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IEWS AND ANALYSES FROM THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

ISSUE 18 • 2012

Institute for Security Studies



The screenshot shows the homepage of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). At the top left is the ISS logo, which features a green circle with a white 'i' and 'S' and the text 'INSTITUT D'ETUDES DE SECURITE' and 'INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES' around it. To the right of the logo, the text reads 'Institute for Security Studies' and 'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité', followed by the tagline 'Knowledge empowers Africa • Le savoir emancipe l'Afrique'. Below this is a navigation bar with links: Home, Topics, Map Search, Multimedia, Publications, News, Events, and About us. A status bar indicates 'You are here.. : > Home Page'. The main content area is divided into two columns. The left column has a blue header 'New on ISS Africa' and lists several sections: 'ISS Today' with the article 'Why Apartheid Planning Continues to Undermine Efforts at Crime Reduction', 'Event Reports' with 'The Involvement of the Private Security Sector in Peacekeeping Missions', 'Publications' with 'Peace and Security Council Report No 20, March 2011', 'Multimedia' with 'This Week in Africa, Episode 6', and 'The Crime & Justice Hub' with the description 'The single most comprehensive source of information and analysis on crime and justice in SA.' The right column features a large blue banner for the 'Crime & Justice Hub' with a magnifying glass icon over a person's silhouette. Below the banner, it says 'Information and analysis sharing for a safer and just society' and includes the ISS logo. At the bottom of this column, it states 'The single most comprehensive source of information and analysis on crime and justice in SA.'

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Dear Reader

Your favourite magazine on Africa has a new look. We hope you will enjoy the new features and columns in this edition, while still giving you the comment and analysis on Africa's current affairs from the best experts out there.

The aim of the redesign of both the magazine and our website is to create an attractive platform for the discussion of those issues that matter to Africans. Log on to the website for a daily blog and regular podcasts featuring top commentators at the Institute for Security Studies and elsewhere.

Do not hesitate to comment on the blog or on Facebook and Twitter. We're waiting to hear your views.

In the news in the last few weeks has been the growing concern about a planned review of South Africa's Constitutional Court decisions. Statements from senior ANC officials about the constitution have also raised fears among those who suspect constitutional changes are envisaged to limit their freedoms.

When it comes to changes to constitutions, Africans have seen it all.

Constitutions across the continent have been chopped and changed at the whim of heads of state and repressive regimes. Often it is for rulers to stay on in power for longer than they should; governments wanting to silence the media and opposition dissent or those who would like to centralise power to make sure there is no sharing of state resources.

Zimbabwe's constitution, for example, has been changed 19 times – a good reason why the opposition and many Zimbabweans believe they need a new one before another election.

In Senegal one of the roots of the rivalry between outgoing president Abdoulaye Wade and his former Prime Minister Macky Sall stems from an incident when Sall was president of the National Assembly and dared to call Wade's son Karim to address parliamentarians on an issue concerning government funds. Furious, Wade changed the constitution to reduce

the 5-year mandate of the president of the National Assembly to one year to get rid of Sall. Strange but true.

Constitutions, though, have also been amended or replaced to serve a positive purpose. In Kenya, citizens seem fairly satisfied with key elements of its new constitution, voted in through a referendum

in 2010. Reform of the judiciary seems to be one of the changes that are slowly but surely producing results.

SA's President Jacob Zuma states correctly that a constitution is a 'living document'. People would certainly agree with changes if these guarantee more democracy and not less.

President Amadou Toumani Touré of Mali sets an example other heads of state could emulate.

Contrary to many of his peers, especially former generals, he'll be retiring peacefully after presidential elections in April and May this year.

His story is exceptional. As head of the army, ATT, as he is popularly known, took power from the long-time ruler Moussa Traoré following a popular revolt.

In a move very rarely seen following coups d'état, Touré then handed over power to a civilian president. He remained widely liked and was elected president much later in 2002 and 2007.

There are very few army chiefs like him. One thinks of general Robert Guei of Côte d'Ivoire, who insisted on staying on following a coup d'état

– also initially applauded by Ivoirians. He fled Abidjan after unsuccessfully trying to manipulate elections and died a bloody death in September 2002.

Today, the Egyptian transitional military rulers are doing much the same. While initially promising merely to ensure law and order in a transition phase, they are still in control, keeping a tight rein on the run-up to elections taking place on 23 and 24 May.

The military, often entrusted with the task of getting rid of unpopular leaders or to ensure the 'interim', are just as easily seduced by power as politicians – once they're at the top, they'll do anything to stay there. Malians are lucky to have had ATT.


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Doubts over new LRA plan

The African Union (AU) has now become involved in the fight against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, following a meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council late last year. The initiative is supported by the United Nations (UN) and other members of the international community.

In principle, the AU is demonstrating its will to deal decisively with the LRA problem, for if it is done correctly, the new initiative could eliminate the LRA threat in

the region. While this initiative is designed to remove or reduce the threat of the LRA, there is no guarantee that it will facilitate the termination of local-level conflict drivers in LRA-affected countries. Paradoxically, the decision to deploy a regional intervention force demonstrates the impact that the LRA has had on the region. It directly affects the people and governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic, the Republic of South Sudan, and Uganda.

There are several challenges to the new force, whose terms of reference are yet to be defined. It should not, for example, just improve on existing military operations; it

also needs to refrain from merely duplicating operational structures and techniques that do not work. The military command will be in the hands of national governments, which could fuel suspicion and intraregional tensions within the alliance.

The AU's decision to mobilise a regional force is also political one, and undoubtedly this will affect the direction, duration and outcome of the initiative. Given the context of previous military campaigns, the questions of power, interests and bureaucratic domestic politics will be important factors to consider.

Sandra Oder

Hopes of reviving the Arab Maghreb Union

The visit earlier this year by Moroccan foreign minister Saâdeddine Al Othmani to his Algerian counterpart Mourad Medelci was described as a step towards thawing relations between Algiers and Rabat. The animosity between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara conflict has for many years caused a stalemate in North Africa relations.

Meanwhile, Tunisian president Moncef Marzouki reserv-



© ZOUHEIR SOUSSI / REUTERS

TUNISIAN president Moncef Marzouki

ed his first trip abroad in February this year for a tour of the neighbouring countries of the Maghreb. In addition, foreign affairs ministers from across the region gathered in Rabat on 17-

18 February to attempt to revive interstate co-operation. All of these events may be seen as positive steps towards the reactivation of the *Union du Maghreb Arabe* (Arab Maghreb Union, known by its French acronym UMA).

Since the UMA's foundation in February 1989, only six summits have been held, which amounts to one almost every four years. Today, 23 years after its creation, and in the midst of profound political changes in the region, the UMA could well

find a new impetus and finally become a strong and viable political and regional entity.

A strong Union would have a positive impact not only on the economies of the region but also on Africa as a whole. It would also provide a bridge between Africa and the European Union (EU). In this period of global economic crisis, where the EU is struggling to keep its economy afloat, the leaders of the UMA ought to work towards genuine interstate political and economic integration.

Abdelkader Abderrahmane

Kenya gearing up for a change of guard

The presidential elections in Kenya scheduled for March 2013 are evoking both optimism and trepidation. This is not only because of the events that followed the 2007 presidential elections but also, more importantly, because the poll will be embedded in transitional processes that will affect Kenya's political landscape for a long time to come. Most of the key provisions of the new con-

stitution that was promulgated in 2010 will only take effect after the next elections. With the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki not eligible to contest for presidency, there is therefore going to be a change of guard at State House after the elections.

There is no doubt that the coming elections will polarise the country, especially if politicians once again turn their campaigns into emotional outbursts that detract attention from the real issues. Critical factors likely to help prevent extreme cases of electoral violence

include the reform of the electoral body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission; the drastic reduction of presidential powers by the new constitution; and the substantial devolution of national resources. The fact that the country's new judiciary is gaining a semblance of legitimacy will also play a role, as will Kenya's experience with the International Criminal Court.

While Kenya is bound to witness factional political campaigns where the political elite organises around ethnic sup-

port and patron-client politics, there seems to be increasing inclination to accept the legitimacy of the constitution and the new institutions. This is evidenced by the recent determination by political parties to comply with the Political Parties Act 2011, which, inter alia, demands grassroots recruitment drives and the election and updating of records with the Registrar of Political Parties. Parties that do not comply risk being deregistered.

Emmanuel Kisiangani

Rwanda's Gacaca courts close

Rwanda's traditional mechanism for resolving civil disputes, the Gacaca courts, will officially be closing on 4 May. The Gacaca courts have tried the bulk of Rwanda's genocide-related cases.

As of July, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)'s main body is closing and will no longer hear any cases except for appeals, all of which must be completed by



A Rwandan community court in session.

(AP PHOTO/STR)

2014. This development raises questions about what avenues will remain open for ordinary Rwandans who have not yet had their cases heard.

While Rwanda has made great strides toward national reconciliation, the government should tread carefully around the closing of the Gacaca and the

ICTR. It is quite likely that only the elite will be able to use Rwanda's legal systems, whereas the Gacaca courts are accessible to anyone. If the Gacaca is closed without providing any alternative way for ordinary Rwandans, including Hutus, to have their cases heard, this will delay justice, which in turn will delay national reconciliation. The time for the end of Gacaca may not yet be here, but the time for the inclusion of all defendants in Gacaca trials is way overdue.

Naomi Kok

The threat of a divided Libya

On 6 March, tribal leaders and militia groups in eastern Libya declared an autonomous, self-governing region called Barqa (in Arabic) or Cyrenaica. According to its leadership, the new region will extend beyond historical Cyrenaica to include parts of oil-rich Fezzan in the Gulf of Sirte and stretch from the Egyptian border in the east to the city of Sirte in the west.

They also established an 'Interim Council of Cyrenaica' tasked with running the region's affairs as well as protecting and advancing the interests of its inhabitants. It should be recalled that eastern Libya accounts for about 66% of Libya's oil production even though it holds only 25% of the country's population.

Reacting to the statement, Mustapha Abdul-Jalil, head of the Transitional National Council (TNC), condemned the move as unilateral and dangerous for the unity of

Libya. For Libya it means there is now a high likelihood of the country disintegrating, whether by consent or by force. The choice of leader for the new entity (a cousin of the former king, Idriss, who was deposed by Muammar Gaddafi in 1969) and the decision to adopt (with some adjustments) the 1951 constitution of the then United Kingdom of Libya, signals the tribal leaders' determination to go ahead with their plan.

Secondly, should the current move persist, it may encourage people in other re-

gions to attempt to do the same. If there is no peaceful agreement between the various protagonists (including the TNC) on the way forward, there may be an armed confrontation for control of either various strategic parts of the country or the entire country. In view of the already volatile situation, one could argue that Libya is not out of the woods yet, and the threat of it becoming the next Somalia still looms large.

Issaka Souare

Al-Bashir sticks to fiery rhetoric

President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan has again been lashing out against international pressure on his leadership.

The Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC)'s 2 March issue of a warrant for the arrest of Sudanese defence minister Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein for his alleged role in crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur

between 2003 and 2004 sparked a strong reaction.

At a rally of Popular Defence Force (PDF) fighters in Khartoum in the presence of the defence minister, President Bashir dismissed the Chamber's decision and questioned the rationale behind its timing. He also implied that the court's action is calculated to undermine the Sudanese Armed Forces and indicated their readiness to defend the pride and dignity of the country.

In a similarly fiery mood, the president also responded to



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US secretary of state Hillary Clinton's testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which sought to blame him for working to undermine the successful implementation

of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Apart from dismissing the possible use of punitive measures against his government, he questioned the role of such moves in his country's recent history. On the South Kordofan and Blue Nile crisis, al-Bashir vowed to root out insurgencies and called for the mobilisation of PDF troops across the country to serve as 'deterrence forces' aimed at confronting all traitors to the country.

ISS Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis

29 April: Presidential elections, Mali

The first round of Mali's presidential elections is planned for 29 April and the second round for 13 May.

A constitutional referendum will be held on the same day.

The constitutional amendment makes provision for a senate to be created, but it does



STEPPING DOWN:
Mali's president Amadou Toumani Touré

not affect the mandate of the president, which is for five years, renewable once.

President Amadou Toumani Touré, who was elected in 2002 and again in 2007, will thus have to step down. The inauguration of the new president is expected to take place on 8 June.

One of the contentious issues in the run-up to the vote is the electoral list, which is said to contain up to 7 million

names, some of which are no longer valid.

Legislative elections are planned for 1 and 22 July.

Meanwhile the security situation in the north of Mali is increasingly giving cause for concern. At the time of going to print, Touareg rebels of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) had captured the town of Tessalit after a long standoff with government soldiers.

10 May: Legislative elections, Algeria

Algeria is having important legislative elections in the wake of the Arab Spring, which saw major changes in most of its North African neighbours.

Previous elections have largely been boycotted by opposition parties and criticised for not being free and fair.

This year, Algeria commemorates its 50th anniversary of independence from France, but also 50 years of rule by the National Liberation Front (FNL). President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has been in power since 1999.

The National Rally for Democracy (RCD), the party of outgoing prime minister

Ahmed Ouyahia, has announced that it will participate in the legislative elections but has not yet nominated a candidate.

Louisa Hanoune's left-wing Workers Party is set to participate, as is the Socialist Front (FFS) of Hocine Aït Ahmed, a well-known intellectual who lives in exile. The FFS is said to have strong support across the country.

While the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) is still banned from participating in elections, three Islamic parties (the Movement of Society for Peace [MSP], Ennahdha and El Islah) are said to be campaigning together. Ennahdha has links with the party of the same name that came to power in Tunisia last year.

Algeria has so far been ex-



ALGERIA'S President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (left), here with Morocco's new foreign minister Saad Eddine Othmani, has been in power for 21 years.

empt from the effects of the Arab Spring that impacted so strongly on its North African neighbours.

Bouteflika suppressed signs of dissent in the early

days of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, but many also say that Algerians are weary of violent upheaval following their country's bloody recent history.

Other events

14-25 May: UN Climate Change Meetings

A series of meetings organised by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change will take place in May in Bonn, Germany. This follows the signing of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

drafted and accepted by the COP at COP17 in Durban in December last year. Among the meetings planned are the seventeenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and the first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP).

22 April: French presidential elections

French presidential elections are set to take place on 22 April, with a second round planned for 6 May.

The current president, Nicolas Sarkozy from the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), will be standing for re-election for a second term. According to opinion polls his

opponent Francois Hollande from the Socialist Party might beat him by a slight margin in the first round.

Jean-Mari Le Pen, leader of the right-wing National Front party, is credited with around 15% of the votes.

Hollande has vowed to change France's policy towards 'all of Africa' if he becomes president.

Triumph of the ballot box

Amid fears of another post-election disaster such as that in Côte d'Ivoire last year, Senegal's democracy stands firm, explains **David Zounmenou**.

