

VIEWS AND ANALYSES FROM THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

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# Nothing like a clean war

Dear Reader...

**T**he official inauguration of an independent South Sudan was for many an immensely joyful occasion, but for others a traumatic event that signalled the failure of 'making unity attractive'.

Many are asking, what does this mean for other states struggling to accommodate regional, religious and ethnic differences? And what are the implications for a viable state in South Sudan?

Over a number of issues *the-african.org* has reported on the unfolding events in what used to be Africa's largest country, Sudan.

This time we look at the new leaders taking over Africa's youngest country – a former liberation movement with severe internal strife and huge challenges ahead.

In two separate interviews the ambassadors to South Africa from South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan also give their views on what this means.

Strikingly, both men seem to be offering a hand of friendship to the other, realising the many commonalities between the new neighbours.

Dark clouds gather, though, due to the intensifying disputes in border regions and over the many outstanding issues still to be resolved through discussions between the North and South.

If independence had been a way to end the continuing wars between the two parts of Sudan, it would be tragic if conflicts once again broke out across the region over land and resources.

**Meanwhile, as we go to print,** the war in Libya is continuing to divide the African Union and stir strong emotions across the continent.

While the NATO countries, especially France, are increasingly engaged in a somber

soul-searching of why the Libyan air raids are taking so long to achieve their goal, others, more cynical, believe the end will not even be in sight before the end of the year.

An argument heard in the Arab world is that the allies – France, Britain and the US – are confident that the rebuilding of Libya will be portioned out to their companies, financed by Libyan oil, 'just like in Iraq'. Delaying the end game will therefore be in their interest.

This is certainly not the impression one gets from debates in the European media.

The French weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*, for example, recently listed all the possible reasons for the failure of the air raids to achieve a speedy resolution.

## Five months down the line the conflict is still raging – at a huge cost

These include internal problems in NATO, the unwillingness of the US to fully commit its sophisticated weaponry and the weakness of the members of the Libyan National Transitional Council.

Added to this of course is the fact that the no-fly zone lobby underestimated Gaddafi.

Who, for example, would have guessed that he would buy hundreds of pick-up trucks in Mali and Niger that resemble those used by the rebels, to confuse the allied pilots? African experts, however, could have told France about this even before the war had started.

'There is nothing like a quick and clean war,' said South African independent defense expert Mr. Helmoed-Romer Heitman at a conference held at the ISS in Pretoria on 24 March, when the ink on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 permitting a no-fly zone over Libya was barely dry.

Five months down the line the conflict is still raging – at a huge cost.

**Following the dramatic events in North Africa,** two previously relatively stable West African countries, Burkina Faso and Senegal, have also experienced popular protests.

In both countries the president seems increasingly unpopular and is accused of overstaying his welcome.

Blaise Compaoré from Burkina Faso has been in power since 1987 and Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade (85) is insisting on being a candidate in elections in 2012.

People's frustration with their leaders is compounded by increasing poverty. Even those who manage to make a fairly decent living have to cope with constant power cuts, lack of services, bad roads and a general rise in food prices.

At this stage it isn't clear where these protests will lead. President Wade doesn't seem willing to let go of the idea of having his son Karim Wade take over from him and is using all manners of persuasion – including perks and a rise in status for traditional leaders – to pull this off.

In Burkina Faso senior members of the army, who started the protests, were dismissed to prevent the possibility of a full-blown coup.

Yet Compaoré is certainly in trouble.

The example of these two countries, including what we are increasingly seeing in Malawi, Uganda, Swaziland and elsewhere, is an indication that anti-government protests by disgruntled citizens could lead to even more dramatic events than what we have seen in North Africa.

I hope you will enjoy this issue and continue to send your own views and analysis of events unfolding in Africa.

**Liesl Louw-Vaudran**  
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## Temporary victory for protestors in Senegal

Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade has decided to withdraw controversial constitutional proposals after they were met with significant protests. These protests signify the growing unpopularity of Wade's presidency, especially over the past few years, in which he is perceived as presiding over deteriorating socioeconomic conditions whilst attempting to further his stay in power and pass on the presidency to his son in the future.

People reacted angrily to Wade's proposal to alter the electoral system from the two-round majority system (requiring absolute majority in order to win) to a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system with a minimum threshold of 25% in the first round.

Another contentious issue is his candidature in the 2012 presidential elections. It should be noted that there was no term limit in the Senegalese constitution when Wade came to power in March 2000, though in 2001 a new constitution reduced presidential term lengths from seven to five years and instituted a two-term limit.

Wade served his first term under the accords of the old constitution, leaving him in a position to argue that his re-election in 2007 was the commencement of the first of two potential terms according to the new constitution.

Wade has stated his intention to run in 2012, which would amount to a third term, according to critics, while he argues it would only be his second one under the new constitution. The constitutional court is reviewing the matter.

## Johnson-Sirleaf aims for re-election

Liberia's National Elections Commission (NEC) has given the go-ahead for campaigning to begin for the 2011 presidential and legislative elections, scheduled to take place on 11 October. A run-off election is scheduled for 8 November.

The contest is likely to pit the incumbent president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf against Winston Tubman, the flag bearer for the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC), and Charles Brumskine of the Liberty Party (LP). The CDC is currently the largest opposition party, having come second in the elections in 2005, when it won 18 legislative seats.

In 2010, Johnson-Sirleaf reneged on her promise not to stand for two terms, arguing that the ongoing post-conflict reconstruction, development and reconciliation process requires stability and continuity. Although she enjoys widespread international support, particularly from the US, Johnson-Sirleaf faces mixed domestic popularity.

Firstly, many Liberians express frustration at the pace of progress. An estimated 80% of Liberians still live in poverty and many complain about the lack of meaningful transformation.

Secondly, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf faces credibility problems. Allegations of corruption have raised concerns, and the truth and reconciliation report has recommended that she step down, hinting that she funded and provided support for the devastating war that ravaged Liberia between 1989 and 1998. The commission also recommended that 50 other political actors be prevented from holding public office for the next 30 years.

## SA police under threat

The killing of police officials in South Africa continues to be a serious problem. Last year, the South African Police Service (SAPS) annual report gave the names of 107 police officers killed on duty. Between 2001 and 2010, 1,130 police officers were killed. Between January and the end of June 2011, 39 more were killed.

In response, national police commissioner General Bheki Cele has called for mandatory life sentences for those found

guilty of murdering police officials and urged members of the SAPS to defend themselves using the 'maximum force' allowed by law.

While all those outraged by the killing of police officers will support these measures, they are unlikely to lead a reduction in the numbers killed. Simply threatening harsh sanctions and encouraging police to use more force in their interaction with suspects is unlikely to improve officer safety. Rather, it will play into systemic police brutality, which is more likely to cause civilians to become fearful and less co-operative with police.

Criminals will not stop committing crimes but will arm themselves more heavily and shoot at police more quickly if they believe they are more likely to be killed than arrested. Instead, the police leadership should focus urgently on improving the strategic, management and internal accountability capacity that will support professional policing. Wide-scale organisational changes are required if the problems of police brutality, corruption, lack of accountability and poor community relations are to be solved.



**SOUTH AFRICAN** Police memorial, Union Buildings, Pretoria

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# **NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME REDUCTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE**

## **2nd INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE**

### **2011**

**Join us for the second annual international conference of the Crime and Justice Programme of the Institute for Security Studies.**

In the seventeen years that have passed since South Africa's first democratic elections the country has experienced high levels of violent crime and mixed results in efforts to transform and improve the functioning of the criminal justice system. The problems faced by South Africa are not unique, and it is unlikely that effective solutions will be specific to South Africa.

This conference provides a forum for academics, researchers and practitioners to share research findings from South Africa, the African continent and the rest of the world about crime, the functioning of the criminal justice system and innovative approaches to reduce crime.

The conference will explore the following themes:

- Innovative approaches to improving criminal justice
- Crime and crime trends
- Social crime prevention

### **Submit an abstract or register to attend**

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**The conference will take place at the Sandton Sun Hotel in Johannesburg  
on 1 and 2 December 2011.**





## 16-17 AUGUST: SADC Summit, Luanda, Angola

The 31st Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of SADC will take place in Luanda, Angola. At the Extraordinary Summit in Sandton, Johannesburg on 12 June, two issues that were hotly debated were political reform in the run-up to elections in Zimbabwe and a possible road-map for Madagascar. These issues are also expected to top the agenda in Luanda.

## 21 SEPTEMBER: 10th anniversary of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action

The UN has scheduled a high-level meeting to commemorate the adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. The document was a product of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism held in Durban, South Africa from 31 August to 8 September 2001.

The conference proved to be controversial, with the United States and Israel withdrawing after claiming that it



**ZIMBABWE** will again be on the agenda when SADC member states meet in Angola

was largely anti-Semitic. It was also notable for the discussions of reparations to the descendants of those affected by the African slave trade. The US, Canada and Israel have announced they do not intend to participate in the 2011 commemoration.

A parallel NGO Human Rights Summit, organised by UN Watch, will take place at the same time.

## OCTOBER: Presidential and legislative elections in Zambia

Following the death of President Levy Mwanawasa in 2008,

Zambia held a hotly contested election that saw present incumbent President Rupiah Banda narrowly defeat opposition candidate Michael Sata. Banda has since served the remainder of the term that Mwanawasa won in 2006 and, according to a recent Economic Intelligence Unit report, is predicted to emerge victorious once again. The Zambian president is elected by a plurality vote and only permit-

ted to serve two terms in office. A total of 150 members of the national assembly will be elected, with the president appointing a further eight.

## OCTOBER: Presidential elections in Cameroon

President Paul Biya is at present the longest serving head of state in sub-Saharan Africa after he became president of Cameroon on 6 November 1982. Biya changed the constitution in 2008 to permit himself to run for a third term in office, a move that helped trigger a series of violent protests amidst socioeconomic discontent over high living costs.

A recent change in the electoral law permits expatriates to vote, which could prove to have a great impact on the elections as the government estimates that around five million Cameroonians live abroad.

### Other important dates

- 9 August:** International Day of the World's Indigenous People
- 12 August:** International Youth Day
- 19 August:** World Humanitarian Day



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A new independent South Sudan will inevitably be led by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

**Andrews Atta Asamoah** looks at the challenges in keeping the Movement and the South together.

# A HOPEFUL STATE

## Can its leaders hold it together?



**A**s South Sudan emerges as the world's newest state, it does so as the world's most inexperienced state, and one of the most under-developed regions of the globe.

Vis-à-vis the international goodwill, natural resource endowment, and enthusiasm of its citizens, it is undoubtedly one of the most hopeful states in the world.

Its oil endowment and agricultural prospects make it a probable breadbasket for the millions of hungry people on the African continent. However, the leadership of South Sudan have the daunting task of dealing with the challenge of existing and emerging insecurities, which are capable of negatively impacting investor confidence, human security, defence spending and the overall pace of development of the new state.

Currently, South Sudan grapples with insecurity at three different levels. The first is a result of age-old cultural practices, particularly inter-community cattle raiding and child kidnapping, which have been exacerbated by the influx of small arms and light weapons.

The second relates to intra-South divisions from politically motivated grievances, the majority of which occurred

after the 2010 gubernatorial elections and the January 2011 referendum.

The third relates to North-South relations and contentions over border issues, status of ex-combatants and the status of Abyei.

In post-referendum South Sudan, trends of intra-South insecurity started with General George Athor Deng. Days before the official declaration of the results of the referendum, militias loyal to him clashed with the Sudan People's Lib-

**Against a backdrop of scepticism, the deteriorating trends have had implications on investor confidence**

eration Army (SPLA) in Fangak country on 9 February.

The clashes claimed more than one hundred lives and displaced several thousands of people. Despite the fact that his revolt is traceable to the 2010 elections and therefore was not new, his February attacks were worrying because it registered the de facto breakdown of intra-South dialogue efforts initiated by the Government of

South Sudan (GoSS) prior to the referendum. It also highlighted the existence of unfinished business in the attainment of a unified South and in making peace and security a public good for southerners.

Since this incident, a number of other SPLA generals have revolted and separately declared their intentions to topple the Juba-based South government. Overall, apart from General Athor, Bapiny Monituel, Gabriel Tanginye,

Peter Gatdet Yak, Gatluak Gai, Abdel Bagi Agyii, David Yau Yau and Uluak Oliny have all set themselves against the government.

### LONGSTANDING DIVISIONS

Despite a shared history of struggle against the North, the people of South Sudan didn't at any time in their history cohesively rally around a single front in pursuit of their shared interests.



AP PHOTO/PETE MULLER

**SOUTH SUDAN'S** newly inaugurated President Salva Kiir Mayardit has a huge task ahead amid the numerous security challenges facing the country

Throughout the period of splits and splintering of armed groups in the South, many leaders and warlords made multiple defections between different factions and armed groups, thereby taking away any sense of attachment to any particular group or course.

These occurrences and characteristics in the history of the South have conspired against the realisation of cohesion in the South and in the SPLM/A. It is therefore not surprising that post-referendum security realities and revolts are emerging along the lines of some of the elements who were integrated into the SPLA after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Like other parts of Africa, the question of ethnic identity has become impossible to

dissociate from personalities, leadership and their choices of political alliances in South Sudan. This is true of the past and present. There are therefore clear inter-tribal tensions traceable to wartime alliances, age-old grievances over cattle rustling and child abduction, and fear of Dinka dominance. Of these, the most critical since the dawn of peace relates to the fear of Dinka dominance in an independent South.

Owing to the dominance of Dinka and Nuer in the liberation struggle, it is a natural consequence for them to dominate the resultant government of the South led by the SPLM/A. This is raising a great deal of suspicion and fomenting grievances among the remaining tribes, especially those who are perceived to have aligned with the North during the war.

## MILITARISATION OF SOUTHERN POLITICS

South Sudan is one of the geographical spaces in Africa that has known no peace since the 1950s. The central role of armed groups during this period has entrenched combat participation and military exploits as critical factors in defining Southern Sudan nationalism. In present day Southern Sudan, it is therefore not uncommon to be asked about one's contribution to the attainment of freedom with questions such as 'What did you do during the days we were in the bush?' and 'Do you have any scars to show for it?'. As a consequence, the politics of the South has been heavily militarized. Army generals remain the dominant actors in politics and the ruling Movement. Of the ten state governors, for example, eight were once SPLA generals. The implication of this is that militarism sometimes dictates solutions to political crises, as was the case of General Athor who took up arms instead of seeking legal redress for his political grievances.

