

VIEWS AND ANALYSES FROM THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

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Africa in 2025 Can we catch up with Asia?


SA's frigates won't take on Somali pirates... for now



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IF YOU CAN PUT RESPONSIBILITY OVER RISK AND RESPECT BEFORE REWARD. IF YOU CAN THINK FORWARD, BY LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND CAN KEEP TRUST ON THE SAME PEDESTAL AS PROFIT. IF YOU CAN ADMIRE FOUNDATIONS AS MUCH AS WHAT'S BUILT UPON THEM. IF YOU SEEK THE BIGGER PICTURE, BY EXAMINING EVERY DETAIL. IF YOU CAN DREAM BIG AND KEEP YOUR EGO SMALL. IF YOU HAVE THE COURAGE TO QUESTION WHAT YOU THINK IS NOT RIGHT, AND CHAMPION WHAT IS. THEN YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT IT TAKES TO WORK FOR ANGLO AMERICAN.

Dear Reader...

This issue of *The African.org* coincides with the start of the festive season – a time of hot, sunny holidays for those of us in Southern Africa.

As we look ahead to another year, we bring you a special feature with a long-term vision of the possible scenarios for Africa in a globalised world where the continent is still lagging behind the main emerging powers.

Thanks to a dedicated study programme focusing on African Futures, our group of analysts is looking at the continent in a wide range of areas, including security, democratisation, development, agriculture, infrastructure, health and education.

Where will Africa be in 2025, or even 2050? Will the massive population growth prove to be a stimulus to the economy and inevitably lead to progress? Will Africa's huge natural resources and abundant agricultural land be the vehicle to propel the continent towards wealth and out of poverty?

Or will climate change, chaotic urbanisation, lack of education and job opportunities, and the fight over scarce resources lead to more conflict, less democracy, a growing number of emigrants out of the continent and more and more poverty?

What will be the impact of Africa's huge ethnic and religious differences?

These are questions with no easy answers.

Read in this and upcoming issues of *The African.org* more about this exciting new look at our continent's future.

Meanwhile, as the year draws to a close, we remember the momentous events marking 2010 – with the Fifa Soccer World Cup in South Africa certainly being the highlight.

There were numerous major political events on the continent, including the epoch-making presidential elections in Sudan and the much talked-about elections in Rwanda.

In the latter part of the year, on 9 November, we saw the first democratic elections in Guinea, taking place after decades of dictatorship and political violence.

On going to print long-time opposition leader Alpha Conde was declared the winner against former Prime Minister Cellou Daliel Diallo, yet observers are increasingly worried about violence in one of West Africa's most neglected states.

In Côte d'Ivoire the elections everyone thought would never happen took place on 31 October, with a second round between the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara planned for 28 November.

When you read these lines the results might already be released and we

can only hope the outcome leads to a peaceful democratic process in what is still the world's largest cocoa producer.

The year 2011 is promising to be full of political challenges, kicking off with the crucial referendum in Sudan on January 9.

In this issue of *The African.org* our analysts look at the various scenarios and outstanding issues surrounding this referendum, which could see the birth of Africa's youngest state.

The year 2011 will also be marked by presidential elections in Nigeria – an event awaited with much anxiety.

Reading how our researcher Lansana Gberie describes the last 50 years of independence – the last in our series for this year – one can only hope these elections go ahead without too many setbacks and organisational hitches.

Also in 2011 the political temperature is set to rise in Zimbabwe as the transitional power-sharing arrangement draws to a close and new elections are planned. Many say these should rather take place as late as possible in the year.

We will certainly continue to bring you the comments, analyses and insiders' information on all these important issues in the months to come.

Happy New Year 2011.

Liesl Louw-Vaudran

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South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak, center, walks together with South Africa's President Jacob Zuma, right, and Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi for the opening plenary session of the G20 Summit in Seoul, South Korea.




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Dr Lansana Gberie is a senior researcher at the Addis Ababa office of the Institute for Security Studies. His publications include *Rescuing a Fragile State: Sierra Leone 2002–2008* as editor and *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*. In his article he looks back at the past 50 years of Nigeria's independence and the presidential elections planned for 2011.



Deborah Akoth Osiro is a researcher in the Environmental Security Programme of the ISS in Nairobi. She is also an advocate of the High Court of Kenya. At the moment her research includes piracy off the East Coast of Africa and the Gulf of Aden. She writes about the plans by the international community to curb this threat to naval vessels.

See our website www.the-african.org for our daily comment articles on African issues and a weekly podcast on current affairs on the continent. Click on 'comment' to respond to any of these. We are waiting to hear your views and opinion on subjects touching the lives of African citizens today.

Benin president in a fix

Ahead of the March 2011 presidential elections in Benin, many believe President Yayi Boni's chances of winning have been marred by a series of corruption scandals.

In 2009 funds destined to prepare for the Community of Sahel-Saharan States Conference in Benin were embezzled. More recently a financial scam was organised at the highest level of state and involved the Minister of the Interior, Armand Zinzindohoue, and the Attorney General, Georges Amoussou. These authorities apparently condoned the fraudulent activities of a financial institution known as ICC-Services.

ICC-Services was set up as a credit and financial structure that claimed to provide returns of 200% on money deposited by citizens, mainly women who own small or medium-sized businesses. From this scam and at the expense of its vulnerable clients, the company made an estimated 100 billion CFA (152 million euros). The scam was uncovered when people failed to receive returns. It appears from preliminary investigations that most of the money was used for political and religious activities at the behest of Boni, while some went through money laundering schemes.

A commission of inquiry hurriedly set up by the government revealed the connection between government officials and the establishment of the fraudulent financial scheme, which bypassed all existing financial regulations. ICC-Services was provided a licence by the Minister of the Interior, who prepared the ground for the financial institution to operate dishonestly with the protection of the government. Although the president claims he had no knowledge of the scheme and the involvement of his cabinet, and has since dismissed the responsible minister and the Attorney General, many in the country believe it is the responsibility of the government to



Benin is heading for elections in March 2011 with President Yayi Boni increasingly under threat following accusations of corruption within his government.

protect citizens from such financial scams.

With this scandal, it is the leadership provided by Boni over the past four years that has come under scrutiny.

Liberia prepares for election year

As Liberia heads for legislative and presidential elections in October 2011, anxieties are running high. President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who is running for re-election, is internationally held in high esteem, but this is apparently not widely shared in Liberia. In 2009, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) listed her among 50 or so political figures blamed for fuelling Liberia's 14-year war, recommending that the 71-year-old step down from political office for 30 years – in effect, a ban for life.

The TRC's recommendations are unlikely to be adopted by the legislature but the recommendations have damaged the president's image in the eyes of many Liberians. In November last year her governing Unity Party's candidate for a major senatorial by-election in Montserrado County (the largest in Liberia, with 35% of Liberia's registered voters) was soundly defeated by the candidate for the opposition Congress for Democratic Change, headed by ex-football star George Weah (who was defeated by Johnson-Sirleaf in 2005).

A defeat for the progressive and

respected Johnson-Sirleaf – which is not at all inconceivable – will likely damage the country's prospects, in terms of both political stability and economic growth, as there is no guarantee that her opponents will stick to her agenda for reform and state-building. Crucial international confidence and support will also be severely undermined. In other words, the stakes for the 2011 elections are unusually high, bringing into sharp relief the issue of whether periodic elections are in any way helpful in a post-war country so prone to ethnic and other polarisations.

African Union to look at solar energy

Among the topics to be discussed at the upcoming 16th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union on 30 and 31 January 2011 will be the issue of solar energy in the Sahara. During last year's January summit the Assembly approved a resolution (Assembly/AU/Res 2 (XIV)) 'requesting all countries with the Sahara in their territories to consider the solar energy potential in this part of Africa as an asset that should be managed for the benefit of the continent'.

Already there are major plans to harness the solar energy from the Sahara that are promising to provide huge sources of energy to Africa and Europe. European Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger stated recently that Europe could start importing solar energy from the Sahara within the next five years. The Desertec Initiative, for example, sets a long-term plan for solar energy from deserts for the next 40 years. According to Desertec.org, within 6 hours deserts receive more energy than humankind consumes within a year.

The 2011 summit will be preceded by the following statutory meetings: the Executive Council (27-28 January), and the Permanent Representatives Council [Ambassadors] (24-25 January). 

Newswatch

Lubanga trial back on track

Ending months of speculation and uncertainty, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) ordered a resumption of proceedings in the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case. It was earlier interrupted by a decision of the Trial Chamber to stay proceedings and release Lubanga, primarily on the basis that the Office of the Prosecutor had abused the process and failed to afford the defendant his right to a fair trial.

Lubanga Dyilo's is the first case to have been tried by the ICC. He is accused of enlisting, recruiting and using children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) province of Ituri between 2002 and 2003.

This latest decision from the Court reaffirms the independence of the ICC's judges and their powers of oversight over the conduct of the Prosecutor. Despite the gravity of the charges leveled against Lubanga Dyilo, the decision also confirms that the Court strictly upholds the legal principles of fair trial and due process.

The decision deftly balances these principles and the right of the defendant against those of the victims and the necessity of ensuring that justice is done. In the Appeal Chamber's decision the role of the Trial Chamber was emphasised. It was stressed that the Trial Chamber is the 'ultimate arbiter' in balancing the interests of victims and witnesses against the right to fair trial of the defendant – and that its decisions had to be respected and obeyed by all parties, including the Prosecutor. The case of Lubanga Dyilo has now resumed where it left off three months ago, with the Prosecution leading evidence. This case is set to continue for months, maybe even years, to come.

A coup for women in the UN

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's announcement on 14 September of the appointment of Michelle Bachelet, former president of Chile, as the Under-Secretary-General for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) is a political watershed that comes at a critical juncture in the life of the United Nations (UN).

Bachelet will be heading a fully fledged agency with a budget of \$220 million, with an operational capacity to build partnerships with governments and communities that may knock the UN family into shape and renew the business of gender mainstreaming, which seems to be suffering from fatigue and lethargy of considerable proportions.

Over the last four years, proponents have advocated for UN Women to have policy-setting responsibilities on substantive issues of gender equality and women's rights, with the authority to ensure accountability on gender mainstreaming in the UN system and a field presence to conduct and shape UN operational activities at the country level.

Seen as a progressive move to honour a pledge made last September to create a better-funded UN agency for women, this institutional coup may be one of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's few legacies to an organisation that is at a crossroads.

Kenya cracking down on crime

Kenya's new law on the Prevention of Organised Crimes 2010, gazetted by George Saitoti, the minister in charge of Internal Security and Provincial Administration, aims at enhancing the prevention, investigation and punishment of organised crimes in the country. The law spells out tough measures to deal with criminal gangs by imposing jail terms ranging from 14 years to life imprisonment for those found guilty. It provides a harsh penalty for anyone who fundraises, organises or directs members of a criminal gang to commit a serious crime and/or for those taking or administering oaths. They are liable upon conviction to life imprisonment.

An example of a feared organised crime group in Kenya is the outlawed Mungiki sect. Mungiki is a politico-religious group that was outlawed by the government of Kenya following atrocities committed against its victims. The disciples of Mungiki claim it is a 'homegrown' religious organisation committed to upholding the traditional 'African way of worship, culture and lifestyle.' It began as a local militia to protect Kikuyu farmers in disputes over land with the Kalenjin and draws some inspiration from the bloody Mau Mau rebellion of the 1950s against British colonial rule. In recent years, it has been associated with a political group known as the Kenya National Youth Alliance (KNYA).

Following the gazetting of the Prevention of Organised Crimes Act in September 2010, the Kenyan Police arrested some members of the Mungiki sect who were en route to an organised meeting that was also to be attended by their self-confessed former sect leader Maina Njenga. The suspects appeared in court and were charged under the new law. The police extended the crackdown on more suspects of criminal groups, and 600 suspects were arrested in one week alone.

Environmentalists in bid to save the Serengeti

The Serengeti ecosystem is an awesome, natural laboratory that scientists have studied over time to try and understand predator-prey relationships. The ecosystem, together with the adjoining Maasai Mara Game Reserve in Kenya, is undisputedly the largest habitat for myriad fauna in sub-Saharan Africa. It is home to Africa's 'Big Five' – lion, elephant, rhino, buffalo and leopard. A majority of the inhabitants of this ecosystem are wildebeest, zebra and Thomson's gazelle.

Every year, during the months of September and October, millions of grazers, together with predators and scavengers (mainly vultures circling above) migrate across the Mara River. The predators stalk the grazers to prey on the weak and the newborn. The vultures clean up the leftovers from the predators' kills.

Over the past three to four years, a dark cloud has appeared over this critical ecosystem – a new issue that is threatening its sustainability and indeed its very existence. All the signs show that the potential for a threat to the sustainable functioning of the Serengeti ecosystem is real and high.

During the just-concluded Tanzanian national election campaigns, the Chama


Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) presidential candidate, Jakaya Kikwete, who ultimately won the elections, made a promise that caught the attention of national and international environmental and conservation agencies is on the construction of a trans-Serengeti highway. The highway is expected to link the town of Arusha to the south and the two towns on the shores of Lake Victoria, Mwanza and Musoma. The highway, if built through the ecosystem, is likely to introduce a stream of traffic into the midst of migrating game, particularly the 2 million-plus wildebeests, gazelle and other grazers. The consequences will be tragic, to say the least.

This promise immediately put the CCM candidate on a collision course with national and regional tourism operators. The Serengeti is a cash cow for Tanzania, attracting more than 100 000 visitors each year and generating millions of foreign currency in park fees, thus helping to propel Tanzania's multi million-dollar safari industry.

Many environmentalists and conservation stakeholders, including academics, are wary of what could happen next: poachers will access the park with ease, killing endangered animals like rhinos; invasive plant

species will be introduced to the park; animal migration will be disrupted and even blocked; animals will frequently be knocked down by speeding vehicles; and the entire ecosystem will be irreversibly degraded, thus setting in motion the demise of the Serengeti ecosystem.

To avert the death of the Serengeti, researchers, practitioners (private sector), the academia and civil society organisations need to continue to engage the government of Tanzania with a view to convincing it to rescind its decision to bisect the Serengeti ecosystem. One avenue that these stakeholders can pursue is to provide technical support in the Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA), reporting on the impact of the planned highway on the Serengeti ecosystem. They could assist in providing situation analyses, which hopefully will feed information on enlightened environmental management into influencing the decision-making process of the government of Tanzania.

These kinds of engagement should be a step in the right direction and should be seen as a modest beginning to a larger, more professional and more effective undertaking in addressing the many challenges of sustainable conservation of the Serengeti ecosystem. 

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SA's frigates and the Somali pirates

There is increasing pressure on South Africa to join the anti-piracy efforts off the coast of East Africa. Some say that modern warships acquired as part of the controversial post-apartheid arms deal could be deployed, but **Anton Kruger** asks whether South Africa really has the capability or the obligation to get involved.

