DEMOBILISATION AND ITS AFTERMATH II

ECONOMIC REINSERTION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOBILISED MILITARY PERSONNEL

Ian Liebenberg and Marlene Roefs

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

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PREFACE

The past decade saw a process of demilitarisation and disarmament taking place internationally. However, this recently appears to have reached a turning point, with countries either experiencing a slump in their disarmament and defence conversion initiatives, or embarking upon or engaged in rearmament programmes. Despite this, many countries still focus strongly on the economic and social reintegration of demobilised personnel. The complexities associated with the reinsertion of demobilised personnel into civilian economies remain a burning issue for many, South Africa being no exception.

Demobilisation and rationalisation are sensitive, complex and politically contentious issues that require careful and well-developed planning before being operationalised. These processes deal with personnel who would often need intensive retraining to provide them with marketable skills that they can use when they are inserted back into civilian life. The conversion of human resources is an integral component of demobilisation and rationalisation processes. It refers to the effective transformation of the skills and knowledge of demobilised military personnel from a military focus to a civilian career. However, this is often easier said than done. In South Africa, where the economy has experienced jobless growth, successful reinsertion of former military personnel into the formal civilian economy becomes even more complex.

The reduction of military personnel in South Africa has been divided into two processes — demobilisation and rationalisation. Demobilisation took place between 1996 and 1998 and was aimed at those who did not wish to integrate into the newly formed South African National Defence Force (SANDF) or those who did not meet the criteria for integration. A number of problems were experienced during the first phases of demobilisation, among others, the poor attempt at reintegration into civilian life. Reskilling programmes were viewed as inadequate preparation to meet the needs of demobilised personnel. The Service Corps, launched in 1995, was a measure introduced by the Department of Defence to oversee the reintegration of demobilised soldiers. The main objective of the Service Corps was to assist in reskilling former combatants. However, it has not been very effective because training was primarily aimed at those with lower levels of skills and training needs. No managerial training was offered and few efforts were made to assist more skilled demobilised military personnel to obtain jobs in other sectors. A process is currently under way to restructure the Service Corps into a Resettlement Agency, which will have a strong development focus in terms of its programme implementation.

The South African Department of Defence will embark upon a rationalisation process to rightsize the SANDF to the desired personnel strength, while providing for the diverse reskilling needs of separated personnel at an affordable cost. This process will entail personnel rationalisation to the required strength of between 65 000 and 70 000 members. However, before the Department of Defence can initiate its rationalisation programme, it has to deal with problems that emerged from the demobilisation programme. Disgruntled demobilised soldiers pose a serious potential threat to the country's security system. In addition, those soldiers who left the system and find it difficult to reintegrate into civilian life may pose a security problem in future.

For an effective rationalisation and reintegration strategy, the Department of Defence has to be informed by an analysis of the skills needs of demobilised personnel, available job opportunities

and skills requirements prior to the initiation of reskilling and training programmes. The retraining offered should match the employment opportunities available in the labour market. In addition, skills training should also be linked with employment creation initiatives. However, training and reskilling have cost implications. It is for this reason that public-private partnerships become an important avenue to explore. The public sector can facilitate the process and the private sector can provide the much-needed resources and opportunities. The rationalisation process should be viewed in a positive light, since it offers a unique conversion opportunity where some highly skilled military personnel can be effectively used in other sectors. However, the general concern is focused on military personnel with lower levels of skills, who will find reintegration more difficult.

The monograph provides a profile of South African demobilised or rationalised military personnel in terms of skills and training needs. It also outlines the current and projected job opportunities available in various occupations (defined in terms of unskilled, semiskilled and skilled) in the different economic sectors of the South African labour market. It is currently estimated that — with an unemployment rate between 20% (using the 'narrow' definition of unemployment) and 29% (according to the 'broad' definition) — the economy must generate about 250 000 new jobs in net terms to ensure that the unemployment rate does not rise. However, in order to absorb new entrants into the labour market, the economy should generate more than 350 000 net new jobs per annum. According to the National Employment Strategy, the demand for skills and a better educated workforce will increase rather than diminish across the total range of sectors and occupations.

Research has found that most of the reductions in jobs have affected unskilled and semiskilled occupations. This is quite significant when taking into account that the majority of the economically active population in South Africa fall within this category. It is projected that employment growth is likely to occur within the skilled and semiskilled occupations, with the skilled occupations exhibiting longer and more continuous growth. Currently, South Africa has approximately 3 000 000 skilled and highly skilled people as opposed to 7 000 000 people in semiskilled or unskilled work, or who are unemployed. This complicates the reintegration of demobilised personnel, since the majority of former SANDF personnel and combatants fall within the semiskilled category. This raises the issue of suitable training and multiskilling, not only of demobilised personnel, but of the South African workforce in general.

Demobilisation is therefore a broader development problem that cannot simply be dealt with by the military alone. A successful demobilisation and reintegration strategy will indeed require some measure of creativity that involves a range of stakeholders. Although a developmental approach is crucial to the reintegration of demobilised personnel, the importance of political direction on this issue cannot be underestimated. Proper investment into the demobilisation, rationalisation and reintegration process can lead to further development in the country.

This monograph is the second of two that deal with this issue. *Demobilisation and its aftermath I: A profile of South Africa's demobilised military personnel* provides research findings that underscore the findings reported in this monograph. It is hoped that both these publications will serve to shed light on the plight of demobilised soldiers, and will provide helpful information for those who are responsible for making and implementing policy and programmes in this regard.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The integration of former statutory and non-statutory force members into the South African National Defence force (SANDF) provided numerous challenges. In addition, the new defence force was to be rationalised along the stated objective of a modern, but smaller defence force, which would suit the new defence budget for peacetime purposes. Generally, it is agreed that the integration of previously contending forces was successful and functionally effective for the SANDF. The new defence force was more legitimate and representative than ever before. However, as a result of the unaffordable size of the new force after integration (more than 100 000 members), rationalisation became imperative. The rationalisation process meant the demobilisation of integrated forces, which affected thousands of soldiers (inclusive of former combatants) of whom the majority were unskilled or semiskilled compared to the demands of the South African economy.

The fact that demobilisation and reinsertion programmes were not readily in place and not properly planned created social problems, such as poverty and unemployment among former soldiers. The same applies to members of the SANDF, who have been and will still be rationalised to reach the envisaged core force strength of 70 000 members by April 2002.

This monograph describes the experiences and needs of former SANDF personnel and combatants — for example, from Umkontho we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA) — with regard to reinsertion into the South African economy. It explores the availability of foreseeable job opportunities for demobilised soldiers and provides suggestions on how to assist those without jobs to re-enter the job market in a fruitful and sustainable way.

Research was conducted among 307 former soldiers. The majority of the sample consisted of non-statuary forces combatants. Other respondents came from the former South African Defence Force (SADF), as well as from the integrated SANDF, while some did not disclose their previous affiliations. Unstructured or qualitative methods, open-ended questions included in the survey schedule and fieldnotes and reports written by fieldworkers were also utilised to gather information. Due to the exploratory nature of the study, these results should at best be regarded as tentative, since non-probability sampling was not possible and the results can therefore not be generalised to apply to the whole population of demobilised SANDF personnel and former combatants.

By far the majority of the 307 respondents were black, male, less than 40 years old and former MK soldiers. About 37% were unemployed. This was especially high among the 19 to 30 year age group of whom 43% were unemployed. Significant differences in educational levels existed between the employed and the unemployed. Approximately two-thirds (65%) of the respondents employed full-time had attained grade 12 or higher, whereas this proportion was just more than one-third (35%) among the unemployed.

Approximately one out of three (38%) respondents mentioned one or more forms of training that they had received, while the others (62%) did not mention any training. Out of the one-third who received military training, more than three-quarters (77%) said that this training had not helped them to find a job. Among the unemployed, less than one out of ten said that training had helped to 'some extent' or 'a lot'. Among the employed, on the other hand, this was more than one out of three.

Given the limited benefit of previous training received, it came as no surprise that 264 respondents (88%) were very interested in receiving further training that would enable them to become self-employed. This interest was particularly high among the unemployed and those already involved in training or studies. In both groups, more than 90% indicated that they were very interested. However, full-time employed (75%) and part-time employed (82%) respondents also showed a keen interest in further training. No gender differences were found.

Among the employed respondents, 90% indicated that the SANDF had not done enough to help them when they left the military. This negative perception was more frequently communicated among the unemployed, with 99% of this group indicating that the SANDF had not done enough to help them. The majority of the former military personnel (41%) said that the SANDF could have equipped them with skills that would have improved their chances in the job market.

The Citizen Force (an alternative for employment) was generally regarded as neither a bad nor a good thing. However, those who had been in personal contact with the Citizen Force tended to be more negative about it than those who had not had any contact with it. Negative perceptions were most common among unemployed respondents.

Notes made by fieldworkers of interviews revealed disillusionment, distrust and extreme dissatisfaction with the treatment the received by former soldiers from SANDF. This related to a (perceived) lack of support in skills development, financial assistance and in securing alternative employment either inside or outside of the SANDF.

At the same time, an examination of shifts in formal sector employment showed that 266 288 new jobs have been created throughout the South African economy between 1995 and 1999. An analysis of the labour market showed that declines in employment in South Africa during the period 1995-1999 were mainly concentrated in semiskilled and unskilled occupational levels. In agriculture, employment reductions affected unskilled occupational levels, in community services, semiskilled and unskilled occupational levels were affected, while the employment reductions were very strongly concentrated in the unskilled occupational levels and marginally at the skilled levels in domestic services. The real winners were occupational categories located within skilled and semiskilled levels. Overall, 567 504 unskilled jobs disappeared and unskilled people were the real losers of the structural shifts in employment levels.

The shift to skilled and semiskilled occupations as a proportion of the economically active population, experienced in the South African economy, is likely to continue if the attempt towards trade liberalisation and constructive engagement with the global economic system is taken into account. The real implication for the typical demobilised soldier is that, in order to be reinserted into the South African economy, lower skilled and semiskilled persons would have to become double or multiskilled (on a personal level) to attain and/or maintain employment. This does not augur well for the individuals in this study, who are not (yet) skilled, or do not indicate a willingness to enhance their skills at least to semiskilled or multiskilled levels.

With regard to demand for labour, moderate growth in building and civil engineering sectors (construction sector) is expected. The largest growth is expected in the wholesale, retail and accommodation sector. Moderate growth is expected in wholesale and retail and faster growth in catering and accommodation.

Little is known about employers' willingness to employ former soldiers. An exploratory study showed that it is difficult to extract information from employers on this issue.

Several suggestions are made in this monograph with regard to policy and policy formulation, the need for further training and (re)skilling of former combatants, pilot project(s) and proposals with regard to the Citizen Force. One of the main recommendations is that policies should shift away from transforming security institutions towards redressing the situation of those who were adversely affected and those who will still be negatively affected between now and the conclusion of the demobilisation process. More specific recommendations included a focus on small and medium-scale projects aimed at skills development in areas that would enhance individuals' chances in the labour market. It is also suggested that two or three Citizen Force units could be established that are situated within the tradition of the armed struggle to provide part-time employment for former combatants.

Proper reinsertion, as the study showed, is a complex and urgently needed process. The South African labour market for lower skilled people has become saturated. Skills have to be developed. However, skills development should not be undertaken in a general and untargeted manner, but rather follow a well-focused and inclusive strategy aimed at building skills that are in demand. Furthermore, initiatives to employ former soldiers in security and defence environments should take into account their military culture and identity, which are still divided along racial and political lines. Whatever strategies might be developed to improve the reinsertion process, special attention should be given to the (in)human aspect of demobilisation. Former soldiers made it clear that the kind of process through which they were demobilised should be avoided in future demobilisation processes at all cost. More attention to the procedural aspects (at least transparency and equal treatment) of demobilisation is strongly recommended.

The study implicitly showed that the demobilisation process — and future rationalisation exercises — of the armed forces should follow a fair procedure, which is both legitimate and non-racial. If not, some historically ingrained faultlines may allow racist attitudes (previous political antagonisms) to fester. On all of the above levels, the challenge is to deal with the issue of demobilisation and rationalisation no longer as a matter to talk about, but to transform it into decisive proactive action.

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Background

In January 2001, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) contracted All Africa Consultants (AAC) to do an exploratory study of the reinsertion of demobilised SANDF personnel into the South African (civilian) economy. This study dealt with the 'demand side' and attempted to assess, as accurately as possible, within current social and structural constraints, the availability of job opportunities for demobilised soldiers (mostly former combatants) in the current South African economy. In conjunction to this study, the ISS also contracted the Wits Peace Studies Group of the University of the Witwatersrand to conduct a survey that would provide a profile of demobilised soldiers in South Africa. The latter study dealt with the 'supply side'. While the two studies are distinct in many respects, they should be seen as complementary.[1]

It is trusted that the findings reflected in this monograph will assist in improving the understanding of the issues and challenges around the reintegration of demobilised personnel into the South African economy. It is hoped that this understanding will culminate in constructive steps to address the challenges posed by this process.

The South African transition from an authoritarian minority state to democracy through negotiation and non-racial elections in 1994, culminating in the acceptance of the new Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), was hailed by many foreign and internal observers as a small miracle. While the miracle introduced the basis for further transition, the management and sustaining the quality of such miracles are entirely different.

In terms of security sector restructuring the impact of the transition and, concomitant to this, the transformation of the defence establishment cannot be underestimated. South Africa succeeded in many ways in the institutionalisation of new codes of conduct regarding civil-military relations. However, the integration of former statutory force and non-statutory force members into the SANDF provided numerous challenges. Former adversaries had to be integrated into a new unified national defence force. In addition, the new defence force was to be rationalised along the stated objective of a modern, but smaller force, which would suit the new defence budget for peacetime purposes. South Africa — as had been the case in many other countries that moved from inter/intrastate conflict to a post-conflict mode — experienced the simultaneous integration and rightsizing of its armed forces and its military structures. However, the process of rightsizing meant that the defence sector, as one of many parts of the public sector had, and still has to shrink. Such shrinkage leads to job losses, something that any country can ill afford.

The integration and rationalisation of the new SANDF implied a rather quick expansion, before the defence planners could embark on the arguably needed contraction phase (rationalisation) of the SANDF. In effect, rationalisation implied a rather large-scale demobilisation process. While the integration process was technically and professionally hailed as a success — especially among the upper military and political echelons — for those negatively or adversely effected by it, the demobilisation process was much more traumatic.

The transformation of the defence establishment is generally regarded as a threefold process — the integration of the former separate forces, the reinsertion or demobilisation process (of former soldiers into civil society) and the necessary operational changes and adaptation of standards from an offensive approach to a defensive approach. All three processes are regarded (or at least perceived to be) functionally effective and necessary for the SANDF as a system. However, they are also dysfunctional for the individual members who are losing their livelihood. Hence, the demobilisation process and its medium to long-term effects became a growing cause for concern.

It is conservatively estimated that approximately 30 000 staff members would be affected by demobilisation in the period 1994 to 2003/4. Currently, it is expected that at least 12 000 people will be affected by 2003/4. This study refers to the 20 000 soldiers who have already been demobilised. The latest figures available indicate that the force size is at 78 000. It is expected that rationalisation will aim at a force of 65 000 to 70 000 members (at the peak of integration in 1994, there were 101 000 soldiers in the SANDF).[2]

Terminology

The term 'demobilisation' is used in most contexts to refer to the general demobilisation of soldiers after the end of an era of intrastate or interstate hostilities. Examples include the demobilisation of former soldiers in the United States after World War I and II and Vietnam, demobilisation by South African authorities after the same wars, as well as demobilisation in Eritrea after the Ethiopian and Eritrean wars. Several other examples can also be quoted.[3]

The terminology used for demobilisation in South Africa is rather unique. In contrast with other

countries, the term demobilisation as used by the military refers mostly to the demobilisation of non-statutory forces (former combatants), who were nominally or administratively 'integrated' in order to be demobilised. Demobilisation in the South African context and discourse around demobilisation also — and sometimes exclusively — refers to former combatants of the non-statutory forces (MK, APLA, AZANLA, Inkatha VIP Protection Units, and others) who were nominally (administratively) integrated in order to be demobilised without entering service in uniform in the new SANDF. The demobilisation of the statuary force members refers to those who left the service of the SADF or the new SANDF by accepting packages (voluntary severance), as a result of natural attrition or for health reasons (dismissal or severance).

For the purposes of the study, an inclusive definition that accommodates aspects of the general or universal definition, but that also includes aspects of the South African usage in terms of the demobilisation of former combatants was opted for. For example, about three-quarters of the study sample were former combatants (non-statutory forces) and about a fifth former SADF and SANDF soldiers.[4]

Research aim

The aim of this exploratory study was to look at those who were adversely affected by the demobilisation process and who had to be reintegrated not only into civil society, but more specifically into the South African economy. This process has taken place at a time when the South African rand is in decline, inflation is expected to rise and the short-term effects of the new macro-economic programme (GEAR) include significant job losses. The latter phenomenon is expected to continue in South Africa for a while before the positive effects of the intended economic restructuring is felt in the medium to long term. The study explored the economic opportunities available for former SANDF personnel in terms of foreseeable job opportunities. The study also looked at how those without jobs could be assisted to re-enter the job market in a meaningful way and on a sustainable basis. Although the focus is on integration and the job market, the study also provides some insight into the experiences and needs of former soldiers.

Structure

This monograph introduces in the first chapter the need for the study and provides background to the demobilisation process. It also briefly looks at the effects of demobilisation. The next chapter outlines the methodology as an exploratory study with complementary qualitative and quantitative modes of analysis. Chapter 3 situates the study within the ambit of demobilisation (as part of overall restructuring) before a profile of the 'typical' demobilised soldier is sketched in chapter 4. This is followed by a context-bound analysis of the availability of job opportunities within the South African economy (nationally and provincially), before the monograph concludes with recommendations to address the situation of joblessness among demobilised former soldiers and combatants.

Chapter 2
METHODOLOGY

Social science researchers are constantly searching for 'knowledge' about some aspect of social reality or human behaviour. The assumption is that knowledge about the social world is obtained, to a large degree, from carefully conducted investigations of social reality.

In this chapter, the methodological dimension of the study is discussed, which accounts for the way in which its methods and techniques were devised and executed.

Objectives of the study

The primary objective of this research was to explore and describe the social reality of demobilised South African military personnel. The secondary objective was to provide relevant recommendations on how to use available opportunities to minimise, if not remove, the key obstacles currently experienced by former SANDF members in their attempts to reintegrate into South African society and make a meaningful contribution to the economy.

Theoretical framework

The theoretical perspective that was adopted for the study is symbolic interactionism. This option was chosen, since its conceptual assumptions do not only provide the ideal framework for exploratory research into the social reality of these former combatants, but also allows for the utilisation of a multimethodological approach to decipher and describe the situation in which demobilised personnel find themselves.