Africa held its breath as the Senegalese campaigned earlier this year ahead of their crucial presidential elections. The controversy over the incumbent Abdoulaye Wade looked set to end in yet another electoral disaster for West Africa. Old tricks of constitutional manipulation, endorsed by the Constitutional Court, paved the way for 85-year-old Wade, who had already had 12 years in power, to seek a third term in office.

Neither street protests (sometimes violently repressed) nor international pressure was able to make President Wade change his mind. Meanwhile, both the government and the opposition unanimously rejected a proposal by the ECOWAS/AU mediation for an ill-defined two-year transition plan. Many citizens feared that there would be an outbreak of violence during the first round of voting on 26 February.

But this did not happen. And even if the mobilisation on voting day was underwhelming – at 51,56%, voter turnout was the lowest since 2000 – the message was clear: Senegalese democracy needs to be protected and unnecessary political crises avoided.

Confusing messages from opposition leaders, fears of violence and the absence of any real debate on the socioeconomic alternatives to Wade might have kept a substantial number of voters away.

If the opposition leaders had been united, Wade could have been pushed out quite disgracefully in the very first round

COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY

When the long-awaited results were finally made public, close to 60% of voters had voted for the opposition. If the opposition leaders had been united, Wade could have been pushed out quite disgracefully in the very first round – a humiliating exit for a leader who fought all his life for democratic governance and peaceful power transition.

It is clear that the Senegalese people are committed to maintaining their country's democratic credentials and upholding peace and stability, especially in light of recent developments in the region.

There is overwhelming desire to keep the national political consensus and reaffirm the importance of ethics in politics at a time when political manipulation in many countries has led to election-related violence and a stagnation in the democratisation process.

In addition, the vote took place as Senegalese suffered repeated power failures, commodity price hikes, systemic corruption and growing social inequality – a situation Wade hasn't managed to reverse despite his promises when he came to power in 2000.

Overall, it seems that the rise of M23, a popular protest movement against Wade's third term in office, has somehow reappropriated the fight for decent political leaders, respect for the constitution, politi-

cal accountability and the preservation of national democratic achievements.

INDEPENDENT ELECTION MONITORS

It is important to point out the relative credibility and integrity of Senegal's electoral monitoring bodies as essential mitigating elements in the country's electoral process. There are now calls to further improve these standards and deliver a clean runoff. Most of the results of the first round were announced on various independent news networks before being confirmed by the electoral commission.

In securing only 34,8% of the vote in the first round, Wade failed to achieve an outright win. This is a sharp decline from the elections of 2000 and 2007, when he won respectively 58,5% and 55,9% of the vote. It is clear that the people of Senegal





(AP PHOTO/GABRIELA BARNIEVO)

Authorities managing the electoral process were faced with a historical responsibility to preserve the transparency of the electoral process and see Senegal through another peaceful and credible power transition


political process, protecting its reputation as one of the most disciplined on the continent, at least as far as politics is concerned.

The authorities managing this electoral process have been faced with a historical responsibility to preserve the transparency of the electoral process and see Senegal through another peaceful and credible power transition. Their personal integrity and institutional credibility are at stake.

WHAT HAPPENS NOW?

While the need for change is being clearly articulated, there do not seem to be any coherent innovative socioeconomic policy suggestions from the opposition on how to take the nation forward. The essential point seemed to be to get rid of Wade and close one of the most controversial political episodes in Senegalese democratic journey.

The president's dream of having his son, Karim Wade, take over will definitely be put to rest. At the time of going to print, M23 and Sall looked set to win the runoff unless there was a dramatic turn of events.

An opposition victory will have at least two major implications for Africa as a whole. Firstly, the continent seems to be entering a situation where its young people are increasingly unwilling to accept imposed authoritarian leaders, and youth mobilisation and social networks are becoming the most effective tools for contestation. Secondly, the fact that the neutrality of the Senegalese army has allowed the political debate to remain relatively nonviolent could potentially have a calming effect on the other electoral processes taking place in the region and perhaps on the rest of the continent this year. 

OPPOSITION presidential candidate and former prime minister Macky Sall casts his vote for president at a polling station during the first round of voting on Sunday, 26 February. Thanks to an electoral system trusted by the country's citizens, voting went smoothly across the country.

are dissatisfied with Wade's insistence on hanging on to power (including manoeuvres to groom his son and the proposed 'presidential ticket' that would allow victory with 25% and the power to appoint a vice-president) and want a new leader to take the country forward.

Collectively the opposition managed to rally a total of about 60% of the total votes between the top candidates after Wade, namely, Macky Sall (who came in second with 26,5% of the votes); Moustapha Niasse (13,2%), Ousmane Tanor Dieng (11,3%) and Idrissa Seck (7,8%). Popular singer Youssou N'dour also came out strongly in favour of Sall, after being prevented from

participating in the first round by the Constitutional Court.

With their unequivocal decision to support former prime minister Sall in the runoff, Senegalese opposition leaders aligned themselves with the general population's desire to force Wade into political retirement. The crucial lesson here is that electoral integrity could be an important tool to mitigate political crisis, not only for Senegal but for the continent as a whole.

Despite the overhanging threat of violence, there are several important factors reducing fears of a Côte d'Ivoire-like scenario. The army in Senegal has managed over the years to remain neutral in the

Political violence a Pandora's

Following the announcement by Senegal's president Abdoulaye Wade that he plans to stand for a third term, unprecedented violence broke out in the streets of Dakar. **Abdou Fall** predicts that from now on, any leader who doesn't perform will face the anger of the Senegalese masses.

Senegal is by no means a stranger to elections. The Senegalese in fact got their first chance to vote as far back as 1848, when Barthélémy Durand Valentin was chosen as the country's first representative to the Palais Bourbon in Paris. Yet no election has been as violent as the 2012 presidential election. Fifteen people died and many more were injured in the three weeks of protests that were aggressively suppressed by the police.

In the first round of voting, which took place on 26 February, candidates were seen running from tear gas, their campaign vehicles attacked by police and their headquarters invaded and sometimes trashed.

Even if on other occasions there have been instances of political violence, those of February 2012 displayed a sharp increase in intensity.

A HISTORY OF POLITICAL CONFLICT

The history of independent Senegal can be divided into three periods.

In the first period, running from 1960 to 1974, the Progressive Union of Senegal (UPS) ran a one-party state, but was deeply divided. The animosity reached its peak with the 3 February 1967 assassination in Thies of Demba Diop, president of the UPS, by Abdou N'Daffa Faye.

In the second period, from 1974 to 2000, there were fears of political violence perpetrated by the parties excluded from the opening of the political space by



ABDOULAYE Wade's government was accused of suppressing dissent through intimidation, imprisonment and attacks on opposition leaders and the media.

box

Senghor and later by his successor Abdou Diouf in the mid-1980s. The main suspects were members of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), the party of the then opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade.

The third episode in Senegal's political history began in 2000 with the election of Abdoulaye Wade as president. During this period, political violence has reached a new height, to the degree that it has almost become a way of regulating the socio-political space.

The many violent events to have taken place during Wade's first two terms include the aggressive attack on opposition leader Talla Sylla on 5 October 2003, the attacks on media offices such as those of 24h Chrono or Wal Fadjri, the death threats made in November 2003 against Christian clergy, the attack on Alioune Tine, head of the Rally for Human Rights in Africa (RADDHO) NGO on 23 June 2011 and, most recently, the intimidation of candidates during the February 2012 presidential election.

The most shocking aspect of this political violence has been the impunity and even praise reserved for those responsible for these acts.

It is clear that even between election campaigns, political violence has been taking root in Senegal in an insidious way, whether through abuse of power or the instrumentalisation of institutions and laws.

VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS

It is what Senegalese would call 'diaye-dolé' or the 'dolécratie' – the numerous violations of rights and improper incarceration, including, for example, the imprisonment of the former prime minister Idrissa Seck for seven months, supposedly for corruption, in what has become known as the 'Thies public works scandal'.

For opposition politicians, ordinary citizens, journalists and all other parts of

Even between election campaigns, political violence has been taking root in Senegal in an insidious way, whether through abuse of power or the instrumentalisation of institutions and laws

civil society, the erroneously named Division of Criminal Investigation (DIC) has become something of a 'conscience police' or political police force, known for the excessively forceful way it arrests citizens who are simply exercising their public rights and freedoms.

But there is also the violence of opposition. Without reaching the acts of sabotage or bomb attacks that might be experienced elsewhere, the violence of those who are not in power manifests in Senegal through legal depositions, illegal occupation of public spaces, attacks on public buildings, and sometimes provocation of those charged with maintaining law and order. Even if the motive is to protest against the abuse of power and these acts are presented as an expression of popular sovereignty, they are still part of a logic of violence.

It is in this context that one should



REUTERS/JOE PENNEY

analyse the rise in violence at the time of the constitutional dispute around the legality of Wade's candidature for a new mandate, which was finally agreed to by the constitutional court on 29 January.

In terms of the evolution of the socio-political space and the permanence of violence, one aspect that has not been sufficiently dealt with is that of private militias. Over a number of years, to paraphrase Weber, the state has been stripped of its monopoly over legitimate physical violence, with the development of various forms of 'self-defence' groups, some of which could be similar to private militias.

Firstly, there are the 'talibe-disciples' – groups that are exclusively run by *marabouts* (local Muslim teachers). Secondly, there are the groups that serve a political leader – the most famous being the 'blue hats' or *calots bleus* that followed Abdoulaye Wade when he was still in opposition.

Looking back at these events, one would want to urge Senegal to close the Pandora's box

Most of them became part of the regular law enforcement agencies when their leader took power. But we can nevertheless detect a resurgence of younger members through the 'blue guards', the *sentinelles bleues*, from the ranks of the Union of the Young Liberal Workers Party (UJTL).

Then, finally, there are the more or less organised groups that place themselves in the service of the highest bidder, including Djiw Niit, a famous self-proclaimed 'warrior group' made up of young bodybuilders – to belong to this club one has to weigh a minimum of 100kg.

These are some of the factors that contributed to raising the tensions observed in Senegal over the past few weeks.

The Catholic clergy and *marabouts* prayed for peace and even Wade organised a peace march, but in vain. Added to the death toll in Dakar were 20 deaths in Casamance province, where the rebel Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) threatened to prevent the holding of elections.


THE END OF TERANGA?

The repeated injustices, lack of respect for institutions, the frustrations born out of impunity and the growing impoverishment of the population have provided fertile ground for exacerbated violence.

Senegal prides itself on being 'the country of dialogue', to quote Senghor, and Senegalese often speak of their generosity, their 'teranga' (hospitality) and their pacifism. However, the progressive breaking down of the socio-political pact has found expression in this election campaign and now risks deteriorating into a free-for-all.

The repeated confrontations on the central square of Dakar, the Place de l'Indépendance, where the opposition attempted to hold gatherings to denounce Wade, were fuelled by police repression and resulted in urban guerrilla warfare. All of these factors have led to a reduction in the voting rate from 70,8% in 2005 to 51,2% today.

Looking back at recent events, one would want to urge Senegal to close the Pandora's box. To prevent violence and its accompanied impunity, it is imperative to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and particularly the role of the constitutional judge (the arbitrator of political disputes) to guarantee justice, equality and respect for the fundamental rights of ordinary citizens. Finally, it must be insisted that every individual with any form of responsibility should be accountable for his or her actions. Those are the minimum requirements of a country at peace with itself.

It is in this context that one should understand the call by the opposition group Y en a Marre, which was created in the run-up to the election. This group wants to see the birth of what its members call an NTS: a New Type of Senegalese. 

MORE LEADERS STEPPING DOWN

While ten years ago there were 11 African heads of state who had retired democratically, today there are 33, says former US ambassador to Tanzania Charles Stith.

On a visit to South Africa to launch the 10th edition of the annual *African Leaders' State of Africa Report*, he said there is a common tendency for countries to adhere to 'some sort of democratic system, to elections and to reforming economies'.

Stith, who is director of the African Presidential Archives and Research Centre at Boston University, said that Senegal's president Abdoulaye Wade, who was gunning for a third term, is an exception.

'It takes a special kind of person to be a president and step down voluntarily. That's why we need legislation to force heads of state to step down. Democracy doesn't guarantee a stream of exceptional leaders. Even in the US we have only had perhaps four really exceptional

presidents,' he said.

The conclusions of the report, which is made up of profiles of 16 African leaders, is that two-thirds of Africa's population 'wake up in a country where they have the right to determine who leads them'.



COMPETING PAN-AFRICANISMS

Why SA's post-liberation romanticism distracts from AU priorities

South Africa's decision to field its Home Affairs minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as a candidate for the position of African Union (AU) chairperson received mixed reaction. **Paul-Simon Handy** believes that while South Africa has an important role to play, its forceful attitude is not appreciated by all.



JACOLINE PRINSLOO

SOUTH AFRICA'S Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma at the African Union summit in Addis Ababa in January. Neither she nor her rival from Gabon, Jean Ping, managed to get a two-thirds majority and the decision on the AU Chair was postponed to June.

The inconclusive election of the chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) during the Addis Ababa summit in January this year has undoubtedly paralysed the organisation at a time when it is critically in need of strong leadership.

With the disappearance of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi from the African political scene, a void was created that should have been filled with fresh ideas, critical thinking and open-minded discussions about the future of the AU.

After ten years of normative construction, diffusion and institution building, the AU is in need of strategic thinking about its future direction. Instead, at the January summit, an unprecedented power game around personalities and the sense of destiny expressed by South Africa led to the re-emergence of old rivalries, suggesting that the hegemon from the south was shifting its African policy towards increased assertiveness.

But for all the ills and wrongs potentially brought about by this new South African posture, Pretoria's bold showing in Addis Ababa has had the indirect (if unintended) merit of raising long-overdue questions about the future of the AU.

What type of supra-national organisation does Africa need at a time when unprecedented growth rates and an improved governance environment are increasing the continent's strategic importance? What type of AUC is needed in order to manage the AU's sensitive transition from an intergovernmental organisation to a supra-national one? Does the AU have the capacity, the right working procedures, structures and systems, adequate expertise and personnel, to fulfil its mandate? Answers to these questions will not come from simply giving the AUC a facelift; they require serious discussion on what kind of AU is most needed by Africa.

ULTERIOR MOTIVES

Instead of focusing on the questions that matter for the future of the AU, South Africa and its continental opponents seem to have launched a battle for control of the AUC, displaying a strong ideological dimension as well as deferring to apparently, national interests.

Whereas the South African government and its ruling ANC party claim to have a historic duty to use their unique conflict resolution experience to 'liberate' the continent, other countries question this rhetoric as anachronistic and not a reflection of the wider post-independence experience of the continent as a whole.

In aggressively pursuing the election of its candidate as head of the AUC, South Africa illustrated a gap between the way it sees itself in Africa and the way it is perceived by other countries on the conti-

intellectual and material resources were used to launch developmental and transformational initiatives such as NEPAD and the AU, aimed at bringing the African Renaissance vision into effect. In designing and promoting common institutions, norms and values to drive African development, the Mbeki administration resorted to a strategy of collective leadership that consisted in building consensus with other key African countries on issues pertaining to the African modernisation strategy.



