

VIEWS AND ANALYSES FROM THE AFRICAN CONTINENT


ISSUE 11 • 2011

the african.org

WWW.THE-AFRICAN.ORG • THE ALTERNATE-MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF THE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

Côte d'Ivoire Sudan

The meaning of a vote



**PEOPLE'S
POWER IN
TUNISIA**



**ZIMBABWE'S
ARMY STILL
RULES**



**ALL THE
FESTIVALS
IN 2011**



9 772073 495007

ANGOLA K500 • BOTSWANA P20.00 • CÔTE D'IVOIRE CFA3 000 • DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO CFA3 000 •
ETHIOPIA B20.00 • GAMBIA D50.00 • GHANA C4.00 • KENYA SH300.00 • MALAWI K5 000 • MOZAMBIQUE R29.00
NAMIBIA \$29.00 • NIGERIA N500.00 • TANZANIA SH7 000 • UGANDA SH7 000 • ZAMBIA K15 000 • ZIMBABWE R29.00
SOUTH AFRICA R29.00 (INCL VAT) • UK £4.00 • US \$6.00 • EUROPE €6.95





What if you could spend 80% of your time analysing data – rather than just assembling it?

You can. SAS gives you The Power to Know.®

SAS Business Intelligence integrates data from across your enterprise and delivers self-service reporting and analysis – so IT spends less time responding to requests and business users spend less time looking for information.

Johannesburg and Tshwane +27 11 713 3400 • Cape Town +27 21 912 2420

► www.sas.com/sa
for a free best practices report



THE
POWER
TO KNOW.

Dear Reader...

It started with a Tunisian street seller, fed up with being harassed by the police. In an extraordinary and violent gesture, the young Mohamed Bouazizi committed suicide – an event that would trigger massive street protests throughout Tunisia.

Who would have thought that the riots that followed would lead to the end of a regime that ruled that country for 23 years?

This is what Tunisians would like to call the ‘power of the people’.

The ousting of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January sent shockwaves throughout Arab-speaking North Africa and the rest of the continent. Though well known for having a repressive regime, where dissent was severely punished and freedom of speech almost unheard of, Tunisia has had a relatively good reputation as a stable and investor-friendly country, as Issaka Souaré underlines in his article on this issue.

The events that led to the ousting of Ben Ali have revealed to the world the true face of a country with a massive young population, exasperated by poverty, joblessness and without any hope for a better future.

Many commentators have since pointed to the role of the Internet and global communication in making sure no regime keeps its people in the dark. Facebook and Al Jazeera led to the Tunisian revolution, some say.

These are all elements present in many parts of Africa and the

developing world.

Is there a lesson here for the rest of Africa? Are violent street protests the only way to effect change when elections are continuously being rigged by those in power?

At a time when the escalating crisis in Côte d’Ivoire is creating huge uncertainty about the fairness of elections in Africa, one wonders whether ‘people power’ is ultimately the only solution. Let the street decide, some would say.

After decades of civil war the South Sudanese have now had the chance to vote. And for now it looks as though that vote, overwhelmingly for secession, will be respected.

In 2011 Africans in 18 countries will be going to the polls. Will their vote be respected and what happens if it isn’t?

In the end the Tunisians took matters in their own hands. They no longer had any faith in elections.

In Guinea, at the end of last year, the opposite happened. People held their breath as the two main contenders faced off in a tense and violent run-off. One can only salute the losing candidate Cellou Dallein Diallo for accepting the results.

In Côte d’Ivoire it hasn’t been the same story and our articles in this issue speak clearly of the impasse that Ivorians and the international community are now grappling with.

The examples of Tunisia and Côte d’Ivoire show two very different scenarios when it comes to the

international community.

One of the issues exposed by the events in Tunisia is the role of certain countries in propping up Ben Ali, supposedly a bulwark against Islamist radicalism.

In an apparent about-turn the international community is now practically united in saluting the ‘return to democracy’ in Tunisia.

The French foreign minister Michele Alliot-Marie will probably long regret having suggested France help to ‘restore order’ in Tunis, only days before Ben Ali was ousted.

On the ground, however, Tunisia is now facing the painful reality of building a democracy from scratch.

While the 8 000 Tunisians who gathered at the *Place de la République* in Paris were celebrating Ben Ali’s departure, chaos reigned in Tunis.


Some fear this could justify the old argument of autocratic regimes of being the only guarantors of stability.

Many believe the Tunisian revolution will spread to neighbouring Algeria and Egypt and perhaps even Morocco.

One should caution against hasty comparisons. Despite their similarities, the structures of clientelism, the security situation, the determination of civil society and the obstinacy of the regimes elsewhere are not all the same. Yet anything is possible where people are longing for political freedom and economic prosperity.

Liesl Louw-Vaudran

In this issue



5 Newswatch

Nigeria, DRC, Somali piracy

6 Upcoming Events

African elections in 2011

8 Last in

Revolution in Tunisia

10 Sudan Referendum

Implications for Africa

13 Juba snapshot

Africa's newest capital

14 Côte d'Ivoire

A possible peaceful way out





Publishers: Mail & Guardian Media, Grosvenor
 Corner, 195 Jan Smuts Ave, Rosebank, Johannesburg,
 2193, South Africa
Tel: +27 11 250 7300 **Fax:** +27 11 250 7502

Editor

Liesl Louw-Vaudran

Editorial Board

Paul-Simon Handy
 Hennie van Vuuren
 Issaka Souare
 Cheryl Hendriks
 Poppie Mputing
 Abeba Amene
 Sandra Adong Oder
 Lansana Gberie

Copy Editor

Sasha Evans

Content Manager: Editorial

Ben Kelly

Production Manager

Trudy-Lee Rutkowski

Proofreading

Iolandi Pool

Design

Colleen Mulrooney

Head of Sales

Adriana Botha

Publisher for M&G Media

Anastacia Martin

Cover image

AP Photo/Pete Muller

Cover caption

Southern Sudanese line up to vote at dawn in the southern capital of Juba Sunday, Jan. 9, 2011. This morning marks the first opportunity for southerners to cast ballots in an independence referendum, the outcome of which will determine if the south secedes from the north to form an independent country.



Institute for Security Studies:
 Block C, Brooklyn Court,
 Veale Street,
 New Muckleneuk,
 Pretoria/Tshwane 0181
 Tel: +27-12-346-9500/2

Copyright: M&G Media Ltd and **the-african.org**. No part of this magazine may be reproduced in any form without written consent of the publishers.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and not those of The Institute of Security Studies, its Council, Trustees, any funder or sponsor of the ISS or M&G Media Ltd.

SUBSCRIPTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION

Helen Chanda

Tel: +27 12 346 9500

email: hchanda@issafrica.org



17 Côte d'Ivoire
 The military option

20 Zimbabwe
 Election scenarios

23 Zimbabwe
 The role of the military

26 Guinea
 Reconciliation

30 Feature: African Futures
 A balancing act

32 Feature: African Futures
 Growth scenarios

34 Debate: gay rights
 Uganda



36 Debate: gay rights
 Church and State

40 Business
 Africa's ports

43 Culture
 Festivals in 2011

45 Books
 Zimbabwe

46 Books
 Interview

48 Last Word

Our contributors



Jean-Michel Debrat is a development specialist. From 2002 to 2010 he was Deputy Director General of *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD), the bi-lateral development bank that executes the French government's development aid policies. He is now AFD's regional director in South Africa. He holds a Doctorate in Geography and graduated from the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration Paris* (ENA). He writes about Africa's future prospects for growth.



Dr Issaka K. Souaré is a senior researcher in the ISS' African Conflict Prevention Programme. He is the author of a number of books, chapters and articles relating to Africa, including *Africa in the United Nations System, 1945–2005*; *Civil Wars and Coups d'État in West Africa*; the novel *Samassi* and, as co-editor, *Somalia at the Crossroads*.



Andrew Kaggwa is a Ugandan journalist with 16 years of experience working for a local language daily *Bukedde* which is part of the Vision Group, the leading media organization in Uganda. He has also contributed many articles on social and political issues in Uganda to South African newspapers.



Dr Chandré Gould is a senior researcher in the Crime and Justice Programme of the ISS. She led a two-year research project on the nature of the sex work industry in Cape Town, the results of which were published as *Selling Sex in Cape Town: sex work and human trafficking in a South African City*. In 2009 she edited a book on the SA criminal justice system titled *Criminal (In)Justice: A civil society perspective*.

See our website www.the-african.org for our daily comment articles on African issues and a weekly podcast on current affairs on the continent. Click on 'comment' to respond to any of these. We are waiting to hear your views and opinion on subjects touching the lives of African citizens today.

The General Delegation of Alliance Française in Southern Africa



French is already spoken by half the population of Africa

Trade with francophone African countries is fast developing, thereby increasing the need to speak French in commercial, medical, engineering, educational, tourist and other sectors....

>> We are the largest and oldest French language learning centre in South Africa
Teaching French is our main business.

>> Our teachers are trained and experienced, most of them are native-French speakers, we have the widest variety of courses at all levels at highly-competitive prices for adults and children.
Our classes, scheduled at various times during the day, never more than 15 students to ensure a **personalised**, student-centered experience that gets you **communicating** in no time.

>> As a cultural centre, we are truly a **gateway** to the French language and culture.

www.alliance.org.za | info@alliance.org.za | 011 646 11 69 | 17 Lower Park Drive - Crn Kerry Road- Parkview 2122

Cape town - Durban - Johannesburg - Port Elizabeth - Pretoria - Soweto - Stellenbosch - Gaborone - Maseru - Mbabane
Lusaka - Bosmont - Bulawayo - Harare - Potchefstroom - Vaal Triangle - Pietermaritzburg - Mitchell's Plain- Bloemfontein

Piracy now threatens Southern Africa

Pirates have reached Southern African shores. The European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) documents two confirmed cases of piracy off the Southern African coastline. The first is a Taiwanese fishing vessel that went missing on 25 December 2010, northeast of Madagascar. The second is a Mozambican fishing vessel that was reported missing between Mozambique and Madagascar and subsequently spotted being towed by a pirate skiff northwards towards the Comoros.

In addition to the confirmed cases, news media reported two failed attacks by pirates close to the port of Beira in Mozambique on 24 and 25 December 2010. Meanwhile, there may be many other attacks that remain unreported.

The implication for Southern Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is clear: the threat of piracy is no longer a theoretical possibility, it has become a reality.

Southern African waters are increasingly becoming an attractive alternative for Somali pirates, who realise that there is worthwhile prey, in the form of numerous recreational and commercial vessels, waiting to be exploited.

This area does not fall within the region normally patrolled by international anti-piracy forces. Naval resources are extremely limited in Southern Africa, and South Africa, the country with the largest naval capability, has a fleet that is effectively grounded due to financial constraints. ■

Changing the rules during the game

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is set to hold its much-anticipated presidential elections in November this year.

Long before that date, however, new rules stack the deck. On Thursday 15 January, both houses of parliament approved a constitutional amendment that eliminates the need for a second round of presidential elections, meaning that a candidate can win with a simple majority. The neutrality of state institutions, mainly the senate and the parliament, has also been compromised by the government's attempts to buy the loyalty of members of parliament (MPs).

Kabila's move drew a swift reaction from his opponents, including the leader of the *Union Pour la Nation Congolaise* (UNC) party, Vital Kamerhe, and Francois Mwamba, secretary general of the *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC). Meanwhile the ailing Etienne Tshisekedi is yet to state his position on the matter.

The move by Kabila ahead of the presidential elections is not unrelated to the recent developments in Gabon and Togo, where incumbents fearing defeat in the likely event of opposition unity changed the rules of the game to remain in control. Kabila justified this move by arguing the second round posed a threat to national unity in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea but these arguments are not convincing.

The opposition will be forced to unite behind a single candidate before the elections - an extremely difficult challenge on a continent where this has only been possible after a first round. From the current configuration, one could argue that the young Kabila (39) has no intention of leaving power anytime soon. ■

The way forward for Nigeria's PDP?

Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan will be the flag bearer of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) in April's presidential elections. He won the PDP ticket with 2 736 of 3 400 valid delegates' votes (almost 78%), while his rival, former vice-president Atiku Abubakar, only got 805 votes during the primaries that were concluded on 14 January.

Both candidates represent a regional divide that is likely to widen should the outcome of the vote be contested. The expectation was that Abubakar would receive most of his support from some northern states, but it seems that even here, Jonathan managed to secure a convincing win. For instance, in Adamawa State, Atiku's home, the votes cast there were in favour of Jonathan by a little over 70%. He had 76 votes to Atiku's 31.

The concern now is what is likely to happen within the PDP. Will Atiku stand as presidential candidate anyway? Will the PDP split along north-south lines? The latter is unlikely, as some northern governors have secured their future through Jonathan. He is almost assured of being the next president of Nigeria, given the extraordinary domination of the PDP and his message of renewal. Though it is too early to speculate, change might not come as quickly as Jonathan is predicting, as the 150 million Nigerians are hoping for political transformation to consolidate democratic governance, fight corruption and better distribute the nation's resources. The deals to secure the PDP ticket also imply compromises on a number of issues that might not receive immediate attention. ■

To the ballot in 2011

This year promises to be eventful, with a series of high-profile elections taking place across Africa. A number of the continent's heavyweights, including Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Egypt, are holding presidential elections – some in an atmosphere of rising tension and uncertainty.

In the first part of the year, Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni is standing for re-election after 24 years in power. Analysts believe he is almost certain of a victory over his main challenger Kizza Besigye, although some say this might only be in a second round if a free and

fair vote is assured.

In Benin, often regarded as a model of democracy on the continent, presidential elections are due to take place in March, with president Yayi Boni aiming for a second term. Some believe, however, that financial scandals in recent years have tarnished Boni's reputation and he might not have an easy win over opposition leader Adrien Houngbedji.

Meanwhile, uncertainty surrounds the planned presidential elections in Niger and Madagascar, both countries having suffered coups in recent times. The question remains as to whether these elections, planned, respectively,

for 31 January and 13 April, will lead to real democracy – or will they merely legitimise the current regimes?

All eyes, however, will be focused on Nigeria, where tensions are likely to reach boiling point ahead of the vote planned for 9 April. While many of the elections this year might just be seen as 'rubber stamps' for the incumbents, no such luxury is predicted for the current Nigerian head of state, Goodluck Jonathan. Analysts believe he will have to fight a hard campaign to overcome some of his regional drawbacks. With former leaders like Atiku Abubakar (former vice president and the sole



Hundreds of Zimbabwean wait in a voting queue on election day in Harare, Saturday, March, 29, 2008. Zimbabweans began lining up before dawn Saturday for crucial elections where President Robert Mugabe's faces the toughest challenge to his 28-year rule and the opposition is urging its supporters to defend their votes against an alleged ballot-rigging plot.

