The state of peace and security in East Africa

Manasseh Wepundi and Roba D Sharamo
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Executive summary

Introduction
The Institute for Security Studies commissioned a scoping study on the state of peace and security in East Africa as part of the ongoing process of deepening its engagement in the sub-region. An analysis of peace and security in East Africa necessitates an understanding of countries in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions, which have been wracked by internal dissidence and interstate conflicts.

The original aim of the study was to look at the peace and security dynamics of the entire East African Community sub-region. However, its dynamic nature – with interdependencies and interconnections with neighbouring eastern, central and southern African countries – necessitated a systemic approach. This meant looking comprehensively at sub-regional conflict systems – those of the Horn and the Great Lakes regions – for an analysis of the region’s peace and security situation.

Peace and security dynamics in East Africa
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) experienced prolonged uncertainty between 2015 and 2018, caused by delayed elections and lack of clarity about former president Joseph Kabila’s desire to seek a third term. Violence has continued to plague the eastern DRC, where there are now over 130 armed groups of various affiliations and sizes.

Most of the countries in the Horn and Great Lakes regions are anocracies, with the sole exception of Kenya, which is a democracy.

Diplomatic tensions beset Kampala and Kigali after they exchanged accusations of espionage, political killings and attacks on trade. An analysis of the Rwanda-Uganda tension reveals other strategic concerns between the two countries. Competition over access to resources in the DRC is one element of the chill in relations.
Somalia is another epicentre of instability in the sub-region. There are ongoing stabilisation efforts in Somalia, including the presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia and military interventions by Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia and the Horn of Africa are experiencing non-traditional security threats by al-Shabaab, which has staged multiple attacks in Kenya. In addition, a Somalia-Kenya maritime border dispute threatens to undermine the war against al-Shabaab and affect the coordination of maritime security.

South Sudan has remained trapped in a vicious cycle of violence, civil war and a web of complex militarised politics, pitting the government of President Salva Kiir against his long-time nemesis, charismatic First Vice-President Riek Machar. Over the last three years, however, some normality has returned and with a transitional power-sharing arrangement between Kiir and Machar, some promise of stability has been observable.

Most of the countries in the Horn and Great Lakes regions are anocracies, with the sole exception of Kenya, which is a democracy. In several countries in the region, there is a new push for more democratic space.

A maritime border dispute between Somalia and Kenya threatens to undermine the war against al-Shabaab and affect regional maritime security

In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed initiated some risky political reforms. In neighbouring Sudan, mass protests triggered by uproar over food prices and economic hardships metastasised into demands for broader political change.

Burundi has faced unrest since 2015 when then-president Pierre Nkurunziza opted to vie for a third term. The unrest included a failed coup d’état and attacks against four military installations.

The challenge of building cohesive and inclusive societies has been worst felt in South Sudan, where political power quickly became ethnicised in the post-secession government.

In some countries, gains at national stabilisation are feared to be dependent on incumbents rather than institutions, as is the case in Rwanda.

In Kenya, nation-building efforts have had to be pursued with more vigour due to recurrent, and mostly political, threats to national unity and state stability. The Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) jointly sponsored by President Uhuru Kenyatta and former prime minister Raila Odinga has ironically contributed to increased political friction.
In the case of Tanzania, the biggest nation-building challenge is the ‘Union issue’, which has involved an ongoing debate on both the format of the United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar’s place within it.

There were over 27,000 incidents of violence affecting communities in the Horn and Great Lakes regions between January 2015 and July 2019. The worst affected countries, in descending order, were Somalia, DRC, South Sudan and Sudan. In the pastoralist areas, there is evidence of the mutation of conflicts from traditional cattle raids to commercialised livestock theft, concerns about violent extremism and disputes over extractive resources.

Rwanda’s experience with post conflict peacebuilding is one of the region’s success stories and an example that state level initiatives work.

Traditional peace and security threats such as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons are still relevant determinants of conflict dynamics. The most armed and therefore most militarised country is Somalia and its breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland. This points to the legacy of war and insecurity, as countries that are in conflict or recovering from it have the largest stockpile of unregistered civilian firearms.

**Interventions**

The African Union has a continental governance as well as peace and security architecture whose constituent parts include frameworks by regional blocs. There are also regional organisations pursuing governance and peace and security interventions, with various slants of focus and overlapping mandates. Among them are the East African Community, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the Regional Centre on Small Arms and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

There are also state level peacebuilding initiatives. Rwanda’s experience with post-conflict peacebuilding is one of the success stories of the region.

In Kenya, there have been multiple government peacebuilding frameworks. Solutions to political disputes include the 2007–2013 national coalition government birthed through the Kofi Annan-mediated National Accord; and the current homegrown BBI between Kenyatta and Odinga.

Uganda has a conflict early warning and early response system and a national focal point on the management of small arms and weapons management in the Ministry
of Internal Affairs. Perhaps its greatest success has been its contribution to the pacification of the Karamoja region.

In Burundi, the local peace architecture includes the customary *Bashingantahe* – a council of elders or community gatekeepers of virtue – who moderate community relations and resolve local disputes. Local peace structures are similarly found in the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda (called *Abunzi* committees), Somalia and Tanzania.

There are also regional civil society networks that are engaged in peace-building activities.

The region remains fragile despite progress in governance and development indicators in some of the countries. The prominent peace and security challenges include violent extremism; insurgency; electoral conflict; resource-based conflicts (including low to medium scale inter-community conflicts and low to high scale conflicts over extractives); the prevalence of illicit small arms and light weapons; difficulty in achieving social cohesion; and persistence of cultures of violence.
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<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location and Event Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfCTA</td>
<td>African Continental Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>Academy for Peace and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBI</td>
<td>Building Bridges Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACH</td>
<td>Cap pour le Changement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECORE</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEJA</td>
<td>Centre d’Etudes Juridiques Appliquées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENAP</td>
<td>Conflict Alert and Prevention Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Conseil National de Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCPF</td>
<td>Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil society organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSVMS</td>
<td>Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSVRA</td>
<td>Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EANSA</td>
<td>East African Network on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASSI</td>
<td>Eastern African Sub-Regional Support Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian National Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPDRF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Front Commun pour le Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPI</td>
<td>Global Peace Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPPAC</td>
<td>Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAG</td>
<td>Inter-African Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IANSIA</td>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICEPCVE</td>
<td>IGAD Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference of the Great Lakes Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPAT</td>
<td>IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSP</td>
<td>IGAD Security Sector Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANSA</td>
<td>Kenya Action Network on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenyan Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNFP</td>
<td>National Focal Point on the Management of Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memoranda of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Never Again Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCIC</td>
<td>National Cohesion and Integration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPI – A</td>
<td>Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPRC</td>
<td>National Peace and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NURC</td>
<td>National Unity and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSSREA</td>
<td>Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTN</td>
<td>Peace Tree Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWD-U</td>
<td>Persons with Disability Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Centre on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENOPs</td>
<td>Regional Network on Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIO</td>
<td>Réseau d’Innovation Organisationnelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, SPLM/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM/A-IO</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSOMA</td>
<td>South Sudan’s Government and the South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANSA</td>
<td>Tanzania Action Network on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UANSA</td>
<td>Uganda Action Network on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFP</td>
<td>Uganda National Focal Point</td>
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Background

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) commissioned a scoping study on the state of peace and security in East Africa. The Institute is a pan-African applied policy research think-tank working in the area of human security in Africa. Within its focus on applied policy research in the East and Horn of Africa, the Institute works extensively with regional organisations, governments, civil society organisations (CSOs) and various institutions in formulating approaches to address challenges to human security in the region.

This study is part of an ongoing process of deepening the ISS’s engagements in the East and Great Lakes regions. The study is aimed at reviewing the state of peace and security challenges in the region with the goal of repositioning the Institute’s work in East Africa. Broadly, it is envisaged that when regional and national level interventions are better coordinated and aligned, the chances of greater stabilisation and sustainable development of the Greater East Africa region will be realised.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Geopolitically, East Africa is part of at least two interlinked regional security complexes: the Horn of Africa and the African Great Lakes complex. This study considers the influences of both complexes in the sub-region, with the implication that the scope of analysis will span beyond member states of the EAC to others constituting the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa.

In many ways, these two sub-regional complexes affect and are affected by complexes to their south, west and north on the African continent, and also to an extent by the Gulf States. They are further shaped by dynamics in the international security environment.

Two of the five least safe and most insecure countries in the world are from the eastern African sub-region: Somalia and South Sudan, which has an ongoing conflict. Also, both South Sudan and Somalia are among the 10 worst affected countries by economic cost of violence as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).

Both the Horn and Great Lakes sub-regions are wracked by internal dissidence and interstate conflicts. In the recent past, there was a coup in Sudan in April 2019 and failed remote insurrections that triggered inter- and intra-ethnic tensions in Ethiopia in June 2019 and South Sudan in December 2013. There have been varying degrees of civil strife in Kenya (in 2013 and 2017) and Uganda, led by youthful Robert Kyagulanyi, alias Bobi Wine.

In Burundi, the late former president Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision in April 2015 to run for a third term led to a failed coup in May 2015 and long-running civil strife. His sudden death in June 2020 before president-elect Évariste Ndayishimiye could be inaugurated created a vacuum and political uncertainty about succession that had...
to be settled by Burundi’s Constitutional Court. There was uncertainty about who, between Ndayishimiye and the Speaker of Parliament, Pascal Nyabenda, was to be the interim leader.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) there has been political volatility and fighting in the eastern regions for over two decades. More recently, there has been armed activity in the central Kasai provinces and northwestern DRC.

