

VIEWS AND ANALYSES FROM THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

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CLIMATE CHANGE CONFLICTS in the Sahara



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CHRISTMAS
MEMORIES**



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CHANGING
ANGOLA?**



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THE WAY
FORWARD**

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Dear reader

Elections in Côte d'Ivoire – still one of West Africa's strongest economies – have once again been delayed. That means President Laurent Gbagbo has now effectively served almost two terms in office after being elected only once in 2002. And it looks as if he is going to stay on even longer if certain groups in the country get their way.

The postponement of the elections, which were supposed to take place on 29 November, does not come as a surprise. However it comes at a time when tensions are mounting and the gains realised in the road to peace and normality are under serious threat.

The contentious voter registration process, the rearmament of both the rebels and the government forces and their mutual reluctance to complete the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), prior to the elections, are just some of the threats facing Côte d'Ivoire. In addition to this is the long delay in completing the logistical arrangements for the elections. Rarely has an electoral process taken so long, cost that much (estimated cost of 115 billion CFA) and held the potential risk of an all-out war in West Africa.

The voter registration remains a highly contentious issue, not only because of the delays accumulated in the final publication of the voters' role, but also due to questions surrounding the credibility of the process. It remains a politically sensitive issue, given all the emotion surrounding identity and '*Ivoirité*' that was the root cause of the crisis of the past few years.

Ivorian political actors and the United Nations praised the identification process that saw 6.5 million voters register for this upcoming election. Now, however, it

looks as if up to 2.7 million voters could once again face the spectre of contested identity and possible exclusion from the elections. How could we have anticipated this new development that goes against all the principles of the various political arrangements negotiated and signed by president Gbagbo and the main political actors in the country?

This new controversy around the voter registration has been heightened by the position of the Constitutional Council, headed by the recently appointed ruling Front Populaire Ivoirien hardliner, Yao Paul N'dre, that in effects reopens the debate around the eligibility of candidates for the elections. This clearly goes against the letter and the spirit of the Linas-Marcoussis, Pretoria and Ouagadougou agreements that put an end to the rebellion and paved the way for elections. While the President of the Constitutional Council argues that his institution has to uphold the constitution – the same constitution that excluded former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara from the previous presidential race – this clearly contradicts the political consensus reached and is likely to re-open old and painful wounds.

Opinion polls done by the French pollsters SOFRESS indicate that while President Gbagbo will probably win a first round with up to 40% of the votes, there are doubts that he win a run-off, particularly if his opponents Ouattara (28%) and former President Henri-Konan Bédié (30%) back each other in the event of a second round, as they've agreed to do.

It is hard to comprehend why the Constitutional Council has to change the rules of the game while Côte d'Ivoire is so close to a breakthrough and that peaceful



and fair elections may even be achieved. Unless, of course, the ruling party has lost confidence in the electoral process together with the peace process and has decided to resort to exclusion methods or violence to maintain its control over the country.


While waiting for the official new date for the elections, one would like to hope that political actors in Côte d'Ivoire would take into account the long suffering of their citizens and work towards the legitimisation of the leadership as a step towards the reconstruction of the former beacon of peace in West Africa. This could be a powerful statement of political will. It could also be seen as the reversal of the perpetuation of the status quo characterised by a consolidated war economy that benefits a few, at the expense of the vast majority in a highly polarised and fragile Côte d'Ivoire. Though the presidential elections could not be seen as a panacea for Côte d'Ivoire's woes, they are critical for the return of a legitimate leadership, peace and prosperity. ■

David Zounmenou

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Upcoming events

AU Summit 2010

The next Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union will be held in Addis Ababa from 25 January to 2 February 2010. The Summit will be convened under the theme: 'Information and Communication Technologies in Africa: Challenges and Prospects for Development.'

The selection on this theme at the January 2009 summit was informed by the realisation of the low usage of ICTs on the continent: Africa is the least connected continent in the world.

The Summit will be preceded by a series of preparatory meetings, starting with the Permanent Representative Committee of Ambassadors on 25–26 January 2010, and the 16th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council on 28–29 January 2010, which draws its participation at ministerial level. The summit itself will run from 31 January–2 February 2010.

Sector-specific preparatory ministerial meetings were held last November when the African Union ministers responsible for communication and information technologies met in Johannesburg, South Africa.

Togo poll

The West African nation of Togo is scheduled to go to the polls on 28 February 2010. Announcing the election date at the end of October, Issifou Taffa Tabiou, the head of the National Electoral Independent Commission (CENI) also made it clear that potential presidential candidates should confirm their participation by 15 January.

The campaign period is from 13–26 February. Interestingly, in the

2010 elections, the electoral commission as a new institution is set to play a critical role. The next Togo poll is being closely monitored and assisted by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), and the AU.

Ecowas' timely intervention averted the mayhem that nearly followed the death of Togo's long-term ruler, the late Gnassingbé Eyadéma in 2005. In the ensuing election of 4 May 2005, Eyadéma's son Faure Gnassingbé was declared a winner against veteran Togolese politician, Gilchrist Olympio. The elderly opposition figure had for many years been banished into exile by Eyadéma senior.

In the recent past, Olympio's Union of Forces for Change (UFC) and the Action Committee for Renewal (CAR) led by Dodji Apevon were on the verge of sealing an electoral alliance. Apparently, opposition unity talks broke down when Olympio told a radio programme that other parties should 'rally behind the candidate of the UFC because ... there exist in Togo only two recognised political forces, notably the ruling RPT [Togo Peoples Rally] and the UFC [Union of Forces for Change]'. This apparent 'big-brother' attitude must have riled the CAR, which pulled out of the opposition unity talks. It remains to be seen though, whether the opposition would salvage the talks within the barely four months that are left before the poll.

Unity eluded the opposition during the 2005 presidential elections and the 2007 legislative elections.

Sudan elections

Sudan is expected to hold its first democratic general elections in two decades, from 5–12 April 2010. The new



African Union Commission chair Jean Ping will preside over the Summit of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa that starts on 31 January 2010.

date follows numerous postponements, with the last being July 2009.

There would be six elections: national presidential and parliamentary, the south Sudanese presidency, state governors, the southern parliament and state assemblies.

The electoral process has been delayed by disagreements over the conduct of the national census, which southern Sudanese under the leadership of Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) felt were skewed to disenfranchise them.

Southern Sudan and the predominantly Muslim north signed a peace agreement in 2005 that ended a 21-year-old bloody civil war between the regions. Though the two parties share power at national level, tensions remain.

The SPLM is expected to field Salva Kiir Mayardit as a presidential candidate against President Omar al-Bashir. Kiir is likely to enjoy the support of former eastern rebels from the Beja Congress, to increase the chances of unseating Omar al-Bashir, who has held power since 1989. Kiir, who came in after the death of former SPLM leader John Garang, is currently a first vice president in the power-sharing national government, and the head of the government of South Sudan. ■

Newswatch

Dealing with Rwandan rebels in the DRC

The United Nations announced on 2 November that it is suspending cooperation with units within the Congolese army (FARDC, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) that are allegedly responsible for the death of over 60 civilians in operations against the Rwandan rebel FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda).

MONUC (UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) has been severely criticised for Operation Kimia 2, joint operation between MONUC and the FARDC against the FDLR. Since military operations against the FDLR began in January 2009, 800 000 people have fled their homes – the highest number of those newly displaced in any African conflict. At least 600 civilians have been killed and thousands of women and girls raped by rebel groups and government forces. The human cost of Operation Kimia clearly outweighs its benefits.

Amid calls for suspension of new offensive operations, MONUC's head, Alan Doss insisted on the operation's success and argued against its abrupt stoppage. Doss' arguments sounded good and appeared to represent a legitimate effort to address the regional security threat posed by the FDLR as part of a broader diplomatic initiative to mend relations with Rwanda.

However, the biggest threat to Kimia 2 are the 53 000 soldiers of the FARDC used against the FDLR. These soldiers had been part of a so-called fast-track integration process. In eastern Congo, this 'integration' took place with no planning, little outside support, and in the middle of ongoing military operations. Cohesive fighting units could simply not be cobbled together from former adversaries that just weeks earlier been engaged in heavy combat against one another. Integration also occurred without proper monitoring or vetting, allowing known human rights violators to swap one uniform for another. Bosco Ntaganda, a former CNDP commander wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, is the most notorious example, but not the only one.

A 3-in-1 leadership for Madagascar

The elusive Madagascar peace deal appeared to have been reached on 7 November in Addis Ababa when the crisis' political protagonists agreed to share power, albeit transitionally.

It took a full week of intense negotiations to seal the deal. Among other things, they have opted for a collegial solution to appoint the head (s) of the transition government.

Self-declared President Andry Rajoelina will have to share his executive powers with two co-presidents (one from former president Marc Ravalomanana's camp and the other from former president Albert Zafy's). There is no clear division of authority among the three presidents. But it was agreed that all major decisions would require the approval and the signing of all three, which gives, at least in theory, a sense of equal authority among them.

It needs to be recalled that the power-sharing deal is a transitional arrangement and should not in any way be seen as a legitimisation of coup makers. In that sense, the most important issue is how to plan and hold credible elections by the end of 2010.

Tough times ahead for new Guinea-Bissau president

The election of the new Guinea-Bissau president, Malam Bacai Sanha, last September, followed political violence that claimed the lives of his predecessor, President João Bernardo Viera, General Baptiste Tagme na Waie and other key political figures.

Though Bacai's swearing-in ceremony was seen as an important step toward the normalisation of the political environment in Guinea Bissau, it is still far from being a panacea for all the troubles facing that country.

Bacai Sanha's ascendancy has raised high expectations from the citizens. While the international community has played a key role in the electoral process, there are now concerns that the country could be neglected. It is precisely at this moment that Guinea Bissau needs the support of main stakeholders both within the region and outside.

The newly elected president has himself expressed concerns over his term in office and some of the challenges he is likely to face. First among them is how to maintain cohesion and coherence within the ruling party, fractioned during electioneering. His relations with the prime minister, Carlos Gomes Junior, need to be urgently mended.

The second key challenge is likely to come from the army. This institution remains a destabilising factor in Guinea Bissau's political landscape. Malam is from a minority group, Beafadas, which is marginal within the army dominated by Balantes. Though he could still rely upon the support of the Mandingos who are well represented after the Balantes, such a strategy does not guarantee the stability of his administration. He would have to move quickly to institute the reforms not only of the military but also of other security institutions.



- 1 Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni (left) and African Union's commission chairperson, Jean Ping, at the AU special summit on refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa that was held in Kampala, Uganda in October.
- 2 The chief executive officer of the NEPAD Secretariat, Ibrahim Hassane Mayaki, presenting his credentials to the South African deputy minister for International Relations and Cooperation, Ebrahim Ismael Ebrahim last September.
- 3 South African president, Jacob Zuma, and Angola's president José Eduardo dos Santos shake hands during the former's relations-thawing state visit to Angola last August.

The nomads of the Sahara Desert, including the Touaregs, are of the oldest victims of climate change in Africa. Desertification, together with other factors like mining and government policies have threatened their existence and some have taken up arms to fight for their rights.

Muna Abdalla looked at the reasons behind the Touareg uprisings across North Africa and the Sahel

Africa's oldest victims of



The Touareg region in the Sahel is prone to environmental challenges, including desertification, deforestation, soil erosion and an insufficient supply of potable water.

Agriculture is principally rain-fed and depends on three to four months of summer rainfall, which makes harvests of food and other crops highly uncertain. The majority of the population depends on agriculture and livestock as primary sources of employment.

Past generations did not overexploit their only source of survival, knowing that their lives were dependent on their ability to preserve and sustain resources. But as climate change has escalated desertification, farmers and herders on the southern fringe of the Sahara Desert struggle to survive in a hostile environment. They have had no option but to disregard traditional means of coping, such as leaving the land fallow for a number of years to replenish nutrients and rotating grazing. These

measures have been sacrificed in the quest for mere survival. No helping hand has been extended in their struggle with the environment and they have become active agents in land degradation.

Environmental disasters that eroded the ability to make a living perhaps had more to do with the general lack of preparedness than climate variability. During the 1950s and 1960s, colonialists and the newly independent Sahelian government invested heavily in cash crops such as



The culture and lifestyle of the Touareg nomads have been increasingly under threat over the past few decades due to climate change. The Touaregs felt ignored and their deep sense of bitterness resulted in some groups taking up arms against their governments.

cotton and groundnuts, sacrificing the cereal crops that were the staple food of the rural populations. When the region experienced severe drought, people dependent on land could not cope. Nor could the governments – and the people found themselves alone in the fight for survival.

In the past, people were able to survive these conditions using their traditional mechanisms. But when the harsh environment culminated in an environmental crisis between 1972

and 1974, and 1984 and 1985, the Touaregs were overwhelmed. Although familiar with and expert in surviving and managing the hostile desert environment for centuries, their means of survival were ineffective this time. The famine of 1973 killed thousands of Touaregs and their livestock, agriculture was no longer able to support the needs of the population, and the extreme shortage of water for farmers and pastoralists threatened the survival of the nomads in particular.

The drought created deep bitterness among Touaregs for the government, as they felt they had been ignored and that neither foreign aid nor local assistance was distributed equitably. Large numbers of Touaregs fled the rural areas for cities, while others migrated to neighbouring Algeria and Libya.

Upon returning to Mali and Niger, they found that much of their land had been taken by sedentary farmers and they clashed with these farmers.

climate change

The Touaregs



Photo Gallo Images/AFP

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, who once announced plans to create a 'Saharan state', has often been seen as supportive of the Touaregs and their movements.



Photo Gallo Images/Getty Images

In Mali the government of President Amadou Toumani Toure has negotiated a series of peace accords with the Touareg rebels, but these have often been short-lived.

To complicate matters, Touareg homeland areas have vast natural resources, including substantial uranium and gold reserves. Many countries have mining permits to explore for uranium, gold and oil. Among them are France, China, India, Britain, South Africa, America, Canada and Australia. Extensive exploration and industry of uranium has diminished and degraded Touareg grazing lands, led to the depletion of water, and exacerbated the rate of desertification.

Over the last few decades, absence of lucid environmental policies and development priorities, combined with population growth, land degradation and erratic rainfall, has exacerbated

...as climate change has escalated desertification, farmers and herders on the southern fringe of the Sahara Desert struggle to survive in a hostile environment

the vulnerability of the population and left them to compete for the scarce resources that have been left. Though these are the common causes of conflict, the specific factors that led the Touaregs to take up arms, and the way such revolts are handled, vary from one country to the other.

When the Touaregs rose, they

apparently had no intention of spreading terror in the region; rather their goal was to obtain a greater share in wealth and equity. It was the vulnerability of the Touaregs' livelihoods that drove them to carry arms.

However, they were dismissed both internally and internationally as terrorists or Islamic jihad, which

justified the suppression of their movements and populations.

The US issued the Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2003, superseded in 2005 by the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) to support Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania in their fight against Islamic terrorists. The major alliances for the US in this strategy have been Algeria, Niger and Mali, and together they have executed combined military operations. These have intensified Touareg rebellions and increased insecurity of the southern Sahara-Sahel region. The US has branded the northern parts of Mali and Niger 'terrorist zones', which has negatively affected the local tourism industry and related livelihoods, and has infuriated Touareg populations in the region; hence many operations are directed against American targets. Many were carried out by the 'terrorist' AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), but the relationship between this group and the Touaregs has not been established.

Meanwhile, multinational exploration companies are said to be involved in one way or another in the conflict. In Niger, the government has accused French and Chinese companies of taking sides and supporting the Touareg rebels. In particular, Areva (the French public multinational industrial conglomerate that is mainly known for nuclear power) was accused by the Nigerian government of supporting Touareg militia groups to deter competitors. The MNJ (Movement for Justice) has accused China of providing military backing to Niamey to crush rebellion in exchange for exploration permits.

It is clear that while the conflict involving the Touaregs has developed locally, it has been enforced through various external actors.



Environmental disasters have eroded the ability of nomads in the Sahara to make a living.

Prospects for peace

No practical solution has been offered for a peaceful settlement for all groups. None of the states involved has created and implemented enabling frameworks to negate and resolve the conflict. Furthermore, overlapping systems of resource exploitation and inability to deal with the issue of climate uncertainty remain at the root of the conflict. Neither Niger nor Mali is likely to grant the Touaregs legal autonomy, as Touareg territory is a new home for the exploration and production of gold and uranium (among others). Mali and Niger are expected to be very keen on ending the chain of Touareg rebellions to ensure that intensive exploration by foreign corporations proceeds uninterrupted.

To this end, the Nigerian government is likely to continue exerting military pressure on the rebels by tightening the grip on their territories and launching a series of attacks on their bases. The Malian government, which has adopted a relatively softer approach, particularly in recent negotiations, will probably

make some concessions and implement community development initiatives to win the ADC (Alliance for Democracy and Change, a faction of the Touareg movement) leadership over to its side.