Related to the militarization is the apparent perception of power and limitless access to resources once given political office. Losing political office has thus meant loss of influence, power and resources for some generals who think it is time to benefit from their years of sweat in the bush. This introduces a dimension of conflict over access to power, resources and influence.

## POLITICAL MEDDLING BY THE SPLM

Political grievances in South Sudan emerged in considerably worrisome dimensions after the 2010 April elections. This is as consequence of political interferences by the Political Bureau of SPLM during the 2010 gubernatorial elections. The Bureau's role appears to have been born out of the desire of the ruling party to position loyal members to take charge of processes preceding the referendum. However, it fuelled grievances within the party and is a principal factor in understanding the rise of tension since the last elections. >>



### NORTHERN INTERFERENCES

Despite the CPA's success in ending hostilities between the North and South, the agreement failed in dealing with suspicions and mistrusts between them. Their post-2005 relationship can thus, at best, be described as 'co-habitation,' or 'managing an enemy you know.' It is therefore not rare for some Southerners to sometimes refer to the North as 'the enemy,' a description that is a vivid indication of the 'we-versus-them' perceptions between the two sides. In post-referendum South, this perception of the North as 'an enemy' appears to be a favourite rubric within which all the (in)security dynamics are explained.

### EFFORTS TO MAKE PEACE

The trend of emerging intra-South insecurity is particularly disturbing, as it threatens to dash the hopes of peace for the South and to redefine the parameters

**It is not strange to be asked, 'What did you do during the days we were in the bush? Do you have any scars to show for it?'**

of the region's insecurity following its disengagement with the North.

It is giving credence to the expectations of sceptics who predicted an implosion and the inability of Southerners to nurture and sustain a stable state. Against a backdrop of such scepticism, the deteriorating trends have had implications on investor confidence and the rapid return of South Sudanese in the diaspora with many adopting a 'wait-and-see' attitude.

Mindful of the negative effects of the trend of insecurity and the need for the South to foster unity, the GoSS has since the start of these major issues embarked

on important initiatives aimed at promoting intra-South peace. One of these is the regularisation of South-South Dialogue Fora under the auspices of President Kiir, Riek Machar and the Chairman of the SPLM. In addition, President Kiir issued an Executive Order in 2010 pardoning SPLA army officers who had revolted. The order was aimed at fostering unity among Southerners in the run-up to the referendum.

Symbolically, it spelt out the South's recognition of existing tensions and the need for dialogue. However, General Athor effectively reneged on his commitment to the provisions of the amnesty following the resumption of military activity by his forces in February.

Perhaps one of the most symbolic moves indicative of the Southern commitment to intra-South peace was the establishment and subsequent elevation of the South Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) into the Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation. The move has effectively institutionalised the quest for peace in the South and given it the requisite profile for resource mobilisation and visibility. Since the institutionalisation of the resolve, a number of grassroot peace initiatives have been spearheaded by the Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation to resolve inter-tribal fighting.

With all these trends of insecurity, the realisation of the full potential of the new state is inextricably linked to its ability to manage the different sources of insecurity now staring the people in the face.

With independence, it is time for the new state to embrace a broad-based government representative of the diverse political elements in the South who contributed in different ways towards the achievement of independence.

South Sudan is in the process of building state institutions. At this crucial stage, the requisite sacrifices that have got to be made by the political elite towards eliciting zero-tolerance for corruption, eliminating negative ethnicity and operationalising the institutional culture of the state cannot be over-emphasised. ■

## LEADERSHIP STRUGGLES

In 1991, elements in the SPLM led by Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Koang Chol attempted to remove Dr. John Garang as the leader of the SPLM. This move was blamed on the lack of democracy in the leadership of Dr. Garang.

In reality, however, a cocktail of issues, particularly leadership struggle, tribal competition and, most importantly, differences on the strategic direction of the struggle, were the primary underlying factors. The latter factor was prime. There was a fierce contest between Garang's 'New Sudan' vision and proponents of 'self-determination' of the South. Rather than remove Garang as the leader, the move by Riek Machar and Lam Akol resulted in a split of the SPLM into two distinct movements –



SPLM-United (led by Riek Machar and Lam Akol) and SPLM-mainstream (led by Dr. Garang). The former group later aligned with the North against the latter. The subsequent struggle between the two groups became the most violent in the history of the Second Sudan Civil War.

# Republic of South Sudan, Oyee!

**Lauren Hutton**

It was fitting that the day ended with rain. Rain is always great in Juba: powerful rumbling thunder storms, with dark, heavy clouds massing on the horizon and then the sheer relief as the drops begin to fall. From anticipation to emancipation; that is the feeling of rain in Juba.

The air itself seems to come alive again, clean and refreshed. On 9 July, the late afternoon rain was the baptism of Africa's newest state; part of the rebirth of a people. The rain provided a reprieve from the heat of the day allowing people to rest aching muscles and refresh tired bodies. It rained for just long enough for people to catch their breath and then be overwhelmed as an awesome fireworks display lit up the night sky. Independence is here and chants of 'South Sudan Oyee' echo around Juba into the early hours of the morning.

The build-up to Independence Day celebrations started many weeks before 9 July. Sometime in May, Juba became abuzz with building, cleaning, tree and flower planting and even recycling – this was truly a capital transformed. Juba laid out her fanfare.

Gone was the dust-and-litter-filled city known to all for its heat and dirt. A new airport building was constructed in weeks (and nearly even finished on time); lights were put on the runway, the apron was extended to accommodate more planes, the capital waited with bated breath for the influx of celebrities and political heavyweights to witness the birth of a state.

There has been massive investment by the government to portray an image of a

country emerging from the scourge of war and into an era of investment opportunity, economic growth and development. Currently sitting at the bottom end of most development indices, independence brings with it the glow of opportunity, the possibility for South Sudan to transition from the periphery and to stand as an equal on the global stage of sovereign states. The transition has accelerated in the past few weeks. From infrastructure

**The list of needs is long, the time to meet South Sudanese expectations for development is short and the threats to the survival of the state are very real**

development to security operations, there have been concerted efforts to guarantee a memorable independence celebration. Although Juba has few tar roads, even these were given a new life with freshly painted lines.

But none of this mattered on the day. There was no talk about how much the event cost to host, no worry about development needs, donor interests or oil revenue. Even during the official ceremony, once the proclamation had been read and the constitution signed by President Salva Kiir, the main focus of the majority of the crowd was on singing, dancing and celebrating.

There is little that can describe the feeling of being amongst the people of South Sudan when the flag was raised and

the new state was born. It was a privilege to share this moment with our African brothers and sisters.

The list of needs is long, the time to meet South Sudanese expectations for development is short and the threats to the survival of the state are very real. This is not a question about the feasibility of a new state, but rather a moral and ethical demand for the people of South Sudan to be able to determine their own future. It is

a future in which their northern neighbour will still have a major influence. But it is a future in which South Sudan has broken free of years of violence and subjugation and emerged with the opportunity to make better choices for its people.

This is the gauntlet being laid by the people before their leaders: we have won the right to be here, now show us that it was worth our sacrifices.

But for a time, the scale of the challenge ahead was eclipsed by something fantastic: a moment full of hope and opportunity. Maybe this feeling will last beyond the party and be the dawn of a new era. Maybe it will not dull as fast as the sheen of other African states that emerged from unjust rule. Maybe South Sudan will be the exception.

In all this uncertainty, there is only one thing that will always ring true: for one day in July 2011, South Sudan was truly exceptional.

Republic of South Sudan, Oyee, Oyee, Oyee! 🇸🇸



# TEARS AND LAUGHTER AS

On 9 July South Sudan became Africa's 54th independent state.

**Lauren Hutton** was there to witness the event.





# A NEW NATION IS BORN



**SOUTH SUDAN** celebrated its independence with a display of diversity in colourful and creative costumes and dancing

LAUREN HUTTON

# The North is not your enemy

**Liesl Louw-Vaudran**

speaks to Dr Ali Alsharif, ambassador of Sudan to South Africa.



Dr. Ali Alsharif

### **Q** HOW DO YOU PERCEIVE THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH SUDAN?

As all my friends from both North and South know, I'm a unionist: I believe in the unity of Sudan. That is based on my conviction that there is no really strong reason that the Sudan should be divided.

### **Q** SOME SAY THAT IF JOHN GARANG (FORMER LEADER OF THE SPLM) WERE STILL ALIVE, THINGS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT?

The CPA's intention was to bring peace and make unity attractive. It is true that because of the security arrangements and the sharing of power and wealth we managed to have peace between the North and the South [following the signing of the CPA in 2005], but we failed to make unity attractive.

The day Dr Garang died, 21 days after taking up the position of vice-president, the countdown started for the fallback position of the CPA, which is self-determination.

With his passing away, we lost a visionary leader. He wanted a united Sudan and he would have worked for it.

### **Q** CAN ONE STILL TALK OF UNITY?

This is my basic position as an African. I have a very strong belief in pan-Africanism, that as Africa we are destined one day to become a United States of Africa.

The unity of Africa of course depends on the unity of its component states and despite the fact that many African coun-

tries, including Sudan, are divided internally in a very superficial way – into tribes and ethnic and cultural groups – if you have a general overview of Africa, you will see that one day Africa will unite.

### **Q** IS A UNITED SUDAN STILL POSSIBLE?

It all depends on how we configure the relationship between the North and the South in the next few months and years. If we work together and with the international community to build two viable states and make sure the two countries cooperate, the borders can become soft borders where people can walk around with their animals for water or for grazing without thinking they have violated international borders or international law and order.

If we cooperate in various fields, such as oil, trade and joint projects like roads and railroads, and if we have peace, I think that after 5 or 10 years, unity will come automatically.

Meanwhile we will be part of international organisations working for integration. We will be part of the African Union, of Comesa (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), probably of the EAC (East African Community). Sudan already applied for EAC membership and we know the South will definitely be a member of the EAC.

Good neighbourly relations will be the new basis of equal partnership and equal relationships. For many years the people of the South thought they were seen as second-class citizens. But if they come from an independent country they



will feel stronger, with a stronger sense of identity. Then it will be like what we see in Europe, which is an economic union that has also dissolved the political barriers. The issue of sovereignty was rendered meaningless because of the peaceful environment.

## **Q** EVEN THOUGH THIS MUTUAL COOPERATION IS NOT HAPPENING?

This is a difficult and sensitive time. It is a time when one country is divided into two, when one people is divided into two. It is emotionally difficult. It is like amputating a part of your body. But if we pass this difficult sensitive period and slowly come back to the reality of the situation, and if there is a new basis for our relationship and we allow people to move freely, in a very short time we will come back to a situation as it was before independence – because the South was autonomous. The only difference is that Southerners are no longer part of the North.

## **Q** WILL THE SITUATION NEED REFORM IN KHARTOUM?

It will need reform not only in Khartoum but in Juba as well. You have to move towards a democratic and free society, with greater representation.

## **Q** WHAT ABOUT OTHER AREAS, SUCH AS DARFUR?

There is what is called the theory of marginalisation. People are talking about areas like Blue Nile or southern Kordofan and Darfur as marginalised. The truth is that most parts of the Sudan are in a way marginalised, in the sense that the country has always been torn apart by this war.

Most of the country's resources were devoted to the war in the South. That's why now you see people saying we are marginalised. Unfortunately the successive governments in the North didn't take this seriously. Why do we have war in Darfur? There was not enough development. Then they saw people in the South



taking up arms and getting a better share of the wealth and resources and thought they should do it as well.

## **Q** ISN'T IT ALSO ABOUT ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES?

This is not the case. Because I don't think the war was about Northern Arabs trying to kill black Southerners or Muslims trying to kill Christians. We have so many Christians in the North. The war wasn't between the North and the South, because many Southerners lived in the North. It was not a civil war. In the Sudan it was a war between the central government and rebels from the South. There were two or three million Southerners living in the north. If it was a civil war they would have been killed.

Personally, if it were my decision, I wouldn't force Southerners to leave; I'd make it voluntary. Introducing dual citizenship for North and South would have allowed people to stay. In 10 or 20 years time this would have helped reunite the country.

## **Q** A LOT OF AID IS STREAMING INTO THE SOUTH. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE PRIORITIES SHOULD BE?

I will say to my brothers and sisters in the South: avoid an arms race. Don't waste the money of your people on fighting whichever enemy. Work not to have an enemy. The North is not your enemy; we are your brothers and sisters. We belong to the same country.

Now you want to live in your own house next to us. You can't move us away, let's be good neighbours.

Do not buy aeroplanes and arms. You will then be indebted to the international community.

This is a trick we have fallen for for many years as African countries. Please don't fall into that trap. Use the money for the people, for development. The people need a lot of services. Beware of corruption. Let the international community help the development according to your needs and not according to their agenda. **E**



# Too many aid workers makes us look poor

**Liesl Louw-Vaudran**

speaks to John Yoh, South Sudan's new ambassador to South Africa.

**Q THE SPLM WON THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH SUDAN, BUT NOW IT HAS TO RULE THE COUNTRY. ARE THE NEW RULERS READY FOR THAT?**

The SPLM/A as a liberation movement has over the years come up with a clear mandate. It is not a political party, it is a mass movement, and the people judge it according to its manifesto and agenda.

The Sudan, as we understood it, was never a country that was well built – the nation building was not complete – throughout its history. The decisional framework of the Republic of Sudan was built on a centralised government with the majority at the peripheries. To be an Arab culturally, to be a Muslim, was regarded as the basis to become part of the governing.

Finally there was economic marginalisation, where the centre and only some pockets of the North saw some development. This is what led to the war and then to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

The challenge for the SPLM is whether it will be able to create a new Sudan, a democratic Sudan in the South.

**Q WHAT WILL BE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH NORTH SUDAN?**

From a geopolitical perspective, we realise we can't do without the North and the North can't do without us. You will have noticed that in the last six months, the



Dr John Yoh

ALEX PRETORIUS

North has been provoking us, taking over Abyei and so on, but for us these are not really serious political decisions. We know them. We know them better than anybody.

When someone is in crisis, when someone is losing something precious, they become so desperate that they try to restructure or derail the process. But we know the North cannot do without the South. We also know we share over 2,000 km of border, so we can't say North Sudan is not important.

For the short and medium term our economies are interlinked, so we will have to work it out.

**Q WILL THE REFERENDUM HAPPEN IN ABYEI?**

It will happen in an easy way, in a very peaceful way. Nobody thought the referendum for the South would take place. We knew it would, we told them it would, and it did. The Abyei referendum will also take place.