During the first week of October, a South African-owned yacht with three South African citizens on board was hijacked by Somali-based pirates off the coast of Tanzania and forced to turn back to the Puntland coast.

Many are asking why South Africa is not joining the international naval fleets to combat Somali piracy, which is essentially an 'African problem'. The European Union (EU) has also asked South Africa on several occasions to join the EU anti-piracy task force. After all, South Africa acquired naval warships at great expense after the end of apartheid. Why not use them?

Firstly, the objectives of the South African Navy, as outlined by the South African Department of Finance, state that the role of the SAN are to defend and protect South Africa and its maritime zones. Using SAN resources to combat piracy would therefore only be justified if the piracy threat were to move southwards into the SADC area and threaten South African trade.

Yet the South African White Paper on

Defence further states that, as a fully-fledged member of the international community, South Africa must fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations. But is the anti-piracy effort strictly speaking a peace mission?

This issue has not been entirely cleared up and it would seem that there are considerable contradictions between the SAN's own stated strategy, that of the UN, and other government strategies.

The second issue is South Africa's capability. South Africa has the only naval force south of the Sahara able to conduct credible anti-piracy operations. Currently, there are only five frigates, seven medium patrol aircraft and 18 small-range coastal patrol craft belonging to sub-Saharan nations available to patrol the 63.124 km of coastline south of the Sahara. Of the five frigates, four belong to the SAN, and most of the patrol aircraft belong to the South African Air Force (SAAF).

The SAN was fairly recently re-equipped with modern frigates,

submarines, and reconnaissance helicopters and also recently held comprehensive anti-piracy exercises. The SAN's Maritime Reaction Squadron (MRS) is a special combat capability that was initially planned for inland waterways and coastal areas in support of peacekeepers, but that can be adapted to anti-piracy operations. Yet the SAN is being crippled by acute financial shortages. The South African defence budget has been repeatedly cut in recent years and plans are in the pipeline to reduce the SAN's operational capability even more in coming financial years. The government plans to reduce the hours spent at sea by the SAN from 9 000 this year to only 8 000 in 2011 and 2012.

Under the current defence budget, the SAN will only be able to deploy one patrol frigate together with one support ship at any given time, and that will most probably deplete its yearly operational budget. The SAN also has other responsibilities, which it is barely





The SAS Amatola, one of four modern frigates acquired for the SA Navy.


capable of fulfilling at this time, such as anti-poaching, search and rescue, and overall maritime defence of the South African coast. Under the current defence budget, deploying one frigate to the Somali coast would mean that the SAN is unable to fulfil its primary responsibilities towards South Africa.

Up to 14 countries have committed naval forces to the joint maritime task force to patrol Somali and adjacent waters and deter piracy. This amounts to nearly 30 foreign warships that are off Somalia's coast at any one time, but has had little effect in deterring Somali pirates, who have moved their attacks further into the Indian Ocean and up to a few miles from the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts, where the poor capabilities of the Kenyan and Tanzanian navies have left coastlines wide open to attack and exploitation.

One would have to ask whether the deployment of a single South African warship will make any difference to

South Africa has the only naval force south of the Sahara able to conduct credible anti-piracy operations

the situation if the current extensive foreign naval force operations are unable to do so.

It would be much more worthwhile for the South African government to concentrate on patrolling the SADC's eastern maritime border. It is a much smaller area to cover, and the SAN could operate from ports in Mozambique and Madagascar. This would make much more economic and military sense than to try conducting operations in the north Indian Ocean and serving as an African fig leaf for international inaction on Somalia. 

Who will pay?

According to diplomatic sources, several European countries have indicated their willingness to at least partly finance South Africa's participation in the international effort to combat piracy. This would include the integration of marines into the naval task force and training in Djibouti or Mombasa.

"It is in line with South African foreign policy ideals of 'Africa for the Africans', and yet there is absolutely no African presence here," said one source.

Though it is clear that South Africa won't be able to send more than one warship to the area, the Europeans believe any help is welcome to achieve the mammoth task of fighting the elusive Somali pirates.

"Perhaps we need the piracy to move down to Southern Africa for South Africa to become involved," said the source.

No to mercenaries vs Somali pirates on the high seas

While the problem of piracy in the Indian Ocean spreads and intensifies, the international community is at its wits' end. **Deborah Akoth Osiro** believes that most of the solutions being offered are an exercise in futility.

The largest naval armada the world has seen in recent times has been patrolling the waters near Somalia's coast to deter pirates from hijacking shipping vessels. Yet, rather than contain the problem, the warships have driven Somali pirates further into the Indian Ocean.

Now an estimated 1 000 to 1 500 pirates are roaming 2 000km from their base in Somalia; as far as the Mozambican channel, east of the Maldives and the Red Sea. And, despite the navies, the pirates seized 35 vessels in 123 attempts between January and September 2010. This is more than the 34 recorded seized in the same period in 2009. The presence of the naval patrols and the increased dangers of capture or drowning while operating further from shores have pushed up the cost of buccaneering. Ransom payments have doubled to an average of US \$5 million, and hostages are being held for up to 120 days – twice as long as in previous years.

There have been numerous attempts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, yet it is escalating. The international community has initiated

several actions, including military interventions, UN resolutions, and policy initiatives by various states and organisations. However, the common thread of these anti-piracy responses is that they follow the path of least resistance. They seem to have been chosen to provide cosmetic solutions and circumnavigate the only obvious resolution: stabilising Somalia.

The latest initiative, the Regional Strategy to Counter and Prevent Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security, was adopted by ministers from the Eastern and Southern Africa-India Ocean (ESA-IO) region in Mauritius on 7 October 2010. Spearheaded by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), its three-tier approach aims to implement a Somalia inland action; encourage regional states to undertake prosecution of apprehended pirates with the financial support of the international community; and strengthen capacities of states in the region to secure their maritime zones.

The ESA-IO Regional Strategy complements existing piracy initiatives

such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and the AU Maritime Security and Safety in Africa Strategy. The Regional Strategy expects to marshal concerted action from the member states to counter the escalating threat, by stressing its negative economic impact.

Even as the push for a sustainable solution to piracy gains momentum, certain inherent shortcomings and developments garnering currency may neutralise the impact of the Regional Piracy Strategy and condemn it to the fate of other initiatives.

In the first place, countries that are seemingly most affected have little say in the best strategy to combat piracy. For instance the new Strategy, like all previous initiatives, essentially relies on the ineffective Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia as the key actor to implement the Inland Action Plan. With the future of the TFG uncertain, its hold on Mogadishu tenuous and the decision by some states to scale up their direct engagement with the more capable Somaliland and Puntland



Abdul Hassan, 39, carries an RPG next to a small boat with some of his crew near Hobyo, on the border between Galmudug and Puntland states in Somalia. He is a chief of the pirate group called the 'Central Regional Coast Guard'. In 2008 it had 350 men in its ranks, and about 100 speed boats. In that year the group attacked 29 ships, earning a total of US\$10million from it. Abdul Hassan himself collected US\$350 000.

administrations, relying on TFG may be ill judged.

In contrast, the states with ships at the front line in the war against piracy led by the EU are unwilling to take decisive action. It is notable that the Mauritius Conference was co-chaired by Baroness Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who was unsuccessful in convincing Mauritius to host piracy trials, agree to the detention of those convicted, or abide by the EU's terms. Kenya and Seychelles are the main regional countries trying piracy suspects.

The issue of judicial consequences for the pirates has been continually irksome. The concept of universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy has proved a fallacy in practice because of human rights concerns. UN resolutions and proposals have just complicated already turbid legal waters. The proponents of tougher legal actions against the pirates would have us believe that if most captured pirates

were imprisoned, piracy would be eliminated.

Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique have been approached but have been reluctant to acquiesce, with good reason. Kenya, which has conducted most of the piracy trials, failed to renew its agreements to accept transferred suspects for prosecution in September 2010 – although this was regrettably for

The proposal to deploy a private navy against the pirates (because the use of naval resources for this law enforcement is unsustainable) could seriously compound the growing insecurity in the region

a very banal reason – namely money – rather than because continued trials contravene the very human rights the western states are keen to safeguard.

The government of Kenya maintained that the country had become a 'dumping ground' for pirates, stretching its criminal justice system without corresponding assistance from the international community. Overall, Kenya has a backlog of almost a million cases, and its penal institutions hold more than four times too many prisoners. Since the trials are targeting foot soldiers and not the kingpins of the piracy operations, the 'dumping' is unlikely to stop in the near future.

Further, piracy in the Indian Ocean is thriving because it is anchored in a flourishing war economy that several parties are exploiting: warlords, piracy financiers, government officials, illegal fishing vessels, insurers, ransom negotiating teams, naval forces, privateers and other mercenaries, and Islamists. The instability and a non-functioning government in Somalia foster

International crime

Somali piracy

the growth of Somali pirates, making it improbable that the exploiters will permit piracy to end without a fight. The recent abduction of a Somali minister by the pirates is illustrative of this.

While attention is focused on piracy, an estimated 700 foreign-owned fishing vessels are engaged in illegal, unlicensed and unreported (IUU) and unsustainable fishing in Somali waters. Madrid's recent US \$3 million offer to turn pirates into fishermen for example is incongruous and a drop in the ocean compared with the \$300 million annual returns from illegal fishing in Somali waters. Negotiators are major beneficiaries too. Ransom negotiations, for instance, tend to cost as much as \$20 million for a \$4 million payout, while the insurers have received \$100 million in new premiums in the last two years.

The international community is aware of the fact that the pirates at sea are mere pawns and the real culprits are elsewhere, but is either unwilling to act or hostage to those interests. Some of the piracy financiers are said to operate in Kenya, the Middle East and other Western capitals, but there is a marked reluctance to investigate and apprehend them. Also, calls to ban ransom payments, due to concerns that piracy is linked to Islamists in Somalia, have been discounted, particularly by Britain, as it would cripple the shipping industry. If the terrorist links were real, ransom payments would of necessity be prohibited under anti-terrorism laws. It would be paradoxical if Islamists used Western funds to coordinate attacks against the West.

Finally, the naval armada, which has no regional representation, has spread the piracy problem to the other regional countries' waters.

In addition, the proposal to deploy a private navy against the pirates (because it is unsustainable to use naval resources for this law enforcement) could seriously compound the growing insecurity in



An armed Somali pirate waiting along the coastline near Hobyo in north-eastern Somalia on 7 January 2010 where the Greek cargo ship MV Filitsa (seen anchored in the background) was being held by pirates.

The international community is aware of the fact that the pirates at sea are mere pawns and the real culprits are elsewhere – but is either unwilling to act or hostage to those interests.


the region. The plan by London-based insurance and shipping companies is to fund a private navy with a fleet of 20 armed patrol boats with mercenaries (the term 'privateers' is apt here). London is the capital of the world's maritime industry.

The legal status of the private navy is indeterminate, though its advocates claim that such a force will abide by the laws of and be answerable to the flag country, which grants a letter of marque, making them privateers. However, the flag states' engagement in countering piracy so far has been negligible and will definitely not constitute an effective oversight over the mercenaries' activities. Lacking legal restraints, the privateers are likely to engage in acts that most navies are constrained from doing by the international rules of engagement: land-based attacks and executions at sea.

Besides, the use of private contractors

in most conflict situations in Africa is controversial. African nations should not allow these mercenaries to operate in their territory in accordance with the recent UN resolution, that reaffirmed that their use violates the UN Charter principles. Unless the naval forces' objective to combat piracy is a façade for other pursuits, a return to privateering indicates that the Somali buccaneers have overwhelmed the naval armada and they should disband.

In sum, piracy, like terrorism and a host of other transnational crimes, has emerged because of the almost anarchical conditions in Somalia. Since piracy is essentially a law-enforcement issue, the only effective response lies in a stable Somalia to enable a functioning government to do its law and order job.

It therefore follows that enhancing the capacity of regional states to prosecute pirates is not a solution. In fact, regional tribunals should be discontinued, because they sustain an illusion that the piracy scourge is being addressed while in reality they have done little to stem its flow. Instead, the naval forces' enthusiasm to capture pirates should be matched by a commitment to prosecute them in their home states. Moreover, enhancing the region's maritime governance should exclude any privateer operations unless they have international legal blessing. 

Exciting times as we follow emerging nations

Together with the Pardee Institute for Future Studies, the Institute for Security Studies has embarked on an intensive study of future trends and prospects for Africa. **Jakkie Cilliers** outlines some of the preliminary findings.

In spite of sustained uncertainty about the future of the world economy, very positive global investment and the pre-2008 economic growth trends have garnered increasing recognition that things are indeed changing rapidly in Africa.

Investment is soaring and infrastructure spend is evident in the larger capital cities, wherever you travel on the continent. Though

poverty generally increased in Africa between 1981 and 1996, it has declined thereafter, this progress only being halted by the recent food crisis and the subsequent global financial crisis.

Even Africa's reaction to the global economic recession has provided many analysts with food for thought, as the continent seems to have weathered the impact of the financial crisis remarkably well. The intervening years saw great

concern about the potential impact of the spike in food prices and global recession on the continent, followed by amazement at the extent to which the majority of African countries have been able to withstand the downturn. On the whole the continent did not go into recession, and growth has rebounded quite strongly.

Africa also saw its sharpest decline in conflict in the years since the collapse

THE SEOUL SUMMIT 2010

Shared Growth Beyond Crisis



France's President Nicolas Sarkozy talks to South Africa's President Jacob Zuma at the G20 Summit in Seoul in November.

of the Berlin Wall, and by 2006, war deaths in the continent had fallen by two thirds. Of course, recent years have seen some levelling out in the sharp declines in conflict, caused by election violence in Kenya, coups in Guinea and the like. Conflict trends are depicted below in the statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The impact of climate change

So far, 2010 has been the warmest year on record since 1880, the earliest date for which global data is available. Globally the average temperature is set to rise by around 0.2°C per decade over the next two decades, and projections are that the global climate will probably stabilise by the end of the century at around 3.5°C higher than 2005. Therefore, the chance of a global temperature increase of 4°C this century (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC]'s high-warming scenario) is increasingly probable.

Climate change will have a more significant impact on Africa than on most other regions due to our global position and the fact that we have a warm climate exposed to inconsistent rains, with much poor soil and floodplains. Of course, vulnerability varies from country to country and from village to village, and it is important to bear in mind that Africa is a relatively water-rich continent in comparison to others. What it lacks is the means to manage and distribute its resources.

About 200 million Africans currently experience high water stress and this figure will increase steadily in the years to come. Many African economies are dependent upon sectors susceptible to climate changes, such as agriculture (which employs 60-90% of the total labour force), fisheries, forestry and tourism.

Africa's massive population growth and the demands on sustainable

As new emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and Russia outpace the growth of developed countries, their expansion is dragging Africa along

livelihoods will also bump up the impact of climate change. By 2027, the continent will have a larger population than China or India, and the rapidly growing young population provides the continent with momentum in the form of a massive potential workforce. By 2032 Africa will have a larger working population than China, and by 2036 a larger working population than India.