NICE hat. South Sudan president Salva Kiir greets Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe and Mozambique's President Armando Guebuza. In the background is Saharawi President Mohamed Abdelaziz.

nent. This gap accounts for diverging conceptions of Pan-Africanism that could present an obstacle to the acceptance of South Africa as a continental leader.

AN AFRICAN AGENDA OR AFRICAN AGENDAS?

For students of South Africa's foreign policy, the 'African Agenda' refers to Pretoria's prioritisation of Africa as the most strategic area of intervention in foreign policy in support of the African Renaissance project.

Probably the country's most important foreign policy pillar under former president Thabo Mbeki, the African Agenda was conceived as South Africa's continentalism that sought to promote a new continental order through institutionalism and multilateralism.

It is under this banner that the nation's

RE-EMERGENCE OF THE LIBERATION RHETORIC

In recent years, however, the 'African Agenda' has become a catchphrase for a utilitarian approach to South African foreign policy and, worse, an ideological argument that confirms both the re-emergence of the liberation rhetoric and the absence of a clearly articulated strategy for the AU.

The conception of an African Agenda based on the ANC liberation assumption that Africa needs to be freed from colonial influences might be appealing in the southern African context due to the uniqueness of its liberation trajectory.

But on other parts of the continent, this type of discourse could be perceived as an attempt by South Africa to mask its hegemonic agenda behind a benevolent discourse. Rightly or wrongly, South Africa's discourse and the assertive way in which it pushed Dlamini-Zuma's candidacy at the AUC in January are likely to produce contestation and competition between African key states.

Breaking with the consensual form of decision-making that has prevailed in African regional organisations until now is probably not a negative development. But South African foreign policy actors should understand that their country's African Agenda is only one among many others, and that this is likely to trigger fierce competition between African states.

In any case, defining a continental agenda in terms of opposition to another region (in South Africa's case, the West and not, for example, China) appears to be



A DIVIDED ORGANISATION. The AU, meeting here in its new Chinese-built headquarters, lacks a common vision of where Africa should be going.

anachronistic in many other African countries as it can only really be justified in immediate post-independence periods.

As the continent has now been politically liberated, the only slavery from which it still needs to be freed is that of poverty and bad governance. This second phase of Pan-Africanism requires different tools than post-liberation romanticism à la the ANC. To many observers, therefore, a legitimate African agenda can only be a common project based on the will of people to live together according to self-imposed norms, values and principles aimed at generating welfare for African people.

WHAT THE AU NEEDS BEYOND PERSONALITIES

It can be assumed that, since its establishment in 2002, the AU has built up a substantial body of norms, principles, policies and institutions that give concrete expression to the idea of Pan-Africanism in the era of globalisation. For the next ten years it will have to focus on moving towards a more prosperous Africa, and a battle of personalities is not likely to be helpful.

If outgoing AUC chairperson Jean Ping's re-election would have signified business as usual in the context of a necessary introspection after a difficult 2011, it is not clear what would have changed if Dlamini-Zuma had won the race in January. In other words, reforming the AU and positioning it for the challenges of the 21st century will require more than just a game of musical chairs at the AUC.

The year 2011 has exposed both the institutional weaknesses of the AUC and the confusion amongst its member states, particularly South Africa, which has struggled to display a consistent approach in dealing with the numerous crises that shook the continent.

A PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNOCRATIC AUC

Among other things, the AU needs to streamline its decision-making structures by improving its standard operating procedures as well as its communication capabilities.

To date the 2008 AU Audit Report remains the most important and accurate analysis of the workings of the AUC and

the AU as a whole. Although its recommendations were not taken up by the commission, the report's findings remain valid four years after publication.

Among other important findings was the panel's view of the AUC as being characterised by 'internal institutional incoherence and disarray with a dysfunctional working and managerial culture at all levels'. In order to start implementing the audit report's recommendations, the AUC needs both excellent management and strategic vision.

The diplomatic aspects of AU representation should be covered by the sitting president. The AUC needs not only to be technically strong, with sound experts recruited from among Africa's best brains, but also gradually to become politically independent. As the AU aims to become a supra-national organisation with a num-

ber of prerogatives transferred from national states, the AUC should be the embodiment of this construction.

MORE THAN A TALKING SHOP

The AUC is the defining organ of an international organisation and as such is generally a reflection of that organisation's health. This is one of the reasons why the audit report recommended that only the AUC's president and vice-president should be elected by heads of state and the rest should be selected uniquely for their competence. This would not only strengthen the chairperson's authority but also bring back competence to the heart of the AUC.

COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

There is general consensus around the idea that the biggest threats to stability in Africa are democratic deficits and socioeconomic inequalities. Therefore, the major progress achieved by the AU in establishing a relatively stable doctrine against unconstitutional changes of government is challenged by the absence of a clear link to its nascent governance architecture.

In its current form, the principle is unable (a) to prohibit non-democratic forms of government already in place and, as a result, (b) to address the democratic dilemma that consists in tolerating repressive regimes as members of the AU while prohibiting their unconstitutional change. This dilemma has generated the idea that the AU is protecting undemocratic regimes.

Paradoxically, despite the institutional blockage created by the non-conclusive election at the AUC in January, and despite the fight for control of the commission by Africa's big countries, it appears that the profile of the organisation has been raised. More than ever, the AU now appears to be the legitimate representation of Africa's aspiration to welfare through integration. **E**



PRESIDENT OF ETHIOPIA Meles Zenawi, President of Benin Yayi Boni (seated), Gambian President Yahya Jammeh and SA President Jacob Zuma at a dinner hosted by South Africa and Ethiopia during the AU Summit.

ber of prerogatives transferred from national states, the AUC should be the embodiment of this construction.

This is and will remain the most contentious endeavour, as member states are unwilling to transfer more power to a technocratic body. However, the AUC should be the agenda-setter, and its efficiency in this regard will come at a price.

The AU needs to be perceived as an organisation that delivers on issues and not merely a talking shop. The legitimacy



SADC RPTC TECHNICAL ADVISOR

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ) and the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC RPTC) invite qualified and experienced individuals from the SADC region to apply for the position of a technical advisor to the SADC RPTC.

GIZ is a federal enterprise assisting the German Government in achieving its objectives in the field of international cooperation for sustainable development. GIZ is supporting the SADC RPTC in becoming a SADC Centre of Excellence for Training in the field of Peace Support Operations.

1 LOCATION SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Harare, Zimbabwe

2 KEY COMPETENCES AND EXPERIENCE

MA in international relations, political science or equivalent, ideally with a focus on conflict prevention and resolution, peace studies, or related subjects

Solid academic background in peace and security issues. Own publications related to peacekeeping and peacebuilding are an asset

At least 5 years professional experience in the field of peace and security in Sub Saharan Africa

Experience in designing curricula and training courses on peace and security related issues, ideally with own experience as a trainer

Experience in project management, including aspects of monitoring and evaluation as well as administrative experience

Previous deployment in a peace support operation and / or work experience in a post conflict context is an asset

Very good working knowledge of ITC technologies and computer applications (e.g. MS Office)

Very good knowledge of English, additional knowledge of French or Portuguese is an asset

Managerial and organisational competence

Willingness to travel regularly

3 RESPONSIBILITIES

The technical advisor is responsible for

- ☐ providing professional advisory services to the SADC RPTC, in particular with regard to research, curricula design, and training
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4 DURATION OF CONTRACT

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Candidates should send an application letter and CV with reference "SADC RPTC Technical Advisor" including contact details and earliest starting date via email to:

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Attention: Ms. Marilyn Muma,
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Email: marilyn.muma@giz.de

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KNOCKING ON A CLOSED DOOR

During the last summit of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa earlier this year, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) asked for a limited amount of legislative power. However, reports **Hallelujah Lulie**, its efforts fell on deaf ears.

In October 2011, the PAP criticised the AU for its failure to prevent the bombing of Libya by NATO and lamented that the latter should have sent an army to Libya to 'stop it falling apart'.

In a statement that surprised many, the vice president of the continental parliament, whose existence is hardly felt by most Africans, expressed disappointment over the AU's passive role in the Libyan conflict.



AN EXCLUSIVE club. AU heads of state are not willing to cede any of their legislative powers.

On a continent characterised by rubber-stamp parliaments and authoritarian regimes, the PAP is struggling to make its voice heard. At present, 47 national parliaments have ratified the PAP protocol and are represented there through the five representatives they each send from their respective national parliaments for a five-year term.

Article 11 of the PAP protocol states that the body shall be vested with legislative powers, defined by the Assembly, to 'examine, discuss or express an opinion on any matter, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Assembly or other policy organs and make any recommendations [on] matters pertaining to respect of human rights, the consolidation of democratic institutions and the culture of democracy, as well as the promotion of good governance and the rule of law'.

However, at present its influence is limited to consultative and advisory powers and its members are nominated by the national parliaments of the member states that have ratified the PAP protocol.

The PAP is based in Midrand, South Africa, but met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 16-20 January this year, on the sidelines of the AU summit, with the intention of reaching out to the continent's decision makers and lobbying them for legislative powers.

FACT-FINDING MISSIONS

Considering its short existence, the PAP has tried to make its mark in a number of high-profile African conflicts. Based on its protocol, which states the promotion of peace, security and stability as a main objective, the PAP forged some level of institutional engagement with probably the most powerful political organ of the AU: the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PAP's involvement in issues of peace and security has been manifested through the numerous missions it has sent out across the continent.

The parliament has sent fact-finding missions to Darfur, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania and Chad. It also dispatched election observers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2006, Kenya in 2007 and Zimbabwe and Angola in 2008, later providing recommen-

dations and resolutions on peace and security issues. The PAP also sent a fact-finding mission to Western Sahara in 2011. But despite these commendable endeavours and the recognition of the PAP's role in continental peace and security matters by the PSC Protocol of 2002, there is little evidence that the PSC or any other AU organ has taken the PAP's recommendations seriously. The PAP also does not have a visible or clearly defined role in continental security affairs or the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

DISINTEREST FROM AU ASSEMBLY

The Assembly, which has been overwhelmed by the election of its chairperson, has shown little interest in paying attention to the PAP's 'ambitious' request.

In a continent characterised by rubber-stamp parliaments and authoritarian regimes, the PAP is struggling to make its voice heard

During the summit, Ghana's former president and PAP ambassador Jerry John Rawlings noted that the process would be difficult as 'some member states believe the continent is not ready for a powerful pan-African parliamentary body with full or even limited legal power'.

The PAP's vice president, Bethel Amadi, made repeated assurances that a transformed PAP would co-exist with national and regional parliaments in a manner that would not derogate from or erode their powers or national sovereignty. But the institutional capacity of the PAP is questionable at present. It has limited capacity to participate effectively in policy dialogue and recommendations as it relies heavily on the technical expertise of civil society organisations. And, as with other wings of the AU, limited financial and human resources are also a difficulty for the PAP.

Many believe that instead of requesting more powers, the PAP should prove its worth by utilising its existing mandate and resources more effectively. As most of the representatives seconded from their

national parliaments have little experience with parliamentary work, the PAP needs to strengthen its partnership and capacity-building activities by sharing experiences and lessons learned with other regional institutions such as the EU. The PAP should also be more specific in terms of exactly what powers it needs and how it plans to use them.

LEGITIMACY THROUGH ELECTIONS

A positive development, though, is that of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, probably the most authoritative expression of the commitment of the AU and its member states to governance, democracy and elections, which was put into effect on 15 February. Many believe that a continental parliament with legislative powers would facilitate the speedy ratification and domestication of the Charter. The final document of the meeting also announced a more visible role for the PAP in its implementation of the Charter, and more collaboration with other organs of the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) in that regard.

The stated vision for the PAP remains that of providing a common platform for African peoples and grassroots organisations to be involved in discussions and decisions on issues facing the continent. So far, however, this has not been realised.

To enhance its legitimacy and enable it to demand more powers and a greater role in continental matters, the PAP should consider direct, democratic election of its members, as is the case with the European parliament. For example, Article 4 of the PAP protocol enjoins national parliaments to ensure that two of the five members of each of their parliamentary delegations are members of opposition parties. The question is, how many African parliaments have themselves been democratically elected?

Ethiopia, for example, which is a member of the PAP, only has one opposition MP in a parliament of 547 members. International observers have criticised Ethiopia's parliamentary elections, which saw the ruling party win 99.6% of the seats. The case is no different for many other members. **E**

Fighting for democratic freedoms

Q&A



Liesl Louw-Vaudran spoke to Pansy Tlakula, chief electoral officer of the South African Independent Electoral Commission and special rapporteur on freedom of expression of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights.

Q THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE WAS FINALLY ADOPTED EARLIER THIS YEAR AFTER BEING RATIFIED BY CAMEROON. DOES THIS MEAN PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRATISATION IN AFRICA?

Well, it took a long time. The Charter was adopted in January 2007 and it took exactly five years to get 15 of the AU's 54 member states to ratify it so it could come into effect.

It also took a lot of effort from the

African Union (AU) and from the African Commission on Human and People's Rights to encourage countries to ratify it.

Q IS IT BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRACY, OR HAVE GOVERNMENTS BEEN RELUCTANT TO GET IT RATIFIED?

In some countries it's bureaucracy, but in others it could be that governments are not happy with certain clauses. For example, the Charter deals with the controversial issue of unconstitutional change of government, whether through coups d'état or through leaders extending their mandates.

Q AS THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AFRICA, YOU HAVE BEEN WORKING ON A MODEL LAW ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION?

After the law is adopted by the Commission on Human and People's Rights, countries that want a law on access to information can then use it for their own legislation. Some countries, such as Rwanda, are in the process of looking at such a law.

Q YET RWANDA HAS BEEN CRITICISED FOR CLAMPING

COUNTRIES THAT HAVE RATIFIED THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE

Country	Date ratified
Burkina Faso	06/07/2010
Cameroon	16/01/2012
Chad	13/10/2011
Ethiopia	06/01/2009
Ghana	19/10/2010
Guinea-Bissau	04/01/2012
Guinea	11/07/2011
Lesotho	09/07/2010
Mauritania	28/07/2008
Nigeria	09/01/2012
Niger	08/11/2011
Rwanda	14/07/2010
South Africa	24/01/2011
Sierra Leone	08/12/2009
Zambia	08/07/2011

Not only in Africa but worldwide. Although the number of journalists killed in Africa is worrying, it is not as high as in previous years. That is because there are other forms of violation being perpetrated against journalists.

If a journalist is murdered, as has happened in Syria, there is usually a lot of media attention, but there are less intrusive ways to suppress the media, such as intimidation, harassment, arbitrary arrests, confiscation of equipment, closure of media houses and disappearances.

Q YOU ARE GOING TO LAUNCH A CAMPAIGN FOR THE DECRIMINALISATION OF LIBEL ON 4 MAY, WHICH IS PRESS FREEDOM DAY. WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

A big problem in some countries is the criminal defamation laws, insult laws or sedition laws that are used to arrest and prosecute journalists who publish articles criticising their governments.