**Q WHAT ABOUT THE BELLIGERENT STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT OMAR AL BASHIR A FEW WEEKS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE?**

Well, the president spoke just after the Abyei compromise was signed, so the news would come out the next day, and what could he say to people? He said either we divide the oil 50-50 or South Sudan pays for the pipeline or they will cut our oil supplies. They want \$10-15 for each barrel of oil that passes through the pipeline, but we know that between Chad and Cameroon it is 41 cents so why should we pay \$15? We are brothers and sisters, so we say, 'Come on, guys....'

**Q WHAT ARE THE PRIORITIES OF THE NEW STATE? THERE SEEMS TO BE A DISCONNECT BETWEEN WHAT THE DONORS WANT AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT WANTS.**

If you know what your priorities are and then someone else thinks that he knows your priorities better, there is an intentional misunderstanding.

**Q ON THE ISSUE OF DEMOBILISATION FOR EXAMPLE, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS PUSHING FOR THE ARMY TO DEMOBILISE AND THE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T SEE IT AS A PRIORITY.**

We are in an interim period; we are not a normal government. Now we are moving to a transitional period of four years. These people [aid donors] are more interested, because we have oil and money, in doing things we know are a priority – but we also know that if we demobilise today,

our soldiers will join the militia in the North. Even if they don't have good intelligence in the South, I expect them to know this.

## Q ARE YOU NOT HOSTAGE TO THESE AID ORGANISATIONS?

The partnership between our development partners and us is that all the agencies in South Sudan – there are over 380 NGOs, whether local or international – must transform themselves from relief-oriented and short-term oriented organisations into developmental organisations. Then we can talk as equals.

The ministry of finance, for example has 60 advisers – young kids, undergraduates; they're interns and we call them experts. Their priorities must shift. They must listen to us. But the way it is going, it won't work.

## Q ARE YOU OPTIMISTIC THAT YOU CAN CREATE A VIABLE, INDEPENDENT, SELF-SUFFICIENT STATE?

The difference between us and others is the human capacity we have. If you look at those in the parliaments, the state and the regions, they all are from the diaspora.

As for South Sudan being a viable state, that's not up for discussion. The reality is that South Sudan is far more advanced than some other African countries that have become independent.

People are only saying this because there are thousands of NGO workers hanging around, so people say: ah, you don't have capacity.

## Q HOW WILL YOU BUILD THE ECONOMY?

Our first priority is agriculture. We are going to spend all our money on agriculture; growing cereals, producing food. The second priority is our livestock. We have 12 million cattle and 11 million goats. We also have one of the biggest water reserves in the world. Only lastly come oil and minerals. We exploit these in that order, to the point that we don't even explore for more oil but give concessions on our minerals, oil and diamonds. **E**

## ATINDERBOX ON THE BORDER

The failure to implement the planned referendum in the oil-rich Abyei district has fuelled anxieties on both sides of the North-South divide, especially since the North's occupation of Abyei in May this year that resulted in massive displacement of people.

When the civil war ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Abyei was accorded a special status. The Abyei Protocol to the CPA stipulates that residents were supposed to hold their own separate referendum at the same time as the referendum in the South, to decide whether Abyei would join the South or the North.

However, the Protocol on Abyei left the definition of 'residents', that is, those eligible to vote in the referendum, to the Abyei referendum commission.

In December 2009, the Abyei Referendum Act was passed by the National Assembly and signed by Sudan's President Omar Al Bashir.

The Act, in line with the CPA, gave the referendum commission the sole authority to decide on who was a resident and had the right to vote in the Abyei referendum, which was supposed to be held on 9 January 2011. But due to disagreement over the nominees put forward by the SPLM, the commission was never formed, leading to the indefinite postponement of the Abyei referendum.

At the centre of the disagreement are the Missiriya nomads, who seasonally pass through and graze their livestock in Abyei from the Muglad-Babansua region and who claim that they should vote in the referendum.

It should be remembered that in 1905 Abyei was transferred from northern Bahr Al Ghazal (a south-



ern territory) into Kordofan. While the Ngok Dinka communities are regarded as permanent inhabitants of the area, other communities, particularly the mainly Arab Misseriya, have established overlapping rights in Abyei.

The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement defined the Southern Province as including 'other areas (in addition to Bahr Al Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile) that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern complex as may be decided by a referendum.' This referendum, which could have determined the status of Abyei, never took place.

Together with the attacks inflicted on the Ngok Dinka in the late 1970s, these factors pushed members of the Ngok to be among the first to join the South in the second civil war, which began in 1983.

A number of key leading figures within the SPLM come from Abyei, making the movement's attachment to the region unflinching.

On the part of the North, it can be argued that the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is using Abyei as a tactical manoeuvre designed either to delay the border demarcation or to deal with its own internal problems by diverting public attention in the North to threats occurring away from the centre. – Solomon A Dersso

# Window dressing to prevent a revolution?

On 1 July Moroccans were called to vote for a new constitution, a move largely seen as an effort by King Mohamed VI to pre-empt a popular revolt in his country.

**Issaka K Souaré** asks whether the reforms go far enough.

**W**ith revolution spreading across North Africa, King Mohamed VI – or M6, as some people call him – on 9 March this year made a speech to the nation in which he promised ‘profound’ reforms.

This was clearly in response to the demands of Moroccan citizens who had also begun popular protests across the country.

Morocco’s monarchy is still widely respected by the population, so the protests have focused mainly on demanding that the king devolve more powers to the elected prime minister, make the judiciary more independent and attend to the socioeconomic needs of the people.

The protesters, spearheaded by the 20 February movement (as with the 25 January movement in Egypt, this is a reference to the date of the first major protest marches), have been calling for the king to withdraw from the day-to-day management of the country’s political affairs and to allow them greater freedom of expression.

**Many observers, including several of Morocco’s foreign partners, particularly the US and France, praised this initiative**

Given that all these issues are dealt with in the constitution, the king set up a constitutional review committee to come up with concrete suggestions on ways in which to reform the country’s political system.

Various political parties were also requested to submit proposals to the committee, led by a former law professor of the king during his studies in Rabat.

Although members of the 20 February movement remained sceptical, many observers, including several of Morocco’s foreign partners, particularly the US and France, praised the initiative.

But while some members of the political elite in Morocco claim that this initiative was not a response to the ‘Arab Spring’ and that it was planned well before the ongoing uprisings began, at least some of the credit goes to the popular pressure spearheaded by 20 February movement.

After weeks of consultation, the new constitution was put to popular vote on 1 July and, according to official results, some 98% voted in its favour with a 70% electoral turnout. However, there were many protests in the build-up to the referendum, with citizens calling for a boycott of the new constitution on the grounds that it did not respond to their demands. Some of the protesters have subsequently dismissed the high turnout reported by the authorities, saying that in reality very few people voted.

It should be noted that the new constitution provides some incremental changes compared to the last constitutional amendment made in October 1996, but it falls largely short of meeting the major demands of the protesters.

## **MORE POWER TO THE PRIME MINISTER**

On the reform side, the new constitution increases the powers of the prime minister, who must now be the leader of the majority party following legislative elections. In the 1996 amendment, there was no obligation for the king to appoint the prime minister from the majority party.

Also, the prime minister becomes head of government, he appoints to major civil-service positions as well as state



enterprises, and his signature is required alongside that of the king on certain royal decisions.

A second innovation was to make the Amazigh or Berber language an official language alongside Arabic, although the latter still holds sway. This was not the case before, despite the Berbers being the original inhabitants of Morocco and much of the Maghreb (that is, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria) before its 'Arabisation' following the introduction of Islam from Arabia in the 7th century.

Another novelty of the new constitution is the fact that Moroccans abroad may now vote and be candidates in various elections back home, depending on certain regulations. Furthermore, a constitutional court has been established, formed of 12 judges, with the aim of strengthening the independence of the judiciary.

The king, meanwhile, is no longer described as 'sacred', but he remains worthy of respect and inviolability of person, and he is still the Leader of the Faithful, even though Article 41 of the new constitution seems to restrict this to the religious sphere.

## NO SIGNIFICANT REFORMS

While these are commendable reforms, it ought to be pointed out that the king preserves many of his executive powers. For example, he remains the 'Head of State, its supreme representative, symbol of national unity... and the supreme arbiter between its institutions'.

Also, and even though it is the prime minister who proposes their names, it is the king who appoints cabinet ministers and can revoke them, only needing to consult with the prime minister.

He chairs the Council of Ministers, the prime minister having the prerogative to do so with a pre-determined agenda. The King can also dissolve either or both houses of parliament, while the head of government may only dissolve the House of Representatives.

This summary reading of the new constitution suggests that there have not been significant reforms in the political

domain, particularly as far as the monarch's executive powers are concerned.

## GENERAL SUPPORT

In light of this, how can we then account for the apparent overwhelming 'yes' vote for the country's new constitution?

One explanation could be that the turnout rate proclaimed by the authorities, or the percentage of the 'yes' vote, might not have been as high as declared. But this is a fruitless line to follow, as it can only ever

**The monarch may be being cautious and gradualist, but he would be well advised to seriously consider increasing both the pace and scope of the reforms**

need for reforms deserves their support, regardless of the extent to which the reforms have yet gone.

It is also important to recognise their awareness of M6's apparent reformist




**THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE** gather as they take part in a rally to support the government's project for constitutional reform during a peaceful protest in Casablanca June 26. Although the reforms don't go far enough, many Moroccans believe in the king's 'gradualist approach'

be a matter of speculation for those who were not part of the process.

Another possible explanation is that the majority of Moroccans were indeed satisfied with and approved the new amendments. Fathoming this would require a comparison of the new constitution with the old one, as well as recognition of the Moroccans' feeling that the very fact their monarch acknowledged the

orientation since he succeeded his deceased father in 1999.

In conclusion, therefore, the reforms may seem scant vis-à-vis the demands of the protesters, but they are still important if compared to the status quo ante. However, although the monarch may be being cautious and gradualist, he would be well advised to seriously consider increasing both the pace and scope of the reforms. 



# The perfect time for change

**Cheryl Hendricks** and **Emily Kinama** ask whether there is hope for gender equality in the aftermath of North Africa's revolutions.

**I**mages of men and women protesting together for more democratic regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have beamed into living rooms across the world. Banners carried by Tunisian women were emblazoned with the words: 'No democracy without equality!'

In fact the first spate of protests of the 'Jasmine Revolution' in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid were brought to us through social media, with 23-year-old Tunisian Maha Issaoui, leader of the Karama ('dignity') group, posting videos of the events on Facebook.

In Egypt, 25-year-old Mona Seif and 24-year-old Gigi Ibrahim's tweets on the events unfolding in Tahrir Square were followed globally, and in Libya, Salwa Bugaighis became one of the icons of the movement.

Despite the large-scale presence of

women in these pro-democracy movements, we know very little about gender relations in the Arab Spring countries, why and how women have participated, or their hopes and the changes that new political dispensations have brought for them.

Although a few reports detailed gender-based violence during the uprisings, media coverage of these events has been, at best, gender blind.

In Libya, the international media fraternity was shocked when a Libyan woman, Eman Al Obeidy, stormed into a

Tripoli hotel and claimed that she had been gang-raped by fifteen of Muammar Gaddafi's men. She was later dragged out of the hotel by troops who labelled her a prostitute. In a CNN interview she indicated that she had been beaten, raped and tortured: 'I was brutally tortured, to the point of them inserting weapons inside me. They would also pour alcohol in my eyes.' She is now a refugee in Romania.

The United Nations Special Representative on Sexual Violence, Margot Wallström, stated that Eman's case was not an isolated incident and that there is a need to prevent sexual violence as fighting escalates in Misrata and other Libyan towns and cities. Sexual violence has become a common tactic in civil wars across the world, and allegations that Gaddafi's forces

**The makeup of the transitional government is an indication that the women's struggle is far from over. Of the 27 ministers in Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf's government, there is only one woman**

**EGYPTIAN WOMEN, as these seen at a vigil for protesters who died in Tahrir square in February 9 this year, play a key role in the Arab Spring**

were given male enhancement drugs with the aim of committing mass rapes are not that far-fetched. As stories unfold, it is evident that sexual violence is part of the repertoire of violence in Libya's civil war.

Although mass rapes do not appear to be a hallmark of the protests in Egypt, there have been incidences of the violation of women's bodily integrity. A Human Rights Watch report of May 2011 asserted that four women detained in a military base in Egypt had been forced to undergo virginity testing.

### WOMEN ARE ACTORS, NOT VICTIMS

These incidents speak to the prevalence of gender-based violence and gender inequities in these countries, but belie the participation of women in the liberation movements. Women are actors, not just victims. They are fighting for a more democratic order, but their particular concerns and interests are either not voiced or being drowned out by louder nationalist or patriarchal voices. If not addressed, this will lead to another lost opportunity to ensure gender equality in all spheres, including decision-making on the future of these societies.

In an interview on Euronews, Nehad Abu Alkomsan of the Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights remarked: 'After President [Hosni] Mubarak stepped down, we felt that there was a deliberate attempt to exclude women from the process of political transition. Women were among the thousands who took to the streets to protest, but when it came to the formation of committees, like the constitution drafting committee, they were conspicuous by their absence. We are concerned about the influence of orthodox Muslims in the transition process. Organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood are reluctant to allow women or Coptic Christians to participate

in the commission. Women are in a contradictory position. On the one hand, we have a clear role to play in society, but on the other hand, when it comes to political decision-making, it seems there is a deliberate policy of excluding women.'

To counter this tendency towards exclusion, Egyptian women organised a protest in Tahrir Square to mark International Women's Day. The protest turned violent when it was confronted by a group of men denouncing women's rights.

Although in 1956 Egypt was one of the first Arab countries to extend the vote to women, they still struggle to occupy their rightful place in the country's polity. The makeup of the transitional government is an indication that the struggle is far from over. Of the 27 ministers in Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf's government, there is only one woman. There are no women governors, and no women experts in the Constitutional drafting committee.

The prime minister has been widely criticised for failing to equitably include

### There are currently only two women (5%) on the Transitional National Council in Benghazi

women in his new government. The removal of the envisaged quota for women's representation in the electoral process also does not bode well for women's future participation in political decision-making.

### TUNISIA THE MOST PROGRESSIVE

Tunisia has been the most progressive North African state in relation to women's rights. In the *New York Times*, Fatma Bouvet de la Maisonneuve, a Tunisian psychiatrist, noted: 'It's no coincidence that the revolution first started in Tunisia, where we have a high level of education, a sizeable middle class and a greater degree of gender equality.'