People's Democratic Party [PDP] representative in the north) and Muhammadu Buhari as likely challengers, and given the huge logistical and organisational challenges, it is set to be a very tough race.

Later in the year, presidential elections will take place in the DRC, Egypt, Zambia, Cameroon and the Gambia, with the incumbent standing a good chance of winning in all cases.

Real uncertainty and international focus, however, will be on Zimbabwe, where the political barometer is already rising ahead of a planned presidential election, probably preceded by a referendum on a new constitution. Will Zimbabwe's 86-year-old leader Robert Mugabe – the continent's oldest head of state – hang in there despite increasingly fierce contestation, or will Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai finally be given the title many believe he should have received in 2008? Read more on page 20.

JANUARY

Southern Sudan: Referendum on independence; 9 January 2011

Central African Republic: Presidential and National Assembly; first round 23 January 2011, second round 20 March 2011

Niger: Presidential; first round (postponed from 26 December 2010) 31 January 2011

FEBRUARY

Cape Verde: National Assembly; January 2011. Presidential; February 2011

Uganda: Presidential, National Assembly and local; 13 February – 9 March 2011

Chad: National Assembly; 20 February



President Goodluck Jonathan speaks during the ruling party primary in Abuja, Nigeria, Thursday, Jan. 13, 2011. Delegates of Nigeria's ruling party began voting Thursday night to pick its presidential candidate, choosing between honoring a power-sharing agreement by selecting a Muslim or endorsing the oil-rich nation's current Christian leader.

2011 (postponed from 2010, 2009 and 2006). Local; 27 March 2011 (postponed from 12 December 2010). Presidential; 8 May 2011 (postponed from 23 Apr 2011)

Madagascar: Local; February 2011 (expected). National Assembly; 13 April 2011. Presidential; 4 May or 1 July 2011. Senate (indirect) 2011 (after local)

Rwanda: Local; February/March 2011. Senate (indirect); 2011 (after local)

MARCH

Benin: Presidential and National Assembly; 30 March 2011

Djibouti: Regional Assemblies and local; March 2011. Presidential; April 2011

South Africa: Local; early 2011

APRIL

Burkina Faso: Local; April 2011

Nigeria: National Assembly; 2 April 2011. Presidential; 9 April 2011. State Assemblies and governors; 16 April 2011

Seychelles: Presidential; July 2011

Tunisia: Chamber of Councillors; July 2011

JULY

São Tomé and Príncipe: Presidential; July 2011. Local; 2011

SEPTEMBER

Egypt: Presidential; September 2011
The Gambia: Presidential; September 2011

Zambia: Presidential, National Assembly and local; before October 2011

OCTOBER

Cameroon: Presidential; October 2011
Liberia: Presidential, House of Representatives and Junior Senators; 11 October 2011


NOVEMBER

Mauritania: National Assembly, regional and local senate (indirect); November 2011

DRC: Presidential (first round) and National Assembly; 27 Nov 2011

DECEMBER

Gabon: National Assembly; December 2011

Zimbabwe: Referendum on new constitution; planned for May 2011. Presidential, National Assembly, Senate and local; after referendum. 

Source: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA)

The downfall of a dictator

Issaka K Souaré looks at the popular revolt that ousted Tunisia's president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali – a first in Arab-speaking North Africa

For 23 years, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali ruled Tunisia with an iron fist, but with mixed results. On 14 January 2011, amidst a popular uprising unprecedented in his country, he finally succumbed to popular pressure and left power.

Following nearly a month of mass protests across the country, and after scores of people had perished, Ben Ali unsuccessfully tried to reduce tensions, with measures that included sacking his whole cabinet and promising to step down in 2014 (at the end of another five-year term). Eventually he fled the country and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia.

This is quite ironic, in view of how he came to power some 23 years ago, on 7 November 1987. On that day, 51-year-old Ben Ali engineered a sort of political change not seen before in Africa: a constitutional-medical coup d'état. Just over a month into his new post as prime minister (and, therefore, as constitutional successor to the head of state), Ben Ali had President Habib Bourguiba, who had been in power since independence in 1956, declared medically unfit for office, using a medical report obtained from the president's doctors under duress. He deposed Bourguiba and assumed the presidency.

Tunisia had mixed fortunes under Ben Ali. On the positive side, he did well at improving infrastructure in his

country. According to the 2010 UNDP Human Development Index, Tunisia is the third best country in Africa and one of only four African countries on the list of High Human Development countries (after Libya and Mauritius and before Algeria). Its annual GDP per capita is \$8 509, with an average life expectancy at birth of 74.3 years and an adult literacy rate of 74.3%. Moreover, the country has developed one of the finest medical systems on the continent, with a good health infrastructure and highly skilled medical staff. Compared to other African states, and given that all this was achieved without substantial natural resources, this is truly an impressive record, and much of the credit goes to Ben Ali. It is this impressive record that bemuses most people.

Tunisia, like some of the Asian tigers, was considered by many as a good example of a 'developmental' regime, despite the glaring lack of democracy and respect for human rights

The reasons behind the revolt

But there is another side to the story, which is what lies behind the ongoing protests that caused the downfall of Ben Ali. It can be summarised in the following: intolerance and oppression of political dissent, massive corruption by the political elite, huge inequality between the masses and those close to the centres of power, and incredible arrogance from the latter in their treatment of the former. In fact, Ben Ali's family members owned what they wished in the country, with no regard for regulations. Moreover, the impressive infrastructural developments seen in Tunis and the coastal touristic areas are no match for the miserable situation of many areas in the south, as was highlighted by the Gafsa uprisings in 2008.

Politically, Ben Ali maintained power through oppression and constitutional manipulation, which helped him win every election with more than 95% of the votes.

The first lesson of Ben Ali's downfall is related to the debate about the relation between democracy and development. Tunisia, like some of the Asian tigers, was considered by many to be a good example of a 'developmental' regime, despite the glaring lack of democracy and respect for human rights. They argued that democracy, understood as 'political good governance', is not necessary for economic prosperity, given that almost all of today's established democracies began experiencing economic prosperity before becoming democratic.

An uncontrolled ruling elite

Democracy may not be a sufficient condition for economic prosperity, but it includes many mechanisms, checks and balances designed to facilitate economic development, particularly in African countries endowed with



Tunisia's President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was branded a corrupt dictator by protesters and forced to flee the country.

abundant natural resources. While an authoritarian regime might have some control mechanisms, and some democratic regimes may be very corrupt, most control measures do not apply to the ruling elites in authoritarian regimes. And while a democratic leader might need more negotiations before adopting a decision, authoritarian regimes constrain most ordinary people from fully contributing to or benefitting from the country's wealth. Tunisia's development, including employment opportunities, is a façade because it is hugely unequal in terms of beneficiaries.

The second lesson is for the immediate neighbours of Tunisia, Africa as a whole and the West. While neighbouring countries might not have an identical situation, most North African countries, particularly Egypt, Libya and, to some extent, Algeria and Morocco, have many similarities with Tunisia. Those are especially found in the huge gaps between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', as well as in their varying intolerance of political dissent.


The threat of 'terrorism' has for long been a weapon of most of

these countries to oppose political liberalisation. Ben Ali's regime even attempted to describe the ongoing protests as having been instigated by 'terrorists'. Many Western countries seem to fight back, to accept this discourse and favour the apparent stability projected by these regimes over the uncertainty of the outcome of free and fair elections. In Egypt, in particular, where presidential elections are expected to take place later this year, after highly flawed legislative elections in 2010 and against the background of suspected dynastical plans by President Hosni Mubarak, Cairo must take note of the happenings next door. The Tunisian saga suggests to the whole of Africa that durable stability lies in good governance supported by the masses, and not in a corrupt elite.

A difficult transition

Regarding the immediate future of the country, it should be recalled that although he was forced out of power, Ben Ali negotiated his departure before leaving. This was clear by his appointment of the prime minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, to succeed

him in a caretaker capacity. But the constitutional court soon declared the vacancy of the presidency as 'indefinite', paving the way to the swearing-in as caretaker president of the Speaker of Parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, who has asked Ghannouchi to form a new government. Both are closely associated with the defunct regime, hence continued calls by many for a 'real' regime change. Meanwhile, others closer to the former president, generally through family ties, seem to be resisting using militia groups to fight back, perhaps fearing for their lives.

The first challenge, therefore, is for the new leadership swiftly to form an 'inclusive' government to represent all the various components of the country. But such a government must respect its 'transitional' nature and organise free and fair elections in a reasonable period. The two-month period provided in the current constitution might have to be extended, but six months would be reasonable. If the Mebazaa-Ghannouchi government fails to do so, the country might witness new waves of protests, with incommensurable consequences. 

Sudan referendum

Analysis



A Southern Sudanese woman votes in a polling station at the suburb of Haj Yousef on the outskirts of the capital Khartoum, Sunday, January 9, 2011.

New state, old fears

Following South Sudan's largely peaceful referendum for independence **Emmanuel Kisiangani** asks whether secession is necessarily something to be feared by African leaders

South Sudan's January 2011 self-determination referendum will almost certainly lead to a vote for secession. After many years of discord and conflict between the largely Arab-and-Muslim north and the black Christian south, this separation is likely not only to change the face of Sudan but to also have defining security and strategic implications for neighbouring countries and the broader international community. It also raises important questions on the legitimacy of Africa's colonial borders.

Given their arbitrary nature, and the fact that the

continent's cooperative institutions, including the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor the African Union (AU), have long held the sanctity and inviolability of these borders, the question is what Southern Sudanese secession would mean for the rest of Africa. For a continent where, in geopolitical terms, the idea of the 'state' has remained in perpetual conflict with that of 'ethnic identity', will South Sudan's secession set a dangerous precedent, thereby further fracturing the continent and prompting instability and violence? At a very basic level, is self-determination, in principle, wrong for Africa?

Self-determination a political right

The right to self-determination is a principle in international law that emphasises the right of nations to choose their sovereignty and political status freely and without external compulsion or interference. It is reflected in United Nations (UN) Resolutions 1514 and 2625, and

affirmed by various regional human rights instruments and declarations. Unfortunately, the principle does not state what circumstances should lead to self-determination or what self-determination should result in. Should it, for instance, be an independent state or can it be some form of autonomy?

Nonetheless, for South Sudan, self-determination is seen as a welcome antidote to what is perceived as Khartoum's previous policies of systematic political alienation and forced Islamisation. It is worth noting, however, that the north-south divide in Sudan goes as far back as the British colonial rule, which emphasized the policy of governing the north and south under separate administrations. It is not surprising therefore, that North and South Sudan went to war with each other even before the country gained its independence on January 1, 1956. Indeed, the intervening period until the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) witnessed little peace, with the exception of ten years from 1973 until 1983. The CPA provided for a referendum vote on whether the South secedes or remains a part of the north. To most Southerners, therefore, the referendum provides an opportunity to define their destiny and rebuild their society after many years of conflict and civil war.

However for Khartoum, separation is not the preferred choice given its implications, not only on the North's access to the South's rich natural resources, but also on the possibility of other regions like Darfur demanding their own independence. Khartoum aside, demands for secession or self-determination are not necessarily popular in many other African countries where colonial borders have been perceived as both artificial and sacrosanct but remain in tension with ethnic groups and those seeking self-determination.

The right to self-determination is a principle in international law that emphasises the right of nations to choose their sovereignty and political status freely and without external compulsion or interference



A man checks voter lists at a polling centre in the Al Barka IDP camp in Bahri, Khartoum

Is secession bad for Africa?

Africa's continental bodies, the OAU and then the AU, have throughout the post-independent era emphasised respect for colonial borders and treated them as sacrosanct or untouchable. The assumption is that even though African borders were drawn arbitrarily, keeping them the way they were at independence helps to ensure relative stability and averts the potential risks and uncertainties of changing them.

There are, however, sceptics who feel that African leaders prefer colonial borders because they guarantee them both international esteem and power within those borders. South Sudan's

secession shakes the perceived inviolability of colonial boundaries and is bound to cause unease in other African countries where civil war is threatening the state or where there are movements fighting for greater autonomy, such as in Morocco's Western Sahara region, the Touareg nomads in northern Mali and Niger, Casamance in southern Senegal, the Cabinda region in Angola, and the Oromo people in Ethiopia or parts of the Democratic Republic of Angola such as Katanga.

Will South Sudan's independence foster a change in thinking around African borders? If South Sudan secedes, it will not be the first post-

Sudan referendum


Analysis



Voters wave a south Sudan flag as they hold images of former south Sudan politician John Garang and south Sudan President Salva Kiir (R) after casting their ballots during the referendum at the John Garang memorial mausoleum in Juba.

Many think that South Sudan's independence will force governments on the continent to pay more attention to marginalised groups

the other hand the emergence of a functional state such as Somaliland presents a compelling case for self-determination. The AU's (and the international community's) reaction toward Somaliland, however, has been uneven compared to that towards South Sudan. The perception is that it has been dictated more by politics than principle and the task, then, should be to determine under what circumstances self-determination should be allowed and where it should not.

Clearly it would be simplistic to say either that self-determination is the answer to Africa's intra-state conflicts or that it is totally bad for Africa. Priority should be given to dealing with the factors that combine to cause self-determination claims. But where the circumstances leave little choice, the AU should either provide some form of defence or allow self-determination as a weapon of choice. The challenge is to consider carefully, on a case-by-case basis, the circumstances under which self-determination should be acceptable. The policy of maintaining the status quo may not necessarily stop self-determination claims or solve the problem. Indeed, while it is logical to support territorial integrity as a moral and legal aspect of constitutional democracy, there should be room for the remedial measure of self-determination where a group has suffered extreme injustices, for which self-determination appears to be the only last resort. 

independence African country to do so. Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia in 1993 following a 30-year war, although Eritrea, unlike South Sudan, had actually existed before as a separate state under Italian colonial rule, and was only annexed by Ethiopia in 1962.

According to this line of thought, Eritrea did not break the OAU/AU restriction on colonial boundaries. However, Somaliland, the northern part of Somalia that declared independence in 1991 and was independent from Somalia for three days in the 1960s, can also argue that it has a case for secession. The government of Somaliland has recently been seeking to restore the old British Somaliland Protectorate border, which existed until 1960 and has initiated efforts to demarcate the colonial border. Yet Somaliland remains internationally unrecognised even by the AU, although some AU member states, in their individual capacities, have indicated willingness to recognise it.

