy choices by disaggregating them. This may be part of a tendency within Eskom that has resulted in the edging out of renewables.

The concept of 'clean' is also varied and should be clarified. One of the parameters implies that nuclear power would address climate change concerns and should thus be considered 'clean', but this is highly contested. Clean coal is another fractious issue. The government has recently boasted that Medupi will be using super-critical coal technology (so-called 'clean coal'), which emits fewer greenhouse gases, and will thus be applying for carbon credits. As the difficult days lie ahead, careful attention must be paid to drafting a final policy whose process has integrity. The consolidation of a democracy depends on it. 

# Renewable energy taking root in Africa

Several African countries have invested heavily in renewable energy, notably hydro-power, and more recently, wind generation.

In Morocco a \$300 million wind farm in Melloussa - the biggest in Africa - was recently inaugurated. According to the Moroccan energy and mining minister, Yamsmina Benkhadra, the wind farm is part of a \$3 billion global project the country hopes to complete by 2020.

The entire project will involve the construction of five wind farms that are expected to increase Morocco's wind generation capacity from the current 280 megawatts to 2,000MW when

completed. This is 15% of the country's energy needs. The Melloussa wind farm is the first phase of the global project, and other sites have been identified as Tetouan, Taza, Layoune and Boujdour.

It is being held up as a model of energy security and sustainable development.

Meanwhile, Kenya is also constructing a 300MW capacity wind farm around Lake Turkana. The \$812 million project, which is to be completed by 2012, is expected to provide for a quarter of Kenya's current installed power.


The Dutch consortium developing the Kenyan wind energy project on the

edge of the world's largest permanent desert lake, estimate the wind farm has the potential to generate a further 2,700MW. Besides this project, Kenya's private investors are planning to construct a wind farm near a premier tourist destination, Lake Naivasha.

Other African countries are also looking into wind power. Ethiopia has commissioned a 120MW farm in Tigray region, while Tanzania is also planning the construction of two projects with the potential combined output of at least 110MW, in the central Singida region.

(Sources: riadzany.blogspot, and Guardian-UK)

# Between a pebble bed and a hard place



The South African government finally appears to have decided to pull the plug on the pebble bed modular reactor project. Although the project has gobbled up almost R9 billion of taxpayers' money, it still needed at least another R23 billion to set up the demonstration reactor and the fuel plant to make the pebbles.

**David Fig** asks why South Africa continued to sink huge resources into the project until recently.

During her 2010 budget presentation in February, South Africa's public enterprises minister Barbara Hogan announced the government's decision to cut its financial support to Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (Pty) Ltd (PMBR). This has probably put paid to the company's plans to build a demonstration model of a locally developed high-temperature reactor called the pebble bed modular reactor.

Its name is such because it uses a technology involving pebble-shaped fuel elements and can be constructed in multiples called modules. Originally

the aim of the pebble bed project was to deliver energy to industry and households, both locally and for export. It was foreseen that it would export 20 reactors a year and build about 10 for domestic use.

However, the technology has proven difficult for the company to master and the building of the demonstration model has repeatedly been postponed. After initially setting the completion date for 2003, the company has continually deferred this, and in 2009 it announced that it had rescheduled completion to around 2020 – a delay of at least 17 years.

The design of the reactor itself has also been modified five times. PBMR stated in February 2009 that the latest version would only generate 80 megawatts of electricity, compared to the earlier target of 165 megawatts. It also no longer claimed that the only rationale for the pebble bed reactor was the delivery of electricity. Instead, its purpose was said to have extended to the generation of heat for industry, the possible extraction of oil from tar sands, hydrogen production and the desalination of seawater.

In terms of costing the pebble bed reactor, Dave Nicholls, an early leader

of the project, estimated in 1998 that the cost of getting the pilot reactor and fuel plant running would be R1.1 billion. By May 2005 this had escalated to R14.9 billion. Estimates doubled within four years and reached R32 billion in August 2009. These estimates do not include operational costs, fuel costs, security provisions, ultimate waste disposal, decommissioning or insurance. Given that the real costs are expected to rise, it is highly likely that the 2009 estimate will be greatly surpassed, should the facilities ever materialise. Cost and construction time overruns have been a typical feature of the nuclear industry in general.

Given the immense cost, the minimal power dividend and the opportunity cost (foregoing smart development of clean energy resources), why did South Africa continue to sink such huge resources into the pebble bed project until recently?

South Africa's nuclear programme can be traced back to the 1950s, when at the onset of the Cold War, the country was integrated into the global nuclear arms race. The development of the nuclear programme was initially understood to be strictly for peaceful purposes, such as generating electricity, and nuclear explosives for the mining and construction industries.

### Nuclear policy under democracy

With the democratisation of South Africa, critics of the apartheid nuclear programme saw an opportunity for a new beginning. One way of proceeding was to rethink the way in which the assets of the nuclear industry could be redeployed, and the highly skilled human capital used for more socially useful purposes.

Capitalising on the kudos derived internationally from the voluntary end to its weapons programme in 1989, the new government strongly promoted the idea of Africa becoming a nuclear-weapons-free zone. The new government's efforts came to fruition in 2009 with the

**“as the nuclear policy debate for a democratic South Africa unfolded, the new state flirted increasingly with the industry's remnants, but behind closed doors and in an atmosphere of secrecy that emulated past apartheid practice”**

ratification of the Treaty of Pelindaba.

However, as the nuclear policy debate for a democratic South Africa unfolded, the new state flirted increasingly with the industry's remnants, but behind closed doors and in an atmosphere of secrecy that emulated past apartheid practice. Some nuclear engineers from the apartheid bomb programme had, after 1989, found employment with the Integrated Systems Technology Holdings (Pty) Ltd company (IST), which provided electronic systems for Armscor, the state-owned military procurement enterprise.

