

VIEWS AND ANALYSES FROM THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

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Youssou N'dour for president?

Dear Reader...

In early January, Senegal's superstar Youssou N'dour – the king of *mbalax* – announced that he plans to run as a candidate in presidential elections in Senegal planned for 26 February.

He said in his statement he feels it is his 'patriotic duty' to run for the highest office in the land. And although he has 'no formal qualifications' he will surround himself with the best individuals Senegal can offer to run the country efficiently.

The star's fans around the world applauded on Twitter and other social networks, but in Senegal, many are skeptical. 'You', as he is affectionately called, might be an important businessman by Senegalese standards and his heart is in the right place when it comes to serving his community, but he is, after all, a singer.

The real story behind this announcement is that it came amid one of the direst political crises Senegal has faced since the advent of multi-party democracy in the 1990s.

President Abdoulaye Wade, who came to power in 2000 with the support of the masses of the young urban population and the likes of N'dour, at the time vowed to serve only two mandates in power. Wade has been a champion of democracy in Africa and mediated in several political crises in his region. That's why people believed him when he so fervently defended the two-term principle.

In 2001, the constitution was duly changed to reduce the president's mandate from 7 to 5 years and to limit it to two terms..

Wade has since served one 7-year term, according to the constitution in place when he took office, and one 5-year term, which ends this year. But the incumbent president has since changed his tune.

Wade (85) and his Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) claim that he is eligible

for another 5-year term, according to the new constitution. Lawyers and constitutional experts differ on whether this is the case. On 29 January the Constitutional Court will make a final decision on Wade's candidacy, which many expect will be accepted.

Regardless of the legal wrangling around Wade's candidacy, many former supporters say the president has served 12 years in office; he is ready for retirement and should now step down.

In 2011, mass protests, inspired by the events in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, led to violent clashes in the streets of Dakar. The M23 or *Movement du 23 Juin*, supported by the *Y'en a Marre* (We're fed-up) campaign, was launched against what many saw as an attempt to introduce the kind of strongman-politics seen elsewhere in Africa.

So far, Senegal has been exempt from coups d'état and other forms of unconstitutional regime change. However, the proposal by Wade and the PDS to change the electoral law in Senegal in order to lower the threshold for a first-round victory in the elections from 51% to 25% seems to indicate just that.

Wade also attempted to introduce the position of vice-president, many in the opposition believed, in order to promote his son Karim as his successor.

But does this mean a singer with no political experience should step in and run the country?

Senegal has a long tradition of democratic party politics, with many strong candidates in the running for this election.

These include the former prime minister and UN mediator in the Great Lakes Moustapha Niasse, Wade's former ally Idrissa Seck and Ousmane Tanor Dieng, the leader of the main opposition. Another former Wade prime minister,

Macky Sall, and former foreign minister Cheikh Tidjane Gadio also said they're prepared to be candidates.

The fact that the Senegalese opposition, together with the power of the street protests, managed to stave off the attempt to change the rules of the elections to a 25% win, is to their credit. If this had been accepted in parliament, it would have had the same effect as a one-round election, which President Laurent Kabila managed to push through parliament in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

So far, the opposition still hasn't managed to unite and reduce the number of candidates, should the incumbent be allowed to run. N'dour's candidature now contributes to divide the opposition vote even more. Some compare him to the singer Michel Martelli who last year became president of Haiti, a country on its knees after the earthquake. Or to soccer-great George Weah, who ran for president in Liberia.

Those who support N'dour claims that he represents civil society in Senegal, mainly because of his various community projects, his support for human rights campaigns and his job creation efforts. However, civil society is usually best represented by those who actively work in non-governmental structures, and do not participate merely as a sideline to their career.

N'dour can also certainly not be described as a technocrat – an alternative sought by many countries to fill the leadership gap and ensure effective governance.

It seems clear that the candidature of someone like Youssou N'dour is a symptom of a wider crisis: the deception of voters by Abdoulaye Wade, who once, for them, was also a superstar.

Liesl Louw-Vaudran
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An angry youth protests in front of a burning barrier following the removal of a fuel subsidy by the government in Lagos, Nigeria, Tuesday, Jan. 10, 2012. (AP Photo/Sunday Alamba)
Cairo skyline and the river Nile, Egypt. (Gallo Images/ Getty Images)

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What to do about the Dalai Lama?

As the ANC celebrates 100 years of its existence, South Africa is faced with a number of important foreign policy decisions, including how to manage its relationship with China. The controversial issue of the Dalai Lama will arise again in 2012, following Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi's invitation to the Tibetan spiritual leader to visit South Africa during the country's Human Rights Day celebrations in March this year.



THE South African government will once again have to face the dilemma of whether to grant a visa to the Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, amid pressure from China.

(AP PHOTO/ALTAI QADIRI)

October last year. Eventually the Dalai Lama withdrew his visa request and cancelled his trip 'to avoid inconveniencing the South African government', saving South Africa huge embarrassment.

South African dependence upon China is growing by the day. As a result the country is vulnerable to Chinese pressure – which is applied unrelentingly by the economic giant against what it sees as interference in its internal affairs.

The story is far from over, however. Time will tell what will happen if the Dalai Lama accepts Buthelezi's invitation.

At the end of 2011, civil society groups in South Africa were infuriated when the government dithered and obfuscated in response to a

request for a visa for the Dalai Lama, who had been invited by Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu to celebrate his 80th birthday in Cape Town in

Goodluck Jonathan's bad timing

As Nigerians took to the streets in January in what has been described as an 'indefinite strike' against the controversial removal of the state fuel subsidy, many experts warned that this would further compound the volatile security conditions in Africa's most populous country.

The government's abrupt termination of the fuel subsidy on New Year's Day took Nigerians by surprise as they marked the beginning of 2012 – a year that many hope will be different from the last, which was dominated by the murderous activities of Boko Haram, most of which took place in northern Nigeria. The militant Islamist group has so far claimed more than 3 000 lives and left nearly 10 000 others injured.

Most experts agree that even if removing the fuel subsidy is a fiscal necessity, as Jonathan's government claims, its timing does not bode well for the country's security.

At a time when Nigerians are already divided along reli-

gious and ethnic lines, the removal of the fuel subsidy has further alienated the people from their government. This provides fertile conditions for Boko Haram to carry out more attacks, as well as to recruit and radicalise more youths from among those who have been



(AP PHOTO/SUNDAY ALAMBA)

PEOPLE take to the streets in protest following the removal of a fuel subsidy by the government in Lagos on 9 January.

hardest hit by the subsidy removal.

At the very least, the move will severely stretch the resources of a government that now finds itself in the position of having to fight Boko Haram on the one hand and control the protesters on the other.

Tracking down Africa's illicit arms

The ability to trace small arms and light weapons (SALW) is an important step toward transparency and preventing the illicit use of firearms in conflict and crime, and 8 December 2011 marked the sixth anniversary of the adoption of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) by the United Nations General Assembly.

Although not legally binding, the ITI's adoption demonstrates an acknowledgement by UN member states that it will enable them to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit SALW within their territories.

For various reasons, the ITI is yet to be fully implemented by African member states. One significant challenge is the fact that conflicts are still simmering in a number of countries, making governance and enforcement of law and order (necessary for effective implementation of the ITI) practically impossible.

Secondly, even the few African countries that are in the process of implementing the ITI have to contend with neighbours that are still in conflict and therefore provide a source of undocumented SALW. Thirdly, most African countries do not consider the marking and record keeping of arms within their territories as a matter of policy priority, and as such they do not allocate sufficient resources even for simple things such as purchasing the machines necessary for marking arms.

Weak political will among a number of African states continues to impede the implementation of the ITI. At this rate, although six years have passed since the ITI's adoption, it may take several decades for it to be fully implemented in Africa. Until then, the region looks set to continue providing the stage for armed groups and the illicit flow of weapons.

By Jakkie Cilliers, Martin Ewi and Nelson Alusala

South Africa's crime rate going down

The findings of the 2011 Victims of Crime (VOC) survey, which indicates perceptions of crime and is carried out by Statistics SA, support the police statistics that demonstrate a decrease in South African crime levels. For example, the 2007 VOC survey found that 57% of households thought crime had increased in their areas over the previous four years while only 18% thought it had decreased.

According to the 2011 survey, the picture is now substantially different. Only 37% of households think the level of crime has increased in their areas, compared to a larger proportion of households (42%) who believe it has decreased.

Therefore, in 2011 more people thought that crime was going down than those who thought it was increasing. This shift is also reflected in perceptions of safety. In 2007, only

22% of survey respondents felt safe walking alone in their areas after dark; this increased to 37% of respondents in 2011.

The survey also finds that most households (53%) saw residential burglary or house-breaking as the most prevalent crime in their areas, followed

by home robbery (50%), street robbery (41%), pickpocketing (29%) and assault (21%).

When asked who was most likely to commit crime in their area, 61% of households stated that it was committed by local people from the area, while 32% thought the perpetrators

of crime tended to be South Africans from other areas. Only 7% of respondents thought the perpetrators of crime in their areas came from outside South Africa.

This challenges the often-repeated sentiment that South Africans think that foreigners are responsible for the crime in the country. However, there were quite large provincial variations in this regard. The vast majority of Northern Cape households (82%) said that crimes were committed by locals living in the area, while only 43% of households in Gauteng thought this to be the case.

When asked why perpetrators commit property crime, the majority of households (58%) thought it was because of 'real need' due to poverty or unemployment, rather than greed (46%). Only one in five respondents (20%) thought that other factors such as drug use were the motivating factor.

Gareth Newham

INDICATIONS are that the crime levels in South Africa are slowly decreasing.



PHOTO BY DAVID HARRISON

Huge challenges ahead in Libya

Despite the much-vaunted defeat of former president Muammar Gaddafi, the 'new' Libya is still on very uncertain political and security terrain. It faces a daunting series of both immediate and longer-term challenges.

Although the war in Libya ended with the fall of Gaddafi's hometown of Sirte, Gaddafi loyalists were not totally dislodged from the country. It is feared that pockets of resistance are present in the southern desert around Sebha, the Traghan oasis, the Wadi Al

Ajal, Oubari, Ghat and elsewhere. Consequently, the risk of insurgency from these areas should not be discounted.

The immediate challenge is to ensure the establishment of law and order. This entails, among other concerns, ensuring that security forces are brought under unified control, security institutions are established within a unified administration, and the criminal justice system is made fully functional.

The country's security sector is in disarray, with the armed groups that fought against Gaddafi being diverse and lacking unified command and control.

Apart from the huge security sector reform this situation entails, incidents of blood vendettas, lootings and similar criminal acts present an urgent threat. Another immediate challenge comes from the proliferation of weapons in the country and the region.

In the course of Libya's eight-month civil war (also known as the revolution), large amounts of weapons ended up in the hands non-government entities all around the country.

Some reports indicate that the level of proliferation in Libya is far greater than it is, for example, in Somalia. The country as a result faces the daunting task of locating and

collecting the arms, securing arms depots and disarming rebel groups.

Meanwhile, Libya also faces longer-term and more structural challenges. The first of these is for the transitional government established on 22 November 2011 to successfully lead the country to peaceful democratic elections.

Another longer-term challenge is to achieve national cohesion and reconciliation. The rebellion, as well as the fall of Gaddafi, created ideal conditions for the emergence of divisions on the basis of region and religious ideologies.

Solomon A. Dersso

26 FEBRUARY Presidential election, Senegal

The incumbent president, Abdoulaye Wade, who has been in power since 2000, has vowed to run for a third term. The Constitutional Court will rule before the end of January on whether his candidature is in line with the constitution.

Other candidates are the Socialist Party leader Ousmane Tanor Dieng, former prime ministers Moustapha Niasse, Idrissa Seck and Macky Sall, and international music superstar Youssou N'dour.

MARCH Presidential election, Egypt

Following the ousting by popular protests of former president Hosni Mubarak, Egyptians are expected to elect a new leader in March.

It remains to be seen whether the leader of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, General Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, will want to stay on beyond the transition phase.

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohammed Al Baradai has meanwhile announced he will not be running for president. Another important factor in this election is the role of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood.

APRIL 23 Presidential election, Mali

President Amadou Toumani Touré has announced he is stepping down in Mali after two five-year terms as presi-

dent, paving the way for any of a number of candidates to take over from him.

Among these are Soumaïla Cissé, current chair of ECOWAS; Dioncounda Traoré, president of the national assembly; MP Ibrahim Boubacar Keita; and popular NASA scientist Cheikh Modibo Diarra, who has not yet declared his candidature.

AUGUST SADC summit, Mozambique

The Southern African Development Community will face a

number of tough choices at the summit, presided over by Mozambican president Armando Guebuza.

The summit will have to decide on what to do about the increasing opposition to King Mswati II's rule in Swaziland and whether to accept the prevailing status quo in Madagascar.

It will also have to take a stand on elections in Zimbabwe and decide whether to give way to pressure by president Robert Mugabe to push through early elections, or insist that a referendum and constitutional reforms precede the vote.

7 DECEMBER Presidential election, Ghana

Incumbent president John Atta Mills will be facing the presidential candidate of the New Patriotic Party, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, in what promises to be a tight elections race.

Atta Mills has to contend with defections from his own party, notably by former president Jerry Rawlings, who has withdrawn his support for Atta-Mills.

Issues likely to be on the campaign agenda are the fight against corruption and maximising benefits from the country's current strong economic growth.

DECEMBER Presidential election, Kenya

Many Kenyans have mixed feelings about the upcoming elections. While there is fear of a repeat of the violence that followed the December 2007 poll, these elections will finally bring an end to the coalition that has often hampered effective government in Kenya.

The current prime minister, Raila Odinga, is likely to face deputy prime minister Uhuru Kenyatta and former ally William Ruto.

However, the ruling of the pre-trial chamber of the International Criminal Court on whether six prominent Kenyan politicians, whose numbers include Kenyatta and Ruto, can be tried for their role in the 2007-2008 post-election violence, will have an impact on who will be running for the highest office.



INCUMBENT PRESIDENT John Atta Mills of the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) party could face tough opposition during presidential elections in Ghana due to be held in December this year.