If a journalist publishes an article about a head of state or a cabinet minister, it might be true and in the public interest. Assuming it is not, the head of state should sue the journalist for defamation. It should be a civil case, not a criminal one, so the journalist won't be sentenced to prison. But

because of the existence of these laws, some journalists practice self-censorship, which has a chilling effect on media freedom.

Q HOW ARE YOU GOING TO MAKE SURE COUNTRIES ADHERE TO THIS?

Because many countries still have laws against libel on their statute books, we are going to lobby for the repeal of those laws.

That would be the first prize. The second prize would be for countries to place a moratorium on laws to prosecute journalists, because we think they have a damaging effect on journalism.

The first step will be research to find out where these laws exist and where they have been used to sentence journalists to jail. We will make this information public.

The Charter deals, for example, with the controversial issue of unconstitutional government, whether through coups d'état or leaders extending their mandates

Q THE CAMPAIGN WILL BE LAUNCHED IN TUNIS. IS THIS SYMBOLIC?

The whole of North Africa provides us with new opportunities for shaping the constitutional democracy in those countries.

Q SOUTH AFRICA IS NOW BIDDING FOR THE POSITION OF CHAIR OF THE AU COMMISSION. WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE FUNCTIONING OF THE AU?

We shouldn't create an impression that the AU hasn't done anything, but there is room for improvement. The AU Commission could certainly be more proactive in dealing with issues and not wait for the situation in a country to get out of hand before acting. It can be much more forceful to act when conflict is about to break out. **E**

DOWN ON THE MEDIA.

That happens in many places. But what is important is that the Rwandan minister of information asked about it and showed an interest.

Q WOULD IT BE JUST LIKE THE AFRICAN CHARTER, WHICH CAN'T BE IMPOSED ON COUNTRIES BUT MERELY SERVES AS A DIRECTIVE?

All we can do is lobby for more countries to adhere to it.

Q YOU WERE CRITICAL OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PROPOSED ACCESS TO INFORMATION LAW. ARE YOU CONCERNED GENERALLY ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN AFRICA?

As conflict-ridden Somalia moves closer to the August cut-off date for its transitional government, **Solomon A Dersso** looks at the initiatives by the international community to salvage the situation and those factors standing in the way of lasting peace.

LEADERSHIP the missing link

There is cautious optimism that the initiative led by the United Kingdom earlier this year to find a solution to the Somali conflict could bear fruit.

The initiative aimed, among other things, to consolidate the military gains achieved thus far and seize the opportunity for securing peace in the war-torn country.

The security pillar agreed upon in London is accordingly directed both to end the threat posed by Al Shabaab and to deepen and expand the ongoing military operations for stabilising Somalia.

The military operation received a substantial boost on 22 February when the UN Security Council raised the authorised force level of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) to just under 18 000 troops, doubled the funding of the

CITIZENS of Mogadishu have experienced two decades of violence and state collapse.

CREDIT: RENE DEL CARME

mission, approved the provision of additional capabilities such as air power and expanded its mandate by authorising it to use 'all means necessary'. Coming as it did at a time when increased attention was being paid to pursuing peace on the basis of an agreed political strategy, the London initiative was meant to build on processes that started during 2011 for finalising the necessary political processes for ending the transitional period in August.

Understandably, the focus of this latest initiative, as well as of those that started in 2011, has been on state-building activities. However, this latest state-building process is different in that, unlike previous efforts, it emphasises supporting local and regional structures of government and not merely establishing a functioning central government.

NO GUARANTEE OF SUCCESS

Amid this plethora of military, security and political developments feeding into each other to create the conditions for peace, it would not be wrong to say that this is the first time since 2006 that Somalia and the international community have come close to breaking the cycle of violence in the country. There is indeed a strong chance that Somalia may finally triumph over its two decades of violence, chaos and state collapse.

Unfortunately, nothing can be taken for granted in Somalia.

There is no guarantee that these multi-dimensional initiatives will not face the same fate as the dozen or so previous attempts at bringing peace to Somalia. The major problem is that there are a number of situations that have the potential to frustrate the opportunity the improving security condition has created. Al Shabaab is a major factor and thus much of the focus of regional and international actors is on addressing the Al Shabaab menace.

There is also understandable concern about the destabilising role of regional actors. Indeed, these spoilers should take a significant portion of the blame for the instability that Somalia has faced over the past decade. Every effort should be made to deny them the opportunity to undermine the momentum for peace in Somalia.

While these threats are as important

today as they have been in the past, the major obstacle to peace in Somalia is the country's political leadership, which has been characterised thus far by its corruption, ineptitude, rivalry, intrigue and lack of cohesion.

A FLAWED TFG

Apart from the serious institutional inadequacies of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), including its limited capacity and failure to establish a functioning security sector, the TFG most notably suffers from infighting and the same kind of leadership crisis that

Shabaab, the various power factions within the TFG became embroiled in fierce squabbles. With the end of the transitional period fast approaching, disagreement has erupted between the Transitional Federal Parliament and the executive institutions of the TFG over whether the TFG's term should extend beyond August 2011.

While the president and his cabinet requested a one-year extension in the term, the parliament and its speaker insisted that elections should be held for the position of TFG president as well as for the positions of speaker and deputy speaker of parliament.



RENE DEL CORRAL

THE victims of Somalia's war. Internal strife among Somalia's leaders is blamed for the lack of a political solution for the country's conflict.

There is indeed a strong chance that Somalia may finally triumph over its two decades of violence, chaos and state collapse

bedevilled former president Abdullahi Yusuf's tenure and led to his eventual departure. Rather than providing institutional checks and balances, the three centres of power in the TFG (parliament, president and prime minister) have produced division, rivalry, instability and lack of common purpose.

The latest power tussle in the TFG took place in mid-2011. As the TFG/AMISOM and allied forces gained territories from Al

This resulted in an impasse between the parliament on the one hand and the president and his cabinet on the other.

In the past two months, there was again a serious power struggle between parliamentarians and the speaker of parliament following the motion to remove the speaker from his post. The situation descended into physical fighting between members of the parliament.

LOCAL POWER STRUGGLES

Another serious threat to political stability are the emerging regional and inter- and intra-clan power tussles. Such rivalries are over control of revenue sources and for filling the governance vacuum ensuing from dislodging Al Shabaab.

Indeed, as the current political and

Rather than providing institutional checks and balances, the three centres of power in the TFG (parliament, president and prime minister) have produced division, rivalry, instability and lack of common purpose

security developments leave the question of leadership wide open, the coming months are likely to see an intense power struggle among Somalia's various political actors.

Although according to the current timeline a new parliament should be elected in May and a new executive in July, some powerful elements, including the president, are believed to be keen on securing another mandate.

While those in the TFG are expected to defend their established interests, other Somali political actors are vying for influence and position in the new political dispensation expected to be inaugurated after the expiry of the transitional period in August this year.



THE FIGHT against Al Shabaab was given a boost in February when the UN increased the force level of AMISOM to just under 18 000 troops.

RENE DEL CAMME

If the opportunity for peace currently being presented is not realised, the last resort should be a joint AU-UN executive administration of Somalia. This is an idea that is proposed in a non-paper recently produced by Italy. Although this proposal is controversial and may require a great deal of advocacy to find support among Somalis, it should not be dismissed altogether. Such a measure is not totally unprecedented. There were cases such as

in Kosovo where a UN mission exercised executive power under a Security Council mandate.

Clearly, the prospects for peace in Somalia, although strong, are far from guaranteed, mainly due to the serious lack of visionary and cohesive Somali leadership. The coming few months will tell whether there is enough wisdom and determination to overcome this major challenge and deliver peace for Somalia. **E**



YOLANDE SIVAMAN

ABDULLAHI Haji Hassan Mohamed

DIPLOMATIC TIES

In an effort to play a role in the new stabilisation plans for Somalia, countries such as the UK and South Africa have taken steps to establish diplomatic representations in the country.

Abdullahi Haji Hassan Mohamed, Somalia's minister of foreign affairs, told a press conference in Pretoria, South Africa, on 13 March that the situation had 'stabilised' and people were rebuilding their lives after two decades of devastating war. However, shortly after he spoke, renewed violence broke out in the capital, Mogadishu, including an attack on the

presidential compound in the city.

Thousands of people were again forced to flee to the centre of the city to avoid heavy fighting in the Afgooye corridor, just south of Mogadishu.

Ugandan soldiers of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) vowed to drive Al Shabaab militias out of the large parts of the country that the organisation still controls by August.

This is also the cut-off date for the present Transitional Federal Government (TFG), whose mandate will have to be renewed through elections.



OPPOSITION leader Etienne Tshisekedi's supporters still believe their leader won last year's elections and vow to continue protesting against the government.

PAUL BOTES

A SHODDY ELECTION

leaves the future in tatters

The political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is increasingly unstable after flawed presidential elections at the end of last year. **Stephanie Wolters** looks at what this means for the future of one of Africa's largest and potentially richest countries.

Widespread electoral fraud, opposition protests, tepid criticism from a worn-out international community, and a ruling party indifferent to its lack of legitimacy – the DRC's 2011 legislative and presidential elections meet all the stereotypes of a botched African election.

But for the DRC's 60 million people, the bungled electoral process means that their future again hangs in the balance. Instead of consolidating a fragile democratic process that started with the conclusion of a peace agreement in 2002 and culminated in the 2006 election, the bungled 2011 polls

have left the country deeply divided and facing an uncertain political and economic future.

Political scientist and director of Kinshasa's Pan-African Institute for International and Strategic Relations, Professor Philippe Biyoya, said, 'We are in a very precarious situation, because the elections were not a moment of reinforcement of national cohesion which could have increased our capacity to move towards a stable future... The elections have not given our institutions strength. They are another war.'

The trouble started long before the elections, with the appointment of a Kabila

crony – Pastor Ngoy Mulunda – as president of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). This seriously undermined the commission's credibility, and sparked a series of challenges from the political opposition.

Already heavily politicised, the CENI then got off to a slow start and was forced to organise the elections under tremendous time pressure as the schedule had already been delayed several times. And there were other serious challenges: in 2006, the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) organised the elections, coming to the party with its massive logistical and administrative capabilities, while the local electoral commission played a supporting role.

In 2011, the UN mission (which in 2010 was renamed the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC, or MONUSCO) assisted with logistical support – but its role was significantly reduced, and the CENI was in charge of the overall process.

KABILA'S LEGITIMACY QUESTIONED

Many of these issues had been pushed by President Joseph Kabila himself. Kabila has long had a 'love/hate' relationship with the international community and he is not shy to openly criticise Western donors, sometimes accusing them of violating the DRC's sovereignty. It was Kabila who pushed for a reduced mandate for the UN peacekeeping mission, and who insisted that the CENI take the lead on the 2011 elections.

Vincent Tohbi, former DRC country director and now director of programmes at the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), says that, in principle, it was right for the CENI to take charge of the process this time around. 'We understand that is the case in all countries emerging from long periods of war and UN supremacy. Once people have legitimacy, they say, "We want our sovereignty; we want to do our thing," which is good. But when you do that you have to have the means and the capacity, otherwise you go straight against the wall. By the time the CENI decided to have open collaboration with the [other electoral players], it was late. They thought that being ready financially meant that they would be ready in

These elections have already shaken the DRC's relationship with international financial institutions such as the World Bank, which announced in January that it was stopping its budgetary support over concerns about transparency and governance

terms of skills and capacity and logistics.'

Where does this leave the DRC? Kabila's legitimacy as president is in doubt – according to the official results, he won with 48% of the vote, against opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi's 32%.

International observer missions such as the European Union and the Carter Center noted incidents of serious fraud and irregularity and have asked for further investigation but stopped short of saying that the outcome was illegitimate, and most Western governments have acknowledged Kabila as the legitimate president.

Domestically, the powerful and well-respected Catholic Church, which deployed 6 000 domestic observers, has been more outspoken in denouncing the election. Since then its leader, Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, has found himself the target of vicious attacks in the pro-Kabila media.

A DAMAGING BOYCOTT

The outcome of the legislative elections, with the presidential alliance (Majorité Présidentielle, or MP) winning 340 of 500 seats, has also been widely contested. The new parliament is composed of members of a dizzying number of political parties – 98 in total – most of which were either created by the ruling party or aligned themselves with the MP out of political expediency rather than ideological kinship.


As many as 45 parties are represented by only one seat. Nonetheless, even these parties will expect to be rewarded for their contribution to the overall victory of the alliance. Says Professor Biyoya: 'Instead of forming one popular party, they divided their forces... they are all in the minority

because no one has more than 100 seats... All these people came to [politics] to become ministers, not parliamentary deputies.'

Managing the demands of all these hangers-on will be a major headache for the president in the formation of his new government as well as in the day-to-day management of parliament. There are already reports that the loose-knit group may split.

But by far the most significant problem is that political opposition parties allied to Tshisekedi's Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS) are boycotting parliament, leaving close to 100 opposition seats empty. The UDPS alone won 41 seats and its political allies several dozen more. This weakens the political opposition, and diminishes its overall leverage.

Tshisekedi, who declared himself president in December, has demanded that the elections be cancelled and that there be a political dialogue to chart the future. Tshisekedi's political advisor and hard-line supporter Valentin Mubake has likened suggestions that the UDPS participate in parliament to eating poisoned



NO end in sight for Kinshasa's poorest. Residents burn old hawker tables used for drying fish.

food, and he rejects the idea that an opposition boycott plays into the hands of the presidential majority.

One UDPS parliamentarian who dared to attend the opening ceremony in mid-February was promptly expelled from the party. Mubake has threatened to expel every elected UDPS deputy who attends parliament. But many political observers fear that the opposition boycott will damage the institution. During a recent political debate on Radio Okapi, Andre Lubanza, vice-chancellor of the faculty of social sciences, administration and politics at the University of Kinshasa said: 'We are facing a crisis because if already a hundred deputies are not presenting themselves... the institution will not function normally. There will not be a credible, functioning opposition... The essential thing is not to be in the Assembly, but to make oneself heard.'

'A battle from within parliament could be a good thing, provided that the opposition manages to organise and get its act together. At the moment it is not organised – the MLC (Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo) and the UNC (Union Nationale Congolaise) are participating,' he added.

There is a lot at stake. These elections have already shaken the DRC's relationship with international financial institutions such as the World Bank, which announced

in January that it was stopping its budgetary support over concerns about political transparency and governance. Bilateral donors may follow – most now appear to be waiting for the formation of a government to gauge whether Kabila intends to reach out to his political opposition.

PRESSURE FROM DONORS

Koen Vervaeke, the European Union's director for the Horn of Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean, and senior coordinator for the Great Lakes region, said: 'The elections were problematic; it is impossible to redo them, financially, politically and logistically... [We] want to see the dialogue broadened and more political space, so instead of a divided society, there are efforts between the majority and the opposition to come together. That can be within parliament and within a government. The majority should not close itself off in an authoritarian stance but instead engage in dialogue with the opposition.'