Most countries in the region are categorised as (either closed or open) anocracies, with only one (Kenya) considered to be a democracy. This informs some of the conflict dynamics such as coups and civil strife. The nature of state power in this region is also a key source of conflict: political victory assumes a winner-take-all form of wealth and resources.

The region is the most volatile on the continent. The state most vulnerable to violence – Somalia – is in the Horn of Africa. The neighbouring states in the Horn and Great Lakes region experience fairly high incidents of violence relative to neighbouring regions (Chart 1 below). By another metric, a continental examination of state stability shows that, with the exception of the Central African Republic, all the other states classified as extremely fragile are in the Horn and Great Lakes sub-region (Chart 2 below).

Chart 1: State Fragility Index 2017

Source: Center for Systemic Peace
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) data looks at the number of battles, explosions/remote violence, protests, riots and violence against civilians. The trends of these in the region appear to have roughly plateaued since 2016, although this year’s appear to be less at this point.⁷

Chart 2: Continental outlook of incidents of violence

Chart 3: Annualised incidents of violence in the Horn and Great Lakes Regions of Africa⁸
Predominant low-level conflicts, especially in the member states of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), are among pastoralist communities that have historically experienced cattle rustling and natural resource conflict-related violence. In the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, pastoralists comprise between 10 and 20% of the total population, yet they contribute about 9% of the meat consumed in East Africa.9

However, with low state involvement in the development and marketing of the livestock-based economy sectors and infrastructure, the pastoral populations of the eastern and Horn of Africa regions live in abject poverty and are often exposed to climatic and economic vulnerabilities, with limited resilience capacities.

There are four main peace- and security-related regional organisations focused on these conflict complexes: IGAD, the East African Community (EAC), the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA). Also drawing membership from parts of the region are the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Thus, these regional organisations have overlapping memberships.

The Horn and Great Lakes regions have a high incidence of violence – a focus area for the multiple regional economic communities

The regional organisations’ mandates are increasingly overlapping as well, but some are ahead of others in achieving peace, security, stability and economic integration. For instance, in 2017, the then African Union (AU) chairperson observed that the EAC ‘had made the most progress by far, largely due to its achievements in regional trade and the free movement of people’.

At the continental level, AU member states signed and the majority ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA) Agreement in May 2019. It establishes what will be the world’s largest free trade area since the formation of the World Trade Organisation.11 Signed by 54 of the 55 AU member states and ratified by 30, the AfCTA was originally supposed to be effective from 1 July 2020 but was delayed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. It will be implemented by 1 January 2021.12

Sub-regionally, there is eastern Africa’s largest and most ambitious infrastructure project, covering Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan – the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project. It promises to further trade and development interlinkages in eastern Africa as part of a regional integration agenda. This agenda is further evidenced by gains in the EAC regional economic
community, whose member states have harmonised monetary and fiscal policies, conducted joint tourism promotion initiatives and have a common EAC passport for citizens, among others.

**Methodology and scope**

Measuring the state of peace and security is a contested issue despite continuous refinement of methodology. Indeed, how peace is measured can impact policy. Whether measurement indicators should be bottom up or top down can determine whether responses are also bottom up or top down.\(^{13}\)

If peace is measured from the perspective of project or programme evaluation, it informs results-based management of the said project or programme. But that is insufficient for understanding the wider state of peace in any given society, nation or region. A comparative approach is therefore useful for learning as well as decision making. Yet a comparative approach – while useful for regional analysis – may not by itself reveal relevant local factors.

An eclectic approach was utilised for this study. Quantitative datasets from multiple analytical models were used to compare, in a reasonably harmonised way, the state of peace across eastern Africa, while qualitative data collection methods were used for primary data and to determine the progress eastern African countries have made in increasing peace in their region.

The qualitative data collection utilised a bottom-up programmatic model of inquiry, in order to map national and local level actors and interventions. In this way, an objective set of peace and security indicators was analysed while relevant actors and initiatives were also appreciated. Two representative frameworks guided the study:

- The top-down Global Peace Indicators (Institute for Economics and Peace), which consider requisite structures of peace as including a well-functioning government; sound business environment; equitable distribution of resources; acceptance of the rights of others; good relations with neighbours; free flow of information; high levels of education; and low levels of corruption.

- The bottom-up Everyday Peace Indicators, whose indicator categories include cohesion/interdependence; conflict resolution; crime/security; daily/security; discrimination; economic; education; food/agriculture; forces/security; freedom; human rights/justice; health; information; infrastructure; leadership; and social. Quantitative data on peace and safety indicators was analysed, while at the same time some interventions and actors in the region were mapped.

Thus, specific methodological considerations underpinned the study:

- Sub-regional context analysis of eastern Africa, looking at dynamics in the sub-region and its countries.
• Intervention mapping and analysis, where sub-regional, national and, where possible, local initiatives were identified and analysed with a view to pinpointing entry points for the ISS. This mapping process also entailed identifying some of the peace and security stakeholders in eastern Africa.

This was primarily a rapid baseline assessment of the peace and security situation in eastern Africa. Because it was a baseline assessment, it was a contemporaneous – rather than historical – analysis of eastern African dynamics. Thus, where historical information was referenced, it was kept to a minimum and only to contextualise current issues.

The study’s research utilised secondary and primary data. The study looked at available quantitative and qualitative literature on the state of peace in East Africa. For quantitative data, it relied on the ACLED dataset, restricting the period of analysis from 1 January 2015 to 31 July 2019 for the very reason that it was for baseline analysis purposes. In some cases, other quantitative datasets from other sources were used to supplement ACLED’s. Specifically, Afrobarometer data was utilised to analyse safety perceptions in countries where surveys were conducted.

The original aim of the study was to look at the peace and security dynamics of the EAC sub-region. But the nature of the EAC sub-region – with interdependencies and interconnections with neighbouring eastern, central and southern African countries – necessitated a systemic approach to the analysis. This meant looking at sub-regional conflict systems – those of the Horn and the Great Lakes regions of Africa – as relevant factors for understanding the region’s peace and security situation.

For primary data collection, a total of 41 key informant interviews were conducted with respondents drawn from Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Of these, 13 were female (see Chart 4 below). The respondents were drawn from government departments including security forces, civil society actors

Chart 4: Key informant respondents’ distribution by country and type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors
and inter-governmental agencies (one member of parliament of the East African Legislative Assembly, and respondents from IGAD). A small group discussion was held with Ugandan civil society respondents.

**Limitations of the study**

This scoping study was a rapid assessment of the present peace and security situation in eastern Africa. It could cover neither the depth of the subject matter nor the breadth of the geography and stakeholders to the extent that an in-depth, longer-term study would. Rather, it captures the most salient peace and security dynamics that can inform future research. Despite this, the study serves to inform follow-up action and/or research.

Secondly, and because of the first point, the study employed purposive and snowball respondent sampling methodologies. The study targeted informants working in peace- and security-related institutions from whom snowball techniques were employed to reach more. Researcher and respondent bias are thus a possible outcome, given that respondents contactable by the researcher were often the first points of contact, and that these also informed the next sampled respondents.

A cascading number of neighbouring states in the sub-region are currently defined by instabilities of different forms and degrees

Lastly, the quantitative datasets informing part of the analysis were from third parties. Although selected based on the reliability of the sources, their research design and objectives were not necessarily aligned to the current study’s, and therefore only relevant parts of their data were relied upon. They were useful for baseline understanding of some peace and security dynamics but were not necessarily tailored to this study’s specific needs. Hence, this study’s reliance on more than one dataset serves to address some gaps.14

**Peace and security dynamics in East Africa**15

**Geopolitics of the sub-region**

A cascading number of neighbouring states in the sub-region are currently defined by instabilities of different forms and degrees. Prolonged uncertainty destabilised the DRC at the national political level between 2015 and 2018 following a delayed election and a lack of clarity on whether then-president Joseph Kabila would seek a third term. Violence has continued to plague the eastern DRC where there are now over 130 armed groups of various affiliations and sizes. The insecurity has both
national and regional implications, as some of the groups are supported by regional
governments and others are fighting against governments in the region.

In 2013 the DRC and its neighbours signed the Peace Security and Cooperation
Framework (PSC-F), guaranteed by the AU, United Nations (UN), SADC and the
ICGLR. The core element of the PSC-F is the signatories’ commitment to refrain
from supporting armed groups hostile to governments in the region.

Progress on implementing the agreement and on getting all countries to respect
their commitments has been slow. However, there has been notable progress in
key areas of security cooperation in the last year, and the change of leadership in
Kinshasa is also giving regional peace new momentum.

Nonetheless, the DRC’s disputed December 2018 elections led to government
dysfunction. A cabinet was only formed eight months late, after a powersharing
arrangement between President Felix Tshisekedi’s Cap pour le Changement (CACH)
coalition and his predecessor Joseph Kabila’s Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC).

However this coalition grew turbulent, with partisan posturing – such as the ousting
of Tshisekedi’s ally Jean-Marc Kabund a Kabund from his post as president of the
National Assembly. Tshisekedi’s appointment of three judges to the Constitutional
Court – an arbiter in election disputes – upset Kabila.¹⁶

Early post-election efforts to stabilise Congolese politics also involved negotiating
a tripartite agreement among heads of state in Angola, the DRC and Rwanda. The
pact included an agreement to revive efforts to promote peace and security through
the ICGLR. ‘To understand the problem between Rwanda and Uganda, one has
to analyse the DRC,’¹⁷ noted a respondent in reference to both countries’ vested
interests in the DRC’s stability.