In 2004, 25% of parliamentary seats were reserved for women, but in the post-revolution period, women only constitute 18% of the High Commission for the

Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution, for Political Reform and Democratic Transition, and there are only two women ministers in the provisional transitional government (8.6%): the Minister of Women's Affairs and the Minister of Health. However, women still constitute 25% of the members of the new parliament. Encouragingly, Tunisia has adopted a new electoral code, to be applied in the anticipated July constituent assembly elections, that introduces the principle of gender parity in the electoral process.

As for Libya, the GenderIndex reveals that although 'most national legislation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supports equal rights for men and women,' it is not effectively enforced. Women remain at a disadvantage in family matters, and domestic violence is rife but underreported. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Gender noted that 7.7% of Libya's parliament is made up of women. However, opposition political parties are banned and women are not allowed to form independent organisa-



tions. It is hoped that the Transitional National Council (TNC) in Benghazi will be more gender inclusive, but there are currently only two women (5%) on the TNC.

Women have clearly held a place at the forefront of the Arab uprisings. The time for them to move beyond equality-on-paper is now. Many studies have shown that the most advantageous time to pursue change in gender relations is at a time of transition and the fashioning of new norms to guide a society.

Women need to ensure that the rights they have already achieved are protected in the realisation of the Arab dawn. This could either be a time for marked progress in gender relations or a turn in the opposite direction, where what they have gained so far is also under threat. ■



# TOUGH TIMES FOR BLAISE COMPAORÉ

Sporadic mutinies by the army in Burkina Faso have left many perplexed as to where this will lead. **David Zounmenou** believes that change is coming to the country – sooner or later.

**S**erious concerns are being raised about the future of Burkina Faso's long-term President Blaise Compaoré, with riots against his government ongoing since February this year.

The protests, which started with student demonstrations, gained momentum when the army joined in, raising serious concerns over the survival of the regime.

Interestingly, they began in the aftermath of Côte d'Ivoire's post-electoral crisis, in which Compaoré played a key role as a peace broker, while some observers saw in the unrest the contagious effects of North Africa's ongoing revolutions.

If in the past the Compaoré regime has treated protest movements with contempt and repression, calling protesters immature and accusing them of being manipulated by political opposition leaders, this tone changed when the elite presidential guard and other army units mutinied.

Officers within the army claimed that the army hierarchy was corrupt and preventing them from earning a decent living. Tensions rose high with the return of soldiers who had been sent on AU/UN peace missions in Sudan and elsewhere and were not paid their allowances.

The regime in Burkina Faso undeniably relies on the military for its survival. Beyond the conflict over unpaid and squandered salaries, the problems in the

army and, more broadly, in the country itself, should not be underestimated.

Furthermore, the series of disputes, popular protests and army mutinies in Burkina cannot be explained without a critical look at the precarious national political situation and the ongoing deterioration of citizens' living conditions under the 24-year rule of Compaoré.

Fearing for his life, Compaoré's early reaction to the unrest was to seek refuge in his hometown Ziniaré before returning to Ouagadougou to reassess the situation. If the mutinies of the presidential guard were to result in a coup d'état, it was not clear whether the instigators would spare him or some close allies of the regime or whether there would be a unity within the military on that initiative.

Compaoré has established for himself a reputation as a peace broker and enjoyed a range of diplomatic successes, to the extent that many have almost forgotten that Burkina Faso was cited in some of the violent civil wars that West Africa has experienced in the post-Cold War era.

Until recently, he could still rely on his traditional regional and extra-regional partners such as Libya and France. However, Paris' stance on the current situation in Burkina Faso seems very cautious, while Muammar Gaddafi is facing a civil war that might end his 42-year rule in Libya.

Regardless of the support that he might



**BURKINA FASO'S** president Blaise Compaore – seen here waiting to address the UN General Assembly – relies on the army to stay in power

get, Compaoré seems to have momentarily regained control over the situation using the two approaches at his disposal.

First he responded to the demands of the Presidential Guard by sacking senior army officers, including the Army Chief of Staff and the Head of the Presidential

Guard. He also dissolved the government of Prime Minister Titus Zongo and appointed a new prime minister, Luc Adolphe Tiao, former Ambassador of Burkina Faso to France and former member of the ruling party, to form a new cabinet.

Second, he moved quickly to address the financial claims of the members of the Presidential Guard that provided incentive for other units of the army to revolt. Neither of these measures, however, has succeeded in quelling the dissent, and opposition leaders are openly calling for his departure.

The new prime minister was only able to renew half of the cabinet, with key strategic positions remaining under the control of the ruling party. Compaoré himself took up the Defence Ministry while deploying his Special Security Forces to repress fresh mutinies in Bobo-Dioulasso, the second major city in Burkina Faso. At least seven people, including a young girl, have been killed in exchanges of fire between pro-government forces and the dissidents.

The key questions that remain unanswered are whether a robust military response will end the precarious situation, and whether Compaoré will be able to work out a short- to medium-term exit strategy for himself and spare Burkina Faso from falling into social disorder as a result of failed political transition.

In appointing himself as the new defence minister, Compaoré made it clear that his foremost priority is to regain control over the military. The extent to which the army determines political outcomes in Burkina Faso is quite well known, and its support remains vital for the regime's survival. A major concern is that it could successfully undermine any political transition that sought to curtail its privileges or ignore its grievances.

There is ongoing debate over the constitutional amendment, mainly on Article 37, which limits presidential mandates. However, there is no guarantee that Compaoré will not attempt to extend his term

## The regime in Burkina Faso undeniably relies on the military for its survival

in office beyond 2015. It would not be the first time that the constitution has been amended to keep him in power on the fallacious grounds that his departure would lead to instability, but any attempt to hang on to power beyond 2015 could also be a trigger for detrimental political unrest.

### HOW IT ALL BEGAN

The crisis started when students accused security forces of assassinating student leader Justin Zongo and went on the rampage over the government's alleged militarisation of campuses.

Lawyers joined in to protest against the lack of independence in the judiciary and the security forces' recurrent interference with judicial processes. The movement then spread to merchants opposing the army's ruthless assaults on their properties and denouncing excessively high taxation.

Political opposition parties lent their support to the protests, hoping to provoke the downfall of Blaise Compaoré's regime and make Burkina Faso the first sub-Saharan country affected by the revolutions sweeping North Africa.

In the shadow of the president is his special army chief of staff, General Gilbert Diendere, one of the close military allies of the regime and essential pillar of the personal security arrangements of Blaise Compaoré.

Historical evidence in West Africa >>



MIKE SEGAR / REUTERS



and across the continent demonstrates that the most successful coups d'état have always been staged by the personal security officers or close allies of the president.

The myth of chaos after Compaoré should not cloud the legitimate need for change in Burkina Faso, and concrete steps should be taken to anticipate a pop-

ular revolt and provide a platform for an orderly transfer of power according to domestic laws and regional norms on democratic governance. **E**

## NEVER ANY REAL DEMOCRACY

**T**he current challenges are the most serious that President Blaise Compaoré had to face since the 1987 military coup that claimed the life of Thomas Sankara and saw Compaoré rise to power.

After the coup, Compaoré was accused of masterminding the assassination of his revolutionary companion, the youthful and charismatic Sankara, who dreamed of transforming the country into a land of decent people.

Since then, efforts to democratise Burkina Faso have been at best cosmetic, and its socioeconomic progress, although praised by international financial institutions, is very limited. Burkina remains one of the poorest countries on the planet.

The decade of crisis in neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire has had a double impact on the economy in Burkina Faso. On one hand, it has negatively affected bilateral trade between the two countries and therefore national revenues have shrunk. Even though goods, services and remittances continue to flow in from Burkinabe living in Côte d'Ivoire, they are sometimes rerouted through other countries in the region, such as Togo, Ghana and Benin, resulting in significant losses for the regime.

On the other hand, the return to Burkina Faso of citizens fearing for their lives might also have placed added pressure on the state's resources and its capacity to respond to increasing social demands, mainly among the

unemployed urban youth.

To make matters even more complicated, the global financial crisis and resulting job losses have also had a negative impact on the country's socioeconomic structures. The immediate manifestation of this is the recurrent riots over increased food prices that have threatened the stability of Burkina Faso and many other African countries.

It is a paradox that the ruling party, the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP), which has managed to win almost all electoral contests since the 1990s, now find itself under pressure from social forces. Compaoré's regime has become increasingly unpopular for failing to bring about meaningful socioeconomic and political change.

At the same time, the opposition is virtually non-existent, dashing any hope for a credible political alternative. For most observers, the main reason for the government's inability to deliver is not necessarily the shortage of resources, but rather the extensive patronage system of the ruling elite and its control over the state apparatus and available resources.

Compaoré's brother and economic adviser, François Compaoré, is widely perceived as a 'little president' and a key figure in maintaining the status quo while the regime's allies enrich themselves unopposed. It was frustration at the lack of transparency in the management of their resources



**PRESIDENT** Blaise Compaoré congratulates Côte d'Ivoire's Alassane Ouattara at his inauguration. The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire had a severe impact on Burkina Faso

that prompted army officers and the presidential guard to launch the violent protests that nearly ended Compaoré's rule.

Closely related to the consolidated patronage network is the absence of an impartial justice system. Citizens are used to the culture of impunity that has become one of the major characteristics of post-Sankara Burkina Faso.

Furthermore, several high-profile activists have been killed in suspicious circumstances, with no conclusive investigations conducted. The assassination in 1998 of Norbert Zongo – a newspaper editor who challenged Compaoré's authority over a corruption incident involving his brother François Compaoré – remains one of the most pernicious cases of impunity. After seven years of unconvincing investigation, the court declared itself unqualified to deliver a verdict and the main suspect – François Compaoré – walked free.

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# Is the AU setting itself up to fail like the OAU?

The way in which the African Union (AU) has responded to conflicts since its inception a decade ago has exposed deep conceptual and structural inconsistencies that raise severe doubts over whether it can achieve its own stated goals, believes

**Festus B Aboagye.**

**T**he AU has been widely criticised for its handling of the recent uprisings in North Africa (Libya), as well in Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan (South Kordofan and Abyei).

In Sudan it would appear that greater responsibility for the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and the relevant Protocols on Abyei was relegated to the UN and the international community.

One may rightly ask why the AU did not consider it expedient to pre-emptively deploy an African force to the North-South Sudan border in the run-up to independence in the South.

On the Northern African conflict, the AU system appeared dysfunctional, presenting conflicting positions between its three member states (Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) on UN Security Council

(UNSC) Resolution 1973 (2011) on the one hand and those of the ad hoc High Panel (Congo Brazzaville, Mauritania, Mali, South Africa and Uganda) on the other. Additionally the Arab League, which includes AU members (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) of the dysfunctional Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), voted for Libya's suspension, providing diplomatic cover to the subsequent NATO operation. In spite of the Arab League's AMU subsidiarity position, the AU has continued to pursue a policy track of negotiation and dialogue that appears out of step with the mainstream sentiment of popular protests for freedom.

The AU High Panel's position also runs counter to broader consensus within the international community, including the UNSC referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC, which subsequently issued an arrest warrant for the Libyan leader, as well as the declaration of the African Court on Human and People's Rights on massive human rights violations by the Gaddafi regime.

The AU adopted the same dysfunctional approach towards the Ivorian crisis in which its numerous principal mediators (Thabo Mbeki, Raila Odinga, Bingu wa Mutharika, Teodoro Nguema and Blaise Compaoré) presented a conflicting array of democratic credentials and leverage as well as divergent negotiating positions. To compound matters Nigeria's position to co-sponsor UNSC Resolution 1975 (2011) for an UN-French mandate on the protection of civilians in Côte d'Ivoire may be lauded by some, but it does underscore the lack of consensus within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and between different actors in >>



REBECCA BLACKWELL

**THE AU** has been much criticized for appointing Guinea Bissau's president Theodoro Obiang Nguema as chair of the organisation for 2011



Africa – most prominently between heavyweights Nigeria and South Africa.

In its response to the contrasting positions of its various members, the AU itself was predictably silent and tardy even in prescribing its impotent remedy of mediation, mediation and more mediation irrespective of the extent of human rights abuses by parties to the conflict. While the UNSC was proactive in paying a visit to the war-torn countries of eastern Africa (Sudan and Somalia), the AU PSC remained stuck in Addis Ababa and looked on silently in the face of the emerging genocide and fratricide in the South Kordofan and Abyei regions of Sudan. How could the AU be so blatantly ignorant of the timing of these new conflicts just prior to the independence of the Republic of South Sudan, made possible in the first place by the failure of the OAU system to manage more than 20 years of the North-South Sudan conflict?

In summary, with the mixed results achieved in the interventions in Burundi,



Darfur and Somalia, the AU and its much vaunted African Peace and Security Architecture are sliding down the path of failure in their responses to the 'new conflicts' in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan. The responses to these conflicts

show that the AU remains largely irrelevant and indifferent to destabilising conflicts, preferring crisis management and damage limitation over more proactive efforts to tackle the root causes of conflict within the continent, often bad govern-

## FROM OAU TO AU: SPOT THE DIFFERENCE

In 2002, after a one-year transitional period, the OAU was transformed into the AU, with a formal inauguration in Durban, South Africa, in July 2003. The birth of the AU received mixed reactions. To some, it was just a cosmetic removal of the letter 'O'. For others, it was a momentous, long-overdue transformation informed by a fundamental shift, not a patch-up, in the principles and purposes of the new Union. To this school of thought, the AU's constitutional stipulation on the right of intervention in grave circumstances was proof of its transformation.

Pertinently, a number of issues forced the transformation of an OAU that, throughout its almost 40

years of existence, blindly held to some principles – sovereign equality, non-interference in the affairs of member states and pacific settlement of disputes – based on a Charter sacrosanctly in service of sovereignty. Armed with such a political philosophy, the OAU set itself up to fail through its dismal performance and inability to prevent, let alone address, the scourge of conflicts on the continent. The OAU's failure was made more apparent by the continent's marginalisation on the world stage, especially after the Cold War.

More than anything else, the key factor that informed the OAU's irrelevance was its failure to prevent and/or manage conflicts.

This failure was attributed to the Central Organ, which was founded in 1993 within the framework of the Cairo Declaration and charged with anticipating or preventing conflicts. Where conflicts had occurred, the Central Organ was to undertake peacemaking and peace-building functions in order to facilitate their resolution.

Eventually, the continental leadership is on record for admitting that the OAU's Central Organ was unable to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide or expeditiously manage the 1998 Burundi conflict. In the context of the Cairo Declaration, the Organ was also unable to find closure to the 1991 conflict in Somalia that continued to spiral out of control.