### Over to Eskom

During the following five years, Eskom took increasing control of the project. In July 1995, it appointed IST to undertake a series of feasibility studies and then granted its nuclear division a R260 million contract to develop the pebble bed reactor's design.

The optimism with which the project was promoted foresaw that foreign investment would play an important role in commercialising the reactor for export. It therefore came as a great shock when US-based nuclear reactor operator company Exelon decided to withdraw from the project in April 2002.

What motivated this withdrawal?

According to PMBR's CEO Dave Nichols, it was due to a 'change in strategic direction' of Exelon. However, it meant that PMBR lost the possibility of Exelon – the largest nuclear utility company in the US – championing the passage of the reactor's safety design specifications through the US nuclear regulators.

Exelon co-chief executive John Rowe had a somewhat different take on the reasons for disinvestment. He claimed that Exelon had pulled out because “the project was three years behind schedule and was too speculative”.

A further possibility is that the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had begun to ask important questions about the core temperatures in the reactor, which Exelon was not cut out to answer. During Exelon's initial approach, the regulator had raised concerns about the fuel fabrication process and control-room design.

Mr DA Powers, a member of the NRC's Advisory Committee on Safeguards, stated in October 2001 that the reactor was seriously flawed, since the chaotic and unpredictable movements of the pebbles inside the reactor vessel were a prescription for core instability. Powers also noted that Chernobyl had demonstrated the potential flammability of graphite, the substance used to coat the pebbles and the inside lining of the reactor vessel.

The approval process was halted in the wake of Exelon's disinvestment. Without NRC approval of the design, it is impossible for the pebble bed reactor to find a market in the US. Further, many countries will want to see accreditation by regulatory bodies in developed countries before making a commitment to purchase.

Having lost Exelon as a partner, Eskom became even more reliant on its only other foreign investor to provide the project with some international credibility. Originally the partner was

British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), a state-owned company that was not privatised along with the rest of the British nuclear industry in 1996, apparently because the operating and decommissioning costs of Britain's oldest reactors and troubled reprocessing plants would not produce profits for private investors. BNFL's shareholding was ultimately bought by US-based Westinghouse, which is now controlled by Toshiba.

Westinghouse has proven to be no more of an active partner in PBMR than its BNFL predecessor, not having added further investment to the project. Strategically, however, it purchased the nuclear division of IST, which was involved in the early feasibility studies and design of the reactor, as well as developing the helium testing facility at Pelindaba. This sale occurred in 2007 and Westinghouse used its apparent commitment to the reactor project as leverage to tender for the first orders of large-scale new generation Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) for South Africa.

However, after considerable delays, Eskom announced in 2008 that it was abandoning the tender process because of lack of finance for new PWRs. Both Westinghouse (with its AP-1000 model) and Areva (with its EPR, already in trouble in Finland and France) had been possible contenders. More recently, Eskom has awarded Westinghouse the contract for refuelling Koeberg in the 2011–2015 cycle.

In August 2009, the CEO of PBMR, Jaco Kriek, presented a new investment profile to parliamentarians. This reflects a reduction of investment by all former partners and an 83% investment on the part of the state, presumably through the Department of Public Enterprises. These percentages also signify Eskom's increasing distance from the project.

Despite the fact that Eskom, a state-owned corporation, has been commercialised, it nevertheless has had extremely weak financial management.

In 2009 it announced a R9.7 billion loss for the previous financial year. The poor financial management is also reflected in the runaway escalation of the costs of constructing the reactor demonstrating power plant and its fuel fabrication plant.

### Will a demonstration PBMR ever happen?

It seems increasingly unlikely that the demonstration plant will materialise. By March 2010, PMBR could not longer afford to retain more than 200 of its original 800 staff, and three of 11 managers. Subsequent press reports indicated even more redundancies. Since it has failed to tap the Treasury for further grants, it will need to contract loans on the open market, or seek partners (like Westinghouse) to inject direct investment, if it is to survive. These options are very unlikely to materialise before August

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**"PBMR is also recognising that it can no longer claim to provide any definitive answer to the country's electricity needs."**

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2010, when the government will finally pronounce on its prospects.

The arguments for ditching the reactor project are compelling. First, each unit will not be able to deliver very much electricity and therefore the project will not fulfil its early promise of assisting the nation to fill its energy gap. Instead, Eskom has begun to turn more decisively towards the idea of building new-generation PWRs at sites identified in the 1980s. Second, the reactors might be in a position to generate heat for industry, but most industrial and existing thermal power plants generate immense

amounts of waste heat anyway. The technology for capturing and applying this waste heat locally may cost only a fraction of that of a pebble bed reactor.

Third, South Africa has a rather precarious electricity budget, with Eskom desperately attempting to raise funds through cuts, higher tariffs and loans. It is unlikely that the reactor project would alleviate this problem; rather, it would add considerably to infrastructural costs and intensify the national debt.

Fourth, as with all other nuclear installations, the industry claims it is low-carbon. While it is true that the nuclear reaction does not contribute to carbon emissions, the entire chain of production does lead to considerable emissions. This includes the mining of uranium, its conversion to a gas, subsequent enrichment, fuel fabrication, the transportation of nuclear materials, the reprocessing of spent fuel and the decommissioning of reactors. In the South African context, extensive amounts of fossil fuels would be consumed in these processes.

Fifth, the special pleading and lack of transparency in the South African nuclear industry mean that the PBMR as a project has compromised our democracy. Nuclear installations require high levels of security, secrecy and centralisation. Our standards of governance of the industry have not risen to the level required to match our democratic aspirations.

Sixth, there is no guarantee that the fifth redesign is the final one, or that there is any definite date for finalising the EIA, the licensing process, or the construction of the demonstration plant. Projections keep being revised and postponed until further into the future.