Kampala and Kigali meanwhile exchanged accusations of espionage, political
killings and attacks on trade. The dispute led to the closure of the Katuna border
post, affecting trade and movement between Rwanda and Uganda.¹⁸ From one
perspective, Rwanda’s concerns are more about stabilisation of eastern DRC, and
it appears that the dispute with Uganda is more about both countries’ interests in
influencing the DRC’s political (and security) trajectory.

This same viewpoint holds that for Rwanda, there is a mix of security and economic
interests – the country remains wary of Hutu refugees of Rwandese descent in the
DRC but is also keen to keep resource-rich North and South Kivu in eastern DRC
under its sphere of influence.¹⁹

However, closer analysis of the Rwanda-Uganda tension reveals other strategic
concerns. Rwanda and Uganda have been on-off allies in and on the DRC for
decades. The relationship has never fully recovered its erstwhile levels of trust since
the 2001 war between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani.
Competition over access to resources in the DRC is one element of the chill in relations, which sometimes drives spikes in tensions. But it is not the main issue. The two countries have different spheres of geographical interest and influence when it comes to the DRC’s resources, and there is a tacit understanding about this.

The deterioration since 2017 was mostly about Rwanda’s alleged infiltration of the Ugandan security apparatus in pursuit of perceived Rwandan dissidents. Rwanda is claimed to have managed to infiltrate the Ugandan security apparatus at the highest level. This has angered Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who feels that Rwandan President Paul Kagame has gone too far in undermining his authority. Kagame, who helped Museveni come to power, reportedly knows Uganda’s security service and its actors intimately.

In return, Rwanda has accused Uganda of actively supporting the Rwanda National Congress (RNC), the armed opposition movement, led by former Rwandan intelligence and military officials who fell out with Kagame.

Non-traditional security threats include state fragility or failure, terrorism, human and drug trafficking, and the effects of climate change

Ugandan interests in the DRC are largely identical to Rwanda’s: the country has security interests, given that many Ugandan rebel groups have operated from the DRC in the past and continue to do so. Kampala also has economic interests, given its vast oil reserves in Lake Albert, which is shared with the DRC. The DRC is therefore one epicentre of the Great Lakes region’s conflict system.

The other epicentre in the sub-region is Somalia, which is struggling to rebuild from its two decades’ old state collapse. There are ongoing stabilisation efforts in Somalia, including the presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007, and military interventions by Ethiopia (the first beginning in July 2006) and Kenya (from October 2011).

Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) intervened in Somalia between 2006 and 2009 to bolster the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the increasingly powerful Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) intervened in October 2011 and by March 2012 had been rehatted under AMISOM, which also draws troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda.

Somalia and the Horn of Africa are experiencing non-traditional security threats, including state fragility or failure, new wars, terrorism, human and drug trafficking, and the effects of climate change. These threats are regionalised and even
internationalised: al-Shabaab’s violent activities have not been confined within Somali borders.

The group has also staged multiple attacks in Kenya. Between 1 January 2015 and 31 July 2019, al-Shabaab-related incidents in Kenya totalled 150, with 1 972 fatalities. ACLED estimates the total number of al-Shabaab-related events in Kenya and Somalia as 3,802 between January 2017 and April 2019.

Further, the geopolitics in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean have accelerated sub-regional and international competition. Rivalry between Turkey and certain Gulf states continues to play out in the Horn of Africa as they establish relations with countries in the Horn (such as Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan) and in the process militarise the Red Sea by establishing bases.

Tensions and disputes between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray leadership continue to shape political and conflict dynamics in the country

Another dimension is the Kenya-Somalia maritime border dispute that threatens to undermine the war against al-Shabaab. Kenya is a major contributor to AMISOM, which is helping to stabilise Somalia. The dispute was triggered by Somalia’s auctioning of offshore oil, gas and mineral blocs falling within the disputed territory.

The maritime border dispute not only complicates the war on al-Shabaab. It also can affect coordination of a maritime security response to the challenge of piracy, whose increased frequency has been aided by ongoing conflicts in Yemen and Somalia.

In 2017, there were 54 recorded piracy incidents in the western Indian Ocean region, an increase of 100% from 2016 and at a total economic cost of $1.4 billion. Thus, the maritime border dispute presents a threat to greater regional integration (especially IGAD’s efforts) and will strain international efforts to fight terrorism, piracy and illegal migration.

A crisis of stabilisation

As the youngest African nation, despite gaining hard-fought independence in 2011, South Sudan has remained trapped in a vicious cycle of violence, civil war and a web of complex militarised politics pitting the government of President Salva Kiir and his long-time nemesis, First Vice-President Riek Machar. With militarised governance from Juba to the rest of the region, South Sudan continues to be embroiled in incessant violence and human suffering.
Over the last three years, through what is called the IGAD Revitalisation Peace Process, some normality has returned and with a transitional power-sharing arrangement between Kiir and Machar, some promise of stability has been observable.

But implementation of the peace agreement has been slow, especially in areas such as security sector reform and reconstitution of the Transitional National Assembly, which has hampered progress on the Constitution. These delays risk pushing elections out well beyond the timeline prescribed under the agreement. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 contributed to the slowing down of the implementation of the agreement.

There have been some efforts to help strengthen prospects for peace. The latest was the initiative by the Sant’Egidio community – a Rome-based Catholic lay movement – which brought together military representatives from South Sudan’s government and the South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance (SSOMA) in Rome. At the end of the meeting, SSOMA announced its decision to adhere to the peace deal. This underscores the importance of continuous engagement of the government and opposition parties on the sustained commitment to, and implementation of, the peace agreement.

**Uncertain democracy**

In several countries in the region, there is a new push for more democratic space. In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abey Ahmed initiated risky political reforms, including rapprochement with Eritrea; release of political prisoners; and the appointment of women to more than half of his cabinet posts. He also allowed the formation of the Prosperity Party, which principally replaced the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPDRF) ruling coalition.

However, the rapid expansion of democratic reforms catalysed resurgent ethnic nationalism, something previously held ruthlessly in check by previous Marxist and EPRDF regimes. Thus, the June 2019 attempted coup in Amhara region was a logical result of this ethnic dynamic. More than 250 people were arrested. Since then, various Ethiopian regions remain deeply affected by ethnic violence.

Additionally, following the June 2020 killing of a popular Oromo singer, there has been a nationwide crackdown on opposition and other dissident voices, with close to 3 000 persons including top Oromo politicians imprisoned.

Furthermore, the growing tensions and disputes between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray regional state leadership continue to shape political and conflict dynamics in the country. Leading issues are the indefinite postponement of Ethiopia’s general election and disagreement on the management of political transition in Ethiopia. How Ethiopia manages the political transition and the dispute
with the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), as well as the peace deal with Eritrea, remains to be seen.

In neighbouring Sudan, mass protests triggered by uproar over food prices and economic hardship metastasised into demands for broader political change. They began in the northern town of Atbara on 19 December 2018, focused on high food prices, and quickly spread to other towns and cities across Sudan. The demonstrations changed from a narrowly economic agenda to a demand that President Omar al-Bashir, who took power in a coup in June 1989, step down. Al-Bashir’s eventual ouster in April 2019 occasioned an uncertain transition, as a military junta took over and unsuccessfully attempted to crush the protests violently. The military junta and the opposition platform backed by the protesters agreed to form a civilian-led administration to steer a transition that would culminate in a free and fair general election.

But closer analysis reveals that Sudan’s Rapid Response Forces (RSF), who have been accused of widespread abuses, hold much bigger sway in the government. They are a new kind of regime: a hybrid of ethnic militia and business enterprise, a transnational mercenary force that has captured the state. Thus, future democratic growth is uncertain.

Contestations for political power in other countries in the region are feeding fears of new trends of political violence. In Uganda, respondents drew parallels between the country’s political developments and Kenya’s experience of political conflict, including electoral violence. Bobi Wine’s rise as a vocal and youthful opponent to Museveni has galvanised the young urban population in protesting against government policies.

But with youth unemployment and gaping sub-national regional economic disparities (Chart 5 below), it is feared that the current brand of politics will climax in political violence in the 2021 elections.

Chart 5: National poverty rates by region in Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>Western</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Burundi, for its part, has faced unrest since 2015, when then-president Pierre Nkurunziza opted to vie for a third term on his Conseil National de Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) party ticket.\textsuperscript{37} The unrest included demonstrations, a failed coup d’état in May 2015, and attacks against four military installations in and around Bujumbura in December 2015.\textsuperscript{38} The human rights situation has worsened, with some reports estimating that the unrest has claimed 1 200 lives, and there have been myriad violations of fundamental civic and political freedoms.\textsuperscript{39} Many of the killings followed abductions of Burundians believed to be dissidents or their supporters. There are reports of forceful recruitment of the population into CNDD-FDD and its youth league, Imbonerakure. Any resistance often leads to human rights violations.\textsuperscript{40}

**The nation-building challenge**

The challenge of building cohesive and inclusive societies in East African countries remains. It is worst felt in South Sudan, but also observable in all other sub-regional countries. In South Sudan, political power quickly became ethnicised in the post-secession government. The attendant instability drew IGAD’s mediation efforts, which most recently led to a transitional unity government led by Kiir and five vice-presidents. The two main South Sudanese leaders and current antagonists – Kiir and Machar, the leader of a rebel opposition movement – represent two major ethnic groups that are dominating the country’s political and conflict dynamics, the Dinka and the Nuer.