On the other hand, Touareg movements will remain fragmented and suffer continuous internal splintering, and penetrations and manipulations by external forces. Peace accords signed so far have proved to be of little significance. While some factions might accept the offerings, others will reject them and seek their own victory. The presence of international powers, whether as mineral explorers or as makers of influential policies towards the conflict, will always serve to weaken these movements.

The problem cannot be solved with broad-brush policies, because of the diversity of social actors and the diversity of political, economic and social factors within the countries concerned. But as a first step, there is a need for a more comprehensive solution that takes into account the root cause of the problem, to avoid having another Darfur in the region.

Touaregs in the Sahel

There are said to be several million Touaregs, but there are no accurate figures. The Touaregs themselves estimate their number to be more than 3 million, while others put the figure at around 1.5 to 2 million. Most live in Mali and Niger, primarily in Algeria, north-eastern Mali and central and northern Niger, Libya, Mauritania and Burkina Faso.

The Touaregs are predominantly Muslim but generally follow a moderate and unconventional version of Islam. As a group, the Touaregs are made up of several tribes, including Kel-Air, Kel-Gress, Iwilli-Minden and Imouzourak. Touareg society is conventionally feudal, including nobles, clergy, vassals and artisans, and labourers (ex-slaves). Today, this stratification with its defined roles and functions is no longer as rigid as it used to be.

Mali

Mali is the main Touareg country. Numbering about 621 000, they make up around 1.7% of Mali's total population. The conflict involving the Touaregs has strong roots in the control over natural resources, especially land.

Mali is currently among the poorest countries in the world, yet it is rich in natural resources including gold, copper, diamonds, iron, kaolin, manganese, phosphates, silver, uranium and zinc. These are exploited by a number of international companies.

Military revolts of the Touaregs have been organised around goals of legal autonomy, equality and fair share of wealth. Environmental stress and the resultant resource scarcity further sharpened the conflicts that flared up during the 1970s and 1980s, and again in the early 1990s. Following a 1992 truce, a period of calm followed but violence broke out again in 2006, followed by a series of peace accords, mediated by Libya and Algeria. The latest of these was concluded in April 2009 between the government of Mali and the Alliance Touaregue Nord Mali Pour le Changement (ATNMC), but it is not expected to last.

Niger

Despite having some of the world's largest uranium deposits, Niger also remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The expansion of exploration in recent years has had implications for both the population and the environment. All exploration operations

are situated in the northern part of the country in Touareg territory and where sizeable pastoral populations extract their living, such as the Tim Mersoï region and Aïr valley.

Climate change has also jeopardised the Touaregs' ability to maintain their livelihood. The Touaregs of Niger were harshly hit by environmental crises during 1970s. Like their Malian counterparts, they felt that they were largely ignored in relief and recovery efforts of the governments, compared to other groups in the same situation. This has added to their previous discontent with the post-colonial government's policies of marginalisation and oppression. In the early 1990s Nigeria's Touaregs rose in rebellion in an effort to create a separate trans-Saharan state. Accords signed during the mid-1990s brought to an end a period of open Touareg insurgency and a decade of relative peace in the region.

However, as in Mali, the Touareg revolts in Niger have escalated since mid-2007 and have taken on a momentum of their own.

The latest of a series of peace deals has been signed in April 2009 between the MNJ and the Niger government, in which the MNJ will lay down weapons and join a peace process, and the government will grant greater rights to the Touareg minority. The Niger government, on the contrary, has granted less recognition to the Touareg movement and dismissed most of their claims.

Algeria

In Algeria the population is predominantly Arab, but different groups dispute the country's exact identity as a nation. The Berbers or Imazighen ('free people'), which include the Touaregs, are considered the most repressed ethnic group. They are concentrated in southern Algeria in the massifs of Aïjer, Ahaggar and Kabyles region.

Poverty and exclusion of large groups of society (particularly the Touaregs), from decision-making, lead to frustration, which for some is released in the form of crime, involvement in radical movements and violence. Algeria has a long history of struggle with Islamic extremist movements that have committed numerous atrocities against Algerian citizens and the army. Although the Touaregs were not known to be attracted to extremist movements, they suffered the repercussions. Touareg fighters have long shared symbiotic relations with Algerian Islamic insurgents, the Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching (GSPC) in northern Mali, and they ran trans-Saharan smuggling routes into North Africa. But the relationship soured when GSPC attempted


to recruit the Touaregs to the movement.

Bitter fights erupted between the two and the hostility has not been contained to date. The transformation of the GSPC into AQIM has led to an upturn in violence from mid-2007. The Touaregs in Mali and Niger continued to have various military engagements with AQIM in their territories. The Touaregs have no history of Islamic extremism and the link between this group and Touareg fighters is still not very clear. With AQIM in Touareg territory in northern Mali and Niger, Algeria has reason to fight them and has sought the assistance of the US in fighting them within and outside Algeria. The US and Algeria have maintained good relations and have formed a coalition against terrorism in the region. The main losers in this fight are the Touaregs.

Libya

The Touaregs are among the oldest inhabitants of the ancient region that is now Libya. When Colonel Muammar Gaddafi came to power, his ambition was to create a Saharan state to embrace all the Sahelo-Saharan countries, particularly those with territories of populations of the Kel-Tamasheq. Consequently, in 1989, Mali, Niger and Chad were considered by Libya as Arab countries. Large numbers of Touaregs from these countries migrated to Libya. Since the early 1960s, the revenue of petroleum and gas has financed the transformation of Libya from a poor nation to a rich one. Thousands of migrant workers were attracted to the country in search of new sources of livelihoods, as theirs had been diminished as a result of drought.

In the 1980s, the governments of Mali and Niger called upon their Touareg populations in Libya and Algeria to return, promising them compensation and resettlement projects. The Touareg returnees demanded greater autonomy and equal shares in power and wealth, but large numbers were arrested and prosecuted. Except this time, they were equipped with arms, rocket launchers and military training, which they put to use.

By 1985, the Touaregs were organised as a separate military force and launched several attacks on targets in Mali and Niger. In the mid-1990s, Colonel Gaddafi had to play down his support for Touareg movements temporarily as his country faced increased political and economic crises. But he remained supportive of the Touaregs and their movements. 

Afro-pessimism or opportunity in a time of climate crisis?

Most vulnerable in the wake of climate change, Africa now adopts a common position in getting industrialised nations to reduce gas emissions.

Trusha Reddy examines the issues surrounding the united stance of the AU, ahead of the United Nations climate change summit in December

Africa finally came alive to international climate negotiations when the African Union announced mid-year that it would be demanding massive financial reparations from developed countries, ahead of the United Nations climate change meeting, from 7–18 December in Copenhagen this year.

Prior to this, poor representation of Africans in ongoing talks and the lack of a common unified African position on a post-2012 climate treaty provided little to inspire confidence in an engaging presence. The African position, buttressed by the AU political rhetoric, is now well on the way to consolidation and the continent's people now wait in anticipation to see if the African team will walk out of the meeting as threatened, if demands are not met.

As these prospects unfold, we examine some of the critical issues that must be considered in these processes, if Africa is to ensure its peoples' security and protect them from the ravages of climate change.

A significant range of issues is on the table within the following broad themes: mitigation and adaptation to climate change, and finance and technology to support these efforts.

These areas of discussion were agreed to at talks in Bali, 2007, for a new international treaty post-2012, also known as the Bali Roadmap process.

But arguably, three fundamental issues stand out for Africa, namely: mitigation targets which is possibly the most important issue, finance (also including aspects around technology) for low-carbon development and adaptation, and a third element outside of the official technical discussions – that of civil society influence.

Mitigation targets

First, let's consider the targets. Current scientific consensus opinion informs us that we need at least 45% greenhouse gas emission reductions by 2020, and 85–95% cuts by 2050, compared to 1990 levels. Anything less will warm the earth to beyond the tipping points that it can sustain. In fact, the more generally accepted limit of 2°C is considered too high. Many countries in the most threatened parts of the world, including small island states and least-developed countries, many of which are in Africa, argue for 1.5°C to be the uppermost limit. The latter would imply more ambitious targets. As Africa is

predicted to be one of the hardest hit by climate change impacts, pushing these targets remains the central priority for the continent, which African leaders have thus far affirmed. Other evidence supports this in economic terms, stating that financial transfers will need to be much greater in time if the emissions are not cut now.

However, the trajectory in negotiations has not been equivocal on this understanding. In fact, it is becoming more apparent that we are heading towards a bad deal – meaning a lot of dithering and politicking – with the result being exceedingly low targets being agreed upon. In fact, at the recent Bangkok leg of talks, reports were that rather than gaining consensus on targets for emissions reductions, the emphasis was on the mechanisms to reduce emissions.

Furthermore, the move to get rid of the Kyoto Protocol, the current global agreement, by some developed countries (instead of formulating a successor to it, as was set out by Bali Roadmap) is seen by developing countries as a way of reneging on agreeing to binding, required-by-science targets.

ecological debt ...has come into vogue as, 'the debt accumulated by Northern, industrial countries toward Third World countries on account of resource plundering, environmental damages, and the free occupation of environmental space to deposit wastes, such as greenhouse gases, from the industrial countries'



Activists wearing masks of US President Barack Obama and France's President Nicolas Sarkozy take part in a demonstration against global warming outside the headquarters of the United Nations office in Bangkok on 5 October 2009. Delegates from 192 countries had been meeting in Bangkok in a desperate bid to thrash out a draft text of a global warming treaty that world leaders aim to sign in Copenhagen.

The Kyoto Protocol

But perhaps we need to put these troubling moves in better perspective: The Kyoto Protocol, which developing countries are desperately trying to hold on to, has been a disaster, or a misguided 'experiment' at best. The cornerstone is carbon trading – the trading of pollution credits – which has largely failed to achieve even the weak target of 5% below 1990 levels that had been set.

Both phases of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS), the biggest carbon market, failed in both of its two phases, having not set a price signal for reduction of emissions or for creating impetus for technology innovations. Carbon trading's structurally flawed offset mechanism

is a loophole for developed countries not to make necessary cuts at home, and instead transfers the responsibility for these cuts to the developing world, such as countries in Africa.

Moreover, offsetting undermines 'absolute' targets because calculation of emission reductions is flawed and the system is riddled with, and prone to, abuse. The United States pushed for carbon trading to be included in the Kyoto Protocol but then backed out of the agreement when it was ratified in 1997, arguing that its targets would compromise their own domestic economic priorities.

As if history is repeating itself, the US has come in again in this round of talks, trying to lower the global ambition. Both the domestic bills, Waxman-

Markey and Boxer-Kerry, make offsets a central component, with two billion tons of carbon dioxide handed out to its worst polluters, and only aiming to reduce emissions by 20% from 2005 levels. Offsets would actually reduce this paltry figure further.

Developed countries themselves are engaged in a battle to get the US to sign the new deal and this suggests compromising even further to accommodate their weak targets. The African position is to withdraw from these debates and rather stick with following the Kyoto line as closely as possible. The understanding is also to maintain the integrity of the UNFCCC (The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) principle of common but



champion this end in talks to succeed in fair and just outcomes.

Finance

The provision of finances to cope with and adapt to climate change impacts, otherwise known as climate finance, is the second critical issue. It is certainly less clear-cut than the debate on targets, because it involves a complex mix of considerations that are not easily reconcilable in dollar terms.

The Quito-based environmental rights group, Acción Ecológica, for instance, defines the concept of *ecological debt* which has come into vogue, as 'the debt accumulated by Northern, industrial countries toward Third World countries on account of resource plundering, environmental damages, and the free occupation of environmental space to deposit wastes, such as greenhouse gases, from the industrial countries.'

The AU alludes to this in its call for reparations of a minimum of \$67 billion and up to \$200 billion annually from the North by 2020, and this does much for underscoring climate justice and the symbolic notion of reparations.

But beyond this, there isn't much clarity on how the figure is arrived at. Costs of environmental impacts have thus far been externalised from ecosystem services exploited in mining and manufacturing processes, for instance, and a proper quantification needs to be justified at the global stage. There have been attempts to determine general economic costs but these also need to be disaggregated. It must also be cautioned, though, that attempts to put figures on natural resources also run the risk of commodifying, or putting a price tag on them, which means they can then be sold off to highest bidder using mechanisms such as carbon trading. This could wind up being a misguided attempt at securing financing.

In any case, the bottom line is sustainable, just and reliable financing that must be assured and which the African position currently states. Delivery of these finances must also happen in a system of accountable and transparent governance that assures quick, direct financing which eludes the traps set up by 'false' mechanisms.


Effects on civil society

Third and lastly, is the focus on civil society. The profile of Copenhagen has been a catalyst for the mobilisation of thinking and actions for civil society in climate change, more than ever before.

As the stakes get higher for African governments, the multitude of actions both inside and outside of the official meeting may be what is needed to tip the balances for more progressive outcomes. Playing the dual role of supporting and holding African governments to account at critical stages of negotiations means that decisive action can be taken to avoid a bad deal from being signed.

More pertinently, acknowledging that the process of implementation and change goes well beyond Copenhagen means that African civil society can do much to foster a new era in accountability in policy and governance in their different local and regional spheres of influence.

Governments must be called on to restore the environmental integrity of laws in place. The struggles and voices of communities experiencing impacts of climate change must be heard and responded to and we must collectively raise the level of consciousness in dealing with these issues.

These locally based actions to push for and promote low-carbon development are the new opportunities we must engender to reintegrate humanity with the natural order of life on this planet. 

differentiated responsibility, meaning that developed countries alone agree to emission targets.

On the face of it, this is a fair and principled position and may be followed through in Copenhagen. However, it must be considered that it is actually irrelevant whether Kyoto stays or goes. The point is that that whatever treaty is in place must be legally binding.

Moreover, if the mechanisms to achieve these targets do not require putting in place ways to fundamentally restructure economies and move away from fossil fuels, it will not achieve the aims for combating climate change that we desperately need. In this respect, Kyoto has been distracting, not to say destructive, to these aims.

Ultimately, it remains a test of political and scientific will to effect positive change over corporate will to retain business as usual. Africa must

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Members from the Unisa team at work in an excavation area close to the harbour of the ancient city of Dor on the Mediterranean coast of Israel.

doctoral thesis in which the OT was read from a gender perspective. Recently Prof. M Masenya became one of the recipients of the Leadership in Research award from the Unisa Women-in-research category of awards. Prof. M le Roux, another female academic from the department, made the department proud when her book, *The Lemba: a lost tribe of Israel in Southern Africa?* was designated in 2008 as the best-selling book in the category of academic books published by the Unisa Press. Two academics, Professors EH Scheffler and WJ Wessels were among the recipients of the prestigious Unisa APEX award.

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The debate surrounding the environmental degradation of Kenya's largest water tower, the Mau Forest Complex, has brought to the fore a cantankerous mix of conservation concerns, human rights violations and politics of greed and patronage. **Deborah Akoth** and **Abeba Amene** in Nairobi navigate the treacherous ravines of the debate

Kenyan women carry stacks of freshly chopped wood from forest trees through an open field in the Western part of the Mau Forest escarpment. Settlers and their families in search of better fortune and a land of their own have steadily encroached legally and illegally in land that was once a dense forest.



Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga has staked his political future on restoring Mau at all costs.

Trading off the **Mau Forest** to politics

In order to unravel the narrative that is the Mau Forest Complex, one needs a clearer understanding of the interactive pieces that contribute to this endless soap opera. The Mau can be likened to a kaleidoscope with ever-changing actors and concerns,

depending on the lens one uses to look at it. Kenya's raging Mau Forest debate has threatened longstanding political careers, livelihoods and environmental security. So why is the Mau Forest Complex such a hot issue anyway?

The Mau Forest Complex is Kenya's

largest indigenous montane forest and its largest water tower. It is a catchment area for 12 rivers and various streams that drain into a number of lakes: the rivers Mara, Sondu, Nyando and Yala which are tributaries to the Nzoia River, and which in turn all drain into Lake Victoria; Ewaso Ng'iro which drains into Lake Natron; the rivers Njoro, Naishi, Nderit, Makalia which feed into Lake Nakuru; the river Molo into Lake Baringo and the river Kerio into Lake Turkana. The waters from the Mau Forests reportedly serve more than 10 million people in Kenya and Tanzania. The survival of the Mara Game Reserve, Lake Nakuru National Park and the Serengeti ecosystem, as well as five other wildlife reserves depend on the Mau forests.

For some, the Mau debate is about access to land and marginalisation of the poor and minority communities. That 'land crimes are as much a part of Kenya's past wrongdoings as economic crimes and human rights crimes' is the conclusion of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular allocation of Public Land report also known as the Ndung'u report. The Commission was investigating the systematic illegal land allocation, a phenomenon in Kenya that had hitherto led to gross human rights violations, terrible suffering for poor Kenyans, as well as environmental degradation.