If the AU ends up recognising South Sudan's secession, the question will be, why not Somaliland? Looking at the cases of Eritrea, South Sudan and Somaliland,

although it is plausible to suppose that self-determination does not always lead to instability and that it may not necessarily trigger secession demands elsewhere on the continent, many think that South Sudan's independence will force governments on the continent to pay more attention to marginalised groups. South Sudan has been accorded a lot of international support by regional and international actors, giving the impression that self-determination can be a useful tool for creating stable societies and a means to manage protracted armed conflict between groups on the continent. Ultimately, a failed Southern Sudan would support those who hold the old boundaries as sacrosanct, arguing that even in this case, it had been demonstrated that there was no benefit in dismantling or reviewing the African states in their present form.

Colonial borders can be changed

On balance, the AU's doctrine on the 'inviolability' of boundaries makes sense when seen in light of the many African countries that struggle with opposition movements, but on

Snapshot:

Aspiring to be Africa's newest capital

REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic




A year ago there were hardly any paved roads in Juba, but things have changed rapidly as more and more development comes to the South Sudanese capital

Aclaimed author and photographer Savo Heleta has spent several months in Sudan and says he is 'truly impressed' with the improvements in the Southern capital, Juba.

'A lot of construction has taken place since October 2009. There are whole new suburbs around Juba with modern-looking houses that were not there last year. However, with Juba being one of the fastest growing cities in the world – from some 250 000 people in 2005 to around 1.2 - 1.5 million today – there is also a lot of poverty.

'The city does not have water, electricity or a sewage system. People depend on the trucks that deliver Nile water to homes and water tanks. The majority of people and institutions get electricity from generators. This is a very expensive and unsustainable way to get electricity, and the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) will have to do something about it very quickly.

'Since 2005, the GOSS has mainly focused on security and institution building, while putting aside delivery of basic services such as healthcare and education. Healthcare is almost fully dependent on international NGOs and aid agencies.

'Small businesses are booming but the majority of people who run these businesses are from other countries (Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia) or from northern Sudan. Since 2005, there have been only a few bigger investments, such as cellphone companies setting up networks and SAB Miller opening a modern brewery.' 



While the South Sudanese have been pre-occupied with the 9 January referendum, focus will now shift to creating a viable capital



South Sudanese registering to vote in Juba – a town aspiring to become a city

Savo Heleta

Savo Heleta



A supporter of Laurent Gbagbo wears a badge showing his portrait in the Treichville neighborhood of Abidjan, Ivory Coast. As the political standoff continues, Gbagbo backers are holding regular rallies to bolster support for the incumbent strongman.

Let them vote again

As the death toll rises in Côte d'Ivoire and the international community is increasingly at a loss about the way forward, **Paul-Simon Handy** and **David Zounmenou** argue that if Gbagbo doesn't step down, the only peaceful solution might be to hold new elections in the north of the country.

Despite unprecedented diplomatic pressure, Côte d'Ivoire's outgoing president, Laurent Gbagbo, still refuses to accept the result of the presidential election that was approved by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and has been certified by the UN.

On 2 December last year the IEC proclaimed former prime minister Alassane Ouattara as the clear winner of an election that took five years to materialise and cost hundreds of millions of euros, as well as a substantial number of human lives. If Gbagbo's refusal to relinquish power does not seem a major surprise to many analysts, ECOWAS, the African Union and the broader international community now face an important

post-electoral crisis that bears the potential of regional contagion.

As the prospect of Côte d'Ivoire relapsing into open warfare after many years of de facto territorial partition appears to be the worst possible outcome, ECOWAS and the AU seem to have exhausted all their diplomatic options. But is the use of force to install president-elect Ouattara inevitable, envisionable and within reach of the relevant actors? Can the international community afford to engage in an action with unpredictable consequences? What are the untapped options at the disposal of the international community to solve the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire in a peaceful manner?

Gbagbo still controls 'useful' part of the country

The Ivorian presidential poll was certainly one of the most expensive and most carefully prepared and monitored elections to take place in Africa in the last two decades. Supervised by the UN, which has had a peacekeeping mission in the country since 2004, it was supposed to end many years of instability and socio-political unrest.

Instead, despite being seen as relatively fair and transparent, the elections have sown the seeds for possible violent conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. The unusual unanimity of the international community in recognising Ouattara's victory over the incumbent Gbagbo is mainly

For his victory to be effective, Ouattara needs to take control of the 'useful' part of the country

The Ivorian electoral crisis indicates how difficult it has become for the international community to impose its views on an illegitimate government

based on the certification of the UN, which is considered by all parties to be an impartial and neutral broker. By supporting the UN's stamp of approval on the election results, the international community has adopted a firm stance based on the legitimacy of the rules and procedures set out in the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement and agreed upon by all actors.

Gbagbo's victory claim is based on a legalistic argument centred around the proclamation of the results by a constitutional counsel partial to Gbagbo, giving him the pretext to launch an anti-Western mobilisation campaign that originally helped him seize power in 2000 and retain it after a failed coup attempt in 2002.

It is ironic that Ouattara's uncontested victory (and the subsequent recognition by ECOWAS, the AU and all relevant international partners) is held back by an incumbent president who spent many years in opposition during the one-party era of former president Félix Houphouët-Boigny. While Ouattara is stuck within the confines of a luxury hotel in Abidjan, Gbagbo and the army control what is generally called the 'useful' part of the country (*le pays utile*). This consists of the southern part of the country (including the capital city), the cocoa belt in the central/western part, and the coastal parts of the country

where offshore oil discoveries have been made recently.

These regions are the richest and the most endowed in agricultural and other natural resources, as well as having a high standard of infrastructure. By contrast, the northern part of Côte d'Ivoire, which massively voted for Ouattara in the past, is controlled by the former rebels of the Forces Nouvelles and is comparatively poor in infrastructure and resources. Partitioning the country along the lines of the current power constellation on the ground would in any case be unfavourable to Ouattara and his supporters. For his victory to be effective, Ouattara needs to take control of the 'useful' country.

Exploring options to end the crisis

Any attempt to solve the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire should take two essential facts into account. The first is that Gbagbo will not cede power as a result of diplomatic pressure. Both his personal convictions and the pressure of the clan surrounding him do not allow for that sort of outcome. Second, time plays in his favour and, as in previous years, he will attempt to break the international community's unanimity by offering semblances of diplomatic solutions just to cement his grip on power and military force.

On the other hand, the international community has no choice other than to be firm on its own principles. Otherwise it will create a dangerous precedent – a sort of 'Gbagbo's jurisprudence' that others in the continent might emulate. Like the post-coup d'état crisis in Honduras in 2008, the Ivorian electoral crisis indicates how difficult it has become for the international community to impose its views on an illegitimate government that is ready to sacrifice human lives to remain in power.

Côte d'Ivoire crisis

The way forward

In a show of exemplary leadership, African regional organisations and political elites (with the notable exceptions of Angola and Gambia) have unmistakably endorsed Ouattara's victory and used a wide range of diplomatic avenues to persuade Gbagbo that it would be in his and the country's best interest for him to hand over power. However, the large amount of high-level envoys deployed by the AU and ECOWAS is a sign of both commitment and helplessness: commitment to the principles and norms enshrined in the nascent African Governance Architecture; helplessness because of the visible lack of concrete outcomes.

In order to bring a peaceful end to the Ivorian crisis, a number of options could be considered. As the choice doesn't seem to be wide enough, the only exit strategy could be the least damaging scenario. The worst possible outcome would be mass killings perpetrated by one or the other camp in defence of either legitimacy or legalism.

Option 1: Repeat elections in contentious regions

Whereas the international community is insisting on seeing Gbagbo relinquish power, the latter insists on having a recount of the votes.

While it might not be an easy decision for Ouattara or the AU, we would argue for a repeat of the election in those constituencies whose results have been nullified by the Constitutional Council. This would be in line with Article 64 of the electoral act that makes provision for the repeat of the electoral process in the case of serious irregularities that might compromise the credibility of the process.

The Constitutional Council nullified a total of 400 000 votes in seven of the 19 voting regions – all constituencies in the north of the country. This part of Côte d'Ivoire has always shown support

for Ouattara and overwhelmingly voted for him in the first round. A re-election here is therefore likely to give Ouattara a victory, even taking into account the discredited Constitutional Council results that has been largely rejected by Ouattara and the international community.

The Constitutional Council announced Ouattara had received only 48.55% of the vote, instead of the earlier 54.10% accredited to him by the IEC. The Council gave Gbagbo 51.45% of the votes and declared him the winner. If there is a re-

election in these northern constituencies it seems logical that at least half of the voters will vote for Ouattara, which will give him the necessary margin to win, even taking into account the figures released by the Council.


The widely acclaimed December 2008 Ghanaian presidential election was decided after the repeat of the vote in a single constituency that led to the election of President Atta Mills. The advantage of this option is that it offers uncontested legitimacy to the winner because the will of the people is respected. The problem would be the additional costs that the international community would have to bear. But the costs of a possible war would be much higher.

Option 2: Government of national unity

Direct negotiations could be encouraged between the two camps and a power-sharing agreement signed that more or less replicates the current power dynamics, with Gbagbo at the presidency and Ouattara and his supporters in the government.

This would certainly be the worst scenario for Côte d'Ivoire, as it is the experience of the past three years. Also, given the personal animosity between the two Ivorian contenders, it is unlikely that such an agreement would stand the test of time, and it might eventually lead to a relapse into war or a palace coup. More generally, governments of national unity in Africa have become a deviation of democratic norms in addition to be elite pacts that rarely serve people's interests.

Option 3: Military intervention

Although the international community has too early threatened to use force to enforce its view, which would probably lead to the mobilisation of Gbagbo's supporters, this remains a serious option to consider – although it would certainly be extremely risky (see article on page 17) 



A supporter of opposition leader Alassane Ouattara, former prime minister and candidate of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) party, holds a picture of Ouattara during a protest in front of the UN headquarters at the rebels' stronghold of Bouake, in central Ivory Coast on December 5, 2010.

Removing Gbagbo through the barrel of a gun

While the negotiated option for Côte d'Ivoire seems to be failing, **Henri Boshoff** looks at the possibility of an international military intervention to solve the crisis.

The crisis triggered in Côte d'Ivoire by the recent presidential election, and the refusal of the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, to accept defeat, constitute an unwelcome challenge for sub-regional, regional and

international organisations. All efforts at mediation by ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations (UN) have apparently failed, and international recognition of the victory of Alassane Ouattara has led to a situation in which

ECOWAS may have to make good its threat to remove Gbagbo by force. This raises several significant questions as to how such an intervention would play out, who would execute it, and what its impact might be.



United Nations troops from Niger drive past a billboard of Ivory Coast's internationally recognized elected leader Alassane Ouattara during a patrol in Abidjan, on Tuesday, Jan. 4, 2011.

AP Photo/Sunday Alamba)

Côte d'Ivoire crisis

The military option

The ECOWAS military chiefs of staff have already met to draft contingency plans for a military intervention and now await political approval from the regional heads of state. It appears that any intervention would take place within the structures of the African Standby Force (ASF) framework as it exists in West Africa. This is a standby arrangement comprising military, police and civilian components and consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which provides for regional peace and security arrangements. Within the West African context, it is covered by Article 21 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999. The ECOWAS Operational Framework initiated the standby force process by establishing a task force (TF) of 2 773 soldiers, which was certified in 2009 in the form of logistics exercise. Another 3 727 personnel were to be ready by 2010 to complement a brigade of 6 500. The TF is structured into two infantry battalions (Western and Eastern) and a composite logistics battalion. The Western battalion is led by Senegal, the Eastern battalion by Nigeria.

The ECOWAS Main Force structure, based on the operational concept of the initial ESF Task Force (ESFTF), is there for rapid deployment, in preparation for a more robust and long-term force. The TF is designed to mobilise quickly and deploy rapidly, and it can be expanded and enhanced into a fully functional main force. This is only a standby arrangement. After the 2010 AU exercise Amani Africa, which tested the operational capability of Africa's standby brigades, it was acknowledged that although much had been achieved, these formations were not yet operationally ready to intervene in complex situations such as the one currently manifesting in Côte d'Ivoire.

ECOWAS has experience of military

A military stand-off

For Ouattara

Ecowas Task Force: 2 773 (a possible additional 3 727 and a brigade of 6 500)

UN: 7 700 (a possible additional 2 000)

French Operation Licorne: 900

New Forces: 8 000

For Gbagbo

Ivorian army: 6 500

Navy: 900

Air Force: 700

Gendarmerie: 7 000

Presidential Guard: 1 300

Militia: 1 500 (?)

intervention in crisis situations such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, but this was at the invitation of the governments of smaller countries. The Ivorian situation is somewhat different. In Côte d'Ivoire, a beleaguered Laurent Gbagbo retains command of the military, the gendarmerie and the police. He also still controls the principal ports and airports in the south. In the capital, Abidjan, he has the support of the majority of the population and a militant youth organisation called the Young Patriots. The national media, including television, remains under his control and is used to mobilise his supporters and discredit the international community, the United Nations Mission (UNOCI) and his


ECOWAS has experience of military intervention in crisis situations such as those in Sierra Leone and Liberia, but this was at the invitation of the governments of smaller countries

domestic opponents, whom he depicts as agents of foreign forces determined to undermine Ivorian sovereignty. This has made Abidjan a very hostile environment, and UNOCI has come under constant attack by the youth.

The Ivorian Defence Force numbers around 12 000, mostly light infantry, with a small air and naval capacity but virtually no air assets. This is augmented by a gendarmerie of 6 000.

These are all factors to be considered in the event of an ECOWAS intervention. Any military operation would have to be quick and clinical, securing control of the command and control systems and the air and naval assets, and extracting Gbagbo without engaging in serious combat. This would require the use of attack and transport helicopters and a highly mobile force, for which ECOWAS would need external support in the form of enablers, helicopters and perhaps a staging platform off the coast. Such an intervention would also have to deal with the consequences of a successful extraction, including riots and attacks on UNOCI, followers of Ouattara and foreign civilians and property. This implies that any intervention plan must involve all the role players in Côte d'Ivoire, particularly UNOCI (7 700 troops and a recently approved additional 2 000) and the French 'Licorne', (900 troops) which is also the rapid reaction force for UNOCI.

The New Forces, loyal to Guillaume Soro, the Prime Minister appointed by Ouattara, are about 8 000 in total.

All the indications are that an ECOWAS military intervention must still be seen as a last option. The deteriorating situation in the country, including continued deadly violence against the population and heightened attacks on UNOCI, has however now triggered the difficult decision to seriously consider intervention. 



6 questions to Mr Young-Jin Choi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Côte d'Ivoire

The African.org: Following the 28 November run-off vote in Côte d'Ivoire and the political turmoil that ensued, the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo has accused UNOCI of siding with his rival Mr Alassane Ouattara. What is your response to these accusations?