2012

Year of the (terrible economic) Dragon

AP PHOTO/HARAZ N. GHANBARI

A full-page photograph of Barack Obama walking towards the camera. He is wearing a dark suit, a light blue shirt, and a patterned tie. He has a slight smile and is looking off to the side. In the background, several other people in suits are walking, but they are out of focus. The lighting suggests it might be late afternoon or early morning.

US PRESIDENT Barack Obama is increasingly prioritising the Pacific, while rightwing Republicans blame China for the country's economic woes.

Following a year marked by significant global tipping points, the threat of recession looms large. **Jakkie Cilliers** warns that Africa is more vulnerable to the global economic crisis than ever before.

The Chinese Year of the Dragon is set to be a difficult year for Africa, as Europe enters another recession, the US struggles to avoid the same and even the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are faltering. The world economy is decelerating and Africa, now the second fastest growing region after South-East Asia, will feel the cold winds of retraction if current trends continue. Despite all the hype about China, 37% of non-oil exports from sub-Saharan Africa and 60% of North Africa's export revenues still go to European markets, while the US remains a major importer of African crude oil.

China's growth is expected to fall to a relatively lacklustre 8% in 2012, although it will still contribute more to global domestic demand than the Eurozone and the US combined. The other three BRIC countries, Russia, Brazil and India, are also struggling. Indian growth rates have slowed to the lowest in 30 years and without substantial economic reform, internal politics are a huge brake on the growth of this dynamic country. With its 2012 budget dependent upon an oil price in excess of \$110 a barrel, which is not guaranteed, Russia is headed for crisis, and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's grip on power may yet unravel ahead of his expected election as president in March. Unprecedented riots broke out in Moscow and elsewhere in the wake of the December 2011 elections for the Duma (parliament).

Despite near-record lows in Brazil's unemployment rate, Latin America's biggest economy may technically be in recession as the Eurozone crisis drags on global demand and the country's increasingly indebted consumers retreat after nearly three years of buoyant spending.

The promise and the turbulence of the Year of the Dragon follows on closely from several significant tipping points in 2011, which was perhaps the most significant year since 1989's collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall.

The real effect of global rebalancing, with power flowing away from rather than towards Washington, is now evident as wealth and influence move from the Atlantic to the Pacific and possibly eventually back to Asia, which dominated the world long before the industrial revolution and the rise of the West.

A GLOBAL REBALANCING

By mid-century, China, the US and India will come to dominate world politics, and the African Futures project at the Institute for Security Studies projects that by 2050,

rates, the US economy should still be slightly larger than that of India but only around two-thirds the size of China's.

But it was events in North Africa and the Middle East that most vividly captured the global imagination in 2011. North Africa and the Middle East, the region with the largest democratic deficit globally, erupted against corrupt authoritarianism and the lack of opportunities for an increasingly educated population. No wonder Time magazine anointed 'the protestor' its Person of the Year for 2011.

The establishment is seemingly under threat everywhere. The US-led Occupy Wall Street movement reflects the unease that rising inequality and banking excesses bring to bear. Even in China, peasants in the small village of Wukan chased out the local Communist Party officials who had embezzled US\$110 million owed to the



REUTERS/MOHAMED ABD EL-GHANY

THE ARAB SPRING has had a huge impact on the global political landscape as citizens in countries like Egypt (above) claim their rights.

China and India will each hold 15-16% of the global population and collectively account for 40% of the global economy at purchasing-power parity. Both are likely to have economies that in purchasing-power parity terms will be larger than that of the US, although, at market exchange

villagers from the sale of more than 80% of their arable land to developers. After the Middle East, the region with the highest democratic deficit is South-East Asia. If violence comes to China, the world economy will be in very serious trouble.

Strengthening patterns of global

realignment, the Arab Spring was not a triumph of secularist liberal democracy but the strengthening of moderate Islam, reaffirming its potential for global growth and relevance as a challenge rather than an adjunct to the West. Much as Western countries may revel in the rejection of violent Islamic radicalism, the developments in the Muslim world reaffirm a different vision of politics from that of Washington, London and Paris, and this will also impact upon the security of Israel and the potential of Palestine to free itself from an oppressive yoke.

THE US: 'A PACIFIC POWER'

In the shorter term, global relations could be reset in 2012. Last year saw the US's 'Pacific Pivot' when President Barack Obama formally announced the country's decision to prioritise the Pacific. America's obsession with China has mounted as domestic politics swing rightward and Republican politicians seek a culprit for the decades of domestic excess that saw inequalities grow and the US export its manufacturing capacity to Mexico and South-East Asia. 'The United States is a Pacific power,' Obama noted, 'and we are here to stay.' The US now has military bases

in Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Guam and Australia – not yet a ring of steel around China, but sufficient to constrain any muscle flexing. The US defence review announced in January reaffirmed the tilt to the Pacific.

The African Futures project at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) projects that by 2050, China and India will each hold 15-16% of the global population and collectively account for 40% of the global economy at purchasing-power parity

Beyond protests in places such as Wukan, one of tens of thousands of domestic protests each year, party-political events in China are set to heighten tensions at roughly the same time as Obama's battle for re-election. In November 2012, at its 18th National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party will see an unprecedented turnover in its top leadership. Seven of the Party's nine Standing Committee members will retire, as will members of the State

Council and the Central Military Commission. The next generation of Chinese leadership have no personal memory of the Cultural Revolution or the Great Leap Forward – they are blue-skies politicians who have known nothing but inexorable Chinese advancement. For them, China's time has come – which sets a rising China up for much greater contest with a declining and fearful US. If the US tilts from its cautious policy of partnership to all-out containment of China, the fallout could be global.

This scenario is more likely under a Republican president, and although the average American voter blames the Republicans rather than the Democrats for the impasse in Washington, no US president since Eisenhower has been re-elected at the levels of unemployment that Obama will experience (estimated at 8.6%) in the third quarter of 2012, and his re-election seems unlikely.

SUPPORTING INDIA

For the US, supporting India is a means of containing China, and US relations with Pakistan, India's most immediate enemy, have taken a turn for the worse. India is dynamic and transforming, although politically faltering. Since 1991, its leadership has pursued economic liberalisation, opening the country up to foreign investment and yielding rapid growth, and India could become a top-five global economy by 2030. In the process, its trajectory has diverged sharply from that of Pakistan. India's future is far from certain, and it continues to face security challenges in a region cautious about its growing influence, but India's expanding economic and political clout is helping the US to maintain a mutually favourable balance of power in Asia.

For its part, New Delhi seeks a US that will help facilitate India's rise as a major power, although India's growth is expected to remain significantly below that of China for decades to come. As a result, two successive Indian governments have pursued a strategic partnership with the US that would have been unthinkable in the era of the Cold War and nonalignment.



AFP PHOTO PIUS UTOIMI EKPEI

GHANAIA President John Atta Mills will have to convince voters during elections in December this year. Important elections will also be held in Kenya, and South African President Jacob Zuma stands to be re-elected at the ANC national congress in Mangaung.



AP PHOTO/DAVID GOLDMAN

CAMPAIGNING for Republican presidential candidate former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney in Charleston, South Carolina. US elections later this year will be significant in determining relations between the world's big powers.

EUROPE'S AGEING POPULATION

These developments have left Europe somewhat bewildered. Militarily it can no longer enjoy a free-rider status within NATO, and its rapidly aging population demands young labour, which can only be obtained from Turkey or North Africa – a move that European populations resist. The African Futures projections indicate how European demographics now resemble those of Japan – ageing, wealthy, conservative and at a political impasse. The future appears to reflect anaemic economic growth as the Eurozone struggles to come to terms with the over-expansion of the common currency and its ambitions to create an integrated economy without surrendering national sovereignty.

The Eurozone countries have no option but deeper integration if the common currency is to survive. Africans need to watch closely, for the dissolution of the euro will have grave implications for European-African relations, particularly the 14 countries in west and central Africa whose currency, the CFA franc, is pegged to the euro at a rate of 655.96 to one.

Europe, and in particular the Com-

mission, has been a powerful moral and political force for Africa, often intervening to tone down stridently militarised French, British and US approaches. The EU has invested close to a billion euros in the African Union (AU)'s peace and security architecture in the past decade, and without European support through the Commission and from individual countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Germany and others, much of the edifice created around the AU to advance African leadership on African challenges will suffer significant damage.

AN EVENTFUL YEAR FOR AFRICA

But democracy has firmly taken root in Africa. Fifteen African countries held elections in 2011; in four of these, opposition parties won. In 2012, the democratic unfolding in North Africa will be profound – although the most likely outcome is not secular constitutions but a form of Islamic democracy, and the prospect of stability in Egypt is uncertain.

Elections in Angola, Ghana and Kenya,

a country eager to mend its reputation following its violence-marred 2007 elections, will dictate the course for three pivotal African economies. South Africa's beleaguered president, Jacob Zuma, faces a

Much as Western countries may revel in the rejection of violent Islamic radicalism, developments in the Muslim world affirm a different vision of politics from that of Washington, London and Paris

struggle for re-election as leader of the ruling African National Congress in the December national conference in Bloemfontein, and Nigeria faces the prospect of escalating sectarian violence after the Christmas Day bombings in Abuja and Jos.

With 54 members of the UN General Assembly, a rising consumer base, the largest potential agricultural spaces and a huge unexplored mineral complex, Africa is emerging as globally important, despite

its widespread poverty, poor governance and instability. China, Turkey, Japan and India are increasingly active in Africa, contesting the US and Europe's historical advantage, and with their continent slowly emerging as an investment destination, Africans have gained agency. However, this is also the region with the greatest domestic instability potential, which continues to be perceived as a direct threat to neighbouring Europe.

Not only is Africa most affected by international terrorism, but terror also continues to grow on the back of huge disparities in socioeconomic conditions, corruption and misrule, particularly in urban areas where social media is experiencing massive growth.

European and American trade remains

highly important for Africa, but its change in fortunes is closely tied to events in China and, to a lesser extent, in India and elsewhere. As countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Korea, Turkey and Mexico rise, their appetite for

In November 2012, at its 18th National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party will see an unprecedented turnover in its top leadership

commodities drags Africa along, and the continent is experiencing improvements in the quality of domestic governance and

revenue collection. The 'hopeless continent' has become a source of global hope and, dare we say it, growth.

Africa, therefore, has much to lose from a global recession and is more vulnerable than before. The managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, recently warned that African nations should expect economic shocks as a result of the Euro-zone crisis. 'Growing economic uncertainty in the world is raising concerns across the continent, where vulnerability to global shocks remains high,' she said. In fact, Africa is less able to weather the challenges of a new downturn compared to 2008, and it is more vulnerable. The Year of the Dragon will be a difficult one for Africans. **E**

REDUCING THE GLOBAL IMBALANCE



Dr Ijaz Shafi Gilani, global commentator and chairman of Gallup Pakistan, says that if you want to understand your own

country, you should view it in relation to the rest of the world.

'I believe we should take a global view of the world rather than a nation- or state-centric one. We tend to start with states and add them all up and then end up with the world. My view is we should have one vision of the world and then slice it up into various countries.

'That is a much more humanist understanding of what people are.'

During a November 2011 conference of the European Institute for Security Studies in Brussels entitled *Global Trends 2030: Citizens in an Interconnected World*, Gilani, who works extensively on Africa, said Africa is increasingly confounding stereotypes.

'In the 1970s, Africa became a symbol of drought, poverty, civil war and corrupt leaders, but this is

changing. The economic conditions and governance are improving. This is not to say that Africa doesn't have problems, it means those problems are recognisable, such as climate change and environmental degradation, food shortages and sometimes conflict.'

Gilani also believes that the notion of the African Union and stronger inter-regional trade and cooperation 'has a lot of punch to it. The rhetoric has been there for a long time, but this is now taking a strong shape.'

He says that in sub-Saharan Africa, which is home to 49 countries and 11% of the world's population, interregional cooperation is so much more natural and important than, for example, in India, which holds 16% of the world's population.

'As economies become more open there is a functional need for cooperation,' he explains.

Emerging powers are increasingly looking to Africa to provide scarce resources. Gilani believes that Africa's capacity to do so is much greater than before. 'In the

21st century, societies and leaders are much more astute about dealing with the resource fight. We find Africans dealing with Chinese, Indians, Europeans and Americans with finesse. It's not the same as the 19th century "scramble for Africa". Everyone is trying to get to the African market, but I doubt this will result in the same asymmetrical relations.

'Africa is changing and democracy is taking root. There is an election in Africa almost every month, some flawed some not flawed, but it's no longer the stories of dictators that we heard in the 80s and 90s. Now it's all about multi-party systems and moving away from the past.'

Gilani also believes that the gap between the world's rich and poor will be narrowed with time. 'I think there are grounds for optimism. At the moment, Africa has 11% of the world's population but produces barely 1% of global GDP. Europe has 7% of the population but produces 20% of GDP; the US has 5% of the population but 25% of GDP. This imbalance will be reduced as the century progresses.' – Daryl Balia

A healthy, working continent

The development of a malaria vaccine and other significant research breakthroughs gives Africa hope for the future. This could save millions of lives, writes

Patrick G McLennan.



In October 2011, GlaxoSmithKline and PATH Malaria Vaccine Initiative announced a significant breakthrough in their attempts to find an effective vaccine against malaria. While vaccine research has been underway for over 40 years, RTS,S is among the first to show real promise.

If the RTS,S vaccine proves effective enough to cut malaria deaths even by half, Africa will experience a boost in many indicators of human development.

This becomes clear using the International Futures modeling software, which is part of the International Futures project of the Institute for Security Studies, to explore what impact a malaria vaccine or other similar technological advance could have on Africa's future.

MALARIA AND DEVELOPMENT

There has been much discussion among scholars about the relationship between malaria and human development.

Looking at the map on Page 14, it is immediately clear that the most malaria-

intense countries are also among the poorest in the world.

Studies show that countries with a high prevalence of malaria grew 1.3% per capita less per annum than those without it. They also demonstrated that a 10% reduction in malaria has historically been associated with a 0.3% increase in economic growth.

While these studies argue that there is a relationship between malaria and slow economic growth, it is important to understand how and why this is the case. Generally, most studies conclude that the physical suffering associated with malaria decreases productivity in various ways.