In order to settle landless Kenyans, several tracts of the forest were excised. However, according to the report, a substantial portion of the forest land demarcated to settle the landless and the indigenous communities was allocated to political cronies, including civil servants, military officers, provincial administration personnel, logging companies, tea, flower and coffee farms. Currently, settlement of ordinary Kenyans has been either

because they bought pieces of land from those who acquired them illegally, or others just encroached, giving rise to the emergence of squatters.

Like most issues, the debate is political. Land grabbing is symptomatic of and propagated by corruption, impunity and poor governance. The governments of former presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Arap Moi made land a currency for gaining influence and power; it silenced opposition and rewarded political patrons. Even President Mwai Kibaki's government allocated sections of the Mau in the run-up to the last elections. Contrary to the fabled Robin Hood of Nottingham Forest, this was a case of stealing from the poor and giving to the rich.

This issue has also been propelled onto the national stage simply because climate change is topmost on the global agenda and is seeping into the national consciousness. It is clear that the dying Mau ecosystem is adversely affecting human and environmental security. According to UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), the forest provides an economic benefit of approximately US\$26 million per annum. Further, due to its trans-boundary nature, it has the potential to create conflict between Kenya and Tanzania.

The country is facing severe water shortage while the food crisis has been declared a national disaster. Narok County, one of the country's breadbaskets, has had poor harvests, with the single reason being the Mau degradation. The water shortage is drying up the parks, which sustain Kenya's largest foreign exchange earner – tourism. The Mara River has failed to meet the needs of the Mara Game Reserve adequately, while the wildlife in Lake Nakuru National Park now depends on underground water to stay

alive. The aquifers in turn are drying, as they are not being replenished. The park's famed flamingoes and pelicans are surviving on treated sewage!

Hydro power plants such as Sondu Miriu are running at low capacity because of scarce water, which exacerbates the energy crisis in a country undergoing power rationing. Kenya relies on water for more than 70% of its power generation in order to supply electricity to less than 20% of its population. Therefore, four out of five Kenyans are not connected to the electricity grid and they further stress the natural vegetation, which is their only source of energy. The potential for conflict looms as the water becomes scarcer and is pitting the communities upstream (Kalenjin) against the communities downstream (Maasai). Human-wildlife conflict is also on the rise, both in the farming and the pastoralist communities.

A plethora of actors, including environmental activists and development partners, has sustained the pressure to address the Mau debacle and urgently reverse its destruction. Though this has been going on for three decades, the current impetus to end the catastrophe has been fuelled by the crescendo of the climate change discourse. This led to the formation of the Prime Minister's High Level Task Force in 2008 to investigate and give recommendations on a comprehensive solution to the Mau problem. The Task Force published a report in July 2009 outlining the gravity of the environmental degradation, human activity impact on the environment and the gross abuse of power.

One of the report's recommendations was for the government to evict the forest settlers, a decision that would affect about 20 000 families. The government proposed to compensate only genuine titleholders who,

according to its statistics, are less than a tenth of this figure. This decision unmasked the hypocrisy of the political leadership, with various bargaining positions emerging.


The contention by Kalenjin leaders is that all the Mau settlers must be compensated and the sanctity of title deeds, irrespective of how they were acquired, be respected. If not, they would be justified to revive historical grievances and insist on the eviction of other communities such as the Kikuyu, who are settled in the Rift Valley. One has to bear in mind that the Rift Valley was the epicentre of the 2008 post-election violence and one of the triggers for violent clashes has always

compensation. Some Kikuyu leaders have even asked for the compensation of post-election violence internally displaced persons (IDPs) before the Mau settlers are considered.

Meanwhile, the prime minister, Raila Odinga, has staked his political future on restoring the Mau at any cost. Going against the Kalenjin camp, which is supported by former President Moi, Odinga has been adamant that those who acquired land illegally, including powerful Kalenjin personalities, would not be compensated. This resolve could cost him electoral capital in the next election, because the majority of his supporters are from that community.

of inquiry have indicated that the underlying problem with the Mau stems from corruption in high offices.

In spite of that, the leadership has no compunction in seeking funds to restore what they helped destroy. The government is holding out a begging bowl for donations of US\$400 million to rehabilitate the Mau ecosystem and compensate the evictees. While former US president Bill Clinton has pledged to mobilise funds to plant trees on 100 000 hectares, the Nobel laureate, Professor Wangari Maathai is reportedly against the government seeking funds because it will be tantamount to rewarding the culprits behind the Mau degradation. In addition, it is possible that the Mau can become an avenue for rent-seeking, without any benefits to the environment and the people whose livelihoods depend on it; and such donations can be diverted to bankroll the political ambitions of the leaders in the 2012 general elections.

Kenya's history is replete with examples of the government initiating processes that seek to address in a systematic and comprehensive manner problems such as the Mau. However, its biggest failure has been to consistently pander to the interests of day. The restoration efforts are unsustainable because the process is highly dependent on the political goodwill of divergent parties. Therefore, the current Mau narrative is not unique and the likelihood is high that the rehabilitation effort will have little impact. Despite what the proponents of Mau conservation insist, Mau's survival is apparently negotiable. This needs to be approached from all angles. The protection of the environment, the need to respect human rights and the need to see that leaders do not auction away Kenya's future is everyone's responsibility. 

Land grabbing is symptomatic of and propagated by corruption, impunity and poor governance

been who the rightful owners of the land are. Media reports claim that the chief bargaining chip of the Kalenjin leaders was to support peaceful coexistence between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu in the Rift Valley, in exchange for the shelving of the Mau recommendations.

The Maasai and Kikuyu political leadership denounced this position and noted that evictees from other water towers such as the Aberdares and Mt Kenya were not compensated and thus Mau should not be an exception. This leadership further charged that Mau was being used to blackmail the government into inaction. Their insistence was that the Mau issue should be separated from national healing and reconciliation. They claimed that the settlers ought to be punished, not compensated, and only people who have genuine titles deserve

The issue of whether or not the settlers in the Mau need to be compensated has been politicised and the original intention of conserving the Mau lost in the din. However the big challenge in the current debate should be how the environmental integrity of the Mau complex will be restored. Herein lies the tragedy of the Mau conservation efforts.

It is evident from the Task Force list of Mau beneficiaries that politicians are protecting their interests rather than those of the poor. Some of the leaders spearheading the restoration process have been adversely mentioned for illegally acquiring public land in previous reports, including the Ndung'u Report. Various reports by government bodies, civil society (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Kenya Land Alliance and Kenya Human Rights Commission) and commissions

Water wars in Africa... what water wars?

Deborah Akoth points to the little-known success of trans-boundary water governance and collaboration among African states

Simmering tension in the Nile basin creates the impression that major water wars are eminent in Africa. The continent is one of the most water-stressed regions in the world, though it contains most of the global fresh water. It suffers from periodic droughts and floods. Most of its watercourse systems – more than 80 rivers and lakes – are shared across boundaries with diverse populations. All the mainland Sub-Saharan countries share at least one of them. This provides the perfect recipe for numerous armed conflicts. But major water wars are unlikely in the continent.

This may be because of the hydrological interdependence of African states, coupled with other economic and social interactions. Hydro diplomacy can only develop in an environment where for instance, multiple states share a single watercourse (the River Nile is shared by 10 states, and the Rivers Congo and Niger by nine). The administration of these trans-boundary watercourses has been relatively successful at preventing violent confrontations.

Where disputes have risen, the resulting dispute settlement processes have formed the foundation for future cooperation. In resolving the Nigeria and Cameroon Lake Chad border dispute, the International Court of Justice ruling provided for the reactivation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission as one of the confidence-building measures.

Water agreements tend to apply between countries in a given water basin, though there are few effective water management bodies. West Africa seems to have some of the more effective initiatives in place such as the Niger Basin Authority.

In North Africa, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya are jointly managing one of the largest water aquifers in Africa, implemented under the auspices of the Sahara and Sahel Observatory (OSS).

Though water cooperation frameworks are outside the established regional economic communities (RECs), these are considered part of the water structure, with some RECs, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West Africa States (Ecowas), playing an important role in the management of trans-boundary waters.


Nevertheless, challenges persist and there is room to strengthen the African trans-boundary water governance. The major problem is as much one of scarcity, as management of the water resources. Though scarcity does not necessarily lead to conflict and in some cases promotes conflict management initiatives like the Inkomati River Basin, it is still a factor to be addressed urgently. Lake Chad provides an illustration of scarcity triggering conflict, when Nigerian citizens crossed into Cameroon in pursuit of the receding shoreline to continue exploiting the lakes' resources.

The management of most of the watercourses does not adequately address sustainable use of the water systems. There is a need for the water authorities to be more involved in initiatives that preserve environmental security. This will be vital with the increasingly changing use of the waters from non-consumptive to consumptive, to meet growing population demands, which requires more quality regulations to be established.

Water relations in some regions are

defined by hydrological hegemony, which is not always a beneficial force. As the largest economy in Africa, South Africa's power relation with her neighbours is invariably in her favour, as evidenced by the Lesotho Highland Water Project. The Nile riparian states' relations is characterised by a disparity in water distribution (Ethiopia 86%) and consumption (Egypt 87%), which creates tensions that could escalate. Mauritania and Senegal fought over the proposed utilisation of River Senegal by the latter, without deliberating with the former.

The majority of the Nile states would like a new pact based on equitable and reasonable utilisation of water resources, rather than acquired rights. However, none is signatory to the applicable international laws such as the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which advocates the principle. The African Ministerial Conference on Water (AMCOW) should strive to strengthen the implementation of major regional and global water resources initiatives. Other hurdles include the need to formally manage shared aquifers, which can serve as alternative water sources, and the effective management of water towers, which have the potential to affect communities in another state if mismanaged, like the Mau Forest Complex.

In the face of Africa's myriad problems of endemic poverty, civil strife and political instability, the level of trans-boundary water governance and collaboration, though inadequate but improving, has managed and could still function towards averting the next big war. That is to be commended. 

The debate on the role of intelligence agencies in democratic societies will never cease to rage on. The debate, however, is not so much about the relevance of such agencies but rather of their modus operandi internally and the legislation that gives them sometimes sweeping powers.

Lauren Hutton takes an incisive look at Botswana's newly instituted Intelligence and Security Act

Operating under the cloak of secrecy

in Botswana

Botswana's president, Ian Khama.

Photo Gallo Images/AFP

As soon as there is secrecy, there is the chance of misconduct and the potential for abuse. It should come as no real surprise then that since its inception in 2007, the new Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS) in Botswana has been dogged by allegations of abuse and the perception that the costly enterprise is nothing more than a tool of presidential power for the purpose of consolidating domestic control.

This inherent distrust of intelligence agencies is in no way unique to Africa. It is perhaps more pronounced in Africa, as state intelligence structures are being formalised and developed. Tensions are therefore coming to the fore that juxtapose intelligence functions as threatening to democracy. In general, this says more about the state of the democracy than about the state of intelligence, but this should not detract from the necessity of debating the role of intelligence in democratic dispensations.

Botswana is no exception to this. The small, stable southern African state has long been held up as an example of freedom, democracy and economic development. However, with the transition of power from Festus Mogae to Ian Khama in April 2008, the quality of the democratic order has been questioned. The perception of democratic deficit has been enhanced by the enactment of controversial legislation such as the Media Practitioners Act and the Intelligence and Security Act. Given the particular regional context in which Botswana finds itself, such measures have been interpreted by some in the media, civil society and opposition parties as movements toward the securitisation of the state, the restriction of democratic space and the infringement on civil liberties.

Particularly when considering

the powers that are assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence and Security by the Intelligence and Security Act, such concerns are valid. The role of intelligence legislation is to define the box in which the distinctive characteristics of secrecy can be employed – it sets the parameters within which state agencies, with the ability to utilise special powers, may operate. That the DIS is perceived as being associated with abuse is in some ways connected to the controversy surrounding the Intelligence and Security Act and the leeway provided to the DIS by the legislation.

and the potential gaps in the previous system should have preceded the drafting of the legislation. The fact that this did not occur is not symptomatic of any particular issue within Botswana but is rather indicative of the manner in which intelligence is usually dealt with in most countries – as a matter for the politicians and policy-makers outside of the purview of the public.

When the Act was drafted and presented for comment, there was a wave of public outcry and debate on the implications of the legislation and the powers of the proposed DIS. On first perusal, it is noticeable that there

The establishment of the DIS largely coincided with Ian Khama's ascent to power and there has been the perception that with the new president came an inclination towards the securitisation of state

Firstly, the development of state security apparatus in Botswana is a contemporary phenomenon with the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) dating to only 1978. Intelligence functions have, until the creation of the DIS, been shared through several agencies including the police, military and the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime.

The establishment of the DIS was in itself a controversial move, as the rationale defining the necessity of creating a new intelligence dispensation was not entirely accepted by the broader civil society. In a perfect world, a public process on the role of intelligence in democratic Botswana

has been a concerted effort to establish a system of checks and balances. The Act creates a Tribunal to investigate complaints from the public as well as a Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security to oversee expenditure, administration and policy issues. Judicial oversight is also required for the issuing of warrants for arrest, search and seizure.

With further consideration, however, one begins to see some areas of concern emerging. Firstly, the intelligence function is centralised around the Office of the President. This is not an international anomaly, but creates the impression of the personalisation of this potential power and also fuels the

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perception that the intelligence function is directed for the use of narrowly defined priorities. Furthermore, such an alignment does not insulate intelligence from undue influence from the executive and advances the perception of bias and partisanship.

Secondly, in the first half of the Act, the role of the President is highlighted, but when it comes to issues of oversight, a minister comes into the picture. This creates ambiguity as to who is to be held accountable for the conduct of the DIS. It also creates a blurred line of authority between the Director General of the DIS and the minister. Additionally, the role of the minister is largely undefined and the requirements for appointment are at the discretion of the President, that is, there is no legal obligation for ministerial control. This further adds to the impression that the DIS is a tool only, at the service of the President. Concerns over the relationship of the DIS to the President are confounded not only by Khama's ascendancy to power through, what is viewed by some as an undemocratic, 'automatic succession' process, but also his strong military background.

Thirdly, the Act assigns wide powers and functions to the DIS. A smorgasbord of intelligence functions is listed, including the more commonplace vetting, counter-intelligence and VIP protection functions to the more contentious policy advice and action roles.

The relationship of intelligence to policy is always contentious, and the provision of advice on intelligence and security policy is in principle not the task of an intelligence agency – the rationale being that given the sensitivity (and potential for abuse) of intelligence functions, the manner in which that is done – that is, the policy

framework – should not be determined by intelligence practitioners. Such an arrangement tends to reinforce perceptions that the DIS is above reproach and creates its own rules. Also given the closeness of the relationship between the DIS and the President, there is always a danger of the intelligence products being used to justify policy decisions, instead of informing in a more objective manner.

In terms of the action roles, the Act provides that the DIS is not limited to information collection, analysis and dissemination, as would be the function of the narrowly defined intelligence structure. The Act enables the DIS to take action in certain circumstances. For example, under the functions of the DIS, it is noted that the DIS gathers information for the purposes of taking steps to protect the security interests of Botswana. It does not define whether information in this regard should be passed on to the military or police to act upon or whether the DIS can take steps. Most worrisome is that the Act confers on the DIS powers of arrest and detention without a warrant in certain circumstances.


The final issue, which is largely related to the first, is that the domains of intelligence functions are not clearly delineated. The DIS contains internal and external divisions. The task of the external division is spelt out in the Act but the role of the internal division is vaguely outlined as the 'gathering of domestic intelligence'. Domestic intelligence is not defined, nor are the parameters of what this should entail. The only direction is given by the definition of intelligence, which states that intelligence is 'information which relates to or may be relevant to any internal or external threat or potential threat to national security in any field'.

However, defining the domestic

intelligence mandate of the DIS would certainly go a long way to ease fears about the role that they are playing within Botswana. It must be noted though that a strong point of the Act is the manner in which threats to national security are defined. The definition sets certain parameters in terms of what the DIS should be focusing on. Given that there has been a lot of speculation on the role of the DIS internally since April 2008, it is critical that the Act clearly defines this aspect, it terms both of public awareness and for the purposes of providing clarity for the broader community.

The manner in which and timing of the establishment of the DIS has cast aspersions on the role and functioning of the intelligence agency. The existing state security agencies are reportedly uncomfortable with 'the new kid on the block' taking over. This was to be expected, as turf rivalries between security agencies with similar or overlapping mandates is an international tendency – probably more to do with securing position and power than anything else.

The establishment of the DIS largely coincided with Ian Khama's ascent to power and there has been the perception that with the new president came an inclination towards the securitisation of state structures. Coupled with some questionable legislative underpinnings, the DIS was always going to be shrouded in controversy. As Botswana was heading towards election in the latter part of 2009, this controversy became public scandal, fuelled by allegations of DIS involvement in extra-judicial killings.

As much as some of the allegations against the DIS will prove to be true, so too will some be proved false, and as with intelligence agencies everywhere, even more will be left unanswered. 