But the Kabila government has already further antagonised the political opposition and civil society, which accuse it of committing human rights violations against its opponents. In early February UDPS secretary general Jacquemin Shabani was detained at Kinshasa's Ndjili airport as


he boarded a flight to Europe. He was later accused of having materials on his computer that incited Congolese security forces to undermine the state. The UDPS has dismissed the allegations and said the files were planted there by the government's intelligence agency, but the government remains steadfast and says it plans to pursue legal action against Shabani, who still has not been allowed to leave the country.

There has also been a clampdown on political freedoms. On 16 February this year, the Catholic Church organised the annual March of the Christians to commemorate the 1992 killing of protestors by the Mobutu government. This year it was also a protest march against the elections.

In Kinshasa, the governor forbade the march to go ahead. In the aftermath, several members of the clergy were arrested, while five television and radio stations sympathetic to the opposition were shut down. The crackdown was condemned by the EU and by MONUSCO.

There are reports of behind-the-scenes attempts by the international community to convince the Kabila government to break its impasse with the political opposition. So far though, these have not borne fruit. Ambassador Vervaeke says the EU's message is clear: 'We have sent a clear message and we are confident they understand what direction we would like them to take. We are actively engaged.'

But there are more worrying signs on the horizon. In late February minister of information Lambert Mende provoked the international community when he said that provincial and local elections currently scheduled for later this year could not be held unless they were financed on time by the international community. Mende also said that the international community had not contributed its share to the organisation of the presidential and legislative elections.

The CENI is already behind with the preparations for the provincial assembly elections, originally scheduled for May. It has said that it will release a new electoral calendar once it has completed its evaluation of the 2011 electoral process. 



PAUL BOTES

Stephanie Wolters is a conflict analyst and journalist specialising in the DRC. She is also a director of Okapi Consulting.

Judges feel the heat



GARETH NEWHAM

Increasing instances of senior ANC officials attacking the courts can be interpreted as an attempt to place pressure on judges to be more 'executive minded' and to act more in line with the ANC's thinking

In the past few weeks there has been increasing concern over statements made by senior ANC officials attacking the South African judiciary. Various ANC heavyweights have made statements that the judiciary is hindering transformation in South Africa and that the Constitutional Court is being used to undermine the elected branches of government (the executive and parliament) and their policy decisions.

Most recently, President Jacob Zuma stated that the government intends to review the powers of the Constitutional Court. However, the executive branch of government has no authority to change the powers of the Constitutional Court without amending the constitution, which requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority, which it does not have on its own.

Although various ministers and government communicators have tried to spin the president's statement differently, it remains yet another example of how certain powerful politicians either don't understand or don't respect South Africa's constitutional democracy.

In this environment, the recent pronouncement that the cabinet intends to assess the impact of the Constitutional Court's rulings and discuss the transformation of the judiciary is generally interpreted in a negative light.

No official explanation has been given as to why the government wants to make these assessments and how they will improve failures in government service delivery. As has been raised by various legal analysts, it is not the Constitutional Court's fault that land reform is slow, local government is not delivering services or that children are not getting adequately educated.

It is therefore difficult to look at the pronouncements by Zuma outside of this context, or without considering powerful ruling party politicians' confrontations with the law. For example, the deputy

minister of correctional services, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, who has made some of the most chilling anti-constitutional statements, has faced corruption charges resulting from questionable procurement dealings he undertook while premier of Limpopo between 1994 and 2004.

These charges were later withdrawn without explanation in 2008 by the then Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) Mokotedi Mpshe, who later controversially also withdrew corruption charges against Zuma.

More recently, a number of court cases have been particularly embarrassing for Zuma and the ruling party. For instance, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that Zuma had acted 'irrationally' by appointing Menzi Simelane as the new National Director of Public Prosecutions despite the man having been found to be dishonest during the Ginwala Commission of Inquiry and the Public Service Commission (PSC) recommending formal disciplinary charges against him.

POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

The Constitutional Court also recently found that the legislation drafted to establish the Directorate of Priority Investigations (also known as 'the Hawks') was unconstitutional. This was because the Hawks were found not to be as independent from political interference as the Scorpions, the agency that was responsible for uncovering evidence of corruption against Zuma and successfully prosecuting former police chief Jackie Selebi on corruption charges.

Increasing instances of senior ANC officials attacking the courts can be interpreted as an attempt to place pressure on judges to be more 'executive minded' and to act more in line with the ANC's thinking. However, it has also been argued that if government officials simply upheld the constitution as they are required to do, there would not be so many rulings against them.

TRAINING PROBLEMS

Meanwhile the South African Police Service (SAPS) has come under fire after the *Sunday Times* weekly newspaper received a copy of an SAPS internal audit report dated 14 December 2011.

The audit found that about 27 329 police officers, or 17% of the 157 704 officers who underwent the necessary training, had failed to achieve the proficiency requirements for handling firearms, limiting the extent of the police work that these officers are able to do.

The report suggests, however, that many of the officers remain in operational posts, which may mean that they will at some point be required to use their firearms in self-defence. The fact that they do not meet the minimum requirements to do so could result in death or serious injury to themselves, their colleagues or civilians.

It has also emerged that at some police training colleges, those who undertake training in handling firearms are not properly tested. Instead, in an attempt to meet performance measurement targets, some instructors simply read out the answers to the written part of the test and allow trainees to stand closer to the target than the distance required.

This means that correct procedure is compromised in order for the trainee to attain a pass mark. Rather than enhancing public safety, police officers who are not adequately trained in handling firearms pose an additional danger to the citizenry.

The findings of this audit also raise the issue of how the mass recruitment of police officers results in a range of other organisational problems. Typically, in order to meet increased recruitment targets, standards for vetting and training are lowered. Management systems become overstretched, resulting in increased police misconduct, corruption and poor service delivery.

How the SAPS will respond to this audit is not yet clear. Hopefully it will result in improvements in the way that police officers are recruited, trained and assessed.

BUDGET HOLDS PROMISE

For more than a decade, the annual budget for the SAPS has been increasing by about 14% per year. The money has been essentially spent on increasing the recruitment

of personnel who work in the SAPS.

In the past ten years or so, approximately 70 000 additional posts have been created and filled within the SAPS, so that as of 2011 the organisation consisted of over 197 000 staff.

This has resulted in a police-to-population ratio of around 1:260, which is far better than the UN-recommended ratio of 1:400. However, an analysis of the crime trends shows that the increase in police officials has not necessarily yielded positive results. Murder has decreased relatively consistently by about 50% since 1994, during which time the number of police officials decreased before increasing.

Moreover, between 2004 and 2009, residential robberies and business robberies increased by 100% and 295% respectively, at a time when the SAPS had grown by a substantial 30%.

More recently, with recruitment figures stabilising and with better use of existing resources, the SAPS has managed to reduce residential robberies by over 10% and slow the rate of increase in business robberies to 4% over the past two years.

This has demonstrated to policy-makers that it is not the quantity of police personnel that makes the difference so much as their quality and skills. Consequently, a decision has been taken to reduce the number of SAPS employees to 188 000 by 2012-15 and increase the number of detectives to 38 152 (a 24% increase since 2008).

The minister of police, who is driving this policy change, announced recently that all police officials should undergo some investigation training, irrespective of whether they work as detectives or not.

This will hopefully reduce the contamination of crime scenes by uniformed officers who, instead of simply securing the area, tend to walk around touching various objects, which hinders the collection of forensic evidence necessary to identify and prosecute criminals. **E**

Rather than enhancing public safety, police officers who are not adequately trained in handling firearms pose an additional danger to the citizenry



THE GOVERNMENT has called for a review of the decisions by the Constitutional Court.



DAVID ZOUNMENOU

Unscrupulous politicians a threat to peace and prosperity

‘The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty.’
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*.

In November 2011, during a visit to Benin, Pope Benedict XVI called upon African leaders to govern for their people and to place the principle of social justice and humanism at the heart of their public actions.

He lamented, ‘At this time, there are too many scandals and injustices, too much corruption and greed, too many errors and lies, too much violence which leads to misery and to death. These ills certainly afflict your continent, but they also afflict the rest of the world.’

Pope Benedict’s call came at a time when Africa continues to face tremendous sociopolitical and security challenges, in spite of the progress made over the past two decades towards creating an environment conducive to economic growth, peace and prosperity.

Two main trends seem to define the current state of affairs on the continent.

On the one hand, Africa is seen as having good potential for economic growth, certainly as a result of sound macroeconomic and structural political reforms introduced since the early 1990s

and the new scramble for its oil, minerals and other natural resources.

On the other hand, the continent seems to be experiencing political stagnation and increasing political violence emanating from deliberate attempts by leaders to manipulate existing political, social, ethnic and religious differences.

In the face of those two contradictory trends, Pope Benedict called for some kind of ethical renewal in the way politics plays itself out on the continent to preserve the fragile social, political and economic gains of the past two decades.

MACHIAVELLIAN AFRICAN LEADERS

The debate about ethics in political life is not new and there exists an abundance of literature on the subject. Politics has long been associated with the art of manipulation, and this has gained momentum lately, inspired by the maxims of the Italian political scientist and philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli.

In essence, Machiavelli suggested that for a prince to rule and maintain his power, public and private morality had to be separated, arguing that such a prince should be less concerned with his reputation and willing to act immorally.

As a political scientist, Machiavelli also insisted on the occasional need for some methodical exercise of brute force, deceit and other unethical means to maintain power. Indeed, we are so familiar with

Pope Benedict called for some kind of ethical renewal in the way politics plays itself out on the continent to preserve the fragile social, political and economic gains of the past two decades

these precepts that Machiavellism is often the first thing that comes to mind when evoking political life on the African continent and around the globe.

It is as though our politicians have tried their best to uphold Machiavelli's submissions to the letter and assigned themselves the task of living up to his maxims. The late president of the former Zaïre, Mobutu Sese Seko, is said to have mastered Machiavellian doctrine to such an extent that his exit from the political scene resulted in the descent of his country into decades of war and chaos.

RESISTANCE TO DEMOCRATISATION

Political activities have become a serious threat to peace and prosperity in many countries in Africa. Resistance to genuine democratisation has manifested itself through many incidents of election-related and other political violence. For example, Liberia's post-conflict reconstruction achievements were nearly reversed with the violence that marred the presidential elections in October and November 2011, when the incumbent president and first elected female head of state in Africa, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, renounced her promise to serve only one term and sought a second term to complete her reform projects.

The same argument was used by the former president of Niger, Mamadou Tandja, and is currently being used by Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal, with each respective country being thrown into unnecessary political turmoil as a result.

Attempts to explain why leaders so quickly turn their back on their promises found that fear of prosecution, an appetite for power, and uncertainties about life after power contribute to their desire to hold on to it.

Indeed, Wade's attempt to hold on to power after completing his two terms (12 years) has been one of the biggest tests of political stability this year. While his argument might be constitutionally valid, it is ethically controversial and has caused serious social upheaval and political conflict in Senegal.

Although active armed conflicts are in a sharp decline on the continent and elections rather than coups d'état have become the norm, political violence is arguably on the rise.

As the methods of political manipulation become more subtle, the reactions of citizens – generally, large groups of young people without many socioeconomic opportunities – seem to be becoming increasingly violent.

In many instances, political manipulation focuses on the electoral process and encompasses four broad initiatives. Firstly, it begins with opportunistic state decisions to amend the existing electoral laws to hold one-round elections (as in Gabon, Togo and the DRC), on the premise of national sovereignty and financial constraints.

Political instability is a threat to economic growth and widespread corruption an obstacle to fair distribution of national wealth

Secondly, existing governments ensure their control over electoral monitoring bodies, including the constitutional councils, which are often led by prominent lawyers with a questionable sense of neutrality and independence. The constitutional councils (or the supreme courts, in some instances) 'declare' the winners of elections sometimes contrary to the real expression of the people's will.

Thirdly, they seek to exclude citizens perceived as favouring opposition movements from the voter's roll while inflating the numbers of voters loyal to the ruling elite.

Finally, they deploy special army units to violently repress any attempt at popular protest. The violent clashes that followed the elections in the DRC, Liberia, Senegal

and many other countries call into question the integrity of some of the recent electoral processes and political decisions in Africa.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY THREATENS GROWTH


The idea of providing incentives for leaders to step down peacefully is, at best, myopic, as leaders generally lose sight of the moral authority and influence they could enjoy in respecting the constitutional term limits and effectively delivering public goods to their citizens.

As the AU decides to make 2012 a year of 'shared values', it is imperative that democracy and good governance norms be given substantial support to reduce incidents of political violence.

The ratification earlier this year of the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance is an important milestone. However, it will be useless if efforts are not made for its domestication and, essentially, if political actors do not strictly adhere to its key principles.

Political instability is a threat to economic growth, and widespread corruption is a major obstacle to the fair distribution of national wealth. The ensuing resentment could be detrimental to the economic prospects foreseen for the continent by major financial institutions, as well as to the survival of the political elite.

There is a great need to heed Pope Benedict's concluding words: 'We are faced with legitimate demands, present in all countries, for greater dignity and above all for greater humanity. Man demands that his humanity be respected and promoted. Political and economic leaders of countries find themselves placed before important decisions and choices, which they can no longer avoid.'

'I launch an appeal to all political and economic leaders of African countries and the rest of the world. Do not deprive your peoples of hope. Do not cut them off from their future by mutilating their present. Adopt a courageous ethical approach to your responsibilities.' 

The Arab Spring exposes do



FESTUS B ABOAGYE

Nothing does more harm to the wellbeing of society than false hopes or the complete destruction of faith in the ability of our institutions to uphold our human freedoms and dignity

The discourse about ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) as a global norm was particularly underscored by the Rwandan genocide, which pricked the conscience of the world to say ‘never again’.

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s 2005 World Summit, which built on the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), serves as a useful benchmark for concrete attempts by the UN and the international community to gain traction for R2P.

Yet it would be incorrect to assume that R2P has been firmly established as a global norm and a universally applied practice in international politics.

WHEN TO INTERVENE?

The Arab Spring provides the most recent R2P test cases and some hard lessons about the future of this mechanism.

The different responses to the popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria have raised serious questions about the principles of R2P, as well as about the process of determining the merits, means and methods of intervention.

Due to the nature of the involvement of the military in the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, to varying degrees, it would seem that there was no need for external intervention of any form.

Similarly in Yemen, although the situation remains unsettled, the transfer of power following the ousting of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh managed to appease the popular protests without any external military intervention.

The Bahraini uprising, however, led to a military operation, although not one that supported the popular protests. In that country, the 14 February revolution reflected demands for greater Shiite political freedom, equality, participation and emancipation from the ethno-

centrism and exclusionist politics of the minority Sunni.

The uprising for democratic reform was brutally suppressed by King Hamad’s police and buttressed by the declaration of martial law and a three-month state of emergency from mid-March 2011.