Symbolic interactionism has been widely influential especially in the study of small-scale interaction, personality and deviance.[5] This perspective emphasises the diversity of social roles and subcultures and the manner in which participants construct roles and identities through interaction with others. People typically develop shared perspectives or common definitions in a given situation as they interact and share experiences, problems and backgrounds. Shared definitions are sometimes accepted as the truth, but meaning is always subject to negotiation.[6] Individuals often create new definitions because the original ones that served as a basis for their behaviour had negative repercussions for them. This development of definitions constitutes the most basic area of research for the symbolic interactionist.

While personality traits, socio-economic status, needs, cultural prescriptions, physical environment and other factors are regarded as useful in attempts to understand human behaviour, these and other abstract constructs (theories, models, conceptual frameworks) are relevant only in as far as they enter into and affect the defining process. In other words, symbolic interactionism:

> "does not deny that there are rules and regulations, norms, and belief systems in society ... [but] it does suggest that they are important in understanding behaviour only if people take them into account. Further it is suggested that it is not the rules, regulations, norms, or whatever that are crucial in understanding behaviour, but how these are defined and used in specific situations."[7]

Another social construction in symbolic interactionism is the concept of 'self':

> "The self is the definition people create (through interacting with others) of who they are. In constructing or defining self, people attempt to see themselves as others see them by interpreting gestures and actions directed toward them and by placing themselves in the role of the other person. In short, people come to see themselves in part as others see them."[8]

To understand behaviour, researchers must understand definitions and the process by which they are manufactured. People are actively engaged in creating their world, and understanding the intersection of biography and society is therefore essential to the researcher.

Methodological assumptions

Symbolic interactionists' epistemological position is that:

> "social reality can only be known through understanding the point of view of social actors, their meanings and definition of their situations, [thus] a positivistic logic of discovery is not followed."[9]

They consequently reject positivists' development of hypotheses prior to investigation, as well as their predefined observer categories. Exponents of symbolic interactionism believe, instead, that more open-ended questions must be asked, a naturalistic approach needs to be followed and the researcher should 'tell it like it is'. They therefore typically collect qualitative or 'soft' data (concentrating on qualities of human behaviour) to reconstruct people's social reality. However, Bilton et al states that once exploratory research has been accomplished, symbolic interactionists often develop and assess tentative hypotheses (analytic induction).[10] These steps, as well as the aim to find proof for their theories, often pursued by symbolic interactionists, are an indication that symbolic interactionists are not "completely free from positivistic influence."[11]

The symbolic interactionist's explanatory logic means that the researcher has to endeavour to provide meaningful and intelligible descriptions of how subjects or participants as contributors of perceptions and insights manage their social lives. However, symbolic interactionists often follow a positivistic logic to explain social reality, since they can implicitly or explicitly count and measure their data. This confirms that "the symbolic interactionist goes some way down the anti-positivistic road but stops short of its end."[12] Therefore, while symbolic interactionists are critical of applying positivistic principles and quantitative methods in their research, their empirical work often reflects methodological aspects that are associated with a quantitative/positivistic approach.

Finally, some symbolic interactionists believe that multiple methods should be used in social research and advocate triangulated qualitative and quantitative research designs.[13]

> "While the use of questionnaires and schedules (quantitative or positivistic research techniques) are mostly discouraged, and in many instances regarded as inappropriate, by symbolic interactionists for discovering how people define the situations they are in and how they construct their actions accordingly, this does however, not imply that such techniques cannot be used at all in research that is largely qualitative in nature. Indeed, it has been suggested that such 'positivistic' techniques can and should be used in combination with, for example, participant observation to a greater extent as is presently the case in sociological research, in order to reach a greater level of understanding of the particular issues at hand."[14]

Research strategy

For the greater part, this exploratory study of the social world of former combatants and demobilised personnel in South Africa was conducted within a quantitative methodological framework supplemented by a qualitative approach. These two well-known and recognised approaches to research differ vastly from each other. In the ensuing discussion, the key differences between the two approaches are outlined.[15]

The quantitative paradigm is based on positivism, which takes scientific explanation to be nomothetic (based on universal laws). Its aims are to measure the social world objectively, to test hypotheses and to predict and control human behaviour. In contrast, the qualitative

paradigm stems from an anti-positivistic, interpretive approach, is idiographic and thus holistic in nature, with the main aim to understand social life and the meaning that people attach to everyday life.

Quantitative researchers use a deductive form of reasoning. In contrast, qualitative researchers use an inductive form of reasoning.[16] Quantitative research takes universal propositions and generalisations as a point of departure, whereas qualitative research aims to understand phenomena within a particular context. In terms of epistemology, quantitative researchers see themselves as detached from, not as part of, the object that they study. Researchers can therefore be objective — they do not influence the study object and are not influenced by it. In contrast, qualitative researchers are subjective because they interact with the subject (object of investigation).

With regard to methodology, the quantitative paradigm emulates the physical sciences in that questions or hypotheses are stated and subjected to empirical testing to verify them. In contrast, qualitative methodology is dialectical and interpretive. During the process of interaction between the researcher and the subject, the subject's world is discovered and interpreted by means of qualitative methods.[17]

Qualitative researchers are concerned with understanding rather than explanation; with naturalistic observation rather than controlled measurement; with the subjective exploration of reality from the perspective of an insider as opposed to the outsider perspective that is predominant in the quantitative paradigm.

Before concluding this discussion of quantitative and qualitative paradigms, four points have to be emphasised:

- Although these paradigms undoubtedly guide social science researchers, the distinctions between the two paradigms are not as clear-cut in practice as the preceding discussion implies.

- There is a trend at present to bring the 'Cinderella' of science into research circles. Qualitative interviewing is generally used to verify knowledge obtained by means of quantitative data collection, or for a preliminary exploration before undertaking more structured survey research

The views of many scholars (for example, in the field of programme evaluation that used to be the stronghold of the quantitative paradigm) on quantitative and qualitative research styles have changed dramatically in recent years. In an excellent overview of the 'paradigm debate' over the past four decades, it is clear that the long and heated conventional-alternative paradigm debate has abated and that equal attention and weight should be given to these two paradigms.[18]

It appears that local scholars have different views on the paradigm debate in South Africa. A review of methodological and theoretical developments in South African social science concludes that, until recently, there has been no real antagonism, similar to that in American universities, between proponents of qualitative and quantitative approaches in the country.[19] Referring to local works, the review concluded that these contributions "have been conciliatory and constructive in tone."[20]

Unit of analysis

The exploratory study's unit of analysis can be defined as the following: a study undertaken during the first quarter of 2001 (a specific point in time) of key characteristics (gender, age, race, employment status and other demographic features), interests (receiving further training, career chosen if given the opportunity, assistance to find a job, and others), opinions or perceptions (regarding a number of matters such as the extent of training received before leaving the SANDF, whether the SANDF did enough to assist after leaving it), feelings (towards the Citizen Force, the commandos, and the Service Corps of the SANDF), and actions (deciding to resign or demobilise, study further after leaving the SANDF, seeking employment), of a group of South African former combatants and demobilised soldiers.

Selection of respondents from the population of interest

In social research, the focal group from which scholars wish to learn something is known as the 'population. This concept is used in the statistical rather than geographical sense. While the population of interest — also called the 'universe' — include all elements or cases of human beings, collectives of individuals or groups, organisations, or social artefacts of a particular study, the population of interest in social research is normally composed of individuals.

When the population of interest is small, a researcher can administer a data collection tool, for example, a questionnaire, to its entire selection of cases or elements. However, universes in quantitative research, such as survey research, are usually relatively large and geographically distributed. In cases where it is difficult, if not impossible, to solicit information from all people, a sample of the universe is selected and information is solicited from this group.

The main problem with sampling is the danger that a particular study's sample may not be representative of the population as a whole:

> "Representativeness is the major issue in sampling, and the reason for its importance is simple: you want to be able to make inferences about the population as a whole based on what you find to be true of the sample. If the sampling error is large — if different samples yield vastly different results — then your conclusions about the population are likely to be incorrect."[21]

The question therefore is how researchers can ensure that a sample is representative:

> "The answer offered by all methodologists is that random sampling is the only technique available that will ensure an optimal chance of drawing a sample that is representative of the population from which it was drawn. This then leads us to consider the two kinds of sampling available to researchers: probability sampling, which is based on randomisation, and non-probability sampling, which does not implement randomisation."[22]

While contentious, quantitative researchers avoid haphazard, accidental, convenient, quota-based non-probability types of sampling. There are special situations where some form of non-probability sampling such as purposive, judgmental or snowball sampling is the only avenue open to a researcher who needs to obtain knowledge of a difficult-to-reach specialised population.

Snowball sampling is often used in social research where research has to be conducted into relatively unknown phenomena and where it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify cases:

"Snowball sampling (also called network, chain referral, or reputational sampling) is a method for identifying and sampling (or selecting) the cases in a network. It is based on an analogy to a snowball, which begins small but becomes larger as it is rolled on wet snow and picks up additional snow. Snowball sampling is a multistage technique. It begins with one or a few people or cases and spreads out on the basis of links to the initial cases."[23]

Since the universe of former combatants in South Africa dating back to 1994 cannot be established, a random sample of representative cases could not be drawn for inclusion in the present study. Cases had to be selected non-randomly. Non-probability sampling was used to ensure that typical characteristics of former combatants were included in the sample.

Quota sampling was first used to establish the following three sets of categories and areas from which former combatants were selected:

- key segments of demobilised SANDF personnel — the different military musterings from both statutory and non-statutory forces: MK, APLA and AZANLA;

- key socio-demographic characteristics: age, gender, race and language; and

- geographic areas: the South African provinces, including both rural and urban areas

Secondly, purposive or judgmental sampling was utilised to obtain subjective information obtained veterans' organisations, the South African Service Corps, and a number of community organisations to identify potential respondents from the target group.

Finally, snowballing was also used. Additional respondents were identified by asking former combatants, who were interviewed, to name other former combatants from their friendship networks. They were also asked to assist the researchers in explaining the objectives and nature of the study to their friends. It was also made clear to the respondents that participating in the research would not harm them but would benefit all South African former combatants in the long run.

Sample

With the assistance of veterans' organisations, the Service Corps, former combatants, interested family members and community organisations in the different provinces, 307 former combatants were finally included in the study. The sample included:

- 154 MK combatants;
- 50 APLA combatants;
- 15 (MK) SDU combatants;
- 1 AZANLA combatant;
- 1 Inkatha VIP member; (total: 221);
- 43 SADF/SANDF members; and
- 7 members of formal TBVC[24] forces (total: 51)

Against the background of a total of approximately 40 000 demobilised SANDF personnel (between 1994 and 2001), the sample is reasonably large. Although the sample was not drawn with the aim to guarantee representivity (and thus generalisation of the study findings), former soldiers who were interviewed did not differ too much, or too little, from one another to sketch a

conceivable profile of them.

With regard to the three selection criteria, it should be noted that key military forces were covered in the sample. Except for race, the variety in socio-demographic characteristics was large enough to reflect a fair profile. Unfortunately, the racial segmentation in South Africa did not allow the snowball technique to cover all four racial categories. White, Asian and coloured race categories were underrepresented. The geographic areas were fairly well represented. Respondents came from all provinces and represented former soldiers from both rural and urban areas.

While the majority of respondents were from the non-statutory forces (see working definition in the appended questionnaire), members from the statutory forces (SADF/SANDF and TBVC defence forces) were also included. Thus, the sample reflected both elements of an exclusive definition of demobilisation and rationalisation and the South African context-bound use of 'demobilisation' following the demise of the apartheid state and corollary structures. In a few cases (by far the minority), people who were 'rationalised' through dismissal or voluntary severance (for example, because they chose not to move from their home base after the TBVC defence forces were integrated) were included.

Although the research results obtained from this sample cannot be generalised to all South African former combatants, the researchers were convinced that sufficient respondents were recruited from the most typical categories of the former combatant population. The sample was sufficient to explore and describe the social world of local former combatants and to construct a profile of demobilised SANDF staff. This profile can be used to make relevant recommendations, related to society and policy. Minimal requirements for drawing a representative sample of demobilised soldiers include:

- the establishment of a generally agreed upon definition of demobilised SANDF personnel;

- knowledge of the biographical and demographic characteristics of this population;

- access to full and accurate information for research purposes (the exact numbers of staff demobilised or rationalised);

- their ranking;

- time and place(s) of service;

- time and place of severance; and

- method of severance.

Future studies in this regard should have such information available before a representative sample can be drawn that may lead to conclusions which can be generalised. It is the belief that this exploratory study could be a first important step towards such future research that will benefit former soldiers.

Data collection

As already mentioned, two well-known and recognised approaches to research were used in the study. While the social survey, a quantitative method, was primarily employed to explore and

describe the social world of South African former combatants, unstructured or qualitative methods such as open-ended questions included in the survey schedule, as well as fieldnotes and reports written by fieldworkers were also utilised to gather information, albeit to a limited extent.

The social survey

For the purpose of this study, the following definition of the social survey was used:

> "The survey may be defined as a methodological technique that requires the systematic collection of data from populations or samples through the use of the interview or the self-administered questionnaire. The investigator approaches a sample of persons who have been exposed to a set of events or experiences and interviews them with respect to these experiences … [A] group of persons are observed at one point in time and questioned about their behaviours, attitudes, and beliefs with respect to a series of issues."[25]

The following two types of survey were used:

- *Individual interviews*: Fieldworkers visited respondents at the places were they were found (residences, work or other places). They recorded respondents' answers to previously constructed questions in a schedule.

- *Completion of individual questionnaires in a group context*: Former combatants and SADF staff were gathered in groups at specific venues where they completed questionnaires in the presence of fieldworkers, who explained certain questions and, when necessary, assisted those respondents with difficulties.

Aspects of former combatants' social situation (fields of interests, attitudes, perceptions, actions, background, demographic information, and others) were carefully studied and converted into specific questions which formed part of the survey questionnaire. Since the goal in survey research is that every respondent should interpret both the questions and answers similarly, special attention was given to both the wording of the questions and their possible responses, as well as their placement in the schedule. Finally, in formulating the questions, the two types of surveys were borne in mind.

Three strategies that proved to be very valuable in the design of the survey questionnaire, were:

- discussions with informants, including personnel of the SANDF, members of veterans' organisations, former combatants and other people who were knowledgeable of about combatants;

- reviews of previous research undertaken on the topic; and

- a reality check and pre-testing. The initial draft of the interview schedule was tested by conducting a focus group with a few of the former combatants who were willing to discuss the items or concepts the researchers planned to include in the study. This focus group pointed out a number of ambiguities, hidden assumptions, or conceptual complexities that the researchers overlooked. After these revisions were made, and the interviewers were trained, a pilot test of the interview schedule was undertaken.

Qualitative methods

In any discussion of qualitative data analysis, it is important that there is a clear understanding of the meaning of qualitative data and how the collection and storage of details about the social world should be done. It is also important to know exactly how to store the data before it is analysed. In lieu of this, some important aspects of qualitative analysis are outlined below.

The term 'data; refers to:

> "the rough materials researchers collect from the world they are studying; they are the particulars that form the basis of analysis. Data include materials the people doing the study actively record, such as interview transcripts and participant observation field notes. Data include what others have created and the researcher finds, such as diaries, photographs, official documents, and newspaper articles. Data are both the evidence and the clues. Gathered carefully, they serve as the stubborn facts that save the writing you will do from unfounded speculation. Data ground you to the empirical world and, systematically and rigorously collected, link qualitative research to other forms of science. Data involve the particulars you need to think soundly and deeply about the aspects of life you will explore … Some qualitative studies rely exclusively on one type of data, interview transcripts, for example, but most use a variety of data sources."[26]

For the purposes of this study, qualitative data included:

- rough material gathered by fieldworkers from particular aspects of the world of former combatants;

- material actively recorded by fieldworkers themselves;

- any information gathered during the course of the study that was not expressed in numbers;

- any human creation and product of former combatants including, for example, words, letters,

- drawings, photographs and household garbage;

- escriptions of situations, events, people, interactions and observed behaviour;

- direct quotations and excerpts from self-accounts by former combatants about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs and thoughts;

- entire passages from fieldnotes; and

- meaning former combatants attached to the world in their own words.

Four qualitative methods for data collection were employed in the study:

- participant observation;
- fieldnotes;
- fieldworker reports; and
- open-ended questions included in the quantitative schedule.

Participant observation

Participant observation refers to a social process during which:

- the fieldworker or researcher interacts with some of the people (former combatants or soldiers) before, during and after the completion of the schedule;

- in the milieu of the latter; and

- the fieldworker observes relevant social behaviour during these exchanges and systematically notes them down.

Collecting data from research participants in their natural settings was especially helpful in obtaining some understanding of the social situations in which former combatants and soldiers lived and worked. This first-hand information also facilitated the interpretation of the qualitative data gathered by means of the schedule.

Fieldnotes

The mainstay of qualitative research is the written account of what researchers (fieldworkers) hear, see, experience and think in the course of collecting and reflecting on the data in their studies. While memorising observations during the current study was often unavoidable, fieldworkers were requested to make notes as far as possible. The compilation of fieldnotes is not as straightforward as it appears, and does not merely represent summaries of events, but rather detailed reproductions of what occurred. Following recent developments in the field of qualitative research, fieldworkers were asked to look out for the following: What activities occurred? Where did the activities occur? What are the views and/or theories of the author/research participant?

More particularly, fieldworkers had to try and cover the following areas when compiling their notes:

- respondents' physical appearance, dress, mannerisms and style of acting (they had to attempt to concentrate on particular aspects of research participants that might set them apart from other participants or inform them about their affiliations);

- respondents' dialogue and conversations which fieldworkers had to paraphrase and summarise;

- a description of the physical setting where the schedule was completed;

- the particular events that the subjects were involved in, in what manner they were involved in the activities, as well the nature of the events; and

- the fieldworker's own behaviour during the interaction with the respondent (since qualitative fieldworkers or researchers are viewed as the instruments of data collection, it is crucial to take stock of their own behaviour, assumptions and anything else that might affect the data that is collected and analysed).

Typing the fieldnotes directly into a computer obviously saves time. Unfortunately, all fieldworkers did not have access to a computer. It was therefore decided to provide guidelines

on the last pages of the schedule and to request fieldworkers to make their notes there. The fieldnotes proved to be very helpful, since they provided a first step toward data analysis. Writing notes also forced fieldworkers to think clearly about what was said, the nature and meaning of particular observations and who the actor or actors were that were involved.

Fieldreports

Since research, like all human behaviour, is subjective — the process of executing the study is in the hands of fieldworkers or researchers — it is necessary to acknowledge and describe attempts made to minimise the effect of this subjectivity. Reports by fieldworkers are called 'reflective notes' by some scholars.[27]

During the exploratory study, fieldworkers were requested to compile such reports by, among others:

- speculating about what they had learned — the themes that emerged, patterns that were present, additional ideas, and thoughts that came to mind;

- reflecting on the study's methods — information about the methods employed in the study, comments on researchers' rapport with the research participants, as well as the ups and downs encountered in the study; and

- anything else that was regarded to be important to the study.