Why ethics regulations **continue to fail SA**

Many African democracies have introduced financial disclosure regulations, which set obligations on elected public officials to declare their personal financial and non-financial interests publicly. While these measures that seek to control potential conflict of interest and ensure accountability are commendable, **Collette Schulz-Herzenberg** highlights their often ineffectiveness in the case of South Africa

Endless media accounts of conflicts of interest situations among public officials reveal two broad failures of South Africa's integrity management system. Firstly, in the unregulated grey zones, numerous opportunities for unethical conduct remain. Secondly, where regulations do exist they are often ineffective.

In the first instance, important examples include the revolving door between government and business where public officials are recruited into the private sector, taking up lucrative jobs with the same corporate interests who had business pending before them when they served in government.

South African law is yet to recognise

that the rapid movement of public officials threatens the integrity of government in two ways: public officials may be influenced in their official actions by the promise of a job with a company seeking a contract or attempting to shape public policy.

Alternatively, former public officials have extraordinary access

to lawmakers and can use their government connections to benefit themselves or their business interests after they leave office.

'Cooling-off period' laws attempt to prevent these abuses by restricting private appointments for a period of one year usually. Yet, they are absent in South Africa. Another grey area involves the interconnectedness of the incumbent African National Congress party in government and black economic empowerment businesses that tender for public contracts. These examples highlight the need for tighter regulations, yet there is little political will to tackle these areas head on.

So why is it that these conflict-prone situations remain unregulated? A fundamental reason relates to the general confusion about the nature of conflicts of interest, or more specifically, what constitutes a conflict. This ambiguity plays itself out in two opposing trends. The first trend is seen with great regularity in media reports, where conflicts of interest are confused or equated with actual corrupt or unethical behaviour. In reality, conflicts of interest should be understood as a situation, not an action. Public officials may find themselves in a conflict situation without actually behaving corruptly. In other words, a conflict of interest does not refer to actual wrongdoing, but rather to the potential to engage in wrongdoing. Of course, the litmus test is whether the individual removes him or herself from the conflict situation. An official may or may not allow the interest that conflicts with the public interest to wrongly affect their conduct. But when reported in the media, however well-intentioned, it is misinformed or sensationalised. The result can be detrimental to the fight against corruption.

Over time, the public may even become dismissive of conflicts of interest regulations as the way to

combat corruption. Responsible reporting is mindful of the differences between non-compliance on one hand, and a genuine conflict of interest on the other. Similarly, when a potential conflict arises and comes to the public's attention, it is an encouraging sign that ethics mechanisms are working. After all, conflicts of interest are a naturally occurring phenomena, and an inevitable consequence of the fact that people occupy more than one social role. Attention should rather focus on those individuals who knowingly decline to remove themselves from a dubious conflict situation.

The other trend is found among politicians, who tend to adopt a narrow interpretation of what constitutes conflicts of interest. Of course, there is general agreement that bribes, kickbacks and extortion all involve a conflict of interest. Yet, the mere abuse of influence, such as nepotism, favouritism and misuse of state or public property, also constitutes a conflict of interest, but those who hold positions of power are less accepting of these aspects.

These tensions highlight a critical issue – that South Africa's public body remains somewhat unsure about what constitutes a conflict of interest situation in public life. The ensuing confusion continues to hold up regulatory efforts, and ultimately, the fight against corruption in the public sector. Until we reach a broad consensus about what should constitute minimum standards of ethical conduct for public officials, a number of activities that are ethically dubious will remain quite legal and those in power will dismiss sensationalist reporting for being precisely that.

Where regulations exist, they are often ineffectual, due, in part, to lax monitoring and oversight. Take financial disclosure as an example. Non-compliance by public officials, across legislatures, executive institutions and the civil service, is a


serious problem because there are few incentives for public officials to submit their records on time.

Firstly, public officials know that their forms are rarely, if ever, scrutinised by an overseer, and are thus unlikely to be missed. The most meaningful incentive, however, is driven by concern on the part of the public official that faces disciplinary measures for non-compliance. However, in reality, this rarely occurs. Serial offenders are not being dealt with harshly, despite the range of penalties that exists. Registrars and Integrity Commissioners lament their inability to enforce penalties, which is usually the responsibility of senior political figures such as Speakers of Parliament, or Ethics Committee members.

The Public Service Commission recently reported, with dismay, a 48% compliance rate among senior managers in the public service in 2008, moving thereafter to recommend charging non-complying members with misconduct. The real concern here is not of non-compliance per se. Rather, that various ethics regimes across government are unable, or unwilling, to employ punitive measures to chastise those who, with apparent ease, dismiss their duty to remain publicly accountable. This makes a mockery of the entire disclosure mechanism, which becomes a hollow exercise.

Beyond this, there is a far more fundamental issue that seriously undermines existing ethics and disclosure regulations. The practice of monitoring and oversight, to detect potential conflicts of interest, is difficult because the very mechanism that oversight relies on – that of public access to information contained in disclosure records – is notoriously hard to realise.

Take the case of parliaments. Rudimentary monitoring ensures that compliance is met. But effective



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oversight requires more rigorous monitoring to identify and flag potential conflicts or irregularities in disclosure documents and powers to institute investigative proceedings.


The South African case falls short in this regard. There is little comprehensive or proactive monitoring of elected officials' disclosure forms. Instead, oversight relies largely on the principle of public access to the information. Scrutiny of the forms by citizens or another public official is deemed sufficient. Only once a complaint is lodged are registrars entitled to request an investigation. Without an official complaint, there is little justifiable incentive for registrars to check members' interests, even when they suspect wrongdoing. Registrars are not expected to investigate actively whether conflicts exist among their members through scrutiny of disclosure forms. Disclosures are taken at face value as correct until someone suggests otherwise.

While the media and journalists play a vital role in holding elected members accountable, they face the same 'access to information' constraints as that of the public. There are large-scale differences across government institutions in the ability of citizens to access disclosure records. It seems that mandating public disclosure by law is no guarantee that the public can access this information. Often, requests for information are met with suspicion or resistance. Even when access is granted, records are not always up to date. Secret disclosure does little for accountability and the detection of conflicts of interest. A far greater commitment on the part of government to transparency and access is necessary if the credibility of the disclosure regime is to be enhanced.

Finally, even where regulations exist, they occasionally provide loopholes. The current situation of gift-giving

to elected officials is a case in point. Although regulations require public disclosure of gifts above a certain value, it imposes no limits or threshold on the value of accepted gifts. So, while it may well be ethically dubious for elected officials to accept a Mercedes Benz from a private entity, it remains perfectly legal. Surely the acceptance of expensive, luxury gifts, however innocent or well intentioned, should be off-limits precisely because it puts unfair pressures on public officials and raises unnecessary questions about the integrity of that individual?

Where to from here? South Africans

should push for national debates on ethical conduct in public life, by asking the following questions. What can citizens expect from their elected and non-elected officials? What constitutes ethical and fair conduct? Despite the tug and pull of conflicting interests, should the elusive 'public interest' always prevail? Over and beyond the enrichment of their loved ones, or themselves, public officials can also step up to the cause by revisiting and revising existing ethics regulations. 

To read more about corruption and governance, go to www.ipocafrika.org

In the news

South African media have had a field day over the last few months, exposing incidents of corruption and irregularities in government.

The arms deal

South Africans are still in the dark when it comes to the arms deal scandal, which rocked the country in recent years. ANC chief whip Tony Yengeni was the first to appear before the South African parliamentary Ethics Committee and eventually go to jail over the arms deal. Yengeni was censured for receiving a significant discount on a luxury car from one of the bidders in South Africa's multi-billion dollar arms deal. President Jacob Zuma also faced allegations of corruption and of lobbying arms deal bidders to obtain cash to maintain his expensive lifestyle. In 2003 the Ethics Committee declared that Zuma, then Deputy President, had not benefitted from interest-free loans in this regard and in 2009 the National Prosecuting Authority dropped further charges against him.

Ministers' R42.6-million splash on luxury cars

Early this year, Minister of Transport, S'bu Ndebele received a Mercedes Benz 500 valued at R1.1 million from Vukuzakhe contractors, a road construction company. This gift was allegedly given in honour of the work that he did as premier of Kwa-Zulu Natal, to provide small contractors with a platform to grow. After receiving the car, Ndebele asked President Zuma for advice on whether he should retain the gift or not. Zuma gave him permission to keep

the car. Ndebele opted to return it, apparently due to public outcry. The Executive Members' Ethics Act stipulates that gifts, which are given in return for a benefit received from the member in the execution of their duties, may not be received or retained.

A sizeable number of ministers have spent over a million rand on each of the two vehicles they are entitled to. These include former finance minister and now economic and planning minister, Trevor Manuel; communications minister, Siphivwe Nyanda; higher education minister, Blade Nzimande, and others. An opposition politician retorted that purchases of expensive vehicles were not 'tools to help the ministers do their jobs' but rather 'extensions of the ministers' egos'.

BEE farms

The South African media has recently unearthed what has all the trappings of an explosive scandal. According to *The Sunday Times* newspaper, about R100 million from the agricultural black economic empowerment fund (AgriBEE) meant to support agricultural projects, HIV/AIDS sufferers and orphans, had been diverted to buy luxury vehicles and homes by politically connected members of the ruling party.

Linked to these allegations are Dan Mofokeng, former housing MEC of South Africa's richest province, Gauteng, who is also husband to ANC provincial legislature member, Jacqueline Mofokeng; and Phil Mohlahlane, former head of the Agriculture Department section and former acting CEO of the Land Bank. Other alleged beneficiaries included Jessica Mojanaga (Mohlahlane's sister-in-law), and an unnamed doctor.

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is the 15th largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. But is there the necessary political will to provide enough funds to the SANDF to meet the expectations, asks **Henri Boshoff**



Ten years of keeping the peace

This year, the SANDF celebrates 10 years of peacekeeping. South Africa has come a long way from having one peacekeeper assigned to one mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 5 September 1999, to having an average of 2 800 soldiers per day assigned to seven missions in six countries today.

The SANDF is currently the 15th largest contributor to UN missions and also contributes to missions of the African Union. It also has a presence in two countries as a result of bilateral agreements.

The question can be asked, however, whether it can continue to fulfill the demand of the leading nation in providing peace support to mediation efforts on the continent.

Domestically, the question has often been asked why South African soldiers

are deployed outside the country while crime statistics are high and they are needed in their own country. It is clear that there is a lack of sensitising the South African public as to why the SANDF deploys to external missions.

In this context, the South African *Defence Review* points out that problems relating to political conflict in Africa are not confined to being within national borders. It is specifically mentioned that inter- or intra-state conflicts that may arise in Southern Africa, and that such conflicts could pose a security threat to regional peace and stability, and thus to South Africa itself as an integral part of the Southern African community. The *Defence Review* states that conflicts and underdevelopment have a negative impact on neighbouring states in the form of a range of non-military threats: environmental destruction; the spread

of disease; refugee movements; and cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms. Thus it seems that South Africa's approach to participation in international peace missions not only links peace and stability in Africa and the region to the country's national interest, but also indicates that the country should play a role in alleviating the suffering caused among Africans by the scourge of armed conflict.

With its first modest contributions to MONUC (the Mission of the United Nations Organisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea), as well as the bigger peace support effort in Burundi, South Africa has clearly demonstrated its commitment to becoming involved in international peacekeeping endeavours. However, it should be noted that the



South African peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

post-1994 reduced military spending and a dwindling defence budget have been at the centre of significant budgetary changes in South Africa in the past decade. Against this background, the Chief of Joint Operations of the SANDF, Gen. Godfrey Ngwenya, recently urged caution against overstressing the capacity of the SANDF in deploying more troops for peace support. Specifically, it has been stated that almost 2 500 members were deployed to the DRC, Burundi and Ethiopia, and that the SANDF's force structure did not allow for more deployments in peacekeeping operations, implying that South Africa has effectively reached a ceiling as far as troop contributions are concerned.

When evaluating the SANDF's peacekeeping role in the last 10 years, it is clear that South

Africa has generally followed a negotiating strategy in which it has functioned as a mediator, followed by a military commitment during the implementation phase or military deployment, followed by mediation.

In the case of Burundi and the DRC, the SANDF was used as a foreign policy tool, implementing brokered peace agreements under extremely volatile circumstances. This also shows that, despite its stated peaceful strategy, the government is willing to use coercive means if need be.

In the case of Lesotho, the SANDF was used as a pre-emptive tool, and in the case of the DRC it was part of a robust peace support operation. In the past, South Africa has also shown that where criteria such as sufficient means, a clear entry/exit strategy and a clear mandate are concerned, the government has been willing to compromise on these three criteria because of the greater importance given to concerns at the strategic level and because of South Africa's predominantly benign regional great power role. Beyond its role as a mediator, the SANDF has played an active part in the creation of peace and stability on the continent in order to sustain this role. The Burundi case has shown that, despite its shortcomings and a lot of criticism of its ability to deploy such a force in the space of two weeks, the SANDF has been able to deploy and undertake its role as lead nation in the mission.

On paper, the SANDF has the manpower and possibly the equipment that would enable it to function as a leading peacekeeper in Africa. Unfortunately, the reality on the ground also shows that serious structural and capability issues negatively affect the capacity of the SANDF to undertake that role. South Africa, and more specifically the SANDF, has recently experienced

problems in fulfilling several of the requirements of deployment in peacekeeping missions, mostly because of a lack of economic and human resources, but also because of domestic political constraints and challenges to management within the SANDF itself. It has the command and control capacity, enough communications equipment for a whole mission, and specialised functions such as medical facilities, airport-handling crews, river-patrol capacity, engineering units and so on. In addition to this, it will soon have a long-distance transport and close-air support capacity. This means that in theory, the SANDF has no difficulty in taking on the responsibility of a lead nation for a brigade-level deployment or participation in peacekeeping missions.

The challenge for the SANDF is to address its shortcomings, some of which are structural, general-to-private ratio, tooth-to-tail ratio, the relationship between force design and available resources (such as problems with rotating), serious health problems among personnel and vacancies among critical function personnel groups, sufficient logistics support, and discipline.

The SANDF has made an important difference: it has been highly praised, for instance, during the high-risk combat operations as part of MONUC's reaction force in Eastern DRC, both in the Kivu provinces and in the Ituri district.

Because of a constant demand for the SANDF to provide troops to peace missions, the SANDF will have to co-operate with often-weak African partners, meaning that the demands on the South African contribution are likely to increase – not only in terms of troop numbers, but also as lead nation in AU-mandated missions. This is expensive, and politicians will have to decide whether the will exists to provide the necessary funds to do this. ■



Drug trafficking in Africa

According to Interpol, raids against drug traffickers in Guinea Bissau are making an impact and cartels are actively looking to take their business elsewhere.

Concerted efforts of regional and international drug control agencies appear to have tipped the scales against the drug cartels operating in the West African region.

Keto Segwai elaborates

Latin American drug cartels that had gained a foothold in the West African region in the past few years are now scrounging for new bases in central and southern Africa.

Efforts to uproot the cartels from the West African region brought together Interpol, the Economic Community Of West African States (Ecowas), United Nations (UN) agencies and the European Union (EU). According to the head

Photo Gallo Images/Getty Images

of the sub-regional bureau of Interpol for West and Central Africa, Prosper Kwame Agblor, the cartels are already actively looking elsewhere on the western seaboard of Africa.

'They are now targeting central and southern Africa, but through Interpol, most of the relevant authorities in those regions are aware of their intentions,' he said in an interview following a seminar at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria.

The dividends of the agencies' campaign against drug trafficking in West Africa are already being realised. As Agblor notes: 'The drug seizures have markedly decreased since the beginning of the year.'

That tide appears to have been stemmed. The patrols of the West African high seas by the navies of Spain and France have contributed significantly to the obvious success in the West African region. Britain and Ghana have also jointly carried out enforcement at the Ghanaian airports.

Interpol, UN agencies (the UN Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau [UNOGBIS] and the UN Development Programme [UNDP]) and Ecowas also played a leading role in that effort. Agblor notes that: 'We are assisting countries in our sub-region to build capacity and in mounting elaborate police operations.

narcotics seized at one of the country's more than 90 off-shore islands. The incident happened last year before the current administration came to power. 'We were chased out by the military on the pretext that we were at a military installation. In fact, it was a major headache to get the permit to go to the island in the first place. The government has been willing to be assisted but the military is powerful to the extent that it makes the whole government powerless,' Agblor states.

The government's predicament had also been compounded by the fact that it was too broke, and unable to pay salaries of the civil servants and the military. Though it has the ministry of justice and courts it does not have a prison. Neither is there a police training school.

As Agblor points out, it was in this precarious situation that Guinea-Bissau's neighbours stepped in to assist. Nigeria, for instance, offered to pay the salaries of Guinea-Bissau's military, while Ecowas was to pick up the country's civil service tab.