But this ethnic hegemony has fed resentments from other communities as much as it has informed alliances. The resultant proliferation of armed groups in South Sudan – most of them fighting for control, at the very basic level, of ethno-regionally defined territories – challenges the end of the goal of a united South Sudan.\textsuperscript{41} In some cases, gains at national stabilisation are feared to be dependent on incumbents rather than institutions, as is the case in Rwanda. In post-genocide Rwanda, the government led by Kagame prioritised reconstruction, reconciliation and nation building. The country adopted and implemented policies to foster national unity, promote reconciliation, peace, security and development. Through *Gacaca* courts, Rwanda pursued a traditional and domestic tool of retributive and restorative justice. The government felt that these courts were the most efficient method of accelerating trials, given the scale of crimes perpetrated countrywide.\textsuperscript{42} Yet there is still a sense in the country that ‘the majority didn’t take time to acknowledge their wrong’.\textsuperscript{43}

‘The change in Rwanda is driven by the president. The current challenge is to institutionalise his values and ensure national ownership. Revolutions come with their challenges. At the time of the change the challenge was to unify the country, but for the next generation, they want innovation and participation in decision
making. The president in his Liberation Day speech challenged the nation to plan for the next 25 years even as they celebrate the past 25,’ noted one respondent.

The sustainability of Rwanda’s gains beyond Kagame’s strong leadership is yet to be tested, but ultimately it will be about the strength of the country’s institutions.

The challenge for Rwanda in relation to the state and its institutions is the high prioritisation of national security, evidenced by the permeation of the country and immediate neighbours with military and intelligence agents. It is understandable why the country would invest in security, given its background of genocide, but this comes at the risk of sacrificing the institutional strengthening of soft power institutions relevant for nurturing social cohesion.

An analysis of peace and security in East Africa requires understanding countries in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions

In Kenya, nation-building efforts have had to be pursued with more vigour due to recurrent, and mostly political, threats to national unity and state stability. ‘Presently, there are multiple government, political and civil society efforts to keep the country united. While President Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga are working on the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), elected women leaders unveiled the non-partisan Embrace: Women Building Bridges for Kenya to support unity efforts in the country,’ observed one informant.

The current efforts are inspired by the political strain following the hotly contested 2017 general elections, in which opposition leader Raila Odinga boycotted the second round of elections ordered by the Supreme Court. Political contests in Kenya have often ignited identity-based fault lines because of the ethnic nature of political mobilisation and alliance building.

The BBI, supported by both President Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Odinga, has ironically contributed to increased political friction, especially between politicians allied to Deputy President William Ruto and those supporting the president. The rift within the ruling Jubilee coalition was evident when supporters of Ruto-allied central Kenya politicians (referred to as the Tanga Tanga wing) clashed with those of the president (called the Kieleweke wing) at a function in Murang’a in October 2020. The clash raised concerns about rising political hooliganism.

The BBI’s planned expansion of the executive by introducing a prime minister and two deputy prime ministers (in addition to the president and deputy president) and the creation of an additional 70 new electoral constituencies are seen as schemes to pave the way for power and economic resource-sharing among Kenya’s big
ethnic communities. So are revenue-sharing formulas based on population size but not land size, and spatial expansiveness of electoral or county units, contradicting the national unity aims of the process. Smaller communities would be further marginalised politically.

In the case of Tanzania, the biggest nation-building challenge is the ‘Union issue’, which has involved an ongoing debate on both the format of the United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar’s place within it. Elections have previously escalated this debate, often triggering mediation efforts. The late Tanzanian president John Magufuli’s leadership style has been two-faced – projected as reformist, but also seen as dictatorial given concerns about human rights abuses and a media clampdown.

There is fear of entrenchment of dictatorship despite the perception of Tanzanians that the country is experiencing great economic growth. Magufuli is lauded for his focus on infrastructural developments and taming official corruption and predatory foreign firms, especially in the mining sector. In 2019 Tanzania also became a middle income country. In the October 2020 election, Magufuli won amid an outcry over electoral fraud from opposition leaders and the imprisonment of the Zanzibari presidential candidate Maalim Seif Sharif. The developments continue to dent the country’s international image.

**Militia and pastoralist violence**

Based on the ACLED dataset, there were over 27,000 incidents of violence affecting communities in the Horn and Great Lakes regions between January 2015 and July 2019. In descending order, the worst affected countries were Somalia, the DRC, South Sudan and Sudan. The highest incidence of conflict was in borderland areas. (Chart 6 below). The borderlands of the Horn of African states are predominately occupied by pastoralist communities and they experience a significantly high proportion of conflicts.

In these pastoralist areas, there is evidence their conflicts have mutated from the traditional cattle raids to commercialised livestock theft, concerns about violent extremism and disputes over extractive resources. This is true in Kenya and Somalia as it is in Uganda, though the latter’s disputes over extractives are regionalised through border tensions with the DRC.

Uganda shares Lake Albert with the DRC, and the two countries have had border disputes inspired by the issue of oil extraction. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda did face accusations of illegal trading of minerals from the conflict-affected eastern DRC. In Kenya, the discovery of oil in Turkana county, whose land is mostly communal and held in trust by the county government, necessitated swathes of land to be subdivided into oil blocs that were awarded to investors by the national government.
Oil discovery also sparked a boundary dispute with the neighbouring Pokot community who claimed that Lokichar in Turkana South was part of West Pokot. There was community agitation for employment and tenders in extractive industries in Turkan and Kwale, while the Lamu community fought coal exploration in the county due to concerns about negative environmental impacts.

Due to weak industrial mining capacity and a weak legal framework, countries in the sub-region and local communities are exposed to exploitative foreign firms. The communities end up with very limited returns from extensive mineral and oil exploration in the region. Most countries have archaic royalties acts and limited national capacity for exploration and exploitation of high-value minerals and oils. The capacity limitations have meant that artisanal mining thrives in East Africa, with Tanzania having legally allowed this small scale mining.

Small arms and other threats

Traditional peace and security threats such as small arms and light weapons, marginalisation of communities and natural resource disputes are still relevant determinants of conflict dynamics. The Horn and Great Lakes regions of Africa have an estimated 9,073,000 unregistered firearms, translating to an average of 2.15 unregistered firearms per 100 people (Charts 7 and 8).  

The most armed – and therefore militarised – country is Somalia and its breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland. In South Central Somalia there are 12.41
unregistered firearms per 100 people. This points to the legacy of war and insecurity, as countries that are in conflict or recovering from it have the largest stockpile of unregistered civilian firearms.

The interplay between firearms on one hand and war, crime, and violent extremism on the other is a concern across the board. In Uganda, respondents highlighted fears about reports that the increasing use of firearms to resolve minor disputes are on the rise, including road rage incidents. A previous study has more seriously demonstrated a causal link between illicit arms proliferation and homegrown terrorism in Uganda, particularly underlining the activities of groups such as the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

In the Great Lakes region, the concern is about armed groups operating from eastern DRC posing a risk to neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda. There are also mutual suspicions of potential stoking of dissidence (including through the arming of groups) in Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

That there are sub-regional concerns about youth (dis-)empowerment only complicates the small arms challenge. Considering that the region’s population is predominantly young and female, current and future disputes will be more about their integration into the economy. Youth disempowerment majorly informs the situation in Sudan with the ongoing protests, as well as their level of conscription.
into armed groups in South Sudan, involvement in extremism in Kenya, and their clamour for political change in Uganda.57

**Global Peace Indicators: Eastern Africa**

**Snapshot of state of peace**

The Institute for Economics and Peace found Tanzania to be the most peaceful country in eastern Africa in the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2019, despite dropping by two points from its 2018 ranking (Chart 9). Rwanda was the second most peaceful, after remarkably moving up 24 places in the global ranking. Rwanda’s improvement was due to the continued decline in the number and duration of internal conflicts.58

The GPI measures peacefulness across three domains: safety and security; ongoing conflict; and militarisation.

Tanzania still remains the most peaceful country in eastern Africa followed by Rwanda, based on the GPI measures of peacefulness. Considering concerns about human rights violations and a clampdown on press freedom in the October 2020 elections in Tanzania, and also concerns about the post-Kagame stability of Rwanda, the eastern African sub-region has critical issues to address to ensure its
stability. These definitely include governance issues, social inclusion, countering violent extremism and addressing pastoralist violence.

**Everyday peace indicators**

The everyday peace indicators framework is new, and as such has not yet been widely utilised in research projects. For this study raw Afrobarometer datasets were extracted for analysis, becoming the basis for a sense of the local wellbeing and peacefulness of east African countries for which data was available. Thus, while the data is from Afrobarometer, the largely descriptive analysis is the authors’. This data was collected at different times for different countries: Burundi’s was in 2015, Kenya’s in 2016, Tanzania’s in 2017 and Uganda’s in 2016. These indicators are not conclusive, but were chosen on the basis of the availability of quantitative data.

**Going without necessities**

Afrobarometer data showed that Burundi had the biggest proportion of households who frequently went without necessities. Over half (51.7%) of Burundi’s (2015) households frequently lacked food, clean water for home use, medicines or medical treatment, fuel to cook food, and cash income. It implied that most households in Burundi lacked these necessities at best several times a week and at worst every day of the week.
In three other East African countries, households who frequently went without necessities were less than half – 42.6% of Tanzania’s (2017) households, 41.88% of Uganda’s and 33.8% of Kenya’s. Nonetheless the proportion of these poor households is significant enough in all the countries to make the region vulnerable to hunger and attendant ramifications (malnutrition, poor health, and even conflict).