Open-ended questions included in the schedule

Strictly speaking, the open-ended questions included in the schedule cannot be regarded as truly open-ended and therefore qualitative, because only the answers are open-ended. In other words, a set of preformulated questions are carefully arranged and put to all respondents in a similar sequence. Nevertheless, this method was used in the present study. It generated valuable data from the perspective of former combatants, SADF and statutory force members on their views and attitudes and how they cope with and make sense of their situation. The main advantage of these open-ended questions for the current study was that it ensured data that was obtained relatively systematically which, in turn, facilitated the comparison of the data.

Data storage

The first concern in terms of data storage is the form in which data should be kept. Qualitative researchers usually leave the research setting and/or subject with any one or more of the following sources of data: documents, fieldnotes or cassette tapes. As already indicated, fieldnotes and reports were used in the present study. Finally, the answers to the open-ended questions were captured on the schedules. For various reasons, of which the most important were practical constraints such as funds and time, recordings were not made of any interviews. Consequently, no transcripts were constructed.

Another issue, which will inevitably confront qualitative researchers during the data storage process, concerns the construction of records and filing systems that would ensure the accessibility of data. In this study, researchers manually sorted and analysed the data. More particularly, a procedure was used that had some resemblance to the method developed by

Bertrand et al.[28] The main steps of this procedure, as applied in this study were:

- A set of codes were developed that referred to the open-ended items, the guidelines for fieldnotes included in the schedule, as well as to themes used in the fieldwork reports.

- The verbatim answers in the schedule, fieldnotes and reports were studied and codes were provided according to the specific open-ended question asked during the interview, the particular guideline employed in the fieldnotes, and the specific heading used in the fieldreports.

- Quotable passages were marked.

- Topics were taken one by one and the coded items in materials were studied to establish whether there were relationships or discernible patterns between the various topics or codes.

Data analysis

The following definition of qualitative data analysis portrays the key features of the process of making sense of the data in the current study:

> "Data analysis is the process of systematically searching and arranging the interview transcripts, field-notes, and other materials that you accumulate to increase your own understanding of them and to enable you to present what you have discovered to others. Analysis involves working with data, organising them, breaking them into manageable units, synthesising them, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell others. For most projects, the end products of research are dissertations, books, papers, presentations, reports or, in the case of applied research, plans for action. Data analysis moves you from the rambling pages of description to those products."[29]

Selection and training of fieldworkers

Fieldworkers or interviewers are the 'foot soldiers' in any research project, whether consisting of structured scheduled interviews or qualitative interviews. Consequently, it is crucial that they are carefully selected and properly trained. Careful attention to the selection and training of interviewers is usually time well-spent.

A number of social scientists identified two important phases in interviewer training: 'general' and 'study-specific'. These phases can be described as follows:

> "The first phase consists of a general orientation to the requirements and routines of standardised interviewing. This can be done by means of lectures, demonstrations, and videos, and might include, for example, information about reading questions as worded, the meaning of different instructions on interview schedules, and demonstrations of nondirective probing … The second phase of training is specific to the study being planned. It involves thoroughly familiarising interviewers with the purposes of the study, the specific questions to be asked, the layout of the interview schedule, and the nature of the respondents to be interviewed. And, most important, interviewers should actually conduct some supervised practice interviews during this phrase of training."[30]

In this study, particular attention was paid to the general and project or study-specific training. This included practice interviews under the supervision of the Social Sciences Consultancy (SSC).

While some social scientists may prefer other data collection methods, virtually all researchers, at some time during their careers, will use quantitative or qualitative interviews to collect data. There are a number of important principles, skills and steps in conducting these two types of interviews. While all these factors may be taken into account during the execution of the interview, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the role of the interviewer in the entire process is of the utmost importance. Fieldworkers should therefore be carefully selected and well-trained if the collected data is to be valid, reliable and credible.

Promising young researchers were approached to assist with collecting information from former combatants. A three-day training course was presented on various dimensions of social research, including the 'general' and 'study-specific' phases of interviewer training, and other aspects of particular interest to the present study. Through this general and specific training, 11 fieldworkers (some with previous experience and others with no previous fieldwork training) were equipped and empowered to conduct fieldwork — a crucial stage in a project of this nature.

Data analysis

Inferential methods — the instruments used in this study to make sense of the former combatant phenomenon — are in accordance with the positivistic model. Suffice it to state here:

- This model of science is founded on the assumption that social phenomena can be unambiguously defined and delineated. Moreover, this is linked to assertions that particular features of such realities can be categorised 'objectively' by researchers and can be measured by the application of numbers to such categories, as well as the number of cases within each of the types.

- The related belief is that phenomena are amenable to statistical analysis. This is clearly reflected in the way quantitative researchers formulate and test explanatory and predictive models of causation. Quantitative researchers assume that aspects of the social world can be simplified and represented by such models.

The key steps and decisions taken during the inferential process of the study are discussed below.

Computing data

After fieldworkers had completed the schedules, these were checked to establish whether they were properly completed. Thereafter, six people captured the data on computer using of SPSS, a statistical programme. The data was entered as soon as the completed schedules were received. This enabled researchers to control the capturing process continuously.

As already mentioned, the schedule contained precoded, as well as open-ended questions. Recoding and coding for numeric and non-numeric data were done after the raw data was entered into the computer. The answers to open-ended questions were entered into the datafile verbatim. Non-numeric data, or string variables, included, among others:

- type of training or education received;

- aspired careers;
- demographic data, such as residential area; and
- reasons for unemployment.

After having reached agreement on clustering, the researchers clustered or categorised the answers to open-ended questions into fewer, and therefore more manageable, categories. Recoding and newly computed variables were then created.

The capturing process pointed to some adjustments that had to be made during the completion of the schedules. It became clear that questions relating to employment and non-employment by the SANDF had to be dealt with more cautiously, since, for example, some respondents indicated that they were (briefly) employed, but never wore a uniform (the so-called 'demobilised' category or people on the CPR). Furthermore, some respondents who completed the schedule themselves did not always complete the entire schedule. Of course, this is a common shortcoming in self-administered surveys, and its effect can often be reduced, for example, by rephrasing and reordering the items or questions. This was not possible in this study, since readjusting the schedule would have led to answers becoming incomparable.

During the cleansing of the complete data set, it appeared that the schedule could have been improved in several respects. For instance, questions on training experiences within non-statutory and statutory forces caused some confusion because the answers to these questions showed questionable overlaps. Completion of the schedule was not always done correctly, which also resulted in inconsistencies in answers given to different questions. While some of these inconsistencies (for example, employed respondents giving reasons for unemployment) could not have been solved, others could have been corrected by building controls into the schedule. Inconsistencies in answers to the questions pointed to the need in future studies to rephrase a number of questions and for fieldworkers to take more trouble to ensure that respondents feel comfortable with both the schedule and the interview situation.

It must be pointed out that, since the former combatant phenomenon is very sensitive, more intense training of the interviewers is required. Fieldworkers have to be sensitive to the following aspects during the interview: recruiting of former SANDF personnel to assist with the research; the manner in which potential respondents are introduced to the interview; the place where the interview is to be conducted; and guiding the respondents through the questions. As is clear from the section dealing with the fieldwork, the current study offers some very useful insights into how interviewers should deal with the specific problems and circumstances in which former combatants find themselves and how to ensure a 'safe' interview environment.

Computing the former combatant phenomenon: Numbers (frequency counts) and percentages

An important consideration in quantitative research is to obtain the incidence, or number of times the phenomenon they want to analyse occurs in their study area, over a given period of time. While quantitative researchers can utilise official sources like data gathered by a government department, or ask a sample of people about their knowledge of and/or perceptions of an issue, these still have to be represented in some quantitative value. In the study, both numbers and percentages of responses were calculated.

Numbers are generally regarded as inappropriate and misleading, since only a minimum of simplistic scientific analyses can be made with frequency counts:

"The essential problem with comparing the absolute frequencies of an observed trait

or status is that such counts ignore the total number of cases in each group (e.g. males vs. females; whites vs. nonwhites) eligible to occupy the status or exhibit the particular trait. When the total number of cases in the comparison groups is equal, then the frequencies can be compared directly. When the comparison group differs in size, however, we need to take explicitly into account the size difference."[31]

Percentaging provides a general measure that takes proportions into account:

> "The percentage is … a … way of expressing the frequency occurrence of a status or trait per 100 cases of subjects. The percentage is computed by dividing the frequency of delinquency by the number of subjects and then multiplying by 100 (percentage = frequency of delinquents ÷ number of subjects X 100)."[32]

People find percentaging more appealing because it provides a sense of proportion or an implicit comparison with other known proportions.

In concluding the discussion of inferential analysis, the following cautionary words are in order.

It is important to realise that the study focused only on two-variable relationships. Since social phenomena are complex and particular phenomena are related to various other social phenomena, it is important in social analyses that a third (possibly even more) relationship between the studied phenomena and other social phenomena should be examined. Using more than two variables in social research requires that the researcher use sophisticated techniques such as multivariate or factor analysis. This type of analysis — to examine the relationship between particular dimensions of the former combatant phenomenon and various other variables at the same time — was not used in this study. The main reason was the fact that the study was meant to be exploratory. It was therefore not possible study to:

- gain an estimate of the substantive significance of a combined set of explanatory variables;

- attribute weights to each explanatory variable, which is proportionate to the importance of any variable in explaining variations in some aspect of former combatant behaviour level, while holding constant the effects of all other variables; and

- construct causal models of the former combatant phenomenon:

- it is common to posit and test a composite model which specifies the collective and respective contributions of a number of explanatory variables at one and the same time, rather than examine a number of separate two-variable hypotheses. This is done by the use of techniques of multivariate analysis (including the calculation of multiple correlations) which permit the examination of the strength of association of several variables at one and the same time."[33]

Furthermore, the data analysis is underpinned by the belief that quantitative data (survey research) enables the drawing of inferences about the population or sample surveyed. However, generalising the study's research results to the larger group of demobilised SANDF personnel, as has already been pointed out, is not possible, since the sample on which they are based is not representative of all demobilised SANDF personnel in South Africa. Such representivity was impossible as information on demobilised soldiers is limited and seemingly not accurate or reliable. This is partly due to a lack of capacity and resources to build such a

datafile, the speed at which the demobilisation process coincided with the transformation and rationalisation processes, and because information on SANDF personnel is classified. In any discussion of this study's findings, the analyses can therefore at best be regarded as tentative and subject to further study.

Data quality

Due to the fact that social research investigates human beings, it is bound to contain errors. It therefore goes without saying that the main goal of the social scientist is to minimise observer effects or nuisance variables as far as possible.

The following excerpts from fieldreports describe how one nuisance variable, attached to former combatants' perceptions and their circumstances, posed a major challenge to fieldworkers:

> "I have done more than 20 face-to-face interviews. I conducted most of the interviews at the respondents' homes. The interviewees were mostly in favour that the interviews were conducted at their homes. There were a few who didn't feel comfortable with me knowing where they lived and who gave me a venue of their choice and I would just go wherever they said. Not all these military people have settled down. There are still those who are unsettled and believe that the war is not over yet. They mostly belonged to MK and APLA. They are still militant and claim that there are still incidents where MK and APLA members are being abducted and killed mysteriously at their homes at night. Others are imprisoned unconstitutionally. One respondent gave an example of his colleague with whom he served with during exile. Because he's an MK man, he was arrested on charges of assault and because of his background he's been awaiting trial for the past 12 months. He claimed his colleague told him whilst visiting him in detention that one of the prison officials said that the government is not comfortable with them running around loose. Therefore, it's a relief for the high commissions when they are locked up so that an eye can be kept on them. He went on to say that 'our government is aware of all these incidents but is just keeping a blank (blind) eye as though they know nothing'. I observed that this particular respondent was near breaking point. I found him very depressed and looking as though he had been told that the world is coming to an end. Life has beaten the worst out of him. He looked as though he didn't care about life anymore. When I was about to leave he started crying. I tried to comfort him and told him that he was not alone as such studies as those I'm conducting are ways and means to see how they can be helped. He then told me of how he has lost his two children and wife because he could no longer support them after he had been retrenched (demobilised). He thanked me for listening to him for he needed to talk to someone. I left feeling sorry for him"[34]

> "The fieldwork was a touching experience of a mistake that deserve not be repeated, as it was more harmful than good. Some respondents were very emotional and couldn't go ahead with the interviews. I had to understand that and tried to comfort some were I was able; it was really difficult to see a man crying his heart out. My experience and comprehension of the situation were that these people were failing dismally to restore the dignity they once had; there was no hope or light at the end of the tunnel that they will ever make it in the future. Lucky for those who were able to go back to school and study further. It has earned them the right to a new employment."[35]

Another set of observer effects involved logistic arrangements that had to be made with the team of fieldworkers, various members of veterans' organisations and SANDF officials and others who assisted with contacting former combatants and/or prospective respondents from different geographic areas themselves. This complicated process often brought unforeseen and unexpected situations. The following accounts by fieldworkers describe these difficulties:

> "However, the only weakness was the choice of the fieldworkers. Some of them are currently employed on a full-time basis and they were not readily available to conduct such interviews. Alternative arrangements had to be made from time to time because of this unavailability. It is suggested that future fieldworkers should be drawn from the pool of unemployed people who could become available when their service is required, and that they should be capacitated in field research."[36]

> "[M]ost ex-militants were reluctant and uncertain of the motive behind the whole exercise … those who left the military because of reasons known to them, felt that they are being traced and targeted, and hesitated to participate."[37]

> "Some venues were small for the envisaged numbers expected. This is due largely to the fact that we accepted venues offered to us. On the positive side, it seemed to make it easier for some participants to discuss their responses … Fieldworkers were at times given short notice to attend interview meetings. This might have been due to the time it took to make arrangements despite having warned/spoken against this ... AAC needs to improve on the office communication and co-ordination in order to afford fieldworkers information and messages in good time."[38]

Conclusion

While attempts were made to minimise nuisance variables in the study, and it is believed that these attempts were successful enough for the research findings to be regarded as valid, it must be emphasised that, because of the exploratory nature of the study, these results should at best be regarded as tentative, even though they are valuable and insightful.

Because of the current scope of the study, there are undoubtedly many aspects of the 'world' of South African former combatants that still need to be unravelled. It is hoped that future researchers will undertake large-scale studies of the circumstances of these former military personnel. Hopefully, research of this nature will aid in unravelling and finding solutions to the difficulties that this group experiences in their day-to-day living because of the various social changes that came about with the newly established democracy.

Chapter 3
INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILISATION PROCESSES

The integration of seven armed forces to form the new SANDF was set in motion after difficult and complex bargaining between negotiators from MK and the SADF. While there were other actors involved, such as the TBVC defence forces and non-statutory forces such as APLA and AZANLA, the main stakeholders — both numerically and politically — were the old SADF, a considerably large and well-trained regular army, and MK, the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), which consisted of externally trained soldiers (mostly guerrilla but some with conventional training and deployment experience) and internally trained self-defence units (SDUs).

The Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC), which was co-chaired by both MK and SADF members, for the creation of the SANDF during early 1994, put the framework for the integration process in place. These former forces included the SADF (85 000 members) and the four TBVC homeland armies (10 000 members), which are referred to as the *statutory forces*. The *non-statutory forces* included MK (20 000 members); APLA (6 000 members) associated with the Pan Africanist Congress; AZANLA, the military wing of what is loosely referred to as the Black Consciousness Movement (a few hundred members); and the Inkatha VIP Protection Units (600 members) associated with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

Members of all the forces, which had submitted CPRs by midnight on 26 April 1994 automatically became integrated into the new force. After negotiations with the IFP, the former KwaZulu-Natal self-protection police force (1 800 members) was later directly incorporated on a preferential basis and not integrated into the system. Although there was a difference in the manner in which these members were integrated into the new SANDF, all were integrated and all were equally new in the SANDF.

The former SADF, with its well-developed organisational ability and complexity in comparison to the other armed forces, provided the framework and infrastructure for the integration process. It was equipped with the established, complex and differentiated structures of a modern, conventional army and was expected to set the pace for the integration process, because it had the administrative systems for large-scale organisational management. This meant that, despite the ANC's electoral victory, the SADF inevitably played a major — if not leading role — in the attempted transformation of the armed forces during the transitional period. The SADF's doctrines, standards and procedures featured prominently in the framework that was used for rebuilding the new force.[39] According to the new political dispensation that emerged after 27 April 1994, the new force now had to move towards building its own identity in accordance with the principles of a democratic South Africa.

This section on integration represents some of the empirical findings of an exploratory, qualitative study conducted into the integration process of the armed forces during the period October to December 1998. Some additional information was gleaned from other studies, publications and reports since then, as well as from unstructured interviews with current SANDF and former SADF and MK staff. The aim of this chapter is to report on integration as a process of social change, as well as to establish the functionality, or dysfunctional impact of integration on the new SANDF, in particular — and (perhaps) on South African society, in general. The sections on demobilisation and rationalisation of the SANDF are based on documentary studies of the SANDF.

A qualitative research procedure, which involved the study of content analyses of documentary sources on the integration process, was firstly conducted. Thereafter, an interview schedule consisting of 25 open, unstructured questions was compiled from the documentary sources. In-depth, qualitative interviews were conducted with ten high-ranking officers and commanders who had first-hand knowledge of the integration process. They had different political affiliations and were employed in different sections of the SANDF. Two directors of the Defence Secretariat in Pretoria were also interviewed to establish their opinions of the integration process. Five of the 12 interviews were conducted at training units in Cape Town, Bloemfontein and Potchefstroom, in order to research opinions and problems occurring at ground level. Confidentiality was guaranteed to all respondents. The advantage was that open and frank discussions were held with respondents. A qualitative analysis was undertaken of the 300 different opinions that were expressed. Categories were constructed and interpreted by taking norms of behaviour (similarities and dissimilarities) into account. For subsequent updating

(1999-2001) reports, publications, media reports and unstructured interviews with former and current members of the SANDF and non-statutory forces were used, the latter inclusive of demobilised personnel.

The SANDF is analysed in this part of the study from a functionalist perspective. The main premise is that military matters of institutional nature were/are regarded as an organised system of activities directed to reach specific goals (integration) and functions in order to survive as a system in the greater South African society. For the purpose of this discussion, a summary of the opinions of respondents is given and put into context by also providing a brief background to the topic.

Complexities of the integration process

Initially, much of the transformation of the SANDF revolved around the integration of the so-called statutory (SF) and non-statutory forces (NSF). The primary objective of the integration process was to unite soldiers from various military backgrounds peacefully to establish an institution that was professional, efficient and representative. The integration of the seven forces was a complex process, because it involved different organisational structures and political affiliations among former adversaries, who still distrusted one another.[40]

In total, 24 intakes of military personnel were processed since 1994. Eighteen intakes, the last in July 1998, were processed at Wallmansthal, five at De Brug and one at Hoedspruit. The 'assembly phase' of integration was only then considered complete — except for individual former non-statutory force 'late-comers' who were belatedly integrated.