As a result of all this, the order books are empty. PBMR is also recognising that it can no longer claim to provide any definitive answer to the country's electricity needs. ■

*Go to [www.issafrica.org](http://www.issafrica.org) to read the full article.*



Nigerian films gained popularity in the 1980's when the government tried to impose conservative values on the society

# Nollywood's ingenuity and innovation come out of the woodwork

The world's second largest film industry, Nollywood, is poised to enter a new phase of growth, development and regulation when it formalises critical issues of copyright and distribution. **POPPIE MPHUTHING** writes that Nollywood's success story shows Africa's alternative models for growth that are legitimate and sustainable.

Nollywood – Africa's "diamond in the rough" - has burgeoned into a multimillion dollar sector in less than two decades. Through political adversity and unstable economic times in Nigeria, Nollywood has persevered to become the second largest film industry in the world. Created by Africans for Africans, the industry embodies the democratic hope that many Africans strive for. It is representative, accessible and driven by the will of the people.

A series of political and economic events conspired to create the optimum conditions that spurred the genesis of Nollywood, making its growth both fortuitous and destined. In the 1980s cinema was squeezed out of the public mainstream as the government of the day converted theatres into churches. The spirit of entertainment it seems, was to be firmly re-routed to the religious realm.

In the face of the conservative values of the public- political sphere, that sought to exert control over private space, a desire

The demand for Nigerian films has been recognised by cable channels in the United States and Britain.

for entertainment was only fuelled. The desire was not extinguished, but fulfilled in alternative spaces. Film watching was driven underground. Video parlours sprung up, just like the Speakeasy's that buzzed all over New York City during the Prohibition, years earlier. And so the 'Moonshine' of home-video entertainment was brewed, sold in bulk and consumed with fervour.

Ironically the then government's desire to streamline spirituality only resulted in its transformation and resurrection in the thousands of films that are produced each year. Nollywood's success lies in the deep understanding and personal affinity script writers, producers and directors have with the religious fabric of their country.

A Harvey Business School paper entitled *Nollywood: The Nigerian Film Industry*, describes a fortuitous development in technology that benefitted Nigeria in the early 1990s, with the introduction of the DVD across the world. The cost of VHS tapes fell, opening an avenue of producing films at fractional cost. The iconic 1992 *Living In Bondage* was the brainchild of an electrical equipment salesman, Kenneth Nnebue from Lagos. With a shop full of blank VHS tapes that were not selling he shot the film with a few friends, for release straight to tape.

And so the democratisation of Nigerian film took root as production costs plummeted. Producers were not hamstrung because they did not have huge budgets. By being forced by the government's restrictions to bypass cinemas, an outlet at the forefront of the traditional film distribution chains of

Hollywood and Bollywood, millions of Nigerians were given access to the stories made for them.

Through the Nigerian Television Authority, the government unwittingly gave further impetus to the domestic film industry in the 1990s by withdrawing support for local productions in favour of foreign content. In particular it favoured soap operas from South America that simply did not resonate with its audience. The alienation of Nigeria's TV watching public bolstered the popularity of Nollywood productions that were affordable and easily accessible. The average cost of a VHS tape or DVD is \$2, an amount most Nigerians can afford. For poor urban and rural consumers who cannot afford video machines and televisions, video parlours that screen the home-grown films are a more affordable option.

Critics of Nollywood point to the relatively poor production values of most films. Nollywood films are shot mostly on location in rented homes and hotel rooms. But it is clear that for the African consumer, familiar themes are more important than the highly-stylised and polished production values of foreign cinematic traditions. For viewers in Nigeria the majority has cast its vote. It chooses to consume home-grown made-for-tape productions, rather than internalise foreign cinematic values. Local productions easily out-sell foreign blockbusters according to africanmoviechannel.com.

**Through its Entertainment Industry Support programme, the World Bank has committed to contribute \$20 million to the sector.**



*The movie "Covenant of the Ancestors", about young people being caught up in the Niger Delta violence, is being shot near Yenagoa.*


In recent years the democratisation of Nollywood has impacted on Diaspora communities in the Caribbean, America and the United Kingdom. Africanmoviechannel.com says there has even been "the advent of Nollywood movies in mainstream cinema in the UK and North America.

The demand for Nigerian films has been recognised by cable channels in the United States and Britain. A large number of the two million Nigerians living in the UK buy imported Nollywood DVDs and Videotapes. Across the continent, M-Net's Africa Magic Channel caters to Africans interested in the stories of their Nigerian brothers and sisters. Films are sold in Ghana, Togo, Kenya, Uganda and South Africa.

The industry that is independent from the government and non-governmental organisations is the second largest employer in Nigeria. It provides thousands of jobs for actors, screen writers, directors, sound technicians and camera operators. An estimated 200,000 people are directly employed by the industry and 1 million people indirectly. The estimated revenue of the industry is \$250 million and now Nollywood is heading towards a new phase of growth,

development and regulation, which has the potential to strengthen the economic security of Africa's most populous nation.

In May this year the ingenuity and resilience of Nollywood was recognised by the World Bank. Africa.Com reports that the Bank has committed to contribute \$20 million to the sector. According to the Business World Intelligence Online, through its Entertainment Industry Support programme, the Bank will contribute as much as \$40 million. The funds will be used to ensure copyright and piracy protection, improve distribution and establish a Nigerian Film Institute. As many as 10,000 jobs are expected to be created over the next five years - a testament to the strides Nollywood has taken and the untapped potential growth it can still achieve.

The birth and growth of Nollywood shows that ingenuity and innovation does not only thrive in formal, mainstream economies. Perseverance and creativity through adversity have been the core drivers that spurred the industry to become the success it is today. The existence of Nollywood shows that globally, and on the continent, there can be alternative models for growth that are legitimate and sustainable. 

# African teams' performance broke our hearts

Aside from the poor performance of their teams, African countries also didn't gain as much financially from the 2010 World Cup as they would have hoped, reports **S'busiso Mseleku**.