SRSG CHOI: UNOCI came to Côte d'Ivoire with the purpose of serving the Ivorian people and not politicians. UNOCI has encouraged the Ivorian people to participate in the presidential election, stating that the results of the election will be respected. The Ivorian people showed their determination to participate in the political process with a participation rate of over 80%. Now it is time for us to deliver on our promise to safeguard the results of the election, in accordance with my certification mandate.

On 29 December the UN head of peacekeeping missions Mr Alain Le Roy stated that the UN was the victim of a campaign to incite hatred against the UN by the Ivorian State television. Has this situation improved?

No. Unfortunately the situation is worsening with daily anti-UNOCI messages being broadcast on state television, Radio Television Ivoirienne (RTI), which is controlled by people from President Gbagbo's camp. They incite their youth groups to attack UNOCI and, since 10 January, the verbal attacks have turned into physical attacks against UNOCI, with UNOCI vehicles being burnt and food supply convoys escorted by our peacekeepers pillaged. For the first time since the

establishment of our peacekeeping mission here six years ago, they have started firing at our vehicles.

Is the UN making any effort to inform the general public in Côte d'Ivoire about its position and mandate in order to counter this propaganda?

Yes, we are doing so by telling the truth through our radio station, ONUCI FM, which covers 80% of the country, our press releases, our weekly press conferences and interviews with the media. Unfortunately, in Abidjan it is difficult to get our message through because information is dominated by State television, which is controlled by President Gbagbo's camp. But I'm certain that most people in the country know the truth. However, what is worrisome is that some supporters of President Gbagbo's camp are incited by the hate messages being broadcast by RTI.

Does the UN fear gross human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire have gone undetected because of this hostility against the UN and its inability to move around freely?


Human rights violations are a source of grave concern for us. We know that so far 247 people have died as a result of the violence that has occurred during this post-electoral crisis. We have also received reports of mass graves, but have been blocked by civilian and military forces loyal to President Gbagbo whenever we have tried to investigate these reports. However, I am confident that the truth will emerge

in this regard so that those found responsible for such gross human rights violations are held accountable.

ECOWAS is threatening to intervene militarily if Mr Gbagbo does not step down. What contingency plan does the UN have if this should happen? What would be the role of the UN during such an intervention?

UNOCI is mandated to protect civilians as well as the Golf Hotel (where Mr Ouattara and his government is based) and to ensure that the result of the presidential election prevails. We will also continue to facilitate political dialogue among Ivorian stakeholders to ensure that lasting peace returns to Côte d'Ivoire. In terms of any possible military action in Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI must remain neutral and will therefore not be involved.

According to the UN, up to 16 000 people have been forced to flee from western Côte d'Ivoire. Is anything being done to help the internally displaced?

UNOCI has already sent two humanitarian missions, which included representatives from UN agencies as well as international humanitarian NGOs, to the affected areas. As a result of these missions, more than 110 tons of food and medicines have been delivered to these areas to help the 17 960 internally displaced persons affected by this crisis. And, most importantly, a conference to raise money for the humanitarian effort is to be held in Geneva soon. 

A global political disagreement

Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe has hinted that new presidential elections should be held as early as March this year. **Judy Smith-Höhn** believes it could lead to more repression and even less democracy in Zimbabwe.

With the second anniversary of Zimbabwe's controversial Global Political Agreement (GPA) fast approaching, there is increasing focus on the likelihood of elections.

Despite the Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) setting 30 September 2011 as the date for the constitutional referendum, thereby increasing the likelihood that elections are deferred until 2012, there continues to be uncertainty as to whether key political players will gear up for the event this year, especially Zanu-PF.

A key element is the advanced age of the President, currently considered to be the best candidate to lead ZANU-PF into the polls.

Mugabe would most likely want to organise, and preferably win, elections at the earliest possible date in order to reinforce his party's hold on power.

Yet analysts highlight the lack of significant economic and political progress as grounds for delaying elections until conditions have become more favourable.

There are 3 likely scenarios for Zimbabwe as we enter 2011: elections could be held in the wake of a full implementation of the GPA; or in the context of a continued stalemate and no agreement between the principals on the outstanding issues; or, finally,

elections could be postponed until the full implementation of the GPA.

For the first scenario to occur, one needs to assume that the principals to the transitional power-sharing arrangement have come to an agreement on the most important of the still outstanding issues, including among others, all parties confirming and approving key government appointments, the allocation of vacant positions to the designated individuals, and the resolution of the issue of sanctions in one way or another.

One must further assume that the process is taking place under a new constitution. In this best-case scenario, the international donor community would readily pledge technical and other support for an election.

SADC, as guarantor of the GPA, and South Africa as its designated facilitator, could not only provide additional support, but could also mark the occasion as a victory for regional intervention in the spirit of 'African solutions to African problems'.

Electoral observers would be posted well before the event to ensure preparations run smoothly and without violence and intimidation.

Many believe that such a scenario would bring about an election victory for the MDC.

Since several ZANU-PF hardliners are reluctant to accept an MDC win, there is a real probability of a repeat of the violence and intimidation witnessed in 2008 to prevent this from happening, particularly given the history of violence in several previous elections. Should the MDC still emerge victorious, it is doubtful that the security sector – most importantly the members of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) and other hardliners within ZANU-PF – would accept the economic and political uncertainty that such an outcome would pose for their futures.

Rushing into an unfair vote

The more likely scenario is that the elections are scheduled for 2011 without the full implementation of the GPA.

While it would certainly be more difficult for the international community to pledge their support, such support might still be forthcoming. However, this would prove a difficult process to manage.

Electoral observation would most likely be restricted to only allow the presence of certain regional and continental bodies. Again, there is a high probability of violence as those opposed to the transitional process apply the same tactics of intimidation in



Appearances can be deceiving. President Robert Mugabe, centre, shares a light moment with Morgan Tsvangirai, left, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister and his Deputy, Arthur Mutambara after giving their end of year message to the nation, at Zimbabwe House in Harare on 23 December 2009.

support of ZANU-PF as they did in 2008.

More importantly, regardless of whether the MDC emerges victorious or not, and given the uncompromising attitude of ZANU-PF ever since the power-sharing agreement was signed, the latter would surely not accept an electoral defeat.

One might therefore see a repeat of a negotiation process that would ultimately lead to a new transitional arrangement between the major parties.

Resistance from the military

In both scenarios outlined above, in other words in the case of elections being held this year, with or without the full implementation of the GPA, much depends on the behaviour of the security sector and high-ranking officers within that sector. This group must be presented with a viable, alternative source of income and some guarantee that they will not be prosecuted for wrongs committed against the population in support of ZANU-PF.

Elections are inherently conflictual processes that tend to exacerbate existing tensions in an already divided society

Without any such assurances, they will most likely remain resistant to a transition that ultimately holds little room for them.

The JOC still appears to maintain an influence on decision-making processes within ZANU-PF. High-ranking military officers continue to occupy management positions in state-owned companies, and retired or redeployed officers hold positions as permanent secretaries in the civil service.

Also, the JOC spearheaded the violent campaign to reduce support for the MDC during the 2008 elections, and they would likely face prosecution for crimes committed against the civilian population, particularly during this period.

It has been shown elsewhere that the

transformation of security institutions is critical for the success of any political transition. Only once security institutions begin to put citizens' interest at the centre instead of protecting the interests of a select few, will there be movement towards creating the stable and secure national environment in which development can thrive and be sustained.

Wait for a new constitution

Turning to the third, more promising, scenario, where elections are delayed due to the continued lack of progress in fully implementing the GPA. This would reflect a recognition that the conditions for convening elections that could be considered free and fair by all participating parties had not been met. It is doubtful that the parties that constitute the transitional government would utilise the additional time to resolve the perpetual dispute over senior political appointments, since they had not managed to make any headway on this issue nearly two years after inauguration.


However, the time could be used to complete and implement crucial processes, such as drafting the constitution, conducting a land audit, and addressing the need for security sector transformation, to name but a few.

In this third scenario, it matters less whether the GPA is fully implemented, for all parties would have bought more time to complete and implement processes instrumental to rebuilding the state, thereby cementing the democratisation process. The

constitution-making process is but one example, with proceedings currently months behind schedule, having yet to process the data from the public outreach exercise needed to draft the document. It would therefore be difficult to schedule a referendum on time, much less hold a national election by mid-2011.

If it were possible to delay elections, focus could instead turn to the mammoth tasks of facilitating sustainable economic recovery,

addressing the issue of ownership rights, conducting a land audit, ensuring that the wealth created from the mining sector is directed to state coffers and not siphoned off into the pockets of individuals, and addressing issues of reconciliation and justice.

This would require the political will of all stakeholders to agree on and implement the policy reforms required to facilitate the transitional process and in so doing, effect lasting change in Zimbabwe. 

SA's slow process a lesson for Zim

There are three possible outcomes of regime transitions: the installation of democracy; the return to authoritarian rule; or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.

If Zimbabwe wishes to utilise this transitional arrangement to move from authoritarian rule to some form of electoral democracy, then there are some valuable lessons from another country that has managed a relatively peaceful democratic transition, namely South Africa.

While the particular realities in both countries may have been different, the deciding similarity in these two cases is the fact that in both countries, the key players to the transitional arrangement face seemingly irreconcilable differences – the unwilling bedfellows appeared to have little trust in their partners, and they had certainly not collaborated with each other prior to the transition.

In South Africa, the then apartheid government and the representatives of the liberation movement had both come to the realisation that they needed to enter into some form of partnership in order to maintain control of the situation on the ground.

Elections are inherently conflictual processes that tend to exacerbate

existing tensions in an already divided society, and if Zimbabwe can learn anything from South Africa's path towards democracy in the 1990s, it is that an initial delay of such democratic processes can allow for an improvement of relations between the adversaries.

Election campaigns and debates within legislature, for example, can aggravate social conflicts as opportunistic politicians exploit tensions to pursue their vested interests.

By the time elections were held in South Africa, the confidence-building efforts undertaken during the negotiation process had begun to bear fruits – the parties had begun to trust each other, political forces had collaborated with each other – hence decreasing the likelihood of a contested election or a hardening of the ethnic divide.

Furthermore, South Africa's experience points to a number of other conditions that facilitated the peaceful settlement of the conflict:

- Parties were willing to explore a negotiated settlement as an alternative to ending the conflict – the liberation movement and the apartheid government realised that a proactive engagement in a negotiation process

would allow them to lead the process.

- The governing elite had undergone a pragmatic shift in mindset and acknowledged the unsustainability of the status quo and the need for major structural reforms, which ultimately even led to regime change.

- The multi-track negotiation channels that were pursued by the adversaries kept open a constant line of communication between the parties despite the occasional cessation of official talks.

- The formation of strategic alliances with local civil society and other international pressure groups further increased pressure for change, as with the mass mobilisation against apartheid in the 1980s and the anti-apartheid movement in several Western states that forced former government allies to withdraw their support and investments in South Africa.

Ownership of the process, in other words, the running of the negotiation process by the conflicting parties themselves, was a key element of its success. In this sense, externals can merely support the process, through either the facilitation of talks, the offer of technical and financial assistance or other means of support.



President Robert Mugabe is closely guarded by soldiers wherever he goes.

Army and police still serving Zanu-PF

The mandate for the government of national unity (GNU), signed between Zimbabwe's rival parties in February 2009, was clear: restore legitimacy to the country's political system, foster economic recovery and provide security for both the transitional state and public safety, all in preparation for free and fair elections.

Furthermore, given the acknowledged partisan nature of the existing institutions, the transitional government was also expected to

As the Zimbabwe powersharing deal continues to falter, **Martin Rupiya** believes the security sector reform envisaged by the Global Political Agreement (GPA) has not taken place.

lay the foundation for a multi-party democratic political system, including a complementary security system.

With the GNU's end being heralded by a cacophony of calls for new elections, now is the moment to evaluate whether or not the preconditions for free and fair elections have been met: that is, the delivery of public and state security, and the undertaking of the security sector reform.

In making this assessment, it is important to distinguish between the complementary tasks of re-establishing

the environment of safety and security, and attending to the role, tasking and composition of the security sector. It is also important to reflect on the need for changes to a legislative framework that has so far encouraged impunity, and the need to provide judicial recourse to victims, both now and in the future.

As Joice Mujuru, the Second Secretary of Zanu-PF and the country's vice president, recently pointed out, 'The country does not wish to continue to be saddled with a partisan police force or security sector, nor does it wish to be identified as one where harassment and murders by state organs are the norm, with citizens reduced to "sleeping with one eye open" for fear of being harassed.'

It should also be noted that the GNU's inauguration was preceded by a mendacious approach to the question of command and control of security ministries and organs by Zanu-PF. Even before the SADC-adjudicated sharing of ministries had been completed, Zanu-PF grabbed all the 'hard' ministries, leaving the MDC-T saddled with the 'empty' portfolios: the ministries of Finance, Education, Labour and Health, among others.

No fundamental reforms

The then SADC-appointed arbiter, former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, failed to convince Zanu-PF to observe the provisions of the agreement it had signed. Only one ministry, Home Affairs, was co-designated to ministers of both Zanu-PF and MDC-T in an unwieldy experiment that has proved difficult to effect. As a result, because Zanu-PF 'appropriated' exclusive command and control of the security ministries, there is now an even heavier burden on its shoulders, away from what would have been an even-handed judgment on the triumvirate principals leading the GNU.

While the GPA provided for a review of ministries after six months, Zanu-PF has continued to maintain exclusive control of the 'hard' security sector ministries. The same is true of the institutions where interaction has remained with the commanders reporting to the president and commander-in-chief, amid obvious public stunts designed to belittle the office of the prime minister.

Hence, despite the requirement that command and control of the security sector be shared during the transition, in fact these have remained exclusively in the hands of Zanu-PF.

Secondly, the GPA provided for the establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) to supersede the Joint Operational Command (JOC), a body that has been associated with stifling democratic space and the arbitrary arrest and harassment of members of the political opposition and the public.

The hope was that this would transfer security policy responsibility to the jurisdiction of the three principals. However, while the NSC Act was passed in March 2009, in practice there has been little or no meaningful change in terms of the president's exclusive dominance over security issues.

Furthermore, apart from a reported reluctance to host NSC meetings, it has also emerged that no substantive security issues have been placed

before the NSC when it meets. Instead, decisions continue to be taken outside the forum of the three principals and, much more worryingly, the discredited JOC has continued to operate as a parallel structure.

Finally, as the country prepares for elections, some senior Zanu-PF officials have publicly adopted warmongering language, calling for the setting aside by military means of any election result if it were to lose the poll. These three points set the scene for us to look towards Zanu-PF and not the GNU principals when asking whether or not security has been provided during the transitional period.