Integration was not achieved by merely combining the seven former forces into a single force. Personnel had to go through several steps before they were 'fully integrated'. The integration process consisted of:

- registering individuals on the PERSOL system;

- determining bridging training requirements and, where necessary, undergoing specified bridging training;

- entering into a contract with the SANDF; and

- placing in a specific SANDF post and rank.[41]

Furthermore, none of these forces was to retain its original form or structure, but was expected to contribute its best attributes to the SANDF. Therefore, integration was also regarded as a process of social change. Old fears, misconceptions and impressions had to be discarded and a new start had to be made. Throughout, the integration process remained a complicated and sensitive process, fraught with difficulties. Soon after the democratic elections in 1994, the ANC and the National Party (NP) expressed that they were in favour of the quick integration and placement of soldiers, with the result that support structures were not readily in place to cope with the process:

> "Neither side at grassroots ... fully understood the detailed mechanics of what had been decided in the JMCC ... Hence for much of its early history integration was almost entirely haphazard, largely experimental and a learning process for all participants."[42]

All intakes were broadly overseen by the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT), who assisted in the certification and adjudication of the processes.

Relationships between personnel of all ethnic groups, both male and female, were precarious, especially during the first few years of integration. However, as integration progressed, relationships improved. Agreement on its success remained tenuous:

> "[W]hen questioned on the outcome of integration three years down the line, former NSF and former SADF personnel seldom concurred on whether, how and to what extent integration had 'worked' because the perspectives of each are largely ... rooted in different historical experiences, expectations — and indeed, without putting too fine a point upon it — a different universe of social and military world-views that directly mirrors the institutional origins of each armed formation."[43]

The process also took much longer than was originally anticipated. Approximately 25 000 MK and APLA members were eventually assembled from a total estimated list of 42 266 (the final figure on the CPR). Only 19 000 combatants had been integrated into the SANDF by July 1998. The vast majority (90.5%) were integrated into the South African Army.[44] The rest did not turn up for integration for various reasons.

Different opinions were expressed, as is usually the case in unstructured or qualitative research, when respondents were asked whether they thought that the integration of the armed forces was complicated because it involved organisational integration. The majority of respondents (58%) were of the opinion that they were definitely experiencing both organisational and racial problems during integration, because of the organisational growth of several thousands of former adversaries who, simultaneously, still distrusted each other. Respondents stressed that some of the difficulties experienced were due to the fact that the various armed forces had different doctrines, organisational structures, and widely divergent political backgrounds. Previous military training also took place under widely divergent doctrines, which included British regimental approaches, Soviet, later Russian, Chinese, several Eastern European approaches, as well as influences from other African countries with their own doctrines. Following the unbanning of liberation movements and preceding integration, a limited number of combatants received conventional training in India, Britain, Russia and Uganda.

The race component also contributed to the complexity of integration. There were previously no black high-ranking officers in the SADF, but as officers were appointed to these top-level positions, no racial or ethnic problems were reported. There was the belief that politics was more of a controlling factor in the integration process of high-ranking officers than racism. Personnel in lower rankings, however, reported racial incidents. This usually happened when staff members were reprimanded for mistakes made or when they failed examinations. Black members felt discriminated against when instructors were white.[45] These observations were regarded as important, but were not heeded at the time. In at least one reported incidence since integration, at the Tempe Base near Bloemfontein, did racism lead to a fatal shooting incident between officers.

In the training units, the positive binding factor for integration was the commonalities between similar specialist training, while the negative factor was the problem of former white SADF members who felt that they were not 'properly integrated', because their numbers did not start with 94 or higher like those of former non-statutory force members. They retained their old force numbers. They felt that they were discriminated against and would be disadvantaged in future promotions. Although no open animosity was reported between troops themselves, racial issues

often came to the fore.

The general belief was that integration on the political, practical and administrative level had to be enmeshed in order to attain overall success. Practical integration, in terms of timeframes and schedules in which certain people had to be in certain positions by a certain time, had to be completed by the end of 1999 — two years after the original date set for completion. Full integration, however, took much longer. Only during 2000 was legislation introduced to finalise the process.[46]

The integration of the TBVC homeland forces was a smaller scale operation, in comparison to that of MK, APLA and the SADF. The integration was simplified by the structural similarities between these forces and the SADF. Due to their constitutional classification, alongside the SADF, as statutory forces, their integration was "far less disruptive, problematic and infinitely more regulated."[47] The TBVC forces used the same military equipment and, to a certain extent, had been exposed to similar conventional training systems, doctrines and standards as the SADF, which saw them as "natural, albeit minor allies in the integration process."[48]

When respondents were asked whether they thought that the members of the TBVC forces integrated more easily because they could fit into the existing rank structure, both positive and negative viewpoints were held. A large proportion (58%) of respondents thought that the integration of the TBVC forces was achieved at greater speed and somewhat more amicable, because they were from conventional forces that had an established rank structure, unlike MK and APLA, which were liberation forces with different ranking systems or none at all. The latter was especially applicable to the SDUs that were trained inside South Africa during the 1980s. The TBVC forces were familiar with the SADF structure, since members of the SADF's specialised training units previously trained TBVC soldiers on an annual basis and, on several occasions, joint training exercises and/or operations took place. They were therefore not unfamiliar with one another and the integration process went relatively smoothly, because of their common training and interests.

However, it was a disruptive process for the members themselves, because the TBVC forces previously received higher wages and allowances than the SADF. This meant that they now received less remuneration in the new SANDF. They were also transferred away from their home units, which had harsher financial implications for them. Some of these members then resigned and were demobilised because of their preference to live in a particular area and/or as a result of financial troubles. Those TBVC members who remained in the new SANDF, and were found to be suitable candidates, were promoted immediately after they had completed their suggested promotion courses. They had immediate parity as a result of affirmative action, which gave them preferential treatment to enable them to catch up with those from more privileged backgrounds. The SANDF was now striving to uphold and strengthen its equal opportunities programme.

The legitimisation of the new SANDF entailed, among others, the successful fusion of the former liberation and conventional armies in the eyes of the broader South African community, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the international community. However, as one respondent said:

> "This was not what really brought legitimacy to the new SANDF. It was the appointment of black officers of MK and APLA that contributed to the legitimacy. The SANDF now acted on their behalf and not against them like before."

Legitimisation therefore depended on and was underpinned by the representivity of integrated personnel from various backgrounds on all levels.

Credibility of the SANDF was seen in conjunction with legitimacy. For the SANDF to be credible, integration had to reflect the different national, gender, ethnic and language groups present within South African society. Credibility was strengthened by a new vision for a new unified force.

On the questions whether respondents thought that the integration of MK and APLA soldiers legitimised the new SANDF in the eyes of South African society, and whether the new SANDF had credibility in the broader society, different opinions were expressed. The majority (92%) of respondents affirmed that the inclusion of MK and APLA soldiers led to greater credibility and legitimacy for the SANDF. Previously, the majority of black people saw the SADF as the instrument of the minority regime (and, to a degree, the white population) to oppress them. Now the SANDF was seen in a different light, although all suspicions were not immediately removed. One former MK commander said:

> "People must not think that we were absorbed and were tokens of the SADF. The more people understood that MK was in control and senior posts were filled by them, the more legitimate the SANDF would be in the eyes of the broader South African population."

More black people (men and women) were integrated and the broader population accepted the SANDF as their own defence force, despite ethnic and language diversities. The proportionate relationship between black and white was much better than before, but imbalances still had to be addressed.

One respondent was of the opinion that, although legitimacy and credibility were obtained over a period of time, both MK and APLA soldiers were still regarded by some as being inefficient. This perception arises from the disparities in the training and competency levels of integrated personnel (and perhaps because of the perception held by some, both inside and outside the military establishment, that training doctrines were/are incompatible). There was also the perception that black people perceived the SANDF as credible, but that segments of the white population thought that its credibility had deteriorated and that it had to be earned again, something that would take time and had to be earned through performance.[49]

Professionalism and high standards had repeatedly been emphasised by former SADF senior officers as prerequisites for the integration process. The assumption was that liberation and TBVC forces lacked the necessary professional standards. Former SADF integrated personnel feared that the lack of conventional training of the constituent liberation forces would have a serious effect on previous "high standards of professionalism."[50] Although senior officers always believed in "professional standards at an international level,"[51] integrated personnel occupying lower ranks saw these standards as measures for institutional demarcation of former non-statutory force members and the maintenance of former SADF leadership over the new force. The approach adopted was that standards would not be compromised but that those soldiers with potential would be given the opportunity to achieve these internationally accepted standards. Bridging training that would qualify individuals to meet appointment criteria in preparation for particular courses required for leadership development was therefore provided at the beginning of 1995. The notion of 'accelerated bridging and training programmes' underpinned this new approach, while it was seldom verbalised as such by former SADF staff. The training was available to all integrated personnel who wanted to pursue a successful career

in the SANDF, but lacked the specific qualifications or expertise to do so.

Most of the respondents believed that the SANDF received a setback in terms of professionalism and training. Some expertise was lost when well-trained members resigned and took severance packages. However, professionalism was retained from the old SADF and transferred into the SANDF. Training units complied with internationally accepted standards and standardised training of integrated personnel took place.

MK members (and some APLA former combatants) felt that their somehow unconventional training and ideologies had to be incorporated and recognised as well. However, the standards (and perhaps the content and future role) of such training were questioned by the former SADF leadership and members. The prevalent belief seemingly was that guerrilla training was undesirable for the complex technological environment of a modern defence force. In retrospect, the benefit and potential inclusiveness that could have been effected by incorporating elements of the different training doctrines, training procedures and operational approaches, were sadly overlooked. South Africa, had integrated different military traditions into a unified defence force (Union Defence Force) at least once before in 1912, after the Anglo-Boer War. A potential warehouse of own lessons learned was thus regrettably overlooked.

There were numerous conflicts over standards during the integration process. The main belief was that standardisation of training within the force was imperative, especially when considering the diversity of training cultures, backgrounds and operational experience of the integrated personnel. The aim was that all integrated personnel should fulfil established course requirements before being appointed to specific ranks or posts. However, previously disadvantaged members were fast-tracked through the system by giving them preferential access to promotion courses. They were sometimes promoted without even doing the course first. This was mainly due to a backlog in bridging and senior staff training. However, since the belief was that promotions were traditionally in line with expertise and courses passed, complaints were received about the promotion of black members who had not yet completed courses, but were nevertheless promoted.

All the respondents agreed that race, ethnicity and culture were problems that would always be prevalent. Coupled with these was distrust. Yesterday's enemies were now integrated into one defence force, where distrust prevailed as a result of competition for the same scarce resources. Racism on both sides was far from dead, particularly further down the organisational hierarchy on lower rankings.[52] Many of the incidents of racism occurred at unit level between members of lower rank. Racism and ethnicity, however, were not regarded as real hindrances among the leadership or else their "ideals of integration would be in danger." In the exploratory study, a variety of demobilised members also complained about incidences of racism before their demobilisation. These complaints relate mostly to the lower rankings and occurred until 1999.

A complete change of mindset and attitudes over time is the only remedy for problems around racism and ethnicity in the SANDF. The development of mutual trust between all integrated personnel was the major challenge of the integration process. Failure to control feelings of distrust and racial tensions undermined effectiveness and cohesion. Ethnicity, however, still had a definite role to play in the SANDF, since proportionate ratios were officially used to determine guidelines for rationalisation.

The views of black and white officers on affirmative action differed. In general, white staff members felt that affirmative action undermined standards and competency. Former non-statutory force members' training and skills were questioned as they had no experience and

training in conventional warfare, and the perception prevailed of disparities in the training levels and competency of these members. The feeling was that equal opportunities did not as yet exist and that all promotions were surely not advanced on merit. As an interim measure, affirmative treatment was applied on various occasions. The need for preferential treatment of previously disadvantaged members led to this decision. One former MK general said that, "*[i]f you base everything on merit, it would still be a white SANDF because black people were delayed in their training*." The counterargument was that, if inexperienced members were put into positions of authority without the necessary qualifications and experience, it would undermine competency, standards and morale in the SANDF.

On the issue of discipline, some respondents suggested that discipline was lacking. This was mainly because it was guided by discipline in a transitional phase (pragmatic disciplinary approaches dictated by a transitional context). It was suggested that this had to be rectified in due course. Discipline in all military forces (inclusive of liberation armies) remains an important factor in order to maintain standards and legitimacy. The maintenance of discipline between black troops and white instructors, for example, was sometimes problematic. This was partly due to the use of language (another salient issue at the time) since some former MK and APLA integrated personnel were not fluent in either English or Afrikaans. The instructors at some infantry units experienced disciplinary problems with TBVC members because of what they chose to refer to as the 'half-day culture'. The general viewpoint at the time was that TBVC soldiers did not integrate well into the infantry. Currently, these problems seem to have dissipated.

The crime rate in some training units was higher than before and regular court martials were conducted. Morale at ground level, nevertheless, was reported to be quite high. However, the morale of most of the former SADF members could be questioned, particularly at middle management level, where most resignations occurred, mainly because of insecurities regarding affirmative action, promotions and (lack of) perceived future career opportunities.

The process of change was reported to be conceptually complex for integrated personnel, because of insecurities and tendencies to hold on to the status quo. The general viewpoint was that officers wanted change to occur, but that non-commissioned officers resigned because of problems with affirmative action. There was the notion that change and promotions were forced onto previously disadvantaged, unqualified members because of political and social pressures. On the question whether national consensus had been built around defence, the responses were positive with regard to the White Paper on Defence to which everybody felt they contributed in a democratic way. Integrated personnel were compelled to accept change, otherwise it would be impossible to unite the armed forces into an effective, cohesive force.

On the question whether integrated individuals from different military backgrounds perceived themselves as a cohesive fighting force, some respondents indicated that a joint focus was still lacking, but others affirmed that cohesion was undeniably established during Operation Boleas in Lesotho. However, the comment was again made that some integrated members "carried the rank, but not the practical know-how to execute the task." The general perception is that it is:

> "difficult to advance members through the ranks at an accelerated pace. The posts associated with these ranks require that incumbents have the necessary education, training or course qualifications, as well as extensive experience in a variety of roles."[53]

The perception that integration was a short-term process was obviously incorrect. The whole

process started after the elections in April 1994 and the last intake at Wallmansthal only occurred in July 1998. The physical part of integration took about three years to complete, but the political part, which respondents referred to as the 'psychological dimension' where mindsets and attitudes had to be changed, would take much longer. Indeed, judging from some of the feedback in this study, this change of mindset is still a point of concern and perhaps requires more attention, especially among lower ranking officers. If not dealt with, some of the legacies of the integration process may linger on and/or impact on demobilised staff and their reintegration into the broader civil and economic community in South Africa.

Integration was noticeably successful as an administrative exercise. Although difficulties existed, substantial numbers of integrated personnel were processed and retrained according to requirements of the SANDF.[54] It has been reported to have been one of the most successful integration processes in the world. However, some felt that it could have been done differently in some respects and faster in others but, when all the positive and negative points are considered, the conclusion was that it was successful and functionally effective. The SANDF now had more legitimacy, credibility and was more representative than ever before.

However, due to the enormous, unaffordable size of the new force after integration (more than 100 000 members), rationalisation became imperative. However, a few disgruntled comments were made about how "rationalisation was not done on merit, but on government decisions as they are trying to set the population balance straight." Younger white members interviewed felt that they could still be productive and deliver excellent work for the SANDF, instead of being rationalised too early.[55]

It is clear from the various findings that integration as a social process was functionally effective, sufficient and necessary for the SANDF, because it contributed to the peaceful and orderly change in the defence system. Furthermore, it could simultaneously be regarded as dysfunctional because of some integration problems that still need attention. The SANDF therefore has an institutional challenge to deal with issues of representivity, equality, racism, discipline and standards of training of all integrated personnel.

Demobilisation

The negotiated settlement between the NP and the ANC had a specific effect on the nature of the demobilisation process. An arrangement was made for MK, APLA and AZANLA soldiers to return to South Africa as 'unarmed civilians'.[56] No formal assembly of soldiers took place. When they arrived in South Africa, the only concern was for their economic reintegration. They were given R50 each and sent back to their respective communities. They had to wait two months before they received grants of R300 each administered by Khotso House. Most of the soldiers received six payments of R300 each. Some, however, were paid as much as R2 500.[57] Some of the soldiers found alternative employment while they waited for the formal demobilisation process to start. Others lived in absolute poverty and suboptimum social conditions.

The formal demobilisation and reintegration of MK and APLA soldiers into South African society started after the April 1994 elections. Legislation to this effect was only passed in 1996. During 1994, the main concern was the integration of the seven armed forces. Planning for demobilisation only started when a crisis emerged over what should happen to the elderly and many other integrated personnel who had failed to meet the standards set for integration. Demobilised women also presented a problem, since their reintegration into civil society had to "surmount various gender barriers."[58] Many of these women found themselves jobless on the streets once their initial severance pay was exhausted.

The SANDF demobilisation package had three components. The first was once-off gratuities that ranged from R42 058 to R12 734, depending on the period of service. The second was limited counselling on personal matters, careers, social services and finances that stretched over a period of two weeks. The third was an opportunity to join the Service Corps for 18 months, during which they would receive training in basic skills, life skills and adult literacy, without any further training or social integration offered.[59] During the course of the exploratory study, the Service Corps was training at least 30% of the respondents. Others were unemployed, had part-time employment or some form of employment since demobilisation.

Joining the Service Corps was not compulsory and most MK and APLA soldiers decided not to join. The leadership of the SANDF, however, was concerned about discharging former combatants into civil society. In order to "discharge its responsibilities," the SANDF therefore established the Service Corps as a "centre-piece institution for rationalisation/demobilisation."[60] The purpose of the corps was to provide training for both integrated and rationalised members of the SANDF in order to equip them for civilian life. The reasons for the lack of interest in the Service Corps varied. Some thought that the training was too basic and others thought they had adequate skills to survive as civilians (some MK soldiers were given the opportunity to study while in exile).

According to Mashike, there were those who took advantage of the opportunity to join the Service Corps and there were others who misused the opportunity.[61] This gave rise to two groups, which Mashike referred to as the 'winners' and 'losers'.[62] The winners were those who were integrated into the new SANDF and those who found alternative employment. The Service Corps was apparently intended to cater for the losers, as a form of long-term integration, which in the end proved to be inadequate in meeting the demands of former combatants. The skills training offered by the Service Corps was often abundantly offered in civil society, for example, motor mechanics and bricklaying, and finding a job was therefore nearly impossible. The chapter on the economic environment deals with some of these issues in more detail. Mashike is of the opinion that the current impetus towards a neo-liberal hegemony is dividing workers into the 'core' (skilled workers) and the 'periphery' (unskilled workers or less-skilled workers).[63] Former soldiers are mostly seen as unskilled in a job market where everybody has to compete for scarce resources and, consequently, they remain losers. This hegemony of neo-liberalism is now unfortunately embraced by the ANC.[64] This should also be seen as a corollary to the macro-economic approach (GEAR), of which one of the short-term effects is the loss of employment opportunities.

The failure of reintegrating former combatants into civil society due to improper planning is becoming a social problem that will haunt South African society for at least the next decade. Unemployment, poverty and, consequently, crime will be with all South Africans for a while.

Rationalisation

Rationalisation of the South African military started immediately after the Namibian/Angolan war in April 1989 when supernumerary posts, which had not been budgeted for, had to be filled by returning soldiers, previously paid for by the South-West African government. A defence budget, which had peaked at 3.4% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1989, had been slashed to 2.2% of GDP by 1995 — a reduction of close to 66% in real terms within six years. These factors led the South African government to decide, in the early 1990s, to rationalise the defence force as a state institution.[65] Rationalisation was again instituted after the April 1994 elections by way of natural attrition (resignations, deaths, discharges, and freezing of posts).[66]

However, with further defence budget cuts, it was inevitable that the existing human resource structure had to be reduced accordingly. At the same time, seven armed forces were being integrated into one single united SANDF and a civilian-led Defence Secretariat was being established. This obviously led to an oversized and unaffordable force.

The integration process resulted in an almost 35% increase in personnel numbers which, in turn, resulted in increasing financial pressures.[67] It became evident that, despite the effect of natural attrition and demobilisation, a process of rationalisation would be necessary. In the past, 57% of the defence budget was spent on personnel maintenance and restructuring was therefore necessary if the Department of Defence was to become more cost-effective.[68] In accordance with new planning only 40% of the defence budget was to be allocated for personnel during 1999. This translated into a force consisting of approximately 70 000 people. The SA Army, which comprised approximately 48 000 members, had to be "rationalised to 42,700 by the end of 2001."[69] Others argued that the social trade-offs in such a short, sharp reduction process are problematic, as can be seen from some international examples.[70]

A new phase in the rationalisation of personnel commenced in 1999. The defence budget was now only 1.6% of GDP.[71] It was planned that, during 2000, 9 300 members would be retrenched with another 4 300 members during 2001, while still maintaining all services and support operations:

> "These retrenchments will be over and above those leaving by way of natural attrition and by the selective termination or non-renewal of short and medium term service contracts."[72]

The staffing of the new structures of the Department of Defence resulted in members being identified for rationalisation. For this purpose, a Rationalisation Strategy Committee, representing all roleplayers, has been established to compile a SANDF Rationalisation Strategy.[73] According to Allie, three possible options for rationalisation have been identified:[74]

The *slow* option, which allows for rationalisation by natural attrition, voluntary severance packages and non-renewal of contracts, will unfortunately take until 2008 to reach the desired effect. It will be expensive, because only 2 500 members leave the SANDF as a result of natural attrition every year.[75] In order to utilise this option to its maximum effect, recruitment in the SANDF has been minimised only to the filling of critical posts.[76]

The *fast* option makes provision for a faster reduction of staff numbers by means of employer initiated retrenchment packages. This will run concurrently with the existing voluntary severance package option. Voluntary severance packages as an option have been successfully implemented since May 1996. With the employer initiated retrenchment packages, which have not yet been approved, retrenchment would be completed by the end of 2001. These packages will only commence, however, after all components of the new Department of Defence force design have been officially approved.[77] The employer initiated retrenchment packages are expected to be less financially viable when compared to voluntary severance packages.[78]

The *recommended* option refers to the retrenchment of members through employer initiated retrenchment packages where the first group would leave in April 2000 (9 300) and the second group (4 300) in April 2001.[79] This is the recommended option to downsize the SANDF to its envisaged new force design and structure.

It was planned that natural attrition would account for the reduction by approximately 5 200

members by the end of April 2000. Voluntary severance packages would account for another 1 100 members, while the envisaged employer initiated retrenchment packages would first involve 9 300 and later 4 300 members. Approximately 20 000 members will leave the SANDF by means of any one of these mechanisms by the end of 2001.[80] However, experience from the integration and demobilisation processes indicates that this current rationalisation process may not proceed as speedily as is envisaged and that it may in fact last until 2003.

Since the Minister of Public Service, Ms Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, temporarily stopped voluntary severance packages during 2000 and only approved the employer initiated retrenchment packages for the SANDF during the last quarter of 2000, the force level will not be reached by the envisaged date. According to the personnel procurement office, the total strength of the SANDF was 78 701 by the end of April 2001. The original recommended figure for December 2000 was 70 000. It is clear that the rationalisation programme is already running behind schedule and that the target would not be reached by April 2001 as planned, but only by April 2002 at the earliest.[81] It is also significant that the name of the original retrenchment package for the SANDF has been changed by parliament to the employer initiated package. This is new package, which is initiated by the employer, makes provision for the supernumerary employee to participate in making the choice.

All members of the SANDF were compelled to apply for advertised posts in the new structure. If they did not do so and declined the offer of another post in the new structure, they ran the risk of being declared supernumerary. If their posts were declared supernumerary, it meant that members would be retrenched if all other options such as remustering, retraining and transfers were exhausted and there were no other available posts for them in the system.[82] However, if members did not find posts in the new structure, they could appeal against their possible retrenchment. Appeal boards were established at the various type formations, the SA Army Office, and at the Chief of Personnel. A special Labour Appeal Court was also created. BMATT (SA) representatives will be present at these appeal hearings to oversee the process of rationalisation.[83] The legal procedure will start within the Department of Defence and can end up at the Defence Special Tribunal for both military and Public Service Act personnel for final decisions. The eventual aim is to appoint only well-trained experienced professionals, who will simultaneously be representative of the South African population. This will be in line with the core force design as promulgated in the White Paper on Defence and through the Defence Review process, where input from civil society was employed. The end result is meant to be a 'leaner' military with an optimum balance between all arms of service (army, navy, air force and medical services).

The implementation of the structural and personnel changes envisaged for the Department of Defence may seem harsh, but they meet the government's transformation imperatives for a smaller, representative, affordable and more effective public service. An exploratory study such as this one therefore becomes important, since it may provide the initial information required, lessons learned, and perhaps even a prognosis on how to deal with the reintegration of demobilised soldiers and staff.

Conclusion

it is clear that the Department of Defence has come a long way since the first democratic elections in April 1994. It has had to overcome many obstacles in terms of the integration and transformation process, and it continues to face many challenges in terms of demobilisation and the proposed rationalisation process. Most of the restructuring has also been due to the steep defence budget cuts. The price that individual members have to pay so that the department can

comply with the financial obligations and restrictions of the new SANDF is extremely high. Operational standards are also under pressure, while highly qualified members are leaving the SANDF. How successful the transformation process has been, remains to be seen. Indeed part of the success of the demobilisation (and the transformation) process depends on whether demobilisation or rationalisation leaves more satisfied than disillusioned or angered citizens. At the moment, the scale seems to be loaded against the former, given the tentative feedback reported in this study.

The demobilisation process may have been functional to the SANDF as a whole, but for those who were demobilised (individuals and their dependants on the receiving end) — and those who will be rationalised, the process appears to be largely dysfunctional. The challenge therefore is to reintegrate those on the receiving end successfully into an economy that has had jobless growth in the recent past.

Chapter 4
PROFILE OF THE DEMOBILISED SANDF SOLDIER

The demobilised SANDF soldier has many faces: he or she may be between 20 and 60 years old, a successful entrepreneur or a disillusioned unemployed person. However, some general features emerged from the survey among 307 former members of statutory and non-statutory forces: SADF, TBVC Defence Forces, MK, APLA and AZANLA.

General information

By far the majority of respondents were black, male, less than 40 years old and former MK soldiers. The following tables and figures provide information on membership of former statutory and non-statutory forces in terms of age, gender, formal education completed and employment status. The tables show the number (base), percentage and valid percentage (the percentages for the proportion of the sample who had completed the question and/or to whom the question was applicable).

Table 1: Age

Age category	Base number	Percentage
21-30	107	35
31-40	109	36
41-50	45	15
51-60	23	8
61-70	20	7
n/a	3	1
Total	307	100*
* Due to the rounding off of percentages, the total does not add to 100%.		

Table 2: Gender

Gender	Base number	Percentage
Male	263	86
Female	40	13
n/a	4	1

Training and educational levels

Respondents were asked about training and education received during and after their military careers and/or demobilisation. Table 5 illustrates the most important formal education and training programmes that respondents had completed while serving in the statutory and non-statutory forces. The respondents were asked to list, in order of importance, up to four formal education or training programmes that they had completed while serving in the SANDF and/or any other previous armed force. The answers were collapsed into ten categories, which covered various types of training ranging from basic military training to a very specific type of training like, map-reading maps.

Figure 1: Highest level of formal education attained

Table 3: Organisation before joining the SANDF

Organisation	Base number	Percentage
MK	154	50
APLA	50	16
AZANLA	1	0
TBVC defence forces	7	2
SADF	43	14
SAPS	1	0
SDUs	15	5
Missing	36	12
Total	**307**	**100***

* Due to the rounding off of percentages, the total does not add to 100%.

Table 4: Present employment status

Status	Base number	Percentage
Study at technikon	8	3
Being trained for a skill	82	27
Completing school	1	0
Employed full-time	30	10
Employed part-time	40	13
Self-employed	18	6
Unemployed, looking for employment	113	37
Unemployed, not looking employment	5	2
Unemployed, not fit for work	4	1
Other	6	2
Total	**307**	**100**

Of the respondents, 38% mentioned one or more forms of training that they had received, while 62% did not mention any training. Table 5 clearly shows that the majority of respondents received basic military training and regarded it as one of the most important areas of training. About half of the responses (49%) referred to military training. Administration and human resources were the second most frequently mentioned form of training (10%).

Table 5: Aggregated data on training or education received while serving in the SANDF and/or any other previous military force

Formal training type	Base number	Percentage
Military	152	53
Admin and human resources	32	11
Technical	27	9
Security	17	6
Medical	12	5
Map-reading	8	3
Transport	7	3
Catering	4	1
Pilot/parachuting	3	1
Other	24	8
Total	**286**	**100**

Training received abroad, before joining the SANDF, resulted in more responses than training received during military service inside South Africa. More than half of the respondents (54%) indicated that they had received training outside the borders of South Africa. However, this training was predominantly military in nature.

Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent the training they had received, had helped them in finding other employment after leaving the SANDF. Of the one-third who received military training, more than three-quarters (77%) said that this training had not helped them to find a job. A small percentage said that the training had helped them to some extent (9%). Only 10% indicated that the training had helped them to find employment and the rest (4%) were uncertain.

Given the limited benefit of previous training, 264 respondents (88%) were very interested in receiving further training that would enable them to become self-employed. As is shown in figure 2, only 3% were not interested in further training.

Figure 2: Interest in further training

The findings presented above refer to the entire sample of respondents and may therefore hide some important differences between respondents. One obvious distinction, which was relevant for this exploratory study, is between employed and unemployed people. The next section therefore focuses on current employment status and training needs of demobilised personnel in more detail. Other individual differences such as gender, age and education were also analysed. These were reported only if relevant and significant differences were found.

Employment status and training needs

Training and education might mean different things for employed and unemployed people or those who are currently studying or in training. This section deals with employment in more detail.

Employment status was inferred from answers to the question: "What are you doing now?" Employment status contained the following categories: unemployed, in training/studying, working part-time, working full-time and pensioners or homemakers. Figure 3 displays the responses to these categories.

Figure 3: Employment status

Further analysis of the employed, unemployed and those who were studying revealed interesting patterns. First, unemployed respondents were generally younger. Within the age group 19 to 30 years old, 43% were unemployed. No gender differences were found. Significant differences in educational levels existed between the employed and the unemployed. Approximately two-thirds (65%) of those who were employed on a full-time basis had obtained grade 12 or higher, whereas this proportion was slightly more than one-third (35%) among the unemployed. Those who were studying were most likely to have a qualification between grade 9 to 11. Within the different levels of education, the proportion of studying respondents was larger among those with lower educational levels (50%) and only 34% of the higher educated respondents were currently studying.

Another interesting finding was that, among respondents who were employed on a full-time basis, a larger proportion had studied further after leaving the defence force than among the unemployed or part-time employed respondents (see table 6).

Table 6: Further studies after leaving the SANDF

Studied further	Yes	No	Total
Unemployed	11	89	100
Training/studying	40	60	100
Part-time employed	11	89	100
Full-time employed	35	65	100
Other	12	88	100
Average percentage	**22**	**78**	**100**

* This table (as well as the other tables in this chapter) include those respondents who were demobilised after being on the CPR, which was used during the integration and demobilisation processes.

The largest proportion of those who studied further was found among respondents involved in training or studying at the time of the survey. However, 60% of those in training or studying indicated that they did not study after leaving the SANDF. This might suggest that respondents

do not regard training as a form of study, but rather perceive studying as a purely academic exercise. Further research could test this hypothesis about the meaning of 'study'. Perhaps there is a need to enhance the notion that studying is not an academic exercise as such, but rather a preparation to enable participation in economic and communal activities.

Former soldiers who were currently employed were more likely to have completed formal training during their military service than those who were unemployed (see table 7).

Table 7: Formal education and/or training completed

Completed training	No	Yes	Total
Unemployed	60	40	100
Training / studying	78	22	100
Part-time employed	48	52	100
Full-time employed	46	54	100
Other	79	21	100
Average percentage	**62**	**38**	**100**

Training had not benefited all respondents to the same extent. In response to the question, "To what extent has the training that you received helped you to find other employment after leaving the SANDF?", about **35%** of the employed (full-time and part-time) respondents said that the training had helped to 'some extent' or 'a lot', whereas this was less than 8% among unemployed respondents. Among unemployed respondents, 86% indicated that training had not helped in finding employment. This proportion was significantly larger than those who were employed full-time. Only 60% were negative about the usefulness of their former training in securing employment.

However, the interest in further training was high. This interest was particularly the case among the unemployed and those already involved in training or studies. In both groups, more than 90% indicated that they were very interested in further training. However, the full-time employed (75%) and part-time employed (82%) respondents also showed keen interest in further training.

Respondents were also asked whether the SANDF had provided sufficient support when they left its employment. Overall, respondents were extremely negative about the help that they had received from the SANDF. Only 3% said that the SANDF had done enough. Among the employed, 90% indicated that the SANDF had not done enough to help former combatants. This negative perception was somewhat more frequently communicated among the unemployed. Of this group, 99% thought the SANDF had not done enough to help them when they left the military.

Almost two-thirds of the respondents (61%) mentioned ways in which the SANDF could have helped them. Table 8 shows the categories into which the responses were divided.

Table 8: What the SANDF could have done to help demobilised and rationalised personnel

Alternative assistance	Base number	Percentage
Offer work in military/assist with	27	15

obtaining job in army	27	15
Offer work unspecified/assist with obtaining job	26	14
Offer training/skills development/accredited training	76	41
Given money/better package/pension	26	14
Treated fairly (kept promise, exit interview, no racism)	23	12
Other	7	4
Total	**185**	**100**

The majority of respondents (41%) said that the SANDF could have equipped them with skills that would have improved their chances on the job market. It is noteworthy to mention that part-time workers and the unemployed were the most likely to mention skills development. This implies that, as far as future demobilisation is concerned, the need for training and skills development (especially accredited training programmes) should receive serious attention by the SANDF and other relevant authorities. Some (15%) also indicated that they should have been offered alternative employment within the military.

The fieldworkers' notes confirmed some of these findings:

"The interviewee is still willing to go back to the army, as he believes he was a good military officer and should serve the country. He would appreciate it greatly if his situation could be dealt with accordingly. He believes that the force will change for the better if they could get people to stand up and not just be window dressers."[84]

"There was a lot of dissatisfaction coming from … [participation in the demobilisation study] as he feels that the policies in general were not correct and as a result, they were victims of the situation. He still has an interest to come back to the force in spite of the experiences he underwent."[85]

Others (14%) indicated that the SANDF could have done better in assisting them to obtain work. In table 8, this latter category is indicated as 'work unspecified'. Some belonging to this group explicitly mentioned employment outside the military, but other respondents may have thought about alternative employment within the military.

Financial assistance, either in the form of a fair package or a 'pay-out', was also mentioned by a substantial proportion of respondents. Interestingly, unfair practices were mentioned quite frequently. These referred to, among others, racism, unfair labour practices and the SANDF not keeping promises.

The fieldworkers' notes contain many references to unfair treatment and feelings of distrust in the SANDF:

"The subject seemed keen to serve his country but is unable to do so due to racial discrimination in the SANDF. What makes him mad is that he has not been to a doctor whilst serving in the SANDF. I see that our government has to provide social security funds to the unemployed soldiers. Maybe this might reduce crime in our country, as I believe that former soldiers commit most of the armed robberies. Most former soldiers cannot find work and have families to support. Existing problems

must be addressed as soon as possible in order to satisfy all parties in the dispute."[86]

"The treatment he received from the SANDF is shocking. He thinks that the Minister of Defence must really visit all the camps and deploy investigation teams to look after the biased treatment of the camps."[87]

"This respondent called me aside and told me that he and his colleagues were punished for mischief that he didn't disclose. They were to work for 24 hours without any food. At dawn they broke into the Messina military base's canteen for food and were caught red-handed. They were dismissed on the spot."[88]

Perceptions of the Service Corps and Citizen Force

Perceptions of the Service Corps and the Citizen Force were also studied in order to obtain some insight into the 'alternative' arms of the SANDF.

Respondents were asked how positive or negative they felt towards the Service Corps. Their feelings varied significantly. Out of the 273 respondents who indicated their feelings towards the Service Corps, 35% were positive, 24% were negative and 41% felt neutral towards the Service Corps (see figure 4).

Figure 4: Feelings towards the Service Corps

Almost half of the respondents had heard of Citizen Force (48%). Knowledge about the Citizen Force was particularly high among the part-time employed respondents (74%) and relatively low among those studying (30%). Among those who had heard of the Citizen Force, perceptions were not unequivocally positive. As is shown in figure 5, 21% were positive about the Citizen Force and 31% were negative.

Further analysis revealed that negative perceptions of the Citizen Force were more common among part-time employees (50%), whereas those in training were more positive about the Citizen Force (36%).

Among the respondents who had heard of the Citizen Force, the study also explored the perceptions of those who had had personal contact with the Citizen Force and those who had had no contact. Among the 19% (60 respondents) who had had personal contact with the Force, 45% were negative, 23% were positive and the rest (32%) were neutral. Negative perceptions were most common among the unemployed respondents.

Figure 5: Feelings towards the Citizen Force

However, those who had had no personal contact were generally more positive about the Citizen Force: 20% were negative, 18% were positive and the rest (62%) were neutral. The proportion of respondents with neutral feelings toward the Citizen Force was particularly high among the unemployed.

The latter observation poses food for thought in terms of the potential part-time employment of former combatants in the Citizen Force, provided the issue is approached properly (see the recommendation in chapter 6 in this regard).

Fieldworkers' notes

The fieldworkers' notes provided extremely useful insight into the experiences, perceptions and feelings of demobilised personnel. Some of the notes expressed how distrust in the SANDF has grown among former SANDF personnel:

> "She was bitter. She thinks she was betrayed as she also contributed but got nothing in return."[89]

> "I've come to realise with this interview how people would die for a course they believe in. Going back for follow-up interviews with this respondent won't be easy as he has lost his trust in the SANDF's management. He believes that as long as his previous superiors are still stationed at that camp he was based at, his life and those of others are in danger."[90]

"The interviewee is still angry about her experiences and frustrations while she was in the army and she believes that the powers to be will not be changed. She doesn't think that those that were retrenched or resigned should hope to a comeback to the force."[91]

Fieldworkers also noted serious anger towards the government:

"They were not properly trained to get employed somewhere [else] after the demobilisation. The other factor was that they were not employed for a long time and as a result could not get [money from the government's Unemployment Insurance Fund]. The pain was severe because he was the breadwinner because the parents were on pension and were not getting much from their pension fund. Because not having the expertise or training for another field of employment it took him years to find other employment.

The circumstances were tormenting and I could hear and feel a lot of anger as I was interviewing the respondent. It was like he is still feeling a lot of regret and disappointment and he also feels that [the] SANDF still owes him a lot as he dedicated much of his energy and time to the life and work of the SANDF. He also felt discriminated against as he was not called again whereas others who worked with him were called back to the service."[92]

Other observations refer to social stigmatisation, personal breakdown, and severe stress experienced by the respondents:

"Since I have been working with these people its hurting to hear what they have to say about their lives and how the integration process has affected them morally as well as their families. It's alarming how people can be changed by experiences. This subject also made mention of how one of his friends/colleagues committed suicide by shooting himself. He felt worthless and inferior in his community. People look down on him for being rejected by the military."[93]

"My subject left the SANDF because of racist practices. He seemed to like the army but something inside is just not right! He looked frustrated and didn't open up about his military experiences like other participants that I've so far interviewed."[94]

On a lighter note, some respondents showed remarkable optimism and the capability to regain control over their own life:

"My respondent left South Africa after he passed standard 8. He managed to study whilst in exile and completed his matric. He was later offered a chance to study IT with a correspondence school. He was in his second year with this correspondence school when he heard of the release of former state president, Mandela, and other liberation movement leaders. Because he was home sick he left and came back to South Africa. He continued with his studies. He now works at a big firm and is doing his practical studies."[95]

"Some people don't care how they are treated as long as they do or have what they want. I wonder why they demobbed this particular respondent. All he knows is that he was told that the SANDF had no more use for him. I'm sure the army needs people of this calibre that are devoted and committed."[96]

"I saw a keen individual who was frustrated by the circumstances but is now only looking at the bright side of life and is hoping to make it big with her new career."[97]

"This lady is very strong; she has a very strong personality. Although she feels her country and/or government has let her down, she feels she wants to uplift her community by running an abuse centre. She is interested in other projects as well but is still looking for funding. She seemed to be very positive."[98]

The nature of qualitative research means that these perceptions and feelings cannot be seen as general, nor can they be extrapolated to apply to all demobilised or former SANDF staff. However, it serves as an illustration of how the process of demobilisation has affected some of the individuals in question. It also serves as a reminder that a great deal still needs to be done by all responsible stakeholders to address the negative effects of the demobilisation process both in the past and to be wary of the potential problems that may arise from the rationalisation process in the near future.

Chapter 5
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR MARKET AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES

The South African labour market faces several problems. This chapter focuses on two of the seven key problems identified by the Department of Labour: [99]

- high rates of unemployment and underemployment; and
- low rates at which productive employment is being created in the economy.

Former SANDF personnel and non-statutory force combatants have to be reinserted into the South African economy. While this rather technocratic brief seems easy enough, the possibilities to integrate soldiers into a civilian and mostly peacetime economy are limited by various real and potential socio-political and economic constraints. The South African economy is growing slower than projected. While inflation is under control, sudden changes in the labour market, and the inflow or outflow of investments can tip the scale in a less amicable way. The sustained low monetary value of the rand and several other issues have to be taken into consideration when assessing the state of the South African economy.

Unemployment

Even a rough estimate of unemployed, demobilised SANDF personnel is currently impossible. To date, no official figures exist. Only if the assumption is made that the average former soldier is likely to be unskilled or semiskilled, black, male and between 30 and 60 years old, could it be estimated that approximately three to four out of out of every ten former soldiers would be unemployed.

The national official unemployment rate was put at 22.5 % in February 2000.[100] However, this figure has been released as part of a discussion paper, rather than as an official statistic. The figure has been adjusted to accommodate the discrepancies between findings from various surveys that were recently conducted. For example, according to the findings of the Labour Force Survey conducted in February 2000, more than a quarter of the potential economically active population are unemployed. Based on these findings, it was estimated that there were 26.5 million people of working age (between 15 and 65 years old). Among them, 16.2 million were economically active, of which 11.5 million were employed and 4.3 million unemployed (this explains the unemployment rate estimate of 26.5%). Of the 10.2 million who were not economically active, 4.8 million were scholars and 1 million were full-time homemakers.

The October Household Survey indicated a 23.3% unemployment rate.[101] The Survey of

Employment and Earnings in Selected Industries (SEE) recently showed a downward trend in formal sector employment while, according to the Labour Force Survey, employment in other formal business sectors, which were not covered by the Survey of Employment and Earnings, showed an upward trend. More specifically, the *Financial Mail* reported that the June 2001 release of employment figures by the South African Reserve Bank has shown that employment in the non-agricultural, formal, private sector increased in the last quarter of 2000.[102] It added, however, that the average level of employment still fell by 2.9% in 2000, following declines of 2% in 1999 and 3.7% in 1998. Making use of the Labour Force Survey, rather than the October Household Survey, the report stated that unemployment among the economically active population in South Africa was 26.9%. If 'discouraged workers' — those who have given up looking for a job — are included, the unemployment rate climbs to 37.3%.[103]

The National Employment Strategy Framework states that, because not enough jobs are being created and because this is the perception and experience of many ordinary people, there is indeed cause to reflect and to act.[104] It is estimated that — against a background of unemployment varying between 20% (using the 'narrow' definition of unemployment) and 29% (according to the 'broad' definition) — the economy must generate about 250 000 new jobs in net terms to ensure that the unemployment rate does not rise. However, in order to absorb new entrants into the labour market, the economy should generate more than 350 000 net new jobs per annum.

In addition, the Framework identified the following discernible trends, which will impact on the economy and labour market:

- Demand for skills and a better-educated workforce will increase rather than diminish across the total range of sectors and occupations.

- Structural changes in the labour market will not be reversed and will probably accelerate.

- Skills development will be increasingly a life-long commitment since the pace of change will accelerate.[105]

The key objectives of the National Employment Strategy Framework were to boost employment growth in the short to medium term and reduce poverty in the longer term. It focused on increasing the demand for labour and on the supply side of labour (the employability of labour).

According to the National Skills Development Strategy, formulated for April 2001 — March 2005, unemployment rates are as high as between 27% and 37%.[106] Furthermore, it stated that South Africa has approximately 3 million skilled and highly skilled people as opposed to 7 million people in semiskilled or unskilled work or unemployed. To illustrate the lack of commitment to training in the South African labour market, the National Development Skills Strategy refers to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Country Profile of South Africa.[107] The report stated that, although 87% of a sample of manufacturing companies claimed to provide skills development opportunities for their employees, in practice, 70% only offered induction and initial training. In the same ILO report, it was suggested that, in the firms surveyed, production workers accounted for no more than 10% of those who had received training during the previous year.

The following sections deal with the supply and demand side of labour in South Africa. The aim is to provide an overview of current employment trends in South Africa.

Employment

Daniels and Lundall of the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town conducted an analysis of the current job market in South Africa.[108] The analysis entailed a review of the following three components of employment:

- the number of skilled, semiskilled and unskilled workers per province and location (urban and rural areas);

- the sectoral dimension of occupational categories (skilled, semiskilled and unskilled workers); and

- changes in the number(s) of workers in each sector and per occupation that took place between 1995 and 1999.

It is important to note that 'occupations' refers to skilled, semiskilled and unskilled workers. The primary data source on employment in South Africa was the October Household Survey. The definitions of the three categories are presented in table 9.

Table 9: List of occupations

Category	Occupations
Skilled	"Legislators, senior officials and managers (including legislators and senior officials; corporate managers; and general managers); professionals (including physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals; life science and health professionals; teaching professionals; and other professionals); technicians and associate professionals (including physical and engineering science associate professionals, life science and health associate professionals; teaching associate professionals; and other associate professionals)"
Semiskilled	Clerks (including office clerks; and customer service clerks); sales (including personal and protective services workers; and models, salespersons and demonstrators); craft and related trade workers (including extraction and building trades workers; metal, machinery and related trades workers; precision, handicraft, printing and related workers; and other craft and related trades workers)
Unskilled	Skilled agricultural and fishery workers* (including market-oriented skilled agricultural and fishery workers; and subsistence agricultural and fishery workers); plant and machine operators and assemblers (including stationary-plant and related operators; machine operators and assemblers; and drivers and mobile-plant operators); elementary occupations (including sales and service elementary occupations; agricultural, fishery and related labourers; labourers in mining construction, manufacturing and transport); domestic workers
* Note that despite the classification 'skilled agricultural and fishery workers', the meaning of skills pertains more to workers of a particular crop than to a range of skills per-se. Consequently, it is defined as unskilled in the report.	
Source: October Household Survey, 1995 (Codebook)	

The following analysis is based on the October Household Surveys conducted in 1995 and 1999. A two-stage sampling procedure was applied during these surveys. A sample of 30 000 households was drawn from 3 000 enumerator areas (ten households per enumerator area). Both the 1995 and 1999 sample were based on the 1996 Population Census enumerator areas and the estimated number of households from the 1996 Population Census. The sample was stratified, clustered and selected to meet the requirements of probability sampling. The sample

was explicitly stratified by province and area type (urban/rural). Within each explicit stratum, enumerator areas were stratified by arranging them in geographic order by district council, magisterial district and, within the magisterial district, by average household income (for formal urban areas and hostels) or enumerator area. The allocated number of enumerator areas was systematically selected with probability proportional to size in each stratum. The sample excluded all detainees, hospital patients, residents of boarding houses and hotels (whether temporary or semipermanent). This sampling procedure complies with international best practice as far as survey design and methodology are concerned.

Throughout the analysis below, employment is disaggregated by occupational classification into skilled, semiskilled and unskilled occupations. This occupational classification system thus forms the basis for the analysis in the exploratory study.

Trends in the job market between 1995-1999

This section evaluates changes in the job market between 1995 and 1999, with a view to identify:

- the present status of the labour market; and
- the possible short-term trajectory of employment growth (decline).

The discussion that follows is based on occupational and sectoral shifts for skilled, semiskilled and unskilled employees.

Occupational and sectoral changes

Overall, positive *absolute* employment growth has been reported for the domestic economy. It is important, however, to determine the distribution of these employment gains at the sectoral and occupational level. In this manner, the 'winners' and 'losers' from these overall employment changes can be determined.

Table 10 shows that the largest aggregate employment growth between 1995 and 1999 was reported for internal trade (454 410), finance (352 112), construction (134 663) and transport (69 257). Within the four sectors, positive growth was registered for all three occupational categories that formed part of the analysis.[109] Although mining and manufacturing exhibited positive overall growth rates in employment, it was spread unevenly. This resulted in job losses in the semiskilled occupational category in the mining sector (12 197) and the unskilled occupational sector within manufacturing (95 692). During 2000, the shedding of jobs in the gold-mining industry was particularly brutal at 6.7%.[110]

Table 10: Occupational and sectoral changes, 1995-1999

Sector	Skilled	Semiskilled	Unskilled	Total
Internal trade	27 708	208 423	218 279	454 410
Finance	177 514	115 253	59 345	352 112
Construction	10 465	110 341	13 857	134 663
Transport	1 608	15 617	52 032	69 257
Manufacturing	88 507	72 877	-95 692	65 692
Mining	11 338	-12 197	43 614	42 755
Utilities	-1 216	-3 789	-2 770	-7 775
Agriculture	26 944	22 628	-91 897	-42 325

Unspecified	3 287	-6 188	-41 653	-44 554
Community services	83 037	-127 608	-85 289	-129 860
Domestic services	-699	9 942	-637 330	-628 087
Total	**428 493**	**405 299**	**-567 504**	**266 288**

Sectors that experienced overall negative employment growth included agriculture, utilities, community services and domestic services. Except for utilities, in which employment over the five-year period shrunk at every level, the declines in employment were concentrated mainly at the semiskilled and unskilled occupational levels. In agriculture, the employment reductions affected unskilled occupational levels. In community services, the semiskilled and unskilled occupational levels were affected, while the employment reductions in domestic services were concentrated in the unskilled occupational levels and marginally at the skilled levels. Consequently, an examination of shifts in the formal sector aggregate national employment showed that 266 288 new jobs were created throughout the South African economy between 1995 and 1999. The real 'winners' have been occupational categories located within skilled and semiskilled levels. Overall, 567 504 unskilled jobs disappeared and these were the real 'losers' of the structural shifts in employment changes.

The current job market in South Africa

Table 11 illustrates the occupational distribution of employment in the South African labour market, classified according to skilled, semiskilled and unskilled occupations. The shift to skilled and semiskilled occupations as a proportion of the economically active population is likely to continue especially when taking into account the proactive attempt towards trade liberalisation and constructive engagement with the global economic system. Employment growth is likely to occur within the skilled and semiskilled occupations. While these occupations may grow at different rates in the short to medium term, (and perhaps the rate of growth in semiskilled occupations will surpass that of skilled occupations in the short to medium term), a scenario for the long term is that skilled occupations will exhibit longer and more continuous growth.

Table 11: The current job market in South Africa, 1999

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
Skilled	2 307 507	22.31	22.31
Semiskilled	3 692 936	35.7	58.01
Unskilled	4 342 680	41.99	100

The provincial organisation of the occupational distribution of employment (see table 12) illustrates the manner in which the aggregate national trends displayed in table 11 resonate throughout the nine provinces in the country.

Table 12: Provincial organisation of occupational distribution of employment

Province	Absolute numbers				Percentage			
	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Total	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Total
Western Cape	381 643	535 860	639 421	1 556 924	24.51	34.42	41.07	100
Eastern	219	311 953	480 777	1 011	21 65	30 83	47 52	100

Cape	092	511 955	480 777	822	21.03	30.03	47.32	100
Northern Cape	33 969	69 650	141 825	245 444	13.84	28.38	57.78	100
Free State	126 568	251 840	362 600	741 008	17.08	33.99	48.93	100
KwaZulu-Natal	422 110	644 224	872 634	1 938 968	21.77	33.23	45.01	100
North-West	125 601	282 845	363 982	772 428	16.26	36.62	47.12	100
Gauteng	731 092	1 115 432	839 860	2 686 384	27.21	41.52	31.26	100
Mpumalanga	112 059	246 720	338 025	696 804	16.08	35.41	48.51	100
Northern Province	155 373	234 412	303 556	693 341	22.41	33.81	43.78	100
Total	**2 307 507**	**3 692 936**	**4 342 680**	**10 343 123**	**22.31**	**35.7**	**41.99**	**100**

Closer examination of table 12 reveals that Gauteng seems to set the pace and perhaps even the trends in terms of the occupational distribution of employment within the South African labour market. While it may be conceded that Gauteng embodies the fulcrum of economic activity in South Africa, it has the lowest proportion of unskilled occupations within its economic and geographic boundaries and the highest proportion and concentration of skilled and semiskilled occupations among the country's nine provinces. Apart from Gauteng, with an economically active population of approximately 2.6 million people (the largest provincial labour force), three other provinces have a job market that exceeds one million individuals: the Western Cape (1.5 million), Eastern Cape (1 million) and KwaZulu-Natal (1.9 million). The occupational distribution according to levels of skill remains less favourable than that found in Gauteng, but the Western Cape is in the second position with respect to skilled and unskilled occupations. Both the North-West and Mpumalanga have a proportionately larger semiskilled employment category than the Western Cape, but are surpassed by it in terms of the skilled employment categories. Provinces that exhibit the highest concentrations in the unskilled categories and the lowest concentrations in the skilled categories are more likely to exhibit low employment generation in the short term. Evidence by Bhorat and Hodge shows that, on aggregate, low-skilled occupations have been shedding labour at a faster pace than skilled and semiskilled occupations are able to absorb.[111] From the data contained in table 12, the provinces that can fall into this category include the Northern Cape, Free State, North-West and Mpumalanga. Mpumalanga, however, may be the exception. As data is assembled about its economic performance in the Maputo development corridor and until the patterns of labour migration from Mozambique are adequately understood, a different picture may emerge for the province. However, these indicators of trends in the labour market should be contrasted with other types of economic indicators so that an accurate picture is obtained of the potential to absorb new entrants, however skilled, into the labour market.

Further analyses can be made by using a range of covariates within the available data to clarify the understanding of the distribution of occupational skills within the South African labour market. The result of a locational distribution deploying similar principles of investigation to the provincial analysis that was shown above, is illustrated in table 13. What is evident from the data below is that almost 70% of the South African labour force are engaged in economic activities within the urban domain. The remainder can be classified as forming part of the rural location with agriculture being the largest employment sector for the rural population.

Table 13: A locational analysis of occupational distribution of employment

Location	Absolute numbers				Percentage			
	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Total	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Total
Rural	344 594	812 042	1 979 464	3 136 100	10.99	25.89	63.12	100
Urban	1 962 913	2 880 894	2 363 216	7 207 023	27.24	39.97	32.79	100
Total	2 307 507	3 692 936	4 342 680	10 343 123	22.31	35.7	41.99	100

Further examination of table 13 reveals that the representation of skilled and semiskilled occupations is greater in urban areas than in the rural domain. In fact, a converse situation can be noted when comparing the urban with the rural domain: there is a greater prevalence of unskilled occupations in the rural part of the national economy when compared with the urban part. Qualifications, which can therefore be classified as forming part of the skilled employment categories, will guarantee that there is a greater demand for incumbents holding such qualifications and skills. Even within the public sector, where the process of restructuring is still under way, the demand for unskilled labour has decreased and technical staff (such as nurses and teachers) have experienced a reduction in labour demand. Many technical staff, who were retrenched through public sector restructuring, have been redeployed in the private sector and, sometimes, may even find their way back into the public sector. However, redeployment often occurs under different conditions and with modified job functions. Highly skilled managers and professionals have continued to demonstrate a high labour demand. This is dispersed among a range of employment sectors.

The real implication of this for the exploratory study (and its assumed effect) is that lower and semiskilled persons in both rural and urban areas would be hard pressed to find jobs. The challenge is simple: lower skilled and semiskilled persons will have to become double or multiskilled in order to get a job, given the current economic constraints. This would also apply to people with 'intermediate skills' (for example, basic computer literacy and basic management skills).

During the exploratory study, it was found that many of the respondents had moved to urban (core) areas in the hope of finding employment. However, they are challenged to enhance their individual skills especially in the urban areas. As argued above, it is imperative for new entrants to possess the skills for occupations in which the labour demand is growing if they are to participate effectively in the urban economy. Invariably, groups classified in high-skilled occupations are best placed to select from the employment options that are made available. Within the semiskilled categories, the freedom to be selective about employment options is more constricted and therefore the supply of labour exceeds its demand. This equips employers with a more flexible license to select the incumbents who are hired. This scenario intensifies when moving from the semiskilled towards the unskilled employment categories.[112]

People in need of jobs will have to upgrade their skills or 'multiskill' themselves if they wish to increase their chances of finding employment. This may be facilitated (apart from the individual choice to do so) through government support, community initiatives, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and perhaps even international donors. The problem with the latter option, however, is mainly as a result of so-called 'donor fatigue'. Two reasons for this could be:

- the inability of authorities to oversee and implement funded projects through best practice (due to the lack of skills and/or capacity); or

- the perception of misappropriation of funding that was brought about under apartheid rule and that seemingly persists.

By refracting the provincial analysis illustrated in table 12 onto the locational analysis in table 13, a more comprehensive picture can be discerned. This can be further enhanced by specifying the placement of each of the occupational categories in the distribution of national employment. This facilitates a better understanding of the employment trends within each occupational category, particularly trends depicting employment growth and cycles of employment contraction, or even instances where employment levels remain static.

The concentration in skilled employment based on province and location (see table 14) shows that, with the exception of the Northern Province, skilled workers are concentrated in urban areas of the national economy. While the national average is 85.07%, the percentage of skilled employment based within the urban economy of particular provinces range from 98.13% in Gauteng to 69.37% in Mpumalanga. Nonetheless, in terms of the placement of skilled personnel who enter the labour market, the rural domain cannot be ignored. While there is a smaller pool to draw from in terms of labour demand in the rural economy, entrants to the labour market who have the requisite skills, in all likelihood, may experience less intensive competition from other job seekers for limited employment opportunities. Within the urban economy, this process would be considered as normal in most cases. In fact, as a proportion of overall employment in each province, at least one-quarter of all skilled jobs are based in the rural areas of the provinces of the Eastern Cape, North-West, Mpumalanga and the Northern Province, as was mentioned earlier.

It is incumbent upon the organisers of all employment placement programmes to exploit these niche areas, which exist by maximising the number of placements within each skill category in every province where the labour demand for skilled jobs exists. To some extent, this will mitigate the trend of outward migration to urban areas and to provinces that have a more dynamic labour market. Consequently, the economic spin-offs to skills dispersion in particular provinces, and towards the rural economy in particular, will strengthen the perseverance of economic activities in rural areas, thus mitigating rural-urban migration.

The analysis of semiskilled employment categories by province and location is shown in table 15. With the exception of the Western Cape, which has a higher concentration of semiskilled workers compared to skilled workers, there is a definite tendency for semiskilled occupations to be concentrated in the urban economies of each province.

Table 14: Analysis by province and location of skilled employment

Province	Absolute numbers			Percentage		
	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total
Western Cape	19 114	362 529	381 643	5.01	94.99	100
Eastern Cape	58 921	160 171	219 092	26.89	73.11	100
Northern Cape	5 623	28 346	33 969	16.55	83.45	100
Free State	13 849	112 719	126 568	10.94	89.06	100
KwaZulu-Natal	67 855	354 255	422 110	16.08	83.92	100

North-West	43 170	82 431	125 601	34.37	65.63	100
Gauteng	13 635	717 457	731 092	1.87	98.13	100
Mpumalanga	34 327	77 732	112 059	30.63	69.37	100
Northern Province	88 100	67 273	155 373	56.7	43.3	100
Total	**344 594**	**1 962 913**	**2 307 507**	**14.93**	**85.07**	**100**

As can be observed in table 15, eight of the nine provinces exhibit this trend. The Northern Province is the only province where this is different. Unless there is an increase in the labour demand for higher levels of semiskilled labour in the medium term, the trend will continue systematically. In this respect, the North-West represents an interesting scenario because the relative proportions of semiskilled labour demand between the rural and the urban economies are still evenly balanced. A rapid escalation in this ratio will confirm the evidential trend of employment demand for higher level skills shifting from the rural sphere and being concentrated in the urban economy.

When considering the trends in the shifts in skilled and semiskilled employment that were illustrated in tables 14 and 15, a significant postulate must be accepted. Labour demand will be the strongest for skilled and semiskilled occupations throughout the economy. This is particularly relevant for the reinsertion of former combatants. No employment placement programme, which hinges the attainment of its objectives on the placement in unskilled occupations, will be successful without obtaining temporary relief from government-supported public works programmes. Moreover, if it involves new entrants into the labour market or if it requires accommodating redeployed personnel from one sector to another, the unskilled occupational category will not be the place where this will happen. In the absence of unrestrained fiscal measures, other strategies have to be planned and executed within reasonable timeframes to avoid unskilled labour from becoming disillusioned with the effects of structural unemployment. Programmes for the systematic and accelerated retraining of employees who potentially face such scenarios should perhaps be devised so that they could compete effectively for new positions that become available as labour demand strengthens for the skilled and semiskilled employment categories.

Table 15: Analysis by province and location of semiskilled employment

Province	Absolute numbers			Percentage		
	Rural	**Urban**	**Total**	**Rural**	**Urban**	**Total**
Western Cape	23 116	512 744	535 860	4.31	95.69	100
Eastern Cape	110 759	201 194	311 953	35.51	64.49	100
Northern Cape	20 531	49 119	69 650	29.48	70.52	100
Free State	55 876	195 964	251 840	22.19	77.81	100
KwaZulu-Natal	148 761	495 463	644 224	23.09	76.91	100
North-West	138 589	144 256	282 845	49	51	100
Gauteng	39 124	1 076 308	1 115 432	3.51	96.49	100
Mpumalanga	103 933	142 787	246 720	42.13	57.87	100
Northern Province	171 353	63 059	234 412	73.1	26.9	100
Total	**812 042**	**2 880 894**	**3 692 936**	**21.99**	**78.01**	**100**

The analysis of unskilled employment by province and location shows (see table 16) that, in seven of the nine provinces, unskilled employment is almost overwhelmingly associated with the rural economy. The exceptions remain the highly urbanised provinces of Gauteng and the

Western Cape, where concentrations of unskilled employment are attached to the urban economy.

Table 16: Analysis by province and location of unskilled employment

Province	Absolute numbers			Percentage		
	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total
Western Cape	165 867	473 554	639 421	25.94	74.06	100
Eastern Cape	288 675	192 102	480 777	60.04	39.96	100
Northern Cape	93 764	48 061	141 825	66.11	33.89	100
Free State	189 386	173 214	362 600	52.23	47.77	100
KwaZulu-Natal	463 428	409 206	872 634	53.11	46.89	100
North-West	240 544	123 438	363 982	66.09	33.91	100
Gauteng	59 778	780 082	839 860	7.12	92.88	100
Mpumalanga	218 081	119 944	338 025	64.52	35.48	100
Northern Province	259 941	43 615	303 556	85.63	14.37	100
Total	**1 979 464**	**2 363 216**	**4 342 680**	**45.58**	**54.42**	**100**

A continuation of the process of employment decline, which has taken place throughout the country and particularly in the agricultural sector, merely aggravates the transference of excess unskilled labour from the rural to the urban economy. Over time, even with high levels of unemployment in the urban economy, unskilled labour will intermittently be involved in participating in economic activities, but this will not guarantee consistent full-time employment. An assessment of the labour demand in the unskilled categories, however, suggests that it will remain sluggish and eventually begin to record a slow and systematic decline in the future. This does not augur well for the demobilised individuals interviewed during the exploratory study who were not (yet) skilled or who did not indicate a willingness to enhance their skills to at least semiskilled or multiskilled levels.

Composition of the economically active population, 1999

The analysis of the economically active population on the basis of the occupational categories that have been used throughout the report and along the axes of race, gender, age and educational levels, provides further insights into the attributes of the South African labour market. Consistent with the analysis that has been provided above, it needs to be reiterated that the labour demand in the economy does not favour employment growth at unskilled levels. Indeed, the long-term trajectory of employment growth will be located within skilled and semiskilled occupations.

Table 17 provides a classification of the economically active population by race. While the analysis of the occupational change within the profile of those engaged in formal employment shows that employment is taking place at a faster pace in the upper echelons of the occupational spectrum, the data in table 17 shows that the economically active population in South Africa is still predominantly unskilled, and more so among the African and coloured groups, where 51.74% of economically active Africans and 48.08% of economically active coloureds fall into the unskilled employment categories. For both groups, less than one-fifth form part of the skilled segment. The occupational distribution among Asians and whites shows a higher predilection to skilled and semiskilled occupations. For the economically active white population, 51.17% are located in skilled occupations. Both groups thus have a higher capacity to participate effectively and respond to the changing skills needs of the economy.

Table 17: Economically active population by race, 1999

Occupation	African	Coloured	Asian	White	Other	Total*
Skilled	941 148	196 200	128 053	997 734	6 441	2 269 576
Semiskilled	2 216 600	458 417	169 187	787 242	5 526	3 636 972
Unskilled	3 385 550	606 457	80 366	164 822	2 107	4 239 302
Total	6 543 298	1 261 074	377 606	1 949 798	14 074	10 145 850

* No missing observations, hence totals differ between tables.

The proportionate distribution of occupational categories along the lines of gender shows that the position of women and men are roughly similar, particularly in skilled occupations, while in the semiskilled occupations, men constitute a marginally higher proportion, and women do so in the unskilled occupations. The evidence that is contained in table 18 shows that men outnumber women within the economically active population by more than 1.5 million. Men outnumber women in the skilled occupations by 32.91% and by 53.06% in semiskilled occupations. Reinforcing the comparatively unequal position that women hold in relation to men, the absolute number of unskilled positions held by men exceeds those held by women by only 26.89%. This means that a higher proportion of women hold unskilled positions among the economically active population.

Table 18: Economically active population by gender, 1999

Occupation	Male	Female	Total*
Skilled	1 293 847	973 499	2 267 346
Semiskilled	2 198 659	1 436 459	3 635 118
Unskilled	2 370 591	1 868 257	4 238 848
Total	5 863 097	4 278 215	10 141 312

* No missing observations, hence totals differ between tables

An analysis of the proportionate distribution of occupations by age group as is shown in table 19 highlights a number of interesting features. Without being overtly concerned with overall totals or overall proportions, the 45 to 54 and 55 to 64 age groups (45.75% and 50.75%, respectively) have the highest proportion of its economically active population occupying unskilled occupations while the age group with the lowest proportion are between 25 and 34 years old.

Table 19: Economically active population by age group, 1999

Occupation	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	Total*
Skilled	187 022	786 054	720 850	430 422	146 270	2 270 618
Semiskilled	565 215	1 345 163	1 034 440	500 051	192 856	3 637 725
Unskilled	511 432	1 319 158	1 275 159	784 747	349 445	4 239 941
Total	1 263 669	3 450 375	3 030 449	1 715 220	688 571	10 148 284

* No missing observations, hence totals differ between tables

Within the semiskilled occupations, the age groups with the highest proportion are between 16 and 24 years old (44.73%) and between 25 and 34 years (38.99%). However, the 45 to 54 age group is shown to have a higher proportion of the economically active population within skilled occupations. However, in absolute terms, the bulk of the economically active population is

drawn from age groups under 45 years of age. It is important to emphasise that the rather poor showing of the under 45 age group in skilled occupations is disconcerting. While these age groups constitute 75.3% of the economically active population, they only form 74.6% of skilled occupations and, at 80.95%, are marginally overrepresented in the semiskilled categories. The ideal is for the younger age groups to have a greater representation in skilled occupations.

A positive sign is the rather significant numerical difference in the number of skilled occupations held by those in the 35 to 44 age group compared to the older group mentioned above. The absolute numerical difference in the size of skilled occupations held between these two age groups shows some interesting features. Overall, the 35 to 44 age group outnumbers the 45 to 54 age group by 76.7%. Within the semiskilled occupations, this difference is exaggerated even further at 106.9%. The 35 to 44 age group therefore has a comparative advantage in terms of semiskilled occupations. Within the skilled occupations, this advantage is greatly diminished to 67.5%. This means that the 35 to 44 age group is not performing as well when compared to the 45 to 54 age group.

In the exploratory study conducted among former SANDF personnel and demobilised combatants, the need for skills development among younger, as well as older participants seemed to be pointing towards a sustained strategy to assist people to find their niche as semiskilled or multiskilled persons.

Table 20 provides a systematic numerical breakdown of the educational qualifications of the economically active population.

Table 20: Economically active population by educational level, 1999

Occupation	None	Primary	Junior secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	Total*
Skilled	18 639	107 865	360 478	664 278	1 083 374	2 234 634
Semiskilled	146 322	635 347	1 268 524	1 239 276	269 513	3 558 982
Unskilled	558 241	1 664 907	1 408 431	440 188	49 354	4 121 121
Total	723 202	2 408 119	3 037 433	2 343 742	1 402 241	9 914 737
* No missing observations, hence totals differ between tables						

Individuals with low levels of qualifications (none, primary and lower secondary) dominate the unskilled occupations. A higher proportion of economically active individuals who have a lower secondary and matric qualification dominate the semiskilled occupations. Finally, over three-quarters (77.26%) of economically active individuals who have a tertiary qualification are based in skilled occupations. Hall and Roodt recently confirmed these findings in their extensive study on the Skills needs of the South African labour market: 1998-2003. [113]

While job opportunities may become available in the manufacturing sector, research cautions that 71 000 jobs may be lost in semiskilled and unskilled categories.[114] This points to the need to multiskill persons who wish to (re)enter the job market.

In terms of the agricultural and tourism sectors, it is expected that less than 50 000 jobs will be created in these sectors in the three years up to 2003. Hall and Roodt caution against undue

optimism, but remark that moderate growth in the building and civil engineering sectors (construction sector) can be expected.[115] The largest growth is expected in the wholesale, retail and accommodation sectors. Moderate growth is expected in wholesale and retail and faster growth in the catering and accommodation sectors.[116]

This reiterates the need to discern niche markets and areas of preference, as well as potential areas for training in the agricultural sector (small farming/large-scale farming, co-operative farming, bio-farming), catering and accommodation sectors and, to a lesser extent, the wholesale and transport sectors. Other areas in relative demand and with some growth potential (provided that negative scenarios such as crime do not deter tourists) are tourism, the tourism-related industries and eco-tourism (with community involvement). Provinces such as the Eastern Cape, Northern Province, Mpumalanga, Western and Northern Cape could benefit form the tourism sector.

The conclusion that can be drawn is that increased public and private investment in tertiary education will have a concerted impact on the direction of labour demand that, as the preceding analysis has shown, does indeed favour the growth in skilled and semiskilled occupations. However, such investment will have to take cognisance of the fact that job creation in South Africa is expected to be minimal for newcomers to the job market on almost every skills level.

Job opportunities and skills needs

One of the guiding principles of the National Skills Development Strategy is that skills development should be demand-led. By this it is meant that a realistic assessment should be made of how skills are to be deployed based on existing demands in the economy. The emphasis should be on skills and competencies required to support productivity, international competitiveness, the mobility of workers, self-employment and the meeting of defined and articulated community needs.

The exploratory study also considered the existing demands in the economy and the willingness among potential employers to employ former SANDF personnel and demobilised combatants. Unfortunately, responses were extremely difficult to subtract. The low response rate made proper analysis impossible. However, the experiences gained during the course of this exploratory study are worth mentioning.

Potential employers showed a remarkable unwillingness to engage in a study of the employability of demobilised SANDF personnel. The reasons for the low response rate and negative attitudes that were aired during telephone interviews, can be described as due to the following:

- lack of knowledge about the demobilisation issue;

- apathy with regard to job creation and the employment of unskilled persons;

- disillusionment as a result of past experiences with former soldiers and/or unskilled persons (this could also perhaps relate to the 'total onslaught' era when companies and private businesses were forced to remunerate soldiers who were called up for duty in the border wars in Namibia and Angola despite their absence from work);

- lack of time or resources to respond, or the lack of co-operation or staff in human resources departments; and

- possible adverse feelings towards former soldiers.

Conclusion

The figures presented above have shown that greater dynamics in labour demand within the South African economy are concentrated within skilled and semiskilled categories and levels. Labour demand for unskilled workers has generally been static for the period since 1995 and it is not likely to change in the short to medium term.

While it is difficult to provide forecasts of the numerical composition of future labour demand, the medium-term historical trend in employment evolution may perhaps be an appropriate short-term indicator of possibilities with respect to future employment shifts.

It is important for public sector institutions that are planning to re-engineer their staff compositions and profiles to explore systematically the plurality of options in intergovernmental relations and by which disemployment effects can be attenuated. Existing national frameworks on the recognition and renewal of qualifications, and skills development facilitate greater responsiveness in exploring these options. Beyond human resources development, there are also financial incentives that can be harnessed through the National Skills Fund, and co-ordinated with various sector education and training authorities (SETAs). Through the National Skills Fund, about R300 million is being dispersed across provinces to assist in job creation in various sectors on provincial level. The Diplomacy and Defence Training Authority (DIDETA) is the responsible organ for former SANDF personnel. The Department of Labour recently assessed applications by DIDETA for funding. However, these projects are unlikely to receive funding, since they did not satisfactorily look into employment opportunities, market-oriented training needs and training manuals that have already been developed.

Given the stated objective of the government to attain a smaller and more cost-effective administration, it could be expected that fewer jobs in the semiskilled, lower skilled and unskilled categories would be needed. When needed, these jobs will probably be outsourced. The implication is that job losses will have to be countered through initiatives that allow lower skilled, unskilled and semiskilled people to find employment (as entrepreneurs) or to be reskilled to a level that would at least allow them to compete for access to the 'markets' created by outsourcing.

Chapter 6
RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter provides recommendations that emanated from the exploratory study conducted among former SANDF staff and combatants. The recommendations are aimed at the following:

- government and policy-related issues, including intergovernmental co-operation;

- job creators or suppliers — companies, NGOs, community organisations, civil society agencies, including trade unions;

- funding and empowerment agencies;

- specific proposals — project-oriented and preceded by pilot projects; and

- the Citizen Force.

The recommendations will be fourfold:

- general recommendations related to policy and policy formulation;

- recommendations related to the need for the further training and reskilling of former combatants;

- recommendations that have crystallised after interviews with key persons and business, labour and military institutions, as well as limited feedback received from companies in response to a short questionnaire; and

- recommendations and proposals relating to the Citizen Force, which may benefit demobilised soldiers and former combatants.

Given the findings of the exploratory study, proposals or recommendations need to be both flexible and holistic, as well as generic. The issue at stake is a serious matter, and solving the socio-economic problems created by demobilisation is immensely complex. No single recipe or solution will serve as a panacea. Rather, a directed effort that is context-bound and, to some extent, pragmatic needs to be considered without delay. Learning from the experiences of other Latin American and African countries (Uganda, Eritrea and Namibia, for example) may also prove useful. [117]

The present government cannot divest itself in any way from the responsibility of playing a major (if not leading) role in attempting to address the issue of the reintegration of demobilised military personnel. The government should include community organisations, businesses, the labour movement, NGOs and the Citizen Force in its attempts to address the situation.

It is important that each of the proposals and recommendations listed below should be seen in the spirit in which it is intended, that of providing a solution to the current socio-economic problems caused by demobilisation. No single initiative or proposal should be seen as too small or irrelevant without due consideration. It could be argued that the escalating crisis around demobilised soldiers, and its real and potential effects, have grown to such an extent that no proposal, however big or small, emanating from whatever quarter, should be demeaned before it is given due consideration, its viability checked and the possibility to facilitate its implementation is explored.

Central to these recommendations is the importance of co-operative governance, interdepartmental co-operation and partnerships (public/private; government/ business/labour; provincial/local).

It has to be mentioned that a simple transfer of the responsibility for demobilised soldiers to a single department or institution (such as the Department of Labour or the National Youth Commission), in the light of the profile of the demobilised former combatant, will be insufficient. The responsibility for an attempt to redress the situation of demobilised people both in the micro and macrocontext may require an office and a centralised point of execution dedicated to the reintegration of former soldiers into society. Given the profile as illuminated in this study, such an office will have to be able to co-operate with different departments on various levels of government. Such a task should not be delegated to an understaffed and undercommitted executive office, which already has its hands full with implementing other directives.

Policy-related recommendations

While the integration and demobilisation process was fairly successful and benefited the new defence force (and presumably the remaining staff), the net effect of demobilisation was negative for the majority of those who had to leave the force. It has become crucial that the situation of those who were negatively affected by the demobilisation process should be addressed. This will require a clear policy shift away from the mere transformation of the security institutions towards a policy that is aimed at and benefits those who were adversely or will be affected by the changes. Particular attention should be paid to those who remain jobless or poverty-stricken, since the potential security threat lies with these disgruntled demobilised personnel. It is important that this applies to all the affected (and those to be affected) who reside in the jobless and/or lower skilled category, regardless of whether they are from the former statutory or non-statutory forces. The implementation of a new policy focus should in no way be seen as benefiting certain people more than others. Redressing the situation should be presented — and implemented — as being non-partisan and inclusive.

The new policy approach will have to be developed, implemented and executed in all spheres and levels of government and will have to depart from the basis of co-operative governance and interdepartmental co-operation. It could include public-private partnerships if deemed necessary.

Some elements of the approach are discussed below.

Company guidelines and incentives

Guidelines and incentives could be provided for companies (for example, in the engineering and construction sector) to make use of labour-intensive measures, rather than mechanisation, and to deploy a certain percentage of former combatants on an agreed voluntary reciprocal basis in executing projects ('movable labour force' concept). Sectors should perhaps be considered where mechanisation is less financially profitable, such as road works and other types of construction and disaster management.

Employment in growth and development areas

Studies on the employability of unemployed former combatants in specific development and growth areas could be initiated and/or sponsored. This could include, for instance, the Maputo Corridor and other major provincial and local development projects such as the utilisation of former soldiers in metropolitan police services. Of great importance in this regard is proper market research of potentially profitable and sustainable markets for agriculture, manufacturing, arts and tourism in specific geographic areas and type-specific project areas.

Renewal of the Service Corps

The revision, strengthening and transformation of the Service Corps's current approach should be undertaken to enable a greater net output in terms of training. In order to achieve this, the following options could be considered:

- Public-private partnerships can be formed in order to increase and enhance the training of former combatants, especially in skills that are needed for production and service delivery.

- The earlier mooted point of a National Service Battalion consisting of former combatants

(from the current jobless category) could be reconsidered. The National Service Battalion will facilitate and execute training corollary to community service in rural and peri-urban areas (the same approach was used with some success after World War II in South Africa following demobilisation). It is suggested that such national service battalion(s) should reside with the SANDF (interdepartmental co-operation should be imperative), while training of selected members can be partially outsourced. However, deployment of these members in development projects should not be outsourced, but should remain the responsibility of the SANDF. Entrants should be allowed to exit the programme when they obtained employment and/or obtained an acceptable level of reskilling or multiskilling.

- The demobilised and jobless category of former combatants could be purposefully involved in agricultural initiatives, local development and other agricultural projects. This should preferably take place on a pilot project basis and strive for self-sustainability before new projects are embarked upon.

- Training and access to training for former combatants and demobilised soldiers should be enhanced through the Service Corps and outside the Service Corps (the enhanced role of sectoral education and training authorities (SETAs) could perhaps be considered in this regard).

- The earmarking of specific projects should take place on a case-by-case basis to ensure that such pilot projects are duly and responsibly funded, executed through the utilisation best practice and proper procedures to become self-sustainable. Projects are to be duly monitored and evaluated for performance to ensure viability and sustainability. Funding could be via the government (such as SETAs (DIDETA) and provincial skills plans), the private sector or other available sources.

Involvement of former combatants in areas of origin

A conscious approach should be adopted to involve former combatants in projects in areas where they originated from. For example, in the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Northern Province, North-West and KwaZulu-Natal, they could become involved in activities related to tourism, agriculture and service delivery. This could include (new) ventures in nature conservation, eco-tourism, tour guide training, as well as arts and crafts marketing training. Local and provincial governments, as well as the private sector and NGOs should facilitate co-operatives in this regard or provide basic entrepreneurial training. It is necessary to identify, through market research, the specific geographic areas and type-specific project areas where this could take place.

Involvement of national, provincial and local forums

The matter of demobilised soldiers should be addressed as a priority by forums on national level such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), on local level within the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and on provincial level in interprovincial forums. This should tie in with the *Fifteen point programme of action, 1999-2004* of the Ministry of Labour.

Training and education-related recommendations

While many of the points made here may relate to policy, training and education recommendations are discussed separately to stress the importance of a directed focus in this

area.

The exploratory research showed clearly that there were both a strong need and an interest among former combatants to be trained, skilled or reskilled. Given the nature of the South African economy as discussed above, it is clear that the majority of demobilised personnel (without relation to any specific previous force of service) are the least educated and are unemployed. It is also evident from other research that the current South African job market needs higher or highly skilled people. The implication is that a directed effort is needed to assist demobilised soldiers who are semiskilled to become specifically or multiskilled. Unskilled or lower skilled soldiers have to be assisted to become at least semiskilled, preferably in a predetermined niche area that corresponds with needs in the South African labour market.

The analysis of skills needs indicated that, while no major increase in semiskilled workers is expected, the market needs will remain fairly stable. Thus, the need for clerical, artisan and semiskilled occupations such as metal and engineering artisans, building trade artisans, printing trade artisans, technical assistants, food processing and catering, transport, trade and communication assistants will either rise moderately or remain stable. The implication for demobilised soldiers is that training needs to be purposefully directed towards the trade sector (inclusive of clerical jobs), the artisan sector and the manufacturing sector, since these sectors are more likely to be in need of reskilled personnel.

A point to consider is the establishment of a trust fund for training purposes specifically for demobilised soldiers. Such a fund — if duly administered, monitored and evaluated for best practice — may be able to assist in funding the training of former combatants and demobilised soldiers, or where such persons cannot benefit from it themselves, then for their children or next-of-kin.

Proposals for project-related initiatives

Smaller or medium-scale projects have to be identified and initiated with the assistance of government, foreign donors and, to a lesser extent, business concerns. Smaller and medium-scale projects based on sound financial management, regular monitoring and evaluation should be embarked upon. Projects should preferably be small-scale and assisted through co-operation and capacity-building in order to make them sustainable.

The list below contains proposals for some projects that can be initiated. However, this list is not exhaustive and can be expanded to include many other projects:

- Agriculture: specific projects to be identified and piloted.

- Bio-agriculture: specific projects to be identified and piloted.

- Security companies: a needs analysis and joint strategy between veterans' organisations, security companies, national and provincial governments, NEDLAC and other stakeholders should be considered.

- A 'moving labour corps' (contract-based): the core idea behind the intended project is to provide a trained group of persons at hand to be contracted by the government, parastatals or private companies on short notice. If a pilot project succeeds, the project basis can be expanded.

- Possible limited 'ring-fencing' of jobs in security-related work: municipal or metropolitan police, traffic officers, security guards for governmental institutions and parastatals, as long as such strategies for ring-fencing can be mutually agreed upon by the government and other stakeholders. This recommendation may be viewed as politically sensitive by some political stakeholders or actors and acceptance should be duly investigated, discussed and agreed upon before implementation. Consensus-based agreement seems to be acceptable to avoid worsening some socio-political faultlines and to prevent the process from being seen as partisan, nepotistic or preferential. Various political actors across the spectrum have to be consulted before agreement on implementation is reached.

- Tourism and bio-tourism: specific pilot projects.

- Co-operatives in arts, crafts and eco-tourism: specific pilot projects.

- Potential for export co-operatives in arts and crafts: specific pilot projects.

The projects listed above should be implemented on a pilot (even experimental) basis. Funding should be conditional. Projects should proceed on a case-by-case basis. Only if a specific project has become sustainable after due monitoring and evaluation, (similar) others could be embarked upon. The ideal is that project-specific ventures should become both manageable and self-sustainable before money (donor funding) is invested in new ones. Needless to say, benchmarking and regular evaluation of performance should form part of each individual project approach to ensure long-term sustainability.

Recommendations related to the Citizen Force

The following proposals are for the consideration of policy makers, the Citizen Force Council and the Department of Defence.

The exploratory study has shown that, although there is some disillusionment with the SANDF, a significant number of individuals who were demobilised have retained positive feelings towards the SANDF and the Citizen Force. The Citizen Force is a potential window of opportunity that could supply part-time income to former combatants through involvement in its activities. This may boost their morale and self-esteem and assure some continued involvement of trained men and women in the primary and corollary roles of security and defence.

Following the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War, the establishment of the Union Defence Force in 1912 accommodated various military and regimental traditions (inclusive of different modes of training and doctrines) by establishing commandos and several Citizen Force regiments, which retained some autonomy and self-chosen 'identity' within the newly united Union Defence Force. The pragmatic approach followed by both the Boers and the British after the Anglo-Boer War was borne out in lessons learned, contextual wisdom and the acceptance of some levels of freedom of association among the military (inclusive of the Citizen Force).

While Citizen Force regiment and commandos may be able to market themselves more effectively, the argument is that different historical traditions give rise to different (and sometimes) negative perceptions of the citizen force, such as those encountered in this exploratory study.

In view of this, it is suggested that consideration should be given to the establishment of two or three Citizen Force units that are situated in the tradition of the armed struggle. In terms of

training, doctrine and composition, such units should be able to assume the identity of Citizen Force regiments or units that reflect the past (the identities of and associations with the struggle). While such units are to be fully incorporated into the defence network, their tradition and mode of operation ('regimental' tradition) should reflect the guerrilla and mobile tradition and elements of the 'peoples' soldiers' (the so-called 'proletarian rifles principle'). Needless to say, in terms of command and control, such units are to be regarded as exactly the same as other Citizen Force units, bound by a professional code of honour and professionalism, and under strict observance of the Constitution, relevant defence and security regulations, and standing orders.

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APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE

ISS: STRUCTURED SCHEDULE

1. **Age Years**

2. **Gender Male Female**

3. **In or near which town or village do you live now?**
   Town/village

4. **Please circle your marital status**
   Married (Christian)
   Divorced
   Unmarried, but living together
   Unmarried/Single
   Separated
   Married (traditional/customary Law)

5. **What is your highest level of education?**
   No school education
   Grade 1 to 5
   Grade 6 to 8
   Grade 9 to 11
   Grade 12
   Grade 10 or 11 and apprenticeship
   Grade 12 and up to 3 years' further training
   Grade 12 and more than 3 years training

6. **(a) Do you have children? Yes No**

   (b) If you have children, what are their ages?

First child
Second child
Third child
Fourth child
Fifth child
Sixth child
More than six children

7. **Population group:** *Interviewer, observe but do not ask a question here*
   White Black Asian Coloured

8. **Home language**
   IsiZulu
   Sepedi
   English
   Afrikaans
   isiXhosa
   Xitsonga
   Tshivenda
   Setswana
   Sesotho
   siSwati
   isiNdebele
   Other (Please specify)

9. **How many dependents (children and other dependents) do you have to look after?**

10. **(a) Were you demobilised from the SANDF, did you resign or were you dismissed from the SANDF?**

    Demobilised Resigned Dismissed

    Fieldworkers: Use the word demobilised in stead of "retrenchment"

    (b) If you resigned or were demobilised, did you choose to resign or to be demobilised (retrenched)?
    Yes No

    (c) If you resigned, did you resign out of protest? Yes No

11. **11. If you were demobilised (retrenched) from the SANDF, how long ago was this?**
    Less than six months
    Six months to 1 year
    More than one year
    More than two years
    Was not retrenched

12. **Do you receive unemployment assistance (UIF) from the state? Yes No**

13. **Is your income the only source of income in the family? Yes No**

14. **(a) What are you doing at present?**
    Studying at a technical institution (i.e. Technikon)
    Being trained for a particular skill (craft)
    Completing school
    Employed full time
    Employed part time
    Self-employed
    Unemployed and looking for a job
    Unemployed but not looking for a job
    Unemployed but not fit for work because of a physical problem
    Other (specify)

14(b) *If answer above is No.09:* Is your state of health a permanent condition?

(*Note to interviewer: will the interviewee ever be able to work again?*)
Yes No Uncertain/do not know

15. **15(a)** How interested are you in receiving further training that would enable you to become self-employed?
Very interested
Somewhat interested
Not interested
Uncertain/do not know

Interviewer please check whether "uncertain/do not know" applies, but do not ask the interviewee whether he/she is "uncertain". Interviewee: Please try to give a definite answer here if you can.

15(b) If Interested or somewhat interested, what type of training/skills development would you most like to get?

16. Could you please indicate which of the careers listed below you would be interested to choose. Please do not indicate more than TWO options, in order of preference:?

Note to interviewer: please show all the options to the interviewees (or write them on a board so that they can see them). Please take your time on this question. Interviewees: Please do not be in a hurry in answering this question.
Electrician Fitter and Turner
Motor Mechanic
Carpenter
Dressmaker
Florist
Catering
Restaurant Business
Nursing
Truck Driver
Typist
Secretarial work/Receptionist
Teacher
Security Guard
Small engine Repairs
TV Repairs
Tool Maker
Welding
Air Con/refrigeration
Entertainment Business
Tourism Business
Taxi Driver
Appliance Repairs
Construction
Electrician
Crafts marketing or making
Farming
Small farming
Street Vendor ("Hawker")
Marketing
Sales
Advertising
Public Relations (PR)
Modelling
Industrial Relations (IR)
Financial Management
Computers
Security Management/Communications Management

Postal Delivery
Courier Services
Bakery
Other (Please specify)

First choice
Second choice

The following questions apply only to the unemployed:

17. **How long have you been unemployed?**
Years Months

18. **What is the main reason why you are unemployed?**
Open question

19. **Since being unemployed, have you at any stage looked for a job?**
Yes No

If not looking for a job:

20. **What is the most important reason for your not looking for a job?**

Most important reason

21. **(a) Do you know how to look for a job?**
Yes No
Do not know
Uncertain

(b) If answer to the former question was "yes", how would you look for a job?

Open question

22. **If you were offered assistance, what type of assistance do you need to find a job?**

Interviewer: please do not help interviewee to specify assistance needed

Open question

The following questions apply to ALL the interviewees

23. **Where were you mainly based during your last three months of SANDF service?**

Name of Base

24. **In or near which town was your base?**
Name of town

25. **Did you have to move to another city/village/town after leaving the SANDF?**
Yes No
If yes,

26. **If yes, how far did you have to move? (Indicate distance in kilometres)**
Kilometres

27. **Did you stay at an SANDF house during service?**
Yes No

28. **(a) If yes, did you have to move into another place to live after leaving the SANDF?**
Yes No

(b) If yes, what type of house/place to live did you move to? Please describe in detail.

29. **For how long were you employed by the SANDF?**
Years Months

30. **In what part of the SANDF (mustering) did you mostly serve during your service in the SANDF?**
Infantry corps
Artillery corps
Signal corps
Medical corps
Engineering corps
Personnel corps
Administration corps
SA Air Force
SA Navy
Special Forces
Other (Please specify

Interviewer: Please circle the one as indicated and if "Other", please specify by writing on the schedule.

31. **With which organization did you serve before joining the SANDF?**
MK
Apla
Azanla
TBVC Defence Forces
SADF
KwaZulu Police (VIP Protection Units)
SAPS
Other (Please specify)

If the interviewee did serve with one of the above:

32. **If you did serve with one of the above non-statutory forces, how long did you serve in it?**
Years Months

33. **What was your level of education / training before joining the military?** *[Applicable to all of the above forces]*
School
University/College/Technikon
Practical Training without certificate / paper
Practical Training with certificate / paper

34. **Please list, in order of importance, up to four formal education/training programs that you completed while serving in the SANDF and/or any other previous military force**
Most important
Second most important
Third most important
Fourth most important

Interviewer: the following question (35) is only for previously non-statutory force members:

35. **Please specify the main type of training outside South Africa that you received before joining the SANDF**

36. **To what extent has the training that you have received helped you to find other employment after leaving the SANDF?**
Helped a lot
Helped to some extent
Has not helped at all

Uncertain/do not know

37. **Did you receive any skill/training IN the SADF that helped you to find other employment after leaving the SANDF?**
    Yes
    No
    Do not know
    Uncertain

    If yes,

38. **If yes, what type of training did you receive in the SANDF? List only two of the most important types of training in order of importance.**
    Most important
    Second most important

39. **What was the most important assistance you received from the SANDF after you left the service?**

    Interviewer: please note that this question refers to help after the retrenchment rendered by the SANDF

40. **Do you think that the SANDF did enough to help you when you left?**
    Yes No

    If no

41. **If no, what else could they have done to help you? Name only the most important thing they could have done.**

42. **Did you receive support from any other organisation (besides the SANDF)?**
    Yes No

    If yes

43. **If yes, from which organisation(s) did you receive support? Name up to three in order of importance.**
    Most important
    Second most important
    Third most important

44. **What kind of support did you receive? Name only the most important kind of support received**

45. **Did you study further after leaving the SANDF?**
    Yes No

46. **What were the two main problems you encountered since you left the SANDF? Please name them in order of importance.**
    Lack of work
    Lack of accommodation
    Family separation
    Lack of money
    Lack of proper education
    Lack of necessary skills / experience
    None
    Other (Please specify)

    Most important problem
    Second most important problem

47. **Have you ever heard about the Citizen Force?**
    Yes No

If Yes,

48. **If yes, did you have any personal contact with the Citizen Force?**
Yes No

49. **If you had heard or/and had personal contact with the Citizen Force (CF), how positive or negative do you feel about the Citizen force?**
Positive
Neutral
Negative

50. **Have you ever heard about the regional bounded forces ("Commandos")?**
Yes No

If Yes

51. **If yes, did you have any personal contact with the commandos?**
Yes No

52. **If you have heard of and/or had personal contact with the commandos, how positive or negative do you feel about the commandos?**
Positive
Neutral
Negative

53. **How do you feel about the SANDF Service Corps and its work?**
Positive
Neutral
Negative

54. **Do you currently belong to a Veterans Organisation?**
Yes No

If yes

55. **If yes, to which Veterans Organisation(s) do you belong? Name only the most important one**

56. **If given a second chance in life, what job/career would you choose?**

57. **Is there anything that you would like to remark about that I did not ask you?**

Interviewer: Continue on back of page if necessary

Thank you for your time and effort!
It is greatly appreciated.

Ian Liebenberg
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Research Team, All Africa Consultants and Wits Peace Studies Group, March/April 2001