At face value, it seems that the high expectations created by South Africa hosting the first FIFA World Cup on this continent were not met. For starters, there was hope that the benchmark set by Cameroon at the 1990 tournament in Italy and equalled by Senegal in Korea/Japan 2002 – that of reaching the quarterfinals – would be surpassed, primarily because the African countries would be playing on home soil.

For the first time in the World Cup's 80-year history, Africa had six teams

playing. The continent normally has five representatives but thanks to South Africa hosting the tournament, they had five plus one representation. This was one more reason to give hope that Africa would surpass its previous performances at the World Cup.

However, the performances of five of the African representatives – including the South African hosts – turned out to be some of the most embarrassing so far, as they all bowed out in the first round (with the exception of Ghana).

As soon as the first round was over, and the Black Stars of Ghana were the only African team left standing, Africans started asking themselves the same question that Holland supporters always ask themselves at the beginning of every World Cup: Is it going to be different this time?

And when Ghana beat the USA 2-1 in extra time to march to the quarterfinals to face Uruguay, the continent went ballistic with joy. Here was a chance for the best team on the continent – who



*The 2010 FIFA World Cup was branded as an African event*

had been crowned the world Under-20 champions at the FIFA Under-20s World Cup in Egypt late last year – to go further and make the continent even prouder.

It is now history that Uruguayan Luis Suárez stopped the ball from crossing the line and going into the net right at the end of extra time with one kick remaining, and the teams tied at 1-all. That kick belonged to Asamoah Gyan who had scored twice from the spot already. What followed broke many an African heart as Gyan blasted his penalty kick against the crossbar, thus sending the game to the dreaded penalty shootout. And so with a 4-2 defeat Africa's hopes went up in smoke.

For their efforts, Ghana only received US\$1 million more than their other African counterparts, as the prize monies were distributed in such fashion that all countries eliminated in the first round received \$8 million, \$9 million was awarded to each team exiting after the round of 16, and \$14 million to each team exiting after the quarter-finals.

The eventual winners, Spain, received a whopping \$30 million, with the Netherlands pocketing \$24 million for being runners-up, while third-placed Germany got \$20 million and Uruguay received \$18 million for finishing fourth.

So, pragmatically, Gyan's miss cost Ghana at least US\$4 million in prize money, as they would have qualified for at least \$18 million if they had gone on to lose in the semi-final and also lose in the third and fourth-place play-off to finish fourth. Another way of looking at it would be that Suarez's handball, which he has since referred to as 'The Second Hand of God', earned his country an extra and undeserved \$4 million from the tournament.

Furthermore, all 32 participating nations, including the six African countries, received an advance of \$1 million from FIFA for participation costs. Professional clubs from which players were selected to represent their countries

at the World Cup also benefitted, as FIFA put aside \$40 million to compensate for the time the players spent with their national teams.

In South Africa, mega-rich Mamelodi Sundowns got the lion's share of this fund, as they had four players who spent 28 days with the Bafana Bafana national team.

The other high expectation from a number of African countries was that they would make a killing from business that would be generated by the event. South Africa's neighbouring states spruced up their tourist attractions

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## “South Africa's neighbouring states spruced up their tourist attractions and started salivating at the number of countries that would use them as team base camp.”

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and started salivating at the number of countries that would use them as team base camps, as well as the tourists they expected to take short sojourns from the southernmost tip of Africa into their countries. However, this was not to be.


Even Zimbabwe, who had five-time World champions Brazil play a friendly against its national soccer team, the Warriors, did not benefit that much as the Brazilians, said to have been accompanied by about 50 journalists and around 100 fans, only spent a day in the country, arriving at 10pm on the eve of the match and leaving at 7pm the following day. An outcry ensued in Zimbabwe after players complained about the payment they received from rubbing shoulders with their esteemed

Brazilian counterparts. It was reported that some players, including South Africa-based Zvenyika Makonese and England-based Benjamin Mwariwaru, scoffed at the pittance and even gave it back. Mwariwaru is then said to have hosted a reception dinner party for his dejected teammates!

While Brazil was reportedly paid a R7.4 million (\$979,464) appearance fee, the Zimbabwean team was given a paltry R29,000 (\$3,838); equivalent to R1,400 (\$185) per player when divided between the entire squad.

While Brazil's stay in Zimbabwe was short and might not have provided the windfall that many expected, authorities say that it has opened the door to tourists, who now see the country in a different light and are pouring into areas such as the Victoria Falls.

Twenty-one African countries contributed 300 volunteers to the total of 15,000 who performed different duties during the World Cup. Cameroon provided the most at 78, followed by Ghana who supplied 52, and the most populous African nation, Nigeria, supplied 32 volunteers, while Botswana provided 28. These individuals acquired a series of different event-management-related skills, as they worked in a variety of places such as the stadiums, media centres, airports and Football for Hope villages. Members of the different African national football associations were also given some tasks during the tournament, to the benefit of their management skills.

It would seem that the biggest gain made by the continent from South Africa's successful hosting of the World Cup is that the world is now looking at Africa in a different light. It is now seen as a continent that can host a world-class event, no matter how big or how challenging. 

S'Busiso Mseleku is Sports Editor for City Press newspaper in Johannesburg



FIFA Fan Fest on the Grand Parade in Cape Town where around 25,000 people gathered ahead of Bafana Bafana's second World Cup match.

# Team SA the ultimate winners

It was with much tripidation that some fans travelled to South Africa to attend the 2010 Fifa World Cup in June and July. **Keto Segwai** reports on their experiences.

Caroline Dessing, one of thousands of Dutch fans, together with a partner, had clocked 8,499 km by road attending all their team's games, right up to the final match in Soccer City, Johannesburg. "The people are so friendly. The roads, hospitality and safety have been perfect," she noted.

No matter how many visitors were quizzed, the impression tended to be the same: all had praise for South Africa and the way the tournament was organised. To find negative criticism turned out to be a mission impossible.