Urbanisation constitutes an increasingly important adaptation strategy to unpredictable and shifting weather patterns. On the other hand, if reports by the International Red Cross are taken into account, there are currently more environmental refugees in Africa than there are refugees displaced by war.

These shifting demographics, along with a warmer, more unpredictable climate, will propel African countries on a hitherto unforeseen trajectory, and many of the challenges presented are compounded by the lack of governance, persistent and widespread poverty, poor economic and social infrastructure, and limited human, institutional and financial capacities to adapt.

However, it is important to emphasise that some of these challenges will be alleviated through developmental initiatives. How African leaderships respond and plan ahead in the coming years will largely determine what impact climate change has on its peoples.

A complex continent

In his famous book *The Africans: A Triple Heritage*, Ali Mazrui reminds us of the continent's three key cultural identities –

that from the West through colonialism and Christianity; its indigenous African heritage; and the influence of Islam. More and more African countries have completed or are undergoing the transition to democracy, while others languish in the shackles of oppression, dictatorship and poverty. Far from the romantic image of uniformity and common ancestry, language and orientation, held both on the continent and elsewhere, Africa presents a complex tapestry of cultural and social influences. Efforts to group and categorise the prospects for development, peace and security often present different outcomes, depending upon which way the prism is viewed. Projections into the future must therefore be treated with a great degree of caution, for they are little more than guesstimates.


At the same time, we cannot understand how to work towards a better future if we do not understand the possible implications of our current trajectories.

New potential for growth

International trends such as the reorganisation of global alliances and a shifting role for states vs financial institutions have tremendous implications for Africa, which has been spoon-fed on the importance of democracy and good governance, as well as being a good ally to the American 'war on terror', as prerequisites for growth.

Thanks to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, South Africa has now rebranded itself globally – and the glow will linger, notwithstanding the tragic terror attacks by al-Shabaab in Kampala, Uganda, during the final game that left more than 70 dead. Despite the fact that the championship was eventually decided between two European countries, the next world cup will be in Brazil, further evidence of the extent to which the global game is indeed, global, and power is shifting to the South.

Africa's fast growing population



Source: UN global population growth projections

It is now time to start preparing for the African Olympic games in 2020, for the Soccer World Cup has demonstrated what serious analysts have long known – that the momentum of African development is accelerating and the continent's economic potential is immense, even though starting from a very low baseline.

International perceptions of Africa are an important factor in its changing fortunes. In the West, Africa is frequently seen as a calamitous continent, evidenced by bad leadership, corruption, murder, poverty, poor governance, fragile states and vast, ungoverned spaces that have to be 'controlled'.

This is not the view held in Asia, Brazil, Russia and elsewhere, where discussions are about the opportunities and future market space in Africa, of the need for investment in infrastructure and the vast unexplored resource potential – even of Africa's potential for agriculture and manufacturing. This is not to make light of the challenges faced by the continent, for even in the best conditions Africa will take generations rather than decades to recover from the ravages of colonialism

and post-liberation politics.

This will not, as former South African President Thabo Mbeki would have us believe, be the African century – it is likely to be the Asian century, even as China's breathtaking growth slows down in the decades to come – for Africa remains little more than a spectator to many of these shifts. By way of reminder, the collective value of all of Africa's economies is merely US \$2.2 trillion, representing little more than 3% of a total global GDP (PPP) of \$69.8 trillion.

Rethinking trade and aid

Although US trade growth with Africa has also been strong, China outpaced the US to become the continent's largest trading partner in 2009. Statistics indicate the extent to which South-South trade is increasing as a component of Africa's total trade relations. Most of this has occurred at the expense of Western Europe, which has seen its share of trade with Africa decline from 51% in 1990 to just 28% in 2008.

An important characteristic is the extent to which the proportion of intra-African trade remains static. Yet Africa

will remain important to Europe for three reasons related to its own needs – proximity, as a source of commodities, and in terms of global governance reform – and Europe to Africa – for all the hype about China, around 40% of foreign direct investment originates from the European Union.

At a time of much debate about the efficacy of development assistance, the improvements in the capacity and quality of African governance evident in the past decade can partly be attributed to the focus that this issue has received from donors such as the European Union. For example, spending by countries from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) on strengthening governance has increased substantially in recent years.

These are exciting times for Africa. Our growth is no longer merely an adjunct to former colonial powers, but increasingly tied to South-South trade. As the new emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and Russia outpace the growth of developed countries, their expansion is dragging Africa along. While much of this is dependent upon the export of our commodities – minerals and petrochemicals in particular – a number of agencies are pointing to the extent to which Africa is also emerging as a potential global market.

These growth prospects will have important governance implications. A growing urban and sophisticated population will end the tradition of self-serving 'big man' leadership, often based on the manipulation of ethnic identity and mobilisation against 'foreign interference' or former colonialists. African leaders will have to contend with an increasingly informed and restless urban population that will test their abilities to a degree never previously seen. ■

Read more in the upcoming monograph on African Futures on www.issafrica.org

Fewer guns, more conflict?

Since the end of the Cold War, the global security context has been characterised by intra-state conflicts, multinational peace and security arrangements and increasingly asymmetrical and civilianised violence. Conflict has become population-centric and threats and vulnerabilities are more complex and unpredictable than ever before.

A key driver of instability will be global and local inequalities and the resort to violence in conflicts over access to resources

Central to these vulnerabilities is the capacity of the state to provide security and deliver services. Lack of service delivery – be it basic services such as education and health care or security and justice services – makes governments vulnerable to whoever can mobilise the population within their territories.

For Africa, the future of peace and security could depend not so much on military means, hardware and capacity as on the capacity to deliver basic services and some form of legitimately accepted law and order.

In a globalised society where sovereignty and power are increasingly diffused, influence can be brought to bear through alliances and support to a range of actors affecting global stability. It is also unlikely that the

dominance of asymmetrical and irregular conflict will decrease.

Especially in Africa, violence waged by armed groups and political movements is likely to continue to be a prime determinant of instability. A key driver of instability will be global and local inequalities and the resort to violence in conflicts over access to resources.


There are two main trends. The first is the shift from militarised violence to criminalised violence.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), violence committed by, between and against organised criminal groups may become comparable to that of an armed conflict in terms of scale and intensity. This shift has been accompanied by, and is in many ways related to, the shift from state-centric to population-centric conflict.


Furthermore, maintaining internal law and order is and will continue to become increasingly difficult as socio-economic pressures such as increasing food prices and urbanisation increase the likelihood and intensity of organised violence.

The second key trend that will continue to shape African peace and security until 2050 is the shift to multinationalism and the manner in which African states take responsibility for African insecurity.

Of particular interest will be the impact of the renewed interest in African resources and the potential of international engagement to fuel or moderate conflict.

Africa will remain a strategic interest for many foreign governments because of resources and oil-producing potential and because of the broader impacts of destabilisation on the global political economy, as so well exemplified by piracy off the coast of Somalia. 

Lauren Hutton



How to feed a continent?

Agriculture still forms the backbone of Africa's economies, even though food imports have grown exponentially in the past few decades. **Donald Mwiturubani** predicts that despite the hiring out of agricultural land to foreign companies, the use of food crops for biofuels and the effects of climate change, farmers will in future be able to produce more thanks to technology and fewer conflicts.

Global trends forecasts for agricultural production between 2005 and 2050 reveal that China and India are at the forefront and are expected to continue to produce more of both crop and meat products.

After China and India, Africa is also expected to continue doing better in this regard.

However, Africa is expected to continue earning less from its exports, compared to India and China, because it is exporting primary commodities, rather than end products.

The protectionist policies in Europe and North America, in place to protect their farmers from any expected loss due to the fluctuation of prices of their agricultural commodities in the global markets, will also continue playing a role. Still, there are several exceptions. For example, exports of vegetables, fruits and flowers from eastern and southern Africa continue to surpass all expectations and reached over US \$2 billion a year, up from virtually zero a quarter of a century ago.

Government policies impact heavily on agriculture. Prior to the Structural Adjustment Policies introduced by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the 1980s, many governments in Africa provided subsidies

to farmers for inputs such as fertilisers and insecticides. With the introduction of a free market economy, the challenge is to put in place institutional and financial systems that will allow rural populations to access credit from financial institutions. In practice, banks and other financial institutions are reluctant to give loans to smallholder (small-scale) farmers, because the majority of them do not have legal titles to the land they own and use for agricultural production, as they do for the large-scale commercial farmers. In the absence of credit and with the rising prices of agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilisers, African farmers will not be able to compete in terms of either the quantity or quality of their agricultural commodities.

Who owns the land?

Faced with these difficulties, farmers will increasingly see land 'grabbed' by those with money in the name of 'investment'. A recent World Bank report on land grabbing has highlighted a number of case studies in Africa where conflicts over land between investors and local communities have intensified in recent years. The report reveals that investments have displaced people from their land and forced them to rent land

for cultivation and livestock grazing.

There is a possibility of African farmers being marginalised and their fertile land taken by investors, with skimpy compensation.

The main problem, though, is that most of these investments are not placed in the agricultural sector but in other sectors such as mining.

In some African countries, land is vested in the state. Users are given title deeds to own and use land for a period of time, such as 33, 66 or 99 years. These arrangements of land ownership and access will continue to shape the way land is utilised for agricultural production in Africa.

Sadly, governments in Africa have not supported their farmers, while at the same time encouraging investors without clear regulations on how those investments were to benefit local people.

Traditionally, access to and ownership of land and water resources in Africa is also gendered, with men controlling grazing land and land for cash-crop production, while women control land for food production. Women do not tend to own either family or community resources. This will continue to affect those agricultural activities that are the domain of women.

Technology the answer

It is, however, expected that rural people's access to information will improve in future, as the majority of them will, for example, be able to own mobile phones. This will enable the rural population to access financial facilities, such as sending and receiving money using services provided by mobile phone providers.

Networking and access to information will allow smallholder farmers to establish associations and organisations, for greater unity when demanding rights, such as legal land

ownership rights. Furthermore, due to increased investment in other sectors such as mining, African countries are expected to be able to improve infrastructure such as roads, which will facilitate transportation of agricultural inputs to farms and agricultural produce to markets.

Access to water

In spite of Africa's immense size, pressures related to limited land and water are expected to shape the future of the continent's agricultural production. In general, though, Africa is

expected to face water scarcity due to population growth and less capacity to adapt to the impacts of climate change.

In Africa, only about 4% of cultivated land is irrigated. Thus, agricultural changes arising from environmental factors such as land degradation, droughts and floods will force African farmers to invest more in irrigation agriculture and apply more inputs such as fertilisers.

Similarly, there has been increased demand for grazing land, due to increased demand for meat and the increasing amount of livestock on the continent.

We need railroads

By 2050, Africa will be the most populous region in the world, with more vehicles and fewer roads than the NAFTA or EU regions. The continent currently comprises more landlocked states than any other region, and its economic growth relies heavily on exporting raw materials, as opposed to manufactured goods, to the developed world and fast-developing states like China and India.

Africa's geographic location south of the major trade routes of the industrialised and major developing regions is a disadvantage that requires correction. This correction can be achieved by introducing the means to physically connect the continent to those trade routes via bridges or tunnels to Arabia, Europe and Asia.


Long-distance rail links utilising tubular track technology promise to be more cost effective than long-distance road links, and should therefore be considered for use in harmony with the introduction of hybrid road-railer trucking technology that would comprise a cost-effective and practical

synergistic partnership between road and rail. Road-railers would be particularly useful in service between warehouses, rail freight yards, ports, and even airports that are served by rail connections.

A comprehensive long-distance African rail network connecting every state and regional economic community, supported by viable road

links and urban transit networks, would facilitate open markets and borders, as well as the integration of the African economy and its people. It would also bring the rest of the world, and its markets, closer to Africa, thereby preparing the way for a wealthier, better developed and, ultimately, more peaceful continent. – Duke Kent Brown

Projected Road Infrastructure per 1000 hectares



Feeding a continent

Globally, while there is enough food to feed every person, the problem is the unequal distribution of food.

In Africa, there are problems of both food availability and lack of access to available food. Issues around poverty (lack of purchasing power), low productivity due to lack of appropriate inputs and knowledge, climate change, land (soil) degradation and underdeveloped infrastructure to support agricultural development, among others, affect food availability and distribution.

Generally, though, agricultural production in developing countries including Asia and Africa is expected to increase – a situation that will improve food security.

The production of renewable fuels (biofuels) using agricultural grains such as maize, wheat, rice and sorghum is,

however, expected to have a negative impact on food security in Africa. Conversion of already scarce arable land from producing staple food into producing grains for biofuels will reduce the supply of cereals, the main staple food in Africa. Although not much of African arable land and consequently grains have been converted to biofuel production, it is expected that the use of grains for biofuels will affect food availability on a global level.

It is reported, for example, that between 2007 and 2008, more than 100 million tons of grain were diverted to the production of biofuels – ethanol and biodiesel – which resulted in an increase in maize prices from \$2 per bushel in 2006 to more than \$15 per bushel in 2008. In this situation, African governments are expected to increase expenditure on food imports as agricultural production in the continent

continues to lag behind demand. This trend would be reversed if appropriate policies were put on place to regulate the production of biofuels in the continent.

The most threatening environmental factor, however, will continue to be climate change, primarily due to less and inappropriate capacities of African farmers and their agricultural systems to adapt to its impacts. However, since Africa is rich in natural resources ranging from flora and fauna to minerals and oil, there are opportunities for the continent to use them for agricultural development.

And though the richness of natural resources in Africa has been attracting conflicts, the decline of civil strife and wars in Africa that is currently being witnessed could increase agricultural output. Farmers will be expected to devote more of their time and money to production systems and spend more time on productive agriculture. ■

A bumpy road to democracy

The current global economic recession has already made the competition for resources in Africa more desperate and violent in the past two or three years. As a result, the number of coups d'état and military crises have increased. Will more African countries become democratic or will they slide back into authoritarianism and autocracy?

According to Freedom House, an international NGO based in Washington DC, Africa has seen notable increases in freedom over the past two decades but has experienced some setbacks in recent years.

Perhaps the most disturbing trend is the decline over several years of some of sub-Saharan Africa's largest and most influential countries that had previously made important democratic progress, such as Kenya and Nigeria, due to flawed elections and related violence.

In their book, *Public opinion, democracy and market reform in Africa* (2005), Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi argue that many African political regimes are likely to remain unstable for extended periods or harden into low-quality forms of democracy, with only a few recognisable as consolidated democracies.

Political and economic reforms since the 1990s have, thus far, been tentative, partial and incomplete, leaving Africa with a myriad of hybrid regimes that mix old and new principles of organisation. They further argue that the incompleteness of the reform process means that African realities are not easily explained by classic democratic consolidation theories.