For example, malaria is a common cause of absenteeism at work and school, inhibiting the ability of parents to make a living and children to receive an education. Without a steady income, families have limited access to malaria prevention and treatment programmes. More specifically, malaria can cause anaemia in pregnant and nursing mothers, which is associated with low birth weight and can

If technological advances, like the RTS,S vaccine, prove effective and cut malaria deaths even by half, then Africa will experience a boost in many indicators of human development


result in long-term developmental consequences for children.

More severe forms of malaria, such as cerebral malaria, can cause physical and mental disorders and even death, decreasing the overall life expectancy in countries with a high incidence of this disease.

CHANGING OUTCOMES FOR THE BETTER

Using the International Futures analysis tool, we can simulate the effects the RTS,S vaccine may have on the continent.

Realising that widespread distribution of a vaccine will take time, we created a scenario where a 50% reduction in malaria-related deaths occurs by 2020, with further reductions at this rate




continuing until 2050. This becomes our improved scenario, which will be compared to our base case or business-as-usual scenario.

If the vaccine is introduced and is effective, according to this model, between 2010 and 2050 almost 8.9 million lives could be saved, when one compares the improved scenario with the base case.

The most pronounced changes occur in infant mortality and poverty.

By 2050, the largest total decrease in malaria-related deaths occurs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.6 million) and Nigeria (1.5 million). Similarly, infant mortality decreases by more than two deaths per 1 000 live births for 13 countries, including a decrease of over eight deaths per thousand for Togo (from 49 to 41).



Countries with a high prevalence of malaria grew 1.3% per capita less per annum than those without it

What's more, the number of people living on less than US\$1.25 per day decreases by almost three million, with the biggest decreases taking place in Ghana (777 000), Niger (497 000) and Togo (319 000).

Of course there are also financial benefits resulting from a decreased burden of disease. The improved scenario sees a total of US\$346 billion added to Africa's GDP between 2010 and 2050, with per capita increases of US\$145 by 2050.

By 2050, the largest total decrease in malaria-related deaths will occur in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Nigeria

As shown by the improved scenario, the countries that suffer most from malaria will clearly benefit from a vaccine. However, public health experts do say that a vaccine will need to be used alongside additional interventions, such as the ongoing distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets.

The latest MDG report claims that current global health initiatives have distributed enough bed nets in sub-Saharan Africa for 76% of people to sleep under, and a conservative estimate states that 38% of children have access to treatment.

The future scenarios projected above ultimately show that while current global health programmes are making an impact, a vaccine would help Africa turn the corner in the fight against malaria and have positive spin-offs for human and economic development in the region.

POSITIVE OUTCOMES

Data from phase three clinical trials of 15 000 children in seven African countries suggest that the RTS,S vaccine could cut the number of malaria cases by half. While these results are based on children aged 5-17 months, new results for infants aged 6-12 weeks will be released soon.

This vaccine is only the latest advance in a long line of initiatives geared towards reducing the incidence of malaria in Africa and elsewhere. According to the 2011 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Report, malaria deaths worldwide have declined by 20% since 2000. Sub-Saharan Africa saw the largest absolute drop, with 11 countries decreasing their malaria-related mortality rates by 50%. Still, malaria (along with pneumonia and diarrhoea) remains one of the main causes of death among children under five years old, with 90% of worldwide malaria mortality occurring in sub-Saharan Africa.



WILD CARDS

In this analysis, all malaria forecasting was based on figures currently available for Africa. However, measuring changes across an entire continent is not ideal because some countries are affected more than others – a number of countries in northern and southern Africa are certifiably malaria free.

These countries, of course, would be better off focusing on the health concerns that affect them the most, and future forecasts should narrow the focus to explore trends in the countries that are particularly hard hit.


Another (equally important) task is to assess other drivers of malaria deaths. Global climate change, for example, stands to threaten any progress made in fighting the disease as well as increasing distribution costs because, as temperatures rise, more areas may enter or re-enter malaria risk zones.

Also, since malaria has a relationship with maternal health and infant mortality, other factors such as undernourishment are important to consider.

Lastly, there are 'wild cards', so-called discrete events that are impossible to forecast. These include outbreaks of political instability, which can affect distribution, or the possibility of mutation of plasmodium parasites that are resistant to treatment and the RTS,S vaccine.

However, since eradicating malaria in Africa is essential for development, any news of a potential vaccination is encouraging.

As shown here, with the help of a vaccine, Africa could soon see its first malaria-free generation.



The **disability-adjusted life year** is a measure of overall disease burden, expressed as the number of years lost due to ill-health, disability or early death.



DIVERSIFY OR STAGNATE

For a prosperous future, Africans shouldn't be lulled by the current commodities boom, argues **André Roux**.

In May 2000, *The Economist* described Africa as 'the hopeless continent'; in December 2011 the same publication emblazoned its cover with the words 'Africa rising'. Economic growth in Africa averaged more than 5% per annum in the first ten years of this century, more than double the rate recorded in the previous

few decades. Along with other emerging/developing countries, Africa is contributing to the 'new geography of growth' – an economic power shift from West to East and from North to South. The question is, can this robust economic growth persist in the longer term, and is it sufficient to co-create sustainable human development?



AN ELECTION poster for President Paul Biya of Cameroon promises major infrastructure projects, though his 29-year reign has left much of the country struggling to make ends meet. The writer says ordinary citizens realise they and their country are poor while a small group of beneficiaries are getting richer, and conclude that in order to become more prosperous, they need to fight corruption.

OLIVIER NOUR NOEL

If left unchecked, this overdependence on natural resources can warp a country's political investment and education priorities, with policies and systems revolving around those who control the resources and who are therefore enriched by them

IS A HIGHER GROWTH PATH SUSTAINABLE?

The primary reasons behind improved economic growth in Africa include the surge in commodity prices (a function of China's almost insatiable demand for commodities) and improved macro-economic stability. For instance, inflation has declined in many countries, foreign and government debt levels have been reduced, state-owned enterprises privatised, and trade barriers lowered. There are also signs of an increase in labour productivity.

In addition, there is a potential demographic dividend: if governments invest wisely in the education and health of the hundreds of millions of Africans aged under 14, as well as in roads, ports and the telecommunications needed to support an industrial export economy, the development trend (for example, increased Internet use is already improving educational and healthcare provision) will be reinforced. New technology could help Africa do more with less and learn from the experiences of Asia's hyper-economies.

Add urbanisation and the rapid increase in the number of consumers with spending power to the mix, and the foundations are laid for a domestic demand-driven high-growth trajectory.

Meanwhile, the world will retain its strategic interest in Africa as the external demand for oil and other natural resources persists on the back of the growing realisation that such factors are finite. Moreover, with 60% of the world's uncultivated arable land and low crop yields, Africa is ripe for a 'green revolution' akin to the ones that have transformed agriculture in Brazil and Asia.

Afrosceptics will argue that the experience since 2000 is a temporary deviation from a trend of inexorable stagnation. When considering whether Africa has the ability to consolidate and broaden the improvements witnessed so far this century, the following issues need to be considered:

- What happens if external inflows are insufficient to finance the resource gap?
- Economic diversification is crucial.
- While Chinese and Indian investment in Africa is welcome and significant, the rapid growth of those two economies underscores the tougher competition in the global economy.
- There is great need for governance and capacity building (investing in capacity building, increasing accountability and transparency, eradicating endemic corruption, strengthening information systems and peace and security).

RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR

For most African countries seeking to determine whether they are on the brink of a new era of growth and prosperity or destined to repeat the stagnation tendencies of the past, two core uncertainties emerge from the above issues:

The first question is, will they succeed in establishing and consolidating legitimate and effective governance based on the rule of law? The historical reality is that in some African countries, political (and corporate) leaders have at times succumbed to the temptation of 'rent-seeking' behaviour, which is when individuals or organisations attempt to earn extra income by meddling

in or exploiting political and/or economic processes.

This behaviour could include corruption, fraud, nepotism and the overall dilution of the rule of law, and it ultimately compromises growth, entrepreneurship, productivity and even national credibility. Another consequence is the emigration of thousands of African professionals to other parts of the world to escape the frustrations caused by inefficient or corrupt systems.

DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL RESOURCES

The second question is whether African countries will develop a more diversified economic structure based on their endowment of natural resources and large numbers of young adults. In many countries in Africa, one or two natural resources comprise the bulk of a country's economic activity and employment.

The price of a given natural resource is largely a function of the rest of the world's appetite for that resource, and therefore

beyond the control of the producers themselves.

Moreover, by simply exporting raw materials, African countries are missing out on the real benefits of having large reserves, including processing them (adding value) into something that consumers wish to purchase at an attractive price.

Many countries in Africa are currently riding the crest of a wave triggered by the commodity price boom. If not properly managed, this commodities windfall could result in longer-term economic stagnation as countries fall victim to the 'Dutch disease' or resource curse, which involves short-lived and exclusive growth.

This phenomenon works as follows: a large and substantial inflow of foreign-exchange reserves (as a result of the new discovery of a natural resource, or a rejuvenation in natural resource prices) strengthens the value of a country's currency. The effect is twofold – the country's manufactured exports are far less competitive in price, while imports become cheaper. The demand for manufactured imports

Countries in Africa need to see the world of economics as being centred on production and on the assimilation and diffusion of knowledge and innovations, rather than on barter

escalates at the expense of the local manufacturing sector, which leads to de-industrialisation.

As Thomas Friedman puts it in his book *Hot, flat and crowded*, 'When money can be extracted from the ground, people simply don't develop the DNA of innovation and entrepreneurship.'

If left unchecked, this overdependence on natural resources can warp a country's political investment and education priorities, with policies and systems revolving around those who control and are therefore enriched by the resources.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND Managing Director Christine Lagarde met South African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan during a visit in January this year, warning of the impact of the Eurozone crisis on Africa. South Africa last year released plans for a major drive to create jobs and stimulate growth in the economy.






PRESIDENT LAURENT KABILA of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was re-elected in November last year amid allegations of fraud and vote-rigging. He has remained in power largely due to the wealth created by the country's rich natural resources, including gold, diamonds and coltan. Still, the country has very few major roads linking rural areas to the big cities and education is in a dire situation. The writer says African countries should rely less on commodities and diversify.

Ordinary citizens notice that they and their country are poor while a small group of beneficiaries are getting richer, and conclude that in order to become more prosperous, they need somehow to curb those who are stealing. In the event, they fail to realise that the real avenues for building a more prosperous society are better education, innovation, entrepreneurship and the rule of law.

SCENARIOS

In conventional scenario tradition the two core issues provide the framework for four generic scenarios for African countries, as illustrated below.



African Renaissance is the preferred/ desired future since it combines the virtues and benefits of having a diversified economy with effective governance. The minimum of conditions that need to be met to achieve this desired state include the following:

- Protection of property rights
- Effective and visible application of the 'rule of law'
- Enhancing the level and diversity of skills in the labour force
- Fostering and entrenching cooperation between labour and management
- Protecting the autonomy of democratic institutions
- Maintaining a stable and surprise-free social, political and business environment
- Land ownership for small and subsistence farmers
- An entrepreneurial revolution
- Moving towards producing high-value goods for both domestic and foreign markets
- A new approach towards security – from a narrow focus (military capacity) to a more holistic view (military stability, food security, income security, water security, education security, etc.)

The current commodity price boom is making a major contribution to a higher growth path in sub-Saharan Africa. How-


ever, should countries fail to use the wind-fall to diversify their economic activity, along with the establishment of effective governance, they run the risk of falling prey to the 'Dutch disease'.

PRODUCTION RATHER THAN BARTER

To avoid this state of affairs, countries in Africa need to see the world of economics as being centred on production and on the assimilation and diffusion of knowledge and innovations, rather than on barter. The driving force is therefore not hedonism, but the human spirit and will.

Even more problematic – from an ideological point of view – is the possibility that reliance on commodities 'guarantees' stagnation, and that this situation has been 'forced' upon African countries by theories that richer countries have themselves never fully followed.

Does this justify trade, industrial, fiscal and monetary policies that protect and/or subsidise domestic manufacturers? Is there merit after all in the 'infant industry' argument?

Should exchange rates in Africa be prevented from strengthening? And are neo-liberal policy prescriptions hypocritical and therefore dispensable? 

Professor André Roux is head of the Institute for Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa

With the number of smartphone users in Africa skyrocketing, **Arthur Goldstuck** predicts that Africans will invent unique applications adapted for their world.

GETTING SMART

Nothing sums up the current and potential future impact of technology on Africa better than the continent's apparently insatiable appetite for connectivity.

Today it is still mainly about connecting human voices, but in the not-too-distant future it will increasingly revolve around the data stream that is made possible by these connections.

On 30 September 2011, the African continent became the world's second biggest region for cellphone use, with 616 million users, overtaking both Western Europe and North America, according to research by Informa Telecoms & Media. Asia-Pacific remains the bigger mobile-using region in the world today.

The implications are staggering: on the surface, the numbers appear to indicate that more than half of all Africans are using cellphones. However, the reality is that many users – as many as a third – have dual-SIM cards.

Especially in Nigeria, it is common for businesspeople and ordinary consumers alike to have two phones, each with a SIM card from a different provider. This way they can, among other things, avoid the prohibitive additional cost of making calls between different providers.

Even when the number of connected SIMs in Africa reaches one billion, it is expected that fewer than 600 million people will be actual phone users.



[HTTP://WWW.NEWSECURITYBEAT.ORG](http://www.newsecuritybeat.org)

In South Africa, according to World Wide Worx research, at least 20% of active SIM connections are from dual-SIM usage, switchboard systems or asset management, where GSM signals are used to track fleets or livestock.

Next year, for the first time, smartphone sales in South Africa will overtake those of ordinary phones

With 56 million SIM cards and 112% SIM penetration, the true user base in the country is around 40 million, with penetration for unique users at 80%.

100% SIM PENETRATION

Nigeria, a country with a population of 158 million people, is expected to reach 100% SIM penetration in the next five years. Egypt's 81 million people will reach 150% SIM penetration.

Cynical observers are deeply critical of these figures, arguing that they only obscure the reality of connectivity in Africa and absolve governments of responsibility for fostering and promoting access.

But a massively positive trend also emerges. If half of all Africans are using cellphones, it means that more Africans than not have access to a communications device they can use almost anywhere. It gives them access to family, friends, and information on an unprecedented scale.