Apparently World Cup fever had smitten everybody. Perhaps that is what happens when you expect the

worst and then are pleasantly surprised. In the run-up to the event, foreign tabloid media, particularly British and Australian, had described the perceived South African savagery in gory terms.

But there were also no scenes of the infamous European and South American soccer hooligans rampaging through the streets of Soweto,

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**"The uniqueness of the World Cup is that there are no permanent fans. Everything is flux."**

downtown Johannesburg, the precincts of Loftus stadium in Pretoria, or any of the host cities. During the tournament, 12 Latin American hooligans were intercepted at OR Tambo International Airport and politely told they were unwelcome, before being returned to their home country.

Africa's first ever World Cup was only open for business to well-mannered hosts and guests. Regrettably, the first criminal acts to be perpetrated during the World Cup did involve the guests – that is, the robbing of Spanish journalists and stealing of large amounts of cash from the Uruguayan team's hotel. Their cases were

dealt with through the swift justice-dispensing machine that was put in place for the World Cup. So was the case of a British journalist, who used a luxury-starved England fan as a live decoy to prove the ineffectiveness of the security measures.

'North Koreans massacred', 'Ghana shatter American dream', 'Heartbreak for Bafana. French disgrace', 'Italy's shameful homecoming' and 'England: Out of Africa'.

These were some of the headlines splashed across the back pages of newspapers around the world. Yet they could belie the fact that soccer is christened 'the beautiful game', and that its primary motivation is to bring people together in a positive way.

Hillary Bamulinde, who had travelled from Uganda to watch a match in Rustenburg with a friend, pointed out that: "this is what we live for – to be there and tell the tale. Some experiences have to be felt. In many years from now, we will tell our children that we were there when the World Cup finally came to Africa. We were there in the winter to see Ghana draw with Australia."

A Botswana fan, meanwhile, wrote in her local paper that; "By January 2010 I decided that I would go to any game, just to be part of this first-ever World Cup to be hosted in Africa, particularly by our neighbour."

The uniqueness of the World Cup is that there are no permanent fans. Everything is flux. They are just too many complexities at play.

This tournament was proudly billed as the showcase African World Cup. Many an African had travelled far and wide to converge in South Africa and soak up the atmosphere at 'home'. "I had to come, as this opportunity will perhaps never presents itself again in Africa during my lifetime," noted a Zambian fan from Ndola when quizzed in Pretoria, en route to the Ghana-Serbia clash.

The African Union will forever be envious of the perennially elusive unity among Africans that the World Cup managed to achieve in its 31 days of play.

The hosts – the South Africans, and Africans in general – rallied behind their six African teams that competed in the Cup, namely Algeria, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. Most of these having been eliminated in the early stages of the games, Ghana was ultimately burdened with keeping the hopes of all Africa

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**"Africans watched in horror as their teams were culled one by one until it was clearly a matter of 'the African Cup without the African teams.' But, amusingly, this did not dampen the spirits of the hosts."**

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alive. What a daunting responsibility.

Africans watched in horror as their teams were culled one by one, until it was clearly a matter of "the African Cup without African teams." But, amusingly, this did not dampen the spirits of the hosts. Football fans are predisposed to move on and search for new friends and new enemies. It becomes a case of "the enemy of my friend is also my enemy". The ensuing permutations or alliances can be influenced by many varied factors that include colonial histories, European/South American/Asian league preferences, individual star preferences, or simply having lived or having friends in a particular country.

The foreign teams that orchestrated the exit of African teams inadvertently drove multitudes of cheering African fans to their new opposing sides.

This is best illustrated by one South African fan at Pretoria's Centurion Fan Fest, Oscar Mthimunye, whose poster read: "Luis Suarez is a criminal. He robbed Ghana. He robbed Africa. Viva Holland."

Besides the Uruguyan's deliberate 'robber' handball, the Dutch also proved to be popular guests, particularly with their travelling orange caravans that traversed the length and width of South Africa, breathing economic life into desolate small towns (dorpies) along their path.

In general, business was reportedly good for townships near cities where the games were hosted, particularly after the tourist hordes discovered the consumer-friendly prices and ambiance offered by such locations. Television images of cheerful foreign football fans tucking into prime South African beef at township taverns were a marvel to watch. Some even accepted crash courses in having a 'braai' – a truly South African-style barbeque. At least they took a genuine piece of South Africa home with them.

Evidently the other entrepreneurs who will sorely miss the 31-day jamboree are the street hawkers who ply their trade at intersections, selling an assortment of merchandise. They discarded almost everything else for the hottest selling items – the flags of competing countries. "It's a must that one follows the games closely to know which teams are on the rise. On average I'm making a thousand rands a day," said one street seller, with an impending tinge of bitterness.

"How I wish this World Cup thing could be just a little bit longer. Soon I'll be going back to the mundane work of selling sunglasses, stickers and what-have-you," he added. ☐

# An unholy alliance

### *The unspoken alliance*

**Review by:** Lauren Hutton

In his book *The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's secret alliance with apartheid South Africa*, Sasha Polakow-Suransky explores the relationship between Israel and South Africa. Central to the book is the alliance between the two isolated states that allowed South Africa to develop advanced nuclear missile technology and provided Israel with the raw material and testing space it needed to expand its defence capacity. This book investigates the manner in which the interests and ideologies of the apartheid and Israeli states merged at a particular historical time to form a strategic military alliance that delivered both economic and security benefits.

Relations between South Africa and Israel in the 1970s have been a topic of international interest for many years. To some the two states might seem incompatible bed fellows but going back thirty odd years, the apartheid state and the Israeli state found themselves in remarkably similar circumstances: both were struggling to survive in extremely (and increasingly) hostile neighbourhoods and national defence and security decision making was becoming dominated by a common siege mentality.