Further political reform is hampered by several contextual constraints that limit development. Because per capita income and basic literacy remain low,

an independent middle class has yet to emerge that can serve to push for democratisation and marketisation. In addition, the top stratum of political leaders remains wedded to a political economy in which wealth and power derive from personal control of the resources of the state. Incumbent elites are therefore predisposed to resist reforms. The development of democracy is also constrained by the slow development and implementation of procedures for public accountability (either horizontally or vertically) and the rule of law.

Moreover, citizens do not always clearly articulate their demands for political and economic reform, although popular attitudes towards progressive political reform in sub-Saharan Africa are being increasingly indicated. ■


Collette Schulz-Herzenberg

African futures

Viewpoint



Educate our children




Education expenditure as percentage of GDP

The World Education Forum's 'Dakar Framework for Action' conference declared that education is not only 'the key to sustainable development' but also 'a fundamental human right.' It

stated that by 2015, all children must have access to and be able to complete primary school. It also called for the eradication of gender inequalities in access to primary and secondary

education, as well as a 50% improvement in adult literacy levels by 2015.

However, the funding of education as a proportion of GDP has not risen as dramatically in Africa as is required by the sector, and instead seems set to remain constant for some time and even to decline slowly in about two decades from now. At this pace, it is unlikely that Africa will significantly change its rate of education in time to respond to and catch up with global expectations. 

Annie Chikwanha

Source: International Futures (IFs) base case version 6

The fate of the resource-rich Abeyi-region has created a lot of tension in the run-up to the referendum. This student from Abeyi believes it should be part of South Sudan.



Visionary leadership can avert war

Amid the dangers posed by the Southern Sudan independence referendum to be held on 9 January 2011, **Solomon A Dersso** believes there are many reasons why the Khartoum government should accept a negotiated settlement.

Depending on how Sudan negotiates the current political terrain, it stands to determine the future of peace and security not only for itself but for the entire region. All the signs show that in the context of the referendum, the potential for escalating violence in Sudan is very high. However, the situation is not entirely hopeless and there are strong incentives and opportunities for both North and South to avoid a return to war.

With visionary Sudanese leadership and active and coordinated international engagement, the dangers of another war in a region that has already endured more than its share can be changed into positive opportunities, firstly for Sudan and eventually for the region as a whole.

In terms of the potential for the eruption of violent conflict, the situation in various parts of Sudan is no doubt alarming. From the perspective of the

North and the South, there are at least three broad issues that have the potential to draw the area into violent conflict.

The consequences of secession

The first issue is the referendum and the likelihood of the separation of the South. As far as the South is concerned, the referendum going ahead as scheduled on 9 January 2011 is, to use Southern Sudan president Salva Kiir's words, 'sacrosanct and non-negotiable'. Many in the South see the referendum as a grand occasion for affirming the freedom, equality and dignity for which so many have laid down their lives. Not holding the referendum on time is therefore not an option. It would present a fatal legitimacy deficit for the newly elected government of Salva Kiir.

For Northern Sudan, particularly for the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and its leadership, the referendum and, most importantly, the strong prospect of secession by the

South, may deal a serious blow to their grip on power.

Given that the North derives a huge percentage of its revenue from oil, separation may lead to a massive reduction in revenue. The NCP government may also face serious legitimacy problems for its failure to avoid secession and divisions may erupt within the NCP structures. There are fears that in such a context, fundamentalist groups may rise to prominence and attempt to take over power.

Additionally, in the North there are fears that the referendum in the South may open a Pandora's box prompting other parts of Sudan, including Darfur, to claim more rights, including self-determination. Historically Darfur has the strongest claim to separate statehood, having been incorporated into Sudan only in 1916.

Currently only a small and radical minority have openly proposed that Darfur should secede from Sudan, but experts have pointed out that in the context of Southern secession, this number is sure to grow.

Given the high level of mistrust between the North and the South, the potential for disagreement over the outcome of the referendum is serious. Should the outcome be contested, there is likely to follow a unilateral declaration of independence by the South, to which the North may retaliate by attacking the South, thereby triggering a return to war.

Who belongs where?

Second, tensions are also high over final-status issues. If the South does decide to secede, and if such secession is to be orderly, the North and the South will face the Herculean task of resolving a number of post-referendum issues.

Key issues include the demarcation of the North-South border, the citizenship status of Southerners in the North and Northerners in the South, the division of national assets and debts, the status

A return to war would inevitably lead to the disruption of the oil industry and would bring about economic collapse in both the North and the South

of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the North and the National Congress Party (NCP) in the South, a formula for dividing oil revenues, the position of the South on the Nile water agreement, and mutually acceptable arrangements for pastoralist groups to move North and South across their common border.

Volatile territories

Third, the fate of the three volatile, resource-rich and highly militarised border territories of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile is also critical, although it has not received as much media attention. According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the central government of Sudan and the SPLM in 2005, residents of Abyei will cast separate ballots on the same day as the Southern Sudan independence referendum. The CPA further stipulates that residents of Abyei are members of the Ngok Dinka community. The CPA, however, leaves the determination of residency criteria to the Abyei Referendum Commission. As the time for the referendum approaches, the heavily armed Missiriya tribe, who side with the government of Sudan, are threatening that to fight if they are not allowed to vote on the future of Abyei.

With respect to the Missiriya and other nomadic people, the CPA merely provides that they have traditional rights to graze cattle and move seasonally across the territory of Abyei.

The negotiations and the continuing

stalemate between the North and the South over Abyei means that Abyei might not be able to hold its separate referendum as envisaged.

Vested interests: the case for peace

While the potential for war between the South and the North is high, it is not inevitable. There is also the potential for a peaceful divorce. As Andrew Natsios, the former US special envoy to Sudan observed, both North and South have a lot to lose from returning to war. Most importantly, such a war will bring about economic collapse in both Khartoum and Juba. While it will likely further weaken the North and trigger potentially uncontrollable political and ideological divisions, it will also deepen the humanitarian crisis in the South.

Both the North and the South are bound by mutual dependence, at least in the short to medium term. About 80% of Sudan's reserves and production are in Southern Sudan, while the infrastructure for exploiting the oil runs through the North. Both sides are highly dependent on the oil industry. Over 60% of the revenue of Khartoum and a staggering 98% of Juba's income come from oil. A return to war would inevitably lead to the disruption of the oil industry and bring about economic collapse in both the North and the South. Neither side dares to risk incurring such a devastating cost and bleak future.

Given the high level of vested interests over the border areas for both local communities and the two governments, there are strong incentives on both sides to achieve a negotiated settlement. This will allow the communities and the local authorities to jointly share the resources and establish secured arrangements for continuing cross-border movements. The proposed annexation of Abyei to Southern Sudan without a referendum with guarantees to the economic interests of the Khartoum government

and to the historical rights of Missiriya pastoralists, signifies the potential for such innovative compromises.

Normalisation of relations with the West, particularly the US, also offers further incentive to achieve a negotiated settlement, especially for the NCP government. If Khartoum abides by the result of the referendum, the United States will begin to lift restrictions on non-oil trade and investment. Upon the fulfilment of the CPA and resolution of the Darfur conflict, Washington will move to lift sanctions, remove Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and ultimately restore full diplomatic relations. In September 2010, the Obama administration already dispatched Special Envoy Scott Gration to the region to offer such incentives to the government in Khartoum.

Another opportunity for a peaceful divorce is negotiation over Sudan's

In the North there are fears that the referendum in the South may open a Pandora's box prompting other parts of Sudan, including Darfur, to claim more rights, including self-determination.

debt. Sudan's current debt stands around US\$38 billion. In return for Khartoum's acceptance of the outcome of the referendum, the South may agree to assume large portion of this debt, for which it may subsequently secure debt forgiveness from Sudan's creditors.

Both the North and the South also host significant portions of each other's people in their respective territories. Southerners (alongside Darfurians) are a large part of the workforce in Khartoum. Given the high cost of labour

in Khartoum, it may not be possible to easily replace such a workforce. Many families in the South also depend on remittances that they receive from their family members in the North.

Ultimately, whether the scale will tip in favour of the potentials for war or the opportunities for negotiated settlement will depend on Sudanese. With good will, a decisive leadership capable of taking decisions based on rational calculation of costs and benefits rather than emotions and blind nationalism on both sides of the divide is likely to reach an acceptable compromise.


Given that the international community, particularly the AU, the US, and the UN, can ill afford another war in a very troubled region, they also have the incentive to play an active and coordinated role in helping the parties to realise that they all stand to lose more through war than in a compromise solution. ■



Students from Abyei demonstrate outside the South Sudan coordinator's office against the delay of the region's referendum.

Sudan

Averting war



As Southern Sudan's independence referendum on 9 January 2011 approaches, there are increasing reports that the government of Sudan and its regional counterpart, the government of Southern Sudan, are getting armed and ready for war. **Festus B Aboagye** asks if the AU policy strategy of non-indifference will be able to rise to the occasion.

AP Photo/Abd Raouf

Referendum a test for the African Union

The drums of war are beating louder and louder in Sudan as the time for the historic self-determination referendum draws closer.

The possibility of another war in Sudan poses perhaps the biggest challenge to the newly established institutions and norm-building around the AU's African Peace and Security Council (APSA). The challenge faced by these institutions is to find and apply as many effective, pragmatic ways as possible to help bring Sudan back from the brink of another war.

First, the AU must be challenged to employ all its pre-emptive political and diplomatic wits, informed by its new security policy doctrine of non-indifference to war and conflict. It ought to put to effective and timely use the institutions it has built as part of the APSA. In this case, the Panel of the Wise, hitherto having focused its efforts on policy-setting, must be employed to deliver a pre-emptive peace to Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa, which has become notorious for inter-state and intrastate wars and conflicts.

In turn, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) should also realise that Africa and the rest of the world will expect it, this time around, to deliver beyond the meetings and communiqués – about 250 in mid-October 2010 – that it has held and issued so far.

The PSC cannot continue with the same palpably cautious approach in the establishment and operation of the African Standby Force (ASF). Given media reports that the government of Sudan (GoS) and its regional counterpart, the government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) are getting armed and ready

for war, another North-South conflict in Sudan will most certainly result in 'war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity', provided for in article 4(h) of the 2000 AU Constitutive Act.

Pursuant to the constitutional provision on 'the right of the Union to intervene in a member state' in such grave circumstances, the possibility of another North-South war in Sudan presents a rare and historic opportunity for the Council to authorise the pre-emptive deployment of the ASF with a robust mandate to prevent war.

AU intervention may resound with the policy stance of finding African solutions to African problems

In this regard, until the outcome of the referendum favours independence, there should be no legal arguments that the GoSS remains a regional government with no sovereign jurisdiction or the right 'to request intervention from the Union' provided for in article 4(j) of the AU Constitution. The GoSS will have the right, ex-post factor after an outbreak of war and following a vote for independence. But it will be too late then to stop a war that both sides appear to have been preparing for since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, in accordance with the perceived wisdom that in order to have peace you must prepare for war.

The employment of these intervention tools may resound with the policy stance of 'finding African solutions to African

problems'. It is not so certain whether they will be the only appropriate tools and sufficient in delivering pre-emptive peace in Sudan. Given the likely impact of such a war on regional and international security, other appropriate intervention tools, such as those that can be deployed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) may be called for.

In the final analysis, the UNSC remains the body with ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and security, a right and a responsibility that the UNSC has guarded jealously. Even so, it has not always been as responsive as it ought to have been, in preventing and/or resolving conflicts such as those in Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan's Darfur, to name but a few. This notwithstanding, the UNSC has hitherto been averse to calls by the AU for the UN to fully support all peace support interventions that it undertakes, the AU argument being that such interventions are undertaken on behalf of the UNSC.

The continued lack of consensus between the two unequal partners has, among other things, contributed to the incidence of hybrid operations in Africa, a classical example of this being the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) since 2007. While the hybrid approach to intervention was welcomed in some policy and research communities, the general view now seems to be that it may not be the best policy option in resolving complex regional conflicts.

Beyond the symbolic visit of the UNSC to the region in October 2010, this is perhaps one reason why the UN Security Council and the US (as one of its key permanent members) have

Sudan referendum

Averting war

been emphasising the enlargement of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the establishment of a buffer zone to separate the opposing forces in the North and South.

This projected operation has been greeted with scorn by the GoS, whose officials have argued that in the first place, the GoSS as a regional government had no mandate to invite the UNSC to play this role. One might tend to agree with the GoS. The UNSC could have expounded the same deployment merely as a revision of the concept of operations of UNMIS, to order the redeployment and concentration of the Mission's forces in the North

on the common border. The UNSC could have replicated the example in the revision of the mandate and configuration of its mission in the DRC, the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC), which since mid-July 2010 has been redesignated the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), and given a strong mandate to focus on the protection of civilians, using force if needed.

It is pertinent, though, that the head of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Alain Le Roy, has sought to downplay international expectations about this projected deployment. And he may be right,

because the UN has not been able to meet expectations of quick reversals in security situations in conflict countries and mission with non-permissive environments, including in Darfur.

What option do all these dilemmas leave the AU, the UN and the international community? While it may be difficult to provide any clarity on such an option with certainty, one may venture a few policy factors. First, the AU should come out of its mode of 'silent diplomacy' and share its perspectives and actions with the Sudanese and African publics, and with the international community. Second, the UN should desist from unilateral approaches and

Interview

Liesl Louw-Vaudran speaks to **Dr Francis Deng**, special representative of the UN secretary-general for the prevention of genocide and author of the recent book *Sudan at the Brink, Self-determination and National Unity*.

Q: You speak a lot about tolerance and national reconciliation in Sudan. But given the predictions ahead of the 9 January referendum, is there still a chance for unity?

A: Everybody agrees now that the idea of making unity attractive, as stipulated in the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement), has not been realised, and that in all probability the South will vote for independence.

Q: There is increasing talk of a violent separation?

A: What is important is that the vote for independence should not be viewed with hostility by the North, because even if the South were to become independent, unless arrangements are made so that the process is accepted, harmonious and peaceful, and the result is accepted not only by northern Sudan but by Africa and the international community, partitioning could become violent.

I am reminded of the way in which India was divided between India and Pakistan. People were very bitter about the partitioning and there was a lot of violence.

Q: How can this be avoided?

A: That's why I'm emphasising that separation and unity are degrees of relationships that are ongoing, and the question is whether they should be made peaceful and stronger, or whether they will be seen as a kind of gesture of hostility that can provoke violence.

Besides, I'm saying that we have focused very much on what divides in a country with a lot that unites but that people have not been open to. And so, now that the war is over and the tensions are somewhat easing, I'm encouraging people to ask if we can begin to look more constructively and look at what unites. And build on that in fostering good relations between the

two countries, should the South become independent.

Q: What about those from other regions of the country?

A: There are people in the North who have become increasingly identified with the Southern vision for the country, and who feel that their plight is not that different from the plight of the South, or perhaps only different in degree. Those people will continue to have a special relationship with the South and therefore link the South with the North.