REBECCA BLACKWELL

**AT ITS SUMMIT** in Malabo in July, the AU was divided about the conflict in Libya

## GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

**L**ike the United Nations in the case of the League of Nations, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) replaced the Central Organ. It entered into force in late 2003 and was launched in 2004 as a key component of the emergent African Peace and Security Council (APSA).

Its much-publicised policy stances and rhetoric of non-indifference and of 'finding African solutions to African problems' constitute the first set of reasons why the African public especially expects to see the PSC's marked departure from the same business-as-usual approach of the OAU.

Starting with the conflicts that it inherited, the AU PSC was indeed able to undertake a peace operation in Burundi.

While AMIB's presence might have prevented an escalation of the Burundi conflict, the mission was hardly able to implement the essential tasks it was assigned. The ensuing peace in Burundi was not a result only of the political and military efforts of the AU, but also of significant political mediation efforts by South Africa, as well as of 'war fatigue' on the part of the Burundian protagonists, and of external (UK and US) governmental support to underwrite the costs of the peace operation.

The AU PSC has been lauded for its intervention in Sudan's Darfur region in 2004. But what did the PSC do differently from the OAU's Central Organ, beyond the deployment of the AU Mission in Sudan-Darfur (AMIS) of about 7 700 peacekeepers, including the historic deployment of about 1 340 police monitors?

ance by the leadership of AU members themselves.

To ensure that it does not set itself up for failure, the AU must pay urgent attention to broad political philosophy issues, including:

- The realisation that the OAU's policy of accommodation between ideological blocs was one of political expediency to embark on the path of unity towards an eventual union framework.
- The imperative for an African political voice on the world stage was the motivation that informed the establishment of the OAU without discriminating between democratic, autocratic and dictatorial states and governments. Today the aspiration towards civilian democratic rule should embolden the AU to adopt a 'fundamentalist' approach to democratic accountability, in order to make civilian unconstitutionalism or military adventurism things of the past.
- The realisation that any form of unconstitutionalism, whether civilian or military, is a symptom of underlying socio-political (and economic) malaise resulting from social injustice and the absence of democratic accountability.
- To add more value to the achievement

and consolidation of these ideals, the AU should craft a new governance architecture based on adherence to a set of inviolable norms and values and not the club mentality of 'we the leaders' of all states and their notions of state-centred security that are injurious to human security within the continent.

- There is need for better vertical AU-to-REC (Regional Economic Community) and horizontal REC-to-REC coordination of policy stances. Africa's lead nations should realise that, no matter how high the regard of outsiders, they will gain greater legitimacy through the support of like-minded African countries and therefore need to consult with them on issues that affect the well-being of the citizens of Africa.
- At the same time, the desire and need for more coherence in AU policies cannot serve to defend repressive regimes and mass human rights violations by particular leaders.

As things stand, the AU appears to be setting itself up to fail by its tardy, incoherent policy approaches and refusal to respond to the root causes of conflict, as well as the deficit in democratic governance and accountability within Africa. **E**



# NO MORE back-door diplomacy

Following the controversy surrounding the UN-sanctioned military intervention in Libya, **Jakkie Cilliers** argues that reforming the UN Security Council is now more urgent than ever.

**T**he shift in global power and influence from the North Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region is clearly the big story for the next 20 years.

We are looking at a future where Western domination of global affairs declines quite markedly, leading to the emergence of a much more diffuse and multipolar world where economic and political weight is distributed very differently. It is also an increasingly unstable world; more competitive, less hierarchical but also more connected and less clear about where authority lies.

In this future, regional organisations, clubs and issue-based groups will gain importance against formal organisations such as the UN and alliances such as NATO.

Although US military dominance is likely to remain unchecked for at least the next two decades, the world map is being steadily rebalanced in all other aspects. The future is a more complex world of shifting networks, alliances and issue-based partners, where new sources of soft power – economics, culture and information – appear to attract as much influence as battleships, aircraft and soldiers.

This will place extreme demands on staid, unrepresentative institutions such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), designed as it was to deal with two main competitors for global power: Capitalism and Communism.

Today the disproportionate influence of the P5 members of the UN Security Council (the US, China, France, Britain and Russia) weighs heavily on the focus and effectiveness of Council business, which reflects an increasingly distant era of post-World War 2 power and privilege.

For decades there have been few fundamental changes in the operational logic of the Security Council. The secretive, back-door diplomacy means that most agreements are struck between these five countries before being presented to other members – a fact that continues to irk the non-permanent members and detracts from the legitimacy of the UN Security Council as a whole.

PABLO MARTINEZ MONSIVAIS



**PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA** has sought to recast American multilateral engagement within the framework of the US as the 'indispensable partner'

The signs of global realignment are becoming increasingly evident, most especially in terms of the growing importance attached to the G20 compared to the G8, and the competition between these clubs and the UNSC.

In this construct, sub-regional arrangements such as regional economic communities (RECs) constitute building blocks of a continental system through the African Union, for example, that includes efforts at structural conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping and other instruments at various stages of maturity and readiness.

While the developed countries focus their attention on the lack of democracy and good governance in developing coun-

tries, the developing countries demand equality between countries and decry the lack of democracy between countries and within purported international organisations such as the UN Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank.

The voice from the developing world is one that calls for a more consensual and measured approach to external intervention that is informed by regional dynamics.

Fundamentally, South Africa and other non-permanent members of the UNSC such as Germany agree that the UN should be the key platform for addressing the global governance deficit. India, Brazil and Nigeria, also currently non-permanent members of the UNSC, agree on the >>



Whereas in the 40 years from 1965 to 2004 the original G7 (Canada, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Japan and the US) produced around two-thirds the global output, by 2010 this had dropped to about 50%. In contrast, the G20, largely as a result of its inclusion of countries such as China, India and Brazil, reflects roughly 88% of the global GDP and will continue to do so until at least mid-century.



need for reform of the UNSC. Without reform, the declining ability of P5 members to have an impact on global peace and security matters will translate, ever more rapidly, into the decline in the importance of the UN itself.

Hence, the current composition of the UNSC presents an important window of opportunity to push for reform. Unfortunately it looks set to become a source of inertia, where would-be permanent members compete for the lowest common denominator, although the German abstention and South Africa's vote in favour of UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya would indicate that there is little likelihood of this happening.

More effective and legitimate global governance involves much more than the enlargement of the UNSC and the current competition over potential seats. It is also – among other things – about streamlining decision-making procedures (which must eventually do away with the category of permanent members as well as the veto right) and enhancing the UN's capacity and efficiency in addressing global challenges.

Quite possibly UNSC reform will come down to a 'package proposal', such as the G4 proposal by Germany, Japan, India and Brazil. In other words, South Africa has a good chance of gaining a seat on the UNSC as part of a larger deal, some



**AFRICAN UNION head of Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra has complained that Africa is being sidelined on the Libyan crisis**

and conflict management.

How will Africa be represented? It is quite probable that once Africa secures two permanent or semi-permanent seats on an expanded UNSC, the common African position on UN reform will be amended to allow for rotation between key countries to serve on the Council, ideally on an elected basis. In this sense, the road to a permanent seat for South Africa, Nigeria and even Egypt does not start in New York but rather in Addis Ababa. This will be through engagement on the all-important Ezulwini Consensus, which in-

favour of the resolution, European approaches have sought to marginalise the AU's role in the process.

The lack of African 'ownership' in the conflict raises serious questions about decision-making supremacy and division of labour in the evolving strategic partnership between the UN and the AU on peace and security. There is a general understanding that the partnership is based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, but there seem to be less agreement on the interpretation and application thereof.

For example, with regard to the matter of decision-making supremacy, Chapter VIII accords regional organisations the mandate of being the first source of reference in their own regional conflicts based on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage. However, the Charter also emphasises the UNSC's decision-making supremacy in Article 53(1), which states that all regional actions require the authorisation of the UNSC.

The AU explicitly acknowledges that the UNSC 'has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' and does not expect the UNSC to be bound by the decisions of the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) on African issues.

Nonetheless, as a minimum the AU expects the UNSC to consult with it and take its requests under consideration on decisions regarding its member states, given its proxim-

ity and familiarity with African conflict dynamics – thereby recognising the principle of comparative advantage. This is not currently the case, most evidently in Somalia where the UNSC has studiously avoided responding to AU calls for speedy imposition of a naval blockade and a no-fly zone.

The PSC's expectation of a non-hierarchical relationship with the UNSC often clashes with the view of the permanent

**'Everyone in the Security Council, not only South Africa, is having second thoughts about the resolution.' – Leslie Gumbi, Chief Director in South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation on South Africa voting in favour of Resolution 1973 on Libya**

elements of which may not be completely palatable to either party. Almost half of the 17 UN peacekeeping missions currently being conducted are in Africa, and over two-thirds of the UN's peacekeepers (or 'blue helmets') are stationed here. As was vividly demonstrated by the unfolding events in North Africa and especially in Libya, Africa remains a region with severe security challenges that demands supply of both global conflict prevention

sists on two permanent seats for Africa with veto rights.

## LIBYA A TURNING POINT

As recently demonstrated with the UNSC's Resolution 1973 on Libya, the relationship between regional and global governance is not straightforward. Although all three of the African countries that are currently non-permanent members of the UNSC (SA, Nigeria and Gabon) voted in

## THE US STILL CLINGING TO POWER

**I**would describe relations in a future interpolar world as being characterised by ‘multiple multilateralism’ – in other words, it would have multiple sources of power and legitimacy spread across a number of organisations, institutions and networks.

It would no longer be a Western-dominated world, but one where norms such as rule of law, democracy and generally, free trade, predominate, having effectively become global values but managed in a complex and slightly chaotic manner.

The US does not, of course, believe in any of this. However, rather than the unilateral and hegemonic approach of the Bush administration, President Barack Obama has sought to recast American multilateral engagement within the framework of the US as the ‘indispensable partner’. This, in the words of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, is tilting the US away from multipolarity to a multi-partner world. This is not the same as a belief in standard multilateralism, but an amended version of the Bush doctrine that the

‘mission determines the alliance’.

Recent examples of issue-based US global partnerships would include the US Nuclear Security Summit that, in April 2010, saw 46 countries sign up to a voluntary plan to safeguard nuclear material used in bombs, civilian nuclear reactors and power plants, and to strengthen associated international efforts.

The Summit and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum that Obama plans to launch in September this year would, possibly, be another example of the same trend as would initiatives such as the Community of Democracies that was launched in Warsaw in 2000. In both instances US efforts aim to complement or supplant global efforts where US national interests are at odds with the emerging global consensus.

This phase will prove transitional as US policy makers struggle to come to terms with the relative decline in power and privilege. At some point the US, as did the UK and others before, will rediscover multilateralism and see the national benefits of a rules-based global system – but we are some decades away from this development. – *Jakkie Cilliers*



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**THE UNITED NATIONS** Security Council meets at the U.N. Headquarters in New York, July 13, 2011, where they unanimously recommended admitting the newly formed nation of South Sudan into the United Nations

members and a fundamentally unequal relationship that is derived from their respective mandates and the universal character of the UN.

This clash hinges upon the interpretation of the principle of complementarity between regional and global governance and demonstrates how the evolving partnership between the UNSC and the PSC is still in need of clearer guidelines and more political coherence to make the two organs, in fact, complementary.

Against this background, SA is championing the relationship between the PSC and the UNSC, which has led to tangible improvements including regular consul-

tations, joint field visits and, more generally, increased synchronisation in the respective decisions of the two structures.

The AU has also initiated a process intended to help it develop a stronger and more structured relationship with the UNSC.

The rapid expansion of UN peacekeeping and the resulting overstretched conflict-management system is perhaps the most obvious example of the current deficit in supply of global governance. The

**The voice from the developing world calls for a more consensual and measured approach to external intervention, informed by regional dynamics**

result has been a selective and inconsistent approach by the UNSC on which conflicts to engage with, thereby undermining its own legitimacy. It also makes a more clear and flexible interpretation of Chapter VIII on the relationship between global and regional governance all the more necessary. ■



# IN THE SHADOW of the informal state

With a new constitution that gives the president even more power, **Paula Cristina Roque** examines the way forward for Angola's fragile government and its parallel structures.

**T**he central government in Luanda has not only survived a potent insurgency, external intervention, international isolation, sanctions and economic collapse, but it has also managed to emerge victorious from a highly destructive and divisive civil war, achieving double-digit economic growth less than a decade after the cessation of hostilities.

Hence the state in Angola may be regarded as resilient and even effective.

However, closer examination of the Angolan political order reveals a very distinct reality of two parallel ruling structures: the formal, fragile government ruled by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), and the more resilient 'shadow' government, controlled and manipulated by the presidency with Sonangol, the national oil company, as its chief economic motor.

While these structures are mutually dependent, their internal functions are sometimes at odds with each other. Recent changes to these structures reveal the fault lines that the ruling elite has tried to conceal, as well as new opportunities for engagement with the ruling structures of Angola by African and international policymakers.

The parallel governments have indeed managed to maintain a political order and post-war stability, which have allowed for

economic growth and the expansion of a centralised patronage network that further contributes to the stability of the existing political order.


The structures of this hybrid resilience are the most difficult to reform because they have been moulded to advance the interests of a few individuals. Dismantling them will present great difficulty for the leadership of future governments in Luanda – which may attempt to rule through these institutions, but will eventually have to reform them.

This will be difficult, as the regime in Luanda mimics not only democracy, but also a functioning state – in which a carefully orchestrated social engineering process creates the illusion of a modern and rehabilitated society – with its own middle class and rising entrepreneurs.

### A CENTRALISED STATE

On 21 January 2010, the Legislative Assembly in Luanda passed a new constitution formalising the unlimited power of the presidency. The new constitution officially names the president head of state, head of the executive, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He can also appoint judges to the constitutional and supreme courts.

It abolishes the post of prime minister and also the direct election of the president; instead the leader of the party with



Several more years will pass before the population is able to participate in reshaping local and regional organs and hold the governors accountable for their mismanagement of assets

the most parliamentary seats automatically becomes head of state. This effectively means that Dos Santos could remain in power until 2022, since the two-term limit begins only with the next legislative elections in 2012.

The president can be removed from office by parliament, but only with the approval of the Supreme Court, whose judges are appointed by the president. The pyramid of power has now been formalised in the country's legislation and has effectively unleashed the flow of unlimited power in Futungo (the presidency).

The president has been given wide powers in appointing and exonerating all key positions in the state apparatus, and

can pass laws by decree. Several elements of the MPLA are reported to have strongly opposed the new legislation and proposed instead that the president be elected by direct polls.

This change will also result in the further delay of local and municipal elections, which were originally scheduled to take place in September 2009, after the presidential polls. The new Constitution promises the staging of some form of local elections (Articles 217-22), but with no mention of the type of institutions to be elected.