Furthermore, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Saudi-led Peninsular Shield Force (composed of 1 000 Saudi troops and 500 United Arab Emirates police) intervened, not to protect vulnerable Shiite populations but to support the government in imposing its will on the people.

Bahrain, at least for the moment, appears to have escaped vehement calls for any R2P intervention.

CONTROVERSIAL R2P IN LIBYA

Undoubtedly the most significant R2P episode last year was Libya, involving the conflicting roles and positions of the League of Arab States and the African Union (AU), as well as the passing of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, imposing a no-fly zone and authorising ‘all necessary means to protect civilians and civilian populated areas, except for “foreign occupation forces”’, among other measures, as well as the NATO-led agency in its implementation.

It was previously unimaginable to think of any form of challenge to Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi’s four-decade rule over a system instituted by him. Here, amid mixed signals of accommodation and outrage, Gaddafi unleashed the might of his military on popular protestors and warned: ‘We are coming and there will be no mercy!’

This coded message on 18 March was the trigger for the set-piece French air intervention on 19 March that, for all intents and purposes, halted the onslaught against Benghazi, where the protests had started in mid-February 2011.

The NATO-led air campaign succeeded in destroying Libya’s military capabili-

able standards over R2P

ties, but it also provided a cover for the increasingly armed protestors under the leadership of the National Transitional Council (NTC) to destroy Gaddafi's hold on the country by the end of October 2011. There are resentments over the NATO action as a cover for regime change and not in accordance with the principles of R2P.

NO HELP FOR SYRIANS

In contrast to the Libyan and Bahraini revolutions, which involved varying degrees of armed violence, Syria has defied any form of external military intervention. The violent revolution in Syria since late January 2011 is aptly a revolt against the dynastic monopoly of political power by the Al Assad family and the Ba'ath party for nearly five decades.

Like Bahrain, however, the Syrian crisis presents a sectarian dimension. While the government whips up fears of Sunni ethnocentrism against Shiite Alawites and other minorities, including Christians, the international community has pointed to Iranian support for the Assad regime.

There is empirical evidence that the opposition and its Free Syrian Army is being provided with arms and this may well lead to the establishment of de facto military and air exclusion zones and other forms of interdiction operations to create safe havens for Syrian civilian populations, as well as to aid the insurgency.

This is a more likely outcome, especially following the lack of unanimity in the UNSC.

FALSE HOPES

Nothing does more harm to the wellbeing of society than false hopes or the complete destruction of faith in the ability of our institutions to uphold our human freedoms and dignity.

While the emerging norm of R2P may have raised hopes in ending impunity and promoting human rights, inconsistencies in its practice have achieved the opposite.

In fact, such inconsistencies as evidenced in the caseloads of R2P have served only to encourage repressive regimes to perpetrate mass atrocities, convinced by the apparent inability of the UN and the international community to take the decisive, collective action they have pledged.

It is not clear – and some have argued this to be a moral failing – whether R2P principles may even have engendered more conflicts by groups anticipating international action in support of their causes.

QUESTIONS OVER EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

There is no debate as such about the primacy of the UNSC in leading on 'timely and decisive' collective action. However,

Regrettably, predictability is far from being a value to which the UNSC, regional organisations or the international community attach any measure of importance



GRAVES IN LIBYA attest to the huge cost in human lives of the Arab uprising. The writer asks when and how the principle of R2P should be applied.

The voting patterns within the UNSC by both permanent and non-permanent members highlight selective tendencies in situations of what could reasonably be called mass atrocity

the lack of broad and sufficient consensus within the UNSC and perceptions of its double standards in dealing with similar situations around the world do not contribute to its own effectiveness.

Polarisation within regional organisations, or divergent or conflicting positions on the same conflict by different regional organisations, or one-sided tendencies coupled with inequalities within the UNSC and 'bullying' practices by its powerful members in deciding which issues are placed on the agenda, clearly pose great risks to effective R2P practice.

NO TEMPLATE OUTCOMES

Although R2P principles underscore a 'case by case'-based application of collective action, predictability in R2P practice would serve to achieve at least two useful ends.

First, it would help to guarantee a degree of certainty, consistency and fairness in international politics of ensuring global peace and security.

Second, state and non-state actors alike would be certain that they would be held to account if and when they reneged on their responsibility to help prevent mass atrocities. It would therefore serve a preventive purpose, consistent with the principles of R2P, by convincing states of predictable consequences for allowing or being complicit in mass atrocities.

Regrettably, predictability is far from being a value to which the UNSC, regional organisations or the international community attach any measure of importance.

Among other factors, national self-interest, lack of political will and deviant behaviour by state and non-state actors, as well as the international community, are to blame for this sad state of affairs.

Thus, for instance, the GCC countries have strongly advocated for military action against Syria but remained silent on referring the Bahrain situation to the UNSC.

In other words, they only deployed the Peninsula Shield to support the Bahraini authorities to put down what they labelled a rebellion instead of seeing it as a popular protest for the same political rights and freedoms that the people of Syria are asking for.

The voting patterns within the UNSC

by both permanent and non-permanent members highlight selective tendencies in situations of what could reasonably be called mass atrocity.

The use of veto power seriously detracts from predictability when, for geopolitical reasons, powerful states proceed on a path of securing their regional security, economic and other interests in other parts of the world. This is the most reasonable way in which to explain the double standards in the treatment of Syria and Libya as opposed to Yemen and Bahrain, for instance.

Empirical evidence suggests that the UN and the international community may have been a bit hasty in concluding, shortly after the World Summit, that R2P had become a norm to be invoked in putting a halt to the specified crimes. Recent R2P practices, especially in the context of the Arab Spring, tend to suggest that R2P is still at best an emerging norm.

AN EMERGING NORM

R2P does not mean the same thing to all stakeholders within the UN system and the international community. Rather, inconsistencies in the interpretation and practice of R2P appear to suggest a tactical victory for 'state sovereignty' in the R2P discourse. That victory could only serve to keep or propel the normative R2P discourse to the strategic centre stage of international politics.

This calls for guarded optimism and avoidance of any quick assumption that R2P can be invoked in all cases when the 'right' criteria are met. More political and diplomatic work needs to be done to assure all stakeholders of a fair deal in the practice of R2P.

How, therefore, may the UN, regional organisations and the international community resolve the Syrian situation now and deal with situations like those of Libya and Côte d'Ivoire in the future?

It is possible that unless consensus is reached on the interpretation and application of R2P, there could be a rise in insurgencies, or some national, regional and international actors may arrogate to themselves the right of 'humanitarian intervention' and justify the end by the means. **E**


Agenda items

African Development Bank looks at global challenges

The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) will hold its annual meetings this year in Arusha, Tanzania, from 28 May to 1 June. The theme of the 2012 meetings will be *Africa and the emerging global landscape: challenges and opportunities*.

According to the AfDB this will give delegates the opportunity to debate Africa's changing role in the world as its economies continue to grow at faster rates than the rest of the world, and the AfDB's role in promoting this growth and development through its projects, operations and investments around the continent.

The AfDB will also be welcoming contributions at this meeting towards the formulation of its new ten-year long-term strategy for 2013 to 2022.



PRESIDENT
of the African
Development
Bank, Donald
Kaberuka.

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World Economic Forum moves to Addis

From 9 to 11 May the World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting on Africa will be held in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa for the first time. Over 600 participants will deliberate under the theme *Shaping Africa's Transformation*.

According to the WEF, Ethiopia, the second most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa, is a 'prime example of the continent's fast-growing economies'.

'Home to the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa will offer an exceptional opportunity to bring together global and pan-African leaders to discuss



DR MOHAMED Ibn Chambas, Secretary General of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, which is preparing for a summit in Malabo.

ACP heads for Malabo

The Secretary General of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, says South-South relations will be targeted in the lead up to the ACP Heads of State Summit to be held this December in Equatorial Guinea.

Chambas is the former chairperson of the Economic Community for West African States (Ecowas).

The ACP is composed of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states, signatories to the Cotonou Agreement, also known as the "ACP-EC Partnership Agreement" which binds them to the European Union. In 2011 the ACP secretariat held its first ever symposium on South-South relations between the ACP and IBSA states – India, Brazil and South Africa, which led to a Memorandum of Understanding signed last December between the ACP Secretariat and Brazil to promote technical cooperation and dialogue.

the future of the region,' the organisation says.

The co-chairs of the meeting include former UN secretary general Kofi Annan, who is also chairman of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa and the Africa Progress Panel; Gao Xiqing, President and Vice-Chairman of the China Investment

Corporation; Donald Kaberuka, President of the African Development Bank; and Tidjane Thiam, Group Chief Executive, Prudential. The issues to be discussed will include strengthening Africa's leadership; accelerating investment in frontier markets; and 'scaling innovation for shared opportunities'.

Other dates:

April 21-26: Thirteenth session of the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Doha, Qatar with the theme *Development-centred globalization: towards inclusive and sustainable growth and development*.



World Congress
on Water, Climate
and Energy

13-18 May: World Congress on Water, Climate and Energy in Dublin, Ireland, organised by the International Water Association.

It takes more than pristine

Tourism could potentially become a huge source of revenue for African countries, writes **Dianna Games**.

Some of Africa's best natural beauty is observed in books about war. Foreign hacks and soldiers of fortune often write about the wonderful landscapes they see as they traipse through war-torn areas.

The beaches, rivers and forests of countries such as Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Gabon, among others, are hardly captured in the literature on tourist attractions in Africa. They are often in remote places that lack facilities, transport, security and other comforts that average tourists would expect to find when spending their precious leisure dollars. But even in more easily accessible locations in east and southern Africa, tourism is a long way from reaching its full potential.

A LITTLE-UNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY

African ministers and officials often cite tourism as a significant area of potential future growth. Most countries now have tourism agencies and ministries – but often there is little idea of how tourism actually works. This little-understood industry reaches well beyond a country's natural attractions.

Having interesting historical sites or scenic attractions is a necessary, but not sufficient, requirement for a tourism industry. It is a crosscutting sector that covers almost every aspect of a country's development, from the political situation and frequency of flights down to the availability of certain foodstuffs, depending on the target market.

For example, in the 2011 World Economic Forum Tourism Competitiveness Survey, Botswana, a prime tourist destination in Africa, was ranked 6th of 139 countries for its protected areas such as the Okavango Swamps, and 27th for the quality of its natural environment.

It also scored well in areas such as policies in the tourism and travel industry, strong property rights, visa requirements and the time to start a business. However, in the overall rankings it came only fourth on the continent and 91st in the world.

The factors that brought it down had nothing to do with its obvious natural attractions. They included an under-developed tourism infrastructure and what was described as the worst quality of aviation infrastructure in the world. It was even marked down for having too few ATM machines.

TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE CRUCIAL

The top performers in sub-Saharan Africa were Mauritius and South Africa, which came 53rd and 61st respectively in the WEF rankings, followed by Namibia.

Among the many factors taken into account, apart from those listed above, were the state of hospitals, availability of doctors, safety and security, price competitiveness, condition of roads and availability of hotel rooms.

Switzerland, which came top of the list, has a tourism industry built as much on its transport infrastructure – an interlocking and extensive network of good roads and world-class high-speed trains –

as on its mountains, lakes and ski resorts. It also has decent hotels with online booking facilities in even the tiniest villages.

In Africa, public transport in general is not for the faint hearted, as South African Sihle Khumalo writes in his book *Heart of Africa*. Khumalo takes various modes of public transport from Johannesburg to East Africa and writes about his experiences, which include chaotic transport schedules, filthy trains, bus drivers with a death wish and sub-standard hotels.

Beautiful beaches, glorious waterfalls and lush forests are not enough. Outside the adventure market, tourists have myriad other requirements

Some countries have got it right. South Africa is one of them. It has natural attractions as well as competitive pricing, good hotels throughout the price ranges, road, rail and air transport connections and the many other things that make up the tourism chain – even though its success is compromised by crime statistics.

Zimbabwe was a premier tourism drawcard in the region for many years. While its tourist facilities have largely stood up to the political turbulence, tourist numbers have plummeted in the wake of negative publicity over the government's actions. Neighbouring Zambia, which has attracted many of Zimbabwe's

A HOT AIR BALLOON takes off with tourists over the Masai Mara game reserve in Kenya. The writer believes tourism can be a huge source of revenue if African countries manage this well.

beaches

Tourism around the world is heading into the doldrums as the Eurozone crisis and soft US economy hit the spending power of Western tourists, who have long dominated the tourist trade in Africa

visitors to its improved offerings at Victoria Falls, has a patchy record in tourism in the rest of the country.

East Africa remains a popular tourist destination but the downsides include its scruffy airports, public transport that is not easy for foreigners to negotiate, crime (particularly in Nairobi) and dated tourist offerings outside the expensive high-end products.

The former French colonies in West Africa, notably Senegal and the Gambia, have built a strong tourism market on the back of sun-seekers from Europe. Elsewhere in the region, Ghana is alone in developing a tourist infrastructure, but it is a drop in the ocean compared to what it could be.

BUSINESS TOURISM

Business tourism is a major driver of visitor numbers in West Africa. Given the rising number of expatriates seconded to countries such as Nigeria, little is being done to cultivate attractions for what is essentially a captive audience.

Countries have failed to capitalise on the lucrative MICE (meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions) industry, often because of inadequate capacity and run-down facilities, as well as inadequate air links.

There is also a limited amount of tourist development along the continent's long beaches and its other waterways. While river

cruises, barging and sailing are big tourist attractions in Europe and other regions, Africa's waterways remain workhorses rather than a source of fun.

Few countries have got the policy issues right to attract tourism (always a risky sector because of its reliance on disposable incomes as well as on issues of peace and security), which are beyond the control of tourist operators.

Another problem has been the tendency of governments to insist on having national carriers, regardless of their profitability.

In most cases, saving the national airline has meant reducing or cutting off any competition and failing to adhere to the open skies agreements signed by most African countries more than a decade ago.

Even though several countries have developed a healthy income stream from their national parks, most of these huge swathes of land lie almost untouched from a revenue point of view. Animals have been poached or driven out by drought, or they remain hidden inside untouched forests that contain no roads or accommodation facilities.

Another underexplored issue is that of


community initiatives that draw local people into commercial ventures either on their own land or alongside it. This has many positive spinoffs, including skills training, revenue generation and environmental protection, as tourist ventures try to maintain pristine landscapes to provide maximum value to paying tourists.


Tourism around the world is heading into the doldrums as the Eurozone crisis and soft US economy hit the spending power of Western tourists, who have long dominated the tourist trade in Africa.

A TOUGH MARKET

Even countries with a broad international offering, such as South Africa, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Kenya, rely to a large extent on the money brought in by tourists from 'developed' countries, despite increasing numbers of visitors from emerging economies such as China.

Tourism is global and that is the biggest problem for African countries. Beautiful beaches, glorious waterfalls and lush forests are not enough. Outside the adventure market, tourists have myriad other requirements.