And this provides the foundation for



It's been shown in the past across Africa that, when presented with tools of defined capabilities, people find creative and innovative ways to turn them into even more relevant tools for local communities

smartphones in South Africa are high-end devices – such as the BlackBerry and Samsung Galaxy ranges – the phones likely to achieve equivalent sales proportions in other African countries are low-cost smartphones from Huawei and ZTE.

Already, one model, the Huawei Ideos, has taken a dominant share of the smartphone market in Kenya by positioning itself as a Google phone, offering access to both Internet browsing and social networks.

Social networks are the first entry point to the Internet for many, even in rural areas. A fascinating trend observed by World

Wide Word in South Africa is that the use of games on phones is higher among rural than urban users.

This indicates not that the rural users have more time on their hands, but that they are exploring their phones' capabilities in an unthreatening context. Once they build confidence and capability in using their phones, they begin exploring other functions such as browsing and social networking.

Fast forward five years and one in four Africans – more

than half of those now using cellphones – will be using smartphones. This brings Internet access, social networking, market information, job seeking and entertainment within the immediate reach of almost every economically active person in Africa.

The amazing aspect of this trend is that most users will not think of it as using technology: the smartphone will be a device they take for granted as an everyday tool.

It's been shown in the past across Africa that, when presented with tools of defined

capabilities, people will find creative and innovative ways to turn them into even more relevant tools for local communities.

In Senegal, a company called Manobi has become a byword for how phones can enhance the lives of entire sectors of the population. It initiated the T2M system to provide weather and market-price information to fishermen and fruit and vegetable farmers.

Using SMS and the WAP data access available on most phones, fishermen can now receive up-to-date weather forecasts to warn them when conditions were unfavourable. Farmers are kept up to date on market fluctuations and prices on any given day, allowing them to decide whether it is worthwhile to go to market that day.

This in turn has empowered both industries to negotiate better prices with middlemen or take advantage of high demand or low supply – and, therefore, to better plan their own fishing or farming activities.

RELEVANT TOOLS

In Kenya, the Ushahidi project was created to allow ordinary people to participate in mapping election violence in 2009. It quickly became far more – a tool for mapping crime, corruption, relief efforts for natural disasters and other forms of 'crowd-sourcing' information.


Throughout Africa, mobile money-transfer services are enabling ordinary individuals to manage their finances better and enter the formal economy. And all of this is happening before the smartphone revolution has fully kicked in. During 2012, as cheap Android phones from ZTE and Huawei and low-end Windows phones from Nokia start to replace the traditional 'feature phone', we will begin to see the emergence of the next wave of technology tools for Africa.

For one thing, the world of apps – small, user-friendly, low-cost applications for smartphones and tablet computers – will come within reach of normal Africans.

It is impossible to say exactly what kind of apps will emerge. But, given the creativity and practicality around the simple but powerful tools developed for ordinary phones, smartphones are set to herald a new wave of smart technology tools for Africa. **E**

MORE PHONES THAN PEOPLE

Percent of people with access to cellphones and broadband



The number of cellphones in Africa is expected to surpass the number of people by the year 2012. Broadband access, while not experiencing as dramatic a change, will continue to grow throughout the first half of the 21st century.

what happens next. In a word: data. While Africans are not exactly rushing to sign up to data services, they are slowly being pulled into the world of Internet connectivity by the phones they use. Next year, for the first time, smartphone sales in South Africa will overtake those of ordinary phones.

SMARTPHONE BOOM

That trend will continue in the rest of Africa in the coming years. While the dominant



A NEW class of small-scale entrepreneurs are emerging in Africa that can also be seen as being middle class.

Self-made consumers

As the wealth of African countries increases, analysts are still struggling to define the emerging middle class, which does not necessarily correspond to preset definitions, writes **Paul-Simon Handy**.



MORE THAN JUST NATURAL RESOURCES

One of the most striking features of Africa's recent economic growth is that it has not been restricted only to the countries that export commodities. While there has been a boom in some mineral-rich countries, its effects are also felt by those with no oil or minerals, largely due to their contribution of services.

This shift indicates that the gap between rich and poor is slowly but surely being filled by new intermediate social categories. Small businesses and the informal sector are creating a new middle class. Geographically located in urban centres, economically diffuse and scattered around a wide range of (sometimes informal) jobs, this middle class lacks the structure of an organised working class.

Studies by institutions such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank and UNECA Bank appear to confirm this trend: in today's Africa, decent living is no longer exclusively guaranteed by connections to the ruling classes or to the select few involved in the extractive industries.

ROLE MODELS

A number of research findings point to new profiles of successful individuals, an emerging group of people whose situation has been referred to by some researchers as 'fragile wealth'; an intermediary stage between poverty and high income. They are not the super-connected but could be owners of bakeries or hair salons, retailers, teachers or those in the wide and generally informal service industry – a new middle class.

Today's middle-class African may be someone who gets a loan from a *tontine* (in very few instances from a bank) to open a gym in an area where he or she believes people will have the means to pay their membership, or a garage repairman who is good at what he does, works 15 hours a day, and reaps the financial rewards.

In previous decades the models of success in Africa tended to be either civil servants or those who worked in one of the large state-owned companies that controlled the production of natural re-

sources, such as Gécamines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sonangol in Angola or the defunct Nepa in Nigeria.

However, social scientists have realised that there are many ways to determine who belongs to the social category that we would call the 'middle class' elsewhere in the world.

Africa's situation is unique and we cannot use the same indicators, not least because the recorded and declared revenue of members of Africa's 'middle class' tends to be far less than that of their European or American counterparts.

FRAGILE WEALTH

A study by the university of Bordeaux defined the African middle class as the 'people who have a sum of money at their disposal that they can choose, or not, to spend once they have met their basic daily needs. This fragile wealth remains modest but enables people to leave poverty behind, no longer to be afraid of their day-to-day situation and even to think about investing into their future.'

For a long time the social structure in Africa has been defined in dichotomic terms: on the one hand the rich (the dictators, the oligarchs, the big bosses of the petroleum companies, and their immediate circles) and on the other side the very poor (the vast majority of the population). The emergence of 'fragile wealth', as diversified and complex it appears, blurs these simplistic lines.

The difficulty in measuring the extent of this new category is that their sources of income are diverse and generally stem entirely or in part from the informal sector. In other words, while official statistics will look at their declared income, their real purchasing power would generally tend to be much higher but undeclared. For example, a school teacher who also has a small farm somewhere rearing pigs or chickens to supplement his income, or a secretary in a private company who owns a catering business that offers lunches in the CBD.

In Nigeria, for example, we know that if the per capita income is US\$240, the buying power is perhaps US\$1 000. This is because the statistics do not reflect the informal sector.

They may not be earning as much as their counterparts elsewhere but they consume, they aspire to a better life and they do everything they can to get their children through school. This is Africa's emerging middle class; a social category that analysts are still struggling to define. Yet it could play a crucial role in Africa's future.

CONSUMERS

The main characteristic of this middle class is its consumption of goods and resources, similar to anywhere else in the world. The impact of this consumerism is firstly that the middle class becomes increasingly individualistic with a much more 'globalised' lifestyle. Its members are not as keen on maintaining strong links with extended families that can so easily become a drain on their income, even though community links are still important. There is an obvious benefit in keeping their revenue for themselves and their immediate families.

A second defining factor of this category is that it is largely urban – in rural areas, the traditional conservative social structure still prevails.

A third feature is the emphasis on education: members of the middle class tend to want more and better education for their children. They see this as an important investment in their future and in that of their children. Studies have shown that many people are willing to take on more than one job in order to be able to send their children to a better, more expensive school.

MORE EXPOSURE

A better education obviously means more exposure and access to information.

It is well known that there has been an explosion in the sale of televisions across Africa, which unfortunately is not accompanied by an explosion in African content. (Nollywood can look forward to a bright future ...)

A population that is better educated, has access to global consumer goods, the Internet and cellphones, naturally has a less docile relationship with its political rulers than less well-connected people, generally living in rural areas, who still look up to whoever is in power.

It is clear that while most Africans still hold on to the ideals of pan-Africanism – mainly as a protest against Western domination and neo-colonialism – the real issue today is to have more wealth and power.

The middle class wants access to wealth, jobs and services, and is putting increasing pressure on the state to deliver it. Governments are beginning to realise this, especially following the recent events in North Africa.

This urban class is saying to the government, 'We don't agree with what you are doing.' There is a qualitative change in the way people are taking to the streets.

The protests against the scrapping of the fuel subsidy in Nigeria, for example, are so widespread because more citizens are becoming conscious of what they can achieve.


AN INVISIBLE CLASS

This emerging middle class in Africa is not always recognised as such, mostly because it does not adhere to international definitions.

However, those who certainly have understood the middle class are the multinational corporations. This is evident, for example, in the success of companies such as the South African cellphone company MTN across Africa. They have identified this lucrative market and supply tailor-made pre-paid packages to tap into its wealth. Insurance companies, too, realise that people with an education and income will need an insurance policy that is tailor-made for their specific situation.

Last year's impressive success of Kenya's charity fundraising for victims of the drought in Somalia confirms that there

NOT ALL GROWING AT THE SAME PACE



Source: www.issafrica.org/futures

Since the 1990s, continent-wide economic growth has seen a steady increase. Among other characteristics, this can be attributed to growing investment and higher commodity prices. Surprisingly, it also comes in the face of more volatile global economic times.

Under this façade of continent-wide growth, however, are deep regional differences. Northern and Southern Africa continue to represent the highest per capita (2 000 US\$) incomes on the continent. According to African Futures 2050, Northern Africa's growth continues to be dominated by its energy base, and Southern Africa is led, less so, by South

Africa's relatively diverse economy. In comparison, the poorest parts of the continent continue to be concentrated in the Central (only hovering near 2 000 US\$ per capita in 2050), Eastern and Western regions.

East Africa may provide a model for more dynamic growth in poorer regions, particularly because most countries' economies in the region do not rely heavily on energy sectors, but instead rely on a mixture of agriculture, services, and information and communications technologies (ICT). Countries like Kenya have, for example, become global innovators when it comes to ICT.

A huge amount of research still needs to be done in categorising Africa's middle class, which also differs from country to country within the continent.

are many Africans ready to spend money. Africa's middle class citizens are not necessarily in a suit and tie, but they are there, making and spending money. ■



Liesl Louw-Vaudran spoke to Mahboub Maalim, executive secretary of the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), about the challenges in Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and their surrounding border regions.

Q&A

Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF KENYA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA?

The incursion into Somalia was the result of serious problems that Kenya had been having with the Al Shabaab terrorists for some time. It reached a point where Kenya couldn't take it any more, so it went into Somalia, initially to create a buffer zone, but this has now been expanded. We had earlier asked that the African Union Mission for Somalia (Amisom) take in the Kenyan forces, and now they are part and parcel of Amisom. They have, in a sense, been 're-hatted'. We think this will strengthen the operations.

We also think there will be a change in the general situation in Somalia. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is finally in transition this year and we will have an election in Somalia. We have a roadmap to this election: the Kampala Accord, which was brokered by IGAD with the support of the UN.

Q WILL ELECTIONS BE POSSIBLE, GIVEN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOMALIA?

The TFG's mandate expires on 15 August, so we will have to have elections by then. There are of course many questions around this, but we think that by then the security situation will have improved considerably.

At the IGAD summit last year we also requested the Ethiopian government to assist. It is not going to do it under the umbrella of Amisom, but this will nevertheless help with the stabilisation of Somalia.

Q THERE ARE STILL FEARS OF REPRISALS IN KENYA FOR ITS MILITARY ACTION IN SOMALIA; WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF THIS?

After its initial attacks in Nairobi, Al Shabaab has been quiet. It is clearly becoming disenfranchised. It is in fact a guerrilla group that says it is fighting for an ideology, but that is not true. If it does have an ideology, it certainly isn't Islam. I am a Muslim myself. If Al Shabaab has any ideology it is that of thuggery and scare tactics.

But I think its followers realise their time is up. Now that Kenya is in Somalia, and Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti are coming in too, they see IGAD closing in on them. Earlier on the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution to keep IGAD from intervening in Somalia, but I think that was very limiting.

Q ERITREA IS NOT PART OF THIS GROUP?

Eritrea has played a destabilising role in Somalia. For a long time now, IGAD member states have accused Eritrea of supplying arms and ammunition to Al Shabaab and we have often called for targeted sanctions to discourage them, as well as a blockage of supplies to Al Shabaab. There was a time when Al Shabaab had better salaries and uniforms than the TFG, but things have changed since the UN approved a sanctions monitoring unit for Somalia. It discovered that this couldn't be looked at in isolation. The UNSC has therefore now approved the sanctions against Eritrea.

Q RELATIONS BETWEEN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN ARE NOT IMPROVING. IS THERE ANY THREAT OF A NEW WAR BREAKING OUT BETWEEN THE TWO?

No, I can't say that. We know there are serious issues, and [Kenyan] President Mwai Kibaki, who is chairperson of the subcommittee of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), is planning to call a meeting of the two presidents to discuss this.

On this point, I think it is regrettable that a Kenyan judge called [at the end of last year] for [Sudanese] President Omar Al Bashir to be arrested if he should set foot in Kenya. I do know that Kenya has obligations when it comes to the Rome Statute and the Kenyan courts have work to do.


But we in the executive also have work to do. We have to act together and look at this issue critically against other existing laws that govern sitting presidents, such as the Geneva Convention, as well as the African Union (AU) position. From an IGAD perspective, this judgment wasn't helpful.

Q WHY?

We have looked at this as a region and through the highest structure of the AU, which is the Assembly. For various reasons, the AU made a decision that we were not going to cooperate with the ICC on this matter.

I think Kenya should not try to stand alone and wriggle out of the decisions that have been made. **E**

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ZANU-PF

'Elections, come what may'



ZIMBABWEAN President Robert Mugabe and his Zanu-PF party are insisting that elections should be held this year. The opposition says previous elections have shown what a dangerous undertaking this could be and first wants a new constitution.

REUTERS/PHILIMON BULAWAYO

As the writing of a new constitution kicked off in December 2011, **Gwinyayi Dzinesa** believes this year is likely to see a referendum in Zimbabwe. But will it restore democracy?

At its December 2011 national conference, Zanu-PF declared that 2012 would be 'a year of elections' – with or without a new constitution – to terminate the shaky unity government that President Robert Mugabe has so often dismissed as 'dysfunctional'.