Competing camps within Zanu-PF

The first point of departure must be an acknowledgement that the GNU has in fact delivered on its mandate on the security question. Certainly more could have been done, but there is evidence of progress in delivering a secure environment. This has allowed for a political and economic resurgence since the near-total collapse of the economy, and the illegitimate political system, shunned even by the SADC and the AU, which emerged after June 2008.

Certainly more can and should be done, but the important foundation has been delivered. This assessment is not blind to the grabbing of the 'hard' ministries and the passing over of the NSC, which has not exactly served its primary purpose and exists parallel to the JOC.

In order to predict the future posture of the security sector in Zimbabwe beyond the transitional period, it is instructive to look inside the competing factions within Zanu-PF itself. In this, we note the tension between two competing camps in Zanu-PF: one that is prepared to use force and discount any influence of the ballot box, and

Zanu-PF grabbed all the 'hard' ministries, leaving the MDC-T saddled with the 'empty' portfolios: the ministries of Finance, Education, Labour and Health, among others



Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe.

In practice there has been little or no meaningful change in terms of the president's exclusive dominance over security issues

another that is cognisant of faltering political support, not prepared to use illegal means of holding onto power, and therefore seeking to adopt a more moderate, conciliatory and democratic approach.

The analysis could discern which of the factions was on the rise at different points in the life of the transition as this manifested in the relationships between the principals.

Consequently we see a schizophrenic approach to normalising the situation, and while there remains a willingness to do more at policy level there has been only minimal change at the institutional level.

A clarion call to the AU

While we acknowledge progress, the security institutions cited in the GPA as partisan and working to influence the political process in favour of Zanu-PF

are still intact. They continue to act as spoilers and have surreptitiously deployed members for political work in preparation for further violence in the upcoming elections.

Even more significantly, Zanu-PF has used the GNU's transitional period to continue to deny the mainstreaming of the command and control of the security sector by the three principals.

As a result, the sector has remained in the exclusive control of one faction that may or may not win the next election, provoking yet more predictions of a return to the pre-GNU levels of violence, insecurity and instability.

Given the interest of SADC and the AU in stability and free and fair elections in Zimbabwe after the transitional period, this finding may well serve as a clarion call for urgent and direct engagement with the


actors in order to resolve the impasse thorough negotiations.

There are several issues that, combined, convince us that more urgent attention should be paid to security sector reform (SSR) in Zimbabwe. The first, for purposes of consolidating the country's national security, is a precondition for stable political and economic relations: policymakers must continue towards establishing the balanced civil-military relations that are conducive to stability and development.

Rebuilding trust

Secondly, there is a need to address the institutional reforms agreed to in the GPA, including issues around national service, recruitment, civic education and human rights law training, as well as refocusing the security sector from a partisan role, embracing a more inclusive and effective national security council and doing away with the JOC.

As things stand, there is a lack of confidence and rapport between civil society and the uniformed forces in their civil-military relations. Thirdly, there is a need to bring into line economic resources allocated towards defence and security, in a country emerging from damaging political polarisation and economic crisis. Because of the residual nature of the conflicted relations with the international community, including financial institutions with sections of the GNU, Zimbabwe is surviving on a cash budget with no direct foreign budget support.

As a result, there is need for serious justification of the finite resources in order to respond to genuine national needs. 

Dr Martin R Rupiya is executive director of The African Public Policy and Research Institute (APPRI).

An alternative powersharing

Is a government of national unity a quick fix to solve conflict and ensure reconciliation?

Issaka K Souaré and **Alimou Diallo** look at the situation in Guinea and offer some alternatives.



Guinea's new president, Alpha Condé, elected in a historic poll in November last year, is taking over a ruined economy and a country divided through a bitter election struggle.

Some of the violence during the election took on an ethno-political dimension, compromising the country's national cohesion and inter-community harmony.

Initially, during the electoral campaign for the second round, Condé and his rival Cellou Dalein Diallou both committed to forming a government of national unity in the event of their victory, incorporating elements of both camps. Soon after his victory was announced, Condé reiterated his commitment to this promise. Given the tense political climate in the country,

the GNU appeared in principle to be a good idea, and the elected president's commitment to preserving national unity is laudable.

A unity government could contribute, in the short term, to a significant reduction of tensions between the supporters of each candidate.

However, a GNU may not achieve these objectives in the long run. On



ve to ring

Guinea's new president Alpha Condé won last November's elections with a narrow margin and now has to find a way to unite the country

the contrary, it could undermine the democratic process.

In the end Guinea is going forward without the GNU, a system experimented with in Kenya and Zimbabwe with no tangible benefits. Perhaps this is why most people, including the African Union and ECOWAS mediators, are resisting

A GNU could lead to a political stalemate likely to have a negative impact on the pace of implementing development projects in the country

REUTERS/Joe Penney

a power-sharing arrangement as a solution for the troubled Côte d'Ivoire.

No to a government of national unity

As well as the enormous difficulty of achieving it in the first place, the argument against a GNU is based on at least four other considerations.

The first is that a GNU could lead to a political stalemate likely to have a negative impact on the pace of implementing development projects in the country. It could also lead to cycles of governmental instability that would compromise development projects.

Secondly, a GNU will make it difficult for the population to hold an identifiable governing team accountable for various actions or inactions, as the government will be composed of all the main political actors in the country. Yet, the principle of accountability of rulers is important in any democratic system.

A third reason not to opt for a GNU is the danger that it could pose to the role of the opposition, and the high possibility that it would establish the 'authoritarianism of consensus' system, which is close to a one-party system.

It should be noted, finally, that after a clear victory of one candidate, a GNU could have a negative impact on the behaviour of losing candidates in future elections, as the losers might develop a propensity to contest election results in order to force the establishment of a GNU. This would void the electoral process from one of its essential objectives, which is to allow the people to freely replace one governing team with another.

But is there an alternative to a GNU that could achieve its ideal objectives while avoiding its shortcomings? We believe one can be found in the creation

We believe an alternative can be found in the creation and institutionalisation of a veritable 'status of the opposition'

and institutionalisation of a veritable 'status of the opposition'.

This mechanism would consist of designating a leader of the opposition with a salary and staff provided by the state. He would be regularly consulted by the head of state on important national issues and associated with the reception of foreign dignitaries, with the possibility of the head of state tasking him with missions of mediation and good offices, both inside and outside the country.

A right, not a favour

This mechanism could appear to some as a recipe for co-opting the leader of the opposition, but this would not be the case, as neither the institution nor the choice of its holder should depend on the will of the head of state.

The salary given to the leader of the opposition and his or her staff should be seen in a similar way as that which is paid to opposition parliamentarians by the state. It would be a right, not a favour. What now needs some elaboration is the way in which this mechanism can be put in place.

There are two possible models. The first would be to appoint as leader of the opposition the candidate who took second place in the elections for head of state, whether in the first or second round.

The advantage of this model is that

it recognises the representivity of the losing candidate, who may have garnered close to half of the national votes (as is the case for Diallo in this instance – Condé won with only 52% of the votes).

It also has the advantage of stability, given that the leader of the opposition's mandate will run concurrently with that of the head of state.

The second model is for the leader of the main opposition party in the national assembly to be made leader of the opposition. This is similar to the proposal for political reforms that was made in April 2010 by the Diawara Project in neighbouring Mali, initiated by President Amadou Toumani Touré and to be adopted pending a constitutional referendum. The advantage is that it could avoid the designation of a 'fake' leader of the opposition, as the second candidate in the presidential election might not be the leader of the majority opposition party in parliament; their political fortunes may have changed in the interval between presidential and legislative elections. The disadvantage would be instability if the National Assembly was to dissolve, and the reconfiguration of the new legislature following a new election.

Truth and reconciliation rather than the ICC

Since it regained independence in 1958, many types of crimes have been committed in Guinea. The human rights violations, particularly those that occurred during the popular protests of January/February 2007 and the massacre of 28 September 2009, were atrocious crimes. Some, such as murder, rape, torture and forced disappearance, constitute

crimes against humanity according to the Rome Statute (Article 7) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) that Guinea ratified on 14 July 2003.

Calls will therefore be made from both within and outside Guinea for the ICC to be seized of these matters.

Without denying its legal competence in this regard, we do not think that the ICC's criminal justice measures would provide an adequate remedy to these crimes.

First, the ICC only deals with those who 'bear the greatest responsibility' for three types of crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) over which it may exercise its jurisdiction.

The Court does not have the means to go after every culprit. Although a good number of the victims of these crimes know the culprits in person, many suspects trickle through the nets of the 'gravity' and 'level of responsibility' criteria of the ICC, meaning a denial of justice for their victims.

Moreover, the destabilisation capacity of some of the suspected culprits, who may be senior military officials, cannot be underestimated. Yet another cycle of instability would lead to more human rights violations, which the ICC's involvement is hoped to prevent.

In any case, and this is the third consideration to be borne in mind, the ICC only complements national jurisdictions (Article 1), meaning that the primary responsibility for punishing these crimes falls on the Guinean authorities. Their involvement in addressing them will make the crimes inadmissible to the ICC (Article 17).

Thus, in view of the limitations of the 'legalist' approach and its potential perils in this case, our recommendation is for the Guinean authorities to establish a truth and reconciliation commission aimed at establishing the facts, identifying the culprits, offering genuine apologies to

the victims and, most importantly, putting into place measures to ensure no repeat of such crimes in the future.

These are measures of 'restorative justice', in a spirit of reconciliation and not vengeance. Added to this, there should be a concerted effort to reform the judicial system and make it more accessible to ordinary people.

Reforming the military

It is not a secret that the whole security sector (army, gendarmerie and police) in Guinea is a source of concern for the majority of the population and even for the stability of the country. A good number of security personnel, who are supposed to provide security for ordinary people, have become, over the past few years, a security threat themselves. Lacking discipline and civic education, some have developed the habit of terrorising the population. The solution is not only a matter of civic and professional training, which is important, but is also a question of improving their working and living conditions.

In addition, as the new president said in an interview published on 16 November 2010 by the French newspaper *Le Figaro*, the reform of the security sector in Guinea will entail an improvement in the retirement conditions of security agents, in the

sending into retirement of some senior but old officers and their replacement by younger and more educated ones, in the offer of continuous training for them, and in their use in development projects. Such projects include the construction and maintenance of roads, schools and hospitals, as well as the security sector's involvement in emergency services, such as fire fighting. The new authorities must also, by all means, avoid a nepotistic approach to the recruitment and promotion of security personnel in the country.

Expectations of the population

Finally, the new authorities in Conakry should have no illusions about the fact that they came to power on the wave of immense popular hopes and expectations of significant improvements in living conditions. By investing in socioeconomic development, particularly in infrastructures and social services (e.g. electricity, education, health and food security), and doing so in an equitable manner across the country's various regions (including those that did not necessarily vote for him), the new president will have honoured his electoral promise, responded to a visible popular need and contributed to national reconciliation by reassuring the neutrals and those who did not vote for him.

It is one thing to be democratically elected; it is quite another to be able to satisfy the multitude of popular expectations. The new president does not come with a magic wand capable of transforming issues overnight. But the president should make no mistake: the Guinean masses – and those of other African countries – that have just elected him, will want to see the dividends of democracy, and sooner rather than later. ■

Without denying the ICC's legal competence, we do not think that its criminal justice measures would provide adequate remedy to these crimes



A continent on the up.

Growth, come what may

While many analysts still predict gloom and doom for the continent, **Paul-Simon Handy** believes that many positive developments are going unnoticed

Twenty years ago, when Africa was struggling to adjust to the post-Cold War era and experiencing numerous violent conflicts and growing poverty, analysts and area experts competed to find the catchiest and most gloomy concepts to describe the continent. Those who considered Africa to be 'lost', 'desperate' or 'without a future' were in the mainstream.

Today the epistemic community is unchanged, but there has been a radical shift in the paradigms shared by most of its members on Africa. Despite tremendous challenges ahead, many experts believe that Africa's futures will continue to follow a multitude of

trajectories, as has been the case over the past 20 years. Amidst conflicts, state decay and poor economic performance, there have also been (sometimes unnoticed) processes of conflict resolution, state reconstruction and economic governance improvement. The latter has ushered in the longest period of growth that the continent has ever experienced and that even the global

Africa has emerged from the global crisis faster and in better shape than Europe and the US

financial crisis has not crushed. In fact, Africa has emerged from the global crisis faster and in better shape than Europe and the US.

The geopolitical mode, the most current explanatory narrative of global trends, consists of acknowledging the shift in power from the West to the East. But one of the most unnoticed features of this monumental transformation is the way in which Africa is finally emerging from a long period of underdevelopment. Has Africa finally taken off? Is the continent now on the path of development, as suggested by many recent prospect studies? It appears that the current euphoria about African futures is at least

as misplaced as the Africa 'defeatism' of the 1990s. What is clear today, though, is that Africa is in the midst of a deep transformation process whose complexity makes it difficult even for experts to identify the main features.

It seems likely that many countries will make great strides in the fight against poverty, but also that inequalities will grow within and between countries. Among other things, trends suggest that African futures will in general be dynamic and driven by a series of factors.

The first is the tremendous population growth. Despite substantial regional disparities, Africa remains mostly under populated, but it is in the middle of a major demographic transformation with almost seismic dimensions. Despite the AIDS pandemic, malaria and the world's highest rates of child mortality, Africa's population is growing at a pace that will see a doubling of current numbers in the next 40 years.

The youth bulge and urbanisation are two crosscutting drivers of the continent's population growth. The way in which the continent will manage its urban spaces and educate, feed, shelter and employ its youth will be decisive in terms of peace, stability and prosperity. Precisely, the tension around service delivery provision will be immense and will channel a great part of social discontent. However, the youth-driven urbanisation of the continent is more of a universal phenomenon that sees Africa catching up with the rest of the world and rather presages the end of peasantry.

The second factor that will impact on Africa's futures is economic growth. Beyond traditional debates about the sustainability of current growth strategies and their impact on our environment, history teaches us the importance of growth in the fight against poverty. Recent studies suggest that Africa's growth will be slow (because resources will be 'eaten up' by population growth)

and at times chaotic, but inevitable. It will not follow an organised, state-directed line, as in China, but rather will take place with fits and starts, as in India. Overall, Africa's economic prospects are dynamic, largely due to the vast amount of unexploited human, technological and natural resources.

There are several factors whose long-term impact is difficult to assess but that are central to future developments. For example, climate change: despite being the continent with the least CO2 emissions, Africa is much more affected by the effects of climate change. The quality and timeliness of adaptation and mitigation strategies will be at the centre of Africa's response to the complex challenges posed by climate change.