For Israel the 1973 Yom Kippur War, although declaring outright the military might and strategic and defence supremacy of Israel, brought international condemnation and isolation. In 1975, the Arab League succeeded in passing a damaging resolution in the UN General Assembly, which equated Zionism and Israeli defence and security strategies with racism and the conduct of the apartheid state. Additionally, the Yom Kippur War nearly devastated the Israeli economy

and the defence industry became one of its biggest export earners. Polakow-Suransky quotes fifteen fold increases in arms exports from \$70 million in 1973 to nearly \$1 billion in 1981.

For South Africa, the 1970s were the end of the 'golden decade' of apartheid as mass uprisings consumed the country and the ability of the repressive state apparatus to control opposition was tested. By the early 1970s the tide was turning. International condemnation for the actions of the apartheid government was growing and South Africa was thrown out of the UN General Assembly in 1974 with the tag of international pariah firmly tied around her neck. The 'terrorist' threats posed by Mandela's ANC and Arafat's PLO drew the generals in Tel Aviv and Pretoria to similar strategic conclusions: the survival of the state depended on the resort to tight and overwhelming force.

Polakow-Suransky relates that on 31 March 1975, Israeli and South African defence ministers met to discuss the sale of tanks, missile boats and the joint development of airplane engines. During these talks, the Israeli delegation offered to sell South Africa some of the nuclear-capable Jericho missiles. The outcome of these negotiations was the signing of a security and secrecy agreement between Shimon Peres and PW Botha on 3 April 1975. The windfall of the military alliance was the signing of the nearly \$400 million contract for Israeli weapons purchased by South Africa in July 1977 just 4 months before the UN placed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

The nuclear weapons component of the South Africa-Israel relationship first came to light when information was leaked to *City Press* during the secret trial of Brigadier Johann Blaauw in 1988. James Sanders describes in



his book *Apartheid's Friends* how 600 tonnes of 'yellow cake' was delivered to Israel, with Blaauw as go-between, and South Africa received enough tritium to create twelve nuclear weapons.

The new revelations in Polakow-Suransky's book seem to give renewed credence to the claims that have been made in other books until now. The possible trade of nuclear weapons components between South Africa and Israel in the 1970s is just one aspect of a strategic alliance that reaped enormous benefits from both states at a time of international exile. It is a tale of *realpolitik*, of international relations based on interest, ideology and the maintenance of the power of the state above all else. Issues of morality, human rights and democracy were not values associated with the unspoken alliance. Polakow-Suransky's book is based on extensive archival research and interviews with former generals and government officials in both states. As such it provides one of the most complete pictures of the scale of cooperation, mutual benefits and motives. ■

### Book details

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# 50 Years: Should we celebrate?

## 50 Ans après, quelle indépendance pour l'Afrique

Reviewed by: David Zounmenou

As many African countries this year commemorate 50 years of independence, citizens are asking themselves whether they should celebrate or mourn. It is this dilemma that brought together a group of 30 academics, media practitioners, sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, economists, activists and writers from the mother continent and the Diaspora, under the leadership of Makhily Gassama, former Senegalese Minister of Culture, to ponder the fate of the continent since its children took over from colonial masters in a new book: *50 Ans après, quelle indépendance pour l'Afrique?* (50 Years Later: What Independence for Africa?) published in April 2010.

This book, the most recent publication on the subject, distinguishes itself by the style of the narratives. The authors move away from old clichés on the subject to provide their personal views on the meaning and implications of the past 50 years of independence, in an open and honest debate. They attempt to make sense of the 'African paradox'; how a continent so well endowed with natural and human resources can be the poorest of the planet.

The contributors acknowledge that Africa has experienced tragic periods in its history, including both the slave trade and colonisation. Though the consequences of these two scourges are well documented, what is perhaps most heartbreaking is the physical, material and moral suffering that has cruelly affected African citizens post-independence, since the destiny of the continent has been assumed by its own children.

In his provocative article on Africa's future, Spero Stanislas Adotevi, a

philosopher and anthropologist from Benin, challenges Africans to think creatively of futures scenarios for Africa; to identify key actors and consider the possibility of their effecting the necessary changes in the next half century. Adotevi points out that the new generation should take advantage of the decline of the West from demographic, economic and military points of view. He projects that by 2025 the West will constitute less than 10 percent of the world's population, while Asia and Africa will represent more than half. For him, even if the current capitalist system remains triumphant, the West will nonetheless have lost its monopoly to emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and – who knows? – one day, Nigeria and South Africa.

Even the military supremacy of the West is no longer an effective means to subject countries to its domination as in the past. These transformations should provide Africans with incentives to rethink their future in complete freedom. As if to further Adotevi's argument, Ivorian philosopher and poet Tallena Boni reminds the youth – albeit often disenchanted, embroiled in violence and with little or no education – of its responsibilities. The author wonders what the future holds for young Africans who have witnessed the failure of their elders, who were also young once.

Senegalese journalist Abdou Latif Coulibaly, attempts to offer some ways out through his pertinent analysis on governance and political leadership, the absence or the poor quality of which have contributed to the current decay. Coulibaly, as many of the contributors to the book, stresses the necessity of getting the governance architecture right and the imperative of honest political leadership as important ingredients for future success. Alain Mabankou, an author and poet from Congo-Brazzaville, backs Coulibaly



when he declares that “we are not the children of independence but children of post-Rwandan genocide” – a tragedy that occurred because African leaders have so far failed to evolve from psychological colonial subjugation and lacked the courage to challenge the post-colonial pact.

The themes in the book are an indication that the African elite, whether in politics or elsewhere, has recognised that the time has come to re-introduce a sense of decency in politics and in the relations that exist between the various components of the society – in other words, reinvent an African social contract. It is an indication that the African elite has now acknowledged its responsibility for the current state of the continent, 50 years after independence. The question remains of how we are going to react from now on. Gassama is unequivocally convinced that ‘African intellectuals’ should no longer be kept away from politics so far dominated by politicians. Africa needs the indispensable contribution of its intellectuals. Will they be able to do any better than the politicians have? The next 50 years will provide an answer. ■

## Book details

Makhily Gassama, *50 Ans après, quelle indépendance pour l'Afrique*, éditions Phillip Rey, April 2010.