Countries have to deliver not only more than the country next door but also more than competing destinations in the rest of the world. Governments would do well to remember this in their policy formulations and incentive structures. 



TOBACCO, which is known in Zimbabwe as the 'golden leaf', has in the past earned the country 50% of its foreign currency and export revenues.

Promise of a good tobacco season in Zim

Zimbabwe's tobacco industry is slowly improving after having been almost totally destroyed due to the mass evictions of commercial farmers.

Barnabas Thondhlana reports that small-scale farmers are hoping for higher prices this year due to lower volumes in other countries.

The old adage that one man's loss is another man's fortune rings particularly true for Zimbabwe's tobacco farmers. While floods have wrought havoc on the crops in top world producer Brazil, this has come as a boom for the nearly 60 000 growers of the golden leaf in this southern African country.

According to Tobacco Industry Marketing Board (TIMB) CEO Andrew Matibiri, this year's crop is likely to fetch higher prices since Brazil's production is expected to decline by 150 million kg. Zimbabwe's tobacco-selling season commenced mid-February with flue-cured Virginia leaf selling for as much as US\$4.75/

kg. The opening price was \$4.45/kg and the lowest was \$1.70. The average tobacco price last year was \$2.28/kg. This year's deliveries are expected to reach 150 million kg, compared to 132 million last year.

Zimbabwe is the largest producer of tobacco leaf in Africa and the world's fourth-largest producer of flue-cured

tobacco, after China, Brazil and the US. The country produces two types of tobacco leaf, Burley and Virginia, the latter being in major demand by manufacturers.

SLOW RECOVERY

Tobacco is Zimbabwe's major foreign-currency earner, accounting for more than 50% of agricultural exports and 10% of the country's GDP.

Output is slowly improving, following a decline prompted by President Robert Mugabe's often violent land reforms, which he said were meant to address colonial imbalances between white landowners and the black majority.

The southern African country's tobacco yield plunged from a peak of 236 million kg in 2000 to just 48 million in 2007/8. Zimbabwe produced 119 million kg of tobacco in the 2009/10 season, double the previous year's output, and 123 million last year.

And yields have slowly been increasing, following the decision by small-scale farmers to cease maize production in favour of tobacco. This is mainly due to the fact that tobacco farmers are paid on the spot, while for maize deliveries to the state-owned Grain Marketing Board farmers have to wait months on end before payment.

According to official figures, over 40 000 small-scale black farmers produced 70% of the tobacco crop. The tobacco register at the TIMB this year included the names of more than 66 000 growers. The remainder of the crop is produced by large-scale commercial farmers, of whom just over 120 are white. In all, there remain about 400 white farmers, from a peak of 4 500 prior to the land seizures in 2000.

A LUCRATIVE CHINESE MARKET

As well as the drop in Brazilian production, the US crop was also affected and is down by 50 million kg. 'These are our main competitors,' said Matibiri.

Matibiri also said that Malawi's production was below 190 million kg and, because it did not produce Virginia tobacco, it competed with Zimbabwe only on the Burley tobacco market. All tobacco grown in Zimbabwe is sold on the auction floors in Harare as unprocessed green leaf.

Tanzanian tobacco will remain the same as last year at 80 million kg, while

India, which does not produce flue-cured tobacco, is at 120 million kg, he said.

Matibiri also said that China was expected to dominate this year's sale. Although the country produced 2 billion kg, making it the world's leading tobacco manufacturer, this quantity did not satisfy its market so it has been forced to import the crop from elsewhere.

Industry officials estimate that a third of the Zimbabwean tobacco crop, or around 40 million kg, was taken up by China last year. The country imported a total of 120 million kg last year and is seeking to increase its local tobacco trade volumes.

AN EARLY RUSH

The industry regulator says that 35 000 tobacco growers have registered to sell their crop. While the auction houses have advised growers to book their sales in advance, many farmers disregard this as they make haste to sell during the opening days of the marketing season to cash in on the good opening prices.

It is my expectation that this year will see a consistent pricing and purchasing pattern that ensures the viability of growers

During the last marketing season, a serious decline in the average price occurred at about eight weeks into the season, leading to withdrawals of tobacco from sales. Local tobacco continues to be in great demand because of its characteristic superior flavour. TIMB chairperson Monica Chinamasa said the tobacco marketing season had opened earlier than previous seasons.

She also said that previous seasons had been characterised by relentless congestion, but with four auction floors licensed this year the situation was bound to be better.

'To achieve orderly marketing, growers should play their part as well. It is inexcusable for growers to deliver tobacco without prior booking or, as in some cases, without even renewing their growers' registration with TIMB,' said Chinamasa.

The time between conclusion of sales and payment of growers should not exceed

a maximum of two hours.

Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development Minister Joseph Made appealed for price consistency during the rest of the marketing season. 'Previous experience shows that high prices only prevail during the early part of the season,' Made said at the opening of the auction floors. 'It is my expectation that this year will see a consistent pricing and purchasing pattern that ensures the viability of growers.'

Economist John Robertson cautioned however that despite such gains, Zimbabwe has far to go to reclaim production levels seen in the late 1990s. 'Some of the sellers are coming to the tobacco floors early this year but I think they are concerned that the prices might fall later in the season.'

AUCTION HOUSES UP THE STAKES

Zimbabwe's tobacco is mostly sold through auction. The four auction houses – Boka Tobacco Auction Floors, Millennium Tobacco Floors, Premier Tobacco Auction Floors and Tobacco Sales Floor – will carry out auctions in Harare. Two companies, Marcopine Karoi and Marondera Group, have applied for auction licences for outside Harare.

Boka, Premier and Millennium have between them invested nearly US\$6 million in infrastructure development. Rudo Boka, MD of Boka Tobacco Sales Floors, said there would be nine banks at the floors. 'We are also trying to encourage a culture for growers to use banks rather than to move around with large amounts of cash.'

Premier Tobacco Auction Floors managing director Philemon Mangena said they were ready for this year's marketing season. The company has poured in \$1.2 million for refurbishments.

Tobacco Sales Floor chief executive officer James Mutambanengo said the company had improved on a number of areas to reduce congestion. 'We have managed to make more accommodation available apart from the tent we usually pitch.'

Millennium Tobacco chief executive officer Richard Chabata said the company had spent \$2.5 million on refurbishment. **E**

Traffic accidents in Africa are expected to soar over the next four decades, becoming a major public health challenge across the continent. However, **Mark Eshbaugh, Greg Maly and Jonathan D Moyer** predict that this could be dramatically reduced if the correct policy decisions are made in time.

Putting the brakes on traffic

Currently, road traffic accidents worldwide claim an estimated 1.4 million lives a year and injure an additional 20-50 million people.

By 2050, the International Futures forecasting model anticipates that global traffic deaths will surpass 3 million people a year.

The forecast shows that Africa will be particularly hard hit, and will account for over a million deaths, or 35% of the global total. To put this in perspective, by 2050, traffic accidents will kill almost the same number of people in Africa a year as now die from HIV/Aids in east and southern Africa combined. For every 20 Africans who die in 2050, one will be killed in a traffic collision.

In response to this growing public health threat, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon launched the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020, calling on member states, international agencies,



civil society organisations, businesses and community leaders to promote efforts to curb rising traffic injuries and fatalities.

Due to increasing motorisation and lagging infrastructure development, road traffic injuries in Latin America, Asia and especially Africa are now serious cause for concern. In Africa, vehicle and road densities, poor infrastructure, minimal regulation, inadequate oversight and inconsistent research also exacerbate road traffic injuries. Additionally, in the absence of regulated public transportation, most Africans rely on unregulated taxi or buses, which often incentivise fast driving in under-serviced vehicles and flouting extant traffic safety regulations.

A significant portion of Africa's road fatalities involve what are known as 'vulnerable road users' (VRUs), including

As GDP per capita rises and households earn more disposable income, countries experience a dramatic increase in the number of vehicles on the road


pedestrians, cyclists, bikers and public transport riders. Even so, most interventions made to reduce traffic accidents are targeted at private vehicles rather than VRUs.

The push by Ban Ki-moon for all countries to implement national traffic strategies and build monitoring institutions is a good step toward dealing with

IF EFFECTIVE POLICY INTERVENTIONS WERE IMPLEMENTED FOR THE SAKE OF ROAD SAFETY IN AFRICA, BETWEEN NOW AND 2050:

- ▶ **4.2 million** traffic deaths would be prevented
- ▶ **144 million years'** worth of productive, healthy lives would be saved
- ▶ **US\$234 billion** would be added to the continental GDP

traffic-related mortality. The Decade of Action could succeed in directing attention and resources towards road safety in the developing world. This article explores what could happen if initiatives like this have a significant impact in Africa.



During this lag, countries typically experience the largest increase in traffic injuries and fatalities, demonstrating that this is an issue that should be understood through a developmental lens.

Currently, vehicle ownership in Africa stands at around 100 licensed vehicles per 1 000 people, but this number is expected to reach 170 by 2050.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Using the International Futures model, the researchers were able to develop and compare the base case with an *improved scenario*. The base case continues many of the policies and trends of the past two decades, but also contains new structural constraints, such as climate change, peak oil and government spending. The *improved scenario* prevents death rates from exceeding 32 in 100 000 (the current continental average) until 2050, despite significant increases in traffic over the period.

The IFs base case expects that, for every 100 000 people in Africa, 48 will die in traffic accidents in 2050. However, by simulating best practices in road traffic policies, our improved scenario expects that only 32 per 100 000 people will die in traffic accidents in 2050. By comparing the base case to the improved scenario, we see that Africa could save up to 4.2 million people (between 2010 and 2050) by increasing road safety and thereby reducing traffic fatalities.

Eleven African countries would experience cumulative reductions in traffic deaths of more than 100 000 people through 2050, led by Nigeria (689 000), Ethiopia (566 000) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (332 000). The improved scenario also shows a major relative reduction in years of life lost from traffic accidents, falling by 119.8 million years (cumulatively) across Africa through 2050. This is mirrored by the reduction in disability-adjusted life years of 144 million years across the continent from now until 2050.

It is clear that reducing traffic-related deaths will have a very positive effect on both human development and economic growth, attesting to the need for African leaders to pay more attention to this issue.


Despite accounting for only 48% of the world's registered vehicles, 91% of annual

ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY FATALITY RATES PER 100 000 PEOPLE

Region	Average fatalities
Africa	32.2
Americas	15.8
South-East Asia	16.6
Eastern Mediterranean	32.2
Europe	13.4
Western Pacific	15.6
World average	18.8

traffic fatalities and 90% of disability-adjusted life years lost (DALYs) occur in low- and middle-income countries.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND TRAFFIC ACCIDENT BURDEN:



The red line represents the loss of material resources and the impact of traffic accidents on economic growth at various stages of development. Figure 1 shows that while the death rate declines at certain levels of development, the economic burden does not – traffic accidents in higher-income countries have a hugely negative effect on GDP.

The blue line represents how low-income countries with few vehicles on the road have a small number of traffic accidents. Then we see traffic fatalities grow rapidly during the middle-income stage of development. Thereafter, countries experience a drop in traffic accidents, as infrastructure improves to accommodate motorisation, road rules become embedded norms and fewer dangerous, unmaintained vehicles remain in operation. **E**

When next you are in Luanda

Culinary expert **Hennie Fisher** explored the best eateries the city has to offer during a trip to the Angolan capital.

A visit to Luanda takes you on a roller-coaster ride of emotions and contrasts. On the one hand is the obvious inability of the city management to deal with the many millions living in a place designed for only a couple of hundred thousand people; and on the other the Angolans' zest for life.

Enjoying life is something that Luan-dans do very well. Once you've looked beyond the litter and digested the exorbitantly high food prices, you can experience and enjoy the many layers of pleasure and fun that the Luandan dinner table presents.

TRULY LOCAL

Traditionally, the main meal of the day is eaten at lunch, often accompanied by a local beer; try Cuca, light, golden and mellow at 4,5% alcohol per volume, or N'Gola or Eka from the provinces of Lubango and Dondo respectively.

Meals are often served with 'funge' (pronounced 'foonge'), a type of porridge starch prepared from either cassava or maize. Should you not have access to the table of a city resident, visit the Funge House restaurant at Avenida Lenin no. 35.

It is a beautiful, small restaurant with wood-panelled walls that serves funge and side dishes, buffet style. Cassava funge is not for the faint hearted and requires an understanding of how a bland starch acts as a vehicle for other tastes and textures.

Luandan cuisine is solidly rooted in a combination of indigenous foods and

Follow Rua Massano de Amorim and look for row upon row of little shack restaurants called Barracas that offer an array of grilled sidewalk food

cooking techniques along with those brought to the country by the Portuguese. It is a heady mix of Mediterranean and African that offers the diner a multitude of sensory experiences. One of the best places to experience this food is at one of those restaurants where food is selected from a buffet and then weighed. It is still a staggeringly expensive experience, calculated at around \$38 – \$40 per kilo, but you can experience superb examples of local food this way, such as feijão preto (black bean soup); arroz de senhoras (a rice and carrot dish); and mufete (beans in palm oil).

SEAFOOD AT ANY PRICE

Seafood features prominently in the Luan-dan diet and locals will go to great lengths for it. The Ilha do Cabo has many restaurants along its length where patrons can



DELICIOUS Portuguese custard tarts or *Pasteis de Nata* to try in Luanda's many coffee shops and restaurants.

HENNIE FISHER



CHURCH of Igreja de Nossa Senhora dos Remedios



SEAFOOD features prominently in Angolan cuisine.

sample delicious grilled octopus, calamari, prawns and other locally caught fish.

Going down Avenue Murtala Mohamed, a finger-like outcrop into the sea, offers

a view over the Atlantic on one side and a harbour scene on the other, with consequently massive differences in price. Avoid getting caught up in the touristy hangouts and restaurants on the beaches and instead venture to the other side to eat with the locals; meals often cost a third or even a quarter of the price.

Of course, choosing the less expensive side of the Ilha has its disadvantages insofar as the view is limited to the large oil tankers on the opposite side of the harbour. There is also the continuous onslaught of CD vendors to contend with, as well as the hordes

of annoying bugs. But there are also smarter places on the harbour side of the Ilha, such as the Cais de Quatro restaurant, which is split over two levels and offers some of the best city and harbour views from its top-floor wooden deck.


The Chikala district, also less pricy and more informal, is on a side arm of the Ilha do Cabo. Reach it by following Rua Massano de Amorim and look for row upon row of little shack restaurants called Barracas that offer an array of grilled sidewalk food. The sidewalks are where much of everyday life in happens here, and

where one should venture in order to experience the true spirit of Luanda.

The cafés and pastry shops dotted around the city provide a real insight into how Luandan people live, socialise and interact – try the Arabica Café behind the Banco de Poupança e Crédito for fabulous spinach pasteia, croissants or filled foccacia, or go for spectacular views and rather expensive espressos from the top-floor deck of the Maianga Hotel.