**Safety and security**

Despite the relatively higher levels of household poverty in Burundi (2015) and Tanzania (2017), the two countries had much higher perceptions of safety. A predominant majority of household respondents – 83% in Burundi and 83.4% in Tanzania – never felt unsafe walking in their neighbourhood. Of the four East African countries surveyed, Kenya had the smallest proportion of households that felt safe in their neighbourhood (59% never felt unsafe walking).

Similarly, larger proportions of household respondents in Burundi (86.2%) and Tanzania (85.4%) reported never fearing an occurrence of crime in their homes as compared to Kenya’s 62.6% (2016) and Uganda’s 53.8% (2016).

These findings were further validated by responses to victimisation questions on experiences of crime and violence. To the question about whether they had
Chart 11: How often felt unsafe walking in neighbourhood?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just once or twice</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many times</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer

Chart 12: How often feared crime in home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>85.4%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just once or twice</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many times</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer
something stolen from their house, the largest proportion of respondents in Burundi and Tanzania denied experiencing this. Uganda had the smallest proportion that had never had theft in their homes.

**Societal openness**

Across the sub-region, there is only a minor proportion of household members that discuss politics with their friends or family members. To the question, ‘When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters?’, less than a quarter of households in each of the countries surveyed acknowledged doing so frequently. The largest proportion of households that regularly discussed politics were in Kenya (21.6%) and Tanzania (20.6%).

Similarly, most households in all the four countries surveyed felt they were free – to varying degrees – to speak their thoughts. Burundi had the largest proportion (12.3%) of households who did not feel free to express themselves. Tanzania and Uganda had the most household respondents – 81.8% and 80.3% respectively – affirming that they were either somewhat or completely free to say what they thought.

On the choice between a powerful government that could ban organisations opposing it on one hand, and the freedom of citizens to join any organisations on the
other, Tanzania comes out as having households most likely to support a strong intolerant state. Over four in 10 (41.7%) of Tanzanian households very strongly agreed with the statement, ‘Government should be able to ban any organisation that goes against its policies’. On the other hand, the largest proportion (44.8%) was of Burundian household respondents who very strongly agreed to a liberal democratic order with everyone able to join any organisation regardless of the government’s stance on it.
Finally, with regard to perceptions on women’s participation in politics, there is a strong and uniform sub-regional support for the view that women should have the same chance of election as men. Tanzania and Uganda had the largest proportion of household respondents – 62.3% and 60.6% respectively – agreeing strongly with the need for equal chance for women’s involvement in elective politics.

In summary, perceptions of safety and security were most positive in Burundi and Tanzania. Kenya and Uganda were found to have a higher crime victimisation rate, going by findings on experiences of theft. On the other hand, perceptions of socioeconomic wellbeing – signalled by views on access to necessities – show that Kenya is doing better than Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda.

Further, respondents in countries presently experiencing higher degrees of political struggle – that is, Burundi and Uganda – were more strongly opposed to notions of an overbearing government. This can be inferred from their predominant
opposition to the possibility of the government banning any organisation that went against its policies. Lastly, a positive finding across all four countries is the fact that household respondents were mostly supportive of women’s equal participation in elective leadership.
Chapter 2

Intervention and actor mapping

African Union

The AU has a continental governance as well as peace and security architectures whose constituent parts include frameworks by regional blocs. It has five strategic priorities for the 2016 – 2020 period, including ‘conflict prevention; crisis/conflict management; post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding; strategic security issues; and coordination and partnerships’. The AU recognises eight regional economic communities (RECs), among which are the EAC and IGAD for the eastern African region.

The AU has adopted several normative instruments to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. They relate to human rights; governance and the fight against corruption; democratisation processes; disarmament; terrorism; and the prevention and reduction of interstate conflicts. The AU’s Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) offers a coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention.

The AU has adopted several instruments to help prevent conflicts related to human rights, governance and the fight against corruption

The CSCPF provides and supports two member state peer review mechanisms – ‘the country structural vulnerability and resilience assessments (CSVRAs) and the country structural vulnerability mitigation strategies (CSVMS).

‘CSVRAs are anchored in the AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), for early warning purposes,’ explained an AU official. ‘The functionality of CEWS is to some extent dependent on the RECs’ and member states’ early warning capacities; hence the AU is interested in strengthening the capacities of both.’

The CSVMS, on the other hand, explores the dimensions upon which the AU and the RECs can best support the actions to be undertaken which may include
measures at regional level to address the structural/root causes of violent conflict. ‘Both the CSVRAs and CSVMS offer a unique opportunity for member states, at their own initiative, the AU and the relevant REC to collaborate in the area of structural conflict prevention,’ observed the AU official.62

These frameworks serve to guide member states, which have the primary responsibility of ensuring effective conflict prevention. The AU’s Peace and Security Council has on its part highlighted concerns about the existence of foreign military bases and the establishment of new ones in some African countries, coupled with the inability of the member states concerned to effectively monitor the movement of weapons to and from these foreign military bases.63

This concern reinforces the need to pursue wider adoption and stricter implementation of the global Arms Trade Treaty, which regulates the ‘trade in small arms and light weapons’, proscribing their transfer into the hands of ‘illegal end users’. It also validates the need for robust early warning mechanisms as a means of conflict prevention, as a basis for monitoring and reporting on arms transfers. Nonetheless, eastern Africa’s RECs’ and member states’ early warning mechanisms do not report on such global arms transfers within their regions and/or jurisdictions.

Regional intergovernmental organisations

East African Community64

The treaty for the establishment of the EAC sets out, among its objectives in Article 5, ‘to ensure the promotion of peace, security, and stability within, and good neighbourliness among, Partner States’.65 This objective also informs the fundamental principles of the regional bloc, as detailed in Article 6 of the treaty.

Among the functions of the EAC’s Summit, which consists of heads of state or government of the partner states, is to include a review of the state of peace, security and governance within the EAC.66 Article 124 of the treaty binds member states to promote peace and security within the community and adopt measures for maintaining and promoting security in their territories.

The EAC also has a Protocol on Peace and Security that provides for cooperation of state parties in ‘conflict prevention, management and resolution; prevention of genocide; combating terrorism; combating and suppressing piracy; peace support operations; disaster risk reduction, management and crisis response; management of refugees; control of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons; combating transnational and cross border crimes, including drug and human trafficking, illegal migration, money laundering, cybercrime and motor vehicle theft; addressing and combating cattle rustling; and Prisons and Correctional Services including exchange of prisoners, detention, custody and rehabilitation of offenders’.67
As part of making operational its Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism (CPMR Mechanism), the EAC set up a regional early warning centre – dubbed EACWARN – with a situation room for anticipating, monitoring and analysing conflicts within the region. The EACWARN needs some institutional strengthening: it has only one analyst and requires specialists in natural resource-based threats and terrorism; and it also lacks its own early warning structures in partner states.68

But this gap can be addressed by establishing EACWARN desks in the Country Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) of IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), where membership overlaps – in Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. This would also promote inter-REC collaboration between the two AU-recognised inter-governmental organisations in eastern Africa. The EAC’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is interdependent with the Peace and Security Department of which EACWARN is a part. The DPA has a mandate to promote good governance and political integration in the region. But its capacity and resource constraints hamper the full discharge of its mandate. It is currently manned by one regular staff member assisted by one temporary project staff member. It has scaled down several of its programmes including human rights, political party dialogue and the Chief Justices Forum.69

These constraints have also contributed – albeit not solely – to the EAC’s failure to engage in regional diplomacy such as in the case of the Rwanda-Uganda and Burundi-Rwanda tensions. Besides resource and capacity constraints, the political nature of the disputes complicated EAC intervention.70

As part of its conflict prevention and management resolution, EAC set up a regional early warning centre to monitor and analyse conflicts in the region

Also, the EAC has entered memoranda of understanding (MoU) with five regional and international organisations to ensure transparent coordination of cross-border security matters. These include the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group; the AU (cooperating on peace and security); RECSA; Interpol (cooperating on the fight against transnational crimes); and the ICGLR (promoting peace and security, democracy and good governance). The EAC is also the designated regional coordinator for the related legal issues of the EU Maritime Security Programme.71

The EAC’s East African Court of Justice (EACJ) has become a stronger defender of human rights. It has become increasingly assertive about member states that
violate the EAC Treaty, including human rights violations. Recently, the EACJ ordered Kenya to pay Martha Karua – a contestant for Kirinyaga’s governorship – $25 000 in damages for infringement of her right to a fair trial.

One key critique of EAC’s peace and security architecture is that policies are great on paper but this has not quite translated to practical interventions. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC have, to some extent, set some standards on interventions, especially in respect of responding to coups, which is yet to be seen in other regions. However, the EAC Secretariat has received technical support from development partners like the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) towards improving their peace and security architecture.

**Inter-Governmental Authority on Development**

The formation of IGAD was inspired by, among other reasons, the purpose of promoting peace, security and stability, and eliminating the sources of conflict as well as preventing and resolving conflicts in the sub-region. Some of its principles include the peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue and the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security. One of its 11 objectives is ‘to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue’.