# How to fix SA's justice system

## *Criminal (in)justice in South Africa: A civil society perspective*

**Review by:** Lizette Lancaster

The high incidence of violent crime has left its mark on the South African society and psyche. From a victim's perspective, an experience of violent crime leads to intensely personal physical and emotional trauma. Too often, however, the criminal justice system, far from being a source of justice and comfort, exacerbates the traumatic experiences of the victim, resulting in secondary trauma, confusion, cynicism and general mistrust of the government. The criminal justice system is in crisis in South Africa, given the high number of cases that it has to deal with. Most experiences of victims of violent crime are not accurately captured save for simplistic coverage in the media. *Criminal Justice in South Africa: A Civil Society Perspective*, published by the Institute of Security Studies, seeks to broaden an understanding about where the criminal justice system is going wrong and what needs to be done to fix it.

This peer-reviewed book offers a rare look into some of the most critical components of the criminal justice system and offers insight into victimisation and criminality. A single case study of a violent robbery is taken and its progress through the criminal justice system is tracked. This provides a unique framework from which to gain insight into the functions and dysfunctions of the police, courts and prisons – albeit at times in an ad hoc manner.

Most unusually for a book published for largely academic purposes, it starts with a meticulous and emotive account of a vicious attack seen through the eyes of the victim, Anna Juries. Chandré Gould, a well-known investigative journalist and researcher, tells the story in an intensely

personal way, drawing the reader into Anna's desperate search for justice and closure. Although her case stumbles through the criminal justice system, the outcome can be regarded as fair. However, unresolved questions linger.

After the opening chapter, the book changes pace quite dramatically, retreating to the sterile safety of more academic writing. Each subsequent chapter depicts individual research findings covering various stages of the criminal justice process. These are seemingly selected because of their critical role within the criminal justice sector and their contribution to the successful response, detection, prosecution, conviction and sentencing of serious crimes.

The chapter by Dr Johan Burger provides insight into the highly publicised emergency response services of the police (the flying squads and the 10111 centres). Although the 10111 police emergency response service is often the first to be called, their performance is disjointed as a result of ill-conceived planning and management practices. Dr Burger provides the shocking insight that the flying squads and 10111 centres are understaffed by 24% and 50% respectively. This is despite the more than 50% increase in overall policing numbers and a total police budget that has more than tripled since 2000/2001.

The chapter on investigation and crime scene management is technical yet fascinating. Bilkis Omar outlines how idealistic national police directives are rendered impractical given the actual crime scene experiences of police and victims alike. It emerges that crime scene investigators are often badly trained, overworked detectives who 'process' crime scenes alone, despite a national police directive prohibiting all but specialist crime scene technicians from




collecting physical evidence.

Iole Matthews's description of the mandate of the National Prosecuting Authority as well as the court process makes a fascinating yet disturbing read, which again highlights the impact of management insufficiencies, delays and staff shortages on the prosecution of cases.

Lukas Muntingh attempts to debunk the myths surrounding legislative and discretionary issues relating to minimum sentencing. The most vital is his conclusion that "[t]here is no evidence to indicate that minimum sentences have had any impact on the rate of violent crime. In fact there is substantial evidence indicating that lengthy prison terms and high imprisonment rates fuel the conditions for higher crime rates."

Gould concludes that the criminal justice system is "overloaded and overwhelmed" and that it lacks the required skills and coordination.

The book not only attempts to expose the weaknesses of the criminal justice system from a victim and research perspective in a constructive and methodical way, it also provides practical recommendations. 

## Book details

Edited by: Chandré Gould  
2009, Institute for Security Studies  
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Paperback



Tim Murithi

# A Year of Peace?

This is the African Year of Peace and Security, although this message seems to have been lost on the multitude of warlords, warriors and mercenaries who are continuing to ply their destructive trade on the beloved continent. On 9 January 2010, the AU Commission launched the official festivities marking the Year, some ten years after a similar commitment raised hardly a ripple. The motto for this dedication is 'Make Peace Happen'. The AU launched the initiative at a summit in Tripoli in August 2009 to draw attention to the scourge of war, which continues to afflict African citizens in all corners of the continent – a situation that has clearly deteriorated in recent years following the recent spike in food prices and the global recession. Clearly, the Union does not expect peace to be achieved in time for Christmas, though this would be an ideal gift to present to the African people.

We are at the halfway point of this noble declaration, yet the level of public awareness about the Year of Peace and Security is relatively low. The intention is to convene a series of symbolic and outreach activities to spread the aspirational message of the urgency of achieving peace and security in Africa beyond conference halls and Addis alone. During the African Cup of Nations (CAN) in January this year in Luanda, Angola, the AU and the Confederation of African Football (CAF) announced a partnership to jointly promote the ideals of peace.

The AU Year of Peace and Security is also to be punctuated by a series of cultural events, including musical concerts, theatre, exhibitions and the use of celebrities as peace ambassadors to mobilise civil society – ordinary people.

The AU will convene seminars, dialogues and roundtables in partnership with research and advocacy institutions, so as to provide an opportunity for Africa's citizens to give feedback on their perceptions of the Union and its peace and security efforts. The Union also plans to raise awareness of its own various peace initiatives by engaging with the media, academia and civil society organisations. In fact startlingly little is known about the extensive engagement of the AU, its Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the various envoys and special representatives, or the early warning and conflict management activities, so this is welcome.

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### The motto for this dedication is 'Make Peace Happen'.