Another factor is developments in democratic governance. After 20 years of democratisation processes, the principles of democracy (regular elections as a

The youth bulge and urbanisation are two crosscutting drivers of the continent's population growth

legitimising process, multiparty systems, parliamentary oversight, free press and independent civil society) seem to be widely accepted, even though the quality of democracy seems to flounder, as suggested by numerous cases of electoral manipulation and subsequent violence. On the other hand, political governance has improved, and it will probably continue to do so as citizens fight for the fundamental right of access to information.


An additional factor is accountable management of the continent's strategic resources and of population movements. Even more important, however, is the management of religion and politics: in

a context of increased identity-based struggles over resources and power, good management will go a long way towards establishing the foundations of peace. Apart from a few local instances in Nigeria, Uganda and North African states, religion has hardly been a major ideological driver of political mobilisation on the continent. But this could change as political entrepreneurs look beyond traditional ethnic constituencies.

Peace and stability

Above all these developments, the question of peace and stability will be central. It appears likely that current trends will continue to shape the security landscape of Africa: less full-scale violent conflicts but a multitude of protracted small-scale instances of localised unrest will centre on the militarisation of social anger. Will religion be the ideological driver of discontent driven by poor service delivery in certain regions and by widespread corruption in other parts of the continent?

What all this ultimately suggests is that African futures will be shaped by the quality of today's agency. In short, leadership matters and will continue to matter. The quality of leadership at both national and regional level will be critical for the sustainability of the developments outlined above.

As the African Union is mobilising around the concept of shared values, Africa's big countries (the so-called 'heavyweights') bear a special responsibility. Together with other willing and capable actors, they will have to strengthen their collaboration by creating forums where those values are generated, amended, debated and adopted. The countries and institutions that project themselves into the medium- to long-term future will also be able to prevent the threats and maximise the opportunities brought about by the continent's transformation. 

In the balance

In 1999/2000, a forecasting exercise was carried out on 'possible futures' for sub-Saharan Africa. The exercise involved a large number of researchers led by Dr Alioune Sall, director of the African Futures Institute based in Pretoria. **Jean-Michel Debrat**, who participated in the research, looks at the possible scenarios that lie ahead.



Canoes float amongst rafts of logs on the Lagos Lagoon, December 31, 2008. Floating rafts of rainforest logs are carried by the many creeks and rivers from outlying areas to the city's sawmills.


It can be said about Africa that a worst-case scenario is never excluded. Indeed, pessimists believe that a downhill trend is highly probable.

Such a trend would perpetuate the relative decline of literacy in a population that doubles every twenty years, water scarcity exacerbated by climate change; a depletion of soil fertility; and recurring

crises of public health due not only to pandemics but also to malnutrition and civil strife. Although these issues may not be completely widespread across Africa, they are certainly present in a number of countries.

Geographers might add to this list the existence of regions that are fragile because they are empty (for example,

peripheral areas of the Sahara desert or forests in the Congo basin) or, conversely, because of uncontrolled growth (for example in the large harbour towns). They could also highlight the potential for conflict in mining areas, and uneven growth between neighbouring areas or even between areas enmeshed within an urban region.



The production of wealth

The organisation of the global economy also constitutes a potential threat in the form of changes in commodity prices, fluctuations in demand, the monetary war and other causes of what are euphemistically known as 'exogenous shocks'.

Is Africa doomed to suffer?

My argument is based on Africa's capital potential, the combined growth of which is responsible for development. Africa's natural wealth is well known: forests (the 'lungs' of the planet), rivers with hugely underdeveloped potential for hydro-electrical power, and arable land likely to offer large increases in yield using environmentally friendly methods.

Population growth and the youth can be seen as a potential source of the overflow of spatial and social structures and of uncontrolled migration. Alternatively, they could lead to substantial human and cultural development.

It is primarily a matter of societal and social development. And here, again, another outcome is possible. One can ask whether leadership driven by a sense of long-term development will prevail in companies, in government, in political parties and in regional or pan-African organisations, against those motivated by private interests like drug trafficking and profits, oblivious to social responsibility and religious extremism.

Who will get the upper hand? It will be a question of who gets to influence world affairs: at the World Trade

Organisation, in climate negotiations, at the United Nations and on the boards of international public institutions and companies. In all these organisations Africa needs 'champions' to further its own cause.

What about the production of wealth? I believe that the diagram above illustrates this challenge. The further its four axes are pushed from one another, the bigger the 'potato-shaped' area of growth and development will be. Ideally it would look like a perfect circle: a symbol of harmony.

This diagram helps us simplify the question of whether we want:

- To 'shrink away'? This would take the form of a tiny circle of growth leading to predatory exploitation and the degradation of natural capital; an inability to train the youth; the social chaos of public authorities overwhelmed by organisations with their own vested interests, and the absence of Africa in the midst of a world where stability is at stake.

- To strengthen? This would mean an Africa in the process of organising its space with transport and energy infrastructures, and urban hierarchies, devoting enough of its resources to education and vocational training, and whose production would be competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.

The answer is obvious, but how can everything be managed at the same time?

Among futurists, there are two

schools of thought. For some, it is about competition, preliminary structural reforms, adaptation to the forces of globalisation, and the conquest of external markets. The problem is that these remedies are seen as alien and imported.

Then there are those for whom, on the contrary, salvation lies rooted in culture, where growth ownership can be generated and innovation triggered by applying them first to African needs before offering them to the rest of the world. This on the condition that the world's major powers, both 'old' and emerging, would allow Africa the time to do so.

The answer may not lie at the level of abstract ideas, but rather in looking at the lessons of Africa's success stories. Consider Botswana, which overcame the 'natural resource curse' (the paradoxical fact that so many countries whose economies depend primarily on natural resources generally suffer from greater poverty). Think about Kenya, which proposed a process of regional integration that was not hegemonic. Look at Ecowas, which succeeded in establishing the joint management of monetary reserves on the mere principle of solidarity.

One can also admire South Africa, which was able to create the moral and spiritual foundations for the birth of a new nation. In much the same way, the private sector boasts many examples of companies that have a pan-African reach.

So in Africa, just as in other regions, there are driving forces of economic and social innovation and perseverance. But the overall strategy lies in the cultural project of societies that are not answerable to anybody else. It lies in an Africa that has strong regional integration while at the same time asserting its pan-African identity.

Let us dream before we act. 

What lies behind prejudice?

Chandré Gould believes that certain religious movements could be influencing the treatment of homosexuals and sex workers in Uganda.

In his 1998 book about the Rwandan genocide, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, Philip Gourevitch wrote eloquently about the power of the media to incite hatred and violence. He made the case that popular radio stations fuelled tensions between Hutus and Tutsis and thereby contributed to the outbreak of genocide. History is filled with lessons about the power of popular media to reflect and magnify societies' prejudices. Giving a voice to prejudice and hatred provides them with subtle but clear legitimacy. It tells those who harbour prejudice that they are not alone and that others share their views. This allows for a public conversation to develop and grow, which can then easily turn to physical action.

This is not a call to gag the press. Nor is it my intent to provide grist for the anti-press mill that seems to have particular traction in South Africa right now. Rather, I seek to discuss the prejudice that lies at the heart of reports carried last year in a Ugandan tabloid newspaper that 'outed' gay Ugandans. The tabloid provided a voice to the deeply ingrained hatred and prejudice that have since forced the 'Top 100 Homosexuals' (sic) in Uganda to remain prisoners in their own homes for fear of violent attacks.

The report, carried in the Ugandan *Rolling Stone* newspaper, was a clear incitement to act against the individuals named. It carried their photographs and addresses, with a call to 'hang them'. A clearer example of hate speech would be hard to find. The authors hide behind the worn mantle of tradition and culture to justify their hatred of difference. They claim that homosexuality is 'un-African' and goes against African tradition. This claim is nonsensical, not only because homosexuality is the subject of just as much vitriol and hatred in the Western world as it is in Africa; but also because sexual orientation is not culturally determined.

It is every citizen's duty to reject those that seek to spread hate and prejudice, just as it is the duty of state representatives to add their voices to those who challenge patriarchy

Ironically, the justification for spreading hate and prejudice in the name of 'African culture' occurred shortly after a visit to Uganda by a group of right-wing religious fundamentalist Americans. These 'non-Africans' visited Uganda to deliver a condescending warning about the 'threat homosexuals posed to the traditional African family'. Their nefarious objectives seemed to have been achieved in October 2009, when Ugandan MP David Bahati introduced a Bill to condemn gay Ugandans to death.

There are clear parallels to be drawn between this and the involvement of right-wing Americans and other religious and conservative groups in the movement to abolish sex work. It is no coincidence that last year a sex worker was brutally murdered in Kampala, her throat slit 'like a chicken' after she had been raped. A graphic photograph of her slit throat was paraded on the front page of a Ugandan daily newspaper under the headline: 'Sex worker bonked, sliced at Mbikko Lodge'.

This disrespect and disdain for the slain sex worker stems from the same kind of thinking as homophobia. It is the kind of thinking that says that women who don't accept the patriarchal imperative to stay home, serve and be dependent on their husbands deserve disrespect. It is the kind




A Ugandan man reads the headline of the Ugandan newspaper Rolling Stone in Kampala, in which the papers reveals the identity of allegedly gay members of Ugandan society and calls for public punishment against those individuals. The writer believes it is 'nonsensical' to say homosexuality is un-African.

of thinking that says that sex should only happen in heterosexual relationships. It is also the kind of hypocritical thinking that says that while it's normal and acceptable for men to have sexual relations with multiple women, women should 'retain their dignity' and stay home to satisfy their men. Anyone who disobeys this patriarchal 'cultural' imperative by having sexual relations that don't conform to the heterosexist norm threatens the existing dysfunctional power relations in society and will be subject to a backlash of hatred and violence.

This kind of thinking is by no means restricted to Uganda. It is just as

Ironically, the justification for spreading hate and prejudice in the name of 'African culture' occurred shortly after a visit to Uganda by a group of right-wing religious fundamentalist Americans

prevalent in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, North America, and many other countries around the world. And everyone who respects human rights and believes in dignity for all should reject it with passion. We should learn from history that using the media to promote hatred leads to bloodshed and human rights abuses. This is not acceptable anywhere, least of all on our continent that promotes the values of ubuntu. It is every citizen's duty to reject those that seek to spread hate and prejudice, just as it is the duty of state representatives to add their voices to those who challenge patriarchy. 

Gays and the church in Uganda

The persecution of gays has given Uganda the reputation of being homophobic. **Andrew Kaggwa** reports.

A religious leader addressing a crowd of Ugandans taking part in an anti-gay demonstration at Jinja, Kampala.



Juliet Victor Mukasa is the chair of Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG), a non-profit, non-governmental organisation that works towards achieving full legal and social equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people in Uganda.

She recounts how she was once stripped naked in church before a multitude of people because, she says, 'the pastor "saw" the spirit of a young man inside me and they burnt my clothes and shoes in order to kill the male spirit'.

According to Victor, the humiliation suffered by lesbians in Uganda includes being raped to prove that they are really women; being thrown out of family homes, and losing jobs for refusing to wear a skirt.

Another gay Ugandan, Christopher Senteza, says he is a committed Christian who has been with his partner for six years. He teaches English and religious studies at a school near where he lives in the capital, Kampala. But Christopher is also gay, something the church in Uganda frowns upon and Ugandan law treats as a crime.

Christopher is a member of Integrity Uganda, a Christian group that offers support for gays and lesbians. Integrity Uganda has been accused of using church channels to lure unsuspecting youths into gay activities with gifts and offers of money and trips to Europe and America.

Christopher Senyonjo, the patron of Integrity Uganda, a branch of Integrity USA, was a bishop of the Anglican church but was defrocked by the Archbishop of the Church of Uganda in 2002 for his 'pro-gay' activities.

But Senyonjo, who says he is not gay himself, says he is just helping children and other gays out of a troubled life due to societal norms that reject them.

'God wants me to help oppressed people. Homosexuals should enjoy all the rights and benefits that heterosexuals enjoy,' he insists.

In 1999, President Yoweri Museveni launched a fierce attack on homosexuals and called on police to arrest them. Museveni's comments followed news that there had been a secret gay wedding in Kampala.

According to Uganda's penal code, homosexuality and same-sex marriages are crimes punishable by imprisonment.

Church and state

Museveni is an Anglican but his wife Janet is a follower of the Charismatic churches and has had an influence on her husband. One of Museveni's daughters owns a Charismatic church in a Kampala suburb.

Museveni, who stands to be re-elected as president this year, though not directly using religion in the campaigns, has in his 24 years in power almost always donated a four-wheel-drive vehicle to a Catholic and an Anglican bishop, as well as to a Muslim cleric in Uganda.

In this way he has ensured that they are always on his side during the campaigns.

Museveni is an Anglican but his wife Janet is a follower of the Charismatic churches and has had an influence on her husband

Janet Museveni, meanwhile, has also used her influence in the Charismatic churches to drum up votes for the husband. Museveni usually visits some of the Charismatic churches when they have big functions.

Born-Again churches have been in Uganda since the 1960s, but most of the Charismatic churches were started in the 1980s and 1990s. During Idi Amin's reign from 1971 to 1979, he banned all faiths (including the Charismatic churches) other than Catholicism, Anglicanism,

Islam and Orthodox Christianity.

However, after Amin was overthrown, freedom of worship was restored and Charismatic churches started taking root in the country.

According to the 2002 population census, 84% of Ugandans are Christian; 42% are Roman Catholics and 36% are Anglicans, with Evangelical and Pentecostal churches claiming the rest. Muslims constitute 12% of the population.

Charismatic churches in Uganda have become popular over time, partly because of the social problems that emanate from the hard economic conditions. People usually flock to these churches because the pastors promise many things, from healing incurable diseases like AIDS to praying for them to become tycoons.

Most of these Charismatic churches fill to capacity, whether on Sunday or on weekdays. Most also now have lunchtime and night prayers.

They clearly have large amounts of money and often erect giant billboards when they have major prayers or what they refer to as 'crusades'. Most of their funds come from followers through what they call the 'Biblical sowing', where followers are asked to give (sow) so that God will give to them in return.

At times, followers even offer possessions like cars and houses to pastors.

An organisation called The National Executive Committee of Pentecostal Churches of Uganda claims to be the umbrella organisation for Charismatic churches in Uganda, with a membership of 400 churches. Among the most important ones are: Miracle Centre; Kampala Pentecostal Church; Christian Life Church; Victory Church; Christian Fellowship Church; Synagogue Church of All Nations; and Liberty Worship Church.

Most charismatic churches in the country are offshoots of these main churches and they command a significant following.