Indications are that the constitutional referendum will take place this year – a prerequisite for SADC and for the opposition before the presidential, legislative and local elections that Zanu-PF so badly wants can take place.

The constitution-drafting process is being conducted in a deeply polarised political environment characterised by mistrust between the political parties. Critics have accused the parties of being bent on manipulating the constitution-writing process to ensure the incorporation of their positions and interests at the expense of reflecting the will of the people.

Indeed, Zanu-PF attempted to stop the constitution-drafting process after the production of the first four preliminary draft chapters, accusing the drafters of siding with the MDC and importing items not raised during the outreach process, and thereby suppressing the views of the people.

There is a real concern that the process will fall victim to partisan capture, with political parties 'smuggling in' points that were not covered during the outreach phase. This creates the danger of a draft constitution that, while being palatable to entrenched political positions and interests, may fail to secure wide public support.

A LONG-AWAITED PROCESS

In December 2011, the long-awaited drafting of Zimbabwe's new constitution finally kicked off. The adoption of a new democratic constitution after consultation with the people is a key requirement of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of September 2008 that ended the election dispute between Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T and Mugabe of Zanu-PF and put

in place a transitional inclusive government in February 2009.

Given Zimbabwe's well-documented history of election-related violence, the adoption of a new democratic constitution is central to the GPA's goal of creating an environment conducive to the free and fair election of a substantive government.

It is also important for laying the foundations for a democratic society free of violence and intimidation. Democratisation and constitution writing are bedfellows in Zimbabwe, where the constitutional process has historically been built upon the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, criticised by analysts as a 'largely preconceived British settlement plan', through which Zimbabwe obtained independence in 1980.

The electoral roll that was first drawn up in 1985 is still in a shambles

In the past 30 years, the constitution, which many see as a symbol of British colonialism, has been amended 19 times, mostly by the previously ruling Zanu-PF, to centralise power and galvanise executive authority to the detriment of oppositional politics. A homemade constitution that is democratic in creation as well as in content is critical if there is to be durable peace in Zimbabwe.

While Article 6 of the GPA required the transitional coalition government to establish a new constitution within 20 months of its formation, enormous logistical, administrative and funding challenges delayed the constitution-drafting process by over a year.

The public consultation process that the GPA emphasised in order to ensure that the new constitution would be 'owned' by the people was acrimonious and long drawn out.

A Constitution Select Committee (CO-

PAC) set up by the unity government to lead constitution making and elicit popular views on a new constitution consisted of members of parliament and senate from the three political parties signatory to the GPA. Several civil society activists argued that Zanu-PF and the two MDC formations had captured the constitutional project and narrowed it to a struggle motivated by the pursuit of party political interests at the expense of the will of the people.

The National Constitutional Assembly, which is a coalition of civil society actors, even mooted an alternative people-driven process under the banner 'Take charge!' in protest at what it perceived to be a flawed parliament-led top-down procedure.

A POLARISED ATMOSPHERE

Zanu-PF and the MDC had been at each other's throats for years prior to their uneasy coexistence in the unity government. Predictably, party polarisation, participant coaching, violence and intimidation, mainly by Zanu-PF supporters and war veterans allied to the party, threatened to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the constitutional outreach programme.

Frequent outbreaks of violence between Zanu-PF and MDC loyalists interrupted the public consultations. This posed an obstacle to the active and effective participation of citizens in the constitution outreach programme. Zanu-PF reportedly used the consultation process to intimidate people as part of its efforts to ensure that the draft constitution would strongly reflect the party's preferences, such as a powerful executive president, no prime minister and preservation of the current security structures.

The police disrupted several MDC-organised preparatory constitutional reform meetings, beat participants and arbitrarily arrested some. Meanwhile, hardliners in Zanu-PF blocked attempts at discussing the contentious issue of security sector reform – widely seen as essential for a free and fair election given the sector's partisan involvement in violent political processes in order to influence the outcome of previous polls – during the constitutional outreach programme.

Notwithstanding this, the fact that the security sector was not one of the 17 themes used by the constitution select committee

(COPAC) teams in the outreach process may have placated an otherwise powerful faction that has the potential to derail the wider constitution-making process.

In a demonstration of the government's commitment, Finance Minister Tendai Biti specifically allocated US\$30 million

elections, it is important to recognise that constitution drafting is only part of a broader democratic reform process. This means that a series of electoral reforms tabled to prevent political violence should also be completed.

These reforms include the require-

Human Rights Commission to investigate cases of political violence as they arise. Special prosecutors and special magistrates courts dedicated to dealing with such cases must also be established. However, professional intervention by politically neutral law enforcement agencies is necessary if these new measures are to work.

A SMALL TEAM

The constitution-drafting committee led by three principal drafters – Justice Moses Chinhengo and constitutional experts Priscilla Madzonga and Brian Crozier – has made significant strides in producing a draft before the January 2012 lapse of the 35-day deadline. The drafters are using a list of agreed constitutional issues drawn by COPAC from a national report of people's submissions.

The chief drafters are being assisted by 17 experts – five from each of the three governing parties and two from the council of traditional chiefs. According to the timetable laid down in Article 6 of the GPA, COPAC is required to swiftly table the draft document before an all-stakeholders conference and then before Parliament for debate within a month of the conference. A referendum on the new draft constitution should be held within three months of the conclusion of Parliament's debate.

towards the constitution-making process and referendum from the US\$4 billion national annual budget for 2012. A further US\$5.5 million was set aside for other constitutional commitments, including the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.

NO ENDLESS BARGAINING

Civil society organisations have expressed their dismay at being excluded from the constitution-drafting process, saying that this undermines the representativeness and transparency of the process. Other critics have argued that the procedural choice to have a small drafting committee undermines public participation and deliberation at the critical constitution-writing stage.

However, having a smaller number of drafters may in fact stem logistical challenges and facilitate the more efficient production of a coherent constitutional document by precluding any possible need to bargain and compromise in order to accommodate numerous divergent personal interests that may not mirror popular will.

Although a new constitution is a significant precondition for free and fair

It is important that the guarantors of the GPA-SADC and the facilitator of the Intra-Zimbabwe dialogue (at present, South African President Jacob Zuma) stick to their calls for an end to violations of the provisions of the GPA

ment for the national police commissioner to appoint, in consultation with the Human Rights Commission, a senior police officer for each province, responsible for the expeditious investigation of cases of politically motivated violence. The officers should be assisted by provincial committees, including representatives of the political parties contesting the election, and chaired by a representative of the Human Rights Commission.

The police chief must also set up special police units in consultation with the

ELECTORAL ROLE IN SHAMBLES

To its credit, the unity government appointed a new Zimbabwe Electoral Commission in March 2010 in an effort to reduce political tension in the country. The Commission was composed so as to achieve a balance in membership between the main political parties. However, the composition of the Secretariat, whose staff includes ex-army officers sympathetic to Zanu-PF, was not changed.

It should be clearly spelled out whether the Commission's role is simply to run efficient elections or, more broadly, whether it is to supervise the whole environment in which elections take place. The Commission remains drastically undercapacitated and would struggle to organise an election called at short notice.

Meanwhile, the electoral roll that was first drawn up in 1985 is still in a shambles, including on its list 'voters' as young as two years old. It also includes many people who are no longer alive, as well as people who have left the country and no longer qualify to vote.

The two MDC formations remain adamant that elections should only be staged after the completion of wider democratic reform.

Against this backdrop, it is important that the guarantors of the GPA-SADC and the facilitator of the Intra-Zimbabwe dialogue (at present, South African President Jacob Zuma) stick to their calls for an end to violations of the provisions of the GPA; completion of the constitutional process, and the formulation of a clear road map to a constitutional referendum and free and fair elections.

It should also attend to addressing other outstanding issues, including security sector and media reforms as provided for in the GPA. Unless this happens, elections will not be held in an atmosphere conducive to restoring democracy in Zimbabwe. ■

Zimbabwe's economy has seen major improvements since the introduction of the US dollar and important reforms by the unity government installed in 2009. But a lot still hangs in the balance, reports **Barnabas Thondhlana** from Harare.

A Chinese yuan for Zimbabwe?

There is a palpably buoyant mood in Zimbabwe today, fuelled primarily by the fact that the economy has started to recover after a decade-long slump and the collapse of the local currency under staggering hyperinflation.

The unity government formed in 2009 by President Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai has stabilised the country, but investors remain uncertain as Zimbabwe inches toward new elections.

And statements by monetary authorities, such as central bank governor Gideon Gono's recent call for the adoption of the Chinese yuan instead of the US dollar that is currently being used as the country's main currency, have not helped matters.

Gono said that the subsequent introduction of a reconstituted Zimbabwe dollar alongside the Chinese yuan and other existing currencies would be both feasible and beneficial to the economy.

But some economic commentators feel the local currency should be reintroduced only when the country has adequate import cover and when capacity utilisation in industry increases. They believe that reintroducing the domestic currency cannot work unless the country works to curtail its imports. Figures presented by the minister of finance recently showed that Zimbabwe, whose capacity utilisation currently stands at 57%, is importing more than it exports and must therefore work to generate exports.

In any case, reintroducing the Zim dollar is bound to be an unpopular move; not because people do not like their local currency but because it cannot hope to compete against strong currencies such as the US dollar.

GROWING FROM A LOW BASE

In his recent 2012 budget statement, Zimbabwe's Finance Minister Tendai Biti said the multiple-currency system would remain in use until at least the end of next year.

Biti believes Zimbabwe's economy is likely to continue its strong recovery next year, to expand by 9.4% after a decade of decline. In his annual national budget, Biti said that agriculture and mining would be the main drivers of growth in the economy.



ZIMBABWE'S
controversial
Marange mines.

Reintroducing the Zim dollar is bound to be an unpopular move ... because it cannot hope to compete against strong currencies such as the US dollar

Despite controversy and confusion over a move by the unity government to boost local black ownership of mining firms, Biti said the sector attracted US\$502 million of investment in 2011.

Zimbabwe is home to the world's second-biggest deposits of platinum, and the country has vast reserves of gold, diamonds and coal.

Meanwhile, the government is pressing ahead with a law forcing mining firms to surrender at least a 51% stake to blacks, which has led miners to halt expansion of their local operations.

Biti said the mining sector was recovering gradually, with gold production ex-



ZIMBABWE'S Finance Minister Tendai Biti says a multi-currency system will be in place until at least the end of next year.



AP PHOTO/TSVANGIRAI MUKWAZHI

DIAMONDS TO FINANCE DICTATORSHIP

Zimbabwe stands to earn more than US\$3bn a year from the three Marange mines, it is reported; enough to end its economic woes almost at a stroke.

But if the revenue from diamond sales fell exclusively into the hands of President Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF it could, critics argue, spell the return of a single-party dictatorship and end the present shaky power-sharing arrangement between Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

The Rapaport Group of diamond traders said at the end of 2011 that it would boycott diamonds from Zimbabwe's Marange field, which has been widely associated with human rights abuses.

The US government has also placed two diamond companies, Mbada Diamonds and Anjin, on its sanctions list.

But this will have no impact on diamond sales, as India and China are turning out to be the biggest buyers of the gems. In any case a significant proportion of the diamonds find their way into the world's capitals through the underworld.

pected to more than double to 28 tonnes next year, while diamond sales could total US\$600 million. But he said the government was not receiving enough in taxes from mining, so it would hike royalties for gold to 7% from 4.5% while those for platinum would double to 10% this year.

Biti, however, also presented a budget skewed towards non-productive sectors of the economy, with 80% of the provisions of the budget financing employment costs and operations. Capital expenditure, which is necessary to increase productivity in economic sectors, has an allocation of only 20%.

Economic analyst Eric Bloch said while the GDP growth targets were attainable, the increase in mining royalties could undermine a sector driving economic recovery.

"The economy, which is growing off a low base, could even grow by as much as 15%. My biggest concern is the mining royalties. These are going to have a tremendous effect on mining operations, which are still recovering from a slump," Bloch said.

In response to Gono's calls for the adop-

tion of the yuan, Bloch said despite the great strength of China's currency, to a major extent China transacts its international trade in US dollars. 'It must also be borne in mind that Zimbabwe presently has relatively limited access to the yuan, its principal currency inflows being the South African rand and the US dollar. Save for export earnings on sales of diverse minerals and tobacco, Zimbabwe is not able to generate significant inflows of the Chinese currency.'

South Africa is Zimbabwe's principal trading partner for imports and exports, due to close proximity and regional collaboration. In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) into Zimbabwe has for many decades emanated from South Africa, resulting in strongly forged links between the two countries.

UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION

Of great concern, however, is the fact that revenues from diamond mining are not finding their way into the fiscus.

Tens of millions of dollars in diamond profits – perhaps more – are being secretly

extracted from state-owned mines in eastern Zimbabwe, bypassing the nation's treasury and raising fears that Mugabe is amassing wealth to help extend his 31-year reign, according to monitoring groups, diplomats, lawmakers and analysts.

'It's quite clear that there's much more money floating around than is justified by the level of economic activity,' said parliamentarian Eddie Cross, a Mugabe opponent. He told the legislature in October that, based on information from geologists and production records, one company alone mined US\$1.4 billion in diamonds in Marange last year. Biti said the treasury was meanwhile short-changed by at least US\$60 million last year.

An international ban on Zimbabwe selling diamonds from several of its rich eastern Marange mines was recently lifted by the industry's watchdog, the Kimberley Process. The ban was imposed in 2009, following allegations that some mines in Marange were controlled by Zimbabwe's military, which was channelling funds to Mugabe's Zanu-PF party. **E**

A new coat of paint for the



ABIDJAN'S Golf Hotel

By **Véronique Tadjou**

The swimming pool at the Golf Hotel in Abidjan has just reopened to the public, from 9am to 5pm each day. The water is clear and refreshing in this humid heat. Everything seems calm and peaceful. It reminds me of the time – it seems so long ago now – when I used to bring my children here to play in the water.

Yet this is where everything happened, where the fate of Côte d'Ivoire played itself out over the course of a few months. When the violence broke out after the second round of the presidential election on 28 November 2010, Alassane Ouattara, some members of his family and his entire government sought refuge at the Golf Hotel. The refusal of Laurent Gbagbo, the outgoing president, to accept his rival's electoral victory triggered a tussle for power that quickly turned into a scorched earth policy.