Q: You talk about John Garang's vision of transforming both the South and the North. Do you think if he was still alive today, things might have been different?

A: I am not the only one who thinks so. I think there is a broadly shared vision that Garang was a Sudanese with a genuinely national vision. But transcending even the Sudanese vision, he was an Africanist. He had a continent-wide vision. Wherever I go, leaders say his death was not only a loss to the Sudan, but a loss to Africa. 📍

***Listen to a podcast of the full interview on www.the-african.org.**



A key player to ensure peace prevails in Sudan: President Omar al-Bashir gestures to army soldiers during a pledge of allegiance rally for the military in Khartoum.

learn to work in close harmony with the AU as the key regional stakeholder. Third, to the extent possible, the two organisations should avoid a hybrid peace support operations approach, which only means lack of broad and sufficient consensus on a common, appropriate solution to the threat of a North-South war.

Fourth, given the UN presence in Southern Sudan, any projected operations to contain the outbreak of a North-South war should be based on enhancing the mandate of UNMIS to focus on security, as well as enhancing the force level and capabilities of that force.

Fifth, the AU should consider the deployment of the ASF not as part of an expanded, enhanced UNMIS, but as a separate operational entity on the north of the common border, especially in the contested regions of Abyei and West Blue Nile.

Sixth, the vehement dispute over the boundaries of the oil-rich Abyei region, strategically located between North-South Sudan, as well as the status of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in central Sudan, should not be downplayed. Even if the issue of Abyei, for instance, was not clearly examined by

the signatories of the CPA, that may not be the only cogent reason for delaying the referendum in the South. The hurdles over the boundaries of the disputed Abyei region, as well as the dilemma of the Arab nomads, such as the Misseriya, who cannot vote in the referendum on whether Abyei becomes part of the North-South, call for statesmanship and not brinkmanship. The disputes over the status of the transitional regions of South Kordofan and West Blue Nile also demand serious, urgent all-inclusive negotiations to resolve the impasse. Perhaps, in a worst-case scenario, lessons could be learned from the disputed border spots on the Egypt-Sudan border, whose demarcation has remained unresolved since 1956.

Finally, after all is said and done, and after war has hopefully been averted or contained in Southern Sudan, the AU should take note that the incidence of many internecine post-Cold War conflicts appears to question the assumption that Africa's nation-building project is coterminous with the independence of its former territories from colonial rule. Difficult as it may be, the AU should accept the assumption, which makes a lot of political sense, that the incidence of such devastating conflicts appears to

flaw the unqualified adherence to the principle of *Uti possidetis juris*.

In the African context, this principle seeks to ensure the inviolability of the frontiers of independent states following their colonisation. However, in international law, the principle seeks to ensure that such frontiers follow the original boundaries of the old colonial territories from which they emerged. It does not necessarily imply that the peoples who were arbitrarily lumped together in such states have no right of self-determination under certain other conditions, such as the provisions of the CPA.

As it did in the aftermath of the Cold War, it may be time for the AU to take a hard look at the interpretation and applicability of this principle – one that its political leadership has failed to judiciously uphold through good governance, respect for human rights, the rule of law and equitable socio-economic development that contribute to nation building, and not the all-rampant tendency towards the exploitation of ethnic identities.

With recent conflict lessons from Somalia, the DRC and Sudan-Darfur, among others, the AU, the UN and the rest of the international community should prepare for the worst, by being more proactive in finding an appropriate, effective solution to the possible outbreak of Anyanya III, a third North-South war. To do otherwise would be to be oblivious to the hard lessons of the history of violent armed conflicts, especially within Africa.

In conclusion, the AU, Africa and Sudan should learn lessons from Kosovo's breakaway from Serbia, and especially bear in mind the landmark ruling of the International Court of Justice that Kosovo 'did not violate international law' by unilaterally breaking away from Serbia. They should be seen to be adhering to international rule of law. ■

50 years of independence

Nigeria



Will his luck run out? The writer describes President Goodluck Jonathan, candidate in the 2011 elections, as 'a bland academic from the troubled Niger Delta and a Christian, far removed from Nigeria's charmed ruling circle'.

A 'catastrophic' past, but potential for a bright future?

In Lorraine Hansberry's 1959 play *A Raisin in the Sun* – the first play by a black woman to be produced on Broadway – Beneatha, a young African-American woman, waspishly takes her earnest Nigerian college boyfriend Joseph Asagai to task. He wants her to get a medical degree and move to Africa with him to fight for its independence. 'You think you can patch up the world. Cure the Great Sore of Colonialism with the "Penicillin of Independence?"' she asks him. 'So what happens after this great therapeutic cure? Have you considered all those crooks and thieves and just plain idiots who will come to power to steal and plunder the same as before, only now they will be

As Nigeria celebrates 50 years of independence and looks forward to new presidential elections in 2011, **Lansana Gberie** reports that the country is still plagued by huge political and economic challenges.

black and do it in the name of the new independence?'

Nigeria gained self-rule in 1960, less than a year after the play's first performance. At the time the young Wole Soyinka, who would become Africa's first winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, was in England, the land of the European colonialists who had subjugated Nigeria. In his passionate and somewhat rambling 2006 memoir, *You Must Set Forth at Dawn*, Soyinka writes that it was clear from the beginning that the new leaders of independent Nigeria were 'a bunch of sleazy rogues who would squander the country's potential, ensuring that self-rule would become a nightmare.'

Nigeria celebrated the 50th anniversary of its independence in October 2010. It has reached middle age, and in 2011 it will hold what promises to be yet another problematic election. The country is, at least nominally, the fourth largest democracy in the world, and the eighth largest producer of crude oil. Nigeria's primacy in many other matters in Africa – cultural, diplomatic, and the sheer size of its population (one in four Africans is Nigerian, many of them educated and highly talented) – is undisputed. The country has never shied away from throwing its military and diplomatic weight around in Africa: it was a very influential driver of the campaign against apartheid in South Africa; led peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s; and has been spearheading the calls for a permanent Security Council seat for Africa, as well as for reparations to Africa for the crimes of the Atlantic.

Yet Nigeria's internal politics appear to be its downfall. It is typical of the idiosyncratic nature of Nigerian democracy that even the (very flawed) 1999 elections that ushered in its current democratic settlement – what Nigerians melodramatically like to call the 'Fourth Republic' – were won by a former military strongman, Olusegun Obasanjo, who, although of Yoruba descent, has always had the approval of the northern elite. This is partly because he is credited with devising the strategy that led to the defeat of Biafra. Obasanjo also benefitted from another, purely negative, factor connected to his ethnicity: recalling the 1993 election that was annulled after having been indisputably won by fellow Yoruba Moshood Abiola, the powerful northern elite decided that an acceptable Yoruba should at last be given power. Out of this deal was percolated the unwritten agreement that after Obasanjo, a northerner would rule for a full two terms before consideration could be given to other ethnic groups.

In the event, Obasanjo's successor, Umaru Yar'Adua – a northerner who was elected in massively rigged polls in 2007 (in which Obasanjo fraudulently prevented many candidates from contesting and there were a reported 700 incidents of election-related violence, including kidnapping) – died in office on 5 May 2010 after a prolonged illness.

This abrupt termination of the inchoate power-sharing arrangement between the largely Muslim north and the mainly Christian south will almost certainly lead to electoral violence.

That this election – which marked the first time since Nigeria's independence that political leadership changed hands from one civilian to another – could be conducted in such a shabby way portended ill for the country. What was more, since Nigeria has 36 states, 774 local government authorities, and an electorate of over 60 million voters, the final turnout (according to the rigged results) of fewer than 35 million votes was uninspiring.

As Nigeria heads once again towards elections, current anxieties derive largely from the fact that while in hospital outside the country for a terminal kidney condition, Yar'Adua failed to comply with his constitutional requirement to hand over executive authority to his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan. Jonathan, a bland academic from the troubled Niger Delta region and a Christian, is as far removed from Nigeria's charmed ruling circle as anyone could be, but his first name

seems to have defined his career so far. In February 2010, the National Assembly, acting extra-constitutionally, passed a resolution that declared him 'acting president'. When Yar'Adua died a few months later, Jonathan became the substantive president. Because he lacked a political base and he is not a northerner, he was expected merely to serve out Yar'Adua's term and then give way to a northern candidate. Instead, he repudiated the supposed elite consensus and declared in September that he would be contesting the presidency for his own term.

This leaves the Nigerian political sphere dangerously wide open and the outcome seriously unpredictable. Assuming for a moment that Jonathan's good luck does not hold this time around (he is unlikely to win without outright rigging), this abrupt termination of the inchoate power-sharing arrangement between the largely Muslim north and the mainly Christian south will almost certainly lead to post-election sectarian violence, and possibly a coup – and the state will likely be paralysed if Jonathan does emerge as winner.

Perhaps anticipating this, shortly before announcing the timetable for the elections, Jonathan dropped a bombshell: he sacked most of the country's senior military and police officers, and (for the first time since the civil war ended 40 years ago) appointed an Ibo, Major General O Azubuike Ihejirika, as head of the army. This may seem like a very safe bet indeed, except that northerners still dominate both the army and police.

There has already been at least one dramatically ominous sign of what may happen during and after the elections. On 1 October, as the country celebrated its 50th anniversary of freedom, car bombs were detonated in the capital, Abuja, killing about ten people. Henry Okah, a leader of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a militant group that has tended to

50 years of independence

Nigeria



A supporter of former military dictator Ibrahim Babangida during a campaign rally to kick off his bid for president, in Abuja. The head of the Electoral Commission, Attahiru Jega, was imprisoned by Babangida when the latter was president.

besmirch the legitimate grievances of the Niger people by its use of terror tactics, including kidnapping and murder – was arrested in South Africa, where he has been resident for several years, and charged with masterminding the attacks.

Shortly thereafter, asserting that the rebels from his Niger Delta home region were not wholly responsible for the twin bomb attacks, Jonathan had Raymond Dokpesi, the head of the presidential campaign of Ibrahim Babangida (a northerner), arrested. Babangida, who annulled the 1993 polls during his former military leadership, had wanted to contest the elections that brought Obasanjo to power, but by a tacit understanding – this is the Nigerian legend – he backed down and supported Obasanjo. He is famously known in Nigerian politics as being highly manipulative and given to base tactics; ‘the Maradona of Nigerian politics’. The stakes, in other words, couldn’t be higher.

Babangida is challenging Jonathan for the presidential candidacy of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) that, with Yar’Adua at the head, had won 69.82% of the votes in 2007. Any candidate leading it will likely win the polls, initially scheduled for 22 January 2011. The other parties that contested the 2007 elections were the All Nigeria People’s

As Nigeria celebrated its golden jubilee, reports suggested a country facing a meltdown

Party (ANPP) under another former military leader, the austere Muhammadu Buharu (who won 18.72% of the votes in 2007 and will also be contesting next year’s polls); the Action Congress (AC) under Atuku Abubakar, Obasanjo’s vice president with whom he messily fell out (Atiku polled 7.47% of the votes; he is also likely to contest in 2011), and 15 other less significant parties.


The National Electoral Commission, however, is in a mess. In August, Jonathan appointed the respected academic, Vice Chancellor Attahiru Jega of Bayero University, to head it. But the commission has been sluggish in revamping the voter registration list, which critics claim is wholly inadequate as it does not reflect Nigeria’s population of at least 150 million people and is allegedly filled with the names of dead people and the under-aged. This means that, in all likelihood, the elections will

be postponed. Jega, moreover, was imprisoned by Babangida while the latter was president, though the new Electoral Commission has said that this will not affect his conduct of the polls even if Babangida is on the ballot.

Outsiders – including the UN, ECOWAS, AU and other international players – will have a very limited, or no, role in the elections: Nigeria pays for its own elections and it does not need, or even welcome, foreign input in the process. For Nigerians, this is a mixed blessing. It enhances the country’s sense of independence and self-worth, but it also means that ordinary Nigerians are at the mercy of the powerful state political machine, which often acts not in their interest but in the interest of sectarian forces.

As Nigeria celebrated its golden jubilee, reports suggested a country facing a meltdown: factories were boarding up as a result of the sporadic power supply (this in a nation that exports so much crude oil), unemployment was soaring, and cholera was ravaging the population.

‘Is it true when commentators say that Nigeria is blessed with potentials?’ asked Wole Soyinka as the country celebrated its 50th anniversary. ‘That the right of staying together as a country is worth celebrating? But I find this embarrassing. I have raised the questions, what and when is a nation? We should find genuine need for celebration. There is a gap between potentials and fulfilment.’

That gap – or to iterate another Soyinka metaphor, that ‘open sore’ – needs to be urgently closed. In middle age, Nigeria ought to adapt Oscar Wilde and say that the waste of the past 50 years has been a mistake, but to waste the next 50 will be sheer carelessness. It is a tragedy indeed that perhaps the most benign criticism of the country is to say that its future – barring major catastrophe – still has the potential to remain bright. 



Ambassador Olusegun Akinsanya

Africa's climate change discourse **and the bumpy road to Cancun**

The key players in the ongoing climate change negotiations converged in Addis Ababa from 10-15 October 2010 to discuss the range of issues around climate change and sustainable development that have an impact on Africa.

The platform was the Seventh African Development Forum (ADF-VII), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)'s forum for discussing thematic issues of critical importance on the socio-economic agenda of the continent.

As Africa's negotiators prepare for COP16 in Cancun, Mexico, the Forum reviewed the commitments and pledges made at COP15 in Copenhagen in December 2009 and the failure so far of the developed countries to honor those commitments. The sessions were frank and action oriented, with a call on the developed countries – the greater producers of greenhouse gas emissions – to honor the financial pledges they made in Copenhagen to provide developing countries with climate change aid to the tune of \$30 billion between 2010 and 2012, and \$100 billion annually from 2020, to meet climate change mitigation and adaptation challenges.

The high-level session on leadership and governance moderated by Achim Steiner, UN Under-Secretary-General and UNEP Executive Director, gave leaders the opportunity to speak about what the developed countries should do to alleviate the suffering brought about by the negative impacts of climate change. The point was made repeatedly that decisive action must be taken to deliver on the commitments promised at Copenhagen.

AU Commission chairperson Dr Jean

Ping urged Africa to speak with one voice and to diffuse any divisive and centrifugal forces working against the interest of Africa. Abdoulie Janneh, UN Under-Secretary-General and executive secretary of the ECA, stressed the need for the developed nations to honor their pledges as a practical way of 'building trust, compromise and enhanced collaborative action in the ongoing engagement between developed and developing countries.'

Dr Donald Kaberuka, the African Development Bank president, spoke of the inter-generational dimensions of climate change and their impact on Africa's development, stressing that a paradigm shift by the developed nations was desirable to respond to the socioeconomic challenges of the continent.

Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of Ethiopia and Africa's spokesperson in the global negotiations, was his vintage self. He spoke frankly and unequivocally, calling for 'carbon justice' and the need for developed countries to help alleviate the suffering of the peoples of Africa arising from poverty and underdevelopment, exacerbated by the negative effects of climate change on their lives. In his contribution, Festus Mogae, former president of Botswana and now UN special envoy on climate change, urged African countries to stick to the climate change negotiations and to speak with one voice.

Is Africa ready for Cancun? And does the political will now exist among the

developed countries to honor their Copenhagen commitments; to shift from rigidities to flexible postures in response to the legitimate concerns of African countries? Although the ADF-VII touched upon all the thematic issues on the table for negotiations, legitimate concerns were still expressed on whether COP16 in Cancun would see a significant U-turn on positions that would make a difference to the lives of African peoples.

The need for African countries to speak with one voice and to build capacity to enhance their performance at the global negotiations was raised repeatedly. It is well known that other continents do have experts and researchers in relevant fields of climate change on their delegations, in order to boost their understanding of performance at the talks.

Unfortunately, many African countries do not follow that route, with capacity constraints and lack of in-depth knowledge of the issues remaining a great challenge. But where there is a will, there is a way, and as Dr Jean Ping said, 'Africa suffers most from problems that it has not created. Given that the continent is already suffering from severe effects of climate change, we must all urgently seek imaginative solutions and forge collective actions for the way forward.'

The Addis ADF-VII meeting has drawn the road map for Africa's collective action, but concerted efforts must be made to remove all roadblocks, for a smooth ride to Cancun and beyond. 

Activists shouldn't 'demobilise'

Surveying the situation on the continent, **William Gumede** argues that a more active role for civil society is essential for democracy and development in Africa.

Most African countries face the real danger of repeating the past 50 years of failure. If Africa is to reverse its decline and start to prosper in the coming 50 years, it is absolutely crucial that its civil society redefine itself to play a new, more interventionist role.

Given the grave crisis in African governance and the paucity of the current crop of political leaders, civil society may not only have to help co-govern, but also intervene in democratising ruling and opposition parties where possible. In other instances it should start new political parties.

Most African states lack the capacity to deliver even the most basic services. Civil society will have to help. American political scientist Elinor Ostrom has shown in a case study how in Brazil, the state and civil society, with the inclusion of local communities, co-operated on (and almost co-managed) safe-water projects. Harvard University's Robert Putnam has argued that democracy depends on 'norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement across the public-private divide'.

To boost the capacity of African states to deliver basic services, new reciprocal co-operative relationships will have to

be developed between the state and civil society – business, organised labour, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), and communities. In fact, a 'reciprocity' of engagement between state and society is crucial for both democracy and development in Africa. As an example, in the late the 1970s (until 1995), Mauritius set up a 'civic network' where civil society and community groups could engage with individual ministerial departments on any policy issue, to make policy formulation more participatory.

Reciprocal engagement between the state and civil society, social partners

Civil society organisations, like those participating in the The Right 2 Know Campaign are increasingly active in S.A. The writer believes if they can't effect change from within, they should rather leave the ruling party.



and communities will help not only tune the state to society's problems, but also make it potentially more responsive to effecting the necessary policy changes. Of course, such co-operation cannot take place until African governments are ring-fenced from opportunistic political, business or ethnic groups, and co-operation between the African state and civil society cannot in any case work if civil society is subservient to the state – as is the case in most post-independence African societies.

A synergy between the state, civil society and communities has been at the heart of successful transformative projects, not only in East Asian developmental states but also in their post-WW2 Western European counterparts.

Post-independence errors

At the time of African independence, the relationship between the liberation and independence movements on the one hand and civil society groups on the other (in countries where they had a significant presence) started, in most cases, in the wrong manner. This laid the foundation for some of Africa's poor post-independence performance on both democracy and development.

At independence, many liberation and independence movements argued that civil society – especially when it played a crucial part in ousting colonial or white-minority regimes – had now played its historic role and should be 'demobilised'. At independence, the new governments firmly put their stamp on civil society, which became seen as part of the state. Significant independent civil groups, such as trade unions and farmers groups, were often incorporated as wings of the new ruling party.

In 1977 in Angola, the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) incorporated and co-opted the main Angolan workers' union, the União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos.

In Frelimo, Mozambique, local 'civic', cultural and voluntary organisations were subsumed into the party. In Tanzania, trade unions that had actively campaigned against colonialism became subservient to the independence-movement-turned-government. In Namibia and Zimbabwe, independence movements in government kept civil society on a tight leash, and so on.

In other cases, ruling parties set up youth, women's, labour and other sections – all under the auspices of the party leadership. Liberation and independence movements saw the role of civil groups aligned with them as extensions of government that should play a role in supporting props to 'deliver' developmental services.

The lesson for Cosatu in South Africa is that if its attempts to democratise, renew and clean the ANC from within bear no fruit, because the party of liberation has become too captured by opportunists intent only on self-enrichment, it would be better to form a 'workers' party'

Silencing dissent

Liberation leaders in government often attack the remaining independent civil society or the press – even when politely critical – as not part of the 'people' but unpatriotic 'native assistants' of imperialists. Even in the civil groups that remained relatively independent, in the early years after independence activists were reluctant

to criticise party and state. Many of the remaining African civil groups survived by not partaking in anything to do with politics, almost the same way they survived colonial or white-minority governments.

At the heart of Africa's deep-seated problems is the fact that most ruling parties and even opposition parties are seen as irrelevant, out of touch and uncaring. There are several options. Civil society groups could attempt to take over the liberation or independence movements that are not yet rotten beyond change. This way they could try to democratise those parties from within, bringing in fresh leaders and more relevant policies, renewing the leadership starters, and making them more accountable, responsive and responsible. The Congress of South African Trade Unions is currently trying to make the ruling ANC more democratic from within.

When to break away

However, it is clear that most independence and liberation movements have become so autocratic that they would be impossible to reform from within. The only way to change an undemocratic political culture, if the African independence and liberation movements have become too ossified, is for the political movements to break – meaning that those serious about democracy within those movements actually break away to form new parties. In such instances, it would be better for African civil society groups – churches, grassroots community groups, trade unions – to band together and form new, more progressive, political parties. Where possible, younger members of the independence and liberation movements (who are genuine democrats) could join forces with civil society groups to form alternative political parties.

Coalitions of civil groups, consisting of trade unions, women's and student groups, churches, media and/or non-

50 Years of Independence

Civil society

governmental organisations, held together by common determination to remove an autocratic government, have on many occasions spectacularly removed autocratic liberation and independence movement governments.

Zim and Zambia

In 1991, in Zambia, people's power propelled Frederick Chiluba, then at the head of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and supported by the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, pro-democracy civil groups and churches, to power. In 1999, the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions, civil groups and dissident Zanu-PF leaders broke free from the ruling Zanu-PF and formed the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai won an election in 2008 that had been blatantly rigged by Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe, but not enough to prevent a run-off. Tsvangirai then withdrew from the run-off in protest against attacks on his supporters. Mugabe was declared the winner, although he was eventually pressurised by regional leaders to form a unity government with the MDC.

In Cape Verde in 1991, dissident groups broke away from the ruling liberation movement, the African Party for the Independence of Cape (PAIC) [originally the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC)], with the support of civil groups, to form the Movement for Democracy (MPD), which was eventually propelled to power in 1991.

In South Africa, civil society closely aligned to the liberation struggle saw community, trade unions, student, women's and civic groups in the 1980s unite under the umbrella of the United Democratic Front (UDF), to help the ANC push out the apartheid regime. In Mauritius when the party of independence, the Labour Party, turned autocratic, younger members of the

At independence, many liberation and independence movements argued that civil society – especially when it played a crucial part in ousting colonial or white-minority regimes – had now played its historic role and should be 'demobilised'

party, civil activists, trade unions and newspapers, rallied to oppose it. In 1969, out of this civil society opposition, they formed the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) political party, which appealed to the poor, the unemployed and the working class, on a radical programme to enhance democracy and a very clear and detailed economic programme for socialist change.

Repeating past mistakes

Sure enough, there have been many examples in Africa of new parties that have come to power on the back of civil groups and then quickly backslid and repeated the excesses of the independence and liberation movements they ousted. In government, the Chiluba group hardly differed in its failures from those of the regime of Kenneth Kaunda, the independence leader. In Zimbabwe's unity government, the MDC has proved something of a disappointment. In South Africa, the civil groups that were part of the ANC family has found it difficult to insert the UDF's more democratic internal political culture, its non-racialism and its inclusive approach, into the ANC. So there are obvious dangers. However, there are also many more opportunities.

In Mauritius the MMM, in coalition with the Mauritian Socialist Party (PSM), won the 1982 election. A year later, in 1983,

defectors from the MMM joined with the PSM to form the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM) and build a majority in coalition with the Mauritian Labour Party. However, the formation of the MMM did bring the breakdown of the staid Mauritian independence and liberation political system, and started the breakup of the older parties and the formation of new coalitions and new parties that changed Mauritius' post-independence political system. Importantly, the newly formed parties had to work to show they were responsive – and they could not afford the complacency of a typical African liberation movement that rests on the laurels of having brought independence. That in itself is some kind of success.

Lessons for SA

Although not spectacular in government, the MPD's rise to power in Cape Verde, did force the PAIGC, the party of liberation, to renew itself, both in leadership and relevant policies. The lesson for Cosatu in South Africa is that if its attempts to democratise, renew and clean the ANC from within bear no fruit because the party of liberation has become too captured by opportunists intent only on self-enrichment, it would be better to form a new 'workers' party'. Of course, there are warnings that such a workers' party could also backslide, like civil-society-backed African political parties elsewhere. However, the formation of a new civil-society-backed workers' party may at least break the complacency of the ANC – as was the case for the independence movements in Mauritius and Cape Verde – and force it to become more responsive, accountable and responsible in government. ■

William Gumede is author of the forthcoming book *The Democracy Gap: Africa's Wasted Years*.



The writer asks whether South Africa will now better articulate its positions at the UN Security Council compared to its previous term.

'Giants' to push for **Africa's** interests at the UN

In 2011, both South Africa and Nigeria will have non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council. **Issaka K Souaré** looks at their chances of making a difference from within.

On 12 October 2010, an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly elected South Africa for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council to serve a two-year term starting in January 2011. Germany, India, Portugal and Colombia were also elected in the same capacity as non-permanent members. South

Africa's first ever and most recent term in the Council was in 2007/2008. The UN Charter does not allow for the immediate re-election of non-permanent members.

In the course of the first year of this new term, Pretoria will be in the good company of Nigeria, India and Brazil. This means that 2011 will make

the Security Council host to most of the great powers and the strongest of emerging ones in the world. With Nigeria present until the end of 2011, it will also be the first time these two African 'giants' sit together on the Council. But what does all this mean for South Africa in particular, and for Africa as a whole?

Perhaps the best starting point for this analysis is to look back at the country's record during its first term. Some observers would appear to reduce South Africa's performance in this period to two issues: its opposition to a Council resolution on the human rights violations in Myanmar (also known as Burma), and its objection to calls for the Council to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe.

To understand these issues fully, they need to be placed in the proper context. It is worth noting that the years 2007 and 2008 were, like most other years, full of activities at the Security Council. In 2007, for example, the Council passed a total of 60 resolutions, while in 2008 it passed 65. These resolutions concerned various issues from around the world. Regarding the South African position on Myanmar, the draft resolution on that country was put to vote on 12 January 2007, less than two weeks after South Africa joined the Council. It came at a time when the UN Secretary-General had recently appointed Ibrahim Gambari as his personal envoy to engage in dialogue with the authorities in Myanmar.

It would appear that other UN organs, particularly the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council, were also considering the matter, given that issues were raised relating to human rights and socio-economic problems in the country. According to Security Council records of the meeting (S/PV.5619), South Africa joined hands with China and Russia in opposing the UK-sponsored draft resolution for three main reasons. These included the argument that the Human Rights Council was a more appropriate forum to deal with the problem than the Security Council, and that passing the resolution might undermine the good offices of Gambari.

Perhaps it should be noted that when the same issue was considered by the

General Assembly in December 2007, South Africa merely abstained from voting, while countries such as India opposed it. South Africa did the same the following year in the company of countries like Mali, Tanzania, Zambia and even Ghana, which had supported the draft resolution in the Council the previous year.

With regard to Zimbabwe, South Africa was directly involved in this matter. Its president, Thabo Mbeki, was engaged in mediating between the Zimbabwean parties and therefore the opposition to Security Council involvement was justified by a concern that the sanctions being proposed did not constitute a better alternative to the mediation process. That mediation process was being criticised, but ironically, the relative stability now seen in Zimbabwe is largely due to that mediation process.

South Africa could be expected to join forces with Nigeria and Gabon to press for more African issues at the Council


Beyond these two cases, South Africa's first term in the Council brought many African issues to the fore of the UN agenda. One important example is the push for more UN involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa in support of the African Union. It is true that the Security Council did not endorse the proposal, for understandable reasons, but the efforts made by Pretoria in pushing for that project are the kind of endeavours expected from a country representing the interests of a region.

That was then: positive to some, negative or mixed to others. But what

can one expect this time around? South Africa could be expected to join forces with Nigeria and Gabon to press for more African issues at the Council and to lobby for them. Perhaps it will better articulate its positions this time around. Perhaps it will benefit from the fact that Mbeki is no longer the president, for it would appear that some charged the country with their perception of its leader. Zuma's diplomacy on Zimbabwe is not louder than that of Mbeki, but the criticism is now quiet.

But two caveats should be added here. First, sitting on the Security Council does not necessarily mean that a country or a group of countries can force the UN to do something that the majority of its members, particularly powerful ones in the Council, do not support.

The second caveat is that while the UN is the primary responsible body for international peace and security, it may not be forced nor is it necessary for it to deal with all issues in Africa. The ongoing Somalia imbroglio is a case in point. While it will be good if the UN contributes more to the search for a solution to the problems of that country, it does not appear that Africa has exhausted all its efforts in that regard. Indeed the recent appointment of former Ghanaian leader, Jerry John Rawlings as the personal envoy of the chairperson of the AU Commission to Somalia, might be the result of a realisation of this fact on the part of the AU Commission. With his experience and personality, Rawlings may be able to push for what most experts have been suggesting: a dual political and military process, inclusive in the former, and well defined and supported in the latter.

It is through such an approach of complementarity, in which the UN only supplements the efforts of the AU, that African membership in the UN Security Council and the UN at large would be the most fruitful for the continent. 

Rethinking business unusual

Steyn Heckroodt

Almost two years ago, I witnessed the head office of the Singaporean oil firm Petrodar going up in front of my eyes, in the heart of Khartoum, in Northern Sudan.

The Chinese-built structure was being assembled, Lego-style, with components taken from numerous cargo vessel containers on the construction site. I found out that these buildings were being put together ahead of time, then taken apart, containerised and shipped to where they needed to be assembled.