The more traditional (Catholic and

Anglican) churches are having trouble keeping their followers, especially the youth, because of the more 'entertaining' worship style of the Charismatic churches. This has forced the Catholic church to start its own Charismatic Renewal movement, where worship is performed in almost the same way as it is done in the Charismatic churches.

The 'kill the gays' bill

Last year, a member of parliament came up with a private members' bill dubbed the 'Anti-Homosexuality Bill.' Among other measures, it proposed capital punishment for what it termed 'aggravated homosexuality', which included having anal sex with minors and HIV-infected gay men raping others.

This led to the bill being referred to erroneously as the 'kill the gays' bill in the foreign media, and after pressure from Western countries and US President Barack Obama, the MP was barred from tabling it in Parliament. Museveni, apparently conceding to pressure when being quizzed by the media about the bill, commented 'Go slow on this'.

In October last year a new weekly newspaper, *Rolling Stone*, started publishing pictures of the 'top 100' homosexuals in the country and calling for them to be hanged.

A Ugandan judge granted a temporary injunction to gay-rights group SMUG to force the paper to stop publishing but editor Giles Muhame defied the ban, insisting the newspaper was acting in the public interest to protect Ugandans from those seeking to 'recruit children to homosexuality'. A week after the ruling it published a further 14 names and photographs of people it said were homosexuals, under the headline, 'Hang them'.

One man who will not hear anything about the persecution of gays in Uganda is Pastor Solomon Male, evangelist and executive director of the

Arising For Christ Church.

Male says that those who 'cook up' stories that they are being persecuted in Uganda are only looking for financial gain, insisting that no homosexual has ever been raped, abused or killed by mobs because of hatred, and therefore there is no evidence of persecution of homosexuals.

'Our campaign focuses on criminals who target little children below the 18-year age of consent, especially children in schools. We call upon those who have chosen to take that sexual route to quit,' Male says.

'God wants me to help oppressed people. Homosexuals should enjoy all the rights and benefits that heterosexuals enjoy'

Male and other church leaders and opinion leaders have formed an organisation called the National Coalition Against Homosexuality and Sexual Abuses in Uganda to fight against what he says are people in high positions who lure young or vulnerable people into gay activities.

He says that the homosexual (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) movement has taken a foothold in Ugandan society, alleging that many respectable, well-connected and educated spiritual, social and political personalities are involved in luring or compelling others, both young and adult, into the ranks of homosexuality.

Also according to Male, the youth are the most targeted, since they are easily lured with promises of gifts, money, visas to travel abroad, educational sponsorships and career promotions. Others are compelled by problems and challenges.

'The perpetrators are persons whom the youth respect and hold in high esteem, such as benefactors, teachers, spiritual leaders, employers and others who use their positions to influence, coerce, abuse, intimidate and silence them, or use their connections to harass, torture and victimise their victims further,' Male says.

Male also vehemently opposes the idea that homosexuals are born, saying instead that they become so due to peer pressure, experience, financial need, or being forced into it.

'Even if they were born then thieves would have more ground, since most of them are born too so it would not be a crime to be a thief,' Male says, adding that it has been possible to counsel some youth and men and make them leave homosexuality.

Another anti-gay activist, Pastor Martin Ssempe of Makerere Community Church, has started the Inter-Faith Rainbow Coalition against Homosexuality, based at Makerere University Kampala, which mainly focuses on discouraging the university community from gay activities. Ssempe says that homophobia is a derogatory term coined in the 1940s to belittle those who are opposed to homosexuality.

Homosexuality in Uganda, just like in many countries in Africa, is still regarded as a 'dirty activity' not fit to be talked about in public. Someone who dares declare that they are gay or lesbian is often shunned by their family.

In religious circles, talking about same sex marriages is considered blasphemous.

This has sometimes caused those campaigning for gay rights to concoct stories about having been persecuted because of their sexual leanings. This may be for financial gain or for the sake of seeking asylum in Western countries. ■

Andrew Kaggwa is a journalist based in Kampala.

MORE
FREE
SPEECH



Mail & Guardian print edition readership
has grown by 61% over the past five years
from 271 000 to 437 000*

Source: AMPS: June 2010*

Mail & Guardian
www.mg.co.za

Mail & Guardian circulation increased by 6% over the same period. 64% of readers are in the economically active 25–49 year age group. Coloured and black readership remained stable while Indian readership grew 2%. Male readership is 66% and 67% of readers continue to work. 80% of our readers are in the LSM 7-10 range, an increase of 3% over five years. Affluent readership is up 7% with 66% earning more than R16 000 a month.



Port workers secure berthing ropes belonging to a container ship as it prepares to dock at the port of San Pedro, in southwest Ivory Coast.

Jack up **our** ports

Africa's ports are seriously lacking in efficiency. But, as **Dianna Games** reports, projects to rectify this situation are taking place across the continent.

It takes the port authorities in Singapore 12 hours to clear a ship with up to 2 000 containers on board and less than three days for a ship to dock in the country's port, clear its cargo and set sail again. More than 70 ships a day move through one of the world's biggest sea ports and its largest container terminal.

In one of Africa's busiest ports, Luanda, it can take more than two months for the authorities to clear goods. On the high seas outside Angola's capital, there is a permanent queue of at least 30 ships as the port struggles to cope with volumes of goods that have increased at between 10% and 30% a year over the past five years.

In Lagos, container clearance can take several weeks. In 2010, the port authority temporarily suspended ship entry into the port to clear backlogs. On the east coast of Africa, ships calling at Mombasa in Kenya and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania also face long delays. At one point, Maersk, one of the world's biggest shipping lines, suspended services to Dar es Salaam because of what it called the port's 'persistent inefficiency'.

According to the African Development Bank (ADB), the time spent in African ports averages 80% of total transportation time, while in East Asia, for example, it is 20%.

Long delays in getting goods cleared have led shippers to impose hefty

surcharges on containers clogging up African ports, which has pushed up the cost of imports.

Only two of Africa's container ports are in the global top 50 league – South Africa's Durban, and Port Said in Egypt. The continent's other biggest container terminals are also in Egypt (Damietta and El Dekheila) and South Africa (Cape Town and Port Elizabeth), as well as in Senegal (Dakar), Kenya (Mombasa), Ghana (Tema) and Mauritius (Port Louis).

The port in Durban services not just South Africa but the entire southern African region, and congestion is a growing problem, exacerbated by transport union strikes in the heavily unionised country.

But many of Africa's ports are very small and a number, such as those in Liberia, have been almost destroyed by war.

Singapore, one of the most efficient countries in the world, may not be a relevant comparison for African states, but it does reflect what can be done with proper focus, good strategies, ongoing investment and productive use of technology. None of these factors are out of African countries' reach.

Ports are at the core of the supply chain between African countries and their international trading partners; inefficiencies and bottlenecks have major implications not just for trade but for Africa's export competitiveness and overall growth.

Although Africa's total trade makes up only 3% of international trade, more than 80% of African trade is with the rest of the world, highlighting the significance of ports in the global trading chain.

The rapid increase in south-south trade – trade with Asia currently comprises 30% of Africa's total international trade – will be compromised if urgent attention is not given to the upgrading of existing ports and plans to build new ones. There is also an increasing need for dedicated terminals for commodities such as coal.

The situation in the ports is the result of years of underinvestment in new equipment and capacity, inefficient systems that foster corruption, shallow harbours, obsolete or insufficient equipment, low productivity and poor transport routes to the harbours as a result of urban sprawl.

Many port authorities defend their performance on the basis that importers are tardy in completing documentation correctly – but this accounts for just a small part of the problem.

According to research on African competitiveness, freight costs constitute about 10% of the value of imports in

The solution appears to be public-private partnerships, to reduce risk and leverage capital for the large infrastructure projects that are required to rebuild Africa's trade capacity

developing countries, compared to 3% in developed countries.

For landlocked countries, the percentages of freight costs to the value of imports are even higher – more than 20% of the value of imports for Rwanda, 24% for Mali and 23% for Niger. Delays at border points account for about 40% of transportation time, with huge cost implications.

The ADB recently put out a detailed report on Africa's ports in an effort to highlight the serious implications of the current situation on Africa's growth and development, particularly in an era of high growth rates.

But there is light on the horizon. A number of new port projects are underway. For example, in Angola, new ports and terminals are scheduled to be built in Luanda, Lobito and Cabinda, with the Chinese rehabilitating transport routes to the coast from landlocked countries such as Zambia.

Luanda's port is getting a \$105 million facelift, which the Angolan authorities say will curb delays but not end them.

To this end, an entirely new port is planned to be situated north of the existing facilities on the outskirts of the city – there is little space around the current port for expansion.

In other key cities, dry ports are being built and harbours have been or are in line to be concessioned out to private

operators on long-term leases. Sizeable private and public investment is lined up for improvements to these ports to position them for future growth.

A particular success story in this regard is in Mozambique, where the ports of Maputo and Matola were concessioned in 2003 for 15 years, with a 10-year possible extension, to the Maputo Port Development Company, a consortium in which the state transport utility holds a significant stake.

Britain's Mersey Docks and Harbours held 51% in the consortium initially but sold its stake to Dubai's port operator, DP Port, and South African shipping company Grindrod. The ports have been refurbished and new terminals established while the harbour is being dredged to allow bigger vessels to dock.

The port is now competing for – and getting – more trade from South Africa's industrial heartland of Gauteng, as well as other countries in the region such as Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia.

Dubai's DP World has also signed an agreement to operate and develop Senegal's busiest container terminal at Dakar; Malaysian port operator Northport is assisting with development in the Congo Republic; and AP Moller of Denmark, which has the concession of the Apapa Container Terminal in Lagos, is spending millions on expanding the congested container terminal there.

The solution appears to be public-private partnerships, to reduce risk and leverage capital for the large infrastructure projects that are required to rebuild Africa's trade capacity. But as usual, there is a political component – the relatively low-hanging fruit of policy and legislation – to back up the efforts on the ground and to lead them.

Investors and concessionaires will not be attracted to risky, long-term infrastructure deals without the solid support of policies that allow for a good return on their investment. ■

Subscribe to

the african.org

www.the-african.org • THE BI-MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF THE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

If you would like to subscribe, go to www.the-african.org

Or please complete the form below and return it to the ISS with a cheque, or a postal/money order for the correct amount, made payable to the Institute for Security Studies (marked not transferable).

Please note that credit card payments are also welcome. Please mail, fax or email this form to:

ISS Publication Subscriptions, PO Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, 0075, Pretoria, South Africa.

ISS contact details: (Tel) +27 12 346 9500, (Fax) +27 086 544 5703, Email: magazine@issafrica.org

Title: Surname: Initials:

Organisation: Position:

Postal Address:

..... Postal Code:

Country:

Tel: Fax: Email:

Method of Payment: Visa ☐ Master Card ☐ Other ☐ Specify:

Card Number: Expiry Date:/..... CVV Number:

Cardholder Name: ☒

Signature: ☒

Please indicate your choice below:

The African.org	South Africa		Africa		International	
1 year (6 editions)	R 175,00		US\$ 29,00		US\$ 34,00	
6 months (3 editions)	R 90,00		US\$ 15,00		US\$ 17,00	

Celebrating Africa

Abu Simbel festival in Egypt

The Abu Simbel festival happens twice a year – on 22 October and 22 February; 60 days before and after the winter solstice. This festival is a celebration of the ancient history of the Pharaohs and the pride and skill of ancient architectural design.

Located in the land of Nubia, Southern Egypt, the Abu Simbel temples are a magnificent site. Built around 1257 BCE, during the reign of Ramses II, the temples are carved in solid rock along the west bank of the River Nile.

The temples came under threat in the 1960s, when the reservoir of the Aswan Dam threatened to spill over and submerge the structures. The temples were disassembled and re-built under the auspices of a massive United Nations project, as they are listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The \$40 million project that took shape in 1964 took four years to complete – a defining moment in the history of archaeological engineering (<http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/88>).

Poppie Mputhing

surveys the continent to see what's in store for culture lovers in 2011



A priest of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is holding a Tabot in a Timket (Epiphany) ceremony at Gondar, Ethiopia

Jialiang Gao

Timket festival at Lalibela in Ethiopia

One of the most spectacular and moving religious anniversaries in Ethiopia is Timket, the Feast of The Epiphany, which occurs across the country and falls on January 19, two weeks after the Ethiopian Orthodox Christmas. Timket is a three-day celebration that commemorates the baptism of Christ in the River

Jordan by John the Baptist (www.uncommonimages.biz/pdf/TimketInEthiopia.pdf).

The ideal place to observe and participate in this sacred celebration is at Lalibela, a holy city located high in the mountains, north of the capital Addis Ababa. Like many other Ethiopian cities and villages, Lalibela celebrates Timket with vigour and devout splendour. On Timket Eve, the Tabot, a replica of the Ark of the Covenant that can be found in any Ethiopian Orthodox church, is carried to the nearest body of water. The Tabot is a symbol of Christ and his journey to being cleansed in the River Jordan. It is covered in silk and carried by priests, who are followed by a colourful and lively procession of worshippers, singing, chanting, dancing and beating drums (www.peace-on-earth.org).

Following an all-night vigil with chanting and prayers by priests and other religious leaders, thousands of villagers join the occasion at daybreak. In joyous celebration and religious garb they join fellow worshippers at the waterside. Prayer, song and communion bind the occasion. Worshippers feast on tej, a drink brewed from sorghum, and injera,

sour bread with spicy sauce. Visitors are welcome to join in the festivities and soak up the solemn praise of this annual occasion.

Morija Arts and Culture festival in Lesotho

The annual Morija Arts and Culture festival has been running for more than a decade. It is an annual occasion when visitors are invited to Lesotho to get in touch with the culture and tradition of the Basotho people of 'The Mountain Kingdom'. One of Africa's last monarchies, Lesotho is a mountainous, landlocked country surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. And yet it has a rich independent history.

The festival showcases many aspects of Basotho traditional and contemporary culture, including music and dance. Visitors may also be introduced to the cultural dress of the distinctive pyramid-shaped straw hat and the thick, ornately designed Basotho blanket, with its huge safety pin holding the ensemble together (www.basotho.org). Pony treks are popular, as these animals provide transport for



The world-famous Cirque du Soleil is performing in South Africa later this year.

many rural Basotho travelling across the mountainous landscape.

Morija itself is historically a town of excellence. Established by the first king of the Basotho Nation, Moshoeshoe I, the influence of French missionaries introduced education to the region that spurred the pursuit of intellectual endeavour among the Basotho in the area (www.morijasfest.com).

Festival au Desert in Mali

The thrilling feature of this festival is that it is held deep in the Sahara Desert. Festival-goers are treated to a musical mosaic as the Festival au Desert attracts top-billing artists from the

African continent and elsewhere. For lovers of World Music, this is the place to be.