Although they were protected by forces from the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and had the world's cameras focused on them, Ouattara and his Prime Minister, Guillaume Soro who led the 2002 rebellion that split the country into two between the North and the South, could not leave the hotel, threatened as they were by forces loyal to

Gbagbo. Their food was airlifted in and they carried out their government and war meetings from within the four walls of this international hotel, renamed by Gbagbo supporters as 'the Golf Republic'.

It was also here that the elected president – who had been recognised as such by the international community – delivered his first speech. Outside, the war raged on. In the end, it took decisive intervention by Operation Unicorn (the French armed forces' peacekeeping operation in

hotel bed, looking dishevelled and wearing a vest, went round the world.

And now there is no trace of all that sound and fury. The Golf Hotel has gone back to normal. The rooms were cleaned and the walls repainted. When you enter the air-conditioned lobby, everything seems to be in place; the cosy lounge, the anonymous décor and the large bay window through which you can admire the pool and, a little further off, the lagoon, framed by the high skyline of Le Plateau, the city centre of Abidjan.

You could be anywhere. Recent history, it seems, has been replaced with amnesia. Except, of course, for the fact that Soro is still staying at the hotel, even if it is with the utmost discretion. A uniformed soldier is on guard at the entrance

to the corridor that leads to his rooms. Sandbags by the emergency exit indicate a military presence.

As for Ouattara, he doesn't live very far away. As chance would have it, his house is located in the same area, just a few roads away from the Golf Hotel. The old presidential residence having been partly destroyed, and an enormous arms cache belonging to Gbagbo's people having been found at the presidential palace in the

There's a huge desire for things to return to normal. People have gone to great lengths to remove all traces of the war and the catastrophic way in which democracy had to be restored

support of UNOCI) troops to capture Gbagbo, in a hail of rockets launched at the presidential residence, where he had gone to ground while his troops started to beat a retreat.

Naturally, he was taken straight to the Golf Hotel where, accompanied by his wife Simone and their son Michel, he was locked up in one of the rooms. He didn't stay there for long, but images of the deposed president, sitting on the edge of a

Golf Republic



middle of town, he prefers to live at home.

There's a huge desire for things to return to normal. People have gone to great lengths to remove all traces of the war and the catastrophic way in which democracy had to be restored. But the trauma is still there, and the country remains profoundly divided. Those faithful to Gbagbo (who, it must be remembered, took 46% of the vote in the first round of the presidential election) tend to see the political situation in terms of 'winners' and 'losers'. Rightly or wrongly, they feel marginalised. They are afraid of not being able to reinsert themselves in a transitioning society driven by members of a new elite who want to forge ahead. Their resentment prevents them from seeing how much cleaner the city is since the waste collectors went back to work. They tell themselves that the economic revival is just a mirage and the country is falling deeper and deeper into debt, in spite of financial aid from the international community and particularly France.

They also complain about a feeling of insecurity caused by the many weapons that are in circulation while the new army, Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), is not yet operational. Tensions are high between the members of Gbagbo's old

forces and those who fought for the current government. And what about those barefoot young fighters who are still waiting for the financial reward they were promised?

It's always the youth who have most to lose in war. Soaring unemployment and a broken-down education system have shattered the future of a whole generation. But something else weighs heavy in the balance – justice. Today Gbagbo is in the Hague, waiting to be judged at the Inter-

In the hope of better times to come, the streets of Abidjan were decorated with many festive lights for the end-of-year celebrations

national Criminal Court (ICC) for his crimes against humanity – the murders, rapes, inhumane acts and persecutions that were committed by his followers during the post-electoral violence.

Although the ICC has relieved Ouattara of the difficult task of judging him at home, Gbagbo's arrest makes the reconciliation process more difficult. Numerous international organisations have denounced the crimes committed by both sides during the civil war. Pro-Ouattara forces

also proved themselves capable of committing atrocities. When will the main culprits be judged?

It may be tempting to rely on time to make people forget, but it would also be dangerous. Impunity is like a gangrene that eats away at all efforts for peace. The Truth, Reconciliation and Dialogue Commission (TRDC), launched with such fanfare just a few months ago, will remain a hollow initiative if its hearings are not followed by equitable justice.

Ouattara needs to present himself not only as a technocrat and a competent economist but also as a unifying force and a politician with wide reach. Will the new elite pay attention to the people's desire for true democracy? It is still too early to know. Nonetheless, an important step was taken with the 11 December 2011 legislative elections, which were conducted under relatively good conditions even if the rate of abstention was high and Gbagbo's party, the Ivorian Popular Front, did not participate.

In the hope of better times to come, the streets of Abidjan were decorated with many festive lights for the end-of-year celebrations. And on the night of 31 December, the skies of the economic capital lit up with a spectacular fireworks display. A dazzling show to chase away a very bad year. **E**

Corruption busters needed



WILLIAM GUMEDÉ

Where significant private sectors have remained, they are often under the threat of possible nationalisation – or of simply not getting trading licences if they do not toe the line

Most well-intentioned corruption-busting remedies implemented in Africa by Western powers, donors and multi-lateral organisations fail because the root causes of corruption on the continent are poorly understood.

Post-independence African governments inherited deeply corrupt institutions, laws and values from the colonial and apartheid regimes that preceded them. However, instead of changing them for the better, African ruling parties and leaders have in many cases just further entrenched these deeply compromised governance systems.

In the majority of African colonies, the colonial elite centralised political, economic and civic power, reserving top jobs in the public, private and education sectors for fellow colonials. Furthermore, in the colonies, the institutions that should have served as watchdogs against corruption – the judiciary, police, security services and laws – selectively served only the elite. These institutions were more often subservient to the all-powerful colonial administrators or governors.

The colonial private sector, in most cases producing goods for export to the imperial market, was usually deeply dependent on the colonial government for licenses, contracts and subsidies and only rarely held it accountable. With few exceptions, the colonial media were equally bridled.

At African independence, most of the ousted colonial elites were replaced by other narrow elites, this time consisting of the independence movement aristocracy, including the dominant independence leader and dominant 'struggle' families, or the dominant ethnic group or political faction.

African independence movements tend to be highly centralised or strongly dominated by one leader and his political, ethnic or regional faction. This dominant structural makeup has allowed them to fit seamlessly into the similarly centralised political culture of the colonial governments.

The newly acquired state bureaucracy; the military, judiciary, nationalised private sector and so on, is often seen as the 'spoils' of victory of the independence struggle.

At independence, the indigenous communities of most African countries were relatively poor, unskilled and without any significant holding in the private sector. In most cases the majority of the grassroots cadres of independence movements have lacked extensive formal schooling or substantial careers outside the struggle.

They have to be provided for in terms of livelihoods after the struggle for liberation. This situation is fertile for corruption, as giving jobs to members of the same faction, ethnic group or region means the idea of merit-based appointments is thrown out of the window.

BUSINESS TOES THE PARTY LINE

Very few African countries at independence had a significant private sector, and those that did more than often than not saw it nationalised by the liberation-movement-turned-government.

Where significant private sectors have remained, they are often under the threat of possible nationalisation – or of simply not getting trading licences if they do not toe the line. As a result, they are unlikely to employ anyone known to be out of favour with the ruling elite.

Partly for these reasons, the private

sector in post-independence African countries is usually docile and unlikely to demand accountability from the government.

In many African ruling-party circles there is a misguided belief that corruption is a victimless crime. However, this is not the case, and corruption has a disproportionate impact on the lives of the poor. It undermines the delivery of public services, including houses, health, water, electricity, diverting financial and other resources that could be used for development, job creation, poverty alleviation etc. It also weakens the capacity of the state to deliver effective services equally, thereby undermining ordinary peoples' trust in their government.

HOW TO TACKLE CORRUPTION

Most African ruling parties and leaders currently lack the political will to tackle corruption sincerely. If this is to change, legislative gaps in dealing with corruption must be strengthened across African countries, and the enforcement of internal anti-corruption controls within states improved.

Africans need independent anti-corruption structures (whether private or civil-society led) to follow up on corrupt officials and ensure they have been brought to book, and to force police and public watchdogs to tackle the cases of corruption exposed in the media and by whistleblowers. The corruption-fighting capacity of existing institutions must also be strengthened.

These watchdogs must receive the appropriate budgets if they are to be able to attract the best candidates and to reward them well. Furthermore, they must be independent from the presidential office or any executive department, such as the police or the justice ministry, and be accountable to parliament.

African ruling parties must punish any bad behaviour, whether legal, social or political, on the part of their leaders and members, and reward good behaviour. Only if that is done publicly can a discredited government regain the moral

authority to deal credibly with transgressions from ordinary citizens. This in turn will help compel ordinary citizens to follow the rules.

Merit-based appointments to jobs in the public service and in politics will go a long way towards reducing the patronage system of jobs for pals, which fosters the environment for corruption.

Candidates for such positions should be judged on the basis of their competence, moral character and genuine commitment to public service.

Blaming the legacy of colonialism and apartheid has become an all-too-easy excuse for not acting against corruption. This will have to change

African ruling parties must bring in a higher calibre of leadership at all levels; people who are known and seen to be more competent, more honest and more decent. For this, a system of merit must be brought into internal party elections.

COURAGEOUS PEOPLE NEEDED

Africans need to actively encourage a new value system in their leaders; one that is not solely based on struggle credentials but that models transparency, accountability and commitment to developmental and societal change. Civil society will have to play a role in shaming leaders who espouse corrupt values and encouraging those who behave with integrity.

The solution is more exposure of corruption by the media and more and better investigative journalism. Unfortunately, the current perception across Africa is that whistle-blowers are more likely to be prosecuted than the corrupt individuals themselves.

The heads of most official anti-corruption organisations are punished by ruling parties if they attempt to tackle

official corruption head on. Whistle-blowers and anti-corruption activists must be celebrated by African civil society, to encourage more and more people to take a stand against corruption.


WESTERN COMPLICITY

African public officials have often dismissed the reports on corruption in Africa produced by international organisations, on the grounds that these reports are infused with Western bias. Of course this is true to some extent. However, that should be a separate debate that should not undermine discussion of the serious issue of corruption in Africa.

Blaming the legacy of colonialism and apartheid has become an all-too-easy excuse for not acting against corruption. This will have to change.

What's more, the hypocrisy in international politics, where Western countries turn a blind eye to official corruption by African ruling parties and leaders who are their allies, should be stopped. So too should the hypocrisy whereby certain Western companies essentially facilitate corruption in African countries in return for lucrative contracts.

One step towards achieving this would be to compel companies trading on government contracts to adhere to a set of integrity standards prohibiting corrupt activities. Civil society could monitor whether companies adhere to these standards.

Civil society groups in Western countries should also demand transparency and accountability from their governments and businesses for their behaviour and business practices in Africa. Corrupt businesses and individuals must be named and shamed – by the media, civil society, trade unions, social movements and NGOs, both in Africa and abroad – in order for corrupt businesses to feel the damaging reputational effects of their wrongful activities. 

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Skeletons in the cupboard:



FESTUS K ABOAGYE

The Netherlands seems to be leading a new crusade of taking moral responsibility for human rights violations perpetrated by its soldiers in its former colonies

Peacekeeping is evolving in ways that are difficult to predict, as demonstrated by the current shift in ideas about the responsibility for human rights violations that occurred prior to or during the deployment of peacekeeping missions to areas of conflict.

The Netherlands seems to be leading a new moral crusade by admitting responsibility for the human rights violations perpetrated by its soldiers in its former colonies. Last year, the Dutch state was held to account by its own courts for two such abuses; one related to deployments in the more recent Bosnian war and the other to its activities six decades ago during five years of repressing Indonesian independence.

In July 2011, a local appeals court in the Hague judged the country responsible for the deaths of three Bosnian Muslim men in 1995. The men had been among about 8 000 Muslim men and boys sheltering in the UN-declared 'safe area' of Srebrenica who were subsequently massacred.

Dutch culpability stemmed from the disgraceful surrender by Dutchbat (the UN Dutch battalion) of the Muslim men and boys to General Ratko Mladić's Army of Republika Srpska (VRS). The court found the Dutch state 'responsible for the death of [the three men in question] because Dutchbat should not have handed them over'.

The second case was the Hague civil court ruling and order in September for the Dutch government to compensate the widows of seven villagers in Rawagede, western Java, who had died in a notorious 1947 massacre when up to 430 men were rounded up and summarily executed by Dutch troops.

Although the Dutch government had previously expressed 'deep regret' for the massacre, which was condemned by the UN in 1948 as being 'ruthless and deliberate', the state had also argued that the widows were not entitled to compensation because of the expiry of the statute of

limitations (normally five years after the commission of a crime).

The court ruled that it was unreasonable to invoke the statute of limitations in this case, which was 'highly unusual' and had 'no precedent'.

'The court finds that the state acted wrongly through these executions and that the state is liable to pay damages in terms of the law,' said Judge Daphne Schreuder.

A LABORATORY FOR PEACEKEEPING

In 1945, after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the country, Indonesia was quick to declare its independence. However, the Dutch colonial government attempted to prevent Indonesian independence for a full five years until 1949.

Together with six other conflicts (see below), the Dutch-Indonesian conflict served as laboratory for evolving the peacekeeping mechanism by default of the UN Security Council (UNSC)'s failure to establish the 'collective security' mechanism provided in the UN Charter.

The six other conflicts were:

- The Soviet occupation of Iran (1946)
- The Albanian-led anti-Greek violence (1946-52)
- The issue of Palestine (1947 to date)
- The issue of Kashmir (1947 to date)
- The issue of Korea (1950-53)
- The Suez Crisis (1956-57)
- The Congo Crisis (1960-64)

The UNSC's failure to establish such collective security has continued to bedevil the evolution of peacekeeping, which has largely been dominated by the politics of some of its more powerful members.

The Dutch-Indonesian conflict at the end of World War II was no exception. The Netherlands initially received British backing in its attempt to re-establish its

the Dutch lead the way

colonial rule. The UNSC's initial response was ad hoc, calling on the parties to cease hostilities and accept arbitration.

UN WEAKNESSES

Glossing over Dutch atrocities during the conflict, the UNSC found it expedient to establish a Consular Commission, composed of Australia, Belgium, France, UK and the US, to observe a ceasefire that collapsed with the resumption of hostilities in late 1948.