The efforts of Ecowas and the international cooperating partners are expected to go a long way towards containing the scourge of drug trafficking that has bedevilled the West African region in the past few years. Or will traffickers just devise alternative dubious means to deliver their lethal cargo to the European market? Their methods have indeed been ingenious: they have included the use of live snails, hollowed-out mortars and old engine blocks, and the importation of cement or chocolate, laced with cocaine, to Benin and Ghana respectively.

Perhaps central and southern African governments should now be on the lookout for imported cocaine-bearing gorillas, elephants, prawns and gold bars? ■

At the height of trafficking, at least two light planes, each carrying about 800kg of cocaine, landed on one of Guinea-Bissau's many island airstrips

He says that drug trafficking became a major problem 'because every year the number of seizures kept increasing,' particularly in Guinea-Bissau. For instance, while in 2006 the drug-enforcement agencies seized about 5 000 tons of cocaine, the following year that figure jumped to more than 6 000 tons. And between January and October last year, the seizures had topped a staggering tonnage of more than 7 000.

At the height of trafficking, at least two light planes, each carrying about 800kg of cocaine, landed on one of Guinea-Bissau's many island airstrips. Cocaine shipments were soon to account for 10 times the income of the state's gross annual national product. Guinea-Bissau derives its earnings primarily from cashew nut exports.

We are also assisting with equipment, which includes a state-of-the-art secured global communications system, or the I-24/7 as it is called. All the 187 Interpol members are now connected to this internet-based system. Where there is no connectivity, we provide satellite systems.'

However, in countries such as Guinea-Bissau, with its inherent poverty and weak governmental institutions, the efforts of the assistance-givers have sometimes been frustrated.

For instance, a party comprising agents from Interpol, the UN, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Portugal were rudely awakened to the unbridled power enjoyed by the Guinea-Bissau military when they wanted to inspect a consignment of

Guinean soldiers on armoured vehicle patrols in the streets of Conakry on 23 December 2008. After the coup by army officers following the death of former president Lansana Conté, there was some optimism in Guinea, but this has now turned to horror and condemnation.

The terrible events of 28 September in Guinea can leave no one indifferent. The killing of over 150 of their compatriots by Guinean soldiers cannot be justified by any means whatsoever. The manipulation of the figures of the casualties and the circumstances of the tragedy by the ruling junta adds insult to injury. The condemnation by the different Guinean, regional and international actors is therefore logical and the right thing to do. But it is important that the aftermath of this tragedy be handled with care and pragmatism. Because of the dramatic nature of these kinds of events, people tend to react with emotion and let these influence crucial decisions.

For example, some have made calls for the perpetrators of the violence, including Moussa Dadis Camara, the head of the military junta in power since December 2008, to be tried before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity.

There is no denying the fact that the horrendous crimes (deliberate killing of unarmed civilians, rape and torture) committed on this day allegedly by Guinean soldiers amount to crimes against humanity, according to the Rome Statute (Art. 7) of the ICC, which Guinea ratified on 14 July 2003. The Court can therefore exercise its jurisdiction on this matter.

But I don't think it realistic or even wise to insist on this action at this particular moment. The Court has its own problems of capacity and cannot be expected to deal with every single situation that falls under its mandate or is brought to its attention, particularly when this is 'yet another' African case. Also, insistence on this action can only harden the resolve of hardliners within the CNDD (National Council for Democracy and Development) to

Poor Dadis, miserable Guinea

Prior to the planned presidential elections early next year, a protest march by thousands of Guineans lobbying against the candidacy of junta leader, Moussa Dadis Camara, ended in slaughter as members of the military junta surrounded the stadium, and opened fire randomly on those within. Amidst the outrage, **Issaka K Souaré** examines some possible solutions for Guinea's future*

prolong their stay in power, since that would be the only cover for them. Neither the opposition forces nor the international community will be able to get them out of there by force without causing even more bloodshed.

Meanwhile, opposition parties have also rejected a proposal by the junta to form a government of national unity. They have resolved not to talk to the junta and even call for its disbandment and the voluntary or forceful resignation of its members without condition. For them, a new government of national unity should be formed with the exclusion of the junta. This would be the ideal solution, given that the members of the junta have certainly shown their incompetence and bad faith in steering the country to a new era of peace and democracy.

But I don't think it is realistic to sack all the members of the junta or call for the unconditional resignation of its head. Not only because the military officers are unlikely to accept it, but also because the 100+ parties and movements that compose the opposition forces may encounter problems when it comes to the appointment of their respective members to this government. The fact of the matter is that the opposition are only united against the junta, but there are serious rifts between them. It has to be recalled also that we are only a few months away from the planned presidential elections of 31 January 2010.

What should then be done?

Firstly, we must establish certain facts. When Dadis Camara claims to be 'held hostage' by some military elements who would prevent him from stepping down - either through a mediated agreement or voluntarily - it might not be totally false.

In February this year, I spent some

time in Conakry doing research and spoke to a wide range of people: members of the government, including the minister of foreign affairs, members of the opposition, trade union leaders, members of civil society organisations and journalists.

On the evening of 26 February I was led to the office of Gen. Sékouba Konaté, the minister of defence, and third (second in reality) personality of the junta. The office was full of soldiers constantly chatting away. Konaté boasted that the CNDD has proved its detractors wrong by staying put longer than they had predicted. 'We're already two months in the job, they'll see...' he said, as his colleagues burst out laughing.

From this meeting and other conversations with people in the inner circle of Dadis Camara, as well as observing the ensuing events, I concluded that elements like Konaté wouldn't really want to give up power anytime soon and would in fact threaten Dadis in the event that he contemplated doing so.

This is not a new phenomenon. Dictators often stay in power for a long time, not always because they want to stay, but because they are pressurised by those around them who know that they have no chance of seizing power and yet can't survive without their leader staying put.

This is even more so in the Guinean case, seeing that the majority of the members of the CNDD have no other skills that would permit them to do anything else once they've left power. Dadis is therefore, in a sense, a victim of his incompetence, and perhaps because of this, a victim of the manipulation of some of his own men.


All the above considered, I would like to suggest three main measures towards resolving the crisis. None may be obtained without dialogue.

The first recommendation is to dismiss certain members of the junta that were directly responsible for the massacre and give more executive powers to the civilian prime minister, Kabine Komara.

As a second recommendation, Dadis must undertake, in writing, that neither he nor any member of the junta or the transitional government would be candidates at the forthcoming presidential and legislative elections. The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) should be strengthened and given the necessary funds to be able to organise credible elections. The junta must stop all its political campaigning activities using public money and account for all the funds that have been recovered so far from the financial audits since they came to power. The money recovered should be managed by a special commission that would include members of the opposition.

It may be recommended, finally, that the Transitional National Council (TNC), that had been agreed to by all the parties, be set up immediately. This body is supposed to replace the dissolved parliament and revise the constitution that President Lansana Conté manipulated prior to his death in 2008. It is important that the constitution is revised before the elections. This is because any leader that comes to power after these elections might find the skewed constitution advantageous and refuse to revise key sections (that is, no presidential term limits and seven instead of the original five years), thereby leading to socio-political upheavals between him and his then former colleagues. ■

** A modified French version of this article appeared in Jeune Afrique, no 2544 (11-17 October 2009).*



Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, member of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation board.

Mo Ibrahim prize no carrot and stick

Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, former secretary general of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), is a member of the board of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which this year decided not to award its \$5-million prize for outstanding leadership to an outgoing African head of state.

Liesl Louw-Vaudran asked him about the prize, his vision for the African Union (AU) and the way out of Africa's crises

Photo: Liesl Louw-Vaudran

The-African.org: **Following the controversial decision not to award an outgoing head of state with the Mo Ibrahim prize this year, is there still sense to go on with the award? Why not rather spend the money on some worthy cause for Africa? Do you still believe it is a good thing?**

Dr Salim: Absolutely. Firstly, this prize has now been in existence for three years. On two occasions we've already had laureates, presidents Joachim Chissano of Mozambique and Festus Mogae of Botswana. This time around, we weren't able to select someone, but the committee said the people we were considering were credible.

I think there is some confusion about the purpose of this prize. The money is just one aspect, but the central purpose is to award excellence in leadership in our countries.

All the reports and all the discussions about Africa always focus on leadership and on the failure of leadership. To a large extent, that is true. But it is not true that everywhere on the continent, leadership is failing. And that is why we think we should award excellence in leadership.

The second point is, we are saying with this prize that there is always life after a person has been president. He or she can continue to play an important role in African and international affairs.

If we talk about a carrot-and-stick approach to leadership in Africa, your prize is in a sense a carrot for African leaders to do good. But what then about the stick? Do you think leaders who are bad should be punished or tried in front of the International Criminal Court?

As far as the Mo Ibrahim foundation is concerned, this has nothing to do with carrots and sticks. Again, that is another misconception. The greatest importance of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation is the

Mo Ibrahim Index, assessing the performance of all the African countries. How has the government performed in human development, on the question of corruption, the question of human rights, good governance, socio-economic sustainability and so on. Our business is to make our modest contribution towards the question of good governance, to recognise where excellent leadership has taken place, and to use the good leader as an example for the rest of Africa.

The Mo Ibrahim index is in a way similar to the African Peer Review Mechanism [APRM], where countries are judged on various criteria following a long, in-depth study. That seemed to be Africa's own attempt to judge performance, but somehow that never really succeeded. What is your opinion of what went wrong?

Frankly, I think it was a major breakthrough. The idea that African countries and leaders can assess performance and make themselves available for assessment, I think, was important. And of course, I wish it could make greater progress and move faster than it has, but you know, sometimes they say perfection is the enemy of the good.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation makes use of all this data like that of the African Peer Review Mechanism and international institutions, the World Bank, Unesco, Transparency International and also the amount of work done by our own researchers. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation is assisted by a distinguished group of academics, mostly African, and African institutions, to put together this index, which helps us as much as possible to put together a rough indication of how a country is faring.

With the start of projects like Nepad [New Partnership for Africa's Development] and the APRM, with

the contribution of South Africa and former president Thabo Mbeki, one got the feeling that there is a great momentum to change things in the AU and in Africa. Now it seems South Africa is in a sense withdrawing and the momentum has been lost?

I think firstly, South Africa and president Mbeki played a very important role with the creation of Nepad and other institutions. It was not South Africa alone, but in cooperation with a number of countries. However, it is important to note that, in the last year or so, because of its own internal dynamics, understandably so, the leadership in South Africa has not spent as much time as they should have [on African affairs]. But my own experience of South Africa is that there is always some reticence, some reluctance to be seen as providing leadership to the continent. I think South Africans need not be too shy and I think the continent has a lot to learn from South Africa inasmuch as South Africa also has a lot to learn from the experience of other countries.

As secretary general to the AU, you have seen the entire progression of the OAU, and the momentum there was initially with the start of the AU, to change and to improve institutions. Is this process still going on or is it now slowing down?

Everything new has its own dynamism and of course, when the African Union was established in Durban in 2002 there was a lot of excitement, which has now diminished somewhat, but the commitment to change is still there. In many areas, the AU is a great improvement on the OAU – areas which in the past were considered no-go areas, areas which were almost sacrilegious – for example, talking of issues on human rights violations, and the notion of the right of the AU to intervene in certain circumstances, which I think is a

remarkable development.

But of course, you have to bear in mind that when the OAU was founded in '63, the major aim was post-colonialism and also the need to inculcate the spirit of pan-African solidarity and fighting apartheid. Now apartheid is a thing of the past, and the AU has new challenges now, of socio-economic development, of ensuring human rights for our people and ensuring the ordinary African benefits from development.

Africa has come out quite strongly against coups and countries that don't

stick to their constitutions. Is the AU Peace and Security Council going to evolve into becoming something like the UN Security Council?

In fact, we are doing more than the Security Council in this respect, by not accepting unconstitutional changes. This is a major contribution by the AU to Africa and also to the international community, in my view. It is very rare that a coup takes place and there is overall condemnation by the whole world. In this case it is almost automatic, if there is a coup in any African country, the reaction of the organisation is almost

instantaneous. The decision taken against Guinea for example, by Ecowas and then by the AU. The actions against Mauritania, which literally at some point forced the government to change its position. Have we as an organisation been able to live up to the expectations? The judgement on that one is not out yet, but there is definitely a significant improvement on how the AU operates and how it faces its challenges.

Does the AU have the capacity to send troops to conflict situations like Somalia and elsewhere? The AU still has to call on the international community to help in conflict situations.

Actually, the AU has not called on any foreign country for help. We have done three things: there has been a clear preparedness on the part of the Africans to deploy troops, even in conditions of difficulties. For example, when African troops went to Darfur – I know for a fact it was a matter of sacrifice – South African troops, Senegalese troops, Ghanaian troops, from the Gambia, and now the Tanzanians have gone there. It is a continental response, which is extremely positive. At the same time, I think the expectation of Africa to get help from the international community is right, because the UN Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and security; it does not say anywhere that this responsibility ceases when it comes to Africa. Of course, we learn from experience and there are difficulties also, because some forces are ill-equipped. If you have a situation like in Somalia where you have Ugandan troops and Burundian troops, they are really making sacrifices. There is nothing to be gained by Burundi or Uganda deploying their sons and daughters there; it testifies to this new commitment in Africa.

**CATEGORY AND OVERALL SCORES –
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2007/2008**

| OVERALL IIAG Rank 2007/2008 | Country | OVERALL IIAG Score 2007/2008 | OVERALL IIAG Rank 2007/2008 | Country | OVERALL IIAG Score 2007/2008 |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1 | Mauritius | 82.83 | 28 | Mauritania | 50.57 |
| 2 | Cape Verde | 78.01 | 29 | Swaziland | 49.43 |
| 3 | Seychelles | 77.13 | 30 | Sierra Leone | 48.91 |
| 4 | Botswana | 73.59 | 31 | Comoros | 48.58 |
| 5 | South Africa | 69.44 | 32 | Rwanda | 48.53 |
| 6 | Namibia | 68.81 | 33 | Cameroon | 47.00 |
| 7 | Ghana | 65.96 | 34 | Niger | 46.59 |
| 8 | Tunisia | 65.81 | 35 | Nigeria | 46.46 |
| 9 | Lesotho | 61.18 | 36 | Djibouti | 46.04 |
| 10 | São Tomé and Príncipe | 60.23 | 37 | Ethiopia | 45.59 |
| 11 | Egypt | 60.09 | 38 | Burundi | 45.27 |
| 12 | Tanzania | 59.24 | 39 | Liberia | 44.92 |
| 13 | Madagascar | 58.37 | 40 | Guinea Bissau | 43.50 |
| 14 | Algeria | 58.36 | 41 | Republic of Congo | 42.79 |
| 15 | Benin | 58.20 | 42 | Angola | 41.02 |
| 16 | Morocco | 57.83 | 43 | Togo | 40.83 |
| 17 | Senegal | 55.98 | 44 | Guinea | 40.41 |
| 18 | Zambia | 55.30 | 45 | Equatorial Guinea | 39.39 |
| 19 | Gambia | 55.13 | 46 | Eritrea | 36.96 |
| 20 | Mali | 54.54 | 47 | Côte d'Ivoire | 36.61 |
| 21 | Gabon | 53.92 | 48 | Central African Republic | 35.00 |
| 22 | Kenya | 53.74 | 49 | Sudan | 33.45 |
| 23 | Libya | 53.69 | 50 | Democratic Republic of Congo | 33.25 |
| 24 | Uganda | 53.57 | 51 | Zimbabwe | 31.29 |
| 25 | Malawi | 53.03 | 52 | Chad | 29.86 |
| 26 | Mozambique | 52.38 | 53 | Somalia | 15.24 |
| 27 | Burkina Faso | 51.58 | | | |

Why is there no capacity? Why have the troops in Darfur, for example, not received the helicopters they've been asking for, for so many years now?

That really defies the imagination. The whole world is going on about Darfur, and the force there is no longer an African force, but an international force, but they have failed to get helicopters, including attack helicopters. This is a sad commentary on the international community. On one hand, you talk of the need to do something about the situation and you have people who are willing to help, but they are frustrated by the lack of resources.

Don't you think the position of the AU on the ICC indictment against Sudan's president Omar Al-Bashir created bad blood between Africa and the international community? The UN backed the indictment. Now the international community is saying, 'Well, solve the problem of Darfur yourself'.

Anyone who would argue this way would be disingenuous. The AU force was already there long before this issue, even when I was leading the negotiations in Abuja. But on the issue of the indictment, it is important to note the AU is not defending either president Al-Bashir or the ICC. The position of the AU is firstly, that impunity should not be tolerated. Secondly, in the case of Darfur, there are a number of issues, like the peace process, the question of humanitarian assistance and the question of justice. Which of these comes first? Some would argue that they must go together. The reality of the situation is you have to deal with the government of Sudan. President Al-Bashir is a fact of life. My argument has always been that justice can always be ensured, but it doesn't have to come today.

When one looks at the situation in Zimbabwe and Kenya it seems as if powersharing after a flawed election is not working?