Several more years will pass before the population is able to participate in reshaping local and regional organs and hold the

governors accountable for their mismanagement of assets. Governors will continue to be appointed by and serve at the discretion of the president. Allowing the population in the provinces to elect its local government representatives would be too risky for the government.

### GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE

In October 2010, the government underwent a significant reshuffle with the interior and foreign ministers being substituted, along with the chief of staff and all key elements of the provincial governments, including the governors of Luanda and Cabinda (the remaining 16 of the 18 governors retained their positions). >>



**LUANDA:** Angola's capital Luanda is the theatre of high political drama as two parallel ruling structures operate, often at odds with one another

MIKE HUTCHINGS / REUTERS

## DOS SANTOS ALL POWERFUL

**T**he presidency today is the most powerful institution in Angola. Dos Santos is not only the head of state, but also the president of the party, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the principal 'adviser' to all other actors involved in running the country.



CLAUDIA DAUT / REUTERS

Over the past 32 years, Dos Santos has kept the MPLA and the government in check by expanding a highly efficient system of patronage that rewards a loyal elite of politicians, family members and the military.

Many, including General Helder Vieira Dias Kopelipa, also previously held important portfolios, such as the Office for National Reconstruction (GRN), which supervises the China Investment Fund. Public Works Minister General Higino Carneiro controls the holding Caduta Organizacoes with interests in banking, insurance, tourism and agro-industry.

Angola's largest mobile phone company, Unitel, is partly owned by the president's daughter Isabel and by the head of communications in the presidency, Brigadier General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento.

The architect of these changes is the minister of state for political and economic affairs and head of the civilian office of the presidency – the technocrat Carlos Feijó, who has already created several independent bodies within the MPLA by promoting these legislative changes, and has extended his influence without being subservient to the political bureau of the MPLA.

The greatest threat for the Angolan ruling elite is domestic. Within the MPLA, there is a general disapproval of the kind of uncontrolled corruption that is currently rampant. The MPLA congress held at the end of April was expected to select a party candidate for the 2012 elections as well as the leading members of the next administration.

There was speculation that Dos Santos may not run and the party could be headed by Carlos Feijó, Manuel Vicente or Antonio Pitra Neto. There would then be a possibility that Dos Santos would seek to retain control of the party from the position of head of the MPLA, but allowing someone else (lacking a popular base and constituency) to take the presidency in a Putin-like move. However, by choosing to leave this issue open, Dos Santos is bidding time for his next move in power.

By distancing himself from the party and surrounding himself with 'outsiders', Dos Santos is either sowing the seeds for further fragmentation within the MPLA and the armed forces, or attempting to realign the apex of state power to secure

his tenure, feeling unable to rely on the previous group of officials in the shadow and formal governments.

Changes have, therefore, occurred at the formal government level to make it more dependent on the shadow government – the weakening of the economy and finance ministries, whilst at the same time strengthening the interior ministry, ensured that the latter's first line of report and loyalty is the presidency.

This strategy could backfire, however, and actually cause the party to unite against him. Angola could be heading towards an era of political contestation as the formula for governing this hybrid state evolves. With all these alterations to the centre of power, will the president and his 'shadow' government be able to maintain control over coercion, administrative authority and party allegiance? Even after the April congress, these questions remain unanswered.

## THE EMERGING HEGEMONY

If Angola's domestic politics and power architecture have long remained opaque and difficult to read for the outside world, even less is known about the country's foreign policy in general. This is particularly true for the post-war period and for Angola's role in Africa.

Luanda does not succumb to external pressures, given that it is not a major recipient of foreign aid and has the diplomatic clout of its mineral wealth.

## THE FOUR MPLA FACTIONS

- |   |   |   |  |
|---|---|---|--|
| <p>● <b>Silva Mateus</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• '27 May' faction</li> <li>• From the Nito Alves group that attempted a coup in 1977 but was brutally squashed by the mainstream MPLA</li> </ul> | <p>● <b>Vice-President Nando</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Controls paramilitary group of 10 000 rapid response units ('Ninjas')</li> <li>• Controls police</li> <li>• Considered untainted by corruption</li> </ul> | <p>● <b>Carlos Feijó</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technocrats</li> <li>• Criticises the need for a political bureau, even though he was recently nominated as member</li> <li>• Feijó's increasing boldness may threaten interest groups within MPLA</li> </ul> | <p>● <b>Kopelipa</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Controls various networks of informers in a separate reporting structure (like Nando faction)</li> </ul> |
|---|---|---|--|



## ANGOLA'S SHADOW STATE – 'ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN'

### President Dos Santos


#### THE PRESIDENT'S UNELECTED ADVISERS:

- Key generals and civilian loyalists, including heads of security services and counter-information services
- Information services are more powerful than the cabinet and provincial government, given that the former have proven more effective in extending state administration and controlling the population

#### FUNCTIONS:

- To serve the president
- To manage all necessary resources needed to guarantee operational success

### Two co-ordinating structures of the state



#### SONANGOL

- Chief motor of the shadow government
- Enables the president to operate a vast patronage network

### Intelligence services

#### STATE SECURITY AND INFORMATION SERVICES (SINFO)

Run until recently by Sebastião Martins

##### Principal functions:

- Collects intelligence
- Serves as 'political police force'
- Co-ordinates provinces, the private sector and the civil service
- Creates a wide network of informers

#### SERVICE FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (SIM)

Previously run by General Miala, currently headed by André Sango

##### Principal functions:

- To guard the individual and collective loyalty of the military and the different units

#### EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIE)

Run by General José Maria

##### Principal functions:

- Determining the political configuration of the region (in particular the two Congos)
- Protecting the interests of the president abroad

It does not react well to impositions of any sort and its pragmatism allows it to engage with divergent global powers, even the US and China that previously supported the ruling party's arch-enemy UNITA.

The tendency to operate in isolation is also a characteristic of its 'exceptionalism', where Luanda prefers to take a 'statist' approach rather than a multilateral consensual approach. The sense of 'exceptional' derives from an internal ruling perception of not 'serving any master', having the military and political might to influence policy continentally, and being able to engage with the West on an equal negotiating basis.

Furthermore, the need to be 'a big fish in a small pond', to determine the rules of engagement, in having impenetrable influence in certain capitals, and not placing itself in a position of weakness politically, economically or militarily, are additional elements of Luanda's petro-capitalist power.

Luanda, therefore, aims to play a larger role in defining the political, economic and security landscape of southern Africa, in a direct bid to secure its interests and as an alternative to South Africa's hegemony, while also wanting to be involved

in key policy matters on the continent, albeit cautiously.

Although Angola's foreign policy in the past led the government to extend support for other neighbouring regimes to isolate UNITA, as in the case of the support given to President Sassou-Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville and Laurent Kabila in the DRC, this tendency will continue even though UNITA no longer poses a military threat. Luanda will shift its focus to projecting force to prevent instability from the Great Lakes region threatening its national security.

### SUPPORT TO GBAGBO EMBARRASSING

However, the current impasse and international embarrassment that Angola now faces after pledging its full support to Côte d'Ivoire's former president, Laurent Gbagbo, who declared himself the winner of the 2010 elections in spite of the official results that gave Alassane Ouattara the presidency, will probably persuade Luanda to reconsider its regional approach.

The first reaction was to send arms and a military contingent of 300 men to protect Gbagbo. However, given that the

AU and the international community declared support for Ouattara, Dos Santos had to quickly reconsider his diplomatic position and try and save face by appearing to act as a solution to the crisis and not an obstacle.

A task force had already been created within the shadow government, with Kopelipa and Chicoty, to deal with the Côte d'Ivoire situation, although, given Gbagbo's capture, it may become redundant. This crisis may have provided Luanda with the opportunity to further reconfigure its regional policy – a step that had already been taken with the recent support by the Angolan armed forces to Guinea Bissau to begin a far-reaching programme of security sector reform. Angola will not want to be caught in an embarrassing and politically compromising situation again (as it was in the Côte d'Ivoire) and this recent experience may provide the necessary impetus to stimulate internal debate. However, it must be noted that the key imperatives of Luanda's foreign policy, driven by the presidency and the information services, will continue to be security, influence and domination, and economically advantageous cooperation. ■

# ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

## as an afterthought

**William Gumedde** looks at the past 50 years of independence and asks why Africa hasn't lived up to expectations when it comes to economic development.



LIESLOUW-VAUDRAN

**A WOMAN** trying to sell her dried chillies in Diffa, in Eastern Niger. The writer says post-colonial governments neglected economic development

In their struggle for freedom, most African independence and liberation movements focused on capturing political power first, while economic transformation was an afterthought or, in some cases, simply left to chance.

In fact, the one cardinal mistake made by many of these movements was failing to find relevant economic strategies for their newly inherited countries.

Even more devastatingly, more than 50 years after independence, the economies of most African countries are still cast in the pattern left by colonial powers and apartheid governments.

Unless African countries move beyond the rigid inherited colonial and apartheid economic architecture, prosperity will remain a distant dream.

Many independence and liberation movements were inflexibly ideological and often nationalised, mostly for ideological purposes.

The reality is that African economies are not going to be developed through solidarity with old industrial or former colonial powers, through aid, or by the new emerging markets. Neither will those powers benevolently put Africa's issues 'prominently on the global agenda', as former South African President Thabo Mbeki has urged them to do.

The very first thing needed is for African governments to base their efforts on the principle of governing in the wider

interest, and to understand that there can be no economic development unless the largest possible number of citizens are lifted out of poverty. Since independence and liberation, the pattern of economic development in most African countries is that only the elite, whether of a particular ethnic group, region, political party or class, have had sufficient opportunities for development.

Second, African governments must bring meritocracy to the public sector and appoint only the best talent to jobs in the public administration, rather than make appointments based on ethnic, regional, political or other affiliations. No country has prospered economically without a professional public service staffed with the best talent available.

Third, they must build their economic transformation around infrastructure development, that is, using infrastructure as a tool of long-term economic development, rather than an end in itself, as has been the case in most African countries.

Infrastructure development must be done smartly, as it was in post-war East Asia and Western Europe – to stagnant areas, developing new markets and cutting the high transport costs that are hampering the development of most African economies. Well-placed infrastructure, rolled out as part of an integrated system of national development, can reshape societies, expand economic opportunities

and change the patterns of development.

African countries should stop the rhetoric of economic visions and statements of intent, and actually cobble together practical long-term development industrialisation plans integrated into the plans for infrastructure development.

At the moment it appears that new investments into Africa, such as those from China, India and Brazil, are leading Africa's infrastructure and economic development, which is similar to what happened during the Cold War.

Instead, it should be left to the countries themselves to decide where and how development should take place and what form it should take. Once these decisions have been made, foreign investment can be partnered with home-grown targeted development initiatives. Unless things proceed in this manner, even new investment from the emerging markets will mimic Africa's colonial Cold War investments and aid-driven economic patterns, which brought economic growth with little industrialisation, broad-based development or new human development opportunities.

The bulk of the economic activities in African countries, whether in urban or rural areas, are taking place in the informal sector. It is therefore astonishing that most of the economic transformation efforts are not spent on developing these markets. Innovative thought should be focused on how to bring those in the informal sector into the supply chains of the private and public sector companies.

Furthermore, African economies must diversify as quickly as possible. Agriculture remains the largest sector where people eke out a living in the informal sector in most African countries. These countries should put their efforts into making sure that people at least produce food and other basic items for themselves without having to import them from abroad.

The best solution for African countries would be to develop an army of artisans out of the millions of unemployed, especially the youth. Through vocational, tech-

### HOW RECENT CRISES HURT BUSINESS

**T**he political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, that started in December 2010, has shaved off 0,2% of the overall growth projections for Africa made by the African Development Bank (ADB), said Professor Mthuli Ncube, Chief Economist at the African Development Bank during a presentation in Pretoria on 5 July this year.

It was expected Africa would grow at



**FORMER** Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo's refusal to leave office plunged the country into economic chaos

WALDMAR FELSER

5,7% in 2011, but this is now projected at 5,5%. Cote d'Ivoire will grow -7,3% this year, but has started a massive recovery and will grow at 6% next year.

The Libyan crisis is also expected to have a severe impact on several economies, particularly those in

the Sahel region. This is due to slowing of Libyan investment and the impact on remittances from Libyan by African migrants. Niger, for example, saw the return of 200 000 migrants returning to their country from Libya following the crisis.

nical or artisan training, individuals may actually become self-sufficient.

It is no surprise that in China and other successful East Asian developmental states, most of the political leadership comes from engineering or artisan backgrounds: this may be one reason for the success of the economic development in that region.

Finally, the focus of regional integra-

### The best solution for African countries would be to develop an army of artisans out of the millions of unemployed, especially the youth

tion efforts must be to encourage African countries to trade with each other. Smart regional integration will focus on clustering African countries on what they can specialise in, with one country providing what the other country needs but may not be capable of producing.

Some of Africa's manufactures and services may be uncompetitive in relation

to that of industrial countries or new emerging markets, but they may be useful to trade with neighbours. African countries will also have to trade smarter with their emerging market friends such as China, as well as with the old colonial and industrial powers.

In reality, if any African country has the ability to export to China, it will find all sorts of obstacles to getting its products into markets there.

At the heart of the African regional integration project must be a continental industrialisation plan. Such a plan will identify viable future industries that different African countries can specialise in. If the new emerging markets are so committed to our development, surely they will be able to listen to our industrialisation plans and partner with us in such a way that we break out of the colonial and Cold War economic patterns of development. If left intact, these patterns will only lead us to be colonised again, this time by new masters. **E**

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# How to free trade from Cape to Cairo?

A free trade area stretching across the member states of SADC and Comesa was mooted at a summit in Johannesburg recently. **Dianna Games** asks how practical this plan is.

**A** united Africa stretching from the Cape to Cairo was a cherished dream of the early liberators of Africa and it remains on the continent's political agenda despite issues around sovereignty and national priorities.

But is it realistic economically? This is the question raised in the wake of the recent regional summit in Johannesburg that marked the beginning of a process of building a Tripartite free trade area (FTA) from north to south across 26 countries.

It is common cause that a bigger market will be more attractive to investors. The proposed FTA comprises more than 500 million people – 57% of the combined population of the African Union member states – and it will harness 58% of the continent's GDP. But the question is whether creating an FTA across the 19-member Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), the five-member East African Community (EAC) and the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) will solve the problems of regional trade or entrench existing weaknesses.