It was only then, at the request of the UNSC, that the Consular Commission deployed up to 63 military observers to establish ceasefire lines, supervise troop withdrawals and infiltrations and investigate violations, among other things.

The manner in which the UNSC mandated and deployed the Consular Commission highlights a number of its key weaknesses and failures, including its glossing over of state responsibility and its conspicuous silence on condemning imperialist aggression against those struggling for legitimate self-determination.

In this way its actions have fed perceptions that it only looks after the interests of its powerful members (in this case Britain and the Netherlands).

The Council's apparent turning a blind eye to human rights abuses by states, emphasised expediency to 'keep the peace' at the cost of promoting and 'reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights' as laid out in the UN Charter.

LESSONS FROM INDONESIA

The Consular Commission achieved its mandate in the long run, but the truth is that its 63 supposedly unarmed military officers lacked the means for effective early mandate implementation. The outcome of Indonesian independence may have had more to do with political mediation than the presence of a small military group in such a vast country.

It is important to question the haste with which the UNSC still deploys large

missions with so-called 'protection of civilians' mandates that, like the Consular Commission, lack the means and the resources for mandate accomplishment.

In places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan-Darfur, the mere deployment of large missions with complex mandates has not met with success because such missions have continued to lack the means and the resources to fulfil their mandates.

However, more recently, the UNSC seems to be finding the right track by coupling peacekeeping interventions with processes to establish legal responsibility for human rights abuses. In addition to robust mandates and greater focus on the protection of civilians, the UNSC's referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC) of serious human rights abuses, genocide and crimes against humanity by state and non-state actors are certain to gain synergy between peacekeeping and sustainable peace building.

Especially in the context of violent armed conflicts in Africa, the role of the ICC can help to address the early moral failings of the UNSC by bringing the perpetrators of atrocities to trial. If the UNSC remains consistent in using the soft power of the ICC, that stance will send a powerful message to deter and minimise the propensity of warlords to resort to unlawful means and methods, even if their causes and objectives are legitimate at the outset.

All parties to conflict, as well as all peacekeeping actors, ought to bear in mind that their actions and interventions may be subject to close legal scrutiny for many years to come.

To consolidate peace and prevent the careless abandon with which states and groups resort to armed conflict, powerful states should emulate the Dutch example of cleaning up the political and legal skeletons in their national closets. Meanwhile, the UNSC and the international community should not relent in holding them to account. **E**

To consolidate peace and prevent the careless abandon with which states and groups resort to armed conflict, powerful states should emulate the Dutch example of cleaning up the political and legal skeletons in their national closets

Dianna Games takes a look at the year ahead for Africa and the challenges facing the continent's two major economies, Nigeria and South Africa.

A big year for two giants

The New Year started in Nigeria with a bang. Just as the country was getting over the Christmas bombing of a church by an Islamist group, killing dozens of people, the government caused rage by removing its longstanding subsidy on fuel.

A protracted public strike brought the economy to a standstill. Luminaries such as writer Wole Soyinka predicted that the economic giant was on the verge of a civil war, and one of Africa's most attractive investment targets was temporarily put on hold while investors waited to see how the drama would play itself out.

At the other end of the continent, in South Africa, the ruling ANC also started things with a bang – this time the popping of champagne corks – as it launched a year of centenary celebrations.

But all this partying masks a deep-rooted power struggle in which SA President Jacob Zuma is fighting for his political life. The country has trying times ahead, with policymakers and power brokers increasingly distracted by the party leadership battle that is set down for the end of the year, when Zuma aims to stand for a second term as ANC president.

However, the trajectory of Africa's two giant economies will, now more than ever, influence that of the continent itself. This may be a watershed year for Nigeria – if it can solve its current security problems – as the privatisation of the power sector brings significant new investment to the industry. And if the stalled Petroleum Industry Bill is finally passed, it should remove uncertainty around the regulatory framework and that sector too may see renewed investment.

Meanwhile, South Africa's role in the United Nations and the African Union may give it a much-needed boost in its desire to be a leader in Africa. It too is likely

to see a lot more investment from new emerging markets as it positions itself as a gateway to Africa, although its low growth rates remain a cause for concern.

A SLUMP IN DEMAND

But the performance of these countries, along with that of many others, is likely to be affected by the recession looming in the Eurozone. Although trade with non-traditional partners now accounts for about 50% of sub-Saharan Africa's exports, 37% of non-oil exports still go to European markets.

This may be a watershed year for Nigeria – if it can solve its current security problems – as the privatisation of the power sector brings significant new investment to the industry


The problems in developed economies may also have an impact on the growth trajectories of the emerging markets, notably China, that are driving new investment and trade in Africa. Any significant slump in demand from developed countries could quickly undermine the high growth rates being predicted for much of the continent.

There are other potential flashpoints for Africa in 2012. In Zimbabwe, always a wildcard in predicting future developments in African countries, tensions are rising as President Robert Mugabe's health declines. Zanu-PF's calls for an election this year are becoming ever louder while its unity government partner, the Movement for Democratic Change, insists on

keeping to the negotiated roadmap – which appears to have drifted off course and may not deliver an election date in 2012. Whatever happens, there is an outside chance that Africa may see the demise of one of its last political dinosaurs – Mugabe – before the dawn of 2013.

Other important elections to watch are those in Kenya and Angola. The former's previous election turmoil does not look likely to repeat itself – but then again, no one from outside the country saw it coming last time. Any instability there is likely to undermine the region's growth trajectory, given Kenya's weight in the East African economy.

The elections in Angola are another potential flashpoint. They include the long-awaited presidential election, which will be



NOT A GOOD start to the year. People run with a placard of President Goodluck Jonathan as they protest on the streets of Lagos on 9 January following the removal of the fuel subsidy by the government. The writer believes this could be a watershed year for Nigeria.

contested by Eduardo dos Santos, president since 1979, quashing recent speculation that he would nominate a successor to take over from him after 33 years in power.

And, of course, the situation in North Africa is still uncertain, with most countries either in the midst of political upheaval or recovering from it and trying to grapple with new realities. With its strong ties to European trading partners, this region is also likely to be the hardest hit by the problems in the Eurozone.

RENEGOTIATING CONTRACTS

Another issue likely to dominate 2012 is the positioning of African countries to gain more revenue from their resources in the wake of heightened investor interest.

Although the debate about nationalising mining assets has not gained much traction beyond South Africa, several countries are increasing corporate taxes and royalties for mining companies and revising mining frameworks to push up the government's mandatory stake in mining projects.

For example,

Guinea's new mining code, passed in late 2011, increases the portion of a mining project the state can hold from 15% to 35%. Ghana raised its corporate tax for miners to 35% from 25% and announced a separate 10% windfall tax on mining profits, while Tanzania has hiked royalties and proposed a 'super tax' on mining profits.

In the oil and gas industry, the state 'take' – a combination of taxes, royalties, payments and other related corporate obligations to governments – is rising as governments renegotiate their relationships with foreign oil companies and new oil producers start on a high base. In Uganda, for example, this 'take' is currently at a very high 80%.

It is not only from the resources sector that governments are targeting new sources of revenue. In 2010 the Tanzanian government passed a law making it mandatory for foreign telecoms investors to list their companies from 2013. As the date gets closer, other countries may start looking at similar schemes to generate revenue.

Nigeria has already passed a 'local content' law for the oil industry, setting targets to draw more Nigerians into the sector through hiring, procurement, suppliers and other areas.

On the macroeconomic front, African governments are facing a range of problems including high unemployment, inflation, high food prices, mushrooming state wage bills and high fuel prices, on top of the general costs of governmental inefficiency and infrastructural weakness.

But for all its problems, Africa remains an attractive target for investment in sectors ranging from resources and green energy to private equity, and the continent still has the potential to realise growth of almost 6% this year.

With mergers and acquisitions set to grow, the private sector could look very different in a year's time as many more African multinationals could emerge, boosted by foreign money and expertise. As the 'new frontier' of investment, the continent has a fighting chance of coming out of the year on a positive note. But for this to happen, it is important to remember that the problems of 2011 and many years before that are still with us and need to be attended to. There is a lot of work to do before Africa can start to realise the full benefits of all the attention it is starting to get. **E**



AP PHOTO/SUNDAY ALAMBA

Writing about the elusive Tsvangirai

A new autobiography records the history of Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the life of Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. **Liesl Louw-Vaudran** spoke to William Bango, co-author of the book.

I caught up with William Bango, former spokesman for Morgan Tsvangirai, in a nearly deserted restaurant in one of Harare's former leafy suburbs. Things are slowly picking up in Zimbabwe – thanks to the new power-sharing government, the days of hyper-inflation are over – but the capital city will take a long time to return to what it used to be.

Bango is back in his country after a stint in Cambridge, UK, where he took a break, as he says, 'far from the madding crowd' – away, that is, from the stress of opposition politics in Zimbabwe.

This is where he started compiling notes for *At the Deep End*, a book whose 550 pages read more like an inventory of events than a revealing autobiography. 'At one point we decided to record all our meetings and for two months I listened to the tapes and transcribed them,' he says.

Bango, a journalist, says he first earned his 'struggle colours' and then, when Robert Mugabe came to power, he travelled with the president on official visits, 'following him around ... making him look good'.

But like many MDC members, he quickly became disillusioned with what Zanu-PF had to offer and threw his weight behind Tsvangirai, whom he then represented for six and a half years.

According to Bango, the book was never intended to be a personal account of Tsvangirai's life so much as a way to put on record much of what has been happening in the last few volatile years in Zimbabwe.

It is true that those looking for a deeper insight into Tsvangirai's personality and thoughts will be disappointed. Still, as he recounts his personal history the reader does get a sense of where Tsvangirai comes from.

He never participated in the struggle against the colonial rulers, never fought in the 'bush', and only briefly joined Zanu-PF. 'In this book Morgan wanted to make things clear, because people say he ran away from the war,' explains Bango.

Is this what has created the deep antagonism towards him from the likes of President Robert Mugabe and former South African president Thabo Mbeki? One remembers Mbeki's scathing letter, sent during political negotiations in November 2008, in which he accused Tsvangirai of being a lackey to the west. But then, Mbeki didn't fight in camouflage hiding from warplanes either.

A RELUCTANT LEADER

Bango insists that Tsvangirai was 'never a political animal' and did not aim for a leadership position right from the start – neither in the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) nor in the MDC. 'He was asked by people to lead the ZCTU in 1988, at a time when he was prepared for it.'

In the book, Tsvangirai describes how a delegation visited him late the night before the voting for the ZCTU secretary general, saying that Gibson Sibanda, then secretary general, had pulled out.

Throughout the book the impression is created of Tsvangirai as a reluctant

leader devoted to his beloved wife Susan (who died in a car crash in 2009) and his children. Yet he is undoubtedly a brave man to have taken on the powerful post-liberation hero Mugabe and his Zanu-PF.

'In Zimbabwe we have a problem challenging authority, but Morgan has a way of expressing himself that people saw as bravery.'

As is also the case in South Africa with the all-powerful ANC, Zanu-PF enjoys the aura of a liberation movement both inside and outside Africa.

'This camaraderie is natural between people who were in exile together and feel they have been anointed to run their country,' says Bango. They see nothing wrong with oppressing their own people, enriching themselves or mocking the rich and famous.

Changing the power balance in Africa can never be a leisurely stroll in a tropical garden

A NEW GENERATION

Tsvangirai also makes reference to Zambia, which became one of the first of Zimbabwe's neighbours to successfully challenge its own liberation party when Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) took over from Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP).

Tsvangirai writes, 'Changing the power balance in Africa can never be a leisurely stroll in a tropical garden.' At the time of Chiluba's takeover, Tsvangirai believed Zimbabwe wasn't yet ready for political opposition and waited another nine years before forming the MDC.

'Their (the MMD's) leadership came from disgruntled nationalists recycled into the opposition, but the MDC, although it had some nationalists, had a new generation, many of whom had no emotional attachment with the liberation struggle or racial discrimination and economic subjugation.'

'Today 70% of the voters are under 40 years old and have no attachment to the



liberation struggle. [...] The people who joined the MDC didn't care that Morgan hadn't been in the struggle.'

When the MDC was founded out of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the only civil-society organisations in Zimbabwe were the trade unions and the church. 'By 2000, everyone was disappointed with the government.' Farm workers were very unionised. They had a raw deal because their bosses now got on very well with the Mugabe government.'

The poor and unemployed were angry about the elite class 'getting greedy'. 'The groundswell which was ready for easy pickings was already there.'

The history from here on is well known: the war veterans started pressurising Mugabe for pensions, Zimbabwe became involved in the costly war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Zimbabwean dollar collapsed and white farmers became the scapegoat for Zimbabwe's woes.

'At that time, whites were demobilised politically and were just focusing on their farms and businesses,' insists Bango.

Of the many accusations that have been levelled against Tsvangirai is that he was 'fronting for the whites' and opposing legitimate land reform in Zimbabwe, but he insists in the book that this wasn't true.

'Initially, when the MDC was formed, whites and black businesspeople formed support groups for the MDC but never spoke out in the open.'

The way the international media focused only on whites being killed in the struggle against oppression by Zanu-PF was also an affront to the opposition, says Bango.

'In the run-up to the 2000 referendum, two or three whites were killed but 48 blacks. The black Zimbabweans were never on CNN.'

EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT TSVANGIRAI

Apart from accusing him of being a puppet of the West and of white Zimbabweans, Zanu-PF also

tried various other strategies to discredit the opposition leader, including farcical accusations that he had paid the Israeli Ari Ben Menashe to assassinate Mugabe and overthrow the state.

This did not work, nor could they get to him by accusing him of corruption. Bango believes that the secret to Tsvangirai's strength is his simplicity 'as an

ordinary man' who has no personal bank account and refuses to handle the party's money.

In November 2011, accusations surfaced that Tsvangirai had had various affairs and produced several illegitimate children. He also allegedly paid lobola for businesswoman Locadia Tembo, but then at the last minute refused to marry her.

In Harare, some Tsvangirai supporters told me how disappointed they were that their leader could make such 'stupid mistakes' when he was on the verge of success, faced with an ailing Mugabe and a Zanu-PF riddled with infighting but, Bango believes, 'Ordinary people are likely to make allowances for him.'