IGAD’s Peace and Security Division spearheads its efforts towards achieving a peaceful, stable and secure region. IGAD’s Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), launched in 2006, was aimed at building national capacity to resist terrorism and promoting regional security cooperation. It comprised five main components, namely: enhancing judicial capacity, optimising interdepartmental cooperation, enhancing border control, providing training, and promoting strategic cooperation. From 2011, ICPAT was renamed the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), which carries on the best practices of the predecessor.

IGAD has majorly mediated various high intensity disputes in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Presently, the South Sudan situation is active, and so are IGAD’s mediation efforts. The South Sudan civil war is active, with Kiir leading the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, SPLM/A, and Machar heading the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).

The conflict has ethnic undertones – both the December 2013 and July 2016 military clashes included ethnically targeted killings of civilians, and there was a growing perception and dislike of political dominance by the Dinka and Nuer communities.

But IGAD’s mediation has been fraught with challenges. The negotiating parties have recurrently violated agreements; and competing IGAD member states’
interests in South Sudan are viewed to have compromised mediation success. For instance, the historical rivalry between Sudan and Uganda is viewed to have placed them on opposing divides of the South Sudan conflict.\textsuperscript{78}

The intractability of the South Sudan conflict despite IGAD’s mediation underscores the need for strengthening IGAD’s capacity to leverage its status as a REC and its members’ geostrategic advantages to better influence the mediation and conflict trajectory in South Sudan. But it also reasserts the necessity for stronger AU-IGAD collaboration in mediating complex conflicts in the region.

IGAD also has specialised peace and security institutions, including CEWARN and the IGAD Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE). CEWARN focuses on gathering and analysing early warning data and disseminates situation and incident reports to member states for response. ICEPCVE addresses the challenges of violent extremism. CEWARN is the nerve centre for IGAD regional conflict monitoring, as well as conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR).\textsuperscript{79}

South Sudan’s conflict has ethnic undertones – both the December 2013 and July 2016 military clashes included ethnically targeted killings of civilians

However, CEWARN has capacity constraints – its regional data collection capacity has been hampered by its decision to drop field monitors, informed by concerns about costs. CEWARN’s hope was that civil society actors in the IGAD region would volunteer conflict monitoring data. The implication was that conflict data would likely be unstructured and episodic, rather than systematised with regular monitoring and reporting on specific and gendered conflict indicators.\textsuperscript{80}

Overall, locally collected sub-regional data on peace and security in East Africa is not as robust as, say, that collected by ACLED or IPRI. It could also point to the resource constraints of sub-regional organisations.

Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States

RECSA was established in June 2005. Its sole mandate is to address the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) to provide a conducive environment for sustainable development. RECSA has its origins with the Nairobi Declaration of March 2000, and the Nairobi Secretariat was created to assist its 10 signatories to attain their objectives. Five countries have since joined: Seychelles (2004), Somalia (2005), Congo – Brazzaville (2009), CAR (2011), and South Sudan (2011). RECSA’s principle objective is to ensure the efficient and effective
implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol, which relate to the prevention, control and reduction of illicit small arms.81

RECSA’s initiatives have included support for member states’ initiatives to improve on stockpile management and building member states’ national focal points to contribute to monitoring the small arms dynamics (such as illicit ownership and arms flows) with a view to curbing their illicit trade and ownership. However, national focal points’ research capacities are often hampered by financial constraints. Further, not many local researchers focus on arms issues and the many dimensions of the security challenges they pose. At the moment, RECSA is perceived as having declined, but it is more that it has struggled with funding issues.82

**International Conference on the Great Lakes Region**

To address intractable and systemic conflicts in the Great Lakes of Africa region, 11 states83 alongside the AU and the UN created the ICGLR in 2003. The first of ICGLR’s peace building instruments was the 2004 Dar es Salaam Declaration, which prioritised peace and security; democracy and good governance; economic development and regional integration; and humanitarian and social matters.

There was the subsequent Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes, in December 2006 (the Nairobi Pact). The Nairobi Pact established a mechanism for dealing with transborder security issues, as well as the disarmament and demobilisation of armed groups. The ICGLR states also signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region, dubbed the Framework of Hope, in 2013.

ICGLR has had funding challenges affecting its effectiveness. And as with other intergovernmental organisations, its capacity to influence change is constrained by sensitivities about state sovereignty, so it cannot penalise members for noncompliance with commitments.84

In 2012 civil society actors set up the Great Lakes Project to improve their engagement in peace and security and reinforce ICGLR’s work. Despite these efforts, civil society actors’ coordination is still viewed as limited.85 This reemphasises the need to strengthen civil society coordination frameworks.

**State level initiatives**

East African states’ peacebuilding initiatives are greatly influenced by their experience of conflict and insecurity. Some examples can be summarised:

Rwanda’s experience with post-conflict peacebuilding is one of the success stories of the region, considering the country’s post-1994 genocide pursuit of justice and reconciliation. In 1999, the government established the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) through an act of parliament to promote unity and reconciliation. The NURC works with multiple stakeholders
to build peace and cohesion in Rwanda, especially including the church and media in its programmes.\textsuperscript{86}

Rwanda also enacted a \textit{Gacaca} law in 2001, which paved the way for a culturally informed process of pursuing restorative and retributive justice for hundreds of thousands of genocide-related prisoners. This served the twin purpose of delivering justice for crimes committed during the genocide as well as realising reconciliation. In the context of an overwhelming number of perpetrators and massive destruction of state institutions, including the courts, during the genocide, the Gacaca courts helped expedite the justice and reconciliation process.\textsuperscript{87} The NURC still implements unity and reconciliation programmes.

In Kenya, there have been multiple government peacebuilding frameworks. Solutions to political disputes have included the 2007–2013 national coalition government birthed through the Kofi Annan-mediated National Accord; and the current homegrown BBI between Kenyatta and Odinga. There are also two government institutions focused on peacebuilding: the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) in the Peacebuilding and Conflict Management directorate, and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC).

\textbf{Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi lack conflict early warning systems – a gap EAC can address by partnering with civil society organisations}

The NSC has coordinated national to local level peacebuilding initiatives and led efforts to enact a national peace policy in Kenya. It also has an early warning system whose successes include its role in conflict prevention in Kenyan elections, facilitation and documentation of inter-community peace accords and its assumption of the role of a CEWARN model country early warning and response unit (CEWERU) in the IGAD region.\textsuperscript{88}

The NCIC has similarly brokered inter-community accords, most notable of which are community election agreements dubbed ‘negotiated democracy’, where competing communities agreed to distribute electoral seats among each other to forestall the chance of political conflicts and promote cohesion.\textsuperscript{89}

There is also the Kenya National Focal Point on the Management of Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP), which has played a strategic role in researching the dynamics of small arm and light weapon possession; coordination of marking of government and civilian firearms; destruction of seized illicit firearms; and facilitation of civilian disarmament efforts.
Uganda has its CEWERU and National Focal Point on SALW Management (UNFP) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Perhaps its greatest success has been its contribution to the pacification of the Karamoja region, where the government implemented the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) between 2007 and 2010. This was a civilian disarmament process integrated with local development initiatives.90

Tanzania has experiences with the institutionalisation of political reconciliation of high-level governance disputes. These attempts were dubbed Muafaka Accords – Muafaka I in 1995, Muafaka II in 2000 and Muafaka III in 2005 – aimed at stemming the political fallouts and electoral violence that strained the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union.91 The Muafaka Accords eventually fed the maridhiano process in 2009 that led to a constitutionalised unity government format in Zanzibar, where the two main political parties have a role in government.

Besides an experiential framework for the management of political disputes, on security matters, Tanzania has embraced community policing in its response to prevent and counter violent extremism. The polisi jamii (community policing) model creates a collaborative relationship between civilians and the Tanzanian police, with the former feeding the latter with information about safety and security issues.92

Nonetheless, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi lack conflict early warning systems – a gap that the EAC’s early warning mechanism can address in partnership with strategic civil society partners. The other countries in the IGAD region all have these systems, including South Sudan, whose platform is domiciled in the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC).93

**Non-state actors**

Grassroots-level peace structures in eastern Africa have some commonalities in form as much as they are also influenced by national and local contextual factors. In Burundi, the local peace architecture includes the customary Bashingantahe – a council of elders or community gatekeepers of virtue – who moderate community relations and resolve local disputes.

The Bashingantahe and local peace committees have been instrumental in grassroots peacebuilding in post-conflict Burundi. The Mennonite Church founded a peacebuilding organisation called MiParec, which then rolled out local peace committees across all provinces in Burundi.94

Local peace structures are similarly found in the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda (called Abunzi committees), Somalia and Tanzania. As noted earlier, the formation of these structures is to a big extent culturally informed. For instance, Rwanda’s Abunzi committees draw from the cultural practice of utilising men of integrity to mediate local conflicts.95 Thus, in all these countries, harvesting of local cultural
knowledge on peacebuilding for learning and sensitisation would sustain such knowledge and practice.

Besides such cultural and/or hybrid actors, there are also many other civil society organisations (CSOs) and networks. The following sections only touch on those that were reached during primary data collection.

**Regional civil society networks**

There are many regional peacebuilding civil society networks in the sub-region. In the small arms sector, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) includes regional and national chapters.