One of the concerns voiced about the proposed arrangement is that it will require yet another layer of bureaucracy. Existing regional economic communities (RECs) function at different levels of efficiency. But common to all of them are problems that are making African goods uncompetitive in global markets – and in many African markets.

These include high transport costs, inefficient border crossings, insufficient investment in trade-related infrastructure and a weak manufacturing base. These factors are constraining the ability of African countries to grow and diversify export markets and add value to commodities.

Poor policy environments and high costs of doing business add to producers' headaches.

Currently, intra-African trade accounts for just 10% of Africa's total trade, compared to about 50% between Asian countries.

There are many reasons why this trade is so low. A number of countries produce the same crops

for export – tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco – so they do not trade these commodities between themselves. Countries have become import dependent because of high local manufacturing costs, and local manufacturers find it difficult to build economies of scale in small markets.

The lack of industrialisation across Africa is highlighted by the fact that containers into African countries usually return almost empty, a trend that adds considerably to exporters' costs.

## A LACK OF POLITICAL WILL

Many of the problems are soft issues – a lack of political will chief among them.

African governments have become reliant on trade taxes and are reluctant



to see this revenue stream reduced by deepening integration, failing to see the bigger picture of increased economic activity over time, and with it a bigger and more sustainable tax base. As a result, politicians tend to pay lip service to the benefits of free trade while finding ways to boost revenues through non-tariff barriers.

These include using national policies and standards requirements to prevent competition with local manufacturers. The lack of harmonisation across borders on competition laws, labelling, phytosanitary standards, recognition of product registrations, quality standards and other issues will have to be tackled by the RECs before an enlarged FTA has any hope of working.

This is a big task and requires devising regional policies to deal with these issues, but it will be welcomed by investors and traders who have to tackle a complex web of paperwork to move goods around the continent.

Another big hurdle for the FTA is the fact that diverse member states are at different stages of economic development, which will make the initiative difficult to implement and will preclude consideration of a common currency.

As things stand, two of Africa's biggest countries – Angola and the DRC – are

not even part of SADC's countdown to free trade, which is well advanced. SADC countries will reach zero tariffs by early 2012.

Many of the countries in the tripartite plan are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) struggling to build diversified export-orientated economies. But on the upside, they have access to preferential trade benefits in Western markets, which may lure foreign investors to set up manufacturing plans to allow them to take advantage of these preferences.

## African governments have become reliant on trade taxes and are reluctant to see this revenue stream reduced by deepening integration

This is already happening in Asia. Vietnam, for example, is investing in Laos and Cambodia to benefit from the preferences offered to those countries by the European Union.

Efforts will be made over the next three years of talks towards the FTA to encourage co-operation on industrial development among member states. This could include finding ways to create regional supply chains, leveraging the competitive advantages of the countries involved.

However, these are difficult issues for supranational bodies to deal with as they raise national sensitivities, despite obvious benefits. Doing so will require vision and new-style thinking on trade matters.

### OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP

One of the issues that prompted initial talks about co-operation between regional economic communities was the question of overlapping REC memberships, which place a costly bureaucratic burden on states to maintain different regimes and on companies to keep up with multiple requirements.

Currently, just a handful of African countries belong to just one of the continent's 14-plus regional blocs. Twenty-seven countries are members of two blocs and 18 of three.

SADC and Comesa have been in talks for nearly a decade about how to resolve this issue. After the EAC was reconstituted, it was included in the discussion, which culminated in a heads of state tripartite summit in Uganda in 2009 – the precursor to the Johannesburg jamboree.

Leaders at the June event in Sandton were upbeat about the prospects of success. But it is precisely good leadership and real political will for free trade that are lacking in attempts to improve regional trade.

Agreements are signed but not properly implemented and there is little attempt to get African officials to buy into the notion of free trade. This is evident at border posts, for example, where

customs officials have poor attitudes to service and often delay goods unnecessarily.

A key issue in terms of attracting investors to take advantage of the FTA is that of 'rules of origin', a complex formula that determines which goods qualify as tariff free under trade regimes according to how 'local' their manufacture is.

Attracting investors from outside the continent will require more liberal rules of origin, such as those that currently prevail in Comesa, for example, rather than the stricter regime of SADC, which is designed, some say, to protect South Africa from external competition.

Analysts predict that South Africa will be one of the winners of the new FTA as it will allow cheaper access to more markets for its own manufactured exports. It is likely to see more competition in its own markets but its favourable trade balance with other African countries is likely to remain, as is Kenya's in its region, for example.

It is not clear how the issue of China's tsunami of cheap goods will fit into the picture, particularly if it moves its manufacturing to Africa. That is another challenge for the experts. **E**

*Dianna Games is vice president of The Africa Advisors, Global Pacific & Partners*





Every year, the sleepy Eastern Cape town of Grahamstown is transformed into a buzz of arts and culture, showcasing South Africa's best.

**Percy Zvomuya** was there.

# VERTI GINOUS LINEUP IN GRA HAMS TOWN



**W**hen people ask how the National Arts Festival in Grahamstown was, I reply that it was fine and fun, especially the music.

It's difficult to make sweeping statements about the whole festival, which ran from 30 June to 10 July, as I was only there for five days, but most of what I saw didn't leave me breathless.

Grahamstown was very cold; the skies were mostly overcast and the clouds occasionally burst to spill out copious amounts of rain.

Even when the sun shone, it was accompanied by a wintry wind that blew furiously through the town's wide streets, keeping the theatre crowd indoors and deflating the 'street carnival' atmosphere.

The festival is always a platform to showcase the winners of Standard Bank's Young Artists in five categories: jazz, won this year by pianist Bokani Dyer; drama, won by director Neil Coppen; dance, won by Mamela Nyamza; music, won by Ben Schoeman; and visual art, won by Nandipha Mntambo.

Unfortunately, as is always the case





**THE ANNUAL** Grahamstown Festival is about music, theatre, the arts and browsing the fleamarket in the town centre

PAUL GREENWAY/3P PHOTOGRAPHY

with the festival, I couldn't check out everything I wanted to see, including the shows by Schoeman and Nyamza.

The programme is so packed it leaves one vertiginous and unsure of what day it is.

### FAMILY DRAMA

Outstanding from the Standard Bank bunch was Copen, whose epic work, *Abnormal Loads*, is a two-century family drama set in the mountain and valleys of KwaZulu-Natal. Incorporating magical realism and re-enactments of battle scenes,

the production shows a young director with lots of ideas and even more bravery – cojones, I think the Spanish call it.

Talking about the Spanish brings me to briefly look at Mthambo's exhibition, *Faena*. Since her emergence a few years

**The programme is so packed it leaves one vertiginous and unsure of what day it is**

ago, Mthambo's oeuvre has involved working with the bovine: cowhide, the bull and bullfights.

This exhibition marks her attempts to slightly move away from her kraal and deflect the idea that she is a one-dimensional artist. *Faena* is a show comprising a video installation, sculptures, paintings and drawings. One piece of news that excited the visual arts community was the revelation that a private collector had bought the entire exhibition – without even seeing it.

One night at the festival, Mthambo walked into a restaurant where I was having supper and our conversation soon meandered to Ernest Hemingway, perhaps the foremost authority on the bullfight in the English-speaking world.

She told me she was reading some of the late writer's works. I mentioned the first Hemingway novel I read, *The Sun Also Rises*, and, like the bullfighter she is, Mthambo swung the monumental *Death in the Afternoon* back at me. It is a meditative text and manual about the intricacies of the bullfight as well as a study of aesthetics. Hopefully, it will help her as she moves away from familiar pastures.

### MUSIC AND ROOTING FOR THE UNDERDOG

Dyer is another bright prospect hand-picked by Standard Bank. He was part of the jazz lineup that also included artists such as the British rapper and saxophonist Soweto Kinch; Swiss vocalist Andreas Scherer; Dutch guitarists Anton Goudsmit and Jeroen Vierdag and Capetonian saxophonist and pianist Marc Fransman.

Drummer Kesivan Naidoo, a previous winner of the Standard Bank Young Artist Award winner for Jazz, was also there, as were saxophonist McCoy Mrubata and several others. Hein van de Geyn, the much-travelled Dutch bass maestro and winner of prestigious gongs including the Prins Bernhard Fonds Music Prize, was also present.

The Dutch musician, now also involved in teaching, is now based in Cape Town. One night, by chance, I sat next to him in a bar to watch Rafael Nadal >>

send Andy Murray out of Wimbledon. We were all rooting for Murray, the underdog (how often is a Briton an underdog?).

I think the most memorable concert must be the one in which Schaerer, Kinch, Naidoo, Goudsmit, Vierdag and Dyer played on a particularly cold Saturday night (the order in which I have listed the artists is a random, unscientific one based on their madness and brilliance).

The dance programme included works by Nyamza, Standard Bank Young Artist for Dance, Sello Pesa's *Lime Light on Rites*, a work that examines the dying and death industry (funeral homes); and Thabo Rapoo's *Batsumi*, a production that examines hunter-gatherers. Unfortunately I couldn't watch *Lovaffair*, a production directed by Ina Wichterich-Mogane that featured disabled dancers (described in the festival programme as 'differently-abled').

### THE BEST OF DRAMA

The theatre programme included works such as Coppen's *Abnormal Loads*, Sylvaine Strike's *The Table*, a family saga set around a revolving table that dealt with history and truth to tell about the family, and Craig Freimond's *Death of a Colonialist*, a drama about an academic family that's falling apart.

Clare Stopford's *Purgatorio* (written by the Chilean-born playwright Ariel Dorfman)

was one of the outstanding productions. Both soulful and soulless, the production is set in purgatory, the place that's set next door to hell (or is it heaven?) where souls go for temporary punishment before eventual redemption.

Then there was Martin Koboekae's *Last Pro in Yeoville*, a drama about a chance meeting between two lovers, a white prostitute and mediocre black painter, and Rob Murray's *Benchmarks*, a drama in mask enacted around a bench that explores xenophobia and human relationships.

There were two productions with a

British connection: *The History Boys* written by Allan Bennett, and *Iris Brunette* by London-based performer and writer Melanie Wilson, a production that only allowed twenty people at a time, making tickets to see it virtually unattainable.

The visual arts component of the festival was very strong and featured works by the late Alan Crump, teacher, curator and artist. The retrospective exhibition, curated by Wits University Art History professor Federico Freschi and titled *Alan Crump: A Fearless Vision*, looks back (in Crump's own words) at the 'objects and residue of [his] thoughts'.

There was also *People, Prints and Process*, an exhibition by the Caversham



**I found it challenging, intelligent and well wrought, although some people shook their heads in bemusement and consternation**

Centre, a pedagogic centre nestled in KwaZulu-Natal that was started by Malcolm Christian. The show looked back at a quarter of a century of work produced by artists that have passed through its grounds, including William Kentridge, Helen Sebidi and the late Robert Hodgins.

In an interview with the *Mail & Guardian's* Niren Tolsi, Jay Pather, chairman of the NAF committee and a celebrated choreographer, observed: 'I am finding work of good substance and quality, but it is interesting that there appears a lot less risk-taking, less work on the edge or jumping off the edge with an idio-

syncratic, singular vision that would keep us [as audiences and a country] moving forward. The committee is mindful of that.'

There was a lot of easy and accessible work; I didn't see many productions that challenged audiences (Sello Pesa's 'dance' piece, although it had the feel of a work in progress, was an exception).

When I first read Austrian poet Georg Trakl a few years ago, I almost despaired. I was confronted with unusual symbols and images, slang and a German dialect that his translator found challenging and virtually untranslatable. I persevered, cheered on by the helpful blurb by Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein that declared: 'I do not understand Trakl's poems; but their tone pleases me. It is the tone of true genius.'

Pather is no hypocrite; he practises what he preaches. There is *Body of Evidence*, his challenging dance piece that was staged at the festival in 2009. I found it complex, yet intelligent and well wrought, although some people

shook their heads in bemusement and consternation.

In an interview with Artthrobb, he helpfully explained: 'You know, one wishes that an audience would get everything you put in. But I also have to accept that I might make a work over six weeks and an audience encounters it over sixty minutes, so much may get lost. All art requires a certain degree of patience and openness in order to allow meaning to be made.'

I wish I could respond to those who ask me about the National Arts Festival thus: 'Eish, I'm still trying to make sense of the rich and complex works I watched,' but I really can't.

But let it be noted that I did have fun. **E**

*Percy Zvomuya reports on the arts for the Mail & Guardian.*



# A treat for African audiences

OUPIA NKOSI

**THOMAS MAPFUMO** at the One Night in Africa concert at Carnival City, Johannesburg

**T**homas Mapfumo, Chimurenga (Shona for 'revolution' and 'struggle') music maestro, was in Johannesburg for a week at the end of May, when he went on stage to collaborate with fellow Zimbabwean musician Oliver Mtukudzi on a memorable night at the Emperor's Palace on the East Rand.

Mapfumo – now based in the United States – was in South Africa to negotiate with Sheer Music, his new record label.

The label has already released his latest album, *Exile*, a sad but defiant meditation on exile and struggle, and *African Classics*, a condensed retrospective collection of his early hits from the late 1970s and early '80s.

Mapfumo is also planning to return with his band, The Blacks Unlimited, for a regional tour before Christmas.

## JOY OF JAZZ

As South Africa's jazz community comes to terms with the death of transcendental jazz teacher and saxophonist Zim Ngqawana, we take comfort in the visits by some of the world's great jazz artists.

Pianist McCoy Tyner was the main act at the Cape Town International Jazz Festival. In July, top composer and educator and saxophonist Yusef Lateef played in Johannesburg. But the signature event for South Africa's jazz enthusiasts must surely be the visit by celebrated and controversial trumpeter Wynton Marsalis, who will be the star attraction at the Standard Bank Joy of Jazz festival, scheduled for 25-27

August. Other artists will come from Brazil, Croatia and Belgium.

The South African contingent will include trumpeter Hugh Masekela; vocalists Sibongile Khumalo and Simphiwe Dana; saxophonist McCoy Mrubata and pianist Bokani Dyer, the 2011 Standard Bank Young Artist Award winner for Jazz.

## CASABLANCA CELEBRATES

The Casablanca Festival, held in Morocco every July, was this year headlined by American rapper 50 Cent.

The festival's main thrust is dance, drama and music. It takes place throughout the city's auditoriums, public spaces (including beaches and parks) and streets.

This year the festival showcased the talents of diverse musicians such as Nigerian muso Ayo; the Brazilian percussionist Carlinhos Brown; South Africa's very own Tumi and the Volume; soul/funk musician Wayne Beckford; and the transcontinental collaborative ensemble Afro-Cubism.