Ideally, whoever wins an election should form a government. But when there is a confrontation, one has to find a way to end it and find a degree of consensus.


It is in the interests of everyone to make this agreement in Zimbabwe work. What is the alternative? My own impression is that this agreement was a relief to literally hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans. It was not a perfect agreement, but it was important. Now the challenge is to ensure that it is implemented in its letter and its spirit.

Kenya, again, is a different story. I think that the

agreement that the former secretary general Kofi Annan and the Elders, the leaders of the region, was able to broker was an important one. We have to bear in mind how Kenya was at that point. It is always easy with the benefit of hindsight to say we should have done this or that, but it was important

My only wish is that our Kenyan friends, the Kenyan leadership, should focus on what they should do in terms of what has happened during the last election, how to overcome that situation, how to undertake the necessary reforms so that by the time the next election takes place, you have a new situation that does not allow for the situation to develop as it has before. This is not only important for Kenyans. Kenya is important for East Africa. Kenya has a strong economy, Kenya's stability is important for East Africa and it is important for Africa.

Would you agree with an investigation into the post-election violence in Kenya?

Absolutely. This is part of the understanding. You cannot allow impunity to reign supreme. You cannot allow those who were responsible for the Kenyan violence not to be brought to justice. This is true of Kenya, this is true of Darfur. 



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Relations between Angola and China are being cemented at the highest levels. Former Angolan prime minister, Fernando Dias dos Santos (right) welcomes the visiting Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, to Luanda in June 2006.

Exploring the impact of Chinese investment in Angola

Chinese investments, particularly in the Angolan construction sector, have, in the short term, generally impacted positively on that country's economy and populace. But **Phillipe Asanzi**, who visited Angola as part of a research project, cautions that the partnership is fraught with imperfections that need urgent attention

At the end of its civil war of more than three decades, Angola needed to rebuild its destroyed infrastructure – schools, hospitals, roads, railways, bridges and dams. Having failed to secure financial assistance from the West and the Bretton Woods institutions, primarily on account of good governance and economic

reforms conditionalities, Angola turned to Brazil, China and India. So far, Chinese financial assistance to Angola has been the largest, estimated at more than US\$10 billion in loans.

Chinese oil companies that include China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Petroleum Corporation

(CNPC) have invested billions of dollars in the acquisition of oil blocks in Angola, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan. Besides the oil industry, Chinese companies have also invested heavily in the mining sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

A distinguishing feature of Chinese

investment in Africa is that it is customarily part of a larger package that includes concessional loans, debt relief and grants. Of note is the fact that Chinese concessional loans are coincidentally given to resource-rich countries, thus affording China easy access to strategic resources such as oil, copper and cobalt.

More importantly also, these concessional loans enable Chinese companies, especially construction companies, to win contracts and establish themselves in the African markets. As a matter of fact, one of the critical conditions of these concessional loans is for the Chinese contractors to be awarded 70% of the financed projects, while the remainder can go to Angolan companies. Furthermore, the terms of the contract are such that at least 50% of the project's procurement must come from China.

The main vehicle of Chinese financial disbursement to Angola is the China Export-Import Bank (Exim). The Exim Bank's loans provide below the market interest rates, and are subsidised by the Chinese government. But their repayment can be tied to some sort of bartering arrangement. For instance, in one of these loans, Angola is required to give China about 10 000 barrels of oil a day.

Besides Exim Bank's loans, China International Fund Ltd (CIF), a Hong Kong-based fund-management company, has granted the Angolan government loans estimated at more than US\$9 billion. These loans are managed directly by the National Office for Reconstruction (GRN), headed by General Helder Vieira Dias who is also the Minister in Chief of the Angolan presidency.

Interestingly, in contrast to Exim Bank loans, few details are known about the terms of the agreement signed between the Angolan government and CIF.

In a related matter, China Development Bank (CDB) in March this year granted Angola a US\$1-billion loan. Once again, the terms of the loan between CDB and the Angolan government remain shrouded in secrecy.

The huge Chinese loans granted to the Angolan government have enabled Chinese companies, especially the construction sector, to win lucrative tenders at the expense of well-established Brazilian and Portuguese construction firms.

currency reserves has enabled the government to stabilise the exchange rate and boost the local currency, the kwanza. The appreciation of the kwanza has sequentially allowed the government to reduce the inflation rate, especially given the fact that Angola imports huge quantities of foodstuffs and manufacturing goods. For instance, the level of inflation came down from 18.5% in 2005 to 12.3% in 2006 and has remained around 12% since then.

Although one cannot entirely

...the increase in foreign currency reserves has enabled the government to stabilise the exchange rate and boost the local currency, the kwanza

The question that remains to be answered, however, is what positive impact has the massive Chinese investment had on Angola's economy and its populace's standard of living?

The impact of Chinese investments on the Angolan economy can be assessed at two levels – macroeconomic and microeconomic.

At the macroeconomic level, the general assessment is that Chinese investments have had considerable positive impact on the Angolan economy. In the last few years, China has become a major player in Angola's oil industry, to the point that it now imports 45% of Angolan crude oil. The huge investments and crude oil exports to China, as well as high oil prices, have enabled the government of Angola to significantly increase its revenues and foreign currency reserves.

In turn, the boost of revenues has enabled Angola to reduce its fiscal deficits and subsequently stabilise the inflation rate in the medium term. At the same time, the increase in foreign

attribute the successes that Angola has achieved in the management of its macroeconomic policies to Chinese investments, it is undeniable that investments in the Angolan oil industry and the subsequent imports of Angolan crude oil to China have played a vital role in the improvement of Angola's macroeconomic parameters.

At the microeconomic level, however, the impact of Chinese investments on the local economy does not appear rosy.

Job creation

There is a general perception that Chinese companies seldom employ Angolan workers. For instance, Chinese construction companies in the Angolan city of Benguela have a workforce of up to 80% Chinese. In addition, Chinese construction companies are accused of only employing the locals in menial jobs, and on casual basis for that matter.

However, there are some complexities that underlie this untenable situation. Firstly, Angola's protracted civil war has prevented the country from

investing in human resources, resulting in the critical shortage of educated and skilled labour force. For instance, it is estimated that only 16% of Angola's government employees have completed secondary school.

Secondly, there is a working culture aspect. Chinese managers are known to decry poor work ethic among Angolans that is characterised by high levels of absenteeism. That situation is further compounded by what the Chinese perceive as rigid Angolan labour laws, which make it difficult to fire non-performing workers. There are reportedly instances where Chinese managers have rather chosen to pay such workers to stay at home and have replaced them with Chinese workers.

Nevertheless, whatever the motives that are behind the Chinese construction companies' decision not to employ Angolan workers, the fact remains that their investments in Angola do not create significant jobs for the local population.

Linkages with the local economy

Generally, Chinese investments in Angola have few linkages with the local economy. In fact, Chinese construction companies import all their inputs from China, including materials such as aluminium, cement and iron ore, as provided for under the terms of the loan that stipulate that at least 50% of the contract's procurement material component must be sourced from China. This is also due to the Angolan economy's lack of capacity to provide such materials.

Joint ventures

The Angola private sector is not benefitting from the 30% quota as provided for under the Exim Bank agreement, for instance. Few, if any, Angolan companies participate in big projects funded by Chinese banks. So there is little joint-venture activity

going on. This could be explained by the fact that most of the Angolan private sector does not have easy access to finance. Financial access in Angola is believed to be contingent upon political affiliation with the ruling party. In short, it is premised on political patronage. The other important aspect is that most Angolan companies lack the requisite human resources and technology to effectively participate in the construction projects.

The only sector of the Angolan economy where joint ventures have been effective is the energy sector, specifically the oil industry where state company Sonangol is involved. However, such projects have limited effect on the economy, since the oil industry employs less than 1% of the total labour force.

On the whole, however, the Chinese investments in basic infrastructure are already showing a positive impact on the standard of living of the Angolan population, especially in cities such as Luanda, Huambo and Benguela. Construction and rehabilitation of schools, hospitals, roads, electricity grids and houses in those places are clearly impacting positively on the populace's standard of living.

The hive of construction activities has obviously led to concerns about the quality of the Chinese projects. In this regard, the Angolan government has lately engaged foreign firms to assess the quality of the roads constructed by Chinese companies and to ensure compliance with best international standards.

Ironically, while China seems to benefit from its huge investments in Angola by gaining access to the country's vast oil reserves and helping its companies get a foothold in an emerging Angolan economy, the benefits that are accrued by the host country remain partial.

But Angola can still apply both short- and long-term remedies to this apparent skewed relationship. To achieve that, Angola will have to implement the sometimes painful but indispensable structural reforms, whose main objective would be to enhance the overall efficiency and productivity, primarily through the creation of a conducive business environment. In particular, the Angolan government's reforms should focus on education, public administration, judiciary, financial and market regulations, and general infrastructure. This will also involve seriously addressing the runaway political patronage and its attendant rampant corruption.

Such reforms will enable the government to conceive and implement successful economic policies that will allow the country to develop a more mature, win-win and sustainable relationship with China, as well as with other partners.

On the other hand, in the long term, Angola has to adopt a vision and strategy that will enable the country to achieve a more equitable and sustainable relationship with China, based on the country's strengths, rather than maintaining a typical neo-colonial relationship whereby China imports all the Angolan raw materials, only for that to be exported back as manufactured goods.

On her part, China, as an aspiring super-power, or rather one in the making, has a responsibility to ensure that ties with Angola do not have long-term negative effects on the stability and human security of that country. The partners need to urgently summon strong political will to address issues of inequality and poverty, with their potential for fermenting instability in the long term that could easily push back Angola to the era of violence. ■

Real estate

a target for money laundering

The apparent boom in real estate throughout Africa has increasingly turned that sector into a hotbed of corruption and money laundering.

Thobani Matheza

looks at the case studies of South Africa and Tanzania where legislation has been enacted to control the sector

In the Eastern and Southern African region, the real estate industry provides numerous opportunities for criminal abuse. In some instances, real estate agents are not regulated and there is no requirement for registration. Notaries are highly involved in land transactions. The amount of money to be made in both residential and commercial real estate creates temptations for fraud and money laundering.

A recent International Monetary Fund study concluded that about \$3.5 trillion is laundered worldwide each year, and of this it estimated that \$5 billion to \$8 billion is probably attributable to South Africa. Media and court reports point to the involvement of criminals running fraud syndicates and drug trafficking in buying up or



The African real estate boom is fuelling corruption and money laundering that calls for stringent legislation to bring sanity to the sector.

developing property. The spotlight has therefore been turned onto this sector – particularly at professionals who facilitate transactions.

In South Africa under the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) every business that could be abused to launder dirty money is obliged to follow certain procedures set out in the act, or face stiff penalties. Although property transactions in some areas are often effected in cash, until recently it was not widely recognised that this

is a suspicious activity that needs to be reported.

The latest Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) evaluation report on South Africa noted that to date, estate agents have filed 48 Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs). However, the Estate Agency Affairs Board (EAAB) has detected some unreported activity, especially in the Western Cape Province, which is suspected to relate to money laundering.

As the statutory regulator for all estate agents in South Africa, the EAAB is working with the Financial Intelligence Centre to combat economic crime and money laundering. It requires statistics concerning the number of STRs being filed by the industry on a province-by-province basis, to enable it to focus its inspections on the provinces where there is the most risk. The EAAB is not aware of any terrorist financing through the real estate sector.

Except in the case of attorneys, the EAAB board inspectors have extensive powers to enter premises, inspect documents and generally make any enquiries necessary to determine whether the provisions of the EAA Act are being complied with. Failure to co-operate with an inspector in the performance of lawful duties is an offence.

Tanzania

The Tanzanian Mortgage Financing (Special Provisions) Act was designed, along with the new Condominium Act, to help an estimated 70% of Tanzanians who are currently without decent housing to acquire bank loans and construct new houses. The Tanzanian National Construction Council stated that the construction sector is the global leader in terms of corruption and for this reason more concerted efforts are required to control and find a solution to the growing problem.

In order to develop a solution, Tanzania has been working with the other countries that are also involved with the construction sector transparency, including Zambia, Ethiopia and Malawi, to ensure that the transparency initiative in the real estate sector is a success. Tanzania is working with the aforementioned countries and is expected to come up

with a system of curbing corruption and money laundering in the real estate sector. Tanzanian initiatives came after exhaustive research had been conducted concerning the regulatory system of the construction sector, as well as of those from other countries mentioned.

However, the Tanzanian government has been disregarding its own laws by allocating plots for the construction of tourist hotels to rich people on areas which were specifically reserved for community services and in violation of master plans, particularly on the coastal belt. According to land regulations, local governments are to inform the Commissioner for Lands about urban land identified for private development. A notice is to be published in the media in Swahili and English. After 21 days, the identified and advertised plot is ready for development and the development is to be supervised by a licenced estate agent.

In most cases, this procedure has not been followed. According to Tanzanian land law, land belongs to the state. This stipulation has effectively put all land, including prime land, in the hands of the land officers, senior government officials and the president. These officials acquire land and dispose of it at will to companies and rich individuals wishing to possess prime land, especially in urban areas.

Since trade liberalisation was set in motion and foreign investors began to take advantage and rushed to invest, houses and land in countries like Tanzania have attained premium prices. Unscrupulous businessmen also took advantage of the situation. Private sale arrangements are made where a nominal amount is quoted as the value of land or landed property; the real market price amount is paid into an overseas bank account. Foreign companies that invest in the hotel

and tourism industry are involved in this type of capital flight scheme. The White Sands Hotel and the Sea Cliff Hotels owned by Indian and South African companies were built on land not sold under competitive tender. Rather, it was bought from people in high office and the money was paid into their overseas accounts, without the taxes and other revenues being paid.

In order to adhere to the measures of controlling money laundering in the real estate sector, public authorities should be obligated both to publish and to justify their reasons for offering a contract to a particular construction company over another. Policymakers need to have knowledge of the ways in which money laundering is carried out and the extent to which it occurs. The prevailing economic and operational processes and the environmental system in which the different types of laundering occur are complex.

The main reason for the complexity is related to the internal and external environments and their distributional impact on the problem of money laundering. In internal laundering, a particular country is the base for money laundering activities. The main actors are internally based and the process of money laundering is within the domestic jurisdiction. However, the process and proceeds also have an external dimension, for example when illegal funds are externalised. The main actors include government officials and their allies outside the state system. Their prominence in money laundering stems from the fact that they control the major means of production in the state sector, which also includes the parastatal sector. The bureaucrats controlling and managing the public economy are the main actors in money laundering through bureaucratic and political corruption. ■

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Don't blame the climate for food scarcity

Ethiopia's president Meles Zenawi

While Ethiopia once again looks to the West for food aid to avoid the starvation of millions, the failure of African agriculture becomes more and more evident. **Dianna Games** looks at why African countries react to such emergencies rather than employ pro-active measures for long-term famine-prevention

Ethiopia's recent plea for food aid to avert the drought-induced starvation of more than six million people is a stark reminder of the famine of 1984 in that country, in which about one million people died.

It is equally stark a reminder that

a quarter of a century after the catastrophe, Ethiopia is still unable to deal effectively with recurring problems in its agricultural sector. It is not alone: the World Bank estimates that 35 countries in sub-Saharan Africa remain net food importers. They include many

countries with some of the most fertile land in the world.

Africa also remains the largest recipient of food aid globally. In 2007, it received 54% of such aid (3.18 million tons) compared to the next biggest recipient – Asia, with 29% of the total.

The continuing calls for emergency food aid are a reminder of the failure of African agriculture, a reality that might best be shown by the figures. According to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), 200 million Africans are chronically hungry at any given time.

Per capita agricultural production has fallen by 5% over the past 20 years, compared to developed countries, where it has increased by 40%.

Photo Gallo Images/Getty Images

It is easy to blame external factors, such as climate, for the situation. But not only is this misleading, it undermines the search for sustainable solutions to the problem.

More critical to the perpetuation of hunger in Africa are policy and infrastructural deficiencies – the low-hanging fruit that many African governments have shown little political will to pick.

Agriculture suffers more than many other sectors from structural problems inherent in the economic and political framework of most countries. These include poor infrastructure that inhibits the movement of goods, high operating costs that undermine competitiveness, the cost of capital and the difficulty of accessing it, limited use of technology, and non-tariff barriers, both internationally and regionally.

There are more intangible problems such as a non-commercial mindset among millions of peasant farmers; emotional and cultural issues around land ownership; and a lack of knowledge about prices and markets.

The politicians have expended inordinate amounts of energy in tackling the problems of international trade, particularly subsidies to farmers in developed markets – although, ironically, reducing subsidies in western agricultural markets will hurt most African countries more than the subsidies do by increasing the cost of imported food on which they currently rely.

The problems in agriculture have been also exacerbated by decades of aid and donor interventions that have hampered, rather than encouraged, market-driven agricultural production.