This year, visitors can expect to see the likes of Samba Touré and Tinariwen from Mali. International acts include JeConte and the Mali All Stars and Saiko Nata.

The Festival au Desert was created

in 2001 and is a celebration of the rich and musical tradition of the nomadic Touareg people. In its earlier incarnation, the festival featured Touareg dances, poetry, camel rides and games (www.festival-au-desert.org). A decade later, however, the three-day festival has grown, and now it showcases 30 or so artistic groups from all corners of the globe.

In a 2003 interview in *Rolling Stone* magazine, Robert Plant commented about Festival au Desert: 'It's one of the few honest things I have been part of in a long time. It's amazing to play out in the sand. There are no doors, no gates, no money. It reminded me of why I sang in the first place...' 

Where to be in 2011

North Africa

May South Sinai Camel Race, Egypt

July-August El Jem Symphonic Music Festival, Tunisia

June Fez Sacred Music Festival, Morocco

December International Festival of the Sahara, Tunisia

East Africa

July Festival of the Dhow Countries, Zanzibar

August International Camel Derby

and Festival, Kenya

September Bayimba International Festival of Music and Arts

November Mombasa Carnival in Mombasa, Kenya

Southern Africa

March Cirque du Soleil, South Africa

April Cape Town International Jazz Festival, South Africa

August Umhlanga Reed Dance, Swaziland

December Cape Town Minstrel Carnival, South Africa

West Africa

February-March FESPACO International Film Festival, Burkina Faso

March Boaque Carnival, Ivory Coast

July-August Panafest, Ghana

October Durbar Festival, Nigeria

November Fête des Masques, Ivory Coast

The last days of Robert Mugabe

Those who ask why Zimbabweans do not revolt against the dictatorial rule of President Robert Mugabe should read this book.

Zimbabwean-born journalist Peter Godwin, author of the autobiographical *Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa* and *When a Crocodile Eats the Sun*, arrived in Zimbabwe shortly after the first round of the 2008 presidential elections to report on what he expected to be 'Mugabe's exit'.

Following the vote, he says, it seemed clear to many observers that Mugabe would have to leave power in the face of an overwhelming victory for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) candidate Morgan Tsvangirai.

Godwin and his sister Georgina had even brought a bottle of champagne with them from Heathrow airport for the celebration. But it was not to be.

Instead of a book on the last days of Robert Mugabe, *The Fear* reads more like a Human Rights Watch report of the beatings, torture, imprisonment and general intimidation of anyone who dared to vote for the MDC in the first round.

One starts to understand why, amid the violence meted out to his supporters, Tsvangirai ultimately decided not to contest a second round.

The Fear does not have the same beautiful prose and depth of Godwin's first two books on Zimbabwe, where the slow unfolding of his childhood memories, his experience in the army on the side of Ian Smith's government (1964-1979) and his horrific discovery of the Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland in the early 1980s are told with a lot of self-effacing honesty and a deep love for the country of his birth.

In the first books, and especially in *When a Crocodile Eats the Sun*, the complexity of relations in a newly liberated Zimbabwe also comes to the fore.


This book has very little of that. Now, Godwin is eyewitness to a terrible crime, which he describes in great detail: visiting victims of torture in prison and in hospital; talking to doctors, nurses and aid workers; and spending time with MDC officials who have suffered trauma in the weeks and months of the Zanu-PF crackdown against the opposition.

Horrific stories like those told by Harare mayor Emmanuel Chiroto, who tells how Zanu-PF thugs kidnapped his wife Abigail and their four-year-old son and then burnt his wife alive, will haunt the reader for a long time.

Although Godwin took many risks to gather the information for his book, he was also wining and dining (perhaps not the best words to describe his dinners in a Harare plagued by shortages) with ambassadors, the remaining white farmers and the top officials of the opposition.

At times, his trips with US ambassador Jim McGee and his close ties to die-hard Roy Bennett make him appear more of an actor than an observer in the Zimbabwe drama.

Perhaps understandably, he has very little interaction with those in Mugabe's inner circle. An exception is a rare conversation with Father Fidelis Mukonori, a close ally of Mugabe, who says to Godwin: 'The old man [Mugabe] is tired, he wants to go, but there are others around him who will not let him step down.'



'There are peace initiatives going on as we speak. I think it will be fine.'

It wasn't fine.

After returning to his family in New York, Godwin goes back to Zimbabwe in February 2009 to see the swearing in of the Government of National Unity (GNU) under the 'nebulous deal' that so many in the MDC were clearly opposed to.

Finance Minister Tendai Biti had accepted to serve against his will. Speaking to Godwin, Biti confirms what many suspect about the reasons for the MDC accepting the power sharing deal.

'You have to bear in mind the pressure put on Morgan by SADC [the Southern African Development Community]. His options for manoeuvre were very limited. SADC used Mafia-style pressure – they told him he was totally on his own if he didn't succumb.'

In the run-up to possible new elections in Zimbabwe in 2011, and with the Global Political Agreement starting to show signs of imminent collapse, Godwin's book is a chilling wake-up call to the realities of political repression in Zimbabwe.

The Fear could also perhaps serve in the future as an inventory of some of the human rights violations and crimes against humanity committed in Zimbabwe. ■

The Fear by Peter Godwin,
Picador, 2010
Reviewed by Liesl Louw-Vaudran

Demystifying traditional beliefs

Liesl Louw-Vaudran speaks to Heidi Holland, author of the best-selling *Dinner with Mugabe*, about her latest book, *African Magic*




One would expect her to resemble the students of local culture one sees going around villages from Senegal to Uganda – a white woman writing about such a sensitive subject as African traditional beliefs.

Acclaimed South African author Heidi Holland, however, has no apparent ambition to immerse herself in rural Africa. Instead she aims to take a serious look at beliefs that still dominate, to a large extent, the lives of modern Africans in the 21st century.

Speaking at a coffee shop in the Johannesburg suburb of Melville, Heidi admits that writing a book on 'African magic' was a challenge.

'It is a controversial undertaking. And if you read the introduction to the book, you'll realise I'm basically saying, "I'm sorry I'm not black, I'm sorry I'm not a priest, I'm sorry I'm not an anthropologist, but here I am!"'

The purpose of the book was to draw from various texts and her own



interviews to demystify some African traditional beliefs.

She says it was important to explain in the book that beliefs in sangomas, witches, prophets, the supernatural, voodoo and the power of the ancestors – from Benin to Malawi – are religion like any other, and not a bizarre 'witchcraft'.

'I've tried to put it in context, like I tried to put Mugabe in context. That's what I try to do as a journalist. I put subjects that I feel are ill-understood into context, and I try to nuance them.'

She admits this is 'a very powerful subject'.

'By looking at the subject respectfully, you get a better understanding of the psychology of people we live with all the time. Africans have

'I'm not religious at all, though I love the idea that God is there, but he is too busy to be concerned by you and me, so we will refer to our own ancestors'

'I think Mugabe and Zanu-PF – the Zanu-PF heavyweights – are two hearts that beat as one.'

such a richness of spirit and despite the hardships people endure on this continent, they tend to survive against the odds. I sense that one of the mechanisms they use to survive is their traditional belief systems,' says Holland.

She explains that in urban areas, traditional beliefs do break down and have in some cases fused with Christianity, but not entirely.

'You only have to go to Soweto to see all those sacrificial animals in pens on a Friday and see funerals in action to realise that they [the beliefs] are alive and well.'

But why don't city dwellers generally like to talk about going to sangomas or practicing traditional medicine and beliefs?

'I don't think people deliberately don't want to talk about it. It is internalised; part of who they are.

'I'm quite careful of what I write about. I'll never write about a white sangoma, for example. I think that is completely ridiculous. But by taking a number of well-researched stories, you can show different aspects of the tradition.'

Holland believes that sangomas are the psychologists of Africa.

'Psychology is a talking science; increasingly so in Western countries. But whom do Africans talk to? They talk to their priest, in the old tradition that has broken down in Western countries. Or they talk to the sangoma.'

Holland describes a project in the Johannesburg suburb of Wynberg where Western-trained psychologists were working in the township with kids who needed psychological help. But, she asks, 'How applicable is western psychology to Africa?'

She remembers going to Baragwanath hospital in Soweto some years ago, and finding that the chief

psychiatrist there didn't speak any local language.

African Magic gives an overview of many diverse traditions and beliefs in various parts of the continent. Does this mean that all these beliefs have something in common?

'Belief systems are much the same, even if the rituals and the symbols are different. This is something that many respected anthropologists have endorsed.'

Belief in the power of the ancestors and the relationship between the living and the dead is one key aspect that emerges across the continent.

'The ancestors are a little bit like European saints. There is a god, but people aren't connected to him directly.'

Holland believes the implications are important for the continent.

'You really don't want to fall out with your ancestors. This is something one should know, to understand the society we live in.'

I asked Holland about her own beliefs. Did she find anything in her research that moved her?

'I'm not religious at all, though I love the idea that God is there, but he is too busy to be concerned by you and me, so we will refer to our own ancestors.'

Dinner with Mugabe drew huge acclaim and has made Holland something of a celebrity. She is invited to speak at literary festivals and debates and has, since its publication, become a regular columnist in the Johannesburg daily newspaper *The Star*.

One cannot help but ask her about Mugabe's psychological makeup, the

theme of *Dinner with Mugabe*. Holland believes that he is still extremely popular.

'Africans like Mugabe. I've even caught some MDC people out. And even journalists.'

Holland recalls how she interviewed a woman who had been tortured by Mugabe's regime.


'At one stage in the interview I said, "Let's switch off that microphone. I can see you respect Mugabe, don't you?" And she said, "He makes us proud because he's clever and he runs rings around everybody else." These are people who don't want him there.

'Which other African is like him? Not even (former SA president Thabo) Mbeki with all his pompousness. Mugabe is a player. They hate him and they wish him six feet under, but there is a level at which they respect him, even as a politician. And the longer he is there, the more that comes into play.'

Holland says that there's a grudging respect for Mugabe, even amongst Westerners.

'If politics is the art of outmanoeuvring people and staying in power then he is a very good politician, isn't he? You can't just go on calling him a monster. You can, but he is an enduring monster, a monster with some spin on him.'

And does she think the ageing Zimbabwean leader is about to step down?

'Some think he is there under duress, that he's there because the generals won't let him go, but I don't think so. I think Mugabe and Zanu-PF – the Zanu-PF heavyweights – are two hearts that beat as one. He is not going against them, he is not doing anything that displeases them, except for his succession indecision; but that is tactical. I think Mugabe is having fun. And he's funny, too.' 

Lauren Hutton



Not so wicked WikiLeaks

Information is power. But in the digital era, it is increasingly difficult for actors, including states, to monopolise this power. The change in the speed and depth of information flow has created new opportunities for increased citizen participation and the growth of transnational interest groups. But these changes have also created new vulnerabilities for states – from cyber crime and cyber wars to information insecurity.

Last year WikiLeaks seized international headlines by publishing 250 000 confidential US diplomatic cables. This came just months after the explosive Iraq war files were released on the website, detailing 109 032 deaths in Iraq, 66 081 of which were civilian casualties.

Some commentators have called WikiLeaks an assault on secrecy, and accused it of presenting a head-on challenge to the use of secrecy by governments. This is forcing states to reconsider when and how to keep secrets in an age marked by massive and

instantaneous flows of information. It also calls into question our understanding of what should be kept secret and when national security can legitimately be used as a justification for restrictions on open, democratic governance processes.

Much of the information that has been leaked in the past few months – including the Afghan and Iraq war logs and the diplomatic cables – has not presented a clear and present threat to the national security of the US or any other state. Yet it has made public and proved without a doubt what has long been assumed about US conduct in the Afghan and Iraq wars, as well as the way in which US views itself and the world around it.

The leaked documents have damaged the US' image both nationally and internationally. Would they have caused any concern if they did not reveal the murders of thousands of civilians or the spying on foreign diplomats and senior UN officials? If the leaking of such information harms US national security, is it the fault of those who leaked the

information or of those who authorised or tasked officials to conduct such suspect operations in the first place?

WikiLeaks has been severely criticised for the recent releases, by governments as well as civil society groups claiming that the website takes the notion of public interest too far and is inattentive to the unintended consequences of its actions.

In most instances, WikiLeaks and its partners publishing the documents have redacted the names of sources and sought to protect individual security as far as possible.


Does it pose a threat to US national security that the global community now knows that US diplomats were tasked to collect DNA samples, passwords, frequent-flyer numbers and bank account details of senior UN officials?

Is it not in the public interest to know that the US diplomatic community was tasked with covert collection functions, especially given that it was doing this in foreign countries (including on our continent)?

In fact, one of the gravest concerns about the leaks that challenged the US secrecy regime last year is that the response will be to tighten information security and place further restrictions on access to information.

This response will be a knee-jerk reaction of reverting to secrecy to prevent embarrassment. The truth is that people leak information because they want to expose unpopular behaviour.

The best way to prevent leaks and the concomitant embarrassment they cause is to pursue policies that are in agreement with the values of the population. If knowledge is power, can greater access to information change the dynamics of relationships between rulers and their citizens, or between global elites and those on the margins of power?

Navigating these changes, one can only hope that the need to keep secrets is met with equal consideration of the need to keep the public informed. 



The founder of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, has been accused of damaging the US' image.

New leaders in Africa

PricewaterhouseCoopers is proud to announce the admission of 22 new partners in our Africa Region:

Alexandra Fotinakis
Chantal Marais
Cyril Azobu
David Kirk
Deon Storm
Didier Nguessan
Elizabeth Schoonees
George Kwatia
James Whitaker
Johannes Grove
Kimani Kariuki
Laurent Pommera
Moïse Kokolo
Oseini Amui
Patrick Obianwa
Pieter Pretorius
Simeon Cheruiyot
Sizwe Masondo
Stefan Beyers
Tanya Rae
Tony Oputa
William Ngwa




PricewaterhouseCoopers – **building relationships to create value across Africa** through industry-focused assurance, tax and advisory services.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 

French Development Agency AFD

**mobilised
for water and
sanitation
in Africa**

Since 2007, **AFD** committed 1.2 billion euros worldwide for water and sanitation, of which Africa is the very first beneficiary, from Senegal to Mozambique, from South Africa to Kenya.



©G.Rieb/FEEM

For instance, in Soweto, South Africa, more than 170,000 households benefit from an upgraded network and the installation of water meters thanks to AFD financing.

AFD stands for Agence Française de Développement. AFD is a public development-finance institution that executes the French government's development aid policies. AFD finances and supports projects that improve people's living conditions, promote economic growth and protect the planet. AFD has been operating in South Africa since 1994 by way of an establishment agreement with the South African government.



Shaping sustainable futures

www.afd.fr