The scandal is part of a strategy to get at Tsvangirai's 'brand', he says. 'The MDC has a brand and Tsvangirai has a brand, which is essential.'

MDC MISTAKES

In the book Tsvangirai, surprisingly, admits that the MDC had made a mistake by voting 'no' in the 2000 referendum over the new constitution being proposed by Mugabe and Zanu-PF. The 'no' votes won the day and 'humiliated Mugabe.'

To me, Mugabe was a leader who would readily burn down a house rather than live in it with a colleague or compatriot who had differences with him

'We could have saved ourselves ten years of political chaos, economic havoc and a hazardous struggle to achieve democracy,' he writes.

But Mugabe was never going to be easily overthrown, not in 2002 and not in 2008. Tsvangirai writes, 'To me, Mugabe was a leader who would readily burn down a house rather than live in it with a colleague or compatriot who had differences with him.'

After flawed elections in 2008 and a power-sharing agreement backed by the SADC, Zanu-PF is now calling for early elections. However, Bango believes that the SADC, the African Union and big businesses in Zimbabwe do not want the elections to take place before proper reforms and a new constitution.

'There is consensus that the Zimbabwe fiasco should end, but there will be no election if the stakeholders don't want it,' he says. E

How to write about Kenya

***One day I will write about this place* by Binyavanga Wainaina**

Granta 2011

Reviewer: Liesl Louw-Vaudran

We've waited a long time for this book. The author of the well-known Granta article entitled 'How to write about Africa' (2005) – a hilariously damning piece about how outsiders tend to exoticise the African experience – has now produced a finely tuned literary work that is funny, entertaining and profound.

Wainaina has been busy as editor of *Kwani?* magazine and now runs the Chinua Achebe Foundation in New York. In 2002 he won the Cain Prize for Literature – the event, he says, that finally made it possible for him to make a living out of writing.

In *One day I will write about this place*, Wainaina recounts his childhood in rural Kenya in delightful detail, dragging us into the world of a nine-year-old in the town of Nakuru experiencing all the emotions and events of growing up against the backdrop of a post-colonial Kenya. ('Television people say Keenya. We say Ke-nya,' he reminds us.)

Many of the scenes are genuinely funny and will bring a smile and a nod from those who have lived in this part of Africa.

For example, when a wedding party get drenched in the rain and rush to his mother's Green Art Hair Salon for urgent repairs to their hairdos. However, the hilarious scene turns sour when a neighbour accuses Wainaina's mother and her assistant of

being 'Ugandans who come to spoil our country,' and an ugly confrontation follows on the sidewalk.

Going to school at Lena Moi Primary School, initially named after the wife of then-president Daniel arap Moi, is a privilege. It is here that Wainaina and his sister Ciru learn to speak 'prim and proper' English, sing in the choir and try dancing like Michael Jackson. The school later has to change its name – stationery, nametags and all – after Lena Moi slaps her husband at an official ceremony. It is now Moi Primary School.

'The letter 'r' climbs into her Gikuyu tongue intact, slaps against the roof of her mouth and is broken into thousand letter 'i's

The children do very well at school, although when they move up to high school the dark reality of tribal politics in Kenya emerges. They are not admitted to any of the best schools in the country because they are Gikuyu, victims of the anti-Gikuyu backlash following the death of the first president Jomo Kenyatta.

The ethnic theme surfaces time and again throughout the book – the devastating reality that led the country to disaster after the 2007 presidential elections.

Interwoven with the story of Wainaina's many experiences as a child and later as a student in South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal is a deep examination of the English language and its use by non-English speakers.

Wainaina's playful prose is reminiscent of the magical appropriation of the



verb by writers like Salman Rushdie – taking the reader into the other space, the other place, where English has become something totally new.

Many readers will instantly recognise his observations on the way his countrymen tend to switch their 'r's and 'l's. 'The letter 'r' climbs into her Gikuyu tongue intact, slaps against the roof of her mouth and is broken into thousand letter 'l's,' he says, talking of the children's nanny, Wambui.

Another wonderful theme in this book is the intimate descriptions of music – both Western and African – and how it accompanies the young boy through to adulthood. The Congolese 'clanging' is 'the sound of our times,' and Brenda Fassie triumphs while Bob Geldof, 'a dirty, pale man with wild eyes,' is crowned king of Ethiopia.

Later, on a visit to Togo, Wainaina writes about the excitement in the run-up to the World Cup soccer final in Germany.

If you want to be successful in business in Africa you have to be like a soccer player, he concludes. 'You have to have an eye that does not just understand the structure of the opposition, but also can fake, deceive, con, charm.'

Throughout the book the reader is acutely aware of Wainaina's high hopes for his country. Alas, this is not the Kenya he dreamt of as a child. When the terrible 2007-8 post-electoral violence breaks out he asks: 'Why this time? Five years ago we had a near-perfect election. Who knows? Could be the price of oil; the beef in China; paranoia about Gikuyu entitlement; paranoia about Kalenjin entitlement; Luo betrayed again; if they win won't there be reprisals?'

Remembering his earlier warning about stereotyping Africa, is this how Wainaina believes we *should* write about Africa? It is certainly extremely enjoyable, good writing, with some unforgettable passages about Africa and its past. **E**


Five years ago we had a near-perfect election. Who knows? Could be the price of oil; the beef in China; paranoia about Gikuyu entitlement...

CELEBRATING 100 YEARS

As the ANC celebrates 100 years of existence, more and more books on the organization's history are appearing on the shelves.

Heidi Holland's *100 Years of Struggle – Mandela's ANC* has just been published by Penguin books. Holland has written numerous non-fiction books, including the acclaimed *Dinner with Mugabe*.

Prof. Susan Booysen, well-known commentator and political analyst based at Wits University's Graduate School of Public and Development Management, also recently launched a new book entitled *The African National Congress and the Regeneration of Political Power*, published by Wits University Press. **E**





INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

Cape Town
May 2012

African perspectives on the challenges and opportunities for the new ICC Prosecutor

The election of the ICC's new Prosecutor in December 2011 is a milestone for the court. This is undoubtedly one of the most important positions within the ICC – and its most public. It comes as no surprise that Africa has followed the process closely and that expectations of the new Prosecutor are high. African states form one of the largest signatory blocs to the Rome Statute, and all of the ICC's seven situations deal with crimes committed on the continent.

The fact that all the ICC's cases are in Africa, together with fundamental concerns about the UN Security Council's role in the court's work, has resulted in criticisms that the ICC is a neo-colonialist exercise that unfairly targets the continent. Relations between the court and some states, as well as the African Union, are now strained. Of most concern is that several African governments, including states parties to the Rome Statute, have refused to cooperate with the court in the arrest and surrender of suspects.

The ICC's current Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, has borne the brunt of Africa's dissatisfaction with the court. As a result, many on the continent expect the election process to deliver a Prosecutor less inclined to keep the ICC's focus on Africa. Fostering political support for the court in Africa is a complex task, but one that will be an immediate priority for the new Prosecutor.

The International Crime in Africa Programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria will host an international symposium in Cape Town in May 2012 to consider these issues. The symposium aims to:

- Provide a constructive forum for debate between African stakeholders and the Office of the Prosecutor.
- Enable frank discussions between senior African government officials, international and regional organisations, and leading civil society representatives on the problems, prospects and expectations for the Office of the Prosecutor.

Blue-light brigades

Adriaan Basson, *Finish & Klaar: Selebi's Fall from Interpol to the Underworld* (Tafelberg 2010)

Reviewed by William Gumede

Adriaan Basson's *Finish & Klaar: Selebi's Fall from Interpol to the Underworld* shows just how 'normal' corruption has become in South Africa.

It is a chilling exposition of just how far the value distinction between right and wrong has blurred. Basson's book should serve as a wake-up call, telling South Africans that corruption is preventing the better life that we believed would be ushered in by democracy.

Jackie Selebi, the former South African national police commissioner, was found guilty of corruption on 2 July 2010 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. His appeal against this sentence was overturned on 2 December 2011.

Throughout his corruption trial, Selebi insisted that he did nothing wrong, including, incredibly, his association with known drug kingpins. In South Africa there is clearly a mismatch between our democratic values and rules and the daily actions of our leaders, whether in politics or business.

A SITUATION RIPE FOR CORRUPTION

Basson describes how Glenn Agliotti, an alleged crime kingpin, had not only befriended Selebi, as well as his inner circle, but also infiltrated the higher echelons of the ANC leadership.

When the ANC returned from exile in 1990, most of the ex-cadres had to be provided with jobs, in order to re-integrate them and normalise their lives. At the time he met Agliotti, Selebi was in charge of taking care of returned ANC cadres.

Inevitably, there was a surplus of unemployed cadres with no profession to turn to. This situation is ripe for corruption in a number of ways. In many liberation and independence movements-turned-

governments, the 'struggle aristocracies' are often in the position of dishing out patronage – jobs, government tenders and newly nationalised private companies. Meanwhile, jobless cadres, having to make a livelihood in society, are forced to seek out, by fair means or foul, the patronage of the leaders with control over the distribution of the 'spoils'.

Dodgy businessmen, such as former mining magnate Brett Kebble who was assassinated in 2005, and alleged crime kingpins like Agliotti, bestowed their patronage on to rising (but impoverished) ANC cadres such as Selebi, who could help them secure favours and contracts with the new ANC government.

A BLING CULTURE

Basson describes how Angliotti secured Selebi's friendship in the early 1990s by offering to pay the hospital fees that Selebi could not afford. After that, Selebi was in Agliotti's debt.

Selebi's adherence to new culture of 'bling' that has taken root in the ANC and among the new black elite (as well, of course, as the old white elite) further fuelled the Selebi-Agliotti relationship. When the new ANC leaders came to power, they inherited the trappings of state power left by the apartheid government: the state cars with bodyguards,

villas, being waited on, free private schooling for their children, free health-care, free luxury travel, and so on. Leaders drive cars worth millions. They wear watches costing R250 000 and clothes worth as much as ordinary cars. They live in Beverly Hill-style mansions and drink expensive whiskies. The blue-light brigades, huge entourages and being treated like VIPs are an integral part of this culture.


This lifestyle, rather than one's contribution to public service or the public good, has become the new measure of achievement.

Selebi, a close ally of former president Thabo Mbeki, who was ousted by current President Jacob Zuma at the ANC's 2007 Polokwane conference, insists that his prosecution has been politically motivated. Some of Selebi's associates say that if he had only changed sides to the Zuma group, he would probably have been able to avoid prosecution in one way or another. Sadly, there is a perception that corruption is often selectively prosecuted – depending on whether or not the individual is close to the leading faction.

It certainly appears to be more diligently prosecuted if carried out by someone from an opposing faction. This perception of inequality seriously undermines the fight against corruption in South Africa. **E**



William Gumede is author of the bestselling Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC.



On a road trip from Morocco to South Africa, **Coen van Wyk** took these photos in Gabon, Mali, Ghana and Cameroon.

Send us your pictures to
llouw@issafrica.org





THE POLITICS OF A HUSTLE ECONOMY

by Tanya Pampalone

It was a languid Monday afternoon in November when a local journalist took us through Kinshasa's diplomatic quarter alongside the Congo River.

Isaac pointed out the sites. There was the Grand Hotel, which charges upwards of US\$250 a night, with local politicians and journalists milling about in its corridors while outside, election observers waited to hop into their ubiquitous white SUVs with the supersized black initials of the United Nations.

Up the road from the hotel, behind a boom monitored by soldiers, was President Joseph Kabila's Gombe home, and nearby, quiet rows of fancy foreign compounds and modern apartment blocks on tree-lined streets where expatriates jogged.

As we walked and talked of the upcoming elections, Isaac, who prided himself on his integrity in a country where it is common for journalists to be given 'tips' by those they write about, told us how he chided his friends who had plans of going into politics. A few minutes later, though, he added that perhaps, in a few years, he might join them. 'After six months in politics, you can build a home like that,' Isaac said, gesturing toward a rather grand building with high walls.

But in a country where politicians make between US\$5 000 and US\$8 000 a month, their salary would get you nowhere near enough to build a house like that in this city. Even renting one of those fancy Western flats is going to set you back

close to US\$4 000 a month. However, it goes without saying in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that you use your political power to fund your lifestyle. Corruption is a national pastime here.

Petrus de Kock, a senior researcher for the South African Institute for International Affairs, says he sees the economic situation like this: 'It's a day-to-day grind. What you end up with is a hustle economy from street level up to the highest political offices. That kind of economy shapes behaviour and leads to corrupt practices. Either you're going to eat today or you're going to be hungry – that's the kind of socioeconomic understanding that people face on a day-to-day basis.'

The reality experienced by the rest of Kinshasa's population is very different from that of Gombe. On many roads, you have to manoeuvre around pond-sized potholes and snake past minibus taxis without windows, battered doors held closed by passengers or not at all. Rubbish is piled up in small grey mountains, and streams are choked with bottles and plastic bags.

In Tshangu, one of the poorest and most densely populated areas of the city, vendors scrape by selling dried fish or peanuts churned into peanut butter. As we passed through the area one day, some residents shouted, 'Madame, tell Obama how we are suffering.'

A January article in the *New York Times* referred to the practice of *délestage* – referring to food rationing – and pointed to the

2011 Global Hunger Index put out by the International Food Policy Research Institute, in which the DRC came last. It also came in last in the 187 countries ranked in the UN's 2011 Human Development Index.

But the country is rich in deposits of minerals like cobalt (used to make cell-phones and laptops) and this is where multinational corporations, and the militias that assist them, have made their money. It's not hard to see how the politicians have cashed in. Transparency International, the global non-governmental anti-corruption organisation, ranked the DRC 168th of 183 countries in its 2011 corruption perceptions index.

In the recent National Assembly elections that ran alongside the presidential elections in November – which appear to have kept Kabila in power despite civil society groups seriously questioning their credibility – more than 19 000 candidates ran for 500 seats.

A few weeks before the polls, I asked the head of a regional democracy advocacy group why the candidate list was so bloated. He explained by way of an example: while recruiting for a position in his organisation's Kinshasa office, each candidate was asked what their aspirations were. Almost everyone interviewed said they were headed for politics. The path to financial success in the DRC is clear – and succeeding in politics is like winning the lottery. ■

– Tanya Pampalone is features editor for the Mail & Guardian

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