Food aid may temporarily stave off starvation, but ultimately it messes with food supply by undermining prices for farmers growing staple foods. What Africa needs is increased production through higher yields, effective

distribution of food and inputs and mechanisms through which goods can be traded, such as agricultural commodity exchanges.

Money being channelled into providing emergency food – a whopping \$285 million is being sought to alleviate Ethiopia's current plight – is being swallowed up by ad hoc interventions, rather than early planning to avert disaster.

Yields in Africa are a tenth of their Asian counterparts, while inputs and technology are expensive and power supply is unpredictable and costly. Research and development is negligible and new, Africa-specific innovations are not forthcoming.

It is not all bad news. There have been some ad hoc – mostly private sector-driven – advances.

For example, contract farming – large commercial enterprises contracting out production to smallholder farmers in return for inputs, finance, training and the final product – is growing rapidly. The model has not been without its problems, including respect for the contracts by the farmers and problems with ensuring the growers meet increasingly onerous trade requirements.

But there are many good business reasons to persist with it. These include meeting growing demands for local empowerment, cutting the costs of inputs and import bills, and being able to control the supply chain better.

A growing African middle class seeking better consumer choices is providing a new, but more demanding, market for value-added foodstuffs, which is boosting African agribusiness companies, while progress in regional trade is increasing the movement of goods between markets.

However, low-value food products produced by millions of smallholder farmers continue to be the mainstay of African agriculture, making it

difficult for countries to move up the value chain.

Africa's weakness in food production was highlighted by the global food shortages in 2008, which pushed food prices to all-time highs, creating a potentially lucrative opportunity that the continent was unable to exploit.


The new 'land grab' taking place in Africa – foreign governments renting land to produce food for their own nationals – equally highlights the size of the potential opportunity.

Despite the criticisms about this trend, governments, in allowing such deals, have clearly woken up to the potential that exists in their own backyards. This is further highlighted by the invitations from African states to South African farmers to produce food in their countries for local consumption and export.

However, these developments suggest that governments are looking for quick-fix solutions to the problems of agriculture rather than for long-term solutions.

Most governments are still nationally focused, derailed by emotional issues around land and the vote-buying potential of agricultural subsidies and price-controlled staple foods. They are also focused on short-term revenue gains rather than the potentially larger gains to be had from broad-based growth and increased regional trade.

African producers face tough times and increasing competition in global markets, a situation for which many are unprepared. New trade rules will only mean more competition – from other developing countries, and not, as the politicians tend to emphasise, from developed country producers.

Land is probably Africa's biggest resource but also its greatest lost opportunity. This is not a climate issue; it is a problem of leadership. 

Mandela, at wife Graça's encouragement, blows out the 88 candles on his birthday cake.



Christmas offers us all an opportunity to assess the events of years past and plot a way forward into the future. South Africa's most celebrated son, Nelson Mandela (Madiba) has lived through the best and the worst of times. He has seen 91 Christmases come and go. **Anna Trapido** says: what better way to take stock of our lives and to learn the true meaning of the festive season than to study some of the stories that relate to Madiba's yuletide experiences – both good and bad

My book *Hunger for Freedom: The Story of Food in the Life of Nelson Mandela* (Jacana Media, in association with the Nelson Mandela Foundation) captures Madiba's earliest memories of the agriculturally self-sufficient Eastern Cape settlements of Mvezo and Qunu, in which he grew up. He speaks of a community where 'consumer goods were luxuries that were served only on very special occasions and Christmas was when we children tasted tea for the first time... at Christmas Eve, adults would slaughter stock and we children would receive a

Photo Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue, Nelson Mandela Foundation

Christmas with Nelson Mandela

portion of meat.' These recollections contrast starkly with the reality of the community to which Madiba returned after 27 years of imprisonment. As President of South Africa, he spent Christmas Day 1995 walking the Qunu hillsides. At each homestead he asked the householders: 'Are you going to slaughter an animal for your Christmas meal?' Very few householders had the means to do so. The poverty of a once-thriving community clearly shocked the President and he told Associated Press Television that 'I hold a party so the children can have some meat at Christmas, but it is a forlorn attempt. They go back to their squalor and their misery. You have to see the way people live to really understand the evil of racial oppression.'

Anyone who has ever stood under the mistletoe will know that Christmas is at least as much about love as it is about roast meat. While working on *Hunger for Freedom*, I spoke to Madiba's friend and comrade Amina Cachalia who recalled a Christmas meal spent with Madiba and his new bride Winnie in 1959. She said 'I remember it so clearly because that was the last Christmas we ever had in Soweto, because after 1960 it was just impossible. Roast and *phutu* and rice, vegetables. Christmas cake. It was a lovely lunch. Winnie was very young and absolutely beautiful. They were exceptionally happy. I think Nelson was completely besotted. She used to glow, there was something about her, even when she was not dressed up she still glowed and he was transfixed in her presence.' Almost three decades of imprisonment ultimately destroyed the union, but it is important to acknowledge how happy they were in the Christmas of 1959. The extent of the personal sacrifice reminds us all of the debt of gratitude that we owe to the Mandela family. In their loss came

the relative decency of all our lives.

Memories of domestic happiness undoubtedly strengthened the resolve of Madiba the prisoner, but it is important to reflect on the long years when Christmas was a time of incarceration under extremely harsh conditions. The nutritionally inadequate, racially discriminatory food served to Madiba and his comrades in Robben Island prison reflected the injustices of the apartheid society from whence they sprang. Even when the food available filled the stomach, prisoners were aware of the danger of dietary monotony destroying their sense of self. In a letter to his wife dated 31 August 1970, Madiba recognised this when he wrote: 'A human being whatever his colour ...

ought never to be compelled toward the taking of meals simply as a duty. This is likely to be the case if the product is poor, monotonous, badly prepared and tasteless.' On Robben Island, the prisoners attempted to subvert the demoralising food regime and so it was that in 1978, Madiba's comrade and fellow prisoner Laloo Chiba made a Christmas cake to mark the season. It was not a cake in the conventional sense of the word. Chiba told me that it was the result of a long struggle for bread at the prison. He remembered: 'right from the early 1960s, we made representations to the prison authorities year after year after year that the prisoners should be allowed to buy with their own money one loaf of white bread at Christmas...


'A human being whatever his colour ... ought never to be compelled toward the taking of meals simply as a duty. This is likely to be the case if the product is poor, monotonous, badly prepared and tasteless.'



Christmas cake provided relief from Robben Island prison's backbreaking work and boredom. From left: Mandela, Namibian liberation icon Toivo Ja Toivo, late ANC activist Justice Mpanza, and their unidentified jailer in 1977.



South Africa's criminal justice system is in crisis, and has been for many years. The police and courts are overwhelmed, and prison overcrowding is a perennial problem. This book is a contribution to understanding where and how the criminal justice system is going wrong and what needs to be done to fix it. The book opens with a detailed story of a real crime in a small town as told by the victim. Following the stages of this story, it takes the reader through the whole criminal justice process, from the police investigation to the court case, sentencing and incarceration of the perpetrators. At each stage the wider issues of laws, policies and disparities are analysed and constructive recommendations made.



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In those yonder years, knocking together a sumptuous Christmas meal was really easy meat in the then agriculturally self-sufficient Mvezo village, Mandela's birthplace in the Eastern Cape.



Madiba's cell on Robben Island. A 10c Christmas feast was highly appreciated at the prison.

Ultimately they agreed. So the family would have to send the money (bread at that stage cost 10c a loaf) and every Christmas, we bought a loaf of white bread – even then we had to share, because some prisoners didn't even have 10c. So that bread was the main ingredient of the Christmas cake. The other components of the cake were cocoa and sugar and currants which we bought because some of us were A-Group prisoners and allowed to buy such things. And the key ingredient, the prison ration-issued yeast-drink, *phuzamandla*. We made a thick, firm dough. And we left it overnight and then we were able to slice it and share it... Even if I say so myself, I really was impressed with the cake I made and all the prisoners remarked that "this is a wonderful thing." So we had a bit of fun and it relieved the boredom of prison life.'

The horrors of imprisonment notwithstanding, Madiba's is a tale of triumph and of a freedom struggle that

was ultimately deliciously successful. There is not a finite amount of love in the world and the arrival of Mozambican former first lady, Mrs Graça Machel, in Madiba's life shows that second chances are especially savoured by those who know the bitterness of love lost. Cross-cultural love is not without complications, culinary and otherwise. The couple spent their first Christmas together in Qunu in 1996. Madiba's grandson Mandla Mandela told me that: 'Aunty Graça went to a lot of trouble to make us a meal from her homeland. The table was just full of prawns and crabs and all various seafood and my grandfather's sister Mabel says to me "my grandson, what is this thing that looks like a crab from the river sands?" and I look and I say "but it is grandma, it is a crab from the river." And she says "nonsense man, we cannot eat such nonsense; we want meat on the table." And my grandfather had to explain to Aunty Graça who was now very keen to hear

what his sister had just said because she could pick up that it was about the food. And my grandfather said "oh, she just commented on how nice the food looks, but they are not used to these things: let's bring more meat". But Aunty Graça could tell that that was not what she had said. When she later learned that the Mandelas didn't want seafood, she was disappointed because she had spent a lot of time in the kitchen. But over time we have learned. Today, put seafood on the table – some prawns, some crabs – and they are the first things to disappear. The Mandelas will attack that food. That is one thing Aunty Graça will always hold her flag very high on: "I taught the Mandelas [about] seafood".'

To examine a great life through Christmas food allows for intimate insights into the trials and triumphs of a man who has nourished the world with his unstinting appetite for social justice. In his hunger for freedom, is a Christmas message for us all. **a**

How many are we? Census and opinion polls have always been a hazardous business in Africa.

The politics of counting Africans

The recently concluded Kenyan census forces us to query the value of numbers, writes **Annie Chikwanha**



Annie Chikwanha

Figures are not everything, but they are essential for planning purposes at all levels. They form the basis of how and why we build clinics and schools in certain areas, locate dams in specific regions, and increase and upgrade our roads. Counting is a simple practice when considered conceptually, but African population counts have, in some cases, been somewhat complicated, contentious, and just like everywhere else, socially and politically consequential.

Cornell University experts Ann Martin and Michael Lynch point out that counting is always troubled and contested. The way in which counting is done can be used to expose the numeropolitics of counting. It implies how categories will be defined and how specific numbers will be assigned, according to some logic. Intrinsic to the process is the notion of surveillance that is based on figures and this is difficult where fragile networks of trust dominate, such as in countries

where politics is violently contested.

The resistance shown by some citizens across the continent in revealing their 'numerical status' at the family level can be attributed to both superstition and a real fear of either inevitable political marginalisation, or manipulation. Some citizens were unwilling to divulge the number of children they had in the recent Kenyan census. This is not peculiar to Kenya only – in Malawi too. Asking about the number of children one has is taboo

and one never gets the correct answer, yet many scientific and nonscientific activities involve practices of counting.

Memories are still fresh of when the number of cattle one owned was used to determine African wealth, and the population policies that were meant to control population growth also haunt our generation – which still counts its successes in ‘quantities’. Censuses are like African funerals – they expose one’s poverty. And we tend to mask our poverty with the little that we have, but when a well-dressed stranger comes into our home and asks intrusive questions, our guard is raised immediately.

Usually, statisticians do their work independently, away from the prying eyes and scrutiny of politicians and opinionates. But these aren’t normal times in many African countries. Incumbent regime survival very often compels governments to play games to disguise the effects of constituency boundaries on desired electoral outcomes and this is fairly straightforward deviousness. The redrawing of electoral boundaries prior to each election is always based theoretically on ‘population movements’, yet no other developments seem to be based on figures which can be used to substantiate need. The multiparty elections, in particular, trigger such memories during censuses. Electoral fraud is behind much of the constituency boundary disputes that politicians have used to hang onto power. Earlier on, the former rebels of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) dismissed the Sudanese census results as gravely wrong, contending that the total for Southerners was too low. The data was not considered to be of much value for anything else either, as one SPLM official argued: ‘Well, the census is supposed to draw the map of the human resources and sustainable development for Sudan, but unfortunately we don’t think it is going to be useful for these purposes.’

In 2005 in Nigeria, the National Council of State, a body which includes the president, 36 state governors and former heads of state, contested the counting process itself. The form for the 2005 census included questions about the religion or ethnic group of persons surveyed and the national council was against this. This came after Ahmed Makarfi, governor of Kaduna State in northern Nigeria, threatened to mount a boycott of the census if these issues were not dealt with in the questionnaire. Resource allocation by the central government had to do with many of the problems. The number of parliamentary representatives which a


Censuses are like African funerals – they expose one’s poverty

region can nominate, and the amount of money it receives from central government are largely determined by the population of that region. As a result, many communities are alleged to have inflated their census figures during previous headcounts, prompting legal challenges by groups which felt disadvantaged by census outcomes. Some critics complained that the census data has no value because the problem with Nigeria is that there is a tendency to place more premium on using census data for revenue allocation than on planning for sustainable development.

So, how then do we count people against a background of non-basic service delivery and the 2007 post-election violence? An angry population, shamed by generational poverty and insensitive bureaucrats, can hit back at such times when officials want to perform what

appear to be routine exercises with the public. Unresponsiveness on the part of the counted and inaccurate information can often lead to wrong numerical outcomes. In addition, cultural barriers, intrusive questions, and the question of who is counting whom, all add to the complexities of counting people in Africa. To get accurate data, census cartographers need to have access to current maps of sufficient levels of scale and detail and in most African countries, such maps are either very old and in some instances, they do not exist at all. As for Kenya, the North Eastern region is hostile territory with no road network and armed escorts are necessary to get anywhere safely. We thus raise the question of whether there has been any value added from counting ‘the people’ in the previous censuses.

Experts warn that although censuses attempt to collect demographic, economic and social data pertaining to all persons in a country, such data collection is never achieved in practice, as there is always an element of under-representation. The under-representation of the population in censuses, however, varies from country to country depending on the level of statistical sophistication of the country concerned, and we add, accessibility of all areas. In much of Africa, such access is determined by the seasons.

Accurate statistical data adds value to the much-needed multi-sectoral approach in planning. Mapping in this way provides some indication of the development direction of a nation, for example, the number of additional jobs essential for accommodating new entrants into the labour market, while taking into account existing jobs. Likewise, the housing sector requires numbers of the projected demand for housing and electricity due to natural increase or migration, and this helps to mitigate looming environmental disasters due to population movements. 

Ms Lulu Xingwana, former minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs. While the South African government has been criticised for the slow progress on land reform, the writer argues that big business should also carry its share of the blame.

Land reform: State vs Market

Photo Gallo Images/Getty Images

Can the blame for our dysfunctional, market-led model of land reform be laid solely at the feet of state corruption, asks **Andile Sokomani**

South Africa's land-owning minority class is divided on many issues, but on one point it seems to agree: corrupt government officials are to blame for the country's dysfunctional land reform programme, not the market. If property prices are too high for land purchases to be affordable for instance, it is not the fault of landowners. Dodgy senior officials hike the prices for personal gain, they argue.

It's not that there aren't any good reasons to point the finger at government officials. A few of them have either been convicted or are being investigated for shady dealings. What's worrying is the opportunistic use of government corruption as a platform for exalting the virtues of the market. Government corruption has become a convenient way of invalidating any attempt at questioning purely market-based land reform, including the controversial 'willing buyer, willing seller' approach. This insistence on the purity of the market, vis-à-vis the corruption of the state, rests among other things on a keen awareness of the market's proven ability to guarantee the security of private property, which works perfectly in protecting the wealth and the privilege of the land-owning minority class. Except for one thing. Markets may not be particularly efficient at pacifying a discontented landless majority. This is a fault of the market, not of government. Insisting otherwise in fact jeopardises the very interests the market approach seeks to protect.

It is almost trite to point out that the

inevitable political instability bound to ensue from a lack of equitable distribution of land is not one of the desirable conditions for the market to thrive. Market-led land reform enthusiasts are themselves acutely aware of this, but conveniently choose to harp on the well-founded but selective motif of state mal-governance.

If there is anything to learn from the Zimbabwean experience, it is the following: the collapse of the country's agricultural sector is less remarkable for cronyism and widespread land grabbing, than for the market asymmetries in access to land that bred these. Conventional market wisdom would have us believe otherwise, downplaying for instance the impact of the free market mode of land redistribution preceding the assault on white commercial farmers. Lamenting

into it, especially after Mbeki's minimalist administration fell out of favour. After much dithering, there are renewed but sluggish efforts at reviving inevitable discussions around legal expropriation. Government is more vocal about its dissatisfaction with market-led land reform and the need to review its principle of willing buyer, willing seller. In short, market forces are increasingly being challenged.