## FILMS SHOWCASED IN ZANZIBAR

The 14th edition of the Zanzibar International Film Festival, 2-10 July, brought thousands of visitors to the island, including celebrated filmmakers such as Nick Broomfield (director of the documentary of slain hip-hop icons, *Biggie and Tupac*).

Some of the films shown at the festival included *Making the Band* by Xena Bantarizah, a Ugandan filmmaker resident in

Canada, which was awarded two festival prizes (Best Original Score and the Chairman's Award). Another notable film was *The Rugged Priest* by Bob Nyanja, a Kenyan filmmaker, winner of the Golden Dhow Award.

Reggae DJ Shaggy was the headline musical act; other performers included Zimbabwe's guitarist and vocalist Oliver Mtukudzi; Senegal's master of the djembe Seydou Seydou Sissokho; Kenya's award-winning pop star Nyota Ndogo; and Tanzanian poet and performer Mrisho Mpoto.

## CAINE PRIZE FOR LITERATURE

*Hitting Budapest* by Zimbabwean writer NoViolet Bulawayo is the winner of the 2011 Caine Prize for African Writing. She emerged victorious ahead of *Butterfly Dreams* by Ugandan writer Beatrice Lamwaka; *What Molly Knew* by South African Tim Keegan; *In the spirit of McPhineas Lata* by Botswanan short story writer Lauri Kubuitsile and *The Mistress's Dog* by South African David Medalie.

This year's judging panel was chaired by Libyan novelist Hisham Matar, author of the Booker-shortlisted novel *In the Country of Men*. He was assisted by *Granta* magazine's deputy editor Ellah Allfrey; Georgetown University professor of English David Gewanter; publisher, film and travel writer Vicky Unwin; and Aminatta Forna, recent winner of the Commonwealth Best Book for 2011 for her novel *The Memory of Love* – Percy Zvomuya. **E**



# A new way of seeing Africa

Stephen Ellis, *SEASON OF RAINS, Africa in the World*

(Jacana Media, 2011)

Reviewed by Liesl Louw-Vaudran

Stephen Ellis, professor of social sciences at the Free University of Amsterdam, is an immensely respected scholar and leading theorist on African politics, development and history.

His latest book comes in the midst of a range of similar works analysing the huge shifts experienced in Africa in the past decade and looking towards the future.

Many of these share two key themes: the huge investment from Asia into Africa that is upsetting the postcolonial relationships between Africa, Europe and the US, and the vast potential of Africa's youth bulge.

This kind of analysis of Africa, unfortunately, is always time bound and can easily be overtaken by events.

For example, although freshly published, it is clear that Ellis' book went to

**The development industry tends to pursue an almost messianic quest for a head of state who will make all things good**

print just before the start of the North African revolutions – a dramatic turn of fate for Africa's Arab countries that of course not even our most renowned analysts had predicted.

Nevertheless, Ellis' book is extremely interesting and will arouse the curiosity of those interested in Africa's future, even though they might not agree with everything he says.



Much of the book is devoted to debunking the notions vehicled by development specialists and NGOs about how to 'fix' Africa.

He states with regret that 'it is disturbing to note the degree to which universities continue to produce graduates schooled in outdated views about development and the contribution of social sciences hereto'.

Of the many skewed notions Ellis cites in his book is the moralistic 'post-colonial' view that Africa should follow the same growth pattern as Western capitalist nations.

For example, agriculture is seen as a step towards industrialisation, and the absence of individual property rights as something that needs to be rectified be-

fore countries will properly develop.

However, Chinese models of property rights put this in a whole new perspective and the growth paths of emerging countries such as India call for a rethink of the classic top-down approach.

'A focus on agriculture as the foundation for new prosperity is not a return to the past, but a new step forward in our socio-economic evolution,' says Ellis, citing the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

In the first part of the book, Ellis explores outdated notions of 'progress' in quite some detail and comments on the infamous 2007 Dakar speech where French president Nicolas Sarkozy declared that 'the African peasant' has no idea of progress and prefers to live 'in harmony with nature'.

According to Ellis, many Western thinkers share Sarkozy's view that Africa must be helped to get onto the right path to 'development' and join the rest of the world in a march towards a better life.

Ellis proves Sarkozy wrong by looking at history to give the reader an insight into the warped power relations that defined the context in which these prejudices were created.

One could argue, though, that some of Ellis' wider notions about African culture and history are in fact not applicable to all of Africa but to specific regions and countries. What is needed is a more nuanced approach.

Although Ellis advises international aid organisations and donors to focus their efforts on country-specific issues and develop policies best suited for individual African countries, much of his book is extremely general, only noting exceptions to the rule in a very few instances. But when it comes to African development issues, the exceptions to the rule are numerous.

While a large portion of the book speaks directly to academics, analysts and aid theorists, Ellis also looks at how many of Africa's elite and intellectuals describe the failure of Africa's development in the last 50 years.

Besides colonialism – an all too handy scapegoat that has become outdated even amongst African commentators – Ellis debunks the notion that Africa's ills are caused by the failure of its leaders.

Seeing everything in terms of the Great/Really Awful head of state is too simplistic an approach, he believes, which outsiders are equally guilty of using.

'The development industry tends to pursue an almost messianic quest for a head of state that will make all things good,' he says.

Donor favourites have included Tan-

## Africa is experiencing a new era where it is no longer victim of the slave trade, colonialism or the new scramble for African resources

zania's Julius Nyerere, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda's Paul Kagame – the latter two, Ellis notes, being popular amongst former US president Bill Clinton's team of Africanists until such time as they started fighting each other.

As soon as one of the favourites disappoints by making an unpopular move or putting his country on the path to economic ruin, the search is on for another Great Leader.

Alternatively, Ellis says, a leader is often a product of society, and people get the leaders they deserve.

'Even the most formidable president can work only with the material constituted by societies, deriving power from the fact that large numbers of people subscribe to common ideas and activities, whether in the guise of formal institutions or simply in informal networks,' he argues.

Instead of focusing on leaders, social scientists should devote a lot more time pondering the unseen, informal and undocumented drivers of change or stagnation that determine how societies develop.

Religion is a major element that is so often overlooked and yet so important in the lives of most Africans.

Ellis remarks how aid theorists, for ex-

ample, often completely overlook the role of Islamic charities in Muslim countries and the huge political influence they have.

The breakdown of formal, visible, state bureaucracy has led many Africans to rely on parallel, informal state structures that often operate equally effectively, though they are not documented in the same way.

'Even when an efficient state bureaucracy is absent, power hierarchy and even institutions may still exist,' he says.

Ellis cites the extreme example of Somalia – a so-called failed state – and tells how Somali pirates have set up a rudimentary stock exchange in Harardheere, 250km northeast of Mogadishu. In this way the communities actually get shares in the piracy activities – quite an astonishing example, but something comparable probably exists in many places that are officially described as being in a state of collapse.

Ellis analyses the notion of a 'shadow government', prevalent in a great many African countries where the official government is actually just a front and the centre of power is elsewhere.

One thinks of the many countries where family networks actually make all the major decisions and take the lion's share of the wealth while the government remains largely ineffectual.

Ellis thus calls upon the reader and the development community not to be blinded by outdated notions and concepts that have been overtaken by the huge changes taking place on the continent.

Africa is no longer in a 'postcolonial' era but experiencing a new era where it is no longer victim of the slave trade, colonialism or the new scramble for African resources.

While many still entertain the notion of Africa-as-victim, the fact is that many governments know very well what they are doing and how to reap a benefit from the interest in their resources, which include raw materials and immensely coveted agricultural land, the book argues.

Africa's emerging middle class and its increasingly sophisticated financial elite, as described by Ellis, are not victims but actors in a yet uncertain future. **E**

# For a more ethical society

**Daryl Balia, MAKE  
CORRUPTION HISTORY**

**(Society for Promoting  
Christian Knowledge, 2009)**

**Reviewed by Greg Ruiters**

**T**his punchy book, written by Daryl Balia, is packed with interesting insights. It correctly situates corruption in South Africa as a matter rooted in the erosion of public morality that impacts the 'civil basis of human co-existence'. Advancing arguments for less market-oriented and more religion-based views of society, the church, and religion more generally, argues Balia, can have a constitutive role in fighting corruption.

To a large extent, the book presents a 'society-centred' view of corruption, prioritising 'moral leadership' and linking the anti-corruption struggle to the struggle for human rights. The only lasting basis for fighting corruption is building independent civil society, including ethical forms of association. Religious organisations, Balia suggests, are special, because they can play a key role in unifying an otherwise excessively splintered civil society focused on narrow interests. The me-

by case studies and a chapter on the role of churches and biblical texts in conceptualising and fighting corruption.

Balia, however, despite his preference for a moral approach, urges that we find implementable anti-corruption strategies that are not too ambitious and are informed by awareness of the costs attached to any programme. He is scathing about the National Anti-Corruption Forum, a non-statutory body formed in 2001 which, he argues, ambitiously tried to get the government and key stakeholders to find a consensus view.

This was not going to happen and represented a signal failure by the Mbeki administration. A well-funded single-agency approach, he argues, is more productive than symbolic actions and policies that are underfunded or unfunded. But high-handed top-down anti-corruption and accountability strategies often fail, since they are essentially punitive and do not mobilise society or provide for ethical leadership.

The book is a welcome addition to the literature on corruption. However, although thought provoking, it fails to deal systematically with the issues it raises. It tends to rely on outdated information, it fails to get beyond the 'perceptions' of corruption as 'endemic', and it fails to go beyond measurements based on public beliefs rather than the experience of corruption.

It is important to ascertain whether South Africa's corruption has a top-down pattern (initiated from the top) or whether it is a matter of a mass of low-level officials sharing bribes with their superiors (endemic). Newspapers play a key role in forming public opinion about the 'endemic' nature of corruption in SA, but as

**This level of inequality not only erodes any kind of social solidarity, cohesion and trust, it sets the scene for generalised corruption**

dia too can help build civil society and expose corruption but it is limited and often, as Balia suggests, is part of the problem because of concentrated ownership of media and its dependence on advertising.

The seven chapters of the book include chapters for both academic audiences and practitioners who might be interested in theories of corruption, anti-corruption strategies and the costs of fighting corruption. These are supported



## The quasi-racist moral discourse – a dangerous phenomenon in which all African governments are automatically seen as corrupt – could be more effectively treated in the book

*Mail&Guardian* journalist Sam Sole has noted, the imprecise nature of perceptions tends to exaggerate corruption.

The quasi-racist moral discourse – a dangerous phenomenon in which all African governments are automatically seen as corrupt – could be more effectively treated in the book by using a broader definition that includes corruption as a many-sided process involving the public, private and civil society sectors. It is important to see the private sector as the major initiator of large-scale corruption.

Like many other texts, Balia's invokes a too-narrow view of corruption. It does not raise injustice as an issue in how one ought to define corruption. It does not sufficiently situate corruption within the political economy of elite domination of resources in South Africa. Concentration of ownership of economy in critical areas such as food, drugs and private health can actually kill people.

Private health is affordable to less than 20% of the population in South Africa, yet a few private health corporations control 60% of health resources. This level of inequality not only fundamentally erodes

any kind of social solidarity, cohesion and trust; it also sets the scene for generalised corruption.

In addition, our racially divided society continues to practice morally indefensible exclusions. Still, analysts would need to distinguish between the petty corruption of an underpaid civil servant and the large-scale criminality of bankers, speculators and brewers.

Given the ethical perspective of the book, it might be interesting to argue for a much wider understanding of corruption as being more about inequity and injustice than about formal breaches of the law where public office is used for private gain. A less restrictive definition would allow for a more contextual discussion of why so many black South Africans conflate injustice with corruption. Many injustices are completely legal but most black South Africans still label them as corruption. The local lexicon of corruption includes instances where just about

anything one does not approve of is labelled corrupt. Those who are nearest to the 'corruption', such as councillors, are presumed guilty and blamed. **E**

*Greg Ruiters is professor of Governance and Public Policy, University of the Western Cape*



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# NATIONALISATION like sweets to a child

by Mandy Roussouw

When ANC Youth League president Julius Malema first proposed nationalising the mines as the answer to South Africa's twin headaches of poverty and inequality, the ruling party hardly paid any attention.

Everyone saw the proposal for what it was – the result of a few well-timed whispers in Malema's ear from his backers who needed their struggling mines to be put out of their misery.

Mining companies shrugged and claimed to believe the government's insistence that this was merely an item on the wish list of a deluded youngster with too much time on his hands. But that was arguably one of the most disastrous political miscalculations of the ANC government. Selling the concept of nationalisation to Malema's constituency is like giving sweets to a child.

To any unemployed, undereducated youngster who has no hope of getting a job and who watched Malema's spectacular rise to the ranks of the rich and famous, talk of owning mines sounds like a dream come true.

And you don't need to be a rocket scientist to understand and buy into Malema's logic. Take the mines from Anglo-American, pocket the cash that comes with selling gold, diamonds and platinum and – boom! – live large. It may sound like fairytale to some, but to a hard-up young man in a dusty two-horse town in Limpopo, it might seem the only way out of a miserable life.

To make matters worse, those on the right side of the fence – those who have the right education or struggle credentials to make good money, or who have access to government money – make it seem as if the only T-shirts worth wearing are designed by Ed Hardy and the only way to get from A to B is in a Range Rover.

At the ANC's midterm National General Council meeting last year in Durban,

party bigwig Enoch Godongwana admitted woefully: 'If I had done my work, we would not be here now.' Godongwana is the deputy chairperson of the party's economic transformation committee, which is where economic policy gets made.


The ruling party has attempted to refocus South Africans on seeing job creation and economic growth as better ways to deal with the pervasive problems facing our nation.

Every now and then a senior official makes a brave attempt to show up the failures of nationalisation in other parts of the world, especially in Africa. But it is too late – nationalisation has captured society's imagination. Malema has added a historical and sentimental dimension to his nationalisation campaign by claiming it was written in the Freedom Charter, which is widely seen as the founding document for the government we have now.

He also poured salt in an open wound – the disappointment that people have about better lives only being delivered to some, while even the 'born frees' (those born post-apartheid) are not guaranteed more opportunities than their parents.

South Africa is at a crossroads and, although it may have come too early, this will be President Jacob Zuma's Rubicon moment.


To undo the Malema effect on the young and the hopeless of our country will take spirited and visionary leadership. Young people will need to be convinced that hard work and education go together to ensure a successful and secure future.

Fairytales only become reality if you are willing to put in the hours. But the upside is that you can then shape the fairytale any way you wish. 

*Mandy Roussouw is the international correspondent for Media24 newspapers*



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