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To date, Year of Peace and Security activities have included a ceremony in April to destroy arms in Burundi convened by the East African Community (EAC) and a similar event in Bukoba, Tanzania, in May. Other events have included the lighting of a Flame of Peace in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Africa, Angola, Ghana and Burkina Faso as part of the Africa Day (25 May) celebrations. Recently the Institute for Security Studies, publisher of theAfrican.org, also entered into a substantive partnership with the Commission to publicise the Year.

The AU Commission recently announced a partnership with Kenya Airways, and is reaching out to the

private sector and inviting businesses to sign the Make Peace Happen Industry Charter as a demonstration of the commitment of corporations to contribute towards the promotion of peace and security on the continent.

As far as showcasing one of the difficult areas that the AU works in, the idea of dedicating 2010 as the Year of Peace and Security is a novel approach that must be combined with demonstrable action. While the campaign requires a significant degree of marketing to effectively initiate debates across the continent, it provides an opportunity for governments, business, ecumenical groups, civil society, academia and the wider African citizenry to launch their own initiatives. Ultimately, the proof of a successful campaign will be in the concrete steps that are adopted by the AU Commission to mobilise practical action by its member states, regional organisations and civil society to transform this aspirational rhetoric into reality to 'Make Peace Happen'. Ironically, given the degree to which ECOSOCC, the AU dormant civil society portal, is little more than a toy telephone, the AU has to demonstrate more than an instrumentalist approach to civil society if it really wants a meaningful partnership. Fortunately, the key sources of instability, African leaders, will all be able to consider their collective lack of concerted action when gathering in Kampala during their Summit. ■

*Shortly after contributing this letter Dr Tim Murithi left Addis. He is now at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town, South Africa.*

## Reader survey



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Please tell us about yourself

# World Cup in pictures



Above: FIFA Fan Fest – Grand Parade, Cape Town.  
photo: David Harrison



Above: Ghana was beaten 1-0 by Germany at a FIFA World Cup soccer match held in Soccer City, Soweto.  
Photo: Oupa Nkosi



Right: A South African fan at the opening game of the World Cup between SA and Mexico.  
Photo: Lisa Skinner

South African fans try to drum up some crowd support during the last half of South Africa's dismal loss to Uruguay. Photo: Lisa Skinner

Below: Blue Gum Club players in Bonteheuwel, Cape Town.  
photo: David Harrison





South African fans were thrilled when Bafana Bafana beat France 2-1 at Bloemfontein Stadium.  
Photo: Lisa Skinner

Right:  
A Mexican fan  
braved the cold.  
Photo: Lisa Skinner

Below: A Dutch supporter celebrates his team's win over Uruguay at the Cape Town Stadium.  
Photo: David Harrison



# The rise and fall of SA's top cop



Mandy Rossouw

The trial of South Africa's former police chief sent shockwaves through the country. **Mandy Rossouw** was in court when Jackie Selebi was convicted of corruption.

If loneliness were a man, it would have been former South African police commissioner Jackie Selebi on that fateful Friday in June.

Shortly after lunchtime, judge Meyer Joffe found Selebi guilty of corruption due to payments that the former commissioner had received from a shady businessman.

As Selebi sat on a hard wooden bench in the foyer of the South Gauteng High Court after his conviction, not a single person took the time to comfort him.

His wife was chatting away on her cellphone as if she was planning her next shopping trip. His lawyers caucused in a corner to discuss the "bloody media vultures" who were trying to get that one precious quote from the man himself.

But no one dared approach him as he sat on the bench; no one could penetrate the invisible barrier around him while he sat staring blankly into space.

The trial had not started like this.

After he famously declared that the gangster and known criminal Glen Agliotti was his friend "finish and klaar", Selebi entered the Johannesburg court as if he owned the place.

And in a way he did.

In 2009, when the case started, Selebi swaggered in with his most senior police officials in tow. There was not a whiff of doubt in the collective mind of Team Selebi that this case would be

over soon and their ringleader would be cleared. They were certain in the knowledge that one of their own would never fall into the trap of corruption.

Nowhere in the country would you find a police officer willing to even consider the possibility that Selebi may be guilty.

"He is the commissioner, of course he isn't guilty. He has enough money, why would he take money from bad people?" a policeman guarding an ANC conference in Bloemfontein said at the time.

But it was not just the rank and file that believed the country's chief crime-fighter was innocent; Selebi also had the buy-in of the highest office in the land – and beyond.

The president of the country – at the time it was President Thabo Mbeki – was eating out of his hand.

Mbeki was willing to push legal boundaries to ensure that Selebi remained untouched by the long arm of the law. It must have been with some satisfaction that Selebi saw how men like the national director of public prosecutions (NDPP) Vusi Pikoli was sacked by Mbeki – all to ensure that Selebi would not land on that witness stand.

The reasons for Mbeki's enthusiastic support were both professional and personal. The two men shared an exile history which put them on the same side of the Polokwane divide – that being the fight for leadership of the ANC that was to play itself out between Mbeki and his

then deputy, Jacob Zuma.

Mbeki needed Selebi on his side to ensure the security forces would not threaten Mbeki's victory at the ANC's elective conference in 2007 in Polokwane.

Interpol appointed him president of this worldwide body of crime-fighters, and kept him in that position for as long as it could.

But as the trial dragged on, Selebi's contingent at court shrank. Sometimes he would arrive at court only with his lawyers, and no hangers-on in sight.

The policemen at court started to look at Selebi as they would any other accused. The adoration in their eyes was gone.

The Selebi trial embodied everything that the ANC is too scared to admit.

It showed that party cadres get placed in high positions with no clue how to do their jobs. It also showed that the morality of these staunch freedom fighters often crumbles at the sight of fancy cars, bling jewellery and, in Selebi's case, designer clothes.

But most importantly, it showed that even the savvy, charming and well-respected Selebi could feel how cold and lonely life is outside the inner circle, and this is where most ordinary people reside. ▣

Mandy Rossouw writes for Mail & Guardian newspaper in South Africa.



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