At a time when General Motors was swirling down the drain of debt, incapable of resurrecting itself, Hyundai was putting up a production plant in Sudan with a view to supplying the whole of Eastern Africa. Sudan borders nine other African countries and has a Red Sea port.

So while the West is pondering

The very same companies that today are not competing on African soil will tomorrow cite the civil wars, the Chinese 'invasion', custom delays, and numerous other realities as the reasons why they are not doing business in Africa

another round of sanctions, identifying why it shouldn't invest in that region, other nations are doing business unusual, as usual. The very same companies that today are not competing on African soil will tomorrow cite the civil wars, the Chinese 'invasion', custom delays, and numerous other realities as the reasons why they are not doing business in Africa.

Doing business in Africa is not about perception, but about real opportunities. Perceptions can be an enabler or barrier to doing business on the continent. Africa is not going to change other people's perceptions for business; it is business that needs to change itself, by getting its hands dirty and focusing on how to be competitive as opposed to critical.

In almost 20 years as an international business consultant, from Hong Kong to Madrid, from Khartoum to Accra, I have come to learn that the secret to business does not lie in a single continent, and nor does any particular continent pose exceptional, insurmountable challenges. The possibility of doing business lies in people, not in a continent or even a country. It takes place between the people who provide regional access and local presence, and you, the business that wants to expand into that region.

Building business models that can react fast to an ever-changing business environment is a way of placing your future in your hands.

First, research the market. Different countries on a continent have different

cultures and needs. Determine the product or service you want to supply to your envisaged market by researching that market, not by assuming that it wants and needs whatever you currently have on offer. Critically audit your route to the market. Many African countries do not have the infrastructure and supply-chain necessities for you to implement typical supply-chain efficiencies – and this is exactly where the opportunities lie (take Petrodar's Lego-style building as an example).

Large parts of Africa trade on the streets, not in supermarkets, so granulise your milks, juices and cold drinks and sell them on the thousands, if not millions, of street corners across the continent. Work differently with your cash flows. There is no point in complaining about the lack of proper banking systems; make use of what there is. If this means money up front and brown paper bags as opposed to electronic transfers, then so be it. By the same token, development in the industries of banking and technology has grown substantially since the 1980s.

A lesson on doing business in Africa: No business has ever failed and withdrawn without someone else stepping into that gap. If it failed it is because its competition rolled with the punches more competitively than it could. ■

Steyn Heckroodt is director of Nyansa Africa, a consultancy based in Ghana.

The EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is subject to review that will end in 2012. It appears that this review will lead to significant changes to the governance of European fishing in African waters. So far, African governments have not engaged in this review, which is disappointing. Mooted reforms to the CFP represent opportunities to make positive changes to the governance of commercial fisheries on the continent, particularly on improving transparency and combating corruption. It is important that African stakeholders consider not only the benefits of these reforms, but also the issues that are influencing policy debates in Europe.

Historically the EU has been an important player in Africa's commercial fisheries, although this status may be dwindling due to decreasing fishing potential and the apparent dominance of Asian fishing boats. For decades the European Commission (EC) has negotiated access to African waters on behalf of the European distant-water fishing fleet, the majority of which is owned by Spanish companies. Since the first fishing access agreement was signed between the EC and Senegal in 1979, the EC has had fisheries agreements with over 20 different African countries. It now has active agreements, mostly for tuna fishing, with 17 African coastal and island states, with new agreements on the horizon for East Africa. In 2002, these access agreements were reinvented as Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs). Part of the payment given to African states for access to their waters was set aside for supporting capacity building and reform in the domestic fisheries sector.

EU fisheries agreements are controversial. They have been blamed for overfishing and targeting fish stocks that are needed by local fishermen. The negotiation of fisheries agreements has

Stop 'secret' fishing agreements

Access to African waters by European fishing fleets is the subject of much controversy. **Andre Standing** looks at the review of the European Union's fisheries policy and its implications for Africa.

lacked transparency, with key information on the implementation and performance of FPAs being kept secret. It is also alleged that European boats fishing under access agreements have under-reported their catches, which has denied some African states important revenue.

Critics of FPAs also point out that through its partnership agreements, the EU has linked development support for African fisheries directly to gaining access to commercial fishing. The number of fishing boats allowed to fish through these agreements directly influences the financial support given to the country for the development of its fisheries sector. This is not only incoherent in terms of the EU's policy towards development aid, it is also a

system that some believe encourages the licensing of too many boats, which may contribute to overfishing.

The perception of Europe's engagement in Africa's fisheries is not all bad. Few experts would want to see the FPAs scrapped altogether, as this would merely open the way for a plethora of individual licences that would be much harder to regulate. Moreover, while the EU stands accused of lacking transparency and accountability, the situation is worse with bilateral fisheries agreements signed between African states and Asian countries and fishing associations. These remain entirely confidential and are quite possibly to blame for more abuses at sea than the European agreements. Moreover, it is a widespread complaint that large aid and infrastructural support provided by some Asian countries to African coastal states are also made contingent on access to fishing grounds. In short, what the critics of the EU agreements want to see is a reform of FPAs, not their removal. FPAs remain a vital part of improved governance of commercial fisheries in Africa.

Criticism of the EU FPAs seems to have been taken on board. In a recent public hearing on the reform of the external dimensions of the EU's CFP, the most important voices from the

While the EU stands accused of lacking transparency and accountability, the situation is worse with bilateral fisheries agreements signed between African states and Asian countries and fishing associations



A fisherman off the Cape coast contemplates his catch. The controversial European Union fisheries agreements have in the past been blamed for overfishing and targeting fish stocks needed by local fishermen.

EC supported the idea of de-linking development support for fisheries in African countries with commercial access for European boats. This is a very important decision. From 2012, the EC may commit to supporting the development of African fisheries on the basis of the needs of individual countries, irrespective of whether those countries agree to provide fishing opportunities to European boats.


The EU is also taking on board complaints about the lack of transparency associated with its dealings in African states. The EC is therefore contemplating adding anti-corruption and transparency clauses to all future agreements, as well as clauses stating that the EU will not fish in the seas of countries guilty of serious human rights abuses. These are policy ideas that will be welcomed by civil society in Africa and Europe, although precisely how they will be enforced seems to be a matter of further debate. A senior official in DG MARE, the EC Directorate-General responsible for fisheries, joked about these mooted policy ideas, pointing out that if they were implemented properly then the EU would not be able to fish in Africa at all.

So why this willingness to change by the EC? It is possible that these policy ideas derive from frustration at the poor legacy of EU support for fishing sector reforms in Africa, as well as the relentless criticism raised by international and local NGOs. Decades of European financial support to African countries have failed to improve the management of fisheries and the development of the artisanal sector in most, if not all, cases. With increasing scrutiny being given to unsustainable and inequitable fisheries, the EU simply cannot carry on as before.

However, there may also be geopolitical factors behind these policy ideas. The owners of European fishing boats claim that Asian companies, for whom adherence to good governance is less of a concern, are squeezing them out of African waters. What Spanish and French fishing companies want to see is a level playing field, which they believe can be achieved through improving public access to information that would show clearly that they are more responsible than their competitors.

The debates surrounding the reform of the EU CFP remain somewhat academic. There is a long process

ahead, turning these ideas into policy documents that will gain the approval of the EU parliament. The process will be drawn out and subject to complex political deals and compromises that laypeople and even most experts will find difficult to follow. It is quite possible that the idea of introducing transparency and anti-corruption clauses in FPAs will be dropped when people think through the practical and political implications, although de-linking development support from fisheries access seems more straightforward.

So far, African stakeholders have been quiet on this review process. However, it would be extremely positive if African governments, perhaps working through the AU, could present their views on how fisheries agreements with the EU and others should be reformed, particularly in terms of improving transparency and accountability. These are pressing needs for improving the democratic governance of marine resources. One suspects that these ideas will not be universally supported within Africa and among Asian fishing companies, which is all the more reason to ensure that they are more widely debated. 

Africa's growth not just feel-good statistics

Is Africa becoming an economic success story? Or are we grabbing a few convenient indicators that make us feel good and blotting out the mountain of challenges that lie below the statistics?

The IMF's Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa report released in October predicted growth of 5% in 2010 and 5.6% in 2011. It also lauded African countries for rebounding quickly from the effects of the global financial crisis.

The African Development Bank's (ADB) annual economic meeting in Tunis in October also took a positive tone, citing the IMF statistics, which were higher than those predicted by the Bank itself in mid-2010. Speakers at the ADB event predicted that the new era of growth was not a flash in the pan but likely to last for decades.

Given the optimism that is generally prevalent in Africa this year, it would be easy to forget that the continent's relative success in the current global climate is based on two key platforms. One is the weakened state of developed markets, which is pushing investment to new and often uncharted territory, such as African countries.

The other is the dramatic growth of Brazil, China, India and other countries of the global South, which have developed strong economic links with African states. Our growth is inextricably linked to theirs, which effectively means we remain vulnerable to external forces for our survival.

ADB president Donald Kaberuka, sounding a note of caution at the Tunis conference, asked whether this might be merely another false dawn for Africa. He cited the oil boom of the 1970s, when

Dianna Games reports that despite the huge challenges ahead, the African Development Bank is optimistic about real growth based on a new 'Africa Consensus'.

high investment flows into the continent led analysts to proclaim that Africa had turned a corner, but instead the continent was plunged into two decades of misery when oil prices contracted and ill-considered reforms compounded a rapid about-turn back to poverty.

Kaberuka, however, believes that things are different this time. 'Something has happened since 2000 that is not simply explained by the price of raw materials,' he said, noting that resources accounted for only about 30% of the momentum of the past decade. The rest, he said, was the result of fundamental economic, governance and structural reforms.

The continent has more capital sloshing around in it than ever before. And it is not dominated, as it once was,

For every \$40bn of foreign aid given to Africa, Africans are now mobilising about \$400bn themselves

by foreign aid. According to Kaberuka, for every \$40bn of foreign aid given to Africa, Africans are now mobilising about \$400bn themselves. This is being raised through bonds, capturing remittances and mobilising pension-fund money, among other mechanisms.

Private equity funds, about 80% of which are managed from South Africa, are mushrooming, driving the growth of competitive indigenous companies and providing yet more resources for multi-sector investment.

A rapidly growing middle class is creating demand for housing, retail complexes and office space. In the resources sector, whole new towns are being built near mines and new oil finds, opening up huge opportunities for construction companies and goods and services.

But things are not all rosy. The mooted formation of sovereign wealth funds – resource profits set aside in funds dedicated to long-term development – may be compromised by an inability of governments to plan long term.

For example, Nigeria, which established a fund several years ago to capture oil windfalls, has channelled most of this money into consumption spending and budget deficits, particularly in the wake of oil price shocks induced by the global crisis.

African stock exchanges are mostly small and illiquid, and are resisting well-meant attempts by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – the continent's largest by far – to co-operate more closely to boost greater foreign investment in African stocks.



African Development Bank President Donald Kaberuka believes fundamental economic, governance and structural reforms have put African countries on the path to sustainable growth.

Financial markets generally remain shallow, and long-term, big-ticket financing is a way off for most African institutions.

Another key building block – sustainable energy – is not yet in place. The ADB, which spends half of its infrastructure budget on energy, says that for growth to accelerate, solutions to the problem must be found urgently.

A new issue for policymakers to grapple with is the pressure for low-carbon growth and developing clean, alternative energy for the future – which is ironic, given that much of Africa's current growth is based on big investment in hydrocarbons.

Agriculture as an effective contributor to economic growth is hardly past the starting block, and now producers face a new and more insidious problem than poor policy and government neglect – climate change.

Other constraints to long-term growth include very low levels of savings; the difficulty of growing micro and medium enterprises, and building a sizeable tax-paying middle class; improving the

Despite the myriad challenges, the growth story is also changing the mindset of Africans, who are more confident about the continent's global positioning and see a chance for a new era

business environment; and developing industry and beneficiation.

Despite the oft-repeated cry that African countries do not have the money to solve these problems, inefficient bureaucracies and poor policies underpin most of the issues constraining growth. Improving health, education and skills is the responsibility of governments – but they are failing miserably in most countries.

In many cases the low-hanging policy fruit is left untouched. Ministers have to append signatures to simple property deals, multiple forms and agencies

are required to start businesses, and decision-making in government moves slowly, if at all, through the chain of command. Solving these problems does not require money but simply the right political will.

Government budgets, most of them still propped up with foreign aid, often reflect skewed and short-term political priorities with limited regard for longer term investment.


High growth statistics have a tendency to obscure real structural inefficiencies in most African economies.

So what is driving the celebrated economic statistics? Most of the highest growth figures are still in resource economies that remain vulnerable to commodity prices and have relatively little diversified growth. But, as Kaberuka said, that is only part of the story. Other economies contributing to continental growth figures are reforming countries such as Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Mauritius and Ghana.

Despite the myriad challenges, the growth story is also changing the mindset of Africans, who are more confident about the continent's global positioning and see a chance for a new era. Instead of looking backwards to find scapegoats for problems, there is a new realism about what needs to be done to move forward.

This was certainly the atmosphere at the ADB conference, where leaders of multilateral and continental institutions spoke about building an 'Africa Consensus' to take the continent into the future.

This, they said, would differ from the Washington Consensus and Beijing Consensus in that it would be aspirational rather than prescriptive; more of a rallying cry than a recipe for growth.

It all sounds good but in a continent that cannot even feed itself, these are early days for the 'new' Africa. To rephrase the old saying, you cannot eat growth. 

Accomplished African-American performing artist **Antonio Lyons** immigrated to South Africa seven years ago and has pursued his acting career in local productions, amongst other ventures. Poppie Mputhing spoke to him.

An American in Johannesburg

I meet Antonio Lyons on a warm summer's day in a light and airy restaurant in the city he has come to call home – Johannesburg. His greeting is as warm as this relaxed Sunday afternoon. He is wearing brown checked trousers, a bright green African-style shirt, designer glasses and sneakers – revealing his cross-cultural style and easy-going nature.

Lyons has an impressive CV, including roles in feature films like *Hotel Rwanda* with Don Cheadle and Sophie Okonedo and the *Sum of All Fears* with Ben Affleck and Morgan Freeman. He has also featured in several drama series, including American productions *24* and *The Practice*. More recently he featured in South African productions including eTV's *Scandal* and *Fourplay*.

Lyons was born in Miami, Florida where he grew up with his older brothers. He reflects on the restrictive influence of a schooling system skewed towards telling the story of white Europeans. 'I was angry as a teenager... [the school syllabus] had nothing to do with me. And I was always extremely independent,' he says.

Lyons says he's always been creative although no one else in his family is similarly inclined. Inspired by the black consciousness messages espoused by African-American writers like Toni Morrison and Richard Wright, he began writing poetry at the age of 14. 'I also used to dance,' he says. 'It was therapeutic.'