Great coffee can be found at the Pastelaria Mirapassos on the Largo Guilherme Ribeiro Pereira, also in Maianga, while the Bolo de Coco on Rua Emilio M'Bindi in Alvalado offers another version of prego (a bifana made from pork), a coconut bun or a rabanada (a type of French toast).

Another hot-drinks bar is Oito Dezoito, which offers views of the old bank building and the main drag of the city. If you are into late-night fun, most of the area's many clubs organise special events on Thursday and Saturday nights, when you can party until five or six in the morning. Follow the locals' example and end an evening of dancing and merrymaking with a special 'hangover soup'.



OCTOPUS kebabs to sample at your leisure.

HENRIE FISHER

Do not leave Angola without breaking the bank at least one time. Though Oon.dah restaurant represents the top end of fine dining, it is extraordinary how relatively inexpensive it is compared to other eateries: \$250 paid for drinks (including a great bottle of French chablis), two starters, three mains and coffees. Oon.dah is

located in the Escom Building on Rua Marechal Bros Tito in the Município de Patrice, and you can glimpse the sea from its verandah.

At the entrance to the restaurant there is a small food hall stocking pâtés, jams, honeys and other gourmet items. The restaurant itself is elegantly appointed, with a long white banquette along one wall facing an open sushi bar. Starter options include a contemporary gazpacho served with crab croquettes and pata negra ham, or a simple plate of sushi made from local tuna



SCARLET aubergines



and prawns. Main courses are slightly less innovative but showcase more traditional fare in a modern style, such as the babalu with beans, an Asian noodle dish, or the gourmet burger. Desserts include a carrot roulade that reflects the multi-cultural nature of Luanda's cuisine.

Luanda is a city offering great food, fun-loving people and a social vibe that few other African cities can rival. **E**

HENRIE FISHER



Daring to challenge Muslim taboos


Algerian writer Leïla Marouane denounces the taboos of Algerian society in her novels, which have won wide acclaim, writes **Hadrien Diez**. She was the guest of honour at the Time of the Writer international writers' festival in Durban in March.

Her characters, most often women, are, in a sense, trapped. Crushed between past and present, convention and rebellion, tradition and freedom, the individuals in Leïla Marouane's novels inexorably see their dreams shattered against the great wall of Algerian society. If they seek an escape – in studies say, or in a boyfriend, or in whatever else might alleviate the sinking feeling of a wasting life – it is later to be thwarted by the shame and rejection of the ones they hold most dear: their mother, sisters or friends.

Relentlessly, Marouane's heroines find themselves trapped between the betrayal of the elite, who spend their time in power delaying the reforms they once promised, and the bigotry of opponents, whose vision of a society conforming to the scriptures barely includes a place for women. Exposing tragedies too real not to be true with a vivid style and a ferocious sense of humour – consider the title of her most recent novel; *The Sexual Life of an Islamist in Paris* – Marouane writes as she would shout, out of disgust and despair.

A REVOLUTIONARY LEGACY

Born in 1960 to a female resistance fighter in hiding from both her imposed husband and the French army, Leïla Marouane is a daughter of the Algerian revolution. The hard-headed movement promoted gender equality and invited women to take off the religious veil, determined to shake the patriarchal order set up by tradition and colonial rule. 'I remember young women passing by on their bicycles, the most affluent driving their own cars, all wearing trousers and short skirts, sunglasses and lipstick. They were going to cinemas and



theatres, to public gardens and restaurants, alone or accompanied. And nobody would find fault,' Marouane recalls about the years directly following the revolution.

In this context, graduating in medicine and literature was not only a personal achievement, it was also the fulfilment of generations of women's dreams whose countless sacrifices had not been made in vain. But the high spirits of the early years slowly crumbled, and the revolutionary ideals of emancipation soon made space for a political landlock that fostered another type of resistance, one based on religious values and Islamic traditions.

True to her personal legacy, Marouane fought back. As a journalist in Algiers, she denounced the taboos of Algerian society:

the condition of Muslim wives, the status of unmarried mothers, the fate of abandoned children. The pressure on her was tremendous, though. 'Your last article (...) brings disgrace on you,' she remembers from one of the many insulting letters she received at that time. 'You have studied in order to represent the Algerian woman with dignity, a woman who is Muslim above all, and not to lose your personality and culture for one that is Western and degrading.'

A HEALING PROCESS

Having escaped a physical assault that almost took her life, Marouane fled to Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. She started to write fiction as a way of healing and an attempt to put her tormented years in perspective. Within her five novels – of which three have been translated into English – some unbearably cruel scenes clearly carry the mark of the moral and physical oppression the author herself had to suffer.

The disoriented Hadda of *La Fille de la Casbah* (still to be translated) wandering the streets of Algiers on a Friday afternoon is hard to forget. Having just learnt that she is pregnant, the young, unmarried woman desperately tries to reach her boyfriend while having to confront public humiliation, for women should not be seen walking outside during the Muslim holy day.

Some of her characters simply cannot bear the pressure. Faced with the loathing of their closest relatives, overwhelmed by social reprobation, they slowly succumb to madness. In *Abductor*, the narrator Samira Zeitoun is harshly beaten and half scalped by her own father for an alleged impertinence. Disfigured and abandoned, she starts inventing a world of her own, a paranoid universe where people are no longer who they claim to be.

Yet in the same novel, Marouane displays the scathing humour that is another distinctive trait of her writing. The author's sense of irony verges on the absurd; a pow-

erful weapon against the horrors she denounces. If Samira's father is so prone to anger, it is because he lost his wife through his own fault. Having repudiated her, he soon realises his mistake and tries to get her back. The problem is that Islamic law forbids a direct remarriage between the two, unless the wife is first remarried to another man and then again repudiated. A complex imbroglio follows, leading ultimately to the defeat of the tyrant.

Mockery and tragedy always intermingle in Marouane's texts, often leaving the reader with a mixed sense of delusion and hope. In her free, unconventional style, Marouane exposes the pleas of a society that has lost its moral compass and looks for it in the wrong place. This is a society where women are both victims and heroines. By narrating their painful destinies, the author courageously claims the long overdue revolutionary promise of freedom and equality. **E**


This article was first published on the Intofrench website <http://www.intofrench.org>.

Stories from the heart

***Dangerous Love*
by Ben Okri**

Penguin Books, 2011

**Reviewed by
Helen Chanda**



The republished version of award-winning Nigerian author Ben Okri's *Dangerous Love* is a welcome edition to the Penguin African Writers Series. It is a tragic love story set in a poverty-stricken part of Nigeria. Its main character, Omova, is a troubled young office worker and artist from a broken family who lives with a father and stepmother who reject him. He finds comfort in his paintings and his love for Ifeyiwa, a woman trapped in a loveless marriage to a much older abusive husband.

Reading these pages you feel almost as though you are there, hearing the sounds and tasting the dust in the streets of Omova's village.

The characters of the delightful *Baking Cakes in Kigali* have now moved to Swaziland in this follow-up novel by Gaile Parkin.

Against the background of a country facing economic hardship, the scourge of HIV/Aids, restrictive customs and the authoritarian whims of King Mswati III, the reader discovers life through the eyes of young Benedict, the son of Mr and Mrs Tungaraza, originally from Tanzania.


The story is funny, well-told and, like Parkin's previous book, in the same vein as Alexander McCall Smith's best-selling *No. 1 Ladies Detective Agency* series. Apart from a few errors (like the hugely exaggerated use of the South African 'né', 'ag' and 'hey man'), the writer seems to have a good grip on local customs and language.

The publishers are not far wrong with their claim that 'this book will restore your faith in humanity.' **E**

***When Hoopoes go to Heaven*
by Gaile Parkin**

Corvus Books, 2012

**Reviewed by Liesl Louw-
Vaudran**



Chronicle of a proud history

Heidi Holland, *100 Years of Struggle: Mandela's ANC*

Penguin Books, 2011

Reviewed by Refiloe Joala

Journalist and writer Heidi Holland, author of the internationally acclaimed *Dinner with Mugabe*, also wrote *The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress*, which was published in London in 1989 before the ban against the party and its leaders was lifted. The book was published in South Africa in 1990, in the same week as Nelson Mandela was released from prison.

In the build-up to the ANC's centenary celebration on 8 January 2012, as signs of the party's declining popularity among virtually every grouping across the South African demographic became increasingly evident, the key question was whether the nation's loyalty to its liberation movement would continue to guarantee it support in the years to come.

In *100 Years of Struggle: Mandela's ANC*, Holland gives a human face to the African continent's biggest and oldest liberation movement. The book provides a detailed account of the establishment of the ANC as a political movement, along with personal histories of the various leaders who carried the organisation and the South African liberation struggle forward.

Beginning in the lush hills of the tiny Transkei village of Qunu, the reader is introduced to the formidable young Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela in his early years as a disciplined child and a diligent pupil with a promising future.

In stark juxtaposition, Holland takes the reader on Mandela's journey from the calm nostalgic accounts of the countryside to the big city of Johannesburg, then a mining centre. The city was the final destination for many young South Africans hailing from the then homelands, travelling for hours and some for days in the tsotsi-run

trains to find work in the 'New York' of Africa, as Holland satirically puts it.

REPRESENTING THE DISENFRANCHISED


It was in 1911, upon the return of Oxford-educated Dr Pixley ka Isaka Seme, that the disenfranchisement of blacks in this country was formally articulated in a conference that led to the birth on 8 January 1912 of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), the country's first black political movement, with the aim of increasing the rights of South Africa's black population.

The movement was later renamed the African National Congress as members of other racial groupings, including 'coloureds' and Indians, found themselves bearing the brunt of the country's racially organised society. With the growth of the so-called middle class, the membership of the ANC across the country grew steadily to incorporate the interest of the masses, with a wider membership comprising chiefs, workers and students.

Holland tells the stories of ordinary men and women who went to extraordinary lengths for the freedom they so desperately craved

In these early chapters, Holland gives rich descriptions of the organisation's members, outlining their backgrounds and the circumstances leading to their role and involvement as organisational leaders or regional coordinators.

She goes on to describe the characters and personalities that shaped the ANC's political direction. These accounts are interwoven into the series of events that unfolded, from the electoral victory of the National Party in 1948 through the defiance campaign in the 1950s, the subsequent banning of the ANC, the 1956-61 Treason Trial, the armed struggle and the establishment of the international network.



BEHIND THE SCENES

Holland also gives the reader an insight into the internal struggles that the leadership had to overcome, thus providing an objective view of the different personalities in the party and their opposing ideologies.

In her behind-the-scenes descriptions of the events that took place from the 1970s and 1980s to the release of Mandela, Holland tells the stories of ordinary men and women who went to extraordinary lengths for the freedom they so desperately craved. Although the title may be slightly misleading, in that the narrative is not focused primarily on Mandela, it does give a multi-layered view of the evolution of the party. This is particularly pertinent now, as South Africans have long been so desperate to maintain the illusion of a 'united nation' that any mention of the historical and emerging factions of the ANC has been deliberately avoided. The book comes thus at an opportune time, calling for the ANC to carefully consider its future relevance under growing external pressures and widening gaps within the party itself.

Holland's book offers more than just a glance into the history of Africa's biggest political movement: it is also an opportunity to consider the future of the South African political landscape. **E**

STRANGER THAN FICTION

An oilman, a diamond dealer, a warlord and a basketball star walk into a New York hotel room. And what comes out is made for the big screen.

By **Tanya Pampalone**

I've got a great script for a blockbuster Hollywood movie.

Here's the set-up: a US basketball star, known for his massive philanthropic contributions, sets up a gold deal in a New York hotel room, complete with a PowerPoint presentation, with a politically well-connected Texas oilman and a shady Houston-based diamond dealer.

After a series of run-arounds, which has the gold going from Kenya to the Democratic Republic of the Congo with nobody really sure who the true owner of the gold actually is, the deal finally goes sour when a Congolese warlord, wanted by the International Criminal Court, meets the plane in the lawless eastern DRC town of Goma. Instead of handing over the gold to the buyers, the warlord seizes the plane and carts off the diamond dealer, who is released almost two months later, but only after \$3 million in 'fines' are paid to the government. In the end, the oilman, who financed the deal, is out of pocket by more than \$30 million – bribes, transport costs, upfront payments – and doesn't have one single ounce of gold to show for it.

The plot is fast-paced, intense, all playing out over a few months in late 2010 and early 2011, in upmarket hotel rooms in the US, exclusive private parties in Texas, customs warehouses in Kenya and on a military tarmac in Goma.

But it is the characters, really, that make the whole story pop.

At centre court is Dikembe Mutombo. In 1987, the towering Mutombo, who was born in Kinshasa, wins a pre-med scholarship to Georgetown University in Washington DC. Not long after, he joins the school's basketball team. A star is born. He plays for nearly two decades on the National Basket-

ball Association circuit, an adored sportsman whose finger-wagging – his playful admonition towards his opponents in the game – made him a larger-than-life personality and reportedly earned him more than \$100 million over his astounding career. He starts a foundation, builds a hospital in Kinshasa, is mentioned in George W Bush's 2007 State of the Nation speech as a shining example of heroic kindness and self-sacrifice, only to shock the sporting world by his central involvement in setting up the scam.

There's Kase Lawal, a Nigerian-born oil tycoon. He's served as a trade advisor to both former US President Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. In his native Nigeria, he sat on President Goodluck Jonathan's presidential advisory council. In South Africa, he's been a funder of President Jacob Zuma's charitable foundation and educational trust. But he's also been accused of conspiring to steal an oil block in Nigeria, pumping million of barrels of oil from it – although he was never prosecuted and has consistently denied the allegations.

The shady diamond dealer was a cadet at the prestigious West Point military academy who grew up in Houston, Texas, before gaining a reputation for his penchant for risky deals in Africa. Carlos St Mary was already fingered in a lawsuit brought by investors he had failed to repay in a diamond deal gone wrong before acting as a middleman in the gold scam. St Mary appears to be the main source in a United Nations re-

port on the incident that had Lawal in contravention of UN resolutions that ban individuals and corporations from financing illegal armed groups in the eastern DRC.

And finally, there's Bosco Ntaganda, head of said illegal armed group. The warlord who faces allegations of recruiting child soldiers and presiding over mass rapes and murder by his troops, in addition to his penchant for smuggling natural resources, is also the likely recipient of much of those tens of millions of dollars from Lawal. But, then, he might not have been acting alone. St Mary tells a prominent UK newspaper that while he was being detained at the Goma airport, Ntaganda was on the phone with DRC President Joseph Kabila, 'arguing over how to split the cash'.

Great script, huh? Thing is, I don't think anyone would ever buy it. Not in Hollywood, at least. The story line is entirely unbelievable, even if the whole thing is true. Besides, the ending is too depressing. The bad guy wins, and the hero isn't a hero at all.

The moral of the story? Africa isn't for sissies and corruption is global. And it appears that it doesn't matter how politically connected you are around the globe, or how much money you've got stashed away in Swiss bank accounts. In the end, it all comes back to basics. The guys with the biggest guns win. **E**

Tanya Pampalone is the features editor of the Mail & Guardian.

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