The East African Network on Small Arms (EANSA), domiciled in the Kampala-based Persons with Disability-Uganda (PWD-U), was a civil society collaborator in an EAC-GTZ SALW Project that ran from 2006 to 2012. EANSA then worked with national chapters in the same network in the EAC sub-region, such as the Kenya Action Network on Small Arms (KANSA), Tanzania Action Network on Small Arms (TANSA) and Uganda Action Network on Small Arms (UANSA). The project was about improving SALW management, while civil society actors took on the role of public sensitisation on SALW initiatives and issues.96

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**Tanzania has embraced community policing in its response to prevent and counter violent extremism**

There is also the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) which is a global network led by CSOs actively working to prevent violent conflict and build more peaceful societies. The partnership consists of 15 regional networks, with priorities and agendas specific to their environment. Each region is represented in the International Steering Group, which jointly determines its global agenda and approach.97

In this sub-region, there is the GPPAC Eastern and Central Africa whose secretariat moved from Kenya’s Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa (NPI–A) to Uganda’s Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE).98

The GPPAC Eastern and Central Africa aims to liaise with the ICGLR in peacebuilding work. The regional chapter has prioritised gender-based violence, conflict-induced displacement, radicalisation and violent extremism (with emphasis on the inability to cope with an expanding youth bulge), effects of climate change, poor governance, and the challenge of election violence as relevant issues to work on in this region.99
There are other networks as well. Recently, one – the Regional Network on Peace and Security (RENOPs) – was formed out of concern about the regionalised nature of conflicts in the Horn and Great Lakes Region. In 2014, it rolled out campaigns in solidarity with conflict-affected South Sudanese people; the campaigns were in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.\textsuperscript{100}

There is also the Peace Tree Network (PTN), which was vibrant in the early 2000s with membership in seven countries in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa.\textsuperscript{101} It still exists, but has struggled with funding and membership has dwindled.

**Civil society agencies and government actors**

There is a myriad of individual peacebuilding civil society agencies in the region focusing on a number of thematic areas. This section shall not mention all individually, but highlight a few, informed by the study’s reach.

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**Chart 18: Snapshot of civil society actors in the region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Thematic focus</th>
<th>Geographic scope</th>
<th>Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>InterPeace</td>
<td>Track 6 Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Parts of Great Lakes and Horn of Africa</td>
<td>Conflict Alert and Prevention Centre (CENAP), Burundi, Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC), DRC, Centre d’Etudes Juridiques Appliquées (CEJA), DRC, Pole Institute, Réseau d’Innovation Organisationnelle (RIO), DRC, National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), Kenya, Never Again Rwanda (NAR), Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Somali Region, Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Again Rwanda</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Governance and democracy</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Youth Voices Rwanda, InterPeace, Global Fund for Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Thematic focus</td>
<td>Geographic scope</td>
<td>Partners</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Again Rwanda &lt;br&gt;<em>cont</em></td>
<td>Youth engagement &lt;br&gt;Research and advocacy &lt;br&gt;Training &lt;br&gt;(Peacebuilding Institute)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Development partners**

Development partners are equally many, and their priorities are varied. A number of them are captured below.

Chart 19: Snapshot of donors and their strategic priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Strategic priorities</th>
<th>Countries of focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Aid</td>
<td>• Infrastructure, trade facilitation and international competitiveness</td>
<td>Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Strategic priorities</td>
<td>Countries of focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Australian Aid**       | • Agriculture, fisheries and water  
• Effective governance: policies, institutions and functioning economies  
• Building resilience: humanitarian assistance, disaster risk reduction and social protection  
• Gender equality and empowering women and girls                                                                                                           | Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda   |
| **Austrian Development Agency CS** | • Right to Peace (peacebuilding, reconciliation and democratisation)  
• Help towards self-help (advancing decentralisation and regionalisation)                                                                                       | Ethiopia and Uganda                         |
| **Canada**               | • Providing development assistance  
• Promoting democracy  
• Promoting peace and security  
• Increasing commercial and economic ties                                                                                                                                                     | DRC, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Tanzania     |
| **DANIDA**               | • Security and development – peace, stability and protection  
• Migration and development  
• Inclusive, sustainable growth and development  
• Freedom and development – democracy, human rights and gender equality                                                                                                                           | Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda |
| **DFID Africa Regional** | • Economic development – better cross-border trade, access to electricity and agricultural productivity  
• Basic services – family planning, work to end FGM and support African countries in tackling deadly diseases  
• Humanitarian – help to avoid worst effects of shocks; drought and insecurity  
• Climate and environment  
• Governance and security  
• Human development                                                                                                                                           | Sub- Saharan Africa                         |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Strategic priorities</th>
<th>Countries of focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>• Food security&lt;br&gt;• Professional (TVET) training and/or skills development&lt;br&gt;• Economic income-generating activities&lt;br&gt;• Basic social services</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>• Regional trade&lt;br&gt;• Regional integration&lt;br&gt;• Mediation</td>
<td>East Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Development Agency (AFD)</td>
<td>• 100% Paris Agreement (climate change)&lt;br&gt;• 100% Social Link (social cohesion, reducing inequalities, especially gender, and access to education)&lt;br&gt;• 3D development thinking (defence, diplomacy, development)&lt;br&gt;• Non-sovereign first (local governments, public enterprises, CSOs, foundations, companies and financial institutions)&lt;br&gt;• Partnership by Design (systematic openness to all potential partners)</td>
<td>DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of the Netherlands</td>
<td>• Education&lt;br&gt;• Equal rights for women and girls&lt;br&gt;• Sexual and reproductive health rights&lt;br&gt;• Food security, sustainable agriculture and water management&lt;br&gt;• Security and the rule of law&lt;br&gt;• Emergency aid and humanitarian diplomacy&lt;br&gt;• Refugees and migration&lt;br&gt;• Climate change</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Great Lakes Region, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF)</td>
<td>• Civic education&lt;br&gt;• Rule of law and good governance&lt;br&gt;• Sustainable economic development&lt;br&gt;• Climate change</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Strategic priorities</td>
<td>Countries of focus</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Research Centre (IDRC)</td>
<td>• Gender equality&lt;br&gt;• Research quality plus&lt;br&gt;• Revitalising skills training and education for youth</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Aid</td>
<td>• Gender equality&lt;br&gt;• Reducing humanitarian need&lt;br&gt;• Climate action&lt;br&gt;• Strengthening governance</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>• Quality Africa: promoting structural economic transformation through economic diversification and industrialisation&lt;br&gt;• Resilient Africa: promoting resilient health systems for quality of life&lt;br&gt;• Stable Africa: promoting social stability for shared prosperity</td>
<td>DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>• Climate change and environment&lt;br&gt;• Democracy and good governance&lt;br&gt;• Education&lt;br&gt;• Energy&lt;br&gt;• Global health&lt;br&gt;• Higher education and research&lt;br&gt;• Macroeconomics and public administration&lt;br&gt;• Oil for development</td>
<td>DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>• A better environment, sustainable use of natural resources, reduced climate impact and strengthened resilience to environmental impact, climate change and natural disasters&lt;br&gt;• Strengthened democracy and gender equality and greater respect for human rights</td>
<td>DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Strategic priorities</td>
<td>Countries of focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Sweden** | • Better opportunities and tools to enable poor and vulnerable people to improve their living conditions  
              • Human security and freedom from violence                                         |                                                        |
| **USAID**  | • Promoting regional partner institutions as a local solution  
              • Intra-regional economic integration and trade as the means to growth  
              • Regional resilience to internal and external shocks                             | EAC, COMESA, IGAD, and their member states              |

Source: Authors
Chapter 3

Conclusion

This study began with the postulation that to understand peace and security in East Africa, one has to understand the systemic basis of peace and security in the sub-region. The pursuit of this understanding necessarily means the broadening of the geographical scope to examine the dynamics of both the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.

Where individual countries have improved in their levels of peacefulness – especially Rwanda’s remarkable example – sub-regional dynamics are proving more challenging, especially given diplomatic rivalries such as Rwanda-Uganda; Burundi-Rwanda; Kenya-Tanzania; Kenya-Somalia; and regional interests in South Sudan.

Thus, the region remains fragile despite progress in governance and development indicators in some of the countries. The prominent peace and security challenges include violent extremism; insurgency; electoral conflict; resource-based conflicts (including low to medium scale intercommunity conflicts and low to high scale conflicts over extractives); a prevalence of illicit small arms and light weapons; difficulty achieving social cohesion; and the persistence of cultures of violence.

The region remains fragile despite progress in governance and development indicators in some of the countries

Yet, as some of the gaps in data in this study have shown, standardised region-wide contextual monitoring of the peace and security indicators is at best inconsistent. Thus, data is available for some countries and not for others, complicating systematised comparative analysis of all countries of interest. This gap, even in the presence of multiple regional agencies that monitor the regional conflict context, is also an intervention opportunity.

There are multiple overlapping initiatives even at the intergovernmental level – underscoring a capacity to systematically monitor the region, with proper institutional strengthening and coordination. For instance, the eastern African region
is covered in IGAD’s CEWARN; EAC’s EACWARN; and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa’s (COMESA’s) COMWARN early warning systems.

Yet the extent of their collaboration, while existent, is weak. A number of these agencies are also experiencing funding shortfalls, affecting their effectiveness and vibrancy. Further, the early warning platforms have technical capacity needs that should be addressed for their optimum performance.

Civil society actors are also diverse and in many ways overlap. There are fewer agencies working on a regional plane, but they experience similar challenges relating to scope and funding. Because of their myriad pathways of change, civil society actors have multiple partnership and capacity building needs.

Thus, there is a need to work both on partnerships and capacity building on one hand, and addressing and/or highlighting the peace and security challenges in the East African context on the other.