In light of his early passion for poetry and dancing, it was perhaps inevitable that, after graduating from high school, he would go on to train with the Billie Holiday Theatre in New York City. During his time there, Lyons continued on a personal and professional journey of exploring the facets of injustice. Eventually, having come a long way from his days of penning angry poetry, he decided to become 'part of the solution.' As a teacher at New

The importance of coming to Africa is threaded throughout Lyons' poetic lyrics

York University, Lyons was part of the Creative Arts team that designed workshops related to conflict resolution and HIV.

Lyons' big break in acting came when he landed a role in an episode of *New York Undercover*. It was the role he needed to break into TV acting. After five happy years there, Lyons decided that the time had come for him to take on a new challenge – breaking into the competitive world of film and television in Los Angeles. In LA he honed his craft and built up his CV by featuring in a range of screen roles. Lyons had achieved the American dream aspired to by millions – at last, he was a successful actor living in the City of Angels.

But suddenly, inexplicably, the auditions and callbacks simply dried up. Lyons says he sank into a depression. Without work there were no pay cheques, and despair set in. 'It messes with your head,' he says. Talks with family and friends prompted Lyons to think carefully about what to do next. 'For two years, I had to go through a process of letting go. It was painful, but I felt spiritual peace was more important,' says Lyons. He was looking for a new purpose. Lyons found it by chance, when a South African friend he had studied with in New York suggested he spend some time in South Africa.

After much introspection, Lyons decided that South Africa might provide just the change of scenery he needed. He wanted to settle in a place where he could perhaps begin to find a

new meaning for his life, divorced from his first love – acting – that had caused him so much anxiety in his home country. 'I did not come here [South Africa] to get into acting. I wanted to try something – anything – new,' he says. Lyons says he had no plan for South Africa to become home. But destiny, it seems, had other ideas.

I ask why he stayed. 'I fell in love with the quality of life. People expect to have downtime to recharge and regroup; I like that balance. People in New York and LA are always rushing around. It can just get too stressful,' he says.

Not only did Lyons' acting find new life in South Africa, he also discovered another passion – making music. He is a 'poetic house musician,' intertwining his poetry with cool, melodic house music. Meanwhile, the importance of coming to Africa is threaded throughout Lyons' poetic lyrics. In 'Human Jewels', the title track of his debut album, he reflects on his journey 'to the other side of the world to discover a more complete me.' In the poetic 'Ode to Johannesburg', he pays homage to his adopted home city as 'the place where my soul soars.'

Lyons is working on a number of projects in the New Year, including a follow-up to his debut album entitled *We Dance We Pray*. He also wants to develop the play *We Are Here*, which he penned and performs. *We Are Here* explores the theme of gender relations in relation to the abuse of women and children. Passionate about making a difference, Lyons hopes to perform the play across the continent with the aim of breaking down the construct of 'hyper-masculinity' and providing men with 'tools to make better choices.'

Lyons says he's still on a path of personal and professional achievement that may take him back to the United States one day. But whatever happens he will always be grateful to Africa – it was here, he says, that 'I found myself.' □

Sugar and warmth in an Indian Ocean paradise

On a trip to Mauritius, where she attended a conference on piracy, **Deborah Akoth Osiro** found a thriving economy amidst the lure of the sunny beaches.

It was a pleasant surprise to find on my first visit to Mauritius that this island nation of dodos and giant tortoises had more than just beaches and nature to offer. Prior to my visit, I imagined it to be as rich, organised and easy-going as its neighbour, Seychelles. The reality was more than just this idyllic isle lifestyle I had conjured up.

One is welcomed with screens full of beautiful beaches and luxurious villas filling the immigration lounge at the airport. However, on stepping into the arrival lounge, the pace is unexpectedly dizzying. Especially the noise of hawking foreign exchange bureaux staff shouting about their wares. I never realised that currencies could elicit such passion.

The bustling sales pitch continued outside, where I had to take a taxi as I was unable to identify my designated

pick-up. My driver Salim's opening statement was: 'First time in Mauritius? Welcome to Africa.' He immediately asked for 20 Mauritian rupees to pay the airport toll, and when I said I had none, he tailgated the driver ahead and we sped right behind the vehicle before the barrier could come down. Africa indeed! For sure, this pace and noise would be inconceivable in Seychelles.

While still absorbing this audacity, I was informed that we were going to his house to pick up his family to take them shopping in Port Louis! Five minutes later, we had parked outside his home and I was being introduced to his lovely wife and daughter. At that moment, I thought the driver should have welcomed me to the Indian subcontinent, what with all the bustle, informality, warmth and openness, which took me back to my days of living in India. Though quite surprised by my experience, I went with the flow, for which I was amply rewarded later when Salim assisted with the confusion with my hotel reservations.

Contrary to my expectations, the weather was chilly, but the people of Mauritius are very warm and greatly interested in the African mainland, which the average person on the street is not very familiar with. The majority of the people are of Indian heritage. The rest, who must reside mainly in Rodrigues (the other large inhabited island) because I did not encounter many in Mauritius Island, are Creole, and a few are of Chinese heritage.

Tourism is obviously a major industry in the country, as it is in Seychelles. However, the enduring memory of Mauritius, for me, was the vast sugarcane plantations. Driving right across the country, from the airport in the south-east of Mauritius Island to Quatre Bornes, Port Louis and Grand Baie in the north-west region, the landscapes were blanketed by acres and acres of sugarcane, intermittently broken by hills and small towns.

Sugar has been the economic pillar of the island nation for centuries. Mauritius could arguably be considered one of the greatest beneficiaries of the decades-long Lome and Cotonou trade agreements between the European Union (EU) and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The Sugar



Protocol guaranteed the ACP countries a preferential price, well above the world price, and a predictable stable market. Mauritius not only satisfied its sugar quotas but also used up quotas allocated to other countries.

The WTO decision against such preferential arrangements and the introduction of reciprocal Economic Partnerships Agreements (EPAs) to replace the old EU-ACP agreements should have sounded the death knell for the sugar industry in Mauritius, but instead the country has transformed raw sugar, which no longer fetches a high price in the EU market, into a major source of energy – bagasse and ethanol. This reduces the country's fuel imports and leaves it able to export the excess energy and electricity. Thus the EU remains a major destination for Mauritian sugar, but in the form of ethanol as well as the traditional product. The sugar factories are able to produce either sugar or biofuel, depending on which commodity is more profitable.

The prevalence of sugar may give the impression of an agrarian-dependent Mauritius, yet it is very much a manufacturing giant whose roots were also based on the preferential market offered by the EU and the US under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The successful export processing zones (EPZs) mean, for instance, that it is cheaper for East African Breweries to bottle its famous Tusker beer in Mauritius. The country has successfully diversified from these two industries into other sectors, such as property development, financial services and technology, with a new Cyber City emerging near Port Louis.

In terms of governance and regulations, the country is miles ahead of its counterparts on the African mainland. A case in point: the antibiotics I would have purchased without a prescription in most of the



Traffic can sometimes be a huge problem in Port Louis, Mauritius, especially during the morning rush hour.




The bustle, informality, warmth and openness in Mauritius reminded the writer of India.

continent but was unable to obtain in Mauritius without a doctor's prescription. This provides protection to consumers in the country, guarantees against counterfeit medicines (a problem that plagues the continent), and safeguards against drug abuse. Of course, I visited a doctor to get the prescription, and for my troubles I only got antihistamines. Now, I am glad I never got the antibiotics.

It is easy to understand why Mauritius always tops the African league tables for development. The country has a high GDP of US \$12 000 per capita, and this is equitably distributed, with less than 8% of the people living in poverty. By African standards, corruption is rare.

But before I get too carried away, Mauritius does have one very familiar

African problem. I was attending a technical meeting to develop a regional strategy and plan of action to counter piracy in the Eastern and Southern African and Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region. The initiative is being driven by countries like Mauritius that are peripherally impacted by

pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia. Mauritius even offered to prosecute the pirates – a responsibility that contiguous neighbours with greater interests are shunning. During the meeting, one local delegate mentioned that he would be late the following morning because of the increasing traffic jams on the Island. He duly came late instead of starting his day earlier to oblige the mainlanders. The rest of our meetings and activities had to accommodate the traffic congestion. But for Mauritians, well, why should routines and sleep be disrupted by a pesky traffic jam? After all, the beach beckons. 

Also read *No to mercenaries vs Somali pirates on the high seas* **on page 10**

Books

Holiday reading

Imagining Africa

Among the many books available for this festive season is the Penguin African Writers' Series – fiction to transport you to another world of sights, sounds and images of Africa.

Many of these are old classics released in a new format.

Decades later they still inspire, thrill, make us laugh or cry and remind us of our continent's chequered history.

An example is Bessie Head's *When the Rainclouds Gather and Maru*, two moving tales set in rural Botswana – Head's adopted homeland after she fled apartheid South Africa.

'Head's love stories highlight the great risk of making a gesture of faith in mankind, whose wickedness can be extraordinary,' writes acclaimed Nigerian-born novelist Helen Oyeyemi in her introduction to the compilation.

The stories reflect the themes of estrangement, loneliness and racism – elements that Head experienced in her own tortuous life. Yet there is also a lot of love, commitment and trust from her very humane characters.


These two novels – her first published works, released in 1968 and 1971 – touch on many issues still relevant


today, including the struggle to improve agriculture in rural Botswana and the fight against ethnic and racial prejudice.

They remain classics of African literature.

Chinua Achebe's *Girls At War And Other Stories* and Ngugi Wa Thiongo's *Weep Not, Child*, also fall in this category.

First published in 1972, *Girls At War And Other Stories*, a collection of 20 years of written work by one of Africa's most renowned novelists, reminds the reader once again why Achebe has won such worldwide acclaim.





The writer of *Things Fall Apart* leads us with humour, allegory, suspense and colourful descriptions through his native Nigeria, with all its drama and, sometimes, utter despair.

The title story *Girls At War* highlights the effects of war on the various members of a society, with all its twisted outcomes. Everyone loses his or her innocence, even the young Gladys, who was ready to go to war for the 'exciting new nation', Biafra.

Ultimately she is lured into participating in the 'war-economy' wearing wigs and make-up to play the part, but with tragic consequences.

Acclaimed Kenyan writer Ngugu Wa Thiongo's *Weep Not, Child*, which first appeared in 1964, pursues the same theme, this time set in Kenya during the Mau-Mau war against colonial rule.

The story of two brothers torn between serving their country and their own ambition is also a classic.

Another in this series, first published much more recently, is *As the Crow Flies*, by Ivorian writer Veronique Tadjo.

Tadjo, based in Johannesburg, is also an accomplished painter and author of several novels, including the moving



Shadow of Imana, travels in the heart of Rwanda, which deals with the 1994 genocide.

As the Crow Flies is set in an urban environment, often in Tadjo's native Abidjan, with nameless characters involved in various interactions, some of them told as if to a diary in the first person.

The reader is never sure of the beginning or end of each of the twenty short chapters, though characters are interlinked through the themes of love, hate, birth, death and imagination.

Also more recently, South African Sarah Lotz' two crime novels *Exhibit A* and *Tooth and Nailed* lend to fun holiday reading with lots of local flavour.

Georgie Allen, a Cape Town lawyer with a fatal weakness for pro bono

Decades later they still inspire, thrill, make us laugh or cry and remind us of our continent's chequered history




cases, agrees to help a woman (mainly because he's interested in her sister, but still) who claims to have been raped by a cop in a police cell. However, Nina's story is full of holes and the Barrydale police are less than helpful.

Along with his trusty sidekick, Patrick McLennan (also known as the Poison Dwarf, for reasons that become apparent), Georgie enters the fray, and soon finds himself tangled up in a mess of lies, prejudice and corruption.

Exhibit A rattles along at an entertaining pace, but it could have done with more fine-tuning.

In *Tooth and Nailed*, Lotz' second outing in the crime genre, she starts to hit her stride. Georgie, still looking the worse for wear, takes on a couple of cases that actually pay. Among these new cases are the blackmailing of a well-connected professor who has a few noisy skeletons in his closet, and the country's first gay divorce.

But just when his finances start to look a bit healthier, Georgie gets a call from his game ranger brother in Botswana, and he and his sidekick have to head north to save Greg from financial ruin or worse. 

Dakar's taxi sisters



By Issaka K Souaré

Earlier this year I took a research field trip to Dakar, the Senegalese capital. On the fourth day of my visit, as I was looking for a taxi in front of my hotel, the Pullman Teranga, I saw a lady with an Islamic headscarf sitting behind the wheel of a yellow car – the trademark colour of taxis in Dakar.

I approached her and she confirmed that she was indeed a 'taxi man'. I tried to correct her, saying that she should instead be called a 'taxi woman'. She told me that officially she and her female colleagues are actually called 'taxi sisters'! Indeed, those were the words written on the front of her car.

I'd been to Dakar many times before, but it was the first time I had seen a taxi sister. There might be others elsewhere in West Africa, but I have yet to see any. In fact, in the northern Nigerian city of Kano the reverse is true: the small public-transport cars designated to be used by women only are all driven by men.

Aminata, my driver, told me that she has been doing this job for three years now. When I asked her why she had chosen to be a taxi sister, she replied, simply, that she wanted to be her own boss. I admire that.

There are about ten 'taxi sisters' in Dakar, according to Aminata. They are part of a government project launched in September 2007, on the initiative of the then Minister of Family Affairs, Women's Entrepreneurship and Micro-finance, which bought ten four-seater taxis designated exclusively for female drivers.

When it came to selecting the new drivers, competition was fierce. Criteria included family status (married women were privileged, as the husband could provide collateral security), level of


education, date of achieving their driver's licence, age (preference was given to those aged between 19 and 30), and so on.

As part of the ongoing support given to these women, they meet every month with a specific unit in the ministry to discuss their progress in repaying the loans used to finance their purchase of the taxis, as well as any difficulties they encounter in the course of their work.

On that note, I asked Aminata how taxi men and other male clients, including her own husband, perceived them initially, and how they perceived them now. She said that they had not encountered any problems, but they didn't drive at night for security reasons. And, I asked, in a country that's more than 85% Muslim (and Muslim countries are considered by many as conservative with regard to women's emancipation), did clients prefer them or, given the choice, would they rather go for a taxi driven by a man? Aminata replied that most clients actually preferred hiring taxis driven by a taxi sister. She said that

in fact many male clients preferred them.

Then I requested special permission to ask a 'sensitive' question. Do male clients choose them over their peers because they are women and do some of them try to flirt with them (*dragner* in French)? Aminata thought that some men might indeed choose to ride in one of these taxis simply because they are driven by women, but she couldn't recall a single incident when someone had tried to flirt with her, and she had heard of no such case from any of her colleagues.

My only criticism of this project is that the interest rate is high: taxi sisters are required to pay about 18% interest on their loans over five years. Such a high interest rate is disproportionate to the proceeds of driving a taxi, and this seems inconsistent with the point of the initiative, which is to help young women have some financial independence. But overall, the project is progressive and valuable. Next time you are in Dakar, you might want to call on one of the taxi sisters. 



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