These developments are very worrying indeed if seen as a malicious move to short-change white farmers and facilitate looting and self-enrichment by corrupt state officials. Not that there is anything wrong with being suspicious of government's motives or questioning the assumption that it is acting in the interests of the landless. However, in insisting that efforts at equitable access to land should come at no cost, other than profit, to

Markets may not be particularly efficient at pacifying a discontented landless majority

the corruption of the country's regime is compelling, but not enough. Simply attributing the possibility of a similar chain of events in South Africa, however far or near, to a decline in pro-market sentiment is an easy way out.

More helpful is an honest inquiry into the real causes of the disillusion with the market. Rather than just decry government corruption, South Africa's market champions also need to come clean from perpetrating the illusion that exclusive protection of existing property relations is somehow compatible with aspirations of equitable distribution of agricultural land. Sixteen years after the advent of democracy, this myth is increasingly becoming hard to sustain. Fewer and fewer influential people in politics and the civil service are buying

existing landowners, the market approach has no credible basis for claiming to be a superior alternative.

Bureaucratic corruption in land administration – along with problems of insufficient post-settlement to beneficiaries and weak state capacity in relation to land valuation and management of land transactions – is not conducive to equitable redistribution of land. However it is no justification for pursuing a purely market-driven answer to the land question, particularly in the context of existing imbalances in property relations. A critical inquiry into the advocacy for broadly market-related land policies and its role in facilitating the adverse consequences of land reform is both sensitive and controversial, but crucial. 

Ma Ellen remembers

This Child Will Be Great: Memoir of a Remarkable Life by Africa's First Woman President

Author *Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf*

Reviewed by Phumlani Majavu

At the age of 68, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf became the first female president in Africa. In her memoirs, *This Child Will Be Great*, she describes her inauguration as the 23rd president of the war-torn Liberia as a day filled with a sense of delight and optimism that hasn't been felt in Liberia in many years. 'On that day, Monday, January 16, 2006, the very atmosphere of Monrovia seemed to tremble with possibility: the possibility of change and restitution and a brighter tomorrow...' she writes.

Ma Ellen, as Liberians affectionately call her, says that even though everyone (well, most people) were ecstatic about her victory, she was well aware of the tough challenges that Liberians were facing, and the problems that needed her immediate attention. Maintaining peace, alleviating poverty, addressing education, rebuilding the social infrastructure, and creating some sort of national unity were some of the pressing issues that needed to be attended to.

Johnson-Sirleaf writes that one of her administration's priorities is education. Liberian schools not only lack resources, but there is also a serious shortage of schools and teachers as well.

One of the reasons that led Johnson-Sirleaf to give precedence to education is because she, rightly, believes that Liberia like any other country 'cannot be advanced when the citizenry is functionally illiterate and lacks the knowledge and skills required to lead national efforts...' Hence her government is busy working on implementing the Free and Compulsory Education legislation.

It is worth noting that school enrolment has increased by close to 50% during her first year in office.

Rebuilding the country's infrastructure that was ruined during the brutal civil war is also one of her administration's priorities. Roads, houses, and hospitals need to be built. In her book, she writes that when her administration took over there was no 'government-provided electricity, no water and only cellular phones. Our cabinet ministers began work in buildings without functioning bathrooms, stripped of furniture and everything else of value.' It was so bad that some 'senior officials were forced to live in hotels that had generators and a satellite connection to the internet, so they could access email and spreadsheets.'

One of the challenges facing Johnson-Sirleaf's government is rehabilitation and 'reintegration training of as many former child soldiers as quickly as possible...'

As if the challenges facing Liberia and its new democratically elected government were not daunting enough on their own, she writes 'aside from the immediate and nearly overwhelming challenges facing the new administration of a country shredded by 16 years of war, military rule, non-development, and instability, [it was] handed, almost from the start, the very delicate issue of Charles Taylor.'

Taylor, a warlord and the former President of Liberia, was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, primarily for his role in supporting the main rebel group in Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), during the conflict.'


Needless to say, the conflict might not have been as brutal as it was if Taylor had



not supplied the RUF with weapons and ammunition.

Without a doubt, one of the toughest challenges facing not just Johnson-Sirleaf and her administration, but the region, if not the entire continent, is to ensure that Liberia never returns to the bloody warzone that it once was.

Johnson-Sirleaf maintains that one of the ways of preventing another gory conflict from erupting in Liberia is by creating a sense of national unity among the Liberians. 'What creates unity', she says, 'is a common identity, a common sense of purpose and understanding.'

Johnson-Sirleaf's book, though relating her memoirs, doesn't only record her interesting life, like graduating from Harvard, her working for Citibank or for the UN, but also chronicles the political history of Liberia. 

Book details

This Child Will Be Great: Memoir of a Remarkable Life by Africa's First Woman President

HarperCollins Publishers
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Days of yore: post-colonial potentials in Africa

We Have Tomorrow: Stirrings in Africa 1959–1967

Author **Peter Mackay**

Reviewed by **Sandy Grant**

There are a number of obvious oddities about this singular memoir, one of which is its publication now, some 50 years after the period it describes. Such is the extraordinary detail in this book, it is apparent that it was written long ago when memory and recall were both vivid. Why, then, has it taken so long to get it into print and why is it a lesser-known publishing house that has finally brought it to the fore?

Mackay's extraordinary story remained untold until close friends rallied around to ensure that, market or no market, this unusual memoir should at least be placed in the public domain. We owe them thanks because this is an extraordinary, strange tale.

Here we have a book which is accurately described in the flyleaf as 'affecting'. It is also described by Terence Ranger in his foreword as an old-fashioned book by an old-fashioned individual; and it is. In so many ways, it is a period piece having something in common with Livingstone but more with John Buchan and his values, and notions of personal honour. But in his introductory chapter it also has echoes of TE Lawrence's style in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*.

Indeed, style and choice of vocabulary are clearly of such importance to the author that the needs of the reader are regularly overlooked. Technically, the book has been beautifully produced – the dust cover makes use of a most striking photo – but it has a 'take it or leave it' content which makes few concessions to the reader. It is awkwardly structured; it is sometimes a hard read, with a word usage that necessitates a stand-by dictionary, and in the end, there remains

an unavoidable feeling that it has been written more for the writer than the reader. It dwells on detail which is already well known but is skimpy, when the author is so well placed to say more. It is therefore an unusual, slightly odd book about all the painful struggles of that time in Africa, which have been displaced by so many more recent, painful struggles involving more personal sacrifice and tragedy, yet more commitment, and more renewal and discovery of ideals and ideas – and in the end, more death.

The chosen title is obviously a personal statement of Mackay's lifelong commitment to a cause which would be deeply tragic, were it not so overly optimistic. Yet his text in no way reflects this optimism, for it tells powerfully of a future which has no tomorrow, as events 40 years after his 1967 closure date have so sadly confirmed.

Mackay's hoped-for future, horrifically, is still to dawn. So here we are with another memoir from that traumatic period of history when European expansionism, followed by settlement and imposed government, came adrift. Mackay, after a remarkably successful army career in Britain, migrated to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) where he was a misfit in its suffocating, conforming, and inbred expatriate society. He wanted none of it, opted out and became a social and then a legal outsider.

He single-handedly drove refugees from Botswana to the Kazungula border and Zambia. He met 'Africans' who dreamed and talked of a different future, joined them and produced 'subversive' newspapers, was imprisoned, and became increasingly involved in the



breakup of the Central African Federation.

He moved easily from Rhodesia to Zambia and to Malawi, was involved at the birthing of Malawi and communed with one of Africa's first post-colonial strongmen, Kamuzu Banda. He lost close friends, particularly Yatuta Chisiza, whose death Mackay poignantly and poetically described while detailing the bizarre and inevitably ill-fated attempt to overthrow the autocratic Banda and his reactionary government.

This unusual memoir is warmly welcomed. Mackay was a significant, backstage actor in many of the major events of those dramatic years and his first-hand descriptions of them and of many of the major figures of the time may well fill some of the still emptier spaces. □

Book details

Peter Mackay

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
Africa pursuit:

Test your knowledge and win a book prize

- Q1:** Who won the 2009 Mo Ibrahim prize for leadership in Africa?
- Q2:** Who chaired the recent AU High-level Panel on Darfur?
- Q3:** Who is Justina Makoko?
- Q4:** What is Migingo?
- Q5:** Where are the headquarters of the Pan African Parliament?
- Q6:** What is the capital of Somaliland?
- Q7:** What is the name of the political party that won legislative elections in Botswana in September this year?
- Q8:** Against which country did Ecowas impose sanctions on the eve of presidential elections in October this year?
- Q9:** Which West African country has the fourth largest phosphate reserves in the world?
- Q10:** The son of a former French president has been accused of involvement in the so-called Angolagate scandal. Who is he?



Send your answers to magazine@issafrica.org. The first six readers who send the correct answers will each get a novel from the Penguin African Writers series. Try to do it without searching on the internet!



1. Selling fruit in Dakar, Senegal
2. A splendid view on the Comore islands
3. Transporting goods in Mogadishu
4. Baobab with a difference in Senegal
5. Bangui's main thoroughfare, Central African Republic
6. A smile in Malawi

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Angola braces itself for the African soccer party

Football is by far the most popular sport in Angola.



The host, President Eduardo dos Santos, and his countrymen are eager for the kick-off.

With slightly over two months before the kick-off of the 2010 Africa Cup of Nations soccer spectacular in Angola, **Gilberto Neto** in Luanda highlights some of the ups and downs the country is encountering in the preparations for the three-week event

Photos Gallo Images/Getty Images

Against the rapid ticking of the clock towards the African Confederation Cup (CAF) 2010, pencilled in for 10–13 January, the host nation Angola is at full throttle to meet all the preparatory deadlines by early December. Angolan society, from authorities to the man on the street seems eager to ensure a successful kick-off. But serious concerns have emerged regarding the country's level of preparedness.

Since the country won the right to host the biggest party for the continent's most popular sport in September 2006, the government has been working tirelessly to ensure that all the necessary arrangements are in place. While efforts are underway and the issue is topping the national agenda, it is understood that a handful of tasks will not make the deadline.

The main concern has to do with the stadiums that will host the tournament. Angola is investing up to US\$1 billion to host the tournament, \$600 million of which goes towards the construction of brand-new stadiums in the capital Luanda, and in Benguela, Cabinda and Lubango. In addition to these, four other smaller stadiums are also being erected to support the participating teams.

According to CAF requirements, all the tournament stadiums should have been ready by 31 October, but the event-monitoring committee, led by Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma, admitted it would not be able to meet this deadline. The committee then set the first half of November as a new deadline, prompting fears that such delays might jeopardise the prospects of turning the event into a memorable African soccer party.

An English company hired to set the grass in the playing fields is also late. The laying of grass ideally is supposed to be done at least four months before

the field would be used. The deadline for its completion was initially set for the end of November, but the contracted company says the job will only be complete by early January.

Angola, which emerged from a 27-year civil war in 2002, has generally undergone many infrastructural challenges. For instance, there is frantic construction and renovation of new and old hotels respectively. By the end of October, the government had said that none of the five major hotels that are being constructed in Luanda was ready for the tournament.

Throughout the country, ordinary Angolans say they cannot wait for the kick-off of the games

Another major concern is the high cost of accommodation in Angola. Hotel accommodation in Luanda ranks as one of the most expensive in the world. An ordinary room in a four-star hotel goes for around \$350 a night. A spokesman from the Ministry of Tourism recently said that the government is considering inviting floating foreign hotels to come in.

The government is also investing up to \$70 million to renew and upgrade the country's only international airport in Luanda, and others in the hosting cities.

The monitoring committee is battling to address the challenges and convince CAF officials that the country can still host a successful event. Early in September the continent's football authority said it was considering shifting the


tournament to another country in view of uncertainty surrounding Angola's level of preparedness. South Africa's 2010 World Cup chief Danny Jordaan reportedly alluded to this.

'As for now, no decision has been taken as to whether or not Angola is ready,' *Vanguard* newspaper quoted Jordaan as saying. South Africa is being considered as an alternative venue, should Angola fail. Nigeria was also under deliberation as a venue, sources in Luanda said.

The veracity of this speculation notwithstanding, the reality is that as crunch-time approaches, CAF inspectors are increasingly tightening their evaluation and monitoring measures over the Angolan preparations. Their visits to Angola have become regular, and the Angolan government was recently greatly relieved when CAF chief, Issa Hayatou expressed confidence in the country's capacity to overcome its challenges and host the games.

The posting of billboards and other advertising material around the host cities is visible proof of preparation for the tournament. Giant countdown watches have been placed in some of Luanda's busiest streets.

Football is by far the most popular sport. Throughout the country, ordinary Angolans say they cannot wait for the kick-off of the games. 'This is our chance; we will make history at this time,' said Mario, 19, a street vendor in the crowded Luanda. Movimento Nacional Expontaneo, an organisation with a long tradition of mobilising fans for the country's national soccer team, recently said it had already mobilised thousands of people in two provinces.

'I haven't seen a single Angolan who is not eager to see this tournament rolling,' says Bruno, a 22-year-old taxi driver. 'I trust we will have a good event and, of course, Angola will win.' 



Keto Segwai

When an election is a right, **not a favour**

Despite major strides African governments have taken in holding scheduled elections in the last two decades, there are still those who regard the exercise as a favour to their people and foreign governments, says **Keto Segwai**

Africa never ceases to amaze. Just the other day, President François Bozize of the Central African Republic (CAR) threatened to call off the elections scheduled for March 2010 if somebody else did not fund the process.

Fortunately, some donors that included the European Union and the United States stepped in to avert this unwarranted affront on democracy, by offering to fund the CAR poll. Admittedly, CAR could be one of the poorest countries in Africa, but it is also true that the country is endowed with considerable resources that include virgin rain forests, minerals such as diamonds, exotic wildlife such as lowland gorillas and forest elephants, and a great agricultural potential – and of course, the country's critical human resource that stands at 4.4 million people.

The major letdown in this equation has undoubtedly been the country's political leadership over the years, specifically its reluctance to allow the citizens to freely choose their true leaders. The country has had four coups since independence. It has been lead by one of the continent's more bizarre men – the self-styled Emperor Jean-Bédél Bokassa, whose reign was not only the embodiment of brutality, but also that of absurdity.

The CAR soldiers have blurred lines between the barracks and the corridors of elective office. Bozize has a chequered history himself. In 2003, he staged a coup against Ange-Félix Patassé, the victor of the 1993 poll. But with military takeovers becoming increasingly out of vogue and being punitively censured by the AU's Peace and Security Council, Bozize instituted an election in 2005, which he won.

It is the impunity with which most African leaders try to thwart the electoral process that amazes. Ironically, the determination to cling on to power by frustrating a fair and free poll is met by an equal resolve from rivals to crowbar the incumbent out of power. Hence the never-ending cycle of coups and counter-coups.

Notwithstanding the shenanigans by Bozize, the majority of African countries that were scheduled to conduct their elections in 2009 did so, though with mixed results.

Algeria set the ball rolling in April by holding their presidential elections that were won expectedly by incumbent Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika. These were followed by the highly charged South African elections that saw former vice-president Jacob Zuma ascending to power.

In May, Malawi went to the polls, the fourth since the fall of the long-reigning life president, Kamuzu Banda. Bingu wa Mutharika parried with John Tembo (of the Banda era) and won, after the two-term president Bakili Muluzi was technically shut out from the race. In early July, Republic of the Congo took its turn at the poll, culminating in the long-serving Denis Sassou-Nguesso retaining the presidency. The main opposition candidate, Pascal Lissouba, was excluded from that election and opposition had boycotted the poll. Still in July, Guinea-Bissau also held an election amid a tense political atmosphere following the assassinations of both the president, João Viera and the army chief, General Tagme Na Wai. Malam Bacai Sanha defeated Kumba Yala (Mohamed Yala Embalo).

In August, Gabon called an ad hoc election

following the death of the long-reigning Omar Bongo. The late president's son, Ali Bongo won the subsequent election against the opposition's Pierre Mamboundou and Mba Obame. Africa's oldest multi-party democracy, Botswana went to the poll in October and Ian Khama's party, which has been in power since independence in 1966, won against the opposition's Otsweletse Moupo and Gilson Saleshando.

The month of October also saw the incumbent Tunisian president, Ben Ali winning by 89.62% against Mohamed Bouchiha and others. Towards the close of October, the Mozambican president, Armando Guebuza once again defeated former rebel leader Alphonso Dlakhamu.

As we were going to print, Namibia was in the throes of pitched electioneering slated for 28 November, with Hifikepunye Pohamba paring-off brickbats from his erstwhile comrades, Hidipo Hamutenya and Ben Ulenga.

In Equatorial Guinea, Obiang Nguema had on 16 October caught his political opponents off guard by bringing the dates of the poll initially scheduled for 2010, to 29 November. Obiang, who has been in power since 1979, was expected to spar with opposition leader, Plácido Micó Abogo.

However, other scheduled African elections failed to take off in Angola, Senegal, Niger, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Madagascar and the autonomous region of Somaliland.

While acknowledging that the road to democratisation is a perilous one for many an African government, the least they could do is to respect the right of their people to elect their leaders. **a**