**Recommendations**

**For regional economic communities and state actors**

- Strengthen inter-REC coordination in contextual monitoring for conflict prevention. Given this study’s emphasis on the importance of systemic approaches to monitoring and addressing conflict, stronger coordination among RECs such as IGAD, EAC and SADC would reduce the likelihood of blind spots in conflict programming and interventions.

- AU-REC collaboration should also include the aim of building member states’ capacities in conflict prevention. RECs, in their liaison with member states, need to avail knowledge and skills, not only on REC-specific opportunities for their members, but also on AU-level capacity-building opportunities for these member states.

- RECs should minimise duplication of conflict prevention structures in member states. Where there are overlapping memberships among RECs, such as with IGAD and EAC, improved collaboration between them in member states should serve to improve complementarity of structures. For instance, where the IGAD CEWARN early warning structures pre-exist in member states, both EAC and IGAD would be best served if the EACWARN focused on non-IGAD EAC member states in setting up EACWARN national structures while simultaneously plugging into pre-existing CEWERUs in IGAD and EAC member states. This would improve RECs’ collaboration at the national level as well.

- RECs in eastern Africa have a number of capacity needs. For instance, the EAC is working to establish a mediation support unit as a response option for the EACWARN. Civil society institutional support to EAC towards this end would be
strategic. Other areas of technical support to regional conflict prevention and management platforms include:

– Training of members of national conflict early warning systems in skills such as data processing and writing actionable early warning reports. Some of the national early warning platforms have specific capacity building needs, such as analysis of early warning data and production of actionable early warning reports to improve response.

– Training of members of national focal points on SALW in areas such as current policy engagement issues and research skills.

– Advisory support to intergovernmental conflict early warning systems such as CEWARN, EACWARN and COMWARN; and mediation structures such as IGAD’s Mediation Support Unit.

– Pursue joint research projects with regional stakeholders such as RECSA, ICGLR, and InterPeace, among others, utilising the strategic strengths of both ISS and its partners on thematic research issues.

• RECs, member states and civil society actors can further pursue thematic training collaborations with specialised training institutes such as Kenya’s National Defence College, Rwanda Peace Academy and Never Again Rwanda’s Peace-Building Institute, among others. This would promote regional knowledge, skills and information sharing, while sustaining capacity gains across the board.

For EAC and member states

• Prioritise governance and rule of law programmes in members’ states, including investing in independent institutions to run free and fair elections.

• Manage intra-state violence and cross-border violence – through improved community security along the porous borders; civilian disarmament; and the disbandment of illegal gangs in urban areas and ethnic militias in pastoral communities.

• Invest in borderlands as points of EAC integration – better one-stop-border posts.

• Increase investments in managing regional politics and tensions, including making the EAC Summit more regular and vibrant.

• Strengthen the CSO network and think-tanks for effective involvement in EAC affairs and programmes.

• Develop a regional framework for better management of extractive industries to promote social cohesion with local communities.

• Develop a regional framework for better management and cooperation over utilisation of transboundary natural resources.
• Comprehensively address different typologies of crimes, including organised crimes, drug trafficking and cyber crimes.

• Strengthen regional capacities for countering violent extremism.

• EAC and IGAD should prioritise the stabilisation of South Sudan.

• EAC needs to develop a high-level panel of the wise and mediation support unit to deal with high-level political and economic conflicts among the EAC member states.

• At the Secretariat level, the EAC needs strategic and technical assistance for the Office of the Secretary General as well as the technical departments of defence, peace and political affairs.

For civil society actors and think-tanks

• Prioritise standardised and systematic regional context monitoring studies in all eastern African countries. This would serve to address information gaps on conflict indicators in some countries. Civil society agencies therefore need to commission and/or conduct regional surveys on specific regional contextual peace and security issues including, but not limited to:
  – Violent extremism
  – Insurgencies, actors, interests and opportunities for mediation
  – Electoral conflict and regional vulnerabilities to electoral conflict
  – Resource-based conflicts
  – Extent of the problem of illicit small arms and light weapons and patterns of possession and circulation
  – Identity-based conflicts; and cultures of violence
  – Militias, their spread, membership, interests and opportunities for demobilisation
  – Crime dynamics and crime victimisation surveys
  – Comparative studies on nation-building and/or peacebuilding projects in the region and perspectives on their success and/or improvement
  – The peace and security challenges of the region’s demographic trends, specifically focusing on the youth bulge.

• Because comprehensive studies proposed above are extremely expensive and would take time to organise, civil society agencies need to establish a regional research consortium. This would bring together researchers (organisations and individuals) with access to specific countries in the region that would then contribute to growing a body of knowledge on the entire region. Such a regional research community should focus on:
– Information sharing and networking
– Capacity strengthening in research methodologies for different themes in peace and security
– Peer review of research projects
– Support for publication of reviewed research projects.

• Setting up a research community can take time. And even when set up, the process of systematically building the body of knowledge on regional peace and security dynamics can be time-intensive. Multi-stakeholder knowledge sharing and harvesting platforms would be a more immediate term achievement for civil society actors. For example there can be:
  – Annual ISS-regional network forums on the state of the region
  – Donor roundtables on topical issues
  – Public talks/dialogues (e.g. in universities) on topical peace and security issues of concern.

• Civil society actors can lead on strategic policy engagement and/or advocacy initiatives to influence formulation, ratification, harmonisation, implementation and monitoring and reporting on the implementation of peace and security policies in the region, including:
  – Monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the 2000 Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and its attendant 2004 Nairobi Protocol
  – Building capacities of nascent national focal points on the SALW instruments and state obligations. Such focal points may include South Sudan and Somalia, among others
  – Revival of advocacy efforts to ratify the Mifugo Protocol or harmonise it with other relevant peace and security instruments, whichever is more strategic
  – Developing position papers on international, continental and regional policy developments, such as the African Union’s Niamey Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation and the Arms Trade Treaty
  – Exploratory studies on the peace and security benefits (or peace dividends) accruing from the implementation of COMESA’s, EAC’s and IGAD’s policies on informal cross-border trade.
Notes

1 A strict interpretation of East Africa would only include East African Community member states – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The Horn of Africa conventionally consists of Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, although it is conveniently regarded as including all IGAD member states – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The African Great Lakes region comprises Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.


3 Ibid, 48.


6 Based on the Center for Systemic Peace’s (CSP’s) state fragility index.

7 The data analysed ran from 1 January 2015 to 31 July 2019.


14 The main datasets were two – ACLED and Afrabarometer, but there was sourcing of some data from other secondary literature, such as the World Bank Group’s poverty assessment in Uganda.

15 For purposes of this paper the sub-region covers the totality of EAC membership, with acknowledgement of systemic influences of the wider Horn and Great Lakes conflict systems on the East African sub-system.


17 Key informant interview in Kigali on 7 July 2019.


30 Key informant interview in Nairobi on 15 July 2019.


35 Key informant interview in Kampala on 10 July 2019.

36 For instance, he’s led protests against a newly introduced social media tax as well as against removal of presidential age caps, which allows President Museveni to rule for life.

37 The late president Pierre Nkurunziza passed on in June 2020 and was succeeded by President Évariste Ndayishimiye.


41 Key informant interview with South Sudanese respondent on 13 July 2019.


43 Key informant interview in Kigali on 7 July 2019.

44 Key informant interview in Kigali on 6 July 2019.

45 Key informant interview in Nairobi on 13 July 2019.


48 Key informant interview in Kampala on 8 July 2019.


While Somaliland unilaterally declared independence and pursues recognition of its sovereignty, Puntland asserts its semi-autonomy, but hopes to be part of a legitimate Somalia federal government. Puntland sees itself as the mother of federalism in Somalia but currently self-administers.

Puntland’s statistics are shown here separately from Somalia’s, on account of its semi-autonomy, meaning the country manages its own security.

Key informant interview in Kampala on 9 July 2019.


Key informant interview in Kigali on 4 July 2019.

Key informant interview in Kigali on 6 July 2019.

Key informant interviews in Kampala, Kigali, and Nairobi.


Based on remarks of an AU official at the Crowne Plaza Hotel, on 9 October 2019.

Ibid.


Member states include Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.


Article 11(3) of The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.


Key informant interview in Arusha on 21 October 2019.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Member states are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan.

See the Preamble and Articles 6A and 7 of the Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).


Ibid.

Based on interviews in Kampala and Nairobi 7–18 July 2019.

Ibid.

82 Key informant interview in Kampala on 8 July 2019.

83 They include Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

84 Key informant interview in Kampala on 10 July 2019.

85 Key informant interview in Kampala on 9 July 2019.

86 Key informant interview in Kigali on 4 July 2019.

87 Key informant interview in Kigali on 5 July 2019.

88 Key informant interview in Nairobi on 15 July 2019.

89 Key informant interview in Nairobi on 16 July 2019.

90 Key informant interview in Kampala on 10 July 2019.


93 Phone interview with South Sudanese respondent.


96 Key informant interview in Kampala on 10 July 2019.

97 See https://gppac.net/who-we-are, accessed 30 August 2019.

98 Group discussion in Kampala on 8 July 2019.

99 Ibid.


101 See http://peace-tree.net/who-we-are/.
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About this monograph
The Institute for Security Studies commissioned a scoping study on the state of peace
and security in East Africa as part of the process of deepening its engagement with the
sub-region. This monograph analyses peace and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa
and Great Lakes conflict systems. It also maps intergovernmental, state and non-state
interventions and actors in East Africa. The monograph concludes that the region remains
fragile despite progress in governance and development in some of the countries and offers
recommendations